

**Wesley Barthelmes Oral History Interview – RFK #3, 6/5/1969**  
Administrative Information

**Creator:** Wesley Barthelmes  
**Interviewer:** Roberta W. Greene  
**Date of Interview:** June 5, 1969  
**Place of Interview:** Washington, D.C.  
**Length:** 28 pp., 1 addendum

**Biographical Note**

Barthelmes, press secretary to Robert F. Kennedy (RFK) from 1965 to 1966, discusses conflicts and negotiations between Attorney General RFK and Representative Edith S. Green about juvenile delinquency legislation and programs, the relationship between Kennedy family members and their staff, and Barthelmes' impressions of RFK's character and personality, among other issues.

**Access**

Open.

**Usage Restrictions**

According to the deed of gift signed April 23, 1971, copyright of these materials has been passed to United States Government upon the death of the donor.

**Copyright**

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be "used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research." If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excesses of "fair use," that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law. The copyright law extends its protection to unpublished works from the moment of creation in a tangible form. Direct your questions concerning copyright to the reference staff.

**Transcript of Oral History Interview**

These electronic documents were created from transcripts available in the research room of the John F. Kennedy Library. The transcripts were scanned using optical character recognition and the resulting text files were proofread against the original transcripts. Some formatting changes were made. Page numbers are noted where they would have occurred at the bottoms of the pages of the original transcripts. If researchers have any concerns about accuracy, they are encouraged to visit the Library and consult the transcripts and the interview recordings.

**Suggested Citation**

Wesley Barthelmes, recorded interview by Roberta W. Greene, June 5, 1969, (page number), Robert Kennedy Oral History Program of the John F. Kennedy Library.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

Gift of Personal Statement

By Wes Barthelmes

to the

JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY

I, Wes Barthelmes of Washington, D. C., do hereby give to the John F. Kennedy Library, for use and administration therein, all my rights, title and interest, except as hereinafter provided, to the tape recording and transcript of the interviews conducted at Washington, D. C. on May 20, 1969, June 2, 1969, and June 5, 1969 for the John F. Kennedy Library. The gift of this material is made subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. The interview is to be closed to general research until April 1, 1981, or until my death, whichever is the later.
2. During the term of this restriction researchers may apply to me for written permission for access to the interview, and those receiving my written permission are to be granted access to the interview by the Director of the John F. Kennedy Library.
3. Further, for a period of ten years researchers may not quote from the interviews, in whole or in part.
4. Researchers who have access to the transcript may listen to the tapes; however, this is to be for background use only, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase or quote therefrom.
5. The interview and its restrictions may be listed in general announcements of the Library's collection.

Page two

6. I retain literary property rights to the interview until April 1, 1981, or until my death whichever is later, at which time the literary property rights shall be assigned to the United States Government.

7. This agreement may be revised or amended by mutual consent of the parties undersigned.

Wes Barthelmes

Wes Barthelmes

April 21, 1971

Month, Day, Year

James B. Rhoads

Archivist of the United States

April 23, 1971

Month, Day, Year

Wesley Barthelmes – RFK #3

Table of Contents

<u>Page</u>	<u>Topic</u>
143, 150, 157,159	Negotiations between Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy (RFK) and Representative Edith S. Green about juvenile delinquency programs
149	David L. Hackett
153	RFK's interest in youth programs
155	RFK's accessibility as Attorney General
158	Green's relationship with John F. Kennedy and RFK
160	Relations between Kennedy family members and their staff
163	Work RFK's friends did for him
165	Paul Corbin
167	RFK's relationship with his staff
169	Barthelmes' impressions of RFK's character and personality
Addendum	Subject Index

Third of Three Oral History Interviews

With

Wesley Barthelmes

June 5, 1969  
Washington, D.C.

By Roberta Greene

For the Robert F. Kennedy Oral History Project of the Kennedy Library

GREENE: You mentioned in the first interview that Mrs. Green [Edith S. Green] was not satisfied with the character of the legislation on juvenile delinquency--juvenile crime, rather--and that she felt it was too comprehensive. What was the nature of her request for changes in the bill?

BARTHELMES: Sometime in 1963, I believe the summer, Mrs. Green raised the point with me, when I was her administrative assistant, that she wanted to inquire into the administration of the National Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Act [Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act], which was passed in 1961. The legislation was under the jurisdiction of her Subcommittee on Special Education. She'd had a strong hand in its formulation.

The first result of that inquiry was to ask Dave Hackett [David L. Hackett] to come to Mrs. Green's office to discuss problems that she sensed had arisen--that is, problems as she defined them. It was quite apparent in the course of the discussion, which ended very poorly--it deteriorated as the conversation went on--that Mrs. Green envisioned the act primarily as one in which small specific innovative programs would be funded to find new techniques, or more flexible techniques, imaginable techniques for dealing with

juvenile delinquency, both in rural areas and in the ghettos, among whites, among blacks, in suburbs. It was quite apparent, as Dave Hackett explained the program as it was then going on, that what was happening was that there were several large comprehensive city-wide--if not city-wide, embracing geographically large areas of cities; Cleveland being one, New York another. It was a large expenditure of money, and she felt they were too identical and that the money was going to cure it or remedy juvenile delinquency in the Lower East Side of Manhattan or in Cleveland. This was not how she envisioned it.

So what we had was one more case, which is not infrequent, of the legislator of record fussing with the executive branch over the administration of a program which he or she, within the Congress, had been instrumental in having enacted. During the course of the conversation, from Mrs. Green's point of view, Dave Hackett made the mistake of saying they had been slow to fund, but toward the end of the fiscal year, June 30, that they were funding a good many programs so they wouldn't have to return the money back to the Treasury. At this point Mrs. Green got very icy and got very angry and berated Hackett at some length. It was obviously a very unsatisfactory end to a conversation to which I was witness and which lasted probably an hour, fifty minutes or an hour. The conversation Mrs. Green had with me about her conversation with Hackett probably lasted longer than the conversation with Hackett did.

[-144-]

Mrs. Green asked if it would be all right--since she had a number of things to do--if I could go down and talk with the Attorney General [Robert F. Kennedy] later to enter Mrs. Green's detailed objections and also to discuss with Hackett and his staff some of the specific problems. This was done a week or two later. I had, oh, a ten- or fifteen-minute conversation with the Attorney General in his office with no one else present. Then, as very often is the case, he passed me over to Hackett. At that point, oh, I think the negotiation--if that is the word--went on probably a year or so and ended inconclusively.

Mrs. Green felt that when the legislation came up for renewal in '64 that she had secured some tighter hold over the administration of the program. I think, in fact, that the administrators of the program, Hackett and the others, actually were able to continue along the lines that they had been during the life of the first program.

My participation simply involved sending memos to the Attorney General--which I assumed simply went to Hackett--on my trip to Kanawha County, where there was a rural program being funded, and to a rather large and, I thought, attractive program in New Haven, Connecticut, and to Cleveland.

It seems to me during that period Mrs. Green also had hearings. As I said, in the renewal legislation there was an effort to emphasize the pilot project and not the comprehensive remedial project.

[-145-]

At that point--if not that day, within a day or two--she conveyed her misgivings to the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, with whom she had a relationship, and who was the only one of the administrative officers who had evidenced a continuing interest in the program.

Under the legislation, Secretary of HEW [Department of Health, Education, and Welfare], who was then Mr. Celebrezze [Anthony J. Celebrezze], Secretary of Labor, who was then Willard Wirtz [William Willard Wirtz], and the Attorney General were sort of a triad or troika who were responsible for the program. It was quite obvious that Secretary Celebrezze and Secretary Wirtz were not taking a personal interest in it, but the Attorney General very definitely was. It showed up in a number of ways, including the Attorney General's tour of the central city in the ghetto areas in Washington, D.C., among other things.

From there, after the conversation with the Attorney General, the Attorney General himself came up--don't remember how soon afterwards--and talked with Mrs. Green and with Dave Hackett. Both were unconvinced at the end of that conversation. It was polite, but there was a great deal of tension underneath in respect to Mrs. Green's part in it. The burden of the Attorney General's quiet presentation was to the effect that it was a problem.

He didn't feel that what was being done, the funding of large projects, the Mobilization for Youth, for example, in Manhattan, was at all inconsistent with the aims of the program. The legislative history of the program, both within the committee and on the floor would bear this out. Well, then we got into a sort of legislative minuet in which each could quote passages in the Congressional Record at the time of passage of the bill that would sustain each other's position. That conversation ended.

[-146-]

It was an interesting observation, I thought then, that the Attorney General had made to me while we were talking. I thought, when I went to work for him when he became a Senator, that was true; although I thought nothing of the remark at the time. In discussing some of the problems of juvenile delinquency he sort of gratuitously made the observation about himself that he had no difficulty remembering what he called "bad" or "terminal" statistics about how much juvenile delinquency there is and drug addiction and various other statistics; he had considerable difficulty remembering remedial statistics about how much is right or how much is being done. The emphasis is always there. I think this was probably an interesting insight that he offered into himself, and I think it showed up in his general attitude towards the world and his role as Senator.

GREENE:                Would you say that Mrs. Green and Kennedy and Hackett disagreed philosophically as far as what the programs should be doing, or simply in terms of how they should be administered? Did they think that her idea of small individual programs in limited areas was simply not comprehensive enough to meet the problem?

BARTHELMES:        I think what had happened is that after the program was passed that the national staff, the administrative staff, of which I believe Dave Hackett was the executive director, leaned to the advice of two prominent sociologists in the area. One was Lloyd Ohlin [Lloyd E. Ohlin]--I think O-H-L-I-N, I'm not certain--and the other was a Richard Cloward [Richard A. Cloward], C-L-O-W-A-R-D, whom I believe is or was at Harvard University. She used to speak contemptuously that the Mobilization for Youth organization or operation in Manhattan.... She referred to it as a "two



million dollar Cloward-Ohlin experimentation program.” But the argument that was raised philosophically.... Ohlin

[-147-]

did eventually arrive on the scene to defend his progeny, and that created a further problem with Mrs. Green because they talked different varieties of English. In fairness all the way around, Mrs. Green spoke a rather precise, and direct, brand of English and Ohlin spoke a professional jargon--a Mandarin, involuted type of sociological speech patter that made it difficult and compounded the difficulty of a communication that was difficult enough.

I think it was basically a philosophical difference on the agreement that you simply.... The innovative program for a neighborhood settlement house, to set up a new settlement house, or to do things with perhaps three or four families on a block--which were the things that Mrs. Green was talking about--were very difficult to control, in terms of controlled experiment vis-à-vis an uncontrolled experiment because of the surrounding circumstances. By the nature of it, to be effective, they, both geographically and in terms of content the program, had to be much larger than those that Mrs. Green had envisioned. It was a very fundamental difference. They may share the premises in terms of, you know, “We want to cure juvenile delinquency,” but once we’ve said that, there really was a very basic difference and a very combative situation, and it persisted into the second renewal of the legislation after I had left.

The interesting thing is I thought it was a microcosm of the problems that were encountered subsequently with the passage of the anti-poverty program, the OEO [Office of Economic Opportunity] Act. The Congressman in New Haven, Congressman Giaimo [Robert N. Giaimo], was complaining that the juvenile delinquency funds were being given to groups that were politically hostile to him. He complained to Mrs. Green and Mrs. Green sent me to New Haven. That wasn’t my impression at all, and this is what I so reported; I don’t believe it went any further. The same situation was complained of in Kanawha County in West Virginia where Charleston is located. The same in Cleveland where the Mayor’s office was complaining that federal funds were being used to “cause trouble” in central areas. Although this was noticed, there really was no one.... I’m drawing a

[-148-]

generalization, but this was the very thing that happened on a much larger scale under the Community Action Program, the CAP program in the poverty bill.

One of the problems Mrs. Green would have with the poverty bill was she’d say, “Well, they cribbed that Community Action Program from the juvenile delinquency section. They put all the sociologists to work, and it’s just causing trouble.”

The controversy was never resolved, I don’t believe, satisfactorily to anyone’s attitude or frame of mind, although the Attorney General did his best to find persons whom he thought were of a temperament that could “negotiate” with Mrs. Green. Don Ellinger, W. Don Ellinger, perhaps bravely was better than, probably performed better than anyone else. There were one or two others at HEW who were sent up as emissaries; they were unsuccessful. I thought that Ellinger was undoubtedly more successful than anyone else.

Relations were so bruised between Hackett and Mrs. Green that he was, you know, deliberately kept out of these negotiations.

The one thing I'd say about Hackett--I found that Dave was very useful as I sought to represent what Mrs. Green's view was because I think there was a great correspondence of attitude between Dave Hackett and Robert Kennedy. Someone I know once said--and it was not meant uncomplimentarily at all--"When the Attorney General itched, why, Dave Hackett scratched." What they were simply saying was, when you went into a staff meeting, Hackett had the uncommon quality of being able to speak for the Attorney General in a way that was so precise that there was almost no disjointment, no inconsistency at all. Staff people are able sometimes to do this in the general sense. From time to time one of them stumbles and badly misjudges the view of the person for whom he speaks, but Hackett was absolutely in identity with the Attorney General and you could rely.... I found out from experience that if Dave Hackett took a position during a negotiation, without his saying, "The Attorney General says,"--it wasn't that he was saying this--he was authentically speaking for the Attorney General. When you would ask him....

[-149-]

Where it really proved out was when he'd say, "Well, I think the Attorney General's position is going to be thus and so, but I'll talk to him," and at the next negotiating meeting, why, you know, this in fact was true. He obviously had latitude, which is typical of Robert Kennedy's approach to his staff, to give them a long leash. If they stumble, they're on their own, but he let them exercise their responsibility.

GREENE: How did the subcommittee members, outside of Mrs. Green, divide on this? Were most of them in support of her position or the Attorney General's?

BARTHELMES: I think the only one that supported her consistently was Robert Giaimo, G-I-A-I-M-O, who had been the House member from New Haven, Connecticut for a good many years. He's now on the Appropriations Committee, but he was on Mrs. Green's committee on special education at the time the first juvenile delinquency bill was passed out of the subcommittee and the full Education and Labor Committee. Congressman Brademas [John Brademas] of Indiana indicated some reservations about it, but as he sat in one or two of the sessions in Mrs. Green's office, and then as the testimony developed during the hearings leading to the extension of the program, he soon disaffected and found himself an ally or spokesman or one who supported the way the program was being administered downtown, and not an ally of Mrs. Green.

[-150-]

Mrs. Green actively solicited allies on the subcommittee. My recollection is that except for Giaimo--and he was not a strong pillar of support; he simply had his own political irons in the fire in New Haven as explained previously--she did find an ally in then

Congressman Goodell [Charles E. Goodell], now a Senator from New York State, and to a lesser degree, Congressman Quie [Albert H. Quie], Q-U-I-E, a Republican of Minnesota who's still on the committee and who still is an ally of hers on legislation since that time, legislation of other categories. The two Republicans supported Mrs. Green, both within the subcommittee and on the floor, but her support from the Democratic colleagues on the subcommittee and within the Education and Labor Committee, as a whole, was minimal.

GREENE: What about Barney Ross [George Barney Ross]? What was his role in this? Did you see much of him?

BARTHELMES: No, I didn't really. This is where I first met him; Barney Ross would sit in at the meetings which mostly concerned Hackett and Ellinger. There was one fellow who was then chairman of the Falls Church, Virginia, School Board at HEW who was a frequent visitor to Mrs. Green's office, and one who was a steady member of the negotiating panel, as I recall it. I don't remember his name right now; it will come to me; I can supply it. I believe he's still at HEW.

Barney Ross would be there from time to time, but I don't remember his saying a great deal. It seemed to me that he did certain things for Hackett, checking out information or making a trip, but I don't remember his being at the nub of the negotiations.

[-151-]

GREENE: Do you know how much selling Robert Kennedy, or Hackett on his behalf, did on the legislation before it was passed?

BARTHELMES: The '61 legislation?

GREENE: Yes.

BARTHELMES: I wasn't with Mrs. Green when the basic legislation was passed. All this discussion on this tape relates to the period when the basic legislation of '61 had an expiration date, a three years expiration date, and attention was being given to renewing it. Mrs. Green wanted to renew it. In the course of her looking, the renewal process she said, "Well, what has been happening to date? Let's look at the record to date." It was then that she discovered from her point of view that the program wasn't operating as she felt it should, and it was out of this that the discussion developed. No. It didn't join Mrs. Green until '62, so what I'm talking about are the problems that were generated out of the renewal, the extension of the legislation beyond the first expiration date.

GREENE: Oh, yes. I wasn't clear on that. How much interest in these problems and projects on juvenile delinquency did the Senator have while you were with him in the Senate? Did he get involved in this at all at that point?

[-152-]

BARTHELMES: Well, the dust had settled. The problems that Mrs. Green raised on the House side in respect to the program, the operation of the federal program, did not exist on the Senate side with the exception, probably, of, oh, maybe Senator Dominick [Peter H. Dominick] of Colorado. On the Senate side, when the Senator went to the Senate, I don't think he found the same situation at all.

By that time the dust had cleared a little and Mrs. Green was devoting her tender ministrations to the poverty program and various other programs that had incurred her wrath, so the juvenile delinquency program didn't have the priority in her list of those things she was mad at. I think the program, subsequently, has been renewed two or three times.

GREENE: What about his interest, in general, on youth problems?

BARTHELMES: It stems from, as I've said on the tape earlier, his great feeling for children, any children. Some people relax by going to movies or reading books or going to ball games; I really think that Senator Robert Kennedy relaxed by being around children, his children or anyone else's children. We talked about his great willingness to attend youth affairs.

By that time, you'll remember, there had been a playground dedicated, I believe at 7th and O [Street], the John F. Kennedy Playground. It was very elaborate, and Roy Chalk [O. Roy Chalk], who is owner of the D.C. [District of Columbia] Transit Lines, had agreed to help finance it, but after the publicity flash and the other things that Chalk had profited from, as time went on, he became increasingly reluctant to support it. There were some problems there; that was a problem, I think, that Barrett Prettyman [E. Barrett Prettyman] probably dealt with more than anyone else. The Senator did visit, while I was there, the playground on one occasion, and as usual with the young people, was literally mobbed.

[-153-]

We had talked when he was Attorney General. I'd been impressed with the "roving leader" program in the District of Columbia, which I thought was very effective. I'd spent a week on the street, during the night and early-morning hours. He was pleased at that and talked to its then director Stan Anderson, who's now a member of the District of Columbia City Council. He, on two or three occasions, had gone down to the playground and school areas in the District of Columbia--a) It was nearby, but b) I think the District of Columbia was of special interest to the Senator; he was on the District of Columbia Committee.

The same was true in New York City, particularly with his efforts toward, his interest in, vest-pocket playgrounds. He talked with then Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall [Stewart L. Udall] about the need to urbanize the Interior Department. If you're talking about conservation in its broadest scope, broadest definition, it certainly involves the problems in the cities--recreation for one. Now, not everyone can hire a guide and a pack and go to Yosemite [National] Park. What are you going to do if you live in the Bronx or the West Side of Manhattan? So he talked to Udall at some length about the idea of the vest-pocket

playgrounds. Could the Interior Department see its way fit--which it did subsequently--to setting up an urban-oriented recreation fund to fund these vest-pocket parks? The building that's condemned and no one wants and the city tears it down, it may just mean put a layer of macadam and put a couple of basketball courts on it or a handball court or something, or a sandbox, just something that will give the neighborhood some relief from playing in the streets.

I guess in April or May of '65, his first year in the Senate, he arranged a tour by helicopter of the major areas in the city that needed recreation facilities. Secretary Udall remained with him, and a good many of the conservation-minded people of considerable wealth and stature. Mrs. Guggenheimer [Elinor C. Guggenheimer] and others attended a luncheon at the Tavern-on-the-Green at Central Park, and out of that came rather successful efforts--Mayor Wagner [Robert Ferdinand Wagner, Jr.] was then Mayor of New York--to start vest-pocket parks, lighted playgrounds, federal programs that cities, urban

[-154-]

areas, can take advantage of. This was, in fact, established by the Interior Department with the approval of the Congress.

GREENE: Is there anything else on that juvenile delinquency committee that we ought to get down?

BARTHELMES: Only that I think it's, you know, unusual.... It's been my experience, in six or seven years as a congressional assistant, that most Cabinet officers play the staff game. It's perfectly legitimate; a lot of things are done in their name, studies, and hearings, and programs, and what have you. Then when the television lights are on they step in front of it and announce that such-and-such a program is a tremendous success.

Well, I'd only been on the Hill three years when I first encountered Robert Kennedy as Attorney General, and I found that--you know, I was impressed that with all the many things he had to do as the chief legal officer of the United States, he had time to devote to this program, personally and directly, by being willing to talk to me instead of Mrs. Green, of dropping by these negotiating sessions from time to time and saying, "How are you doing?"

His presence was very definitely felt, and I think this was felt in the so-called negotiations I referred to, in which I represented Mrs. Green. You know, he was very attentive to this; and he was very anxious that the program not be imperiled and an agreement be reached that would result in the continuation of the program in the most effective way. In effect, those words are more or less what he kept repeating on and on as he talked to Mrs. Green, not once, but twice, in person.

[-155-]

He would come to the Hill, it was my experience, with Mrs. Green and others. Usually the member goes down to the executive branch, but he would come to the Hill and take time--forty-five minutes is a tremendous amount of time for a Cabinet officer to spend

with a member of Congress about a relatively small program. When you think of the business of crime and corruption and civil rights enforcement and some of the really very major issues that were swirling about the Justice Department at that time, plus the great reliance that President Kennedy, John Kennedy, placed on his brother, this was one of the first living examples I have of the humanness of the private person. His role in that brief encounter impressed me a great deal.

GREENE: Do you think that might have been...

BARTHELMES: Very uncommon, particularly in this program. When you see Secretary Celebreeze, you rarely get an answer from anyone, not even in his office. Secretary Wirtz--there seemed to be no one really in the Secretary's office or the Assistant Secretary's, you know, who really were at all interested.

From time to time Mrs. Green would send out, for the record, letters to the three Secretaries, and the answers weren't coming back from Secretary Celebreeze's office, Secretary Wirtz's office. In telephoning to the Secretaries' offices, Celebreeze's and Wirtz's, you know, you couldn't find in whose out-box, in-box, the letter was. You know, where does a letter go? You couldn't find where it was referred. It never showed up. There was obviously no interest; we soon learned that. But there sure damn well was a lot of interest in the Attorney General's office. It was steady and continuing, and out of the limelight. This was the other thing, it wasn't a matter of being a glory-hound about it, just that day-to-day business.

[-156-]

It comes back to me in little bits and pieces, further, that there were two or three occasions when the Attorney General would call Mrs. Green in the course of these negotiations and say, "Well, Mrs. Green, is it going to your satisfaction? I hope we can reach an agreement. It's a very important program, and I think we've got to help," on the phone call. And this, in this cold and distant town, can't help but impress someone, particularly when it's compared to the efforts of others in prominent positions.

GREENE: Do you think there was any real effort to compromise, or were they pretty firm in their feeling that her approach was not the best one?

BARTHELMES: Well, I think they sort of rolled with the punches, and, to put it candidly, I think that they got their own way. I say "they"; I mean the Juvenile Delinquency Program, the board itself. The executive branch, you know, really had to trim there and alter there. For the most part, when all was said and done, the program went on pretty much as it was being run before Mrs. Green's intervention. In other words, some accommodation was made; and politically, if for no other reason, there had to be. There was additional language added to the extension legislation that provided that there would be small demonstration projects in representative geographical areas throughout the country, you know, that they would reach beyond the Mississippi River into the "great beyond" there. There was one funded in Eugene, Oregon, Lane County, a rural project, and

there was one funded in Los Angeles. But essentially the commitment was such with the Mobilization for Youth--to use that as a conspicuous example because that was the great object of Mrs. Green's wrath--and the investment was such there that it continued. Some of the other larger urban--New Haven, which is another one that she objected to. They accommodated her just enough to, you know, de-fang the bulk of her discord.

[-157-]

GREENE:                   What was her attitude towards Robert Kennedy during the whole thing?

BARTHELMES:           Sort of a sorrowful mother for an errant son, which is an attitude that Mrs. Green had toward a good number of things. Sometimes it was just plain out anger she felt. It wasn't sorrowing mother toward an errant son in respect to Dave Hackett. She had had a great deal of commitment and involvement, as you know, with the Kennedy campaign in 1960. She was chairman of John Kennedy's presidential preference primary campaign in May of '60, which John Kennedy won, and then again in the general election in the fall of '60.

This is off the point, but I'd like to tell just one anecdote that does not involve Robert Kennedy, but it involved John Kennedy. Mrs. Green told the story that in December of 1959 she had given a lot of thought to which of the obvious presidential candidate nominees she would support. In Oregon she was in very difficult shape. Neuberger, Senator Richard Neuberger [Richard L. Neuberger], was then alive. He and Mrs. Neuberger, Maurine Neuberger [Maurine Brown Neuberger], and others supported Adlai Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson]; there were others who supported Hubert Humphrey [Hubert H. Humphrey]. There was a smidgen of support for Lyndon Johnson [Lyndon Baines Johnson]. Then there was Senator Morse [Wayne L. Morse] who was a senior Senator from Oregon; Senator Morse supported himself, and he was so nominated in Los Angeles in July or August of '60.

Nevertheless, politically, it posed a problem. And there was demonstrably, even in 1960, a great deal of anti-Catholic sentiment in the southern part of the state, which is not within her district, but nevertheless she tells the story. In December of 1959 before John Kennedy actually had formally announced, which I believe was January 1 or January 2 of '60, he had solicited and obtained an appointment with her. They talked about forty-five minutes, at the conclusion of which she said, yes, she would support him. After the usual, you know, amenities, the conversation, the discussion, broke up and Mrs. Green--then located in the Cannon Building--accompanied John Kennedy to the door of her inner office leading to the outer office, opened the door,

[-158-]

and who should come around the corner into the office but Hubert Humphrey! Hubert Humphrey took one look at the situation and quite sensitively and sensibly said to her, "I guess I'm too late." Mrs. Green said, "Yes, you are." They shook hands and Hubert Humphrey, who was his usual genial self, said, "Well, may I have a couple of minutes with you anyway?" And John Kennedy went on his way, Senator Kennedy went on his way.

Hubert Humphrey came in and she closed the door, and he said it was his loss, you know, he certainly wished that he could have her support. But she'd already given it. I had to put that on tape.

GREENS: I had one other question that I've forgotten.

BARTHELMES: Juvenile delinquency?

GREENS: Yes. Oh, I wanted to ask you what executive agencies and their representatives got involved in the negotiations?

BARTHELMES: To my knowledge, the Justice Department.

GREENS: That's all?

BARTHELMES: That was all. The Justice Department in the person of the Attorney General and Dave Hackett and the Executive Board, which was attached to the Justice Department for rations and quarters only. It could have been located somewhere else. It was really, as I said, under the administration of the three Secretaries. But Hackett was over in the Justice Department, and this is where, you know, negotiations took place. I don't recall any other--other than nominally as I've explained them--of the executive branch agencies getting involved in this at all.

GREENS: Not only at the top, but not even at a lower...

[-159-]

BARTHELMES: No ma'am. No. These negotiations never had anyone from Labor, never had anyone from HEW, nor was any interest ever expressed by either Secretary Celebrezze and his office or by Secretary Wirtz and his office. They were too busy.

GREENE: Unless there's something else on juvenile delinquency, we'll switch over a bit to personality.

BARTHELMES: Sure. I don't think of anything.

GREENE: We discussed a number of points in the course of our discussion. But how much personal contact did you have with Robert Kennedy outside of the office during your time in the press operation?

BARTHELMES: Well, in accompanying him outside the office in the role of press secretary?

GREENE: Well, I really mean in a social situation.



BARTHELMES: No. None. None really, except for the case where--not really. There were Christmas parties for the staff. There were press parties--splash parties arranged for the press at Hickory Hill that I arranged for newspaper reporters, TV cameramen, TV reporters, magazine writers, and what have you--a series of them, so that everyone was included eventually, any of those who covered the office with any regularity. Once or twice, oh, I say "once or twice," but several times, simply out at Hickory Hill to have a hand in the development of a speech, doing something along those lines. But, you know, not really socially as I understand the word.

GREENE: Do you think he deliberately separated his staff and social acquaintances?

[-160-]

BARTHELMES: Yeah. I have every reason to believe--whatever else anyone else would say--in my personal experiences, you know, that Robert Kennedy deliberately, as a matter of policy, suavely, but nevertheless, made a strict delineation, a strict line between staff and his friends; you know, between.... The staff did come out from time to time, either on business or staff parties. But, you know, in terms of going out and climbing mountains or playing basketball or football or tennis, or what have you, that was something else.

I don't believe.... I've been told by others that this was John Kennedy's position. I remember Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen] making that clear one time when he was in Robert Kennedy's office. The Senator wasn't there, Robert Kennedy wasn't there, but I remember him talking about it. As long as he'd worked for John Kennedy there'd never been a social occasion that he'd been invited to. He wasn't complaining; it was simply a descriptive situation. It seems to me there's an indication somewhere in Richard Whalen's [Richard J. Whalen] book, *The Founding Father*, in which Joseph Kennedy [Joseph P. Kennedy] is quoted as giving advice to his sons as to the attitudes they should have toward those who work for them. I don't remember the exact quote, but it's in that, "Don't mix business and pleasure." I think that was rather apparent.

GREENE: How did the staff feel about this, particularly some of the younger people?

BARTHELMES: I don't know. I've never heard any complaints. I would think that several of the women who were on the staff felt in going to a staff party at Hickory Hill Christmastime and in the summer, that this, in effect, was socializing. So be it, it's not my definition.

[-161-]

The staff had entrée to Hickory Hill during the summer for the pool, as did the staff of Senator Edward Kennedy [Edward Moore Kennedy]. Most Saturday afternoons--everyone

was at work on Saturday morning--unless there was something planned for that evening by the Kennedys, and occasionally on Sundays, but usually Saturday afternoons, the pool was open to the members of the staff and their wives and their children. This was a regular thing.

GREENE: But this is when the family was not there?

BARTHELMES: When the family was not there. I can remember a couple of Saturday afternoons when Mrs. Kennedy [Ethel Skakel Kennedy] was, in fact, there. She sort of came out and waved and went back in. But that's not social either.

GREENE: Were there any friends who sort of rode the fence in this who were both working for him and socializing?

BARTHELMES: Well, I think there were those who did work for him, for Robert Kennedy although I don't.... My impression is that they weren't salaried, although I don't know that for a fact. There was Carter Burden.

GREENE: He was not a salaried staff member?

BARTHELMES: Not to my knowledge. If he was, I don't know, but that was not my impression. And then that was rather periodic, occasional during my time.

[-162-]

GREENE: What about vanden Heuvel [William J. vanden Heuvel]?

BARTHELMES: Well, vanden Heuvel was the Acting Regional OEO Director in the spring of '65. And he had his office--the OEO office was in the same building as Senator Kennedy's New York office--in the Lexington Avenue Postal Station. He did considerable work for the Senator, arranging a trip, you know, or doing specific projects, but at that time he was on the federal payroll.

GREENE: Do you know how he was generally regarded by other people around Kennedy?

BARTHELMES: I think that if he were involved in a project, he was obviously one to touch base with. But I don't think, you know, he really was regarded as one who really had any great stature. I don't think he was anyone one checked with. But vanden Heuvel was not a reticent person. He would call in to Angie Novello [Angela M. Novello], you know, and ask to talk to the Senator, and perhaps he'd get through and perhaps he wouldn't. If the Senator were there, he'd talk to him. But, you know, he's just another in the galaxy that whirled around. Obviously the Senator gave him some

things to do, so presumably the Senator had some confidence in what he gave him to do or he wouldn't make assignments to him. When there were parties, the vanden Heuvels very often were there. And vanden Heuvel went to Latin America, both the vanden Heuvels as I remember.

GREENE: Do you recall any problems with social friends getting into substantive matters over their heads and having to be bailed out? To some degree, perhaps, this is what happened in Oregon in '68, but do you remember any other instances like that?

[-163-]

BARTHELMES: In '68 I've just heard--you know, secondhand, not out of personal experience--there was an effort, an assignment made in connection with the Kennedy Center [for the Performing Arts], which was not then built, the John F. Kennedy Cultural Center down on the riverside. There was considerable effort at one point to put it downtown and put it various places. The decision was made that it go down there. But there was still, up to the very end, considerable tugging or pulling within the Congress, which had some responsibility because it had authorized and appropriated some funds for its construction. I think there was a fellow the Senator asked me to deal with in one aspect of the site problem. When the fight of the site along the river had been renewed and I had an indication that the staff people I knew on the appropriations committee felt mixed motivations and efforts were going to be made to deny funds unless the Center was built downtown on Pennsylvania Avenue, I mentioned this to the Senator. He referred me to Spalding.

GREENE: Charles Spalding?

BARTHELMES: Charles Spalding. I remember his saying "I don't want them to get that site in trouble, and Spalding had better be damn sure that it's the right site." That sort of surprised me at the time because I thought it had all been resolved in his mind long before. I remember trying to get him, Spalding, and being unable to. I remember sending him a couple of notes, with the Senator quite simply transmitting messages either by phone or by letters. I never got any answers back. I don't know whether Spalding dealt directly with the Senator or whether nothing was ever done, but there was always talk.

[-164-]

Except for that and what I heard about the Oregon campaign, there was always talk about self-designated agents of the Kennedys, particularly in New York, who were friends, who were going off doing this and that. Now, very often it took political form. It was a case where someone would inadvertently, or otherwise, misrepresent his views for the Senator's views in some of the lower New York counties, Westchester County, within the boroughs of New York City, as to political matters--I just don't remember specifically, I'm sorry--and

then having to be, either through Steve Smith [Stephen E. Smith] or the Senator himself or maybe, perhaps, Joe Dolan [Joseph F. Dolan].... Dolan very often was the heavy. I remember he'd call them up and say, you know, "We don't want that done." But I just don't remember. I'm sure that Joe Dolan would be more helpful.

GREENE:                   What about Paul Corbin, kind of an interesting character you hear mentioned, his role?

BARTHELMES:        I only have had several brief encounters with Paul Corbin. I know that Angie Novello told me that she didn't want him in to see the Senator. And I know Congressman Bolling [Richard W. Bolling] of Missouri had told me that he had gone to Robert Kennedy during John Kennedy's Administration and said, "You know, this Corbin is bad news. This is what I was told. He's going to get you in trouble." But Corbin always seemed to have a long life.

[-165-]

When he came to see the Senator or to pass some message on, when the Senator was located on the ground floor of the New Senate Office Building in '65 and into '66, on a half a dozen occasions he would show up in the mailroom which is on the third floor and then he'd phone down to me or to Dolan and say, you know, "This is Paul Corbin. Here I am." "Where are you, Paul?" "Well, I'm up in the mailroom." So I'd say, "Why don't you come down?" On the first occasion I hadn't realized this strained relation with Angie Novello. He said, "No, I'd better not." I thought that was strange; he had a reputation of being sort of tough. So I'd end up in the mailroom. He'd say, "Well, tell the Senator this," and, "Tell the Senator that." Or, "Somebody told me that Hubert Humphrey's going to resign as Vice-President;" or, "Humphrey will never run for President;" or, "Humphrey is...."

He always had rumors, you know, like Lyndon Johnson was going to dump Hubert Humphrey. He knew that for a fact because somebody had told him that, and it was absolute gospel truth. The Senator should know it. Most of the things, I'd usually say, "Tell him yourself. You see him. You can call him." But he didn't want to fuss with Angie; he didn't want to run across Angie. I asked Angie about this. She said, "I don't want him near here. I don't want him in here. I'll throw him out." Which was hyperbole, but I guess figuratively she had.

I'd seen him at staff parties at Hickory Hill, Christmas parties, for example, in December '65, December '66. He was there, but he seemed to sort of surface and then disappear. I got the impression that everyone would sort of shake their head, whether it would be Jerry Bruno [Gerald J. Bruno] or Joe Dolan; but he would sort of come and go. Except at Hickory Hill, when obviously he was there in person. When he showed up on office premises I've never known that he ever had any direct--face-to-face or by telephone--dealings with the Senator. He would always have messages to send to him through me or through Dolan. But I never saw any personal contact.

[-166-]

Then at Hickory Hill, he'd be there, and I sort of watched him, but I never saw him go near the Senator. But he'd be there. I'm not saying he was avoiding him, but they never seemed to come.... In the course of an evening, two or three, four hours, it's sort of hard not, to, you know, at least come across anyone's path. He seemed to be there, but he'd always--I always had the impression of keeping his distance. He obviously wasn't unwelcome or he wouldn't have been there, but I don't know how much enthusiasm there was.

I've never worked with him, so to speak, on any projects or assignments that he was involved in. But I do remember, you know, Joe was referring to Corbin having gone to New Hampshire in '64 to start a Vice-Presidential write in. Corbin became visible somehow. My recollection is that Joe Dolan said, you know, that Corbin was sent out--that is, "recalled"--of New Hampshire. He didn't say anything beyond that.

GREENE: How interested was Kennedy in the personal lives and problems of his staff? Did he show much curiosity about what you did outside of the office?

BARTHELMES: No. No. Now, there was an occasion when Adam Walinsky's wife, Jane, was seriously ill; I believe she'd had a miscarriage. In fact, Adam told me Jane had had a miscarriage. The Senator called the hospital and he sent flowers.... [Interruption] If something like that came to his attention, you know, he was immediately responsive, but in terms of, you know, "How are the wife and the kids?" or "How old are the children?" I don't recall anything. I don't know of anything like that.

[-167-]

There were occasions when he would come into the reception room, there were new people there, receptionists and what have you. He'd sort of shake hands with them. He'd forgotten that he had hired them. But I didn't notice any.... I think if you had gone to him, you know, and said, "I'm terribly broke...." I think anyone felt free if they had a tremendous problem that involved, say, the way you had to take leave because someone in your family was extremely ill, if you needed financial help, or something like that, there was every indication that you would have gotten a very sympathetic response. But in terms of day-to-day chitchat, there wasn't.

I don't know of any member of Congress I've worked for before, I don't know of any who were truly interested. In respect to the work to be done, he was far more generous to his staff than most members of Congress in my experience. Mrs. Green, for example, I don't think really realized that something happened at the close of the day which was 8 or 8:30 at night. You know, somehow you became disembodied, or you went in the desk drawer until seven in the morning. There was no acknowledgement that anyone else ever had an outside life. I know when she interviewed me for employment she asked me if I was married. I was not then. And she said, "Well, good." She said, "Good, there won't be any interference." I wasn't resentful of that. I didn't realize we were going to work twelve hours a day.

On weekends we'd get a tremendous amount of mail--take the Easter weekend, Good Friday, Saturday and Easter. The Kennedy office you know, used to register--a light day was seven or eight hundred letters a day, and the office usually got over a thousand a day, answerable pieces of mail of some sort from some place, mostly from New York State. Thursday night, close the office down and everybody has three days off. I mean that's just how it was. You know, you had to fight your way into the office on Monday morning because the mail had stacked up so, but he felt his people should have the three days off. The same with Christmas. Now, he didn't bother with, nor should he have bothered himself with a lot of the mechanics and nuts and

[-168-]

bolts of running the office; that was Joe's in terms of vacations and sick leave, of which there was none that I can remember.

GREENE:                You say there was no sick leave?

BARTHELMES:        No. I simply meant I don't remember any prolonged sicknesses. That's how I meant it. I mean if there were problems and somebody was going to be out of the office for a month because there was an operation or some disability, there'd be a problem. But he didn't....Those are the things that Joe Dolan dealt with.

GREENE:                How would you describe the impact that Robert Kennedy had on your own life and thinking?

BARTHELMES:        Well, I don't think anyone can work for him from the first day without having been touched by him. I think it would take a rather insensitive person not to have been affected--whether one was successful during one's stay there, or unsuccessful or moderately so....

[BEGIN TAPE I, SIDE II]

BARTHELMES:        I don't think anybody could ever be untouched by him. He certainly touched me, and I'm a rather difficult person to reach. But for me it was a laying on of hands. I don't think anyone's ever the same. I think that, you know, the thing I always had to reconcile myself to was my direct impression of him (which someday I hope to put down in book form) and the disparate view drawn by the newspapers--my particular staff jurisdiction. And neighbors of mine were irrational toward him--the double standard they held him to, the constant irrelevant comments as to the length of his hair. No one goes around saying, "Jesus, that Ike's [Dwight D. Eisenhower] just bald." The irrelevant comments. No one is immune, of course, from

[-169-]

criticism, but these comments were irrelevant and they were inconsistent, and, really, double standard ones held by people, newspaper, TV, radio and magazines, and my neighbors held them.

I don't know what it was, why people were so impenetrable. They seem to be less condemnatory now that he's dead. But at the time, I thought it was a cluster of attitudes that I don't think anyone successfully surmounted, including my predecessor and successor.

What I saw, you know, was that he really was tense and he was tough, which I think was an exterior view the people had of him. He was more actionary; he was more for action than he was for reflection. But curiously enough, his actions, although they were gut ones, always seemed to have a certain intellectual quality to them. I mean they were intellectually correct for the most part. His reaction to poverty and to injustice were--I think, as I said before, as with all Irishman--gut ones. After all, the Irish were historically oppressed. But I think these attitudes were intellectually valid as well; it wasn't just sort of action for the sake of bully-boy action. He wasn't, in the common sense, given to reflection. He really, you know, did believe in hard work and the puritan ethic. When you think of all the attacks that were made on him, the criticisms, this whole malpractice of critics that kept hounding him....

He was a very, very constructive and affirmative man. He believed in work; he believed in diligence, and he believed in integrity. He insisted upon it. One of the things that staff people remember, at least I remember, is that in dealing with him, and I think I've said this before, he always gave me an extra sense of dimension of myself. He elicited the possibility that I can work beyond my competence--I can always do better. He seemed to be saying there's a whole unexplored area that you're capable of doing. I think the staff person always had that in mind--and that you were seeing a new extension of yourself and your confidence.

[-170-]

If you only try, you can really do better. I think that this is something that he certainly conveyed to me, and I think that he always conveyed to the staff. I mentioned this before, but he always conveyed, in a way, a bit of, I think, sadness as he talked about particular programs or particular pieces of legislation or, I guess, generally, the condition of the country at that time. He sort of conveyed the futility of, as I said, most means and the uncertain glory of most ends. But I think that if he had any commandments, one of the major commandments would be, "It really is a secular sin not to try." You probably were not going to be completely successful, but maybe we would take the edge off it, maybe we can blunt it or maybe we can make things more bearable, but we've just got to try. Like the business of the juvenile delinquency program, which is just very small in the scheme of things, you know, but it's important that we try, important that we reach an agreement, important we get this program going to the satisfaction of all so, you know, it's in effect. I think he always conveyed, perhaps paradoxically with his sense, in his uncertainty about the futility of most things and the uncertain glory of most ends--yet, a sense of, you know, there was opportunity in the country, there was a chance that things would get better and therefore at least you had to try.

I think that this is the thing brought about by his death, that it really reduced opportunities in the country. And you know, worse than that I think, or more importantly in

the matter, it really substantially reduced, you know, the inventory of hope or the stock of hope that the country had.

GREENE: Yes. Do you have anything else?

BARTHELMES: No. I don't think so. That's about it.

[END OF INTERVIEW #3]

[-171-]



Wesley Barthelmes Oral History Transcript – RFK #3  
Name Index

**A**

Anderson, Stan, 154

**B**

Bolling, Richard W., 165  
Brademas, John, 150  
Bruno, Gerald J., 166  
Burden, Carter, 162

**C**

Celebrezze, Anthony J., 146, 156, 160  
Chalk, O. Roy, 153  
Cloward, Richard A., 147  
Corbin, Paul, 165, 166, 167

**D**

Dolan, Joseph F., 165, 166, 167, 169  
Dominick, Peter H., 153

**E**

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 169  
Ellinger, W. Don, 149, 151

**G**

Giaimo, Robert N., 148, 150, 151  
Goodell, Charles E., 151  
Green, Edith S., 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149,  
150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158,  
159, 168  
Guggenheimer, Elinor C., 154

**H**

Hackett, David L., 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149,  
151, 152, 158, 159  
Humphrey, Hubert H., 158, 159, 166

**J**

Johnson, Lyndon Baines, 158, 166

**K**

Kennedy, Edward Moore, 162  
Kennedy, Ethel Skakel, 162  
Kennedy, John F., 153, 156, 158, 159, 161, 164,  
165  
Kennedy, Joseph P., 161  
Kennedy, Robert F., 145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 152,  
153, 154, 155, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161,  
162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169

**M**

Morse, Wayne L., 158

**N**

Neuberger, Maurine Brown, 158  
Neuberger, Richard L., 158  
Novello, Angela M., 163, 165, 166

**O**

Ohlin, Lloyd E., 147, 148

**P**

Prettyman, E. Barrett, 153

**Q**

Quie, Albert H., 151

**R**

Ross, George Barney, 151

**S**

Smith, Stephen E., 165  
Sorensen, Theodore C., 161  
Spalding, Charles, 164  
Stevenson, Adlai E., 158

**U**

Udall, Stewart L., 154

**V**

vanden Heuvel, William J., 163

**W**

Wagner, Robert Ferdinand, Jr., 154

Walinsky, Adam, 167

Walinsky, Jane, 167

Whalen, Richard J., 161

Wirtz, William Willard, 146, 156, 160

Subject Index  
WESLEY BARTHELMES

Africa	
RFK and	111 - 115
Agency for International Development (AID)	109
Alliance for Progress	108
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA)	38
Area Redevelopment Administration (ARA)	55, 74
Bedford-Stuyvesant Project	120
California	
Democratic Party	21
Primary Election, 1968	138
Civil Rights	
RFK and	92
African Diplomats	106
Mississippi	
Oxford	5
Communism in the U.S.	17 - 18
Cuba	
Missile Crisis	84 - 85
Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR)	40
Democratic Party	
RFK and	47
District of Columbia	154
Dominican Republic	
RFK and	4
Economic Opportunity, Office of (OEO)	44, 148, 163
Foreign Relations, Senate Committee on	101
Government Operations, Senate Committee on	90
Health, Education and Welfare, Department of	
Legislation	146, 156, 160
Interior, Department of	154 - 155
Investigations, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on	17
John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts	14
Johnson Administration	
RFK and	26-28, 32, 57, 64-65, 110-111
Johnson, Lyndon B.	
RFK Relations With	26 - 27, 68
Justice, Department of	1, 6, 146, 156, 159
Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control	
Act (1961)	1, 143-148, 150-153, 157,
159	
Kennedy Administration	
Cabinet	12

Kennedy, John F.	
Humorous Anecdotes	4-5, 37
Kennedy, Joseph P.	
Appointment to Court of St. James's	126
Kennedy, Robert F.	
Attorney General, 1961 - 1964	67, 123, 145-46, 149, 155-157
JFK Assassination, 1963	83
Senate Years, 1965 - 1968	2-3, 25-26, 29, 33, 44-45, 52-54, 72, 74, 82, 88 - 89, 90,
165-166	
Staff	2-4, 6-11, 24-25, 52, 69-70, 91-92, 121 - 122, 165
Latin American Trip, 1965	102 - 110
African Trip, 1966	102, 110 - 115
Author	
<u>To Seek a Newer World</u>	96
Leadership and Administrative Style	4, 6-7, 22, 95, 170-171
Personal Characteristics	6, 22, 32, 42, 44, 50, 72-73, 169- 171
Political Philosophy	25 - 26, 33, 38
Press Relations	1, 2-13, 15-19, 22-4, 31-32, 34- 35, 49, 57-63, 64-66, 73-75, 79- 81, 85-88, 91-92, 94-95, 105, 122-127
RFK's Public Opinion Polls	116 - 117
Speeches	
Senate	24-25, 30-32, 39-40, 4 , 47-49, 2, 101-102
Vietnam,	266, 25-26, 30-31, 34, 59, 101- 102
Staff Relations	3 - 4, 6 - 7, 10 - 11, 2 - 53, 71, 144, 160 - 162, 167, 169
Labor, Department of	146, 156, 160
Labor, Organized	
RFK and	38, 82, 84, 92 - 93, 135
Labor-Management Relations, Select Committee to	
Investigate Improper Activities in	17 - 18, 131
Latin America	
RFK and	102 - 110
Liberals	
RFK and	3, 20 - 22, 34, 125 - 127
Magazines	
General	38, 66, 86 - 87, 107
<u>Esquire</u>	76
<u>Life</u>	125
<u>Look</u>	85, 107, 125
<u>Newsweek</u>	73, 124

<u>Playboy</u>	15
<u>Ramparts</u>	20 - 21
<u>Saturday Evening Post</u>	62
<u>Time</u>	19 - 20, 60, 73, 80, 125
<u>U.S. News and World Report</u>	19 - 20, 64, 124
<u>The Washingtonian</u>	7
McCarthyism	
RFK and	17 - 18
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)	140
New York	50 - 51, 118
Congressional Election, 1966	117 - 118
Democratic Party	8, 117 - 118
Newspapers	
<u>Amsterdam News</u>	22 - 23
<u>Birmingham News</u>	122 - 123
<u>Chicago Daily News</u>	18, 35, 62
<u>Los Angeles Times</u>	2, 16
<u>New York Daily News</u>	35, 125
<u>New York Herald Tribune</u>	35, 40-41, 62-63, 79, 107, 121
<u>New York Post</u>	3 - 35, 62
<u>New York Times</u>	11 - 12, 18 - 19, 35, 57, 64, 68, 75, 80, 107, 112, 124, 141,
<u>New York World Telegram</u>	19, 60, 63, 79, 95
<u>St. Louis Post Dispatch</u>	65
<u>Village Voice</u>	20
<u>Wall Street Journal</u>	75
<u>Washington Post</u>	20, 124-125
<u>Washington Star</u>	105, 124
Oregon	
Democratic Party	1, 71, 130 - 131
Primary Election, 1960	130 - 131, 158
Primary Election, 1968	129 - 137, 139
Senate Election, 1966	120, 128
Peace Corps	113 - 114
Presidential Campaign, 1968 - RFK	
Pre-announcement	129 - 132, 138 - 139
Ethnic Support	130
State, Department of	103 - 109, 111, 114 -
Television	
American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)	75
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS)	12, 13 - 14, 33, 41
“Face the Nation”	13, 97
“Issues and Answers”	13, 68, 97
“Meet the Press”	13, 68, 97 - 99

United States Information Agency (USIA)	33
Urban Renewal Administration	12
Vietnam	
RFK and	30 - 34, 59, 65, 98, 100 - 101
VISTA (Volunteers in Service to America)	43 - 44
Warren Commission	83
Youth	
RFK and	39, 44 - 46, 145 - 148, 153 - 154