

**Orren Beaty, Jr., Oral History Interview – JFK #8, 12/12/1969**  
Administrative Information

**Creator:** Orren Beaty, Jr.  
**Interviewer:** William W. Moss  
**Date of Interview:** December 12, 1969  
**Place of Interview:** Washington, D.C.  
**Length:** 23 pages

**Biographical Note**

Beaty was administrative assistant to Congressman Stewart L. Udall during the late 1950s and assistant to Secretary of Interior Udall from 1961 to 1967. In this interview, he discusses national parks and seashores, American Indian affairs and policies during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, among other issues.

**Access**

Open.

**Usage Restrictions**

According to the deed of gift signed July 23, 1979, copyright of these materials has been assigned to the United States Government.

**Copyright**

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be “used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research.” If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excesses of “fair use,” that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law. The copyright law extends its protection to unpublished works from the moment of creation in a tangible form. Direct your questions concerning copyright to the reference staff.

**Transcript of Oral History Interview**

These electronic documents were created from transcripts available in the research room of the John F. Kennedy Library. The transcripts were scanned using optical character recognition and the resulting text files were proofread against the original transcripts. Some formatting changes were made. Page numbers are noted where they would have occurred at the bottoms of the pages of the original transcripts. If researchers have any concerns about accuracy, they are encouraged to visit the Library and consult the transcripts and the interview recordings.

**Suggested Citation**

Orren Beaty, Jr., recorded interview by William W. Moss, December 12, 1969, (page number), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.

JUL 22 1970

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

Gift of Personal Statement

of Orren Beaty


JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY


I, Orren Beaty of Washington, D. C., do hereby give to the John F. Kennedy Library, for use and administration therein, all my rights, title and interest, except as hereinafter provided, to the tape recording and the transcript of the interviews conducted at Washington, D. C. on October 10, 1969, October 24, 1969, October 31, 1969, November 7, 1969, November 14, 1969, November 21, 1969, December 5, 1969, December 12, 1969, December 19, 1969, January 9, 1970, January 16, 1970, February 13, 1970, February 20, 1970 and February 27, 1970 for the John F. Kennedy Library.

I hereby donate all literary rights in the transcript of the aforesaid interview to the John F. Kennedy Library.

The tape and transcript may be opened to researchers at the discretion of the Director of the John F. Kennedy Library; his decision to be based on such considerations as potential embarrassment to living persons or their immediate successors, the interests of national security, or potential prejudice to the friendly relations between the United States and foreign nations.

This agreement may be revised by mutual consent of the parties undersigned.

  
Orren Beaty  
July 4, 1979  
Month Day Year

  
Archivist of the United States  
July 23, 1979  
Month Day Year

Orren Beaty, Jr. – JFK#8

Table of Contents

<u>Page</u>	<u>Topic</u>
171	Proposed Great Basin National Park
172	Concessions businesses in National Parks
175	Rainbow Bridge and Glen Canyon Dam
178	Assateague Island National Seashore
179	Outdoor Recreation Bureau
181	User fees for recreational areas
183, 185	U.S. Trust Territories (Guam, Samoa, and the Virgin Islands)
184	Executive order putting a P.T. 109 crewmember into the Park Service
187	American Indian affairs
192	Terminating the trusteeship of Indian reservations
193	Kinzua Dam in northern Pennsylvania

Eighth of Fourteen Oral History Interviews

with

Orren Beaty, Jr.

December 12, 1969  
Washington, D. C.

By William W. Moss

For the John F. Kennedy Library

MOSS: Okay. Let's see, last time we were talking about parks, mostly, and I'm trying to recall if there were any particular parklands or park acquisitions that were important that we had not covered. We got through the Oregon Dunes and Indiana Dunes business, Canyonlands, the Prairie land business, the different seashores, and we were talking about the resignation of Connie Wirth [Conrad L. Wirth]. I wonder if there's anything else in the parks area that is worth covering. What about the concessions problem that you faced when you first came in?

BEATY: Well, this went on....

MOSS: Did you ever get over that?

BEATY: Yeah, this went on the whole time that John Kennedy [John F. Kennedy] was president and continued into the next administration. Also, there was the--I think it started during this period, I'm sure it did--the proposed Great Basin National Park in Nevada, which would take in some rather high mountains in northeast central Nevada. Senator Bible [Alan Bible] was strongly for it. Most of it was public land, forest land and BLM [Bureau of Land Management] land. It would provide a wide range of topography, from desert up to alpine-type vegetation and climate.

[-171-]

Congressman--what's his name [Walter S. Baring, Jr.]; the man who's been in the House the whole time that Udall [Stewart L. Udall] was Secretary of Interior--was opposed to it because he just flatly represented the mining interests and the livestock interests. Livestock people didn't want to lock it up from grazing, and the mining companies didn't want to lock up the mining and mineral resources. We made some adjustments on the boundaries and delayed consideration of it to allow exploration of some potential--not potential, but some actual molybdenum deposits and something else which might prove commercially productive. Then some of it did look like it would be productive, and we drew the boundaries a little different to cut out part of that so that they could go ahead with their mining and still have a park. But we never managed to get approval of it. As I mentioned last time when talking about Indiana Dunes, when the congressman from that district's opposed it's very hard. There was no all-out support from the state administration or from the leading newspapers, and so it was kind of Senator Bible ready to push the bill through the Senate and the congressman ready to block it in the House, and it never moved. It's still sitting there, undesignated.

On the concessions thing the House Government Operations Committee, with Jack Brooks [Jack Bascom Brooks] of Texas being the principal protagonist, I guess--or antagonist--felt that the concessionaires were making unusually large profits, that they had kind of a cozy arrangement with the Park Service. Well, I think that's probably true. The Park Service were.... I don't mean the profit end of it, but the arrangement over the years. The Park Service people worked with these concessionaires, and they know each other well, and they understand each other's problems. I don't think it's like a private developer going out and developing a recreational area and then advertising for concessionaires to apply. There, you're starting out fresh with the concessionaires determined to make the best possible deal and the developer, on his side, trying to make the best possible deal for himself. I don't see anything particularly scurrilous about this arrangement, but Jack Brooks does and did. I'm sure he had some staff people on that committee who were needling him constantly about, "Look at this," and "Look at this."

There were some concessions that had caused lots of trouble that they could use as examples. I think Yellowstone was probably one of them, which was so overcrowded the concessionaire never can keep up with the demands and never can provide very good service. The Yosemite contract was one that was in some dispute, and the California congressmen and senators were involved in trying to get us to do something about that. The details of it, both of them, I couldn't enlighten you on. But one of the main problems was a combination of things: the growth of the number of visitors each year and the consequent demand for better

[-172-]

facilities from the concessionaires and better services and the concessionaires' unwillingness to add all of these extra facilities without getting their contracts extended to a full term, twenty years or twenty-five years, whatever it was.

MOSS: Who got involved in this at the departmental level?

BEATY: Well, John Carver [John A. Carver, Jr.] would've been the principal one.

MOSS: Who else?

BEATY: I'm sure the lawyers in the solicitor's department, perhaps the contract officers in the administrative area. Because of the interest that's continued, I'm sure, over the years at the departmental level in parks, not just Udall, before him.... It's just one of the more interesting, attractive areas to look at. You have meetings around the country, and it's nice to set them up at one of the park areas instead of in some downtown spot that looks like any other downtown. So everybody takes an interest in it, and I think that even though there may have been lawyers fooling with it or somebody in the administrative area looking at it, it gets down to the assistant secretary and the Secretary.

MOSS: Any sense that Udall was exasperated with continuing problem that....

BEATY: Oh, sure. I think it got to be a very frustrating thing. There's some feeling, I think--never heard him express it, but I got the feeling that Jack Brooks had some kind of a personal animosity toward Udall. It may or may not have been connected with Interior or the Park Service; I don't know what it was; it's a nice little puzzle because he was so absolutely unyielding on anything to do with this. Bob McConnell [Robert C. McConnell]....

Why don't we go back a minute. Jack Brooks is one of four or five Texas congressmen who usually vote a rather liberal line. And I would guess, during the six years Udall was in Congress, on controversial liberal versus conservative issues, they voted together on 90, 95 percent of the issues. They were logical allies, with Brooks representing a constituency that had a lot of labor in it, the Gulf Coast shipping and chemical--you know, the petro-chemical industry along the Gulf Coast. And yet, I don't know what happened. I think there was some real bad feelings there.

To go on a step, Bob McConnell, who was our congressional liaison officer, knew Jack Brooks very well. I think they probably played paddle ball together in the House gym. Bob kept trying to make peace and get them together on it--at least he said he did--but nothing ever came of it.

[-173-]

And Bob always talked in a rather cryptic way about Jack Brooks' feelings. And that wasn't something I wanted to dig into; there were too many other things to worry about. So I didn't. This may just be, you know, a way to try to rationalize why we had a problem we couldn't solve.

We got the bill passed, a bill passed, giving concessionaires what they felt they needed to expand. I know this happened after President Kennedy's death. The thing passed overwhelmingly with the chairman of the House Interior Committee [House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee], Mr. Aspinall [Wayne N. Aspinall], and the leading Republican,

Mr. Saylor [John P. Saylor] speaking for it, although Saylor may have tossed in some reservations. I forget the details on that. Jack Brooks fought it on the floor and got beaten. It's the kind of thing that would normally be approved by a voice vote or under suspension or something--you know, no kind of a debate or floor fight, but there was one that developed. And the pro-concession contract forces won by about two hundred and forty votes to eighty or something like that, a really overwhelming thing. And yet Jack Brooks wrote to the President and demanded certain things. And in signing the bill, the President required Interior to continue to consult with the House and not to put this thing into force until certain things happened. And again, this added to the frustration of the whole thing: something that should be relatively simple, taking so much time and leaving something unsettled hanging over your head. But the end of this thing all happened after President Kennedy's death.

Something had happened in the Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] period--I think I may have alluded to this last time--in the Death Valley area where a former head of the Park Service was involved representing a mining company, Borax [U. S. Borax and Chemical Corporation], There was some argument about--I know we didn't get into this phase of it, but I mentioned that this is something that I thought we ought to talk about. There's only a certain amount of water available in Death Valley, and this company had part of the water.

Congressman John Moss [John E. Moss] of California is on that House Government Operations Committee, and he had been active, as you know, in the freedom of information efforts. He had a staff member named Sam Archibald [Samuel J. Archibald] who worked on that particular thing. And they were of the opinion that Wirth and the former head of the Park Service, whose name I still haven't been able to come up with....

MOSS:           The previous one before Wirth?

BEATY:          No, it was.... It may have been the preceding one, but I'm not sure about that.

MOSS:           I don't know. I can't think of it.

[-174-]

BEATY:          The man's still alive; he's still active; he's still taking an interest in parks. He participated, as I said, with us on this meeting when we were trying to calm the Advisory Board down after the Wirth retirement. A very constructive sort of person that I had never really met or gotten to know until that Grand Canyon trip, the Grand Canyon-Petrified Forest trip.

But Sam Archibald told me on two or three occasions, "We're going to help you get rid of Wirth." Well, we hadn't expressed any desire to get rid of him. You know, this was all news to me. Udall may have known about the Death Valley problem. He probably did because it's one of those things that got talked about in the House Interior Committee when they were considering concession contracts, things like that. But that committee persisted in feeling that there were things wrong in the Park Service administration of matters involving concessionaires and landholders, inholdings as well as land bordering the parks. And I think this may have been one of the things that related to the problem with.... The same group of



staffers was advising John Moss, on the one hand, and Brooks on the other. But again, there's very little solid information I can add to this.

MOSS: I have one note here I found that.... I don't know, you may know something about this since Udall was involved. It has to do with the FDR [Franklin Delano Roosevelt] Library up at Hyde Park or the FDR home library. And the story that I've got is that Jimmy Roosevelt [James Roosevelt] sold some of the land to a local merchant and that Abba Schwartz then went to Carver and Udall and others to talk about this, you know, this having gone out of the property, and that the government finally bought the land back.

BEATY: I remember something about this, but I can't add anything to it. Udall had some talks with Jimmy Roosevelt about it. I wasn't a participant in the meetings. My recollection is totally vague except that I had the impression that, whatever it was, Jimmy Roosevelt hoped that we would be able to keep this all part of the package. I don't know what....

MOSS: Okay. I'll check this out with Carver and see if he has anything on it. One or two other areas I've got notes on here. There's the problem of the preservation of Rainbow Bridge out there in--what is it, behind Flaming Gorge?

BEATY: No.

MOSS: Or was it--what's the other dam?

BEATY: Glen Canyon Dam.

[-175-]

MOSS: Glen Canyon. Yeah. Right. My western geography is not good.

BEATY: Well, the Colorado River extends through several states, and this one reclamation project provided for dams from Glen Canyon on upstream along the main stream and two tributaries. So it's easy to figure out why you wouldn't know.

MOSS: Yeah. Now, there was a problem. You never quite got around to the preservation features, the levees or what was it that was to be built around the area? Why was this?

BEATY: Well, when this whole project was authorized, was being authorized, the conservationists kicked up a big fuss about the Echo Park dam site, which would have backed some water into the Dinosaur National Monument-- Dinosaur National Park? I forget if it's a monument or a park [Dinosaur National Monument]--in either Utah or Colorado. It's right along the border. I forget where this would

be located. Flaming Gorge became the substitute dam for that dam when the advocates of the project decided it'd be easier to get the whole thing approved by dropping that Echo Park fight, getting out of that fight, and going on to something else.

Part of the compromise effort, I think, was language written into the bill to protect Rainbow Bridge, which is a hundred and sixty acre national monument bordering, I think, on the Colorado River, surrounded on the other three sides by Navajo Indian reservations. It was taken out of the Navajo reservation. If the reservoir behind Glen Canyon were at the highest level that they planned for, it would back some water through a gorge under Rainbow Bridge. There wouldn't be any water against the footings where the arch comes over, but down.... It sets about like this and drops down perhaps thirty or forty feet into this normally dry gully or arroyo. In the spring when the snow on Navajo Mountain, which is nearby, is melting, or in the summer when there are thunderstorms, there'd be water running down through that. But it never runs full; it's just a low intermittent stream. The conservationists felt that any water around there would change the character of it, would be a violation of park principles to allow this intrusion of water into this park or monument. They went beyond that and raised the specter of having it collapse, destroyed because of the water. The Geological Survey made some studies and said there was no danger of that.

But this was something that Udall was greeted with when he came into office. Glen Canyon was under construction. It had been started while he was in Congress, while Seaton [Frederick A. Seaton] was secretary, and it was reaching the point of being completed--or it was reaching the point, I think, where they were going to have to close gates on the tunnels that had been bypassing the water, the river, while they did the initial construction

[ -176- ]

work on the dam until they got the dam up to a certain height so they could proceed with it, with water against the base. This built up during the first year or two he was there, to get him to do something about it, and finally, it came to the point of actually closing the gates of the dam and let it start filling. They, even though all the decisions had been made two or three times, deluged him with telegrams--the Sierra Club and National Parks Association, whatever it is, all these people. Nobody was willing to give up on it. They wanted to stop it.

Well, someday they may fill that dam. It has never filled. There's never been any water go up that gorge to the park, to the Rainbow Bridge area. The forecast was that only 7 percent of the time would water ever be up there. None of that 7 percent has arrived yet. The fact is, of course, if it did get that high, the water would change the coloration of the rocks, and it would make a change.

The big problem was that Congress had approved a bill with language in it protecting the Rainbow Bridge, and the same Congress, the same chairmen who approved that, would never approve money to build the protective works. And what they proposed was a dam between Rainbow Bridge and the river so that when the reservoir got to its height, this would keep water from coming up stream. But of course, to do that, you've got to--by building a dam to keep the water out, you're going to build a dam to keep water in when it rained and when the snow melted, and so you better build another dam upstream to keep the water out, and this would change the nature of the thing. Then you've got to have pipelines or some

kind of conveyance channel to get the water out from the upper dam before it overflowed and started down through the other stream bed.

This is a very remote area. There are no roads, absolutely no roads for miles. Contractors building it would have to, of necessity, tear up an awful lot of unmarred scenery, mountainsides and hills and things to build a road to get the material to build the dams, and just the building of the dams would change it. So Udall was really more opposed to that, I think, than opposed to letting--he didn't want to destroy the bridge, either, Rainbow Bridge. But, you know, if the Congress won't appropriate some money, you can't do anything about it. We continued to ask Congress to appropriate the money I think, probably for two budgets after we went there, maybe three. I forget the exact timing on it, but the Congress never did. I think Rainbow Bridge looks better than it would if they had these dams around it, but it's still.... Conservationists regard this as a breach of faith and violation of all the principles that parks are based on.

[-177-]

MOSS: Okay. How about Cape Hatteras [Cape Hatteras National Seashore, North Carolina] and Assateague [Assateague National Seashore, Maryland]? Hatteras came during the Kennedy administration, didn't it?

BEATY: No, no. Cape Hatteras had been built.... No, Cape Hatteras had been approved long before.

MOSS: Had it?

BEATY: Yes.

MOSS: Well, it was my impression that it was not finalized or something until....

BEATY: No, it was in existence. I don't know when it was put in the park system, but it was there.

MOSS: Okay. How about Assateague? That did come after.

BEATY: Yes, yes. Assateague was described as, you know, the seashore or unmarred island area, barrier reef-type thing, barrier island, providing possible recreation benefits, nearest this big population center of Baltimore and Washington. And it was undeveloped. Ocean City and all this stuff to the north was certainly developed and overdeveloped and becoming even more so.

A private developer named Leon Ackerman had bought part of the island. I think the lower part had been obtained by the Fish and Wildlife Service a good many years ago and was incorporated into a wildlife reservation or reserve, where fish in the sea, water fowl--however they designated it. The upper end of it was a Maryland state park. There was no bridge across to it, so there was no access, but Maryland had agreed to build a bridge or was in the process of agreeing to build a bridge.

The middle part, that had been obtained by Ackerman, had been sold off in small lots to people who wanted summer seaside cottages. So here was a group of two thousand to five thousand property owners, most of whom wanted to keep their land and have a place to build these summer things, opposed to Udall and the park people who wanted to preserve this for use by everybody. They felt there was no adequate water facilities and certainly, with the water level just underneath the surface, practically, no way to handle sewage and other waste disposal problems. We tried to keep the Maryland state government from appropriating money for the bridge and authorizing it, and did for awhile, but they finally went ahead with it. It was a hotly contested issue, but we finally got it approved and got enough money to start an acquisition, over the, I'm sure, still bitter feelings of a lot of medium-income people who feel they've been done out of summer homes, which I'm sure would've increased in value over the years just like everything else down there.

[-178-]

Getting Assateague, I think, helped break the dam against this sort of thing. I think Fire Island was authorized after Assateague--I may be wrong. But it seems to me that getting Assateague opened it up for a lot of others, including one of the lake shore things in Michigan. The state of North Carolina, I think, practically gave all the land for the Cape Lookout [Cape Lookout National Seashore, North Carolina], which extends south down the coast from Cape Hatteras. This happened after the Kennedy administration ended, though.

MOSS: Okay. I think parks takes us pretty easily into the outdoor recreation business, too. Let me ask, first, what was the reaction in the department when the report of the Outdoor Recreation Resources [Review] Commission came out? What was it?--30 January, '62, I believe.

BEATY: Yeah. Well, Udall had been in the House Interior Committee when this Outdoor Recreation Resources Commission was authorized--was set up. The members of that committee--and the House and Senate committees--served on this. It was, I think, one-third--maybe it was one-fourth--House members and one-fourth Senate members, and the other half being private citizens. Laurance Rockefeller [Laurance S. Rockefeller] headed it. Connie Wirth had been representing the department in these discussions.

There'd been periodic reports to the committee. Udall was not unaware of what was coming. In fact, there were meetings off and on during our first year there. By the time the formal report was printed and actually presented to the President or to Congress or probably to both, we knew what was going to be in it. And Udall and Carver, and I'm sure Jim Carr [James K. Carr] as well, were all working on this to prepare our reaction and to prepare information for the President's use in commenting on it.

There was very little disagreement at department level with its findings; in fact, I think it probably was warmly welcomed. In the Park Service, on the other hand, there was a lot of resistance to it. What it was going to do is take away a lot of their functions. And, the commission apparently felt, and enough members of Congress agreed that the Park Service had not foreseen and adequately planned to cope with the increasing demands on our outdoor

recreational facilities: that to get it done properly, there's going to have to be an entirely new bureau, agency, set up to do it. Also, they recognized that additional money was necessary to acquire the land and help the states acquire land to meet the same needs but in areas that didn't come up to national standards for national park systems. Certainly the recommendations for being in a different bureau was resisted by the Park Service. I think this is probably one of the reasons for the increasingly difficult relationships between Wirth and Carver and Udall, whoever else had to deal with him on it.

[-179-]

MOSS: Okay. Now, how was it decided to go ahead with a departmental action on creating the bureau rather than with legislation?

BEATY: Well, there seemed to be some reluctance to move fast, and it could be done by.... You know, you get a bill introduced, and it takes a while to get it through Congress--you have to have hearings--and the timing, by the time we got down to this, was such that--I'm kind of guessing, I think, here, more than giving any facts. But my feeling was that there was a concern we wouldn't get action until the following year. It could be created by executive order, and it was, in order to show fairly prompt responsiveness to the recommendation of the commission. We knew that eventually we'd want to get Congressional sanction for this, and certainly we would have to get appropriations for it. We'd have to get some kind of a fund set up to finance the acquisitions and the aid to the states and local communities in getting their land acquisitions. But this is one step that can be taken right off and was.

MOSS: Whose idea was it; do you know?

BEATY: I think it was probably Udall's, although John Carver may have recommended it to him.

MOSS: How was it cleared through the White House?

BEATY: Direct discussions. I think, probably, Stewart talked to Lee White, [Lee C. White], who was handling a lot of these things in those days, and very likely went over it with him. But in the end, I'm sure there were discussions or conversations between Udall and the President.

MOSS: How did you come up with Ed Crafts [Edward C. Crafts] for the job of director?

BEATY: We wanted somebody that wouldn't make this look like just an Interior show, that it was something that stretched across the government. The Forest Service had to be involved. There'd been this decades long rivalry, as we talked about, between Agriculture and Interior, particularly between Forest Service and Park Service because a lot of parks have been created out of Forest Service land. Forest Service feels their

recreation program is good and that they could handle it without letting it be taken away from them and turned over to Interior.

Ed Crafts was a veteran of the Forest Service. He had good contacts on the Hill. We'd gotten to know him as one of the few, at that time, low-level bureaucrats that we got to know when I was up there with Udall in the House of Representatives. Two come to mind: Ed Crafts and Rex Lee [Hyrum Rex Lee]. Rex had been up on Indian matters and we'd gotten to

[-180-]

know him. And here was a guy about two levels below the bureau chief, and they're just not the type you do get to know. Well, we did get to know Ed Crafts on Forest Service matters. He was no stranger. We were impressed by his approach to things. I think, probably, Senator Anderson [Clinton P. Anderson] and Wayne Aspinall both were advocates of this choice. Larry Stevens [Laurence N. Stevens] had been the executive secretary or the principal working member of the Recreation Review Commission, and I think he was always under some consideration and wound up in the number two spot. I think, probably, John Saylor was an advocate of his.

It was to try to heal the breach between Interior and the Forest Service. It was to try to get a man that understood recreation. Forest Service had a good recreation program going in developing park campsites along streams and in the forests and the kind of stuff that Interior left to--the Park Service hadn't done, really. A lot of different factors there.

MOSS: Speaking of the problems between Agriculture and Interior--I forget whether it was the spring of '62 or the spring of '63. In *Harper's Magazine* Julius Duscha had an article in which he talked about the bureaucratic infighting and how it was a waste and this kind of thing. And one of the things that he mentioned was with reference to the Outdoor Recreation Bureau; and he talked about the Forest Service showing Udall a plan that they had for utilizing their facilities in a recreation manner. And Duscha said in the article that Udall asked them to keep it under wraps until they had a chance to do a really comprehensive thing, but suddenly, you all found that the report was all over town. Do you recall this?

BEATY: I remember the article. I haven't reread it for a long time. Julius covered Interior, and I'm sure he covered Agriculture, too, for the *Washington Post* for awhile. He always struck us as being a very facile reporter, pick up things fast. He didn't bother with the in-depth background, the strong reasons why some things had to be done. He tossed off opinions that sometimes were right, but weren't always. I don't remember this incident.

I know from talking to people in the Forest Service since I left Interior that they always regarded Udall as a boomer, a guy who'd grab their ideas and run with them before they could get anything done. They resented this. It's quite possible that they lobbied for their own plans. I know of occasions when they did. In this particular thing, I don't remember. At that point, Udall and Freeman [Orville L. Freeman] were still working very hard to try to keep peace in the two families, and I think probably both of them dismissed the article without getting seriously concerned or involved in refuting it or attempting to refute it.

MOSS: You got into a real hassle later on with the question of user fees. This gets involved with the land and water conservation part, too, and user fees for the recreation areas. Do you have anything particular on that?

[-181-]

BEATY: Well, we were trying, as I mentioned a few minutes ago, we were trying to find ways to finance the land and water conservation fund. Everybody is in sympathy--I think even people who are working there--with the idea of free use of the parks and recreation areas by the American public as taxpayers who finance the acquisition and development. But with budgets increasingly tight and demands growing all the time, the feeling was that if we didn't find some other sources of income to acquire lands and to develop them, that we'd reach a point where we couldn't get any more, that there'd just be--we'd come to a dead end. And some parks already had entrance fees and admission fees. Some of them were limited to paying for Yellowstone [Yellowstone National Park, Wyoming]. So the precedent was there. So the question really boiled down to where are you going to apply fees, are you going to apply them generally?

The Forest Service, I think, was a little reluctant to start charging more than just what they had charged for cost of garbage disposal and things like this around some of their campsites. The Corps of Engineers was adamant against any fees on use of recreation areas behind Corps reservoirs and on long rivers in the Southwest or elsewhere. But this really centered in Oklahoma, the opposition there.

MOSS: Yeah, didn't the engineers in their '36 or '38 act for reclamation work have some kind of agreement that recreational use of the waters would be free?

BEATY: Yeah, that's what they based their argument on.

MOSS: If not explicit, at least implicit.

BEATY: Then there's the question of when they had built these things and turned over the recreation area to the states to administer. Would this apply? Oh, if I remember the compromise, we agreed that where the states administered it, there'd be no charge. It'd be up to the states. If they wanted to charge fees, fine; if not, then there wouldn't be any. But where the federal government still controlled, there would be fees. And you could get this one overall, annual fee, golden eagle passport, and get this sticker for your windshield or card to put in your pocket which would admit you and anybody in your car to any park or recreation area under federal control. And this was finally worked out and approved, and yet the corps always resisted it. They didn't move to implement it very fast. They fought against it and finally knocked it out a couple of years ago. Last year? It may have been 1968. Ed Edmondson [Edmond A. Edmondson] in the House and Fred Harris [Fred R. Harris] in the Senate carried the ball in opposing it, working very closely with the Corps of Engineers, and they lobbied like hell against it--I mean in support of the repeal. It is just a question of who makes the rules and

regulations and the policy, the executive branch or some bureau that has built up very close ties with Congress. And of course, the Corps of Engineers and the Forest Service are two of the best for building up their own individual relationships on the Hill.

The fees were approved. They have produced increasing amounts of money, but still, far below what was anticipated. And to create the fund, the Land and Water Conservation Fund, they also got the gasoline tax on boats, fuel boats, which I think can be reclaimed if the boat owners apply for a refund, but most of them don't. So our fund builds up here, and we got this transferred into the land and water conservation fund. And also--and this is where the biggest source of it came from--from the sale of excess property. The, more recently, long after the Kennedy administration ended--and I'm sure this is subject to some additional fighting--we got some of the revenues from off-shore minerals put into this fund to bring it up to two hundred million dollars a year. Senators from the states bordering the ocean, particularly the Gulf of Mexico, opposed this because they looked to all this land, even beyond the three-mile limit, as providing revenue to the states, if they can ever get the law passed that way. So they resist trying to get it put into some--earmarked for some other use. And nevertheless it was done.

MOSS: Okay. Let's shift to the question of territories, which was also under John Carver's purview.

BEATY: Let me check something else, first, out here.

MOSS: Surely, surely. [Interruption] Okay. Now, territories John Carver. We've talked a little about the people who were manning the positions, so I'll talk about the issues. Let's take the question of the Guam and Virgin Islands home rule issue first. How did this break on you? What did you find in the way of issue when you arrived in the department? Where were the pressures coming from?

BEATY: I'm pretty blank on the home rule thing in both of these, about how soon we were hit with it and....

MOSS: Okay. Well, let's shift to another thing, then. How about the dissolution of VICORP [Virgin Islands Corporation] in the Virgin Islands. What was wrong with this Virgin Islands Corporation? Everybody said it was a lousy thing, but what was wrong with it?

BEATY: Oh, I don't know. I suppose it was a place where you could pay political debts by putting people on it. And you couldn't do too much without somebody else's approval, and so--I'm just kind of theorizing. I think there were some potential built-in conflicts of interest because people who got involved in.... This is natural.



It's a beautiful place; you want to live there or spend some time there; and then you look around for business opportunities to make it possible to be involved. There were lots of people.... I interviewed people who wanted to serve on that board. There were guys who claimed to have helped Vice-President Johnson [Lyndon Baines Johnson] in Texas or somebody who helped President Kennedy in Massachusetts. And I don't think anybody I interviewed ever got on the board. I'm rather confident that this is the case. But it was really something that attracted a lot of attention from people who didn't necessarily have the good of the Islands at heart, in my view. But the corporation itself, I don't know if.... You know, it was organized; it's been in existence a long time before we took over; it wasn't something I ever got into, except to assemble papers for Udall when he's going to a meeting. And, usually, John Carver was handling this, and the Secretary trusted him, so Udall's own staff didn't ever dig into it very deeply, as far as I know. Certainly I didn't.

MOSS: Speaking of old political debts and that sort of thing, just by accident in the presidential executive orders, President Kennedy put out an executive order getting Maurice Kowal into the Park Service without competition, getting him a position....

BEATY: He's one of the PT....

MOSS: He was one of the PT cronies. That's right. Do you recall the circumstances?

BEATY: Oh, sure. I think he was one of the guys who hadn't done too well after leaving military service, and we tried to find a place in the Park Service as a gardener, a relatively low-level job, really; but there was just absolutely no way he could--if I remember this right--that he could be qualified under civil service. Lack of education or physical condition or something, total lack of experience. Whatever it was, he just didn't come in under any of the qualifications that were necessary. And it reached the point where the Park Service was quite willing to take him if they could find some way to pay him without bumping into civil service rules, and so this executive order resulted.

MOSS: What did you do with him? Where did you put him?

BEATY: I don't remember. I think this thing started with a call to me from Ted Reardon [Timothy J. Reardon, Jr.], who's usually the one who called on things like that--either Ted or Dick Maguire [Richard V. Maguire]. Nobody resisted, but it was hard to work out.

MOSS: No resistance from Wirth and the Park Service?

BEATY: Well, if there was, it never came to the fore. They acted like they were willing to do it. It's not like you're taking some outsider and putting him in charge of one of the regions

in Park Service or something like that; it's just to find a job for somebody. And I'm sure, over the years, they've found jobs for people that were not otherwise qualified except for the interest from higher up.

MOSS: Okay. What about United Nations pressure for reports on United States-owned territories--not the trust territories which was a different matter, but places like Guam, Samoa, and the Virgin Islands, that were regarded as integral parts of U.S. territory, but are not states?

BEATY: Yeah. I don't recall any....

MOSS: You don't recall any relations with the State Department over this?

BEATY: No.

MOSS: Okay.

BEATY: The State Department usually was represented when we were preparing for meetings on a trust territory, I remember, but I don't remember beyond that.

MOSS: Okay. What sort of meetings did you have on the trust territories?

BEATY: Well, it was usually preparation for visits out there by the United Nation's survey team. Principally, that's all I remember of it to talk about. There's usually somebody in the White House who is following this. Mike Forrestal, [Michael V. Forrestal], I know at one time did, and Charles Johnson. And these were people that John Carver talked to, as well as whoever was doing this in the State Department.

MOSS: Okay. How much of a push was there to get something really going in the trust territories, to make a show, because they were lagging behind, really?

BEATY: Well, from the outside there's very little push. I think we got good support out of the White House. Johnson and Forrestal, at different times, were eager to see something productive. Everybody realized that the United States hadn't taken the proper steps to restore the economy to what it was before the war, before the actual hostilities destroyed so much of their facilities, and we ought to not just to get it back to that level, but go way beyond that to bring them up, their standard of living and their educational and economic opportunities, to something comparable to anyplace else. But, you know, there's no built-in lobby group

supporting them. We recognized that things needed to be done, and our job was to persuade Congress to appropriate enough money to do it, and they never did and never have.

MOSS: Why?

BEATY: I don't know. It's way out there, and it isn't permanently United States property. I suppose there is still, partly, the old feeling that this is a--whatever value it is, it was from a defense standpoint. Defense didn't have to explain this to Congress; they just got what money they needed and built bases. I think it probably.... The needs had never been examined very carefully when Defense had it, and Interior had a hard time persuading anybody that there were some real obligations. You know, "It's true everybody wants to live in the south sea islands. What else did these guys want?" [Laughter]

MOSS: Okay. I think we covered earlier, when we were talking about Rex Lee, the whole business of Samoan development. Is there anything else we ought to add there? You mentioned his educational TV experiment that went well on that island. The moves towards self-government, the tribal councils and so forth, what developed here?

BEATY: Things that I think I know are not coming to me this morning. One of the things that I do remember about it is the effort to develop business enterprises that would not just bring in some outside firm, but that would let the Samoans themselves be investors and entrepreneurs and middle-level officials. The new hotel-motel complex there is one of the examples of that. We had periodic dealings with fishing companies that are based there to try to get them to bring the Samoans into their local operations more--not just as laborers, not just as fishermen or cannery workers or whatever the situation was. And this applied in the trust territories as well. They have a state legislature--that isn't what they call it. I forget whatever it is.

MOSS: It's tied up with old tribal representation.

BEATY: That's right. That's right. And we provided--I'm not sure if we initiated this; it undoubtedly had gone before--but we provided a lawyer or two to help advise them on developing laws that fitted their own needs and encouraged them to do their own thinking on it. But I can't think of anything specific. I remember this and....

MOSS: Okay. This ties in nicely, then, with the next topic I have on the outline, and that's the Indian Bureau problem of the

[-186-]

American Indian. You said that there wasn't much political power behind doing something for Micronesia. I wonder what's politically practical about Indians? What makes.... There are a couple of places where people have said that both President Kennedy

and Robert Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy] had a real interest in the Indians. Now, why should two such vote-getters really care about the Indians?

BEATY: Well, you know, I think it's a matter of how much heart you have, among other things. It's rather obvious that the Indians had been given a bad deal by the non-Indians who settled the country and chased them out of their lands and installed them in rather remote and unattractive areas. In our part of the country, I think, the Indians lived where they wanted to. The reservations were set up where the Indians already were, and they weren't just herded onto them, like the Indians that we chased out of the Southeast and Georgia and Florida and moved up in Oklahoma and things like that. So I don't think that we're subject to all the indictments. But at the time that John Kennedy was running for president, there were hundreds of thousands of Indians living on reservations in inadequate housing, very primitive sanitary facilities, inadequate job opportunities, and, in spite of all the money that'd been spent--and a lot had been spent building new schools--inadequate education. It was a rather apparent wrong that needed righting. But more than the feeling, the sentiment for doing what was right, a lot of church groups are interested in Indians, and I think the Indians have a constituency outside their immediate states. They've got more support in New York City or Chicago than they do in Albuquerque or Phoenix. And so I think there was good political mileage in it as well as just the desire to do something good for them.

MOSS: Do you know of any direct communication of this feeling on the part of either the President or Robert Kennedy to you or Udall or anybody in the department?

BEATY: I couldn't pinpoint a specific thing, but I know that Udall talked about Indians with the President and with the president's staff on several occasions. There were eloquent spokesmen for the Indians who were listened to, who could get to the papers or in direct contact with the President or his advisors. Will Rogers, Jr. [William R. Rogers, Jr.], headed one organization known as Arrow,[Inc.] I don't know what the letters mean or whether it's just a name that seems applicable. A man at the University of Chicago named Sol Tax, had conducted some studies and seminars on Indian matters, and he was bombarding the administration with his ideas.

MOSS: How much clout does the American Association of Indians--or the Association for American Indian Affairs, Oliver Lafarge's outfit,--have?

[-187-]

BEATY: Well, you know, he was a well-known guy. I don't think it has too much, really. There are people on it who can get an audience with a president or a secretary of interior fairly easily, so they can get their views across. But as for lining up votes when it would come to a showdown, if there were such a thing, I'm not sure that they'd have an awful lot of power. The National Congress of American Indians, NCAI, has a larger membership, and it represents more tribes than the American....

MOSS: Association for American Indian Affairs.

BEATY: AAIA. But both of them, you know, they're kind of complementary. One of them has more non-Indians involved, and the other one has more Indians involved. I don't think we ever had the resentment against what we were trying to do that Secretary Hickel's [Walter J. Hickel] having right now. I don't know why, exactly, unless they've become more militant over the years. Indians were pretty docile. I think it's true that they don't want integration in the sense of, you know, Negroes in the South or in the big cities feeling that they need to be totally accepted residentially, schools, and jobs.

MOSS: They had tribal prerogatives that they want to preserve.

BEATY: That's right. They want to preserve their culture, and they want to preserve their; well, their prerogatives, particularly the wardship status that protects them from state taxation and, for all I know, federal taxation as well, from imposition of state law and order in...

MOSS: Misdemeanors at least.

BEATY: That's right. And this is one of the reasons I said that they have more support in Chicago and New York than they do out in the bigger towns immediately adjacent to the reservations. There are dozens of merchants who will stand up and cite instances where they sold a car or a refrigerator or...

MOSS: We're running out of tape. Excuse me.

BEATY: Okay.

[BEGIN SIDE II, TAPE I]

MOSS: All right, we were talking about the Indians.

BEATY: Well, I was starting to say that in the towns around the Indian reservations, because of the fact that law and order on the reservations is a matter of tribal concern, mostly,

[-188-]

you can find all sorts of merchants who complain that they've sold cars or pickups or appliances on time and are unable to collect. When the payments stop, they are unable to collect or to repossess. Or people who are driving a car on a highway that runs through a reservation and are hit by a pickup truck driven by a drunken Indian, in the classic phrase, are unable to collect any damages. The Indian wasn't insured; they can't get him off the

reservation to do anything about it; and if they did, he doesn't have anything. So there's all kind of local resentments against Indians: that they get all kinds of money spent for them; they get free schools without paying taxes, and they get free medical care without paying taxes; and that this old business about Indians being downtrodden and picked on is not true. Well, Indians have a long way to go to be brought up to non-Indian standards out that way. So these people are wrong, I think, but the feeling exists just the same. So there were a lot of problems.

MOSS: Okay, so you have two contrasting opinions: you have the local opinion that disparages the Indian and resents him; you have the do-gooder, American Friends Service Committee type who really wants to do something right for Indians; and the Interior Department sits in the middle. How do you reconcile all this?

BEATY: Well, you know, Congress as a group is more humane than an individual congressman who has some local people telling him to quit giving these Indians everything. So with a good program, the bureau can get some help from Congress to do things that need to be done. It's hard to get enough. It's hard to get enough out of the administration. Most of the problems that I'm thinking about occurred after President Kennedy's death.

But when we came into office, the Eisenhower administration was claiming that they had finally built classrooms for every Indian student. There had always been a shortage of classrooms, and they had spent a lot of money building new classrooms. But they hadn't quite succeeded, and we continued to appropriate new sums or to ask Congress to appropriate new sums to build additional classrooms. And we build and built lots of new schools. The Indian birthrate increased. Maybe we caught up; I'm not sure. But then we reached the point of adequately staffing all of the new schools. And this Indian Bureau, I guess, is the biggest single bureau as far as our operating expenses goes. The Bureau of Reclamation spends a lot more money because of the construction and that sort of thing, but Indian Bureau with all its education costs, plus the Public Health Service costs for medicine, which is outside Interior's immediate control, is a big user of the federal tax dollar.

MOSS: How about an overlap with HEW [Health, Education and Welfare] on Indian education? How did this work?

[-189-]

BEATY: There were various times when there was talk about turning all this over to HEW. There were some that were within the department for doing this. I'm sure not within the Indian Bureau, but I think probably John Carver and Stewart Udall both would have been willing to shift it over there if it could be done. It couldn't be because after President Johnson took over and there was this pressure to have some reorganizations and to consolidate and to make things more efficient, Udall and John Gardner [John W. Gardner] and people on the White House met upon this--the Budget Bureau particularly.... I think it was put this way: that if Gardner could persuade the Indian tribes, Indian leaders, that this was a good move, the President would send an executive order

to the Hill and through the reorganization process, actually make the transfer. Gardner's first appearance before one of the organized Indian groups--I forget which one it was--failed to produce any results, and he just absolutely couldn't do it. They turned down the offer to make the change. They weren't ready to do it; they couldn't handle it for whatever reason.

Well, you know, I don't think, in his heart, Stewart Udall wanted to get rid of it. He's fond of Indian country. He wants to do things for the Indians. He didn't like the idea of giving it up. But as part of the overall thing, if this would improve the situation and they could get more money that way, fine. The House appropriation subcommittees that handled HEW matters over the years that Udall was in Congress and in the Interior Department kind of forced money on the agency. The [National] Institutes of Health are an example--how much money they got beyond what anybody would request for them or hope to get. And on the other hand, Interior had a rather tight-fisted appropriations subcommittee in the House that kept cutting back, or at least holding down on the new requests.

MOSS: NIH [National Institutes of Health] had Fogarty [John E. Fogarty] and Lister Hill.

BEATY: That's right.

MOSS: You didn't have a congressman.

BEATY: We didn't have anybody like that. That's right, yeah. We had Senator Hayden [Carl T. Hayden] in the Senate, an old Arizonan, who was chairman of the committee, both the subcommittee and the full committee, and he would've helped, but we couldn't get large amounts through Mike Kirwan [Michael J. Kirwan] and his staff people, particularly Gene Wilhelm [Eugene B. Wilhelm]. We just couldn't do it.

MOSS: Even after you've wined and dined Kirwan? [Laughter]

BEATY: That's right. Even after we'd applauded him as a great conservationist, the greatest conservationist.

[ -190- ]

MOSS: That's a good story. Why don't you put that in here, Interior's "lobbying" of Mike Kirwan.

BEATY: Well, Jim Carr knew Mike and had known him when Jim worked for the House Interior Committee. Jim had worked in the Bureau of Reclamation for the Interior Committee. He knew Clair Engle, and I'm sure this was the reason. He knew how much power Mike had, and everybody knew how much Mike like to be praised for his progressive, forward-looking efforts on behalf of natural resources and all the things Interior had to do with. So a great, big testimonial dinner was organized for Mike Kirwan in the cafeteria of the Interior Department, and we got congressmen and senators and outside organizations--all the conservation organizations, I suppose, were represented--and

really a fine affair, and said a lot of nice things about Mike in his presence. One of the legends is that at one point, after about ten minutes of talking about some other things or listening to people talk about some other things, Mike leaned over to somebody and said, "Why doesn't somebody say something about me?" [Laughter] But we, were shooting for our first billion-dollar budget. And he got up and thanked everybody for their help and so forth, but he said, "You're still not going to get above a billion." [Laughter]

MOSS: This is sort of skating kind of close to the law, departments lobbying Congress, isn't it?

BEATY: I suppose it is. Nobody was pushing him on any particular thing at that time. It was just....

MOSS: This is a fine point, lobbying for...

BEATY: That's right.

MOSS: ...a particular issue or particular appropriation.

BEATY: And it wasn't the department; it was a committee organized--you know. I don't know. I don't remember. It was a Jim Carr project that Udall went along with, I think, more than a Udall project. But everybody recognized the value of getting Mike on our side.

But Senator Hayden grew up in a period in Arizona just a few years after the Indian wars. You know, he's ninety years old, ninety-one or something, so you can see how far back he goes. He was born in Tempe, just outside Phoenix--or if not born there, he was brought up there by his parents when he was a week old or something. I think he was born there, probably was. I'm positive; I remember now. We've heard him talk about Indians as "Hostiles." Not calling them that now, but this is the term. They were the "hostiles" when he was a boy growing up. Savages. And I don't think he would've been too sympathetic with our efforts to get additional money for Indians if it had meant some special effort on his behalf to force other people to

[-191-]

go along with him, even though he had, you know, all the power that an Appropriations Committee chairman has to tell his colleagues, "Okay, I'm giving you this, this, and this. Now, I need an extra million and a half dollars for teachers' salaries, over what the administration has agreed to go for." The administration, the Budget Bureau balancing these things, would hold us down below what we thought was necessary to meet Indian education needs, and you can't, theoretically, lobby against what your administration tell you to do. But even if we had done it, I don't think Hayden would have given us that kind of support.

MOSS: Okay, in terms of general policy, you made a very definite move away from the old Seaton termination idea. It had become rather moribund, really, in the



Eisenhower years; it hadn't been working. And you were moving towards bringing industry and indigenous commerce into the reservations. How did this effort go?

BEATY: First of all, I think we--I don't think we were fully informed on where the pressures lay on termination when we came into office. We were opposed to the idea; we weren't opposed to gradually bringing Indians to a point of accepting the need for being part of the community as far as law and order is concerned, as far as, "If you can get your schools into public school districts, do it, because it's going to mean that they get better education; they grow up coping with all the forces they have to cope with as adults." But we were against the idea of just, as a tribe became fairly self-sufficient, throwing them out to the mercies of the local economy and the local law officials and so forth.

We had seen rather bad examples in the Menominee tribe in Wisconsin and the--whatever the Oregon tribe was [Klanath Tribe]--the two major ones that had been terminated during the Eisenhower administration. I keep thinking I should know.... Well, I can't think of the name of the Indians in Oregon. But both of them had extensive timber resources; and the Indians sold this off; and a lot of it was cut too fast, particularly in Wisconsin; and they lost a lot of their income from orderly cutting and milling of the timber. And they were coming back for additional help from Congress and the administration.

So we were against that sort of thing, and, actually, we were talking against it. Secretary Udall had a luncheon one day, in the secretary's dining room at Interior, with people from the Democratic side, I think, entirely, the Senate Interior Committee. Senator Anderson, I think was there, Senator Church [Frank Church], Senator Metcalf [Lee Metcalf], Jackson [Henry M. Jackson], no doubt. I just don't remember the guest list. It would be interesting to go back and dig that out because it represented the real power in the House

[-192-]

and Senate Interior Committees. We were talking about Indian policy; this was the whole reason for the meeting. At that point, I think Senator Church was the subcommittee chairman. This subcommittee chairmanship moved around a lot; nobody kept it very long. And the discussions against termination suddenly brought up a lot of resentment from the Senators, and it seemed to me that they had pushed the Eisenhower administration into this as much as the Eisenhower administration initiated the termination policy. It was very clear that they favored it.

MOSS: For what reasons?

BEATY: Well, they've got a staff man named Jim Gamble [James H. Gamble], who is from Albuquerque and came back with Senator Anderson, and Jim had stayed there as other people had come and gone. I don't know how many subcommittee chairman there've been since he's been on that job--there's been a lot. And he knows it better than any of them do, and he kind of runs it. And he's got a very different approach to Indian matters. He's got the local approach, really, that Indians will always use the federal government as a crutch to protect them from actually participating in public life as

everybody else does in the states where Indian reservations are located. And he doesn't think you can do anything. He thinks the Indian Bureau can't make any real gains and, therefore, there should probably be less federal effort and gradually just throw them out. You know, make the government help so inadequate--I'm putting.... These are just my words; these aren't his--I'm just guessing, but I think there's validity to it. You make the government help so scarce and the requirements so unattractive, that they want to be terminated; they want to get out on their own.

MOSS: Okay. Let me move to one more thing since time's running short. The Indian business is not complete without some discussion of the Kinzua Dam [Allegheny River Reservoir, Pennsylvania] controversy. Do you recall how that came to your attention?

BEATY: Well, I remember it from what happened when Udall was in the House. And I think he opposed the construction of the dam.

MOSS: It was the Corps of Engineers.

BEATY: That's right. It was a corps project which would flood out the Kinzua villages and farm lands and stuff along the river in southern New York and...

MOSS: And northern Pennsylvania.

[-193-]

BEATY: ...northern Pennsylvania. It's right along the border, I know. I think beyond the actual authorization of the project, he tried to do something while he was still in the House to stall the operation. I know at one point he and the small and losing group of Democrats and Republicans tried to do something--I've forgotten the details, whether it was eliminate this from the appropriations bill, or whatever it was--some step to reverse the original decision to build a dam. It was a corps project; it wasn't our responsibility. He took steps or had people under him take steps to get additional help for the reconstruction when it became impossible to--obviously, it was impossible to stop construction.

MOSS: There was a meeting at the White House that Lee White chaired, I believe. Did you attend that meeting?

BEATY: No, I didn't.

MOSS: You didn't. Know anything about it?

BEATY: Well, I know what our position was, generally, but I really.... I'd probably just confuse the record here if I tried to talk about it without knowing more than I do.

MOSS: Okay, let's break off there. We'll pick up Public Lands and Water and Power next time.

BEATY: Okay.

[END OF INTERVIEW #8]

[-194-]

Orren Beaty, Jr. Oral History Transcript – JFK #8  
Name Index

**A**

Ackerman, Leon, 177  
Anderson, Clinton P., 181, 192, 193  
Archibald, Samuel J., 174, 175  
Aspinall, Wayne N., 174, 181

**B**

Baring, Walter S., Jr., 172  
Bible, Alan, 171, 172  
Brooks, Jack Bascom, 172, 173, 174, 175

**C**

Carr, James K., 179, 191  
Carver, John A., Jr., 173, 175, 179, 180, 183, 184,  
185, 190  
Church, Frank, 192, 193  
Crafts, Edward C., 180, 181

**D**

Duscha, Julius, 181

**E**

Edmondson, Edmond A., 182  
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 174, 189, 192, 193  
Engle, Clair, 191

**F**

Fogarty, John Edward, 190  
Forrestal, Michael V., 185  
Freeman, Orville L., 181

**G**

Gamble, James H., 193  
Gardner, John W., 190

**H**

Harris, Fred A., 182  
Hayden, Carl T., 190, 191, 192  
Healey, Denis W.,  
Hickel, Walter J., 188  
Hill, Lister, 190

**J**

Jackson, Henry M., 192  
Johnson, Charles, 185  
Johnson, Lyndon Baines, 184, 190

**K**

Kennedy, John F., 171, 174, 178, 179, 180, 183,  
184, 187, 189  
Kennedy, Robert F., 187  
Kirwan, Michael J., 190, 191  
Kowal, Maurice L., 184

**L**

La Farge, Oliver, 187  
Lee, Hyrum Rex, 180, 186

**M**

Maguire, Richard V., 184  
McConnell, Robert C., 173, 174  
Metcalf, Lee, 192  
Moss, John E., 174, 175

**R**

Reardon, Timothy J., Jr., 184  
Rockefeller, Laurance S., 179  
Rogers, William R., Jr., 187  
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 175  
Roosevelt, James, 175

**S**

Saylor, John P., 174, 181  
Schwartz, Abba P., 175  
Seaton, Frederick A., 176, 192  
Stevens, Laurence N., 181

**T**

Tax, Sol, 187

**U**

Udall, Stewart L., 172, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178,

179, 180, 181, 184, 187, 190, 192, 193

Wilhelm, Eugene B., 190

Wirth, Conrad L., 171, 174, 175, 179, 184

## W

White, Lee C., 180, 194