

Orren Beaty, Jr., Oral History Interview – JFK#7, 12/5/1969
Administrative Information

Creator: Orren Beaty, Jr.
Interviewer: William W. Moss
Date of Interview: December 5, 1969
Place of Interview: Washington, D.C.
Length: 25 pages

Biographical Note

Beaty, administrative assistant to Congressman Stewart L. Udall during the late 1950s and assistant to Secretary of Interior Udall from 1961 to 1967, discusses the National Parks Service and individual parks and seashores, and intermittent efforts by the Interior Department to hire minorities, among other issues.

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Orren Beaty, Jr., recorded interview by William W. Moss, December 5, 1969, (page number), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.

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
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Orren Beaty
July 4, 1979
Month Day Year


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Orren Beaty, Jr. – JFK#7

Table of Contents

<u>Page</u>	<u>Topic</u>
145	Stewart L. Udall's objectives as he took his post
146	Bureau of Reclamation during the Eisenhower administration
148	Udall's first actions as Secretary of Interior
149, 155, 167	National Parks and Seashores
150	Udall's administrative style and habits
150	Intermittent efforts to hire minorities
153	Cabinet assistants meetings
154	Ball Committee of assistant secretaries
165	National monuments
167	Circumstances of Conrad L. Wirth's retirement

Seventh of Fourteen Oral History Interviews

with

Orren Beaty, Jr.

December 5, 1969
Washington, D.C.

By William W. Moss

For the John F. Kennedy Library

MOSS: Okay, I'd like to talk about, well, really, what Udall [Stewart L. Udall] thought he was going to do with the department when he got it. How did he express himself on this? What were his expectations and objectives as you saw them-- I suppose you could call it a sense of mission--and how did he transmit this to other people?

BEATY: This isn't something I've given a lot of thought to, and I may be a little slow in reconstructing some of it. A lot of the things that--right at this moment I'm not thinking about anything substantive, but I'm thinking about the events. I seem to recall that the things I heard him saying to people like his colleagues in the House as he was preparing to leave and go on down to the Interior Department, in private or semiprivate, were also the things he was saying when he'd be interviewed by reporters who were keeping up with the cabinet as it was being named and discussing things in a fairly substantive way. And I think that a reading of the newspaper clippings on the cabinet at that time would probably tell some of this, be of some value at least. I remember somebody from the *Evening Star* [Washington, D.C.] did a rather careful and--I can't think of the reporter's name, but he was well known. He was doing this for most of the cabinet. He spent a lot of time on it; he did some research. Carroll Kilpatrick for the *Post* [Washington Post] did something, also.

There was a sense of mission. Exactly how he had it sorted out for the degrees of emphasis sort of thing, I don't know. I know that he was thinking a lot about reclamation. I'm talking about the things other than the obvious that became so apparent later on--the

conservation effort that he involved himself in, which he was thinking about at that time. But the things that I'm thinking about particularly, that he knew he was going to have to face and wanted to get to work on, were reclamation, public lands mix-ups, things that had caused so much localized controversy.

[-145-]

I don't think people in Washington paid much attention to it, but up in public land states it was a matter of a great deal of concern: the slowness in handling public land applications and the policy on whether these lands should be just turned loose because some fairly outdated law was on the books, or whether we should find some ways to get the laws amended; and on reclamation, because throughout the Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] years there'd been very little done on reclamation. It wasn't just that bills weren't being passed to authorize new reclamation projects; it wasn't that appropriations were running at a fairly low level for construction; but it was that that there was very little planning being done. When we came in, there was--I think the phrase he used was; "The shelves were bare." There weren't any plans there waiting to be submitted to Congress. There undoubtedly were some small projects. I remember there were one or two in Kansas and Nebraska, and certainly, California always has some projects they're ready to go to work on. But generally, it was a pretty bare cabinet, and he knew that the Democrats who had been criticizing Eisenhower for the "no new start" policy for six or eight years would have to produce something or be accused of either being insincere in their criticism or unable to deliver when they did get a chance at it.

MOSS: How valid was that "no new starts" charge, really?

BEATY: Well, probably it was a little bit like the missile gap deal. It was something that seemed valid because you weren't getting any recommendations for anything out of the administration. Sometimes, when Congress more or less inaugurated a policy and pushed it through, there'd be an Eisenhower veto on it for one reason or another. I'm sure there're some rather valid reasons for the vetoes, aside from just a disinclination to build any reclamation projects.

I remember the Yellow Tail Project in Wyoming and Montana. Senator Mansfield [Mike Mansfield], Senator Murray [James E. Murray], Congressman Metcalf [Lee Metcalf], the later Senator Metcalf, were all pushing this project. It was passed by Congress, authorized; Eisenhower vetoed it. The administration had opposed it. Eisenhower vetoed it on the theory that they hadn't worked out the Indian problem, the Indian compensation. It goes through part of, I think, the Crow reservations, the reservoir does. Maybe they were going to pay the Indians too much for the land; maybe they weren't going to pay them enough; but it hadn't been settled. I'm not familiar with the details at this point.

MOSS: That can be checked out.

BEATY: That's right. But there was that. There was the rivers and harbors bill, the omnibus bill, the pork barrel bill, whatever you want to call it. It would be

vetoed because there was too much money spent in it or too much money scheduled to be spent in it or because there were a lot of projects in that hadn't been studied properly ahead of time. And these were good reasons, but nevertheless, it led people, Democrats and reclamationists and this sort of thing, these sort of people, to believe, I

[-146-]

think, that there really was a "no new start" policy. The Colorado [River] Storage Project Act was approved during the Eisenhower administration. It was the sort of thing that the planning had to have been started a good many years before in the Truman [Harry S. Truman] administration, maybe before that, because the Colorado River is one of these things that the people have been thinking about and planning and being unable to deliver on because of the fights over water rights and that sort of thing for forty years or more.

MOSS: This goes back to Hoover [Herbert Clark Hoover] Dam, doesn't it?

BEATY: Well, that's right. The Hoover Dam couldn't have been built until they worked out some of these conflicts. And it's rather aptly named because Hoover was sent to Santa Fe to meet with representatives of the upper and lower basin states in 1922, I think, when the Santa Fe compact was approved. And there are still some uncertainties about what it meant; but nevertheless, it did pave the way for Hoover Dam, which came along quite a bit later. And the Upper Colorado project was a big project. It was probably the biggest single one that had been approved up to that time. It involved dams in four or five locations, a tremendous dam on the Colorado River in northern Arizona, the Glen Canyon Dam. So you couldn't say there was "no new starts." Eisenhower pushed a button in the White House to set off the blast that started construction. They did have a new start or two, but it was a slow program when we came in.

MOSS: His was one of emphasis rather than quantity, or something of this sort?

BEATY: Oh, I think it was that. It was emphasis and quantity both. I really don't think they were presenting the program very aggressively, and partly because they were sympathetic to private utilities. The private utilities didn't want any dams built that created hydroelectric power, which would be sold under the preference clause to municipals and REAs [Rural Electrification Administration] and provided additional competition for them. And so this would just naturally slow down the enthusiasm in a Republican administration to build them, to get these things authorized.

There was a big fight in California, the Trinity project, the big argument over selling the falling water. The government built the dam to sell the falling water to the private utilities who would produce the power and distribute it on their own lines to their own customers. And everybody cut out, according to the opponents. Clair Engle wanted them, the REAs, the public consumer-owned utilities, as they call them. This was a victory for the Democratic Congress in beating the Eisenhower administration on that question in 19--I don't know when--'55, '56. So there were a lot of factors, but they didn't have it...

MOSS: Did Udall have a sense that he needed to--or a feeling--that he needed to impart a sense of urgency, to sell a new aggressiveness, in any particular area, reclamation or something else; or was it a wave of reaction to the Eisenhower....

[-147-]

BEATY: I think it may have been a little bit of a wave reaction; a little bit of a feeling that we had to get started on things fast and get things to--you know, make some show of progress. The planners in the Bureau of Reclamation were put to work on a seven-day week, or something like that, program. I think the press release said something about fifty-six hour week decreed for reclamation planners, or something like that, to get some likely projects in shape to submit to Congress. I don't think it was a sense of urgency in that some of the West was going to dry up and blow away if we didn't get these things built in a hurry, but it was trying to prove that this was a different administration and that there were different emphases and that we were no longer going to be dragging our feet on getting good projects under way.

MOSS: Was there any particular area in which he felt weak, in which he felt he needed to rely almost exclusively, say, on one of his assistant secretaries for ideas, administration, this kind of thing?

BEATY: No, he's got a great deal of self-confidence. I think he felt that he.... I know he knew that he didn't know everything about every one of these areas, but I still think that he had an unbridled confidence in his ability to grasp it if he settled down and studied each of these things in its turn and leaped in. He did depend a great deal on other people, but in each case, I think, he was reserving decisions for himself to a great deal. We've mentioned John Carver [John A. Carver, Jr.]. I think he depended on John a great deal on lands, but he didn't put this aside and forget about it himself; he was still working on it. And one of the first things we did, of course, (I think we mentioned this in one of our previous talks) was put a freeze on accepting any new public land applications in order to give the people in the BLM [Bureau of Land Management] and John Carver and others an opportunity to--I think the lawyers, too--time to work out new procedures and to get rid of the backlog and handle this better than it had been handled. He spent a lot of time on it, but I think he did--on John, at least--did rely on him more than he did on most of the other assistant secretaries.

MOSS: What about in some of the technical areas such as marketing of power and, oh, things like the oil import quotas and this sort of thing where you get rather involved economic issues and technical--well, engineering issues, you know?

BEATY: On the power, I know he spent quite a bit of time with Floyd Dominy [Floyd E. Dominy], as the commissioner of reclamation, and with Jim Carr [James K. Carr], who had worked with the Reclamation Bureau before he was with the state water agency in California. I know he consulted with Wayne Aspinall [Wayne N.

Aspinall] and Clair Engle and others that he had known and worked with in Congress. I think he took more of a hand in this himself than he did--I know he did--than he did in oil imports, for example, because Arizona didn't import any oil. It wasn't anything that as a congressman he'd been exposed to except for the briefings that the Interior Committees would get from Seaton [Frederick A. Seaton] and Elmer Bennett [Elmer F. Bennett] and other people in the Eisenhower

[-148-]

administration who were working on, first, the voluntary oil import controls and then the mandatory that was put in effect about the year before the change of the administration.

I'm rather confident that the first few orders that were issued in the oil imports thing about allowing more fuel oil to come into the East Coast and perhaps setting some hearing on this--I don't recall the timing on this very well, but these things happened in the first few months--in these cases he was depending on the technical people, the experts, so-called experts, in the mineral resources area and accepted their judgment on it. I suppose he put his own touch on it in how it was handled or how the congressmen were notified and so forth, but I don't think any of his ideas were put into this in the decision-making process. He just accepted what we were given. This is my belief. I'm not positive. It wasn't one of the areas that I got involved in too closely. I may have helped set up meetings with assistant secretaries and that sort of thing, and I may have sat in on them--I usually did in the earlier period; I tried not to miss anything. But I don't remember any of this; I'm just kind of surmising.

MOSS: Okay, did you see in any of his early operations, particularly, a tendency to take specific things and sort of bring them up to his office for handling? Just as an example, perhaps, the Cape Cod Seashore [Massachusetts] thing, that kind of thing.

BEATY: Yeah, yeah. I think you're right; he did. I don't know when President Kennedy's [John F. Kennedy] birthday was or is, but either his birthday or something occurred fairly soon after...

MOSS: In May, I believe.

BEATY: Is it May? Well, I think that this was the absolute outside deadline that he established--I don't remember how this came out--that we ought to give a birthday present to the President by approving the Cape Cod National Seashore, and we had meetings involving a lot of people from the department and the bureau, the [National] Park Service, and this got a great deal of emphasis. A lot of work had been done on it before we came in; we weren't just starting out cold. Republican Congressman Hastings Keith had been pushing it. I don't think he was on the House Interior Committee. It wasn't a brand new idea, so it was possible to give it special emphasis to get it done. And there was this feeling, I think, in Congress that too much time had elapsed between the last big set of additions to the park system and that they needed to get to work on it. The

combination of that feeling and the President's upcoming birthday gave this thing a lot of special emphasis, a lot more than many things.

I think we talked about the Lower Colorado River land use program involving California and Arizona, perhaps Nevada. But I think really it was the area extending from Davis down, which is just about where Nevada and Arizona and California all come together. This is something he got into and brought everybody up at the office and went over it. The Bureau of Reclamation, which had some responsibilities, the Bureau of Land

[-149-]

Management, Sport Fisheries, just about everybody that... I don't know, it may have been people that you and I wouldn't even think about right now. It was a big meeting, and certainly the technical review stuff, the Chuck Stoddard [Charles H. Stoddard] operation, was right in the middle of it.

MOSS: How about others areas? Did he do the same thing in Water and Power, and in Minerals?

BEATY: I think there was less in Minerals than almost anything else except for the oil and gas end of it. I can't recall anything that there was any real urgency on with the exception of the helium program, which had been approved the year before and the Coal Research, which I think--we've mentioned both of these. These had been authorized by the previous Congress but hadn't been implemented yet. I think there was a real deadline on the helium. It was just a matter of not letting the Coal Research thing lag. And by working on Coal Research, it gave a balance to the program of letting more fuel oil in. So you did something for the coal industry as well as keeping people from freezing to death on the East Coast by letting more oil in, which the coal people opposed. Other than that, I can't think of anything in Minerals that got a lot of attention in the first few months.

MOSS: How did Udall let people know what he wanted done? Did he set down policy guidelines? Did he just talk things up? What was his...

BEATY: He did a lot of work on the phone. He did a lot of work calling people up; assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs were moving in and out all the time. He started early, worked late, had a lot of night meetings, a lot of Saturday meetings. Sometimes before, sometimes after the preliminary meeting, he would dictate a memo on his views on something. And he edits himself fairly carefully. He'd work these over and distribute them, then, to the appropriate people. He had a tendency to cut across channels, bureaucratic lines, and this probably caused us some trouble. In the helium thing, he got involved with the lawyers and the helium experts, but he overlooked the contract specialists in the department. Little details would be forgotten, be overlooked, that he should consider. But normally, he kept Jim Carr involved, and the Under Secretary was, with a few exceptions, a stickler for following the channels. And Jim had known Otis Beasley [D. Otis Beasley] for a long time, and he'd bring others into it. And so this would put it into channels,

but we missed on some of those, too. Just in the urgency to get things done, you'd call up a few people you know are working on it and pitch in, give some orders.

MOSS: Yeah, okay. Now, let's say, in something that's a departmental policy--take, for instance, the question of equal employment opportunity within the department--how did he promulgate his policy on this?

BEATY: Well, he'd get all of the assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs together and tell them that this was right and that he believed that the administration was right in pushing it and that he

[-150-]

expected them to follow through on it. I imagine there were also a number of directives distributed, but he used the personal touch quite a bit on it.

MOSS: What kinds of follow-up action did he ask for?

BEATY: Reports, monthly reports. If things would go too slowly he'd call Beasley in or Beasley and the lawyers and say, "We got to do something about this." The Park Service was regarded as kind of a lily-white organization. There were no Negro park rangers, certainly no Negro park superintendents or anything like that. Very few except white Anglo-Saxon Catholics and Protestants, perhaps a few Mormons. He talked to the Park Service about doing something about it, and Connie Wirth [Conrad L. Wirth] and everybody promised that--agreed that they knew that it wasn't good and that they had to do something better. But time passed and nothing really happened. He got Otis Beasley and people from the solicitor's office and organized a task force to go into the southern Negro universities and colleges and interview professors and students in biology and things like this. And there aren't too many. Maybe there are now, but at that point they were mostly studying in education and for the ministry and a few, law. It was hard to find people who were studying for a career which would lead into Fish and Wildlife service, Park Service, things like this, in the department. And I'm sure that they had gone through previous exercises that didn't produce any real jobs, and there was a lot of skepticism. Even going in and talking to them and assuring them that there'd be jobs if they.... Summer jobs, for example: you could take the students or the professors who needed to supplement their income by working in the park for the summer--he guaranteed that we have a certain amount of jobs for them, and it worked out. The first year we set up a quota of fifty or something like this, and we got fifty-two promises and only about thirty-five showed up--I'm just tossing off inaccurate figures, but ones that I think are fairly close--because they didn't believe.... I think they didn't think that we'd really come through on it.

MOSS: Why do you think that was--just a general mistrust?

BEATY: I think so. It worked out, and I think most of them had some good experiences. And the next year the number leaped up to about a hundred, and

it was a continuing effort, then. And then these people were encouraged, if they liked the Park Service, to go into permanent employment with it when they got their degrees or whatever the situation was.

He had Frank Barry [Frank J. Barry, Jr.] to do the same sort of thing with the Negro law schools, to try to get them into the summer intern program with the solicitor's office. And Frank got really devoted to this effort, this cause, and he still had very little success in getting them interested. I think partly because of the increased emphasis they could make better deals than they could with Interior, for one thing, in the legal end of it. But this is why he did it. I'm sure the files will show orders or directions on this sort of thing to comply, but it was dealing with people in charge personally and saying, "Let's get this done."

[-151-]

MOSS: Did this effort ever lose its momentum over the course of the administration?

BEATY: Oh, I'm sure it did from time to time.

MOSS: And why?

BEATY: Well, I think partly because department heads, bureau chiefs, people like the administrative assistant secretary, had grown up in government at a time when minority races except for the Indian Bureau, which hired a lot of Indians--or for minority races except Indians, who were hired in rather large numbers by the Indian Bureau--just weren't considered for jobs except as custodians and messengers and maybe junior grade secretaries or stenographers, but that's about the extent of it. Otis Beasley came from the South, from North Carolina, I think, and he never did anything but agree a thousand percent that the policy of equal employment opportunity was right and that we ought to follow through on it and that some bureaus wouldn't do it unless we forced them to, but he would come up with odd things for reasons why it was difficult to make it work.

One of them was, of course, that you don't list people's names--so-and-so, age, Negro, Indian, Mexican-American; he didn't have that. You could look through, if you know southwestern names, and pick out Mexican-Americans in some cases, but you can't always do that. Certainly, you can't do it with Negroes. So he would bring up these reasons why: "Well, you know, how do we know what percentage we have?" And the bureaus just didn't like the idea, I don't think, of having somebody tell them who they ought to hire for any reason other than he could pass the civil service exam or that he had been doing a good job and should be promoted because of that and for no other reason. I think, probably, that reluctance still exists, even after all the gains. But, you know, there were periodic outbursts of attention from the White House, and when these things happen, it naturally caused the departments to exert renewed interest, renewed activity.

MOSS: How were these outbursts expressed?

BEATY: Well, there'd be a cabinet meeting, I imagine; or there'd be a memo from the White House; or one of these meetings involving people from my level. "The

reports are beginning to look kind of mechanical. Are you guys really trying? Let's step it up a little bit." Well, after one of the big efforts out of the cabinet, cabinet meeting I think, we got the program going again, and we had a departmental assembly, meeting in the--I think they call it congregation; I forget what they called it--and we got the Vice-President [Lyndon Baines Johnson] over to speak to the group and to support the program. This was not long before Kennedy was assassinated and the Vice-President became president. It seems to me it was within two or three months, that at that point we had a renewed effort going on. There was a constant, continuing feeling that we had to do something to equalize, to make up for the shortcomings in the past on hiring minority people at jobs more important than custodians. And we were constantly looking for them.

[-152-]

Oh, I think there were five positions at that time in the leadership of the solicitor's office, and one of those was filled by a Negro, because we went out and deliberately looked for him. There was the solicitor, the deputy solicitor, and then there are five associate solicitors--maybe there're six or seven now because the work's been expanded. One of those was a Negro, but only because we really went out and struggled to get him. We got another one in the oil end of it. He's still over there in the oil import program, J.J. Simmons [Jake Simmons, Jr.], who was--his father had been active in Oklahoma politics. We may have mentioned him, I'm not sure. There was some political support for him, and this made it a lot easier although, again, it was a struggle for me, with one of the assistant secretaries, to get him put on the job because the assistant secretary didn't feel that this political support necessarily meant that he was qualified. It was hard, and I'm sure we didn't achieve the goals that either the President or the Secretary wanted to achieve.

MOSS: How would you assess its relative priority with, say, things like getting new parks and getting the revision of the old budget circular done and things of this sort, tracking it up against the--in perspective?

BEATY: Oh, I think it had a very low priority. I don't think there was ever any intention not to comply with it, but the feeling was that.... "Not to comply" is not the right word, or not the right phrase there, but no intentions of downgrading its importance. But there was a feeling that this could be done while we were getting our programs moving and that the important thing was to get results on the programs. I don't think I ever voiced it that way, but I think the results would bear that out.

MOSS: I'd like to follow up something you dropped here a few minutes ago. You were talking about meeting with people and your meetings of people at your level. What sort of meetings were these? How frequent? What were their purposes, this kind of thing?

BEATY: Well, sometimes we had meetings, kind of a debriefing session, a day after the cabinet met. Fred Dutton [Frederick G. Dutton], the secretary of the cabinet,

would brief the cabinet assistants. As you know, after the first few meetings of the cabinet, there were very few for quite sometime, and as a consequence, our meetings fell off, too. I think they started having more meetings with assistants simply to keep us.... This was a channel that you could get across some ideas that weren't quite as important as calling the cabinet together for something.

MOSS: These would be called by Dutton?

BEATY: That's right.

MOSS: Fairly regularly?

BEATY: I can't say that they were regular. I've forgotten.

[-153-]

MOSS: And would all departmental assistants be represented?

BEATY: That's right. That's right. And we had some little, informal meetings, get-togethers, luncheons. John Seigenthaler, I think, had us over to the Justice Department for lunch one day, and I had them over at the Interior another day. We went to Agriculture once, Post Office once. There was an effort to maintain a kind of a liaison among ourselves on what was going on and what the problems were. And always, in these cases, Fred Dutton or Ted Reardon [Timothy J. Reardon, Jr.] or somebody from the White House was--several of them were invited, Larry O'Brien [Lawrence F. O'Brien] and others. But usually, as is rather obvious, they don't all have time to take off for some hour-and-a-half luncheon. So we would usually wind up with one or two.

MOSS: What sort of things would you talk about?

BEATY: Well, this civil rights effort and the equal employment was one, certainly. Congressional liaison was another, where the problems were.

MOSS: Were you expected to brief Udall on these meetings after you got back?

BEATY: Yes. If they were bringing up something new that he hadn't already had thrown at him in a cabinet meeting or some memo from the President or somebody over at the White House, I was certainly supposed to brief him on that. I think they felt that anything that he really needed to know, he would get from them directly and that this wasn't proper to be going to him through somebody at a lower grade, lower rank. But at the same time, it was a matter of instant information. You come back from a meeting and something important happened; you'd tell him about it. It was more to give us information, that the Secretary already had, to follow through on. These are things that we know you're going to be asked to follow through on, and so, you know, you might as well get firsthand what we--the President told the cabinet or that sort of thing.

MOSS: All right. What about other interdepartmental groups? Do you know of any others where--say, at the subcabinet level, with assistant secretaries or the under secretaries or whatnot?

BEATY: I don't know of any particular assistant secretaries' group, but the under secretaries met. They called it the Ball Committee because George Ball [George W. Ball]....

MOSS: They called it the Ball Committee. Were there any other names given to it?

BEATY: I can't think of any.

MOSS: And who was the rep of the Interior?

[-154-]

BEATY: Jim Carr.

MOSS: Jim Carr was the man on this?

BEATY: Yeah, that's right. I don't really think that after he left and John Carver became the under secretary that this was happening, at least not in a regular way. It was fairly regular for quite sometime in the first couple of years.

MOSS: What sort of things were they concerned with? What came out of those meetings?

BEATY: Oh, there was more policy, I think, than administration. I think the stuff that we bumped into in our things were administration, getting things done within the departments. The other involved some trade questions. I remember Mr. Carr talking about some of our problems with Japan on trade. It involved fishery compacts, agreement on the North Pacific fisheries, the North Atlantic, offshore oil, oil imports. Those are the things that I've got a fairly strong memory that Mr. Carr mentioned they were discussing.

MOSS: When there was a particular area, would Carr take along one of the assistant secretaries?

BEATY: I think he'd take people that knew something about it, but generally they didn't want the meetings to get too cluttered, and they didn't take a lot of people along. I'm sure Jim's got a great memory on this and could tell you, but I can't. He usually would come back from the meetings and sit down with the Secretary and tell him what had happened. I wasn't there; I wasn't in the meeting; I wasn't in the room too often. I was occasionally, but I don't remember anything that would be helpful to us here on this.

MOSS: Okay, let me move, I think, into, as I said at the beginning, some of the more substantive things, and I think we might start with John Carver's area first and talk about.... Well, let's start with parks and seashores and monuments and things. You mentioned the Cape Cod thing briefly a few minutes ago. Was there a specific Kennedy interest in the Cape Cod business, and how was this expressed to the department?

BEATY: Well, to my knowledge, nothing in the way of a formal communication came over. I think that the Secretary and the President had talked about this privately before they took office. I know that it was that one of the things that Mr. Udall talked to Connie Wirth about when they were discussing his future as the head of the Park Service. And of course, Wirth was in full agreement that this is a high-priority item. Wirth was, I think partly from the pride of authorship, very much involved in pushing a successful conclusion of Mission 66, which was the

[-155-]

Park Service's big program during the Eisenhower years. I suppose it started in 1956, a ten-year program, to come up to the hundredth anniversary of the Park Service or the hundredth anniversary of the creation of the first national park, or whatever it was in 1966, and to help meet the needs that had become apparent after the war--the greatly increased use of the parks and totally inadequate roads and park facilities to meet this surge of visitors. In lieu of creating new parks or expanding the park system in any material way, they settled for increased appropriations for construction within the parks, and it was hard to get Wirth off that and onto thinking about moving into new parks. So whenever you'd talk about things, he'd also talk about Mission 66. Well, obviously, any new administration's not going to spend a lot of time pushing somebody else's catch-phrase. But there was no problem on the Cape Cod thing. Wirth and everybody agreed this was something that we could make some real strides with, and so let's leap right into it.

MOSS: There were some uncharitable public references to the thing as "a Kennedy playground." Did this annoy anybody?

BEATY: I'm not aware of any such view.

MOSS: Any particular problems in getting the Cape Cod thing through?

BEATY: Oh, sure. Not from Congress, really. Right now, I can't sort it out, whether it had any effect on the presentation of this to the committees in getting it done, or whether it involved the problems we ran into after it was authorized in acquiring the land. These were various townships where a lot of private owners didn't want it to go into the park, didn't want their house--I think this probably happened before the thing was authorized. And this led to language in the law allowing life tenancy, where people could live there and retain their homes as long as they lived, but they couldn't change the

nature of it, and in the end, it would go into Park Service, into the public ownership with the Park Service administering it.

MOSS: There were a couple of subsequent seashore bills that I've got a couple of questions on. On the Padre Island [Padre Island National Seashore, Texas] one, who was behind this? Was the Vice-President involved in this at all?

BEATY: Yeah, he was, certainly. And I think that the Secretary wanted the Vice-President to have a park of his own. It was not just that; in fact, that was a very minor part of it. It was a thing that had been pushed probably just as long as Cape Cod National Seashore. There was an old county judge or something in Harlingen or McAllen, one of those towns down along the border, the southern end of Texas, who'd been campaigning very hard for this for a long time. People up at Corpus Christi were working on it and interested in it.

Let's see, there were fights on that, more disputes. The newspapers in South Texas, those three papers down there do the border, all owned by one

[-156-]

man, the Hoiles [Harry Hoiles] papers. Hoiles is a real throwback. We may have mentioned him. He's against public education, even, and certainly he's against anything that a Democrat would be standing for. And he was for developing this island for commercial use. There'd been some fishing camps and motels and stuff at each end--one end down near Harlingen; the other end's up near Corpus Christi. It's a long, long island, you know. It extends from where this curve of the Gulf at Corpus Christi heads south all the way down to the Mexican border, practically. It's very narrow. It's remote, and it wasn't being used. It's not close to the heavily populated part of Texas. If you opposed it, you could find some good arguments against it: that this area needed developing; it needed commercial development; it didn't need a playground for those people who just wanted to wander around and look at the sand dunes. And those papers down there were constant opponents.

Senator Yarborough [Ralph W. Yarborough], there, pushed it very hard. Because he did, I think maybe the Vice-President was not as enthusiastic as he might have been, but I don't recall this. You know, there was this controversy, constant.... They were on different sides in the Texas Democratic party and had been all the time. And Yarborough was very outspoken in support of it, but the Vice-President was for it, too. I think Udall regarded this as a real accomplishment when he got it through.

Senator Allott [Gordon L. Allott], for some reason, supported the opponents of the park and particularly or.... I should say he aligned himself with the opponents of the park and fought very hard to get a road approved. The park people felt the island was much too narrow to cut it in half with a paved road all the way from the north to the South; that the roads could be built over on the mainland and crossing here and there so that people could come in and use it, but the lot of it should be left uncluttered by asphalt. And this was one of the big fights on that, was getting it approved without that road. And Allott was pushing the road very hard. That is one of the things I remember about it. I haven't gone back and read any of this particular thing for quite sometime.

In the end, they allowed--you know, you work out compromises, and they didn't take all the island. They took a lot more than the opponents wanted them to take; they took less than they wanted to get. But they allowed a little bit of commercial development at each end. The rest of it went into the park. It was one of those early illustrations we got of how expensive parkland becomes once you authorize a park. And the amount authorized to pay for it didn't begin to pay for it. They had to raise the amount several times, the Congress has, at least twice, in order to pay what the courts determined were the true values.

MOSS: You had a similar problem with Point Reyes [Point Reyes National Seashore, California], didn't you?

BEATY: Yeah, I think this was even worse. Of course, it's a little different, too. It's right there close to San Francisco in a heavily populated area, and the amount of money involved is a lot more than Padre Island.

[-157-]

MOSS: Who was pushing Point Reyes?

BEATY: Well, the *San Francisco Chronicle*, Clem Miller [Clement W. Miller], who was a member of Congress representing that area. And then, unfortunately, both, I think, for the country and for him, he was killed in a plane crash before--or maybe I'm mixing it up. But sometime in the period involving Point Reyes at one end of the calendar and the Redwoods at the other end, Clem Miller got killed, and we lost a very active supporter, somebody who had been--and would have been--quite helpful in getting these things done. The board of supervisors or commissioners, whatever they call that in that area, had two or three people on it who were very strong supporters, and then there were also some on it that were great opponents. They were looking out for the dairy interests who had their farms right down by the edge of the cliffs and didn't want to change it. The feeling was, I think, that it wasn't so much that they wanted to keep it in dairy land, but they wanted to develop it, eventually, for urban uses where it would become a lot more valuable. I can't remember now the personalities involved, particularly.

MOSS: While we're on California, there was some confusion...

BEATY: Jim Carr, of course, was very much for this, and he was doing everything he could to help make it work.

MOSS: While we're on California, there was some confusion, wasn't there, over surveys about preserving the historic integrity of Sacramento--freeways and this sort of thing? Do you remember the story there?

BEATY: Oh, yeah. Jim Carr, of course, knew all about Sacramento, having lived there. And the old town--warehouses and whorehouses and saloons and.... I'm sure

very little of this was in actual operation by this time, but the history had it, the legend had it, that we knew where all this was or somebody did, and Jim was determined to help preserve this. And I'm sure he was prodded by the McClatchy [Eleanor McClatchy] newspapers, the *Sacramento Bee* and so forth--particularly the *Sacramento Bee*. And we may have bent the law or the procedures a little bit in the way we acted on that, but we were trying to preserve this area against a freeway and against the State Highway Department, Department of Transportation, and so forth. I remember Jim putting me on the phone with some newspaper or radio station or something to say something, which was entirely in line with our policy, but it wasn't the kind of thing I usually got involved in. But it was giving some support to the people there who were trying to keep these old villages from being torn down to make way for the freeway. That's really about the total extent of my memory. I don't even know how it came out.

MOSS: Okay, let's move to another thing now. There were a couple of situations that I'd like to take the Oregon Dunes and the Indiana Dunes, which were very troublesome. Let's take the Oregon Dunes first. Now, who were the pros and cons in this?

BEATY: Well, Senator Neuberger.

[-158-]

MOSS: Senator Neuberger?

BEATY: I can't remember. Was the original Senator Neuberger [Richard L. Neuberger] dead at this point and his wife [Maurine Brown Neuberger] in the Senate?

MOSS: Right.

BEATY: I'd forgotten what year he died and what year she took over. But the husband of that senatorial team was the one that first started pushing it and endorsed the idea. And Mrs. Neuberger, then, followed through and supported it. Senator Morse [Wayne L. Morse] opposed it for some reason--or he didn't oppose it publicly, but he required certain conditions which made it almost impossible to get it approved. The Forest Service was against it because they didn't want some of their forest lands included.

MOSS: I have a note here that may jog your memory a bit that Wayne Morse objected that the bill put too much power of acquisition and condemnation in the hands of the Secretary. Now, was this really valid or was he simply piqued because the bill hadn't been cleared through him?

BEATY: Well, personally I think he was piqued. I think Wayne Morse did a great many good things while he was in the Senate, but I think, in this case, he was totally warped, really, just outrageous. This condemnation authority has existed from the time you started setting up parks, and it's always been. In almost every case it's been

voted. You can't acquire parkland in many cases if the Congress doesn't authorize the power of condemnation. It wasn't anything new. I think it was just a device that he used, seized upon. And yet, you know, he was a dean of a law school, prided himself on his knowledge of constitutional law and human rights, and I'm sure he built an awful fine case in his own mind against giving some bureaucrat power to move in and take people's homes away from them, that sort of thing.

But we felt that there was no way--not involving Oregon Dunes, but involving park acquisition program anywhere--that we could back up on that. We could do what we did on Cape Cod, allow a life tenancy if there were areas we felt had to come into the park that people didn't want to give up, let them use it during their lifetime. But Morse didn't like.... There was a rivalry between him and the Neubergers, and he never did come around. There were signs at times he was going to do it, and he never did, and the park never came into existence.

MOSS: Now, on the Indiana Dunes. This is slightly different. You had Paul Douglas [Paul H. Douglas] and the conservationists on one side and you had the steel people and some of the Indiana politicians on the other side. Now, how did this go?

[-159-]

BEATY: Well, I think both of these things were settled after President Kennedy's death.

MOSS: Yes.

BEATY: Although they weren't both settled. Oregon Dunes still isn't settled. Both of them, the fights continued after the change of presidency. Charlie Halleck [Charles A. Halleck] was the leader of the House Republicans. This was his district. You don't ever, under normal circumstances, approve a park or a reclamation project or anything else in a congressional district when that congressman opposes it, and particularly when he is the leader of one of the parties. It was a very difficult situation. There wasn't a conservationist around who didn't think that this was a worthwhile project and that something ought to be done to save a little bit of that end of the lake from industrialization. But these are some of the problems you run into. I forget the name of the leading conservationist in that part of Indiana. Tom Dustin seems to fit in my mind. He was active in the Audubon Society or one of these conservationist's organizations. He was a very fine guy and, you know, a letter writer and an article writer and a regular witness at hearings. And I think he lives at Fort Wayne.

The publisher of the Fort Wayne newspapers ran a fairly liberal newspaper. I forget whether he runs one or both papers there. He was a good Democrat. He supported Kennedy and supported the Democrats for the 1960 election, and he was against the Dunes. He wanted a park, but he felt that we could go ahead with the industry as well; that the new port and the new steel mills....

So kind of tripping lightly over eggs--you know, the situation, the kind of circumstances you're in. Paul Douglas was a very determined guy. And the people in Indiana

said, "Sure, it's great for Chicago to want to set up a park over here for their playground and take away our jobs and our industry." So unions got involved in it and opposed it. Not all of them; some of them came out and voted for it.

Development proceeded in some areas, and it got to the point, the fight dragged on so long and they kept whittling it down, that, I think, Udall himself probably lost a little interest in it; there wasn't enough left to make it really qualify as a national seashore, lakeshore, as the designation came to be known. But we kept on working on it and finally got it.

There was a congressman [John E. Roush] from southern or central Indiana...

MOSS: Ray Madden [Ray John Madden] ?

BEATY: No. Ray was pretty good on this. He's a Democrat, and he's from Gary [Indiana]. If he hadn't been for it, I think we couldn't have overcome Halleck's opposition. But he was up there in kind of a mixed situation with the unions and the industries to deal with. And this other guy--I don't know why he did it, but I was glad that there was somebody

[-160-]

there who would. He's the one who was out of office for three or four months because he almost got beaten in a very close election, in '62, probably. They took a recount and a whole lot of studying, and they finally found out he won by twenty votes or a hundred votes or something like that. He's not a prepossessive type of a person, but I think he regarded himself as a probable peacemaker between the people in Indiana who.... And he could do this because he wasn't directly involved; his district wasn't directly involved. He had an assistant who's now working for Senator Bayh [Birch Bayh], and the two of them really did a lot of work on this. We can find his name. If I saw a list of Indiana congressmen--he probably got beaten last time when we lost so many seats down there.

MOSS: I'm just thumbing through this article on the Indiana Dunes. I don't see his name.

BEATY: Did you find Tom Dustin?

MOSS: No. I didn't find Dustin either. Most of their names are the ones who were involved in the business end. Thomas Moses was executive vice-president of the consumer dunes, the involvement of the Murchisons [Clint Williams Murchison]...

BEATY: Inland Steel, Bethlehem and...

MOSS: Yeah, right, right. And Governor Welsh [Matthew E. Welsh], former Governor Craig [George N. Craig], all these people are mentioned, but I don't see either Dustin or this other fellow.

BEATY: Well, most of the governors gave us some support privately. They didn't really lead out--I don't remember that they did strongly for it. It was hard to get it done, and it took a lot of leadership in Congress by people like, you know, Jackson [Henry M. Jackson], chairman of the Senate Interior Committee, and others who could run with something like this, where the local congressman couldn't or where the people who didn't want to buck a man like Halleck couldn't.

MOSS: Let's take a break a minute while I turn this tape.

BEATY: Okay.

[BEGIN SIDE II, TAPE I]

MOSS: Okay, let me see. There was quite a controversy over the Canyonlands [Canyonlands National Park] thing in Utah. My notes indicate...

BEATY: We called this the first new national park in four years or something like that; that isn't right, what I said isn't right. We regarded Cape Cod and Padre Island and Point Reyes as seashores, and here was a new park being created, mostly out of public domain. It could be done without an awful lot of expense. You just get the authorization and put the

[-161-]

land out of the Bureau of Land Management control into the Park Service. Some of the areas we wanted were in Utah State Park, so it involved dealing with the state of Utah directly, as well as with the effects of...

MOSS: Let me hold just a second.

BEATY: Yeah, okay. [Interruption]

MOSS: Now, talking about the Canyonlands in the state of Utah being effected.

BEATY: Well, the controversy is one of those that develops anytime you change the status of public domain land. If it's being used for grazing, even if only half a dozen or so ranchers are involved and maybe less than two thousand head of cattle, all of a sudden the whole state seems to feel threatened that their economy is going down the drain because you're taking this land out of commercial use and "locking up the resources" is the classic phrase. And to oppose the hunters and fishermen or these organizations--of course, it was hunting rather than fishing that they were concerned with because, you know, in most cases fishing's not barred in a national park, anyway; but hunting is. Well, you know, you look at that area, you fly over it, you walk through it or whatever you do--and it's hard to conceive of there being an awful lot of hunting. It's barren. In some of the areas there's enough grass, probably, for some deer, a few, but Utah's hunting

capability wasn't destroyed by creating this park. Everybody had some reason to oppose it. This was very close to Moab, and there was some sulfur deposits and potash, I suppose, in that area, and there were some developments. Senator Bennett and the Utah business establishment--if you want to use that word--were opposed to it.

Udall was supported by Senator Moss [Frank Edward Moss]. Maybe it was the other way around, because Moss was a very active leader in this fight for a big park. We were going for one that included about a million acres and included Dead Horse Point State Park and would tie into the Arches National Monument and Natural Bridges National Monument.

I don't know whether we'd get to--probably not to Capital Reef National Monument. All these are in the same sort of thing, colorful sandstone, desert scenery. But they wanted to extend it to make one big national park in that area.

They got some support from some of the people in that area. It seems to me one of the Moab newspapers supported the idea, at least at times. But the business editors of the Salt Lake City papers were flailing away at it. And Udall, through the information service or the park information people, got a film made called the *Sculptured Earth*. It had very good photography, but the commentary wasn't as good as it might have been, and the sound didn't come out too good. But nevertheless, it was showable, and it was used to promote the park idea, to explain what it would do and try to allay some of the fears.

I forget when it happened, but it must have been--I think it's probably 1962, but I'm not sure. It may have been late 1961 Udall had various things to do on the West Coast and stopped off in Salt Lake City on his way back

[-162-]

through to get acquainted with the editors and publishers of the newspapers to talk to them about it, to talk to local leaders. He had, at that time at least, three or four.... He had rather good and close personal relationships with three or four of the ruling people in the Mormon Church, the Council of Twelve. One of them was kind of the executive leader under President McKay [David O. McKay]. I can't think of his name right now, Hugh Brown [Hugh B. Brown], or.... It just doesn't come through. I'm not a Mormon and I tend to forget who the people are.

So he was doing everything he could to--not to try to just run roughshod over the wishes of the people of Utah, but to explain to them the advantages of this, what a park would mean in increased tourist traffic and tourist business, and that this in the end would mean more economically than letting a few ranchers continue to run their cattle there or to have a few mines that open up and run a little while and play out. Here's something substantial. It would constantly increase in value. But along with it he tried to sell them the idea of the philosophy of preserving some of this unique scenery unmarred by commercial development. Well, the controversy got so hot that the University of Utah chose not to let them have this meeting on campus, and they had to have it someplace else in downtown Utah. It was a...

MOSS: Governor Clyde [George D. Clyde], I believe, called the film a political ploy or something of this sort.

BEATY: Yeah. Yeah. Governor Clyde was quite helpful to us on many things in Utah, even though we're different parties. And he had a man in charge of state resources--I can't think of his name, but we can find it because he served on the National Parks Advisory Board--who was very helpful to us on many things. I know they had mixed views on this, but Senator Bennett was so outspoken and so determined not to let this park come about that I'm sure that Governor Clyde was kind of backed into a corner, and it's understandable why he'd view a professionally made film as an unfair attempt to influence people there for the benefit of Senator Moss. You know, the Republicans versus the Democrats and forget about the park values. That really was about the height of the opposition, when they had to move the meeting off the campus, because it gradually fell into--the pieces fell into place. We compromised pretty drastically by cutting back the size until it came out, finally, about a third as large as originally intended. And Senator Moss is still trying to get some of those western portions of the park added to it.

Meanwhile, the state of Utah has built a fine new visitors' center at the North Point State Park, and they're going to continue to operate it as a state park. But there's no paved road from the main highway, from Moab north and northwest into the central part of Utah, the heavily populated area. You turn off that and you've got about a twenty, twenty-five-mile dirt road. Maybe it's gravel. But it's rough, and it's dusty in the dusty seasons, and you can't make any time on it to get to Dead Horse Point and then on out to other features of the Canyonlands which surrounds this thing, the Island in the Sky area and so forth. It's gorgeous country if you're accustomed to

[-163-]

desert scenery.

MOSS: Another area that really never got off the ground was the proposed Prairie Lands Park [Prairie National Park], Kansas area. Udall got run off a man's land looking at it, at one point, didn't he?

BEATY: Yeah. As I mentioned at the beginning of this session today, there hadn't been an awful lot done under the Eisenhower administration. Secretary Seaton had a lot more interest, apparently, in doing something than Secretary McKay [Douglas McKay] had had in the first four years of the Eisenhower administration. When you're preserving areas unique to America, it seemed logical, I think, to preserve an area of grassland, the prairies where the buffalo roamed and Indians moved back and forth.

And a lot of this land in Nebraska and Kansas, perhaps in Wyoming as well.... We had suggestions for prairie land parks in at least those three states and perhaps others. They were areas that hadn't been plowed up; they hadn't been overgrazed to the point that the original vegetation had been completely destroyed; they were areas where if you put a fence around and quit grazing for awhile, the original vegetation would come back, and I'm sure there'd be an increase in the natural wildlife and rabbits and coyotes or whatever it happens to be. I'm not an expert on this, but I understand the general theory of it.

This particular area, where this episode occurred, was fairly close to Secretary Seaton's hometown of Hastings. I think this is right. I think he owned a newspaper there. And

it was logical to me that the Park Service, trying to get a little help higher up in getting a new park area, chose this area near Secretary Seaton, where he'd be interested personally. I also think there was a dam built on the river not far from there so that there had been some governmental activity in the area. And because there had been some land acquired so that this would ease the.... I'm very confused on the details of this, but there were several reasons why this particular area was chosen.

And Connie Wirth kept pushing this as a great idea. And Udall was intrigued by any new park ideas. In fact, he was asking for ideas from the Park Service: "Tell your regional directors to get information in on things that have been overlooked or that have been tried and then fallen through for one reason or another." So every time Udall would head out West, Wirth would try to get him to stop by and take a look at this. And finally there was the right occasion, and he made that stop....

I think the Park Service efforts were very faulty on this. They made no attempt to alert him to the possibilities of trouble. You know, it wasn't a totally unpleasant thing. He stopped in a nearby town, and a lot of people in favor of it talked to him, and he got a chance to look at the area. But one of the ranchers who opposed it--and I'm sure who was a Republican--chose to make a stand. And here's the embattled farmer or rancher out there on the hilltop telling Udall to, "Get you and your helicopter off my land." And

[-164-]

rather than having our little friendly visit and looking the area over and talking about it, there was a confrontation; and naturally, that's what got the publicity, a picture of Udall extending his hand and this guy shaking his finger or his pitchfork or whatever it was. By itself, it wouldn't have made any difference, but on top of the oil company ticket sales thing and the Bay of Pigs story on national television and so forth, it made it look like, "Well, here's another Udall blunder." He didn't regard it as any great disaster, but I chewed on Connie Wirth a little bit about it, his miserable planning on it.

MOSS: Well, he could've at least picked a friendly rancher.

BEATY: That's right. Well, you know, he could've done a thousand different things. Stewart just stumbled into it totally unprepared for open hostility, and I think he probably handled himself very well, but he shouldn't have had to. Well, that publicity brought in a lot of suggestions. "Let's set up a grasslands national park or a prairie park up in our area. We've got land that is ideal for this, and it's got tracks running through it where the wagon trains went across." And you know, you got all kinds of suggestions in favor. And you also got a lot of letters saying, "That was a mighty fine rancher. We'll run you off our land, too, if you come down here." [Laughter] It never came about. I think it might someday, but it kept getting decreasing priority as other areas showed better opportunities, and you spend your time on the better. I'm sure this was enough of a distasteful thing that he didn't have the same enthusiasm for it as he did for other things.

MOSS: Let's come back East for a moment or two, right back to Washington, and talk about setting up the White House as a national monument. Who was handling

this in the Interior Department?

BEATY: Hell, I don't have any idea. I remember this being mentioned several times. Bill Pozen [Walter I. Pozen] in our office did a lot of work with National Capital Parks, which is a division of the National Park Service. They're the ones that had the duty of maintaining the grounds and all these things around the White House. Jim Carr, I think, had a little hand in it. Udall himself--I'm sure any initiative came from Udall.

MOSS: Any feel for the relationship between, say, Udall and Mrs. Kennedy [Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy] on this?

BEATY: Yes. Well, I don't really have a feel for it, but this was a factor. She was taking this active interest in either restoring or redoing the inside of the White House, and she and he talked about it a great deal. And Bill Pozen talked to a couple of her secretaries, Pamela Turnure and I forget who else.

MOSS: Tazewell Shepard [Tazewell T. Shepard, Jr.], I think, was involved in this.

BEATY: Yeah, that's right. That's right. That's right. I remember he

[-165-]

and Udall talked about it on some occasions, I think more by phone than personal, although it's quite possible they met over there when I wasn't around.

MOSS: Do you recall a minor flap about lighting the monuments?

BEATY: Oh, sure, I remember a great deal about that.

MOSS: What happened?

BEATY: The first time that I recall hearing anything about this, Ted Reardon cornered me over at the White House after one of our cabinet assistants meetings or something like this and said, "You know, why don't you put some lights on the Jefferson Memorial?" And (I forget what he called the President), "The Boss keeps asking me how come there's no lights over there at night? He thinks it ought to be lighted." I went back and made some inquiries--probably through John Carver, although maybe I talked to Wirth directly. I was probably as bad as Udall about going to the bureau chiefs instead of going through the assistant secretaries. But anyway, I went through some kind of channels and word came back that the architect didn't design this to be illuminated and it would be wrong to illuminate it. And, "Oh, how about illuminating the figure or something?" "No, we just don't do that."

Time passed, and Ted got me on the phone and, "Hey, when are you going to get that monument lighted? Every time we come in from Andrews and fly over that thing in the helicopter and it's dark, the President says, 'How come they don't get that lighted? I'd like to see how it looks.'" It's really one of those deals where the bureau didn't want to do it, and they dragged their feet, and they would never have done it. But one day I got kind of a direct order--you know, still informal and friendly tone, but there was some urgency to it.

MOSS: From Reardon?

BEATY: Yeah. I don't think I ever talked to anybody over there except Ted about this. I forget who I talked to, whether it was John or Wirth, but I said, "This has just got to be done. Get some lights out there." So they went to the Signal Corps or somebody in the Defense Department and borrowed some spotlights and installed them.

And I'm told that during the installation process the President showed up over there one night and was talking to some of the workmen--and before they realized it was the President. He'd happened to look out the window and saw the lights flickering as they were trying them out and had somebody drive him over and took a look at it. [Laughter] All of this looked good to him, and permanent lights were then installed. They still resisted doing it for the Lincoln Memorial, that this absolutely would ruin it, that the whole focus was on the figure of Lincoln inside this darkened monument structure. And I was gone from Interior when they finally moved ahead to get the money to illuminate it, and, of course, I think it's a gorgeous thing at night, now, lighted up. But the Park Service would never have done

[-166-]

it without prodding from higher up.

MOSS: How about the Fire Island [New York] situation? I think we've mentioned this once or twice before. I'm not sure whether I talked to you about it or to Carver about it. I know I talked to him. How did you get--I've also talked to Ed Crafts [Edward C. Crafts], as a matter of fact, on it. How did you get all the New York people together on this? There was quite a stew about it, wasn't there?

BEATY: Yeah, and I had even less to do with this than with a lot of the other things, and I'm not sure I can be a great deal of help on it. You know, I am a westerner; this is New York. I was unaware that such a thing as Fire Island even existed until this big storm, you remember, a northeaster, that played havoc with Ocean City and all these resorts up and down the coast from Virginia Beach, I guess--or at least from Ocean City, Maryland--all the way up to Cape Cod. It destroyed a lot of houses on Fire Island, and that's when I first became aware of it. I think that's when people on the island, the landowners in the parts of it, became active.

Robert Moses wanted to protect what was left of Fire Island by building a big highway along the seaward side, build it up and, you know, provide kind of a dike-like protection and turn it into a Jones Beach or something like this. Well, they didn't want to do that; they wanted to preserve it pretty much as a natural seashore. And this fitted right into

Udall's concept of how it should be done. Charles Collingwood [Charles Cummings Collingwood]--is it CBS [Columbia Broadcasting System]...

MOSS: Yes. It was at that time. In fact, I think he still is.

BEATY: ...Was a property owner. He has an area out there on the island. And there was a pretty active citizen's organization of property owners, most of whom wanted the park rather than the Robert Moses approach. Well, with people like Collingwood involved, they had some access to the media. They could get publicity in the *Times* and on television. They could also get attention of people in government. But Bill Pozen handled this from our office. You know, I'd catch an occasional phone call from somebody, attended some meetings, but I didn't have a leading.... I just didn't follow it; it wasn't my responsibility. There was a lot of mix-ups on it from time to time, and yet you stumble along and it finally works out. And I just can't contribute much to it.

MOSS: Okay, let's take another thing, which I'm sure you were aware of, and that's the business of Connie Wirth's retirement. What led up to this? I know that John Carver went out to Yosemite and read the riot act to the National Park Service, and shortly afterwards, Connie Wirth retired--or his retirement was pending--because of growing dissatisfaction between him and Udall. How did this develop?

BEATY: First of all, because I know we're not going to have time to do it today, but I want to mention it so we won't forget it, one of these

[-167-]

areas of urgency when we came in was Indians. And this is in Carver's area. I know we'll get to that eventually. And we put a lot of emphasis on that the first few weeks we were in office, just as we did on parks.

Well, John Carver was the kind of guy who relied a great deal on the bureau chiefs. He would tend to back them up, their views, rather than try to push his views over on them. And I think he went along with Connie Wirth quite a bit on many things. I distinctly remember John's defending Connie when I was kicking him around--in private, not face to face.

I felt that Wirth was--rather than being overjoyed that, finally, here was somebody in charge who was actively pushing parks, he resented the fact that he was no longer Mister Big in the parks; that people just didn't automatically think of Connie Wirth when they thought about parks. They were thinking about John Kennedy and Stewart Udall and people who were trying to get more parks put into effect. So some of the problems we had resulted from his resentment. I may be unfair on this. I couldn't cite anything specific on it, but Connie was an old practiced, seasoned bureaucrat who knew how to get things done, or how not to do things, depending on his own whims. And John used to support him on some of these things.

But John finally just got fed up with Connie's refusal to perform when John thought the decisions had been made and clearly transmitted.

MOSS: What kind of things?

BEATY: Well, at this point, I can't remember what precipitated that particular thing. But I do remember that I was present when Udall and Wirth had a talk six months before all this happened in which Connie said he wanted to retire. Whether this was voluntary or forced, I don't know. I think he sensed that his ideas weren't being accepted particularly, that we didn't have full confidence in him. He had other opportunities. But on the surface, it was a voluntary resignation. He said, "I don't want to quit until after some meeting." Maybe it was after the National Park Advisory Board's annual fall meeting and tour of the parks. They always meet and visit about three parks or something like this. And he'd like to announce it himself at one of these sessions. And this was satisfactory to Udall, and they began to look for somebody to take Connie's place.

They asked him for suggestions, and of course, he was promoting some of the guys in the service that were close to him, and in the end his choice wasn't--the people he originally recommended in his list didn't include George Hartzog [George B. Hartzog, Jr.], who became the successor. But when George's name was mentioned to him by Carver and Udall--both of them were impressed by Hartzog--Connie said he was a good man and that certainly he'd fit into this, too. To all intents and purposes, in my mind, we were headed for an amicable change of control, change of direction there, of leadership in the Park Service.

[-168-]

But something happened that caused John to go out to this meeting in Yosemite, supposedly a closed meeting, and sound off and be critical of the Park Service in such a way that it was interpreted as a rebuke to Wirth.

MOSS: Was the speech cleared through you and Udall beforehand?

BEATY: No. No, I don't think so. I didn't see it, I know.

MOSS: I've read the speech, and he refers to the Park Service manual in terms of its being like a Hitler [Adolf Hitler] youth movement.

BEATY: It was a pretty strong speech in temper. It didn't have to be quite like that, but John was--he has very strong feelings and, as I say, he'd been defending Wirth and the National Park Service to a certain extent, and I think he kind of felt betrayed that they hadn't come through on something that he thought was clearly understood. And so he, you know--in the classic, current term--he overreacted and blasted away; while if he'd just waited a little while, Wirth would have been gone and nothing would've happened. But even the reporters that I know real well and had known for a long time--I'm thinking of one in particular, and who's not particularly sympathetic with parks, much more sympathetic with developing the resources--wrote great emotional pieces about dropping the pilot, dropping Connie Wirth, a man who'd led them through the Mission 66 and so forth.

Well, the Park Service, the Advisory Board--and this included Governor Clyde's man.... Harold Fabian [Harold P. Fabian] is the man's name, a Utah man, who's a real fine, old constructive guy on parks. Harold Fabian and one of the former directors of the Park Service, who we've got to get into this because of the hassles with Congress over Death Valley, the so-called conflicts of interests over the private property owners there.... And this man's involved in that. He just belongs in any discussion of parks during that period. They all liked Connie; they felt he'd been unfairly treated; a kind of a revolt was threatened.

Udall, during the time he was in Congress--we had pushed for upgrading Petrified Forest and Painted Desert National Monument to national park status. And the National Parks Association didn't think it had the multiple features that merited park status. It took quite a bit of doing to get it approved, but it was approved, subject to acquiring a lot of the holdings, the rangelands and stuff, that was in private ownership at the time. Well, all this had been done, and it had been declared a national park, and it was to be dedicated during this trip of the National Parks Advisory Board. They met at Grand Canyon and dedicated a ranger training facility there in the name of some former superintendent of the Park Service, director or whatever his title was in those days, and then on to Petrified Forest.

Well, Udall couldn't.... You know, with the work he'd done, logically, he should've been there making this dedicatory speech. His schedule was such that he couldn't go, and I made a talk in his absence, and it was only

[-169-]

one of many talks that were made that day. But because of the flak over Wirth and Carver--I think Udall and Carver both talked about this--they felt that somebody ought to be out there with them representing the Secretary, and he sent me in, not just to show up at the last minute at Petrified Forest, but to get with them at Grand Canyon and stay with them for the three days or whatever it was that this was going on. And I did, and we had many, many private sessions, and my remarks at both the Grand Canyon and Petrified Forest had great praise for Connie Wirth and the Park Service, and it blew over. There wasn't any real blowup. There was no censure from the Advisory Board, which some people had threatened. I know John and Udall could both give you a lot more details on this than I can.

But I was there involved in this series of meetings. I got together at night, the first night I was at Grand Canyon, with.... We went down to Flagstaff, I guess, the Museum of Northern Arizona, for dinner. Ned Danson [Edward B. Danson] had been on the Advisory Board--these guys all kind of stick with it; after they served their terms, they all hang around it. It's something they really get interested in. And we had this meeting there. And between the reception and the dinner, I think Mr. Fabian and the former superintendent or director of the Park Service--whose name I've just got to remember--and I went up and met in the back room and went over this. I made all kinds of assurances that Connie was going with the Secretary's blessing and there was no problem--I mean from the personal feelings. I don't know. Those three days were pretty busy, and yet, nothing really stands out, particularly, in the way of any violent remarks or any unpleasantness. It worked out. Things worked out nicely.

MOSS: Did you hear any echoes of this from the White House area?

BEATY: No, I don't recall a thing. Udall may have heard something, but I didn't. I just don't think they paid a lot of attention to things like this.

MOSS: Okay. We're just about running out of time so I think I'll close it off.

BEATY: Fine.

MOSS: Okay, thank you.

[END OF INTERVIEW #7]

[-170-]

Orren Beaty, Jr. Oral History Transcript – JFK #7
Name Index

A

Allott, Gordon L., 157
Aspinall, Wayne N., 148

B

Ball, George W., 154
Barry, Frank J., Jr., 151
Bayh, Birch, 161
Beasley, D. Otis, 150, 151, 152
Bennett, Elmer F., 148, 162, 163
Brown, Hugh B., 163

C

Carr, James K., 148, 150, 155, 158, 165
Carver, John A., Jr., 148, 155, 166, 167, 168, 169,
170
Clyde, George D., 163, 169
Collingwood, Charles Cummings, 167
Crafts, Edward C., 167
Craig, George N., 161

D

Danson, Edward B., 170
Dominy, Floyd E., 148
Douglas, Paul H., 159, 160
Dustin, Tom, 160, 161
Dutton, Frederick G., 153, 154

E

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 146, 147, 148, 156, 164
Engle, Clair, 147, 148

F

Fabian, Harold P., 169, 170

H

Halleck, Charles A., 160, 161,
Hartzog, George B., Jr., 168
Hitler, Adolf, 169
Hoiles, Harry, 157

J

Jackson, Henry M. "Scoop", 161
Johnson, Lyndon Baines, 152, 156, 157

K

Keith, Hastings, 149
Kennedy, Jacqueline Bouvier, 165
Kennedy, John F., 149, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156,
160, 166, 168
Kilpatrick, Carroll, 145

M

Madden, Ray John, 160
Mansfield, Mike, 146
McClatchy, Eleanor, 158
McKay, David O., 163, 164
Metcalf, Lee, 146
Miller, Clement W., 158
Morse, Wayne L., 159
Moses, Robert, 167
Moses, Thomas, 161
Moss, Frank Edward, 162, 163
Murchison, Clint Williams, 161
Murray, James E., 146

N

Neuberger, Maurine Brown, 159
Neuberger, Richard L., 159

O

O'Brien, Lawrence F., 154

P

Pozen, Walter I., "Bill", 165, 167

R

Reardon, Timothy J., Jr., 154, 166
Roush, John E., 160

S

Seaton, Frederick A., 148, 164

Seigenthaler, John, 154
Shepard, Tazewell T., Jr., 165
Simmons, Jake, Jr., 153
Stoddard, Charles H. "Chuck", 150

T

Truman, Harry S., 147
Turnure, Pamela, 165

U

Udall, Stewart L., 145, 147, 150, 153, 154, 155,

156, 157, 159, 160, 162, 164, 165, 166,
167, 168, 169, 170

W

Welsh, Matthew E., 161
Wirth, Conrad L., 151, 155, 156, 164, 165, 166,
167, 168, 169, 170

Y

Yarborough, Ralph W., 157