

Franklin Wallick Oral History Interview –JFK #1, 2/23/1966
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Biographical Note

Wallick, Franklin; Editor, Wisconsin CIO News; Wisconsin political figure. Wallick discusses his role in Hubert H. Humphrey's presidential campaign in Wisconsin, as well as John F. Kennedy's political presence and own presidential campaign in Wisconsin. Wallick also discusses how issues such as the media, labor, and religion factored into this presidential campaign, among other issues.

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Franklin Wallick

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Oral History Interview

with

FRANKLIN WALLICK

February 23, 1966
Washington, D.C.

By Charles T. Morrissey

For the John F. Kennedy Library

MORRISSEY: Where shall we start?

WALLICK: Well, the first recollection I have of Jack Kennedy [John F. Kennedy] was back in 1951. The year I was married I was living in Washington for about three months waiting to go overseas. I was trying to kill time so I used to go up to the Hill and sit in on congressional committee hearings. Jack Kennedy was just a young congressman at that time. I just happened

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to duck into a Labor Committee hearing where he was appearing as a witness in support of a bill he had sponsored, setting up a labor extension program similar to the rural extension programs that the farmers had. And I must say that at the time I was somewhat appalled at how green and unsure of himself he was. Of course, later he became much more adept at handling himself in public, but this was very soon after he was elected a member of Congress, and he was very green and very uneasy at some of the questions that were being asked of him by members of the Committee. This was just sort of a fleeting impression I had at that time.

The next encounter I had with the Kennedy family of any kind was reading a *Saturday Evening Post* article -- I

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don't remember the year -- but I remember sort of saying to myself, "Gee this family really has something." This was in Wisconsin at the time, but it was long before Jack Kennedy was even mentioned as a presidential candidate. Somebody said, "It sounds awfully clannish to me." And they sort of dismissed it with that. But I must say that the touch football, the Harvard influence impressed me at that time. I was sort of taken by this family at that point.

Then the next encounter with the Kennedy family, or with Jack Kennedy actually, was when Senator Kennedy came to Wisconsin to speak at the Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner. At that time I was the editor of the *Wisconsin CIO News*, which was a weekly labor paper which was fairly widely read among Democrats because

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we sent it gratis to a lot of Democrats and it was an influential paper among Democrats. We used to report in depth on Democratic happenings. I was very impressed by Kennedy because he handled himself very well. In fact there was almost no comparison between this Kennedy and the Kennedy I had seen as a young congressman when he first arrived in Washington. I wrote a very glowing account of this young Franklin D. Roosevelt from the East. And, of course, people were already asking the question: "Could a Catholic ever be elected president?" And in this article I said, "He's more influenced by Harvard than he is by the Catholic Church."

I sent a copy of this to Senator Kennedy, this article, and got a letter back sort of noncommittal, sort of

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laughing about the whole thing, saying that you really find things out about yourself when you go out on the hustings like this. In the letter I said that I'd be very happy to support him if he ever decided to run for President. And I think as a result of that letter I was put on a list of people in Wisconsin who were considered pro-Kennedy. And of course later on I always suspected that somebody like Jerry Bruno or Pat Lucey [Patrick J. Lucey] would spring this letter on me and accuse me of welching on a commitment. Though I don't think they would have.

But the fact of the matter was I was very strongly impressed by the Senator when he came out to speak at our Democratic dinner and wrote a very favorable article about him and wrote a letter to his office,

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to him personally, saying that I would be very happy to support him, although at that time it was strictly a guess as to whether he would enter the Wisconsin primary, whether he was really interested. I suppose in the inner circle it had been decided that he would do all these things, but I don't think anybody in Wisconsin at that point had any strong idea that he would.

Then the next time I saw the Senator was when he came in to campaign for Bill Proxmire [William Proxmire] in the special election in 1957 after Joe McCarthy [Joseph R. McCarthy] died. I was still editor of the *CIO News*, and I was working with people who'd been sent in by the Senate campaign committee, and they had asked me, as they would ask others, "Do you think Senator Kennedy would do any good

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in Wisconsin?" I said, "I think he would be a real asset. I think what we need in this campaign is.... Well, for one thing we need somebody who can sort of rally the Polish Catholics. And I think that he would be very good at that. I think also he's just a very attractive personality in Democratic politics. If he came in to campaign for Bill Proxmire in a special election, I think it would arouse interest in the campaign; it would help Bill Proxmire."

So, it was arranged that he would come in. I helped set up some of the places that he would go. He went to Kosciuszko's statue on the South Side. We had a luncheon. He was interviewed on television. In fact I was picked as one of the persons to ask him questions -- at a station on the North Side of Milwaukee,

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I've forgotten which on it was; it was a CBS station. Just before the camera started to roll, I was talking to him about the Kohler strike because at this point there was a lot of speculation about a hearing in the McClellan Committee involving the Kohler strike. The Teamsters had had a long investigation, and there were a lot of people saying, "By God, wait till we get onto the UAW [United Auto Workers], and we'll really explode things." And, of course, the Senator had taken the attitude that the UAW was a clean organization and had nothing to fear. And this was the UAW's attitude. I was telling the Senator as we were chatting before the program on the air that I hoped that he would be able to bring the president of the Kohler Company before his committee and ask him a few questions because he

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was a very strange man and he would burst out and say all kinds of things if he was put on the stand. And the Senator just sort of chuckled a little bit and said, "I'll have to remember that when it happens."

In fact it was actually Senator Kennedy who brought up the Kohler strike as we were talking because I think *Newsweek* had run a story a few weeks before this saying that the Kennedy brothers were keeping the UAW from appearing before the McClellan Committee.

And I think this was sort of a front-page story. It was the lead story in *Newsweek*. And he was a little bit irritated by this. I told him about the Kohler Company president, I said, "If you ever get him on the stand, he will say a lot of strange things." At

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that point, he sort of chuckled.

Then I went out to the airport. On this trip I had planned to go along with him to Green Bay. Ted Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen] was accompanying the Senator, and I had planned to go along with him through Green Bay, but I guess they ran out of space. I remember chatting with Ted Sorensen out at Timmerman Field, an airport on the north side of Milwaukee where private planes flew. They chartered a plane to go up to Green Bay to make a meeting. And I remember talking to Ted Sorensen; he said, "Do you think we really ought to be going up there?" And I said, "Boy, if you ever want to run for president, that part of the country's going to be crucial."

I must say that Sorensen seemed to be at this point to be genuinely indefinite

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as to whether the Senator would actually get involved in a primary or even run for president. I think this was after the '56 election. So they must have decided to make a drive for the presidency, but they were certainly at that point uncertain about entering the Wisconsin primary. And later on I heard that Ted Sorensen was against getting involved in the Wisconsin primary for reasons I never understood. But I do remember telling him that Green Bay and that whole area around Green Bay served by television and newspapers in that area would be extremely important in a presidential primary if Kennedy decided to run.

Well, then, of course Bill Proxmire got elected. I think Senator Kennedy's presence in Wisconsin was extremely helpful in chalking up a really big margin. I

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think the next thing that's important in my involvement in this story is the visit I made to Washington sometime after this. I don't remember exactly when I had reason to come to Washington. I was still editor of the *Wisconsin CIO News*, and I had lunch with a friend of mine, Charles Stoddard, who at that point was working for the Resources of the Future, which is a Ford Foundation financed conservation bureau. He'd been pretty close to Senator Humphrey [Hubert H. Humphrey]. He and I had lunch, and we were talking about the political fates for Democrats. I told him I thought Kennedy was a pretty strong person in this whole business of picking a president. And he said, "Well, you know, you shouldn't count Humphrey out. Max Kampelman tells me that Hubert is really going for this." I don't

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remember whether he put it exactly that way, but I certainly got the impression from talking to Chuck Stoddard that Kampelman had let him know that Humphrey was going to be a factor in the next presidential primaries, the selection of the next president for the Democrats.

Now, I'm going to back up just a little bit. Just stop that a second, will you?

MORRISSEY: Yes. [Tape recorder turned off -- resumes]

WALLICK: Now, somewhere in here, there was a State Democratic convention. I think this was after the Stoddard business. Yes, I'm sure it was. So this is following in sequence. There was a State Democratic convention, and this was right after Proxmire had been elected. Proxmire was nominally supporting Humphrey at that point. Humphrey, of course, had

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been instrumental in getting Proxmire on the Agriculture Committee and did a few other things for him. And Humphrey was all set to be a speaker at the convention. As I recall, it was in La Crosse, Wisconsin. But it was one of those times when the Senate was meeting on Friday, and it was impossible for Humphrey to make it. I think Jerry Bruno was then working for Proxmire. Jerry Bruno had a Humphrey demonstration set up. The roles get a little bit reversed in some of these things. Jerry had a little demonstration all prepared as part of Proxmire's nudging of Humphrey, and we had a little powwow with Herb Waters, representing Humphrey. And I was asked by Chuck Stoddard to pull together a few people that I felt would be key people with any possible interest in Humphrey and of some

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importance in the party. Pat Lucey showed up at this with sort of an Irish twinkle in his eye, as much as to say -- at least, it seemed that way as I thought about it later on -- that "I'm very happy to sit in on your discussions because I'm finding out things about the Humphrey organization I wouldn't otherwise know." Pat did sit through this. Of course, we were not aware of it at the time, but we used to sort of laugh about it later on when we realized that he had been sitting in on some of the discussion involving a possible Humphrey organization in Wisconsin. This was done down in a hotel room in La Crosse, involving not more than about seven or eight people. I don't even remember who was there except Herb Waters, Stoddard, I think Sam Rizzo, who was the UAW guy later active, of course, in the Humphrey campaign.

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The next thing that took place was a visit by Jim Loeb [James I. Loeb], who had been asked by somebody to come out to Wisconsin and poke around and find out what kind of organized support for Humphrey he could stimulate. He met with me. I'd known Jim in Americans for Democratic Action in years past, and we had been good friends. I was the one person in Milwaukee that he knew, and I was enthusiastic. I got together a group of people,

mostly labor people -- some people who were strictly party people and some people, of course, who were both party people and labor people -- and we had a luncheon and discussed the possibility of Humphrey as a candidate for president in the primary and the Convention. And that really was sort of the beginning of any kind of a formal organization. Jim Loeb's first

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visit to Wisconsin. And again I don't remember when that was at all.

Then Jim either came back or at that time we planned a trip that Humphrey would take through the state. By this time I was working for the state AFL-CIO, was no longer with the CIO. We had merged. The newspaper had been discontinued. So I was on the state AFL-CIO payroll. My job was to set up congressional district political action groups. One of the things that we were doing was having dinners to raise money for various congressional candidates.

One of the ways I blended these things together was to schedule Senator Humphrey to speak at a sixth congressional district dinner in Fond du Lac, which was billed as a fund raising thing for Jim Megellas [James Megellas] who had been the

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candidate and was going to be the candidate again. (Gee, these dates are awfully hazy.) I'm pretty sure this was the first swing that we made through the state.

It actually started out in Eau Claire. Lester Johnson had arranged a breakfast in Eau Claire with some of his key people. And this, of course, was vital to what was then the ninth congressional district. We had an afternoon -- not an afternoon, it was sort of a noon rally in a little town near Eau Claire that was arranged by some of the REA [Rural Electrification Administration] people. And this proved to be a real fizzle. It was very poorly organized. It just shows you how crowds mean nothing. They're good for the moment, but of course ultimately we carried the ninth and we

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lost the sixth. But organization was so essential in these things. I remember that there's a story of a sharp *Washington Post* correspondent....

MORRISSEY: Kilpatrick [Carroll Kilpatrick]?

WALLICK: No. Not him.

MORRISSEY: Albright [Robert C. Albright]?

WALLICK: Oh, Eddie Folliard [Edward T. Folliard] was along. He wrote his Sunday story after this noon rally which was attended by fifty people.

Of course, this was the story that got into the *Washington Post*, and people back here thought that Humphrey wasn't doing very well. On the basis of the breakfast meeting and the noon REA meeting, he wasn't doing very well. But then we flew across the state to Fond du Lac, and we had a sellout

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crowd. Of course we somewhat papered the hall with free tickets, as was ordinarily done in these things. We were trying to pack the hall. But we had a tremendous turnout of people -- probably the biggest political dinner they had had in that district up to that time. Since then they've been able to do well, but this was when the Democratic party was still in the ascendancy. And this was, of course, a very conservative part of the state. Humphrey was the speaker, and of course he did very well.

Then that night he drove to Milwaukee with George Haberman, who was the president of the AFL-CIO. He was a very conservative building trades guy, but very pro-Humphrey -- I think mainly because he didn't like what Kennedy was doing on the McClellan Committee. In other words, he was pro-Humphrey for the wrong reasons, in my

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estimation anyway. But at any rate Humphrey did a real selling job on himself with Haberman. He convinced Haberman that he should go all out. Of course, it made my job easier because I was on Haberman's payroll, and it gave me a certain amount of freedom to spend my spare time working for Humphrey. That morning I arranged a series of telephone calls over the state to key Democratic people where Humphrey would just call these people up and say hello and make them feel good.

One of the things we tried to do was to call people who had been Kefauver [Estes Kefauver] supporters because Kefauver had had a pretty effective organization in the state, and we were trying to win over all these people. So we'd call all kinds of people. I remember at one point

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Humphrey called Casey Kendzierski [Casimir Kendzierski] was a state senator on the south side who had been very active in the Kefauver campaign but had had sort of a falling out and was a little bit bitter about Kefauver. Humphrey said blithely, "Estes asked me to call you up and say hello." And I kept nudging him and saying, "Don't say it." But he said it anyway. He must have made about twenty or thirty telephone calls all over the state to key Democratic people and people who were active in the Kefauver campaign. Then that night he....

I think he had a television program that afternoon, which went off very well. And of course we were getting good press coverage in the state -- good television and press coverage in the state all during his trip. I think it was pretty well organized. Then we went to Kenosha for a

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big dinner honoring either George Molinaro -- yes. it must have been George Molinaro -- who was the state representative and later became the speaker of the Wisconsin Assembly. Kenosha's a big Democratic town, well organized, and for these things they get a big turnout. And, of course, Humphrey was in really the fine fettle and did very well.

Then Jim Loeb asked me if there was anybody that I knew of who could sort of keep some kind of an organization functioning on a full-time basis that evening. And I said, "Yes, there is a person." Sara Moore who had been picked as Miss Young Democrat the year before. She was at the meeting, and we talked her into taking the job. And she ultimately set up some kind of an office, sort of a letterhead organization. We had lots of photographs taken of people shaking hands with Humphrey. This was really

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sort of the beginning.

I think Kennedy had had a very successful trip through the state prior to this. I think this was a pretty good operation altogether. It had achieved its purpose of getting Humphrey back on the Wisconsin scene, and there was a lot of comment about him as a possible presidential candidate. And altogether it was a pretty successful operation. Of course, from the standpoint of Humphrey, the unfortunate thing was that this was about the last big barnstorming trip that he took through the state. I'm trying to remember the date on this thing. It was early in '59 when this happened. And there was almost no more of this for the rest of the year because he was very busy in the Senate and spent very little time getting out in the state.

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Humphrey had always had the idea that people in Wisconsin knew him, and myself and a few other people tried to convince Senator Humphrey and the people around him, such as Herb Waters and others who asked our advice -- we tried to tell them that he was not well known in the eastern part of the state. He was well known in the western part of the state because the Minneapolis newspapers, the Minnesota papers, slop over into western Wisconsin. It's almost like a part of Minnesota as far as politics is concerned. But in the eastern part of Wisconsin he just didn't have any kind of a following that would compare with this. And the only way he could make up for this sort of thing was to spend more time in that part of the state.

I think there was only about one more

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trip that was made, and I was involved in setting that one up. Tom Hughes and Karl Rolvaag came down from Minneapolis to help plan that. Before they had come down, some of us had set up a schedule which apparently had just horrified Senator Humphrey because it involved

early morning handshaking bits at the plant gates, which was sort of a Wisconsin tradition established by Kefauver and Proxmire. And it was much too tight a schedule. So Tom Hughes and Karl Rolvaag had come down to sort of loosen up the schedule so that he could get around without quite so much sweat. I'm trying to think how that one started.

That trip started, I think -- as I recall, the first stop was Eau Claire, which was the third congressional district. We had a luncheon meeting in one of the

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service clubs, and then Humphrey was very insistent that we do more than just speak at places. He wanted to go to places that would identify himself with the things that he was interested in. So I dreamed up this idea of taking a side trip down to a little city near Eau Claire where one of the first soil conservation districts had been established in the early days of the New Deal. There was a big monument there, and there had been a very successful CCC [Civilian Conservation Corps] camp there which would give him a chance to talk about the youth conservation corps which he was very much interested in. I can remember Pat Lucey, who came along as the state chairman -- by this time, of course, we all suspected he was pretty deeply involved in the Kennedy campaign, but we invited him to come along as long as he

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didn't overhear everything we said. He took me aside and said, "Well, just how many people do you think you're going to see going down there and coming back?" And I told Pat, "Well, it isn't how many people we're going to see. We want people to know that Humphrey is identified with programs, and soil conservation, the youth conservation corps idea are the sort of things that he stands for." So, it was somewhat of a detour, but we had brought along a *Milwaukee Journal* photographer to just provide a collection of good photographs of Humphrey in Wisconsin.

He took a lot of excellent pictures during this trip which were used later on by the *Milwaukee Journal* in their Sunday supplement. And this was sort of a bonus that we got without realizing it at the time. We brought this guy along

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mainly just to take pictures, but his pictures turned out to be so good, and by this time there was so much speculation about a presidential primary, that the *Journal* picture editor who put out this supplement decided that he would use these photographs for a special story on how a man campaigns for the presidency, or how he gets around the state. And some of the pictures that were taken on this excursion paid off very handsomely.

Then from Eau Claire -- good grief, where did we go next? -- I think we went to Madison. No, we didn't go to Madison. We went to.... At the time I knew this very well, but I may be getting some of these trips mixed up. There were only two really big trips. The first one I described, and then this one. As I recall, we went to Manitowoc. No, we

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went to Wausau. No. That was much later. I just can't remember whether we went to.... Oh, I know. We started out at Beloit, that's right. We had a breakfast meeting in Beloit, then we went across the state to Eau Claire. I'm trying to think where we went next. And then we went to La Crosse, and we had a big dinner there for Lester Johnson that night. And this was in the ninth congressional district. This way we hit the first congressional district at Beloit. That's where it started. And then we went to the third district and then to the ninth district. Then that night....

George Tames from the *New York Times* was along. He had traveled with Kennedy a couple of weeks earlier. And Cab Phillips [Cabell Phillips] was along on that trip, and of course the two Minnesota political writers were along. Cab Phillips talked

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Humphrey into having a backgrounder, which was quite new for Wisconsin because the Wisconsin political reporters, particularly when they were traveling in a pack like this, didn't go much for backgrounders because they were afraid the other guy would scoop them. They didn't really have any good understanding among themselves. But, anyway, we went up to a bedroom in Sam Halpern's house after the dinner, and Humphrey talked very frankly and candidly about his chances in Wisconsin. Then on the basis of that, stories were written several days later. Ira Kapenstein was along for the *Milwaukee Journal*. In fact, I think I was rooming with Ira.

MORRISSEY: Can you reconstruct a little bit what was on Humphrey's mind during that background session?

WALLICK: I think most of it was pretty well written

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up in Kapenstein's story and also a story that Cab Phillips wrote. I can't think of anything he might have said that they didn't write. He spoke very frankly and candidly, not for quotation. This was the first time I had ever seen anything like this, and it did give these guys a chance to sort of write better stuff than if they were just sitting in a speech listening to him say something because they talked a little bit about tactics and strategy of what was then evolving into quite a major confrontation between a man from the East and a man from the Midwest.

Let's see now. What did we do the next morning? We must have taken off for.... I think that's when we went to -- yes, I know we did -- we went to Manitowoc; flew across the state again.

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Manitowoc was in the eighth congressional district, but we just made a quick airport stop there and talked to a few reporters. But we landed in Manitowoc because Sheboygan didn't have an airport. We drove down through Sheboygan County, stopping at a schoolhouse, and he talked to kids. He was really having a ball. He's the kind of guy that begins to get going as the day moves on. Then, of course, we were constantly getting behind schedule.

But the reason that I had been very insistent on trying to get to Sheboygan was that I knew that we'd get good coverage in the *Sheboygan Press*, which is a Democratic newspaper. I knew that the sixth district was going to be tough for Humphrey, but at that point we were very anxious to get press coverage. And we did get excellent coverage, not only by the reporter who

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just followed along to do a story on what Humphrey was saying and doing but also there was a special feature that was done on Mrs. Humphrey by the woman's.... So there were a lot of big stories included in the issue going to press, and of course he was giving radio interviews all along.

Then we went back to Manitowoc, and we flew to Madison. He made a major speech in Madison that night to a Democratic county organization in Dane County. Then we went out to Governor Nelson's [Gaylord Nelson] residence. There was a lot of talk, of course, that Governor Nelson was going to try to get Humphrey to not run in Wisconsin because he was very much afraid of a blood bath, or words to that effect, between Humphrey and Kennedy. Everybody said, "Well, the Governor hasn't had a chance to talk to him yet, but once he gets to Madison the Governor will talk

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to him." And I made arrangements for the chairman of the county, Liesl Tarkow [Elizabeth Tarkow], to come over that next morning and have a chat with Humphrey because she was very pro-Stevenson, and we were, of course, trying to get the Stevenson people on our side. This was a constant problem -- to try to break down this intense loyalty to Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson], that many Wisconsin Democrats had. She had a pleasant chat at the breakfast table in the Governor's mansion with Senator Humphrey, but I don't think she was terribly moved.

I might also point out that when Jim Loeb and I were making one of our trips around the state trying to line up various people, we had talked to Shirley Cherkasky in Appleton, who was the chairman of the Democratic organization up there. And we tried to convince her

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that she should support Humphrey instead of Stevenson, and without any luck. I think her classic comment was that "In looking at the candidates, Stevenson is way up here, and Humphrey and the rest of these people are way down here." This was sort of the typical

attitude of a lot of these Stevenson people in Wisconsin. It was characteristic of a lot of the people in Dane County, which was very strong Stevenson country.

Then the next day, or after the breakfast -- I think I'm getting a couple of trips mixed up here. I'm sorry. I'd make a very bad witness in a murder trial. We paid a visit to Jim Doyle [James E. Doyle] -- let's see, it was that visit and another visit. Jim Doyle, of course, later became the leader of the Stevenson forces nationally. We stopped in to see him, and Bronson La Follette

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was working there as a clerk in the firm. Of course, he later became the attorney general. Senator Humphrey had some nice things to say about his father. But again I don't think we made any real in-roads there. We stopped in to see -- again I think this was another trip. But there was another trip that was made specifically to Madison. Senator Humphrey was scheduled to speak at a steelworker's summer school in Madison's university. And I think it was during that trip that we saw Jim Doyle, and we also went in to see Bill Evjue [William T. Evjue].

There was a reception at the home of State Senator Fred Risser and lots of pictures were taken. This is sort of a custom for any aspiring Democrat to pay a pilgrimage state visit to Bill Evjue who is a very influential editor whose

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newspaper sort of carries on the LaFollette progressive tradition. Evjue had his photographer come in and take a picture, and this was printed on the front page. There was a big story in the Madison paper about Humphrey's visit to Madison.

Well, after that.... There were two trips to Madison. I've sort of got them combined here. But after this visit at the Governor's mansion, which came first, as I recall.... I forget exactly how that trip petered out. But it was a fairly successful trip in terms of press coverage and impact on the state. I think there were only three trips like this before the late winter of '59 and the early winter of '60 when the candidates really announced themselves and dug in for a real solid campaign. Our problem all through this period was

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convincing Humphrey that he should come out to Wisconsin, spend more time there, make more trips, line up more people.

Now during this time, of course, my job was to try and line up more people around the state. We set up an organization. I was the campaign coordinator. Gene McCarthy [Eugene J. McCarthy] came out at one point to help us set up a state committee. We set up officers. Sam Rizzo was picked as the state Humphrey chairman. By this time we had gotten commitments from what I think was an extremely good group of party people around the state. And I think it could have easily been said at that point that we had the party people on

our side in terms of organization. And this was my job: to get on the telephone and call people, commit them. And if you see any copies of the stationary that

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we put out, you'll see that we had a list of really solid Democratic Party people all over the state. Of course, we were all very much aware of the fact that we had to have strong organization in all ten congressional districts. We didn't make any trips to the tenth. We didn't make any trips during this time to Green Bay.

But one of these trips we landed in Wausau, which was the center of the seventh congressional district, and Humphrey spoke to a big rally which was a seventh district COPE [Committee on Political Education] rally similar to the one in Fond du Lac earlier. I can remember that very vividly because we had a terrible thunderstorm and we rode back in a chartered plane. I think we may have gone from Eau Claire to Wausau. But at any rate we had a good

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rally in Wausau. It was at a Catholic church, and Humphrey was in real form and was kidding the nuns from the platform. I think if they had taken a vote among the people in the audience that night between Jack Kennedy and Hubert Humphrey, even though it was in a Catholic church and even though there were a lot of Catholic in the audience, I think he would have gotten all the votes that night because he's very skillful at winning the people in a situation like that. Then we flew back to Milwaukee, and I think he had a television program the next day. I'm forgetting the sequence of some of these trips, but I think I've hit all of the cities pretty well.

Then, of course, the announcement was made in late December of '59 or early January of '60 -- within a matter of a

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couple of days of each other -- that they were going to run. And of course, then the weather intervened. We had a very severe snow that winter. We had from January to April to try to organize -- to mount -- a presidential primary campaign. And traveling around the state was extremely difficult. Traveling from my home on the near east side to the campaign headquarters downtown was extremely difficult because we had very severe weather; a lot of snow and very cold. We had this old house on Wisconsin Avenue that a friendly Democrat had turned over to us. It was going to be torn down later on for a hotel or a motel. It happened to be right next door to the bishop's residence. We had our headquarters in this building. For the next three or four months all the activity was out of

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this building. About this time I took a leave of absence from the AFL-CIO. I worked full time on it, the other volunteers working -- our chief job was to just keep the flow of Humphrey material moving.

One of the problems I had was convincing the people who were making the real basic decisions in the campaign that we shouldn't use billboards, that we should use car tops instead. Car tops were sort of a poor man's billboard, and they've been very characteristics of Wisconsin Democratic campaigns, but it wasn't until the very end that we sort of finally broke down and started using car tops. But Humphrey had the billboards set up all over the state, which sort of became a symbol of the campaign -- "Vote for a Midwest progressive. Vote for Hubert Humphrey." This had all been dreamed

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up in Washington, D.C., by a group of people involving Geri Joseph, Bob Barrie [Robert W. Barrie], Jim Rowe [James Rowe] and people like that who were trying to really second-guess the Wisconsin situation. I think there were enough semi-professional political people in Wisconsin who could have probably given them some better advice. But we were sort of stuck with this idea that they were going to use billboards.

My job at this point was to help in the preparation of materials. I dreamed up campaign literature and also took campaign literature that other people had prepared and had it printed. At this point I did practically no traveling around the state. I spent almost all my time working in the headquarters trying to service our Humphrey supporters around

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the state with the material. I personally think it was a bad mistake not to have car tops because it give a person a chance to identify himself personally with the candidate and also provides everything you could get in a billboard. But, anyway, we had the billboards. And much later on we had the car tops.

Another responsibility I had at this point was to pick the picture that was going to be on the billboard. This had been a real problem all during my involvement with Humphrey, to try to get a good photograph of Senator Humphrey. His attitude was, "I've got a thousand photographs." But the fact of the matter, was, they weren't the kind of dramatic pictures, photographs that make you want to identify yourself with him. They were always pictures that were taken of Humphrey while

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he was speaking or very formal and posey. And these were not the most effective. They were not the warm, human kind of photographs. The only pictures we really had were the ones that our photographer friend from the *Milwaukee Journal* had taken. And of course we used those as much as possible.

But Humphrey apparently somewhere along the line had raised hell with Henry Luce about all the publicity that Jack Kennedy was getting. And so Wally Bennett [Walter B.

Bennett], the *Time* photographer here in Washington, had taken a series of photographs that were used in drawing a *Time* cover. And we used one of those photographs. I was the guy who got permission from *Time* to use that photograph as a campaign photograph. This was the one where his head is sort of tilted

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with a big grin. They had a thousand of those things printed up after they saw the photograph. And then they got afraid here in Washington that *Time* wouldn't give them permission. But I managed to get permission through some people I know in Chicago. So we went ahead and started using this photograph. But this was very late. This was even after the billboards had been designed, so we didn't use them on the billboards.

But this is typical of the kind of.... Humphrey is very disdainful of PR types who try to build an artificial image. And this, of course, is one of his really endearing qualities, that he is very disdainful of Madison Avenue image-building. He had a feeling that if people were not for him because of what he was, then to hell with them. But,

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you know, when the stakes are high, you've got to sometimes sort of give in a little bit on some of these things. I think we did suffer from lack of really well planned, well thought out media and materials.

The thing that did impress me about Humphrey was that, as we were getting closer and closer to the date, we'd kept getting these memos with ideas that he had obviously dictated late at night and sent out. And these ideas were great. At one point, for instance, he said, "We're going to have a mailing to all the school people in the state." I got hold of some kind of a list and mailing materials. This was late in the day. It was one of those frantic things you do way at the end. And we got a special mailing out to school people on Humphrey's

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work in education. So he was constantly aware of the deficiencies in the campaign, and he was doing things. But I often had the feeling that if we had been able to do these things a week before or a month before, they would have had more impact. And of course the Kennedy campaign was really superb to watch from the other side. They knew all the skills of public relations and publicity. As a publicist myself, I was very envious of the extremely effective things that they were putting out and the things that they were putting out and the things that they were doing.

Of course, I must say that at this point I had some disenchantment with Senator Kennedy because he was not talking about issues, he was not talking about any substantive matters, he was selling himself as a personality. Of course, I'm sure that they were doing this deliberately

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because they had been taking polls. The polls apparently had shown certain things -- that people were attracted to him as a personality and not because of anything he stood for. And so, from their standpoint, they were perfectly justified in doing this. But as sort of an ideological Democrat, I was personally somewhat affronted by this. But I must say that their results were better than ours.

MORRISSEY: To what extent were you impeded by the lack of money?

WALLICK: Well, this was a constant problem. No question about it. And, you see, everything was done in spurts. You'd get a little bit of money, and you'd spend it on something. But in terms of having a budget that you'd start out with and planning a campaign as a total attack on the voter, we were never able to do this

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Everything was done in spurts, in starts. Whenever there was a little bit of money, you'd try to figure out how you could use it, instead of starting out with a budget and saying, "This is what we've got to do, " and then trying to hew to that budget, we just didn't do it.

It was a very impulsively run campaign, but some of the Minnesota people told me all Humphrey campaigns are that. And how was I to argue against success? But, as I said earlier, we just had to do a better job of getting this man known in the eastern part of the state because this is where the votes were. You see, we had the first, the fourth, and fifth, sixth and the eighth district all in the eastern part of the state. And for that matter the seventh, of course, was a very crucial district.

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He was not well known in the eastern part of the seventh district.

We hobbled along as best we could, and I must say that about a month before the primary date I privately felt in my own mind we had no possible way of winning. I'd managed to get nominated as a delegate for Humphrey from the fifth district. Of course, I was anxious to go to the Convention from the fifth district, and I felt the fifth district was one that we could get because it was not as predominantly Catholic as the south side of Milwaukee. It was a sort of German, socialist, Lutheran, more cosmopolitan part of Milwaukee. Henry Reuss was the congressman and was pretty typical of the district. And this was a district that we should have been able to take. But, I must say that privately

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I was very uneasy about our chances of ever taking the fifth.

Well, somewhere along the line here -- I think it was about six weeks before the election or maybe a month before the election -- I came up with what I thought was a pretty

ingenious idea of mailing out, a Minnesota technique but applying it to Milwaukee - a "his" and "her" voters' guide that would be sponsored by the Committee for Progressive Democrats. We got a very representative group of people on both sides of the mayoralty election, which was, of course, a very complicating factor for us because we were trying to appeal to the hard-core Democrats. And yet the hard-core Democrats were split right down the middle on the mayor's race in Milwaukee between

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Henry Maier and Henry Reuss.

I dreamed up this idea of having a "his" and "her" voters' guide to be mailed to the home of every registered voter in Milwaukee County. This was designed as a way to get support for Humphrey in Milwaukee because it was very evident to most people that we were not doing well in Milwaukee even though it was a big labor town and we should certainly do well there. And so I was told to work this thing up, and the Minnesota Democrats were going to do the addressing. So the thing was done in Minnesota, and I was given the job of going through the registered voters list and deciding which assembly districts -- this was going to be done on an assembly district basis -- which assembly districts, or no, it would be

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aldermanic districts because this was a spring election, which aldermanic districts we could use this. Because, you see, there were some aldermen who were not endorsed by labor, and these people were all going to be people who were Democrats endorsed by labor, and then we'd have the split thing for mayor. You could vote for either one.

This was a sort of a weird ploy, but at the time it was considered sort of a desperate gesture. And we went through with it. I took the train out to Minnesota with these voter lists, and the guy who met me up there was Norm Sherman [Norman Sherman] who is now Humphrey's press secretary -- active in the DFL [Democratic Farm-Labor party]. And the Minnesota Democrats addressed these things, they were mailed, and I don't think

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they did a bit of good. I really don't. [Laughter] I looked at the results afterwards. I know Jerry Bruno told me afterwards that they were real worried about this because apparently they had somebody in our headquarters who was tipping them off on what was happening.

MORRISSEY: Oh really.

WALLICK: And they knew about this, but they didn't know....

[END SIDE I TAPE I]

WALLICK: Pat Lucey told me long afterwards that, as he put it, Bruno had told

him that they had somebody in our headquarters who was getting our press releases before they were ever released. Of course, we always acted on the assumption that this was so, but it was a little bit unnerving to find out that it really was the truth. During the real campaign from January on

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Gene Foley [Eugene P. Foley], who had run for Congress and was very close to Humphrey, came in and sort of ran our headquarters because it was obvious that we were having difficulty in coming up with somebody that everybody could agree on. I was really considered part of the Lucy faction of the party and not terribly friendly to Henry Maier and some of his people, although we had many people from the Maier camp who were active Humphrey people. So this created some factional problems within the organization, and very wisely Gene Foley came in to sort of mediate and he ran the headquarters.

Of course, Jerry Heaney [Gerald Heaney], who at that time was the national committeeman from Minnesota, really sort of called the signals, made the basic moves in the campaign. He would come in on flying

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trips from Duluth to confer with Gene Foley and myself and others. They were very willing, at this point, to accept my advice on things. But everything was limited, of course, by time and money.

Another thing which was done at this time was to have Minnesota coordinators in each congressional district. People who were close to Humphrey would be assigned to Kenosha, Racine, Madison. Jim Loeb was assigned to Madison to sort of mastermind that area; Gene Foley was in our part; and we had people in Eau Claire and La Crosse. To a certain extent this was similar to what the Kennedy people were doing. They had people close to Kennedy who were established in these different parts of the state.

Our big problem was that we just weren't coming through, and this was

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increasingly evident to the people who were making the decisions. So at one point it was decided that we should put out a comparison of the farm record. This was done, and I think this was very effective in the farm areas. I think we had very effective material for the farm areas, and I think the results showed that. Humphrey did very well in the western part of the state and in most of the farm areas.

Another reason for having Gene Foley in Milwaukee was that he was Catholic, and we were trying our damndest to not get involved in a religious war. We picked as the chairman of our Milwaukee committee Marian Heaney whose brother was a priest and who was a Catholic herself. She was very loyal to Humphrey mainly because she was an active UAW member.

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The thing that happened was that we had two types of people who were really all out for Humphrey. There were the real hard-core ideological Democrats and the labor people. Humphrey had done a good job in identifying himself with labor's cause. We had no great difficulty in getting labor people to be active for Humphrey. But when you start getting beyond that, it was sort of difficult.

But I think Humphrey came through towards the end, and I really do think we were gaining on Kennedy in Milwaukee. I think some of the network television shows, many of which I never saw because I was involved in the campaign, were very helpful to us because I think Humphrey's personality, his ebullience -- the real man sort of came out. But he is the kind of guy who would not stage anything

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like this four months early for use in the campaign. It would happen -- only in the course of campaigning would this sort of thing, would this personality of the real Humphrey come out. For instance, one advertising guy told me afterwards, "You know the thing that really I thought was the most effective was old Hubert standing out at some plant gate talking to his kids about how to pass out handbills." And this was on some network television show. Little things like this, you see, that if a guy had been Madison Avenue minded could have staged three or four months earlier. And I think this kind of thing might have gotten him a lot more support in the eastern part of the state where he was not well known. But he's just not the kind of guy who would do that, so you did

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what you could under the circumstances.

Well, that really pretty much tells the story up to the actual campaign. I remember having a long -- not long -- but a talk with the guy who was going to write the *Time* cover story about the different districts. You know, they ran a map, and I thought he had the thing sized up pretty well. As I recall, the districts that were sort of a toss-up were the second and seventh, and the eastern part of the state was pretty pro-Kennedy and the western part of the state was pretty pro-Humphrey. And this is the way it was, and this is the way it turned out.

I remember also having a talk with Bob Novak [Robert Novak] who did a good story on the campaign. He had it sized up pretty much the same way.

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MORRISSEY: Did you pay special attention to the second and seventh districts?

WALLICK: I personally was not involved after January. Jim Loeb worked in the second district, and somebody else was in the seventh. Although you

can tell from those early excursions around the state we certainly did touch base in those areas because there were television stations and daily newspapers and they were very crucial areas.

MORRISSEY: I've heard it said that Humphrey had support from the labor leadership, but he didn't necessarily get the votes from the labor membership.

WALLICK: I think that's true. I think that's true because it's one thing for a leader to have his name used, it's another thing to have.... Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] certainly got the votes of a lot of rank

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and file union people. But it wasn't Humphrey's fault, it was just the fact that we couldn't get the real Humphrey through to people. I think if Humphrey had done the kind of campaigning that Estes Kefauver had done -- you know, plant gates.... He did this, of course, in the dead of winter. But if he had been able to do that in the summertime or in the spring when the weather was nice, I think he could really have cut down the Kennedy margin in Milwaukee. But it was almost impossible to campaign that way in the dead of winter. So that was a constant handicap.

MORRISSEY: I'm surprised he didn't do better with labor because at that time a lot of people were suspicious of Kennedy's record in view of the McClellan Committee hearings and Landrum-Griffin.

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WALLICK: Yes, well, there were a lot of people who were very bitter about the McClellan hearings. Frankly, I felt that a lot of this bitterness was unjustified. I never was sold on the idea that Kennedy had it in for labor. I wasn't happy with some of the things that were being done. We had as one of our key leaders in the Green Bay area a guy who was a Teamster, and I personally felt that he was a very -- and I was one of the guys that recommended him. Emmett Terry. He's now dead. He died just a few weeks ago. But as far as I was concerned, Emmett Terry was a good, solid, trade unionist. And just because he was a Teamster was no reason why he should be smeared with all of Jimmy Hoffa's ills. And I think that the polling that Kennedy people had done had convinced them that

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the attacks on Jimmy Hoffa and the Teamsters were popular and, therefore, they should attack the fact that we had a Teamster guy on one of our committees. I thought that was dirty

pool, but I guess we did a few things that were somewhat questionable too. These things get pretty rough up until the hour the ballots are counted.

MORRISSEY: I've heard the Humphrey campaign criticized as too much of an over-the-border weekend foray by the Minnesota Democrats.

WALLICK: There was a certain amount of that. I think Pat Lucey is one of the best political organizers in the game, and when Jack Kennedy was able to get Pat Lucey in his corner.... Pat, of course, was acting as state chairman. He was publicly neutral, but privately he was deeply involved in advising the Kennedy people

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on what to do. I think when they got him on their side they got a real pro. And Sam Rizzo and myself and a few other people were absolutely no match for Pat Lucey. For one thing, I had a very modest salary in those days, and my problem was to try to pay the gas bill and keep my family in groceries and things like that. I was not able to do a lot of things. If I had been able to be turned loose, maybe I could have been a match for Pat Lucey because I knew the state pretty well. But there were just certain limitations to what I could do. Pat was an extremely skillful person. He knew the state like a book.

Of course, they had another dimension to this thing which I think was very helpful to them. In fact, I believe that we could have won it if we had a closed

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primary. You see, in Wisconsin anybody can vote in the primary, and there was no contest from the Republican primary. Kennedy ran as a personality, and they has this subtle appeal to Catholics -- very conservative Catholics voted for Kennedy in the primary because they were attracted to this attractive young man who was a Roman Catholic and who might be the first Catholic.... These things were implicit in everything that was done. And this is why you've got this tremendous vote in the Fox River Valley, Green Bay, and all north of Milwaukee all the way up to Green Bay. And of course after Kennedy was nominated, I was still working for the state AFL-CIO, and I was determined to capitalize on this thing and see if we couldn't get a Democratic congressman elected up there.

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This is just to show you some of the ironic twists in this thing.

MORRISSEY: Running against Byrnes [John W. Byrnes]?

WALLICK: Yes, running against Byrnes. We had a candidate who was not the greatest candidate in the world, but he was a good candidate -- he

worked hard. And we put out literature all through that area. The irony of it was that it was mimeographed in the headquarters of the Teamsters. The campaign all said, "Give Jack Kennedy a friend in Congress, vote for Milo Singler." This was the whole pitch. Emmett Terry's Teamsters' mimeograph machines were turning out this kind of literature by the tens of thousands saying, "Give Jack Kennedy a friend in Congress." And of course Byrnes was scared to death because he thought that an awful lot of these Catholic Republicans and Catholic

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conservative who had been attracted to Jack Kennedy in the primary were going to stick with Kennedy and vote for Kennedy for president and possibly even vote for a congressman. And Byrnes had been very lase about all of his campaigns. He used to go all over the country giving speeches, sort of ignore his opponent, but he stayed pretty close to home in 1960. He was really worried about the outcome of the election.

MORRISSEY: Why do you suppose these Catholic Republicans came home during the November election?

WALLICK: Well, obviously Kennedy after the Convention -- and even before the Convention -- began to talk issues and substance. He was no longer the Hollywood figure. He was a Democrat who just incidentally was a Catholic.

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I don't think there's any question but what Kennedy got a lot of Catholics to vote for him. But many of the conservatives, who had sort of cavalierly voted for him in the primary, just couldn't stomach voting for this liberal Jack Kennedy for president, and didn't. And of course, as you know, we lost the state. Maybe some of the residue of the religious bitterness may have been responsible for that. In fact, I'm afraid this is true. We probably lost the state because of the Lutherans in the western part of the state. I was not aware of this. I was quite oblivious to all this. I used to talk to people who said, "Boy, this religious thing is really strong." And apparently, it really was. But it was hard to believe that this sort of thing could really happen.

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MORRISSEY: Stronger out state than in Milwaukee where you were?

WALLICK: Yes.

MORRISSEY: To what extent were the wounds opened up in the primary a factor in not getting more votes for Kennedy in the fall?

WALLICK: Well, of course, the real active party people who had been active for Humphrey had no great difficulty in being active for Kennedy as a presidential candidate. I think the debates got everybody excited, and we really felt that we had a champ. I, personally, had a little bit of trouble getting over the bitterness of the primary because I sort of thought that Humphrey had gotten the shaft. I always had this sort of feeling for Kennedy, but a certain amount of resentment was mixed up in this admiration. It just seemed that he had too much luck

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and too many things given to him. And Humphrey was the guy who fought down the line for the real gutty things, and we shouldn't turn our backs to him. And when he got beaten in Wisconsin, I was frankly somewhat bitter. I was never enamored with Adlai Stevenson like this, but I did have a certain feel for Humphrey. And I didn't really get over this until after the first debate. Of course, who wanted Nixon [Richard M. Nixon]?

MORRISSEY: What were the Stevensonians doing throughout that Kennedy-Humphrey campaign?

WALLICK: Well, they were living in a dream world, I think. Adlai was their god. They didn't do any good for Humphrey. I think most of them voted for Humphrey. Well, I shouldn't say that, either, because I think the Kennedy people made a very skillful play for a lot of these people,

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and there were many Stevenson people who ultimately in the primary voted for Kennedy. But I think probably we got most of them, and certainly Dane County, which was the storm center for Stevenson support, went strongly for Humphrey. Again, this was a religious thing too because it was a strong Lutheran area, and I suppose this was a big factor.

MORRISSEY: Did you go down to West Virginia?

WALLICK: No, if they had done better in Wisconsin.... They had suggested I go to West Virginia, but I must say I'd really had it after Wisconsin. I had no stomach for going to West Virginia. And I guess it was even more poorly organized there than it was in Wisconsin. As Herb Waters once said, "You know, Wisconsin was pretty well organized." It never seemed organized to me.

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MORRISSEY: Did you go to the Convention?

WALLICK: No, I didn't. I'll tell you what I did do. I worked very hard on a few Humphrey delegates to try to get them to switch to Kennedy, the line being that we had to support Kennedy to stop Johnson. I don't think I was terribly successful, but I did work on quite a few of these people that had been for Humphrey, and I told them that I thought the only thing they could do at the Convention was to support Kennedy early because he was our only hope for a liberal candidate.

MORRISSEY: But they didn't buy it?

WALLICK: I'm trying to remember.... No, the ones that I worked on were the ones who were of the hard nut cases, and I don't think I succeeded.

MORRISSEY: You mentioned several minutes ago that you had made a special effort to get some

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of the Kefauver people behind Humphrey. How successful was that?

WALLICK: Well, I think Kefauver was sort of a phenomenon that really was not a product of any political genius in the state, and the ones that we got were not terribly instrumental in doing much good for Humphrey. We did get a few, but it didn't mean that much. We could have used some of Kefauver's campaign style. For instance, if Humphrey had spent more time in the state, I think this might have been helpful. Of course, Kefauver was a national figure because of the crime hearings. These were factors that made him sort of the public figure that Kennedy was. Humphrey didn't have any of this going for him, and he was not a national figure. He was a Minnesota figure. The thing that his people couldn't understand

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was that he was not well known in the eastern part of the state. Nothing was ever done to overcome it -- not enough. Some things were done, but they didn't do too much. There's no reason at all why we shouldn't have carried the seventh district and the fifth district if we'd had a better organized campaign. And if we'd gotten those districts, we would have had a majority; we probably could have carried the state.

MORRISSEY: You certainly would have been interpreted as a semi-winner at least.

WALLICK: Right. I felt, as far as I was concerned, when we lost the seventh and the fifth district, I felt that that was the end. I just didn't feel that we had done anything that was worth bragging about.

MORRISSEY: Were you with Humphrey the night the

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returns came in?

WALLICK: I was, briefly. I didn't feel in any mood to do much except just slink home and go to bed. [Laughter]

MORRISSEY: I was wondering if you remembered much discussion about whether or not he should go into West Virginia?

WALLICK: Well, I remember people talking about it, but I just didn't want to get involved. I just felt that the whole thing had been sort of botched. I didn't know anything about West Virginia, and it just seemed to me that.... Well, I didn't have any opinions one way or the other. Everybody assumed that he would do well in West Virginia, but we'd done such a miserable job in locking Wisconsin that I felt like we'd been quite a failure.

MORRISSEY: From your vantage point did you feel

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that the national leadership of organized labor had definite hopes and fears about who might win that campaign?

WALLICK: Well, of course, as you probably know, the Kennedy people were constantly working on George Meany, Al Barkan, the COPE -- not Al Barkan, but Jim McDevitt [James L. McDevitt] -- to try to get labor to be neutral. This was part of the strategy. And they were working on the UAW and the Steelworkers. Walter Burke, for instance, was the man who really kept the state AFL-CIO from endorsing Humphrey. Burke is now the secretary-treasurer of the Steelworkers; at that time he was the district director. Somebody got to him and convinced him that it would be a mistake for the state labor organization to endorse Humphrey as we had hoped they would. And so what happened was that the state

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organization came out with a statement saying nice things about Humphrey, but short of endorsement. I'm sure that this was....

Of course, one of the things that used to burn up Burke, and this was typical of the kind of inept finagling that went on was that one of Humphrey's big supporters was Sam Halpern who was a businessman in Eau Claire that had a big factory that had moved to Mississippi. And they dealt with the Steelworkers. Burke was extremely unhappy at their labor relations, and yet Humphrey's people were using this businessman whose plant had

gone to Mississippi as an intermediary with Burke. And it used to irritate the hell out of him. It didn't make my job any easier trying to talk to my good friend Walter Burke

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about Hubert Humphrey when the envoy from Humphrey was the businessman the Steelworkers had been having so much trouble with. But this was typical of the things that happened. There's no question that the Kennedy people were constantly and very skillfully trying to keep labor neutralized.

MORRISSEY: You mentioned you were a member of Pat Lucey's faction of the party? How many...

WALLICK: Well, I was considered that. I have a lot of personal admiration for Lucey as an organizer. At one point, I guess, Jerry Heaney had gone to Pat and said, "Pat, we want somebody to represent us in the state whom you can get along with." And so Pat said, "Well, how about Frank Wallick?" And that and other things were the reasons why I was...

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MORRISSEY: It's my impression that not many Pat Lucey Democrats were working for Hubert Humphrey.

WALLICK: Well, I don't think that's true. No, I don't think that's true. Pat has a lot of friends. I don't consider myself a Pat Lucey Democrat. I like and admire and feel very close to Gaylord Nelson, and yet Gaylord Nelson dislikes Pat Lucey intensely. You know, factionalism is a disease all of its own, and it's hard to really describe why a person does one thing or does another thing. Now there were a lot of Lucey people that were pro-Humphrey. Actually, Gaylord didn't do much for Humphrey -- Gaylord Nelson didn't. He was governor, and he not takes credit for being "longtime friend of Hubert Humphrey," but I know how hard we had to work on him to try to get him to do certain things for us.

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It wasn't very easy because he was getting a hell of a lot of pressure from the Lucey people to stay neutral. At the time he was trying very hard to be neutral. He was not a Humphrey partisan. I'm sure he voted for Humphrey, but he was for Stevenson really, as much as anybody.

MORRISSEY: Let me go back to one point that I may have missed because I wasn't listening carefully and that is the reasons for your movement from

being favorably impressed by Kennedy to being a worker for Humphrey -- could we run through that once again?

WALLICK: Yes, well, as I say, I saw Kennedy at our Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner, and of course this was during the Eisenhower years. I was never a person who was enamored with Stevenson. I just thought that Stevenson didn't get through to people,

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and I thought that Kennedy had a certain charisma about him and a capacity to say things well in his eastern way that made him a good candidate, and I was terribly impressed for him. And I wrote exactly what I felt at the time. But I had always had a great admiration for Hubert Humphrey. When I found out from Stoddard through Kampelman that Humphrey had serious designs on the presidency, I felt a personal commitment to Humphrey, and I've always been a Humphrey fan, too. So, I had to struggle with myself. I wanted to be active, I wanted to do something, so I decided I'd be for Humphrey. And I always had a feeling for Kennedy, but during the primary, you see, Kennedy played down issues and played up the personality bit. So during the primary it wasn't difficult to be for

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Humphrey because Humphrey was emphasizing issues; he was talking about his record. And Kennedy was not doing these things; Kennedy was going around shaking hands, having receptions, and projecting his image. But, of course, after the Convention, even during the Convention, this thing changed. Kennedy got out and slugged away.

MORRISSEY: You were impressed with Kennedy at a time when many liberal Democrats were concerned about his silence over McCarthyism.

WALLICK: I never was terribly taken with this argument that he was soft on McCarthyism. There were people in Wisconsin who made quite a thing of this, and, frankly, it left me cold because I felt Jack Kennedy was basically a young, intelligent person. And any young, intelligent person would be right on these things. Every politician

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makes compromises, and if Jack Kennedy made any compromises involving McCarthy, it was only because of good political reasons, not because of any feeling. I had complete faith in the man's intelligence. This is what really attracted me. Also the fact that he was an avid reader; I am too. I just naturally had a certain empathy for the guy. He was a newspaper man; I am too. So, these were things I admired in him. Of course, after he became

President, I was almost a Kennedy cultist. The people he brought into the government were bright people who changed the whole character of government.

MORRISSEY: Did you meet him at all after he was President?

WALLICK: Let's see, I don't think I met him after he was President. I met Bobby Kennedy under strange circumstances. I came

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down to Washington to work for the UAW. Dave Rabinovitz [David Rabinovitz] was an old friend of mine, and Dave used to kid Bobby Kennedy by saying, "You wouldn't have so much trouble with these labor people in Wisconsin if you'd kept Frank Wallick on your side." So apparently Bobby knew about me and knew that I was involved in the Humphrey campaign, but we never had a chance to meet. I had to go in with a group of civil rights people when he was Attorney General to complain about something, and everybody was shaking hands. This was the first time I had met this guy. When my turn came, I said, "I'm Frank Wallick of UAW." And he sort of jumped back, recovered quickly, and passed on to the next guy. I never actually had a chance to talk to him.

Oh, one of the things that I did

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during the campaign was try to get Vel Phillips to support Humphrey because I had been very active in getting her made national committeewoman. In fact, I had nominated her and caused all kinds of trouble to myself and to the party and everything else. So I used to work hard in trying to get her to either stay neutral or some out for Humphrey. Of course, she eventually came out for Kennedy and was very active for Kennedy. That was a little story all of its own. I used to just.... I can still see Jack Kennedy in his press conferences. I don't think anyone will surpass him in press conferences. He was absolutely out of this world.

MORRISSEY: Is there anything in your notes over there that we've missed?

WALLICK: Oh yes, there was one thing. Kennedy spoke

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when he was a real candidate -- this was the winter of '60, just before the primary.... Both Kennedy and Humphrey were speaking at the state Democratic Convention, and things were getting pretty bitter in those days. I was standing out in the hallway. Kennedy was speaking. He was giving a pretty matter of fact speech, and I muttered in a rather loud stage whisper, "This guy just isn't coming through." And there was a guy who turned around and gave me one of the dirtiest stares I've ever gotten. It was Kenny O'Donnell [Kenneth P. O'Donnell]. I'll never forget that. [Laughter]

Oh, after the election Pat Lucey called me up once and wanted to know if I wanted to go over to the Peace Corps. I had been one of the persons that had gotten Henry Reuss interested in this

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idea. Of course, Kennedy had picked this thing beautifully and used it in the campaign and really used it in the campaign and really followed up on it. This was something that interested me greatly. We just had a new baby in our family, and I just didn't feel that I could leave.

I never saw the President although I must say I used to watch every press conference with great admiration; I used to read his speeches. Oh, another thing that happened was a friend of mine from Milwaukee who was a brother-in-law of Lee White, who is an associate to Ted Sorensen. He had come down for a bar mitzvah and had said he knew Frank Wallick back in Milwaukee. And Ted Sorensen had said, "Frank Wallick is one of my dearest friends." This was news to me, but it was nice to know that he felt

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this because Ted had really tried to sort of get me a couple of times to commit myself to Kennedy, and I just shied away because I didn't want to get involved in a discussion at that point because I had already made a commitment to Stoddard and Max Kampelman and Herb Waters.

MORRISSEY: Why did Vel Phillips stay with Kennedy rather than Humphrey?

WALLICK: Well, I think she was attracted to this guy as a personality. She thought that Humphrey was not presidential caliber. This is what I would guess.

MORRISSEY: Well, I think that about covers it.

WALLICK: You think so? How long have we been talking?

MORRISSEY: About an hour and thirty minutes, I think. Thank you.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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