

Orren Beaty, Jr., Oral History Interview – JFK#12, 2/13/1970
Administrative Information

Creator: Orren Beaty, Jr.

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Biographical Note

Beaty was administrative assistant to Congressman Stewart L. Udall during the late 1950s and assistant to Secretary of Interior Udall from 1961 to 1967. In this interview, he discusses interactions between the Interior Department and White House staff, and the Kennedy administration's difficulty with getting legislation passed, among other issues.

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
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Orren Beaty
July 4, 1979
Month Day Year


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Orren Beaty, Jr. – JFK#12

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Twelfth of Fourteen Oral History Interviews

with

Orren Beaty, Jr.

February 13, 1970
Washington, D. C.

By William W. Moss

For the John F. Kennedy Library

MOSS: You were saying that you were with Udall [Stewart L. Udall] once or twice when he was talking to John Swainson [John B. Swainson].

BEATY: Well, the reason I was thinking about it is that Senator Hart [Philip A. Hart] is a wounded veteran of World War II, and it looked like Governor Williams [G. Mennen Williams], as chief Democrat in Michigan, was making a conscious effort to bring people like that in--attractive, youngish. Senator Hart is not really young any more, but at that point he was. I think he was lieutenant governor or something of Michigan before he ran for the Senate. And I was recalling he mentioned what a pleasant person Swainson is, and he was. He didn't act like a harried executive when we were visiting with him.

Udall was at Detroit fairly early in his tenure as secretary of Interior--I forgot when, but it was probably his second year--and he had been gone on the trip for a week or ten days, one of his longer trips, and I took a bundle of mail and things that needed signing and met him in Detroit. And we got some work done between some appearance he made in the afternoon and that evening speech he made. And Swainson was there for the evening affair--it was some kind of reception which I suppose the governor hosted; or at least the governor was the star of the local group--and we sat around and visited. I had heard about him, but it didn't register that he was at least a double paraplegic until I saw him walking. He gets

around very well, but it's plain that he's not just an ordinary two-legged human being walking.

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MOSS: What was the occasion of his appearance?

BEATY: This was a state parks recreation conference. Labor people, who were pushing the idea, were obviously very apparent in there. But there were municipal people and state people and a lot of private citizens. The outdoor recreation types were there, although it was, I think, more of an urban-type recreation thing than the type you would ordinarily associate with Interior, outdoor parks, wilderness, and that sort of thing. I don't remember an awful lot about it.

MOSS: It was just something...

BEATY: That's right.

MOSS: All right. Okay. Well, what I'd like to talk about primarily this morning, at least to start out with, is the relationship between Interior and the White House staff. Let me ask, first of all, how thoroughly do you think that President Kennedy [John F. Kennedy] and the individual members of his staff understood both the mission of the Interior Department as Udall saw it and the functional mechanics that you had to go through to get things done?

BEATY: Well, I wouldn't want to--because I don't think it is right to downgrade the understanding of anybody in the White House on these interdepartmental relationships. I think that they probably made themselves very much aware of some of these problems, but as to what Interior did or might do, I think that they probably would just as soon not be bothered, for the most part. I don't think that there was any wild interest in it. I think we talked once before about President Kennedy's campaign speech, the Billings, Montana speech, which was the only real conservation, reclamation, "develop-the-West" type speech that he made during the campaign. At least, this was the one that all of the REA [Rural Electrification Administration] people and the dam builders and so forth would refer to as their charter to go ahead with these things. I really think that the things that were done or started were inaugurated in Interior and not because the White House was pushing us to do these things. When I say "we," I was just there; I wasn't an innovator; I just remember how some of this stuff happened.

I think the power people felt they had a mandate to move ahead, as they hadn't for a good many years. And that's--I think we talked about this too--where we tossed out an announcement, fairly early in the administration, about a new effort on public power, electric power transmission, and so forth and got into some trouble with the White House because it was the kind of thing that they would have liked to have announced because it was a step toward fulfilling something that was said during the campaign. But mostly it was a matter of

convincing them, first, that what we wanted to do had some merits and didn't cost too much money.

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MOSS: Well, this is important. Did you constantly have to convince them that it didn't cost too much money, and in what terms was this put to you by the White House?

BEATY: Well, it's hard for me to differentiate between the White House and the Budget Bureau.

MOSS: From the point of view of Interior.

BEATY: That's right. Whenever we got involved in something, usually we'd wind up with Carl Schwartz [Carl H. Schwartz], Sam Hughes [Phillip Samuel Hughes], Elmer Staats [Elmer B. Staats] telling us it cost too much money or you have got to find another way to pay for it or this sort of thing. But so many times Secretary Udall would do these things on his own, so that there may be a lot of things that were said or done that I don't know anything about. It's not a matter of any lack of communication; it's just that he had a lot of things to do and he went on to other things. He'd be over at a cabinet meeting, or he'd go over to see somebody on a scheduled meeting and then stop by another office and talk about this particular pet project of his. And then we'd have two or three of the assistant secretaries in and be talking about it, and then Stewart would say, "Well, Ralph Dungan [Ralph A. Dungan] thinks this," or "Lee White [Lee C. White] thinks that," or "Ted Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen] said so and so." And it was plain that he hadn't seen just the person he went over to see, but he'd gone out of his way to try out something on somebody else.

I think Mike Feldman [Myer Feldman] was the principal one on minerals, oil, coal, that sort of thing, even before he moved up in the rankings over there. Here was somebody who, I think, understood some of the ramifications, political as well as economic or policy things. He was the one that the people from the mine unions would come to see or the people from the oil companies would come to see or talk to on the phone when they anticipated something was going to happen or had some problems. I personally had the feeling that he listened to them more than he listened to us; that he had his opinions pretty well formed before we heard anything about it.

In the power field--well, you can't say they weren't informed there, either, because Lee White had worked for TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority] and pitched in well enough to have somebody's confidence to be named to the Federal Power Commission. He and Joe Swidler [Joseph C. Swidler] had worked together years before....

MOSS: How did he get along with Ken [Kenneth Holum] and with....

BEATY: I think very well. Lee's a very easy-to-get-along-with person.

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I think that we generally had a feeling from time to time that he wasn't as militantly working towards our objectives as we would have liked, that he was more--which is what he is supposed to be doing--looking out after his boss's overall image, the overall accomplishment, putting the pieces together so that he didn't overdo it in one way or another than we were. We had our missions.

MOSS: Why did you use the word "image" there?

BEATY: Well, I didn't mean it in the sense of advertising, and that's the reason I started trying to explain it. It wasn't image; it was how you give the overall accomplishments or the balanced picture--I don't know.

MOSS: Whether you can make the machine work?

BEATY: We saw something that needed to be done, we thought, and it might have been done faster and better if we got instant backing from the White House or we got the President himself involved. As Lyndon Johnson [Lyndon Baines Johnson] used to tell us at congressional liaison meetings after he became president, "A lot of people think I just want to make every announcement." He said, "That isn't it at all. I don't care whether I make some of these little old announcements. It's the extra weight I can give it by having it announced by the President instead of by an assistant secretary of Interior," or something like that. Well, you can believe that or not, you know, whether he meant that, but there is truth in it, there is validity to it. If the President makes an announcement on something he makes the front page. But if the Secretary of Interior announces it, it might not even make the *Washington Post* if it's some reclamation project out West or desalination plant or that sort of thing. If the President does it, it doesn't make any difference how localized it may be, it is something they'll pay attention to.

So Lee, on the other hand, had to figure out how you or your president's man talking to the appropriations committees should explain why we were asking for more money for something when something else that they might regard as more important wasn't being given that emphasis. I guess image is a good enough word. He had to give a balanced view of his boss, rather than the kind we would have done, having only this one field of responsibility.

MOSS: You mentioned, a moment ago, Mike Feldman moving up in the rankings. Was it obvious to you that there were rankings of White House assistants?

BEATY: Well, some of this stuff is partly reflected from other people,

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rather than Bill Pozen [Walter I. Pozen] worked in the campaign headquarters a little bit during the '60 campaign. Sorensen was traveling with the Senator, the presidential candidate, and he and Mike Feldman were good friends, allies according to

the stories. And whether this is true or not, this is what I was told: in effect, Sorensen said, "Feldman, you stay here and run the headquarters and protect my flank, and I'll see that you don't get downgraded in the traveling party." How do I know this is true? I don't even know, knowing the people who told it to me, whether they heard this said or whether they heard somebody else say they heard it said. You know, everybody tries to act like they were on the scene at the time something was done or said, and I got it pretty much third hand. But really, I was not aware of any jockeying for power over there during Kennedy's three years or whatever it was. First of all, I wasn't involved over there an awful lot. When I was, I was concerned about the issue we were talking about. I wasn't perceptive; I wasn't looking for that sort of thing.

MOSS: Well, let me take it from a little different point of view.

BEATY: Okay.

MOSS: If you wanted to get something done, and Udall told you to contact somebody on the staff, and say you contacted Feldman instead of Sorensen, was this generally sufficient to get the job done, or did you occasionally have to escalate to White, to Sorensen, in this way, in order to get your message across?

BEATY: Well, you know, Sorensen was close to the President, and he didn't have time for everybody's phone calls. I don't recall his ever returning any call of mine. I don't recall ever making more than three or four. Usually, if I got through to him, it was because Stewart had said to him, "I'll have Orren Beaty call you and give you the details on this." And in those cases, I got the calls through. Usually, Stewart would just say, "Look, Lee White's working on this. Call him, and talk to him about it" or, "Ralph Dungan wants to know about this." Ralph and Lee, I think, were the two I talked to the most, except Fred Dutton [Frederick G. Dutton] which was a different sort of thing.

You know, you started out with Fred as secretary of the cabinet. The Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] administration had had just a fixed routine. The cabinet met every certain day of the week, once a week, and the next day or that afternoon, late, the cabinet assistants would go over and whoever was secretary of the cabinet would give them a briefing and tell them what all had been said and what all was expected of their particular boss so that you get a double follow-through thing. This started out that way, I think. Secretary Seaton's [Frederick A. Seaton]

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assistant gave me this routine that they followed, and so I was looking for it. They started out that way, but the cabinet meetings fell off. There weren't very many, and when there were, maybe Fred would call us over--he did at first, and then I think they saw little value in it. They could type up a memo and send it around and save the time of a meeting. We quit having those. But I think I probably worked with Fred more in the first six months than with anybody else.

I didn't even get to know Lee White, except perhaps meeting him at cocktail parties or things like this, until later. Holum, working in Power and working with developing this recreation criteria on how recreation contributes to the cost of a reclamation project or a Corps of Engineers flood control dam or whatever it was, got to, I think, work with Lee because Lee was working out of the White House on that with the Budget Bureau people and with our technical review staff people, Stoddard [Charles S. Stoddard], Caulfield [Henry P. Caulfield, Jr.], Frank Gregg [R. Frank Gregg], and whoever else worked on it. So I think it was--just thinking back now--it was through that source that I got to know Lee. And then, of course, there were lots of things going on where we worked in meetings together. Then Lee represented the White House, more or less, on a trip we took to Russia in 1962. And by that time, I knew him fairly well, but of course, on a trip like that you really get acquainted. So from then on, I think, if I didn't know who to talk, I could call Lee and find out who to talk to.

MOSS: What sort of things did you talk with Fred Dutton about in the first six months? You said you had mostly contacts with him; what sort of things were you doing?

BEATY: Well, it.... Let me add something else. I had a tremendous number of contacts with Claude Desautels [Claude John Desautels] and Larry O'Brien [Lawrence F. O'Brien] because I was listed as both congressional liaison and....

MOSS: Okay. I was going to get to that.

BEATY: Right. I just forgot that end of it. I was thinking about the substantive end of it. But Fred, apparently, was the recipient of a lot of information from Larry O'Brien on problems in Congress or things that needed to be done on appointments or interviews with prospective employees. And I got lots of calls from Fred or from Dick Maguire [Richard V. Maguire] on people that I assume some senator or congressman was nagging them about, "Why can't this guy get a job?" or "Why can't he at least get an interview?" And then I would follow through on that. There was somebody else, too. Chuck Roche [Charles D. Roche]--I think we've mentioned him before--worked at the national committee, but there was good liaison between the

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committee and the White House on employment. Roche and Maguire, I think, worked on that mostly.

MOSS: There was good liaison between the Democratic National Committee and the White House?

BEATY: Well, I regarded it as one operation, it was that close. Chuck, I think, probably worked in the White House. He'd go over there in the morning to speak with

everybody about what all was going on and then back to the committee, which was right across the street over here, at that time. But again, I hadn't worked in the campaign, so I was busy getting to know who these people were. It wasn't a matter of going into something where we'd been working together for the previous year. I'm sure that was the case on a lot of these deals where the people had been working in the national campaign. I had been out in Arizona, for the most part, during the fall and just saw them when they came through. And usually, you meet an advance man rather than one of the real staffers; they were all traveling with the President or with the candidate.

MOSS: Did you have any trouble adjusting to the new situation, or they to you?

BEATY: Well, they may have had a lot of trouble. I didn't have any trouble that I recall. I had more trouble after Johnson became president. I think Cliff Carter [Clifton C. Carter] who had worked with Johnson off and on for a good many years, would tell an interviewer that when Mr. Johnson was vice-president, Interior worked with him better than anybody else. I think he had a feeling, as Sam Houston Johnson's book [*My Brother, Lyndon*] indicates, that he was pushed off in a corner and nobody paid any attention to him. We talked about one of his disturbances with Interior for not consulting him on some appointment, where I happened to be the one who got the phone call. But Cliff called me fairly regularly, and I'd try to deliver on whatever it was that they wanted in the way of information or checking something out. I knew Walter Jenkins [Walter W. Jenkins] fairly well, and Walter would call and we'd get things going. After they moved into the White House, it was just impossible to get Walter Jenkins to return a phone call. It was as if I had never known him, or as if I had been an enemy, and yet it wasn't. It's just that they were busy, I'm sure. What more can I say? I adjusted to the people I hadn't really gotten to know before in the Kennedy operation better than I did for the ones that worked with Johnson and that I had known previously, before he became president, before they moved into the White House.

MOSS: You put this down to what reason?

BEATY: Well, my feeling at the time was that Johnson had a long memory

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and that he was going to get rid of Udall and why should they bother returning our calls. Stewart never thought this, or if he did, he would.... I'd go tell him I was concerned that we couldn't seem to get return calls and things like that; and he didn't agree with me. I was probably wrong because he stayed around, and I really think it was the unusual pressure of having everything on him at once. I bumped into Walter over in the hall, one day, of the White House, just outside the President's office, and we had a very pleasant visit, just chatting while he was waiting to go in to see the President. So there was nothing that I could see in the way of any animosity. I just think they were overwhelmed with the amount of work, and undoubtedly they had departments that were of more concern, as far as

the national well-being was concerned, than ours. I probably rambled away from your initial questions.

I got a lot of things from Fred on the overall program and on this sense of image building, I suppose. We've got to get this done before the '62 campaign starts and things like this.

MOSS: What sort of things did you have to get done before the '62 campaign started, and why?

BEATY: Well, to show accomplishment, I think. I've got a box of loose-leaf folders that the people around Johnson prepared to show what had been accomplished. Each department was supposed to be compiling these things, and I was busy getting each bureau to give us something on what it had accomplished. For example.... As I started to say, from the Kennedy administration I don't find too much of this stuff. I don't think there was that much. I think Johnson's people overstressed this, whereas the Kennedy people....

MOSS: In '64?

BEATY: Yeah, in '64 and '66.

MOSS:. Okay. But in '62 there wasn't much of this?

BEATY: There was less, I think, at that point than there was afterwards. There was a great effort, you know, to keep from losing congressional seats in the off-year election, and we had the accelerated public works program going to attack unemployment in the depressed areas, and I think a real effort was made to put these in crucial or critical congressional districts where we might win or lose by a narrow margin.

MOSS: Can you think of any specific instances in which this happened or in which it backfired or in which it gave you trouble?

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BEATY: Well, no. I think if you check in the newspapers of that period, clippings and things would show that Republicans were generally attacking this as a purely political operation. And yet a lot of them had voted for it, and a lot of them benefited. Their districts benefited from it, but I can't recall any specific thing that was a big hullabaloo--can't think of the right word to fit this.

MOSS: Well, not necessarily getting out into the open press, but anything behind the scenes...

BEATY: Oh, I see.

MOSS: ...that happened that wouldn't show. Where it was a near thing, perhaps.

BEATY: I'm not going to be able to help you. I don't remember anything else.

MOSS: Okay.

BEATY: Unless, later--in the past three weeks I've been going through the files, and maybe one of these days I'll find things that will help us in these interviews.

MOSS: Now, you mentioned the Larry O'Brien operation. He and Claude Desautels and Mike Manatos [Mike N. Manatos]--how did this operation work, and how did you work with it?

BEATY: Well, this was almost a full-time operation as far as the guy on the departmental end of it, because Claude... I knew Claude better, I guess, than everybody else in that whole operation. He had been Congressman Aspinall's [Wayne N. Aspinall] principal assistant for a good many years. Stewart Udall was on the Interior Committee, and our offices were just around the corner from each other on the fourth floor of the Old House Office Building, the one they call the Cannon Office Building now. I knew him very well. In fact, the first meeting I attended of congressional people who were working in the Kennedy campaign was called by Claude and set up in one of those old committee rooms in that office building. Ted Reardon [Timothy J. Reardon, Jr.] and Steve Smith [Stephen E. Smith] and some other people came over for it. I think we talked about this once. But Claude either became, under pressure, very obnoxious, or he was always that way. I see him now, and we're on the best of terms, and we stayed that way most of the time, but it was only because I had a great deal of forbearance. He was a mean, demanding, impatient son-of-a-bitch. You just wanted to get him by the throat and choke him.

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I know he knew it was a problem getting things done, but to hear him talking on the phone, "What in the hell is the matter with you people over at Interior?" just like that.

MOSS: On what issues?

BEATY: Whatever it was.

MOSS: Whatever it was?

BEATY: Yeah.

MOSS: You don't recall a specific issue?

BEATY: Well, mostly it was letting something be announced that some congressman wanted announced, and the congressman told Larry or Dick Maguire, Dick

Donahue [Richard K. Donahue], or whoever it was, "Goddamn it, they've done it again. Interior let some Republican announce this." or, "They announced it themselves, and it means a great deal to me. You let a contract to buy some generators. This is up in Sam Stratton's [Samuel Studdiford Stratton] district, and Sam Stratton didn't hear about--and it's a plot. They're determined to get me beaten up here." He'd call up and raise hell. At the time of any change in administration, a department, like Interior particularly, with a lot of different bureaus and all of them with some interest to a congressman or senator, there are going to be contacts with no political overtones at all between a senator of a different party and the people he's been working with in the previous administration, one that was in control previously.

The bureau gets conditioned under Seaton, for example--and Eisenhower--to let Senator Bennett [Wallace F. Bennett] know if anything happens in Utah. There were people in the Bureau of Reclamation that were from Utah. They were Mormons. Bennett, I assume is a Mormon. They had a good personal relationship. And so here it comes, a call raising hell that Senator Bennett announced something. Well, Jim Carr [James K. Carr] for example, would get a call, and he'd come in and say, "We don't even know it yet." Well, Carr had a great dislike for Dominy [Floyd E. Dominy] and I think we've talked about this and probably will more in the future. He wanted to nail Dominy on things, anyway. He'd say, "That son-of-a-bitch Bill Palmer [William L. Palmer]." Well, Bill Palmer was an old Utah guy who was up near the top in Reclamation, and he was always suspected of being the guy that was feeding stuff to Bennett. I don't think it was a real plot on anybody's part, but this relationship has been built up over an eight-year period, and the average bureaucrat is not going to think that he's getting his new boss in trouble just because he tells some senator. After all, we've all got to go up to the Senate and get our

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appropriations and our enabling legislation; we've got to be good to all of them. And of course, you do try to be as much as you can, but when you got....

I keep thinking about Utah because Senator Moss [Frank Edward Moss] was a friend of Stewart Udall's. In fact, Stewart had gone up and campaigned and made a couple of speeches the year Moss was elected, in 1958, I think. That's right, '58, '64, '70. We've got a new one coming up. Moss has to run again this year. So here's this rivalry between a liberal Democrat, a Kennedy supporter, and a hard-rock conservative like Bennett who was against everything except programs in Utah, and he's getting all of the announcements. Manatos would kick up a fuss, and Claude would double it. This is the sort of thing.

A lot of the times the calls were just routine. "Tip O'Neil [Thomas P. O'Neil, Jr.] wants to find out about something. Will you send somebody up to talk to him?" "Well, sure." This is easy. But if Tip complained a couple days later, then Claude would probably be impatient.

He had a tough job there, you know. He was the guy in the office. He was the one that could be on the phone. Everybody else was up maneuvering around the Hill. And I understood this. Bob McConnell [Robert C. McConnell], the guy who eventually became our congressional liaison man, had known Claude even longer than I had and had known him more intimately earlier than I had known Claude. I just knew him to say hello to him or

check something about the Interior Committee. Bob is a very understanding person on things like this, and he'd stand up to Claude and do what he could to smooth it out and things worked all right. Nothing was.... I never was really happy when the girl said, "Mr. Desautels is on the line." [Laughter]

MOSS: You knew it meant something that you had to adjust to.

BEATY: I had to sit there and hold my tongue and say, "We'll do it, Claude. We'll get it done."

MOSS: A little digression here. You mentioned Floyd Dominy in the Reclamation Bureau. For the first time--I don't know why I didn't get on these before--I was looking at the nomination hearings in '61. I saw that in Udall's nomination hearing they jumped on him about Floyd Dominy, wondering whether he was going to keep him on or not. I forget exactly which senator jumped on him. One of the more liberal, pro-public power.

BEATY: It was probably Jackson [Henry M. Jackson].

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MOSS: I think perhaps it was Jackson who jumped on him and said, "Now look, are you going to be making the decisions, or is Floyd Dominy going to be making the decisions?"

BEATY: Yeah. Yeah.

MOSS: And Udall assured him that he would be making the decisions.

BEATY: That's right. Well, they had talked about this privately, and I think Jackson wanted to put it on the record. He wanted it out so Dominy would read it and see it, and whether Udall told Dominy or not, here it was out in the open. He was very much opposed to having Dominy kept on as Reclamation...

MOSS: Jackson was?

BEATY: Jackson was. Yeah. And I think Magnuson [Warren G. Magnuson] was, too. It was the way that Reclamation had handled the Columbia River irrigation project or whatever it is.... It's a huge central Washington project of about a million acres, only half of which have been developed, and it was the slow pace of its development that they were upset about and had been. I know it wasn't Dominy personally; it was budget restrictions. In the position Jackson has been in, as a ranking man, and pro-administration--whatever administration it is--on military matters, as chairman of Interior Committee, and so on and so forth, if anybody can do it, he would have gotten it done because he is a very effective senator. It just cost a lot of money and Reclamation only gets

its part of the overall budget, and you can't put it all in there to develop another 200,000 acres of canals to get the water into another 200,000 acres. But they really were down on him. I think we've talked about this once.

MOSS: A little bit, yes.

BEATY: Because I went over to Jackson's office a couple of times before Christmas, 1960 I think. Really, before Christmas--between Christmas and the time that the Senate and Congress came back and they started these hearings. Jackson wasn't there the day that I finally got the message. I finally talked to Jackson on the phone once. He said, in effect, "If Stu wants us to hire him, wants to keep him, okay, but he is probably going to regret it. He'd better be certain that he's making the decisions," in effect, what was repeated there in the hearing.

On the other hand, the senior senator from Arizona, Carl Hayden [Carl T. Hayden], thought Dominy was the best--and he put it in a letter--"the best Reclamation Commissioner I've ever known," and he was Dominy's great sponsor. Udall, from Arizona, couldn't very well kick in the teeth of his senior senator about the only thing he really asked about in that whole change of administration. He had one or two minor officials that he wanted placed, but this was really the only one that he came out flatly on. I think Jackson understood this, that Stewart was in

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no position to say no, and so having made his point, he went ahead and accepted it. But I also seem to recall that several times in later years he was slipping the old needle in and reminding, "Well, you know, I told you about him."

MOSS: Well, back to the White House. I wonder if you can recall the way in which the business of preparing presidential messages to Congress on Interior Department matters worked. There was a little bit of a mention of Interior programs in both State of the Union messages, the early messages on economic recovery and natural resources, this sort of thing, and then in March of '62, the conservation message. How are these things handled...

BEATY: Well, that was a lot of...

MOSS: ...sort of split up?

BEATY: Yeah. There was a lot of talk back and forth between Stewart and the President, and Stewart and Sorensen. We were helping. Stewart was providing some language for the first State of the Union thing. I think around the tenth of January or something like this, I remember something being sent to Ted Sorensen that Stewart had dictated one night, marked up badly the next morning, got it retyped, and then sent it down as a draft. I don't know where they were working, where the Kennedy operation was being run from--probably the Senate offices. I just don't remember.

MOSS: No, I don't recall either, but that can be checked out easily enough.

BEATY: Yeah. On hiring matters....

MOSS: Some of it was down in Palm Beach.

BEATY: That's right. That's right. Sure. On the recruiting, the staffing business, O'Brien and Adam Yarmolinsky and these people were working over here in the Democratic National Committee, which was, at that time, 1100 Connecticut [Avenue, N.W.]...

MOSS: Right.

BEATY: ...just before they moved over here in this building. That's a mere detail. Stewart provided language on the various things that they wanted to include, and he suggested some things. I don't know how much of it got in. I'm sure people who have looked at it and have studied it would know. Stewart can give you a lot of help on that.

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But on the conservation message, this was talked about off and on all the rest of the year after that first State of the Union, these first things that were sent up. Maybe they thought about it, but it was really an Interior project. Stewart--and I'm sure on his part Freeman [Orville L. Freeman] also--but Stewart particularly, because he was the one I was watching, was going out of his way to say we've got to have Agriculture's input and we've got to have this and that. He wanted the Federal Power Commission involved and the Corps of Engineers. But from the recreation and conservation standpoint, it was principally Interior. And Stewart had been working with the Rockefeller Committee [Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Committee]. We had meetings off and on, and we knew that report was going to be made public in January. We set a lot of briefings ahead of time, and John Carver [John A. Carver, Jr.] who was overseeing the Park Service, was actively involved, and Bob Mangan [Robert M. Mangan] on his staff was a good writer and.... They were always working on language for this. I don't mean always, but work was being done ahead of the last-minute pressure that you get to put a message together. I think that conservation message--a great deal of it came out of Interior. I'm sure, also, that Sorensen reworked a lot of it, too.

MOSS: On most of these messages would the.... Wait a minute. First of all, was the initiative on the conservation message from Interior?

BEATY: I think so.

MOSS: Okay. Now, on other messages, such as the first natural resources message,

other related things such as the State of the Union, message on regulatory agencies, federal highway program, and this sort of thing, the initiative was from the White House?

BEATY: Very definitely, yes.

MOSS: Okay. Now, how did the White House go about it? Give you a call, and say, "We're ginning up a message on this and that, give me an input," or what?

BEATY: No, I think there were memos from probably Sorensen to the Secretary, and Stewart would look it over and call a quick meeting. He usually had the under secretary there and whichever assistant secretary or whichever assistant secretaries were involved. He'd bring them all up and talk about it, tell them what he thought ought to be done, but also, "Give me some suggestions." It would be worked that way.

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Only rarely did I get a call direct from some second-or-third-echelon assistant over there. I did sometimes on follow-throughs. "We need those tables or those statistics before you send over your textual material. Get it on over." But it was a high-level operation; they didn't mess with the assistants. It was usually Sorensen, I think. I can't think of the young guy that worked with him at that particular time. Everybody was young, but he was younger. And because, I think, Stewart recognized that Sorensen was the closest, he took an awful lot of calls from this younger guy working with Sorensen, which, thinking about it now--I don't think it even entered my mind at the time--he really shouldn't have. It should have been just a matter of if Sorensen was busy so was Udall busy, so the underling would have been talking to an underling.

MOSS: How important was that kind of protocol in the relationships between the departments and the White House?

BEATY: Well, from my point of view, it didn't exist. I mean we just really.... I think, probably, being untrained in that sort of thing, we just wanted to get the job done. I have a feeling that just from the pressure of time, it became a rather important thing over there. I could get Claude a lot faster than I could get Larry O'Brien, and I could get whatever this young guy's name was by calling him, and I couldn't get Sorensen except on rare occasions. Stewart could. Obviously, they'll speak to a cabinet officer.

Although, I think a lot of the stuff that people like Drew Pearson and others wrote, both towards the end of the Kennedy years there and during the Johnson years, about some members of the cabinet being cut off--I think they were. I think Ed Day [J. Edward Day] may have had trouble getting through to anybody. What's the Secretary of Commerce's--Hodges [Luther H. Hodges]. They needed him because they needed a southerner. He had a lot of respect in the business community. I don't think he proved to be a particularly innovative or constructive cabinet officer, and I think, probably, he was inclined to talk a lot and take up time, and they didn't have time for that sort of thing. He might have found trouble getting

through. I'm sure that there were times when Stewart didn't get through immediately, either. But all this is understandable when you think about the state of the world and the state of the dollar and the gold outflow, that there was the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State and all of these people to be concerned with. I don't know that protocol.... I never was really aware of a lot of hindrance that this would cause.

MOSS: I wasn't thinking so much of hindrance as touchiness about...

BEATY: Yeah, I see.

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MOSS: ...maintaining it.

BEATY: Yeah. I'm sure Claude said something about it occasionally. "You don't expect the President of the United States to get on the phone and talk to one of the..." I'm just making this up, but this is about the way he would have reacted.

MOSS: The kind of attitude he would have had.

BEATY: Yeah.

MOSS: All right. Moving on to a slightly different subject, and that's the President's western conservation tour. How was this started? Where did the idea come from, and how did you convince the President to take this tour?

BEATY: Well, I know that Stewart talked to Larry O'Brien about it because of the congressional aspect of it. There were two of these; one of them, the President stopped in South Dakota to dedicate or to look at a saline water thing--this was 1962, probably. He stopped off in southern Colorado, Pueblo, to sign the Frying Pan-Arkansas Project Act and then stopped on the West Coast someplace. I've forgotten what that one was.*

MOSS: Would that have been the Oregon Dunes tour?

BEATY: Did the President ever visit Oregon Dunes? I don't think so.

MOSS: It was my understanding that....

BEATY: Maybe it was Point Reyes. I don't know; I just don't remember that. Oregon Dunes was controversial and uncertain, and I have a feeling he wouldn't have

* Interviewee's note: Sorry. This was part of the 1963 trip. Maybe the San Luis Dam in California was visited in 1962.

gone there.[†] But this one was arranged with both--I think Stewart talked to Larry a number of times and Mike Manatos because of the senators that were involved. Senator Carroll [John A. Carroll] was running that year, in '62, and this was an Interior Department reclamation victory after all these years of no new starts and that sort of thing, and here was a chance to stop off at a reclamation project that had been approved during the Kennedy administration. He wanted Stewart to talk to Bailey [John M. Bailey], Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, talk to him about some of these things, because of the political aspects of it. I know he talked to the President. There were memos back and forth, from time to time, suggesting logical stopping places and things that could be said, things that could be emphasized at these stops.

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All of this was followed, only more so, on this larger tour in 1963. And it was obvious since it started in Pennsylvania, with the Gifford Pinchot estate thing that Agriculture--Forest Service--was involved in the planning. But I think probably Stewart submitted as many as a half a dozen different memos on proposed agenda or schedules, and they'd work them out. He had a very leading role in what was put in this, and we provided a lot of suggestions for speeches. But I remember reading--it's been reviewed somewhere recently, too--that there wasn't an awful lot of enthusiasm for what he was saying, what the President was saying, at some of the earlier stops. He wasn't getting much attention, and then he started talking about the test ban treaty and other things that had affected peace, and all of a sudden there were all kinds of enthusiasm. And so he talked about conservation or reclamation and all these things at each stop as he was supposed to but he hit the stuff that hadn't been prepared ahead of time, really, as part of the conservation tour message. It was a great trip. Have you seen the film that they, Interior, put together on that?

MOSS: No, I haven't.

BEATY: It's really a great film. Their navy photographer made the trip, and this film was just put together about the time of the assassination. It was a real tearjerker when you see it a couple of weeks after the funeral and everything else. But it was well done and probably hammed up a little bit with the Mormon Tabernacle Choir singing "from sea to shining sea" and that sort of thing over and over and over again. But it had a lot of Kennedy in it at each of these stops, and you saw the features that they came to look at, the Apostle Islands up in Lake Superior; Hanford plutonium plant or whatever they call it, the nuclear energy facility out there in Washington; driving down to the Mormon Tabernacle from the airport out in Salt Lake City. Everything about it was a good depiction of what he was looking at and the kind of people. Good expressions, and everybody was a very enthusiastic group of audiences.

MOSS: What would you say was the purpose of the trip, number one?

[†] Interviewee's note: He didn't.

BEATY: To give a boost to conservation generally, and to get ready for the '64 campaign.

MOSS: Okay.

BEATY: I'm sure that this was a big factor.

MOSS: I didn't understand--you were talking earlier about the lack of enthusiasm on the President's part for the conservation things. Did he agree with this estimate or not?

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BEATY: No, no, no, no. I may have misstated it. It was what the reporters were writing about lukewarm responses from audiences and things; that they weren't fired up to it; that it was kind of a so-so trip. The Minnesota appearance and.... Wherever it was that he first got into this test ban business, this is where the reporters traveling with him seemed to detect a great deal more enthusiasm from the audiences. The President, picking this up, emphasized that more than the original reclamation, or recreation or whatever it was, text that he started with for each of these stops.

MOSS: What did you feel about the President's own enthusiasm?

BEATY: Well, I wasn't on the trip.

MOSS: Oh, you weren't on the trip.

BEATY: No. So all I know about it is what I read and then looking at these pictures, this film, afterwards. Udall was on it.

MOSS: All right, there was the White House Conference on Conservation in May '62.

BEATY: Again, I think this is one that Udall conceived and promoted and undoubtedly dragged Freeman and others in because it needed everybody's participation. A lot of work was done there.

MOSS: How useful was such a thing?

BEATY: I don't know. I don't know that a lot came of it. I'm a little jaded on Washington conferences at this point. I just.... None of them.... It seems like you're just going through the same thing over and over again. At that time, it seemed like a good thing because it was getting the President publicly involved in something, and it was a chance to mobilize all these different committees and organizations that are working on things like that. I think this one was a fairly good one.

We had at least one or two world conferences on desalinization of water and that sort of thing. Well, I don't know what this accomplished. Technicians and scientists get together and exchange views; well, they can do it by sending their papers back and forth, anyway. I don't think that the cause of low-cost desalinization has been advanced a great deal from that conference, but again, I don't know. You get these guys together, and maybe they really inspire each other. There's been six or seven years since they had the big one here with all the different world groups present, and it still costs a dollar

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for a thousand gallons at small plants and thirty cents at the big ones, and you can't compete yet with stored water or this sort of thing.

MOSS: How did congressional people react to these conferences? For instance, somebody like Wayne Aspinall, who was on the program.

BEATY: Each one is an individual who has his own thoughts, and unless you sit around his office when he's letting his hair down, you don't really know what he thinks. I think that if you have them on the program and it's a good audience, they like the idea; if they're just invited to be there and aren't participants, they can, with good reason, say it's a waste of time and a boondoggle and so forth. Congressmen are pretty calculating in what they do. They've got to get elected and reelected, and if a conference like this conflicted with some important thing back in their district, I'd think they'd be out in the district and not here, because their little part in this program doesn't get them any space in the hometown papers. They may make a newsletter out of it or get a press release out of what they said, but it isn't something that spontaneously inspires attention from the radio or television or newspaper people.

MOSS: What kind of enthusiasm did the conservation lobby groups and academic people have for this conference? People like...

BEATY: They were very enthusiastic.

MOSS: People like Gil White [Gilbert C. White], for instance.

BEATY: I think they really were happy that it was going to happen, and they had lots of ideas on it. I'm sure some of them were disappointed that there wasn't more attention paid to this or that, but generally, I think there was an understanding that there was a limited amount of time and a limited amount of platform space. I think it was good. I think it was well received, and that it did do some good.

MOSS: Any feedback on it afterwards?

BEATY: I can't recall specifically. I mean, Park Service and the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, I'm sure, had increased correspondence as a result of it. But

something specific happening, at this point I don't recall.

MOSS: Okay. We were talking a little earlier in a way--in connection with the conservation tour--about preparations for 1964. What sort of organization was developing for the 1964 campaign,

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and how much were you and Udall and others in Interior involved in it? Where did the initiatives come from, who was doing the planning, this kind of thing?

BEATY: Well, Udall was pretty farsighted. The record he made undoubtedly was being mentioned--about the need to get ready for '64. But he was paying attention to areas where there was trouble. And he was calling them to people's attention, like Larry or Mike. He talked to Mike Manatos quite a bit and to Larry in order to get to approach the President and his principal advisors from a different route, as well as in his own direct meetings over there.

It won't add an awful lot to what you're doing, but late in 1963.... I don't remember what time of the year Congress quit that year, but when it was all over, the guys in the White House got one of the presidential Potomac River yachts and invited congressional liaison people, people like me, cabinet assistants, some of the new appointees, younger guys, Kennedy-type people, who had been appointed to commissions and boards. I remember Dave Black [David S. Black] being on that trip, and he'd been appointed in the past year to the Federal Power Commission. He later became head of the Bonneville Power Administration for us and then came back as under secretary. All the people that I worked with who were still around--everyone was there. I remember being cornered or finding myself on the fantail or whatever you call the little back part on one of those smaller things with Dave Black and Ken O'Donnell [Kenneth P. O'Donnell], and, oh, probably Tom Hughes [Thomas R. Hughes] of Agriculture, one or two of the congressional liaison people, and somebody got around to Goldwater [Barry M. Goldwater]. And I, being from Arizona, popped off about Goldwater. O'Donnell said.... [Interruption] Ken said--I think this is a fairly accurate quote--"I don't think we're going to have the luxury of running against Mr. Goldwater next year." Well, Goldwater was the one the Republicans chose to sacrifice.

MOSS: Do you have any idea why he said this?

BEATY: Well, you know, we were talking about the campaign; we were talking what the problems were. Kennedy's legislation program was not moving. I know, there wasn't any quitting point that year. Congress...

MOSS: Went way late until....

BEATY: Yeah, they even came back in after the funeral and after Christmas, and it just went on and on. There must have been some kind of a pause, or, at least, they

decided that they'd better have a party before it got too cold to get out on the river or

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something like that. So we were talking about the problems caused by the.... I remember some of it now, about the Congress and "You guys have all done a great job, but we're not making any headway, and we just can't let this go on," you know.

MOSS: Excuse me. I'm not sure exactly which time you're speaking of now.

BEATY: I'm talking about the river trip, the boat trip....

MOSS: Which...

BEATY: In 1963.

MOSS: In late 1963?

BEATY: Yeah.

MOSS: Okay.

BEATY: Let's say a month before.... Maybe the conservation trip was over; maybe it hadn't started yet; but it was in that period. September.

MOSS: Okay. So Kenny O'Donnell's remark was after the assassination.

BEATY: No. No, no.

MOSS: This was before.

BEATY: Yeah, this was all before.

MOSS: Okay. I could understand his saying this after the assassination, you know, because everybody thought at that time that Goldwater had had it.

BEATY: Yeah, that's right. That's right. This was before the assassination.

MOSS: Now, why would he have said it before?

BEATY: I think he thought that the Republicans would come up with somebody else, that Goldwater wouldn't get it, that he'd be too easy to beat. We couldn't count on that kind of a luxury, of just having a pro forma campaign and win.

MOSS: Because the general impression you get from reading the material of that period is that the White House is just sitting there licking its chops waiting to get into Goldwater.

BEATY: That's right.

MOSS: Yeah.

BEATY: Well, I think Kenny at this point thought this so much that he couldn't believe that the Republicans would go with him, that they'd have to go for a stronger candidate.

MOSS: So what were these people doing in the way of gearing up for '64? What were the issues, and who were the people they were figuring they were going to have to take after?

BEATY: I wish I could remember. [Laughter] Mostly, at this point, what we were talking about that led up to this was the lack of progress on so many of these bills that he couldn't get things going on, and there was some disgruntlement, I think, at committee chairmen who weren't pushing hard enough. Obviously, I think they had in mind some of the southern committee chairmen.

MOSS: I was looking at the Gallup [George Gallup] polls the other day, and Kennedy's popularity was at its lowest level around this time, too.

BEATY: Yeah, that's right.

MOSS: Did this come up in the conversation, too?

BEATY: I don't recall that the popularity thing did; it probably didn't. [Interviewee's note: It didn't.] But mostly, they were talking about--they weren't talking about the campaign specifically, but we had to get over this hump in Congress so we wouldn't be criticized for not being able to get anything done. You know, it was about this time that Kennedy was--or at least people around him were heard to say that the President didn't have enough power; there needed to be a more powerful office. Midge Decter. Did you read her article in *Commentary*?

MOSS: Yes, I certainly did. I wrote her an answer, too. [Laughter]

BEATY: Did you?

MOSS: Yeah.

BEATY: Do you think she'll run it?

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MOSS: I don't know. I don't know. I accused her of being too enamored with the mythology and not sticking to facts.

BEATY: Yeah.

MOSS: She really was taking the mythology to support the mythology to attack the mythology, rather than coming down to cases.

BEATY: Yeah, I think that's right. And I know she can write better than that. It was a little obscure, trying to get the point, but I got her point.

MOSS: How valid do you think it was? By the way, just for the record, this is a Midge Decter article in...

BEATY: *Commentary*.

MOSS: ...*Commentary*. Right. How valid do you think this charge of lack of leadership or powerlessness in the presidency, from the point of view of late 1963, really was?

BEATY: Well, I think she made some valid points, and I'm not talking about Kennedy himself or Bob Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy], the President or the attorney general. I'm talking about some of the bright young guys that they had working with them who kind of trampled on congressional feelings. This really happened. Dick Donahue, who was described in Theodore White's [Theodore H. White] first *Making of the President* (1960) book as "coruscatingly brilliant" or some such thing, was absolutely insolent with members of Congress. I think he thought he was kidding part of the time, but they didn't understand...

MOSS: Hold it. We got to stop.

[BEGIN SIDE II, TAPE I]

MOSS: We were talking about the Midge Decter article and particularly the question whether or not the Kennedy administration was really running into trouble and the powerlessness of the presidency. And in particular, you had just mentioned that Dick Donahue was very abusive to congressmen. At what stage was this?

BEATY: Well, you know.... It wasn't.... I don't know. I think, probably, it sort of happened right along, but.... First or second year. Dick wasn't there too long.

It would be a close vote. You'd have everybody geared up working on the different congressmen or senators, whichever house it was in--mostly the House, is where the fights were. And I don't remember which vote it was, but we won it. And Donahue bumped into one of the ranking

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Republicans who was opposing it, opposing us on it, and just went out of his way to crow about it, "I guess we rubbed you guy's nose in it," and this sort of thing. Well, you might need that guy's vote on something else two weeks later, and the word got back to people like Bob McConnell, who I mentioned, who had learned over the years to deal with conservative Democrats, with Republicans, and with guys who thought more like we did. Regardless of what each particular issue was, if you couldn't get their vote, sometimes you could at least get them to be absent that day, "take a walk" or something, if it really was a crunch. But you don't get them to be absent if you've kicked them around the day before on something else.

There was that problem, and there was also the problem of overdoing it. We'd have a meeting of the congressional liaison people over in the Fish Room, and Larry O'Brien would call it, and he would run a nice meeting. And then we'd get down to the vote that was coming up on something, and whoever was representing that department would tell where the problem areas were. Then we'd go over the list of names and who would take this one and who would take that one. That's fine. You get to talk to the ones you know best and see how they stand on it and if there's a problem. But what would happen is that somebody would get scared, and everybody else would start calling. And you go to a man like Tom Morris [Thomas G. Morris] of New Mexico, who was a very independent Democrat.... He's from the eastern part of New Mexico, the part where the Texas Panhandle overlaps, the Bible Belt-type stuff. His sympathies were more conservative Democrat rather than Kennedy Democrat, and he didn't like to be pressured to vote one way or another. He usually voted right, but he'd miss on some. He told Bob McConnell one day, he said, "If I get one more call on this thing --I've had four already--I'm not going to vote for it. The hell with it. I'm just not going to be put in this kind of a position."

One of the people I went to see--who in the heck was it? Maybe it was Sisk [Bernice Frederic Sisk] of California or Biz Johnson [Harold T. Johnson] of California. It could have been some--I ought to think of his name. I was making my rounds, too, and this was a bill we wanted to pass. And he had somebody with him, and he saw the guy to the door, and he saw me sitting there and invited me to come on in. I think it was Sisk. Before I had a chance to tell him, he said, "I know why you're here." And he said, "If you mention it, you're going to be about the fourth one today. I don't want to hear about it. They ought to know I'm going to vote right on this." He was friendly, but you could tell he was irritated by this business. Well, Eisenhower got criticized for not pushing his programs hard enough, and it may have been a reaction here, that these guys knew about it, and they weren't going to be criticized for that. But they overdid it. I got the feeling that Midge Decter was criticizing them--I mean she was knocking the whole

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Kennedy thing, the Kennedy myth. Do you praise them on promises or accomplishments? But I have a feeling that she was stirred up, in part, by this kind of an operation, which really wasn't John Kennedy, personally. It wasn't John Kennedy's operation, personally. But the people he had working on these things were overenthusiastic or, in Dick Donahue's case, unfeeling of the way Congress operates. You can be a very bright guy, and you can run a fine law practice, and you can be active in your state politics, but unless you've been working around the Hill and know how these people regard themselves, you're going to get into trouble.

MOSS: All right. Is there any evidence that the impact of this was getting back to the White House, or any evidence that they began to understand it over there?

BEATY: I think so. Dick Donahue was already on his way back to Massachusetts at this point. In fact, I think he left after the first year. My chronology may be wrong here. He came back and helped on other projects, from time to time. In fact, I think I've seen him since Kennedy's assassination. After he'd gone to practice law in Massachusetts or practice lobbying or what ever his job was, he would be brought back here to help on things like putting together the Accelerated Public Works Project, for example. I'm not sure of that, that is just an illustration.

But as I recall, that conversation that afternoon on the boat was an indication of the realization that there were problems on the Hill and that it wasn't all because of the conservative committee chairmen. "We've got to approach this thing in a different way," or, "Whatever is holding it up, we've to find ways to get Congress off dead center and get some of these things passed. We can't go on dragging sessions into the Christmas holidays and not getting anything done."

I really think that it would have been worked out, although I rather doubt that you would have gotten this outpouring of legislation that followed Johnson's succession to power. I think part of that was out of respect to Kennedy's memory, the feeling of guilt that we didn't contribute much to making his presidency work, as it was to the rather overwhelming approach that Johnson took to it. If you think that the people under Kennedy approached these guys four or five times, you should have seen it under Johnson, as there was really the old pressure operation going. But he got results. For a while, at least, I never saw so many bills getting passed as there were in 1964 and 1965 and 1966, I suppose. In fact, 1966 was one of our better years in Interior. I think that's when the wilderness bill was passed. I believe that's when it was.

MOSS: Well, this can be checked. I don't recall.

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BEATY: Yeah. Wilderness, Outdoor Recreation, and the Land and Water Conservation Fund. I may be wrong on those.

MOSS: I think that was '64.

BEATY: It probably was. It was one of those great outpourings of legislation that followed Johnson's--gee, I've forgotten whether it was then or whether it was after the new bunch of congressmen came in in '66. However, in any case, most of our really good victories at Interior came in the second year of each Congress. In 1961 we didn't get an awful lot passed. Towards the end of 1962, we got a lot of good ones, and it was partly to note some of those that Kennedy made that first trip. I mentioned the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project.

MOSS: In what ways do you.... Do you know if this was getting back to, say, Sorensen and to O'Brien and to Kennedy, this business of the lower-level people really rubbing the congressmen the wrong way...

BEATY: Yeah.

MOSS: ...and if so, with what results?

BEATY: If you talk to Chuck Daly [Charles U. Daly] sometime--he's in town with Children's Foundation, which is kind of a Kennedy organization--he might give you some thoughts. I think he would be inclined to be like Donahue because he's a kind of a--if you don't know him, you might view him as a kind of a quick-on-the-tongue, smart-aleck-type guy. But Chuck had worked up on the Hill with us in the House side and with the Kennedy operation over in the Senate, and he, I think, got along much better than.... It seems to me--it's my recollection that some of the things about Larry's realization of what was going on came to me from Chuck. He didn't join the administration immediately; he was with Stanford Research [Institute] for a few months and came in here towards the end of the summer of 1961, probably. I've forgotten the exact timing.

The first thing I recall about this, Claude Desautels called and wanted to know what I thought about Chuck Daly. They were beginning to recruit him. They knew that Dick Donahue was leaving and were looking for somebody else. I seem to recall Chuck saying something about Larry's concern over this, and I'm sure that Larry was up on it. And if he knew, I'm sure that he transmitted it to the President. I just don't think there was any.... You know, you don't tell everything, you don't pound it everyday, but you let the boss know from time to time where the problems are. I would think that there would've been a lot of concentration on that.

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I can't remember what it was I read recently where they were talking about his skill in working with Wilbur Mills [Wilbur Daigh Mills] on some of the things that were done in that committee [House Ways and Means Committee]. On the other hand, I ran into criticism of a lack of that approach in dealing with Fulbright [J. William Fulbright] on foreign affairs, foreign relations, whatever it is [Senate Foreign Relations Committee]. Fulbright wanted to be secretary of state and didn't get asked. He got kind of ignored the first few months, and then we ran into a lot of problems getting things in that area. Most of this stuff is hearsay or

gossip by congressional liaison guys talking at meetings, before the meeting starts, and that sort of thing. So I can't be specific about it.

MOSS: There is the accusation--and this has come up in a number of places--that, while Kennedy had been in the Congress, he was never of it and never really understood it, and this is the source of some of this problem. Now you've attributed it to some of the second-level people who were not in or of the Congress. Do you think it was simply a matter of not understanding how to handle the situation?

BEATY: Well, I think Mike Manatos got into a lot less trouble on the Senate side. You know, Mike had worked up there for years and knew his way around and was a low-key guy. We had our problems with him, too. He'd call up and be very impatient because something hadn't been done the way he thought it should be done, but I don't think he got the President in trouble on the Senate side. And if there were trouble with Fulbright, it was because Kennedy chose not to do it or people in the State Department who should have been running that kind of a liaison weren't doing it. I just don't know; this wasn't my baby.

MOSS: What about a genuine lack of respect for the opinions of other people. Did you ever run into this on the part of the White House crew?

BEATY: Well, I think so. I think there was certainly insolence...

MOSS: A "we know best" type of insolence?

BEATY: Yeah.

MOSS: To what effect and in what instances, can you recall?

BEATY: No, I can't. Let me tell you something else I remember. Somebody was talking to Stewart Udall when I was with him on a trip--this is while Kennedy was still president. I think it was probably California, but it may have been an Arizona trip.

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They were talking about, "Isn't it amazing what a great president he has become," and how little impact he made when he was in the Senate, words to that effect. And Stewart said that Kennedy had said to him something like this, "You could have stayed in the House, and I could have stayed in the Senate the rest of our lives, and we would never have gotten to be powerhouses or committee chairmen or anything because we just didn't fit into that 'go along to get along' type operation up there." I know I'm misquoting Stewart. I'm probably misquoting his quote of the President, but this was the idea he was transmitting. And I think this would indicate that the President himself had some disdain for congressional processes. You know, you are very aware that you've got to treat them a certain way to get anything

done, and that you can't attack their most cherished views and hope to accomplish anything as president.

He had a great touch in speeches and in public appearances with members of Congress to really give them the boost as a true politician is supposed to do, but what he did in public and what he thought privately, generally, I think in anybody's case, are different things. If a president or a cabinet member could split himself into seven or eight different people, they'd probably do a lot better than they would with seven or eight staffers who have had less experience. And I guess the communications thing, too, between the top man and his assistants, is a problem. You think you know what he wants, but you're never sure. I mean, you may be wrong on it, and you do it differently than he really intended, and the thing gets into trouble. But he's the guy that has to take the responsibility for it.

MOSS: Well, I think, since it's getting on to a quarter to eleven, I'll let you go here this morning.

BEATY: Okay.

[END OF INTERVIEW #12]

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