

## FOREWORD

### **Transcript Warning:**

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### **Punctuation:**

The following conventions are used throughout the transcripts:

- \* \* \*      To indicate a pause in the recording while the speaker listens to the person speaking at the other end of the telephone. Used when only one side of a telephone conversation is recorded.
- [ ?]      When the transcriber is not certain of what is said on the recording.
- . . . .      To indicate a sentence which the speaker trails off without completing it.
- . . .      When a speaker is interrupted before a sentence is completed.
- \_\_\_\_\_      To indicate the speaker's emphasis.
- [ ]      Used to enclose editorial comments of the transcriber such as */Meeting appears to be breaking up/* or */Several speakers speak at once and none of the words are intelligible./*

### **Names:**

The first time a name is mentioned, the full name is provided whenever it is known. "JFK" and "RFK" are used for President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy, respectively. When the identity of a speaker is unknown, "Speaker?" is used; when the identification of a speaker is uncertain, a question mark follows the name. The heading of each transcript gives the names of all participants listed in the President's Appointment Books as scheduled to attend the meeting.

### **Preparation:**

These electronic documents were created from transcripts available in the audiovisual research room in the John F. Kennedy Library. The transcripts were scanned using optical character recognition and the resulting text files were proofread against the original transcripts. Some formatting changes were made.

Papers of John F. Kennedy

Presidential Recordings

Dictabelts

## **Dictabelt 17A**

Conversation #1: President Kennedy and Robert V. Roosa

April 2, 1963

President: ----- opposed the world monetary conference because of the shortage of liquidity.

Mr. Roosa: Yes.

President: What's our position on that?

Mr. Roosa: I think it ought to be that it has to be prepared very carefully, uh . . . that we have been trying to feel for areas of agreement where some kind of a consensus might emerge eventually and we haven't found it yet. That we're not opposed to the idea, but publicly we feel that at least while we speak for a government, it's no harm in his doing it, but speaking for a government, it would raise too many false hopes. To put great stress on it now, uh . . . .

President: Well, the liquidity just depends really today, world liquidity, on the dollar and sterling, doesn't it?

Mr. Roosa: Yes, it does. And there is need to get more and, meanwhile, uh . . .

President: And then, with the back by our own personal supply of gold, to have the whole world monetary system depend on the United States supply of gold, which happens to be, in a sense, a historical accident . . .

Mr. Roosa: Sure.

President: . . . doesn't make much sense, does it?

Mr. Roosa: No, no, it is too limited and for the long run we have got to broaden it out. So what we have been doing, of course, in the meanwhile, is to build these new arrangements, which are minor, but are helping us get through the next few

years while there is a chance to probe to see what the other countries are prepared to take on in the way of burdens. They haven't been surplus countries long enough. They haven't lived with convertibility long enough to have reached a stage of quite understanding what it means to them. And where over the next few years I think we will find that we can get more and more that comes from them to help support the monetary system, right now it is sterling and the dollar, and, of course, mainly the dollar.

President: What would we want to . . . Ideally, what would we want?

Mr. Roosa: I think, ideally, something along the lines he is talking about. A continual enlargement of the monetary fund, if it is going to do what he says, and that is, itself create credit. We're going to have to maintain some standards so that it doesn't run away.

President: Yeah.

Mr. Roosa: And it's the problem of getting the other leading countries to share in the development of those standards and to develop good operating arrangements that will survive a crisis; that, we do have to push away on now.

President: Yeah.

Mr. Roosa: And what we are doing meanwhile with on our own arrangements, what we call the swaps and the borrowing in foreign currency, is in fact to bring the other leading countries into a working relation with us from which in time I think, and I hope not too long, they will see . . .

President: Yeah.

Mr. Roosa: . . . much more of what has to be done. So that we are moving really in spirit in the . . . along the lines that he proposes, but with a feeling that you don't just solve it with a monetary conference. You remember the bad one in . . .

President: Yeah.

Mr. Roosa: . . . '33. That one was called before they'd gotten a consensus among the leading countries and without adequate preparation.

President: Yeah.

Mr. Roosa: There was a lot of world confidence built up around it before it happened, and then it collapsed.

President: Yeah, good, ok, thanks a lot, Bob.

Mr. Roosa: Fine, bye.

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## **Dictabelt 17A**

Conversation #2: President Kennedy and David Ormsbv-Gore

April 2, 1963

President: Hello.

Amb. Gore: Hello.

President: David?

Amb. Gore: Yea, I just thought I would have a word with you before you see Wilson.

President: Sure, right.

Amb. Gore: One of the impressions he has got talking to Senators and indeed some people in the Administration is that there's no enthusiasm for the Multilateral Force.

President: Yeah.

Amb. Gore: I don't know whether you want to correct that impression or leave him with it. But I thought you ought to know.

President: Yeah, yeah.

Amb. Gore: The other thing is that the impression that he strongly got in talking to Senators is that any questions of doing away, United States veto of use of weapons in Multilateral Force is really not a political possibility.

President: Yea, I think that is correct. I don't think that we ought to use the word "veto," but there should be unity on the firing. Or at least, the firing ought to include the United States, the decision to fire.

Amb. Gore: That absolutely suits us, but you know the Germans look as though they may insist that some sharing, uh . . .

President: Well, then, I think we just have to, uh, it is just not a start. I mean, you can't have some Europeans who have got about three weapons deciding we are going to fire everybody's. And I would think that they wouldn't want to be firing any weapons if the United States isn't going to fire its. But anyway, we couldn't possibly go for that, and we are making it very clear, and I'll say that. I think that a . . . we ought to give the MLF a little help until, so if we ever get the Germans in on it on the basis we are now talking about, surface ships and with American acquiescence, and if they think that . . . seems to me that's got some merit.

Amb. Gore: Correct, but chiefly political merit.

President: That is correct, but I think that they see it as that. But I think it really sticks it to the General [de Gaulle]. If it fails, it is just going to play into the General's hands. So, I am going to give him my little ginger. I thought he had a good speech yesterday, because I thought it was . . . as a political speech it was good because it didn't have too much hot air in it. It had a lot of hot air in it, but it didn't look like hot air [laughs].

Amb. Gore: No, I quite agree, I thought it was very sensible.

President: How is he with you?

Amb. Gore: Oh, well, fine. Everything's going alright.

President: Is he enjoying his visit?

Amb. Gore: I think so. He looks . . . [inaudible]

President: The liquidity was, uh . . . [laughs] he and Macmillan are just about as close, uh, actually, he and Macmillan are, uh . . .

Amb. Gore: They're extraordinary close together on most things.

President: Aren't they. Who is like [Hugh] Gaitskell just personal. It is like all these, uh, sort of like Nelson Rockefeller, isn't it.

Amb. Gore: On nuclear test ban, I think the Prime Minister will be coming back with another message in the next twenty four hours or so.

President: Right, ok.

Amb. Gore: He sent me a draft and I have made some comments on it. So what he would hope is to get some agreement by the end of this week on what a joint message to K [Khrushchev] would look like.

President: Right, right.

Amb. Gore: And then how we would play the hand with that will take a little bit time more.

President: Right, right. I saw a British plane was fired on in the corridor or right out of the corridor, a Cessna.

Amb. Gore: Oh, really . . . I haven't seen . . .

President: In the a . . . Berlin, but I guess it had moved out of the corridor a bit.

Amb. Gore: Probably doing something silly.

President: I was Smathers this morning. He was with his wife and son. I said, well, it just shows how lucky some guys are. [laughs] OK. What other impressions has he got, anything else that he ought to be, uh, about Nassau. He hasn't got any impression that we are not for Nassau, has he?

Amb. Gore: No, uh, . . . But of course I mean you saw from his speech his view is that we don't need the weapons and he would do his best that some arrangement was made so that whatever the Polaris submarines being built are handed over for some other use. Whether he will think like that when he sees all the facts and figures remains to be seen, uh.

President: Well, he may decide politically he doesn't want to quite go that hard in my judgment before he's finished.

Amb. Gore: I think that's very likely.

President: The national deterrent, uh, he may find himself in trouble on that one.

Amb. Gore: On other things, I mean, you will find he agrees on most of these things: trade and Kennedy Round and all that. Of course, I think that he is very optimistic about what might come out of the Kennedy Round. I mean, our report from Paris is pretty gloomy.

President: I know. Well, de Gaulle is just . . .

Amb. Gore: Yea, he can easily wreck that round if he wants to.

President: Yeah, yeah.

Amb. Gore: And then by mid-summer next year, I don't know what we will look like as forward policy. I mean, you can't . . . in trade barriers. The agriculture service is all building up and everyone getting very angry with, with each other. You might see quite a mess. He . . . he . . . Harold Wilson happily goes on and thinks that there will be a great conference and which all these trade barriers will come down. You will allow in lots of raw materials and temporary foodstuffs from the Commonwealth and the undeveloped countries. It is a nice picture but I can't see it happening with the Six.

President: Ok, good, fine.

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## **Dictabelt 17A**

### Conversation #3: President Kennedy and Eugene Black

April 2, 1963

President: ----- for some White House function.

Mr. Black: Oh, really.

President: And if she couldn't find it, she wanted to get the greatest living expert . . .

Mr. Black: Oh, oh.

President: . . . and in addition, it was the challenge to the White House switchboard that they are able to find that you were heading for the station. I don't know how they found that out.

Mr. Black: Well, I didn't . . . I didn't get the message until a little while ago that you'd called.

President: Yea, that was what it was about, [laughs] Jackie wanted to ask you that.

Mr. Black: As a matter of fact, I was going to call you tomorrow. I talked to [General Lucius] Clay as you asked me to and did not tell him that I had even seen you.

President: Right, right.

Mr. Black: He said if he testifies that he is going to say what he has been saying, which was that first of all that we had not been asked to study the new program, that we merely studied the old program. And that if we felt that if certain criteria had been followed, that the old program could have been reduced by 500 million dollars. Now, what that means is that if Clay agrees with the increases that you have asked for, namely the 325 million dollars for Latin America. And you know the 200 million social progress and 125 million more for aid and also 80 million more economic aid for India and Pakistan and Nigeria,

additional money. And also 80 million dollars for military aid to India, plus 50 million more to increase your emergency fund. This amounts to about 525 million dollars.

President: Right.

Mr. Black: Now, Clay said that he doesn't differ with this request.

President: Yeah, yeah.

Mr. Black: And I don't, I think they are perfectly, uh, all those increases are perfectly reasonable increases.

President: Right, right.

Mr. Black: So, what this would amount to would be he would say yes according to the criteria we have established. They could have done this last year for 3 billion 4, but now there are new things that will bring this up another 500 million plus.

President: Which he supports.

Mr. Black: Yea, that will be about 4 billion dollars.

President: That will be fine. As long as he . . . you see, what happened was in his press conference, he was sort of stressing so much the 500 million dollar reduction of the previous program that all the papers ending up with a 3.4 figure.

Mr. Black: That's right.

President: So that we never got much around to that, uh.

Mr. Black: I called him today and I just said, what are you going to do. I want to know because I am going to be asked by reporters and I may testify, too, so I want to know what you are going to say. Now, the only thing wrong with that from your standpoint is that he will be talking about 4 billion dollars or 3 billion 9.

President: Well, if you will just stick with 4 billion, you know, I, and we could just make that the line, that is fine with me.

Mr. Black: Now the only thing that, uh.

President: What do you suggest that I ought to do sort of make sure that we try to keep him really saying it, so that they understand it. Otherwise, it gets awfully complicated.

Mr. Black: I think he is alright, Mr. President. I don't think there will be any trouble there.

President: Right, OK.

Mr. Black: He and I understood each other. And there is only one slight problem, and that is when you ask for 125 million for the Alliance for Progress, which is in keeping with a more or less of a commitment. The one trouble about that is there is going to be one helluva job to find a way to put that money down there.

President: Well, that's alright.

Mr. Black: That is alright though if you get the authorization and if the Latin Americans don't come through that, uh.

President: That is exactly right. This year we are letting 200 million pass, but it is important that we have the dough there in case that they do. Right.

Mr. Black: That is exactly right. I would testify that this is a perfectly proper amount and I would like to see that much put in Latin America, but there is no guarantee that they'll come through to that extent.

President: Right, exactly, that's fine. That is fine. Good, well, I will, uh, you will be back in any case, uh.

Mr. Black: I will be back in two or three weeks.

President: Good.

Mr. Black: And I will have to see you when I get back, and I will tell you what I picked up over there.

President: OK. Good.

Mr. Black: Fine. I enjoyed seeing you. I don't think that you have to worry about Clay.

President: Right, OK, good, thank you.

## Dictabelt 17A

### Item 17A.4

April 2, 1963<sup>1</sup>

JFK: Hello.

Shriver:<sup>2</sup> Hello, Jack?

JFK: Yeah, Sarge.

Shriver: Hi, how are you?

JFK: Good. Fine. Fine.

Shriver: I'm sorry to bother you . . .

JFK: Not a bit.

Shriver: . . . but I'm getting rather suspicious over here that, uh, despite your instructions that, uh, some of our friends over in the Central Intelligence Agency might think that they're smarter than anybody else and that they are trying to stick fellows into the Peace Corps.

JFK: Yeah. Yeah.

Shriver: And, John McCone has told me on two or three occasions, and Dulles<sup>3</sup> of course did, that they never would do that.

JFK: Right. Right.

Shriver: They sent out messages and the rest of it.

JFK: Right.

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<sup>1</sup> Date is as given on material received, but it is not confirmed.

<sup>2</sup> R. Sargent Shriver.

<sup>3</sup> Allen W. Dulles.

Shriver: But, uh, we've got a group in training now that looks suspicious, and I'd like, uh, . . .<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Dictabelt 17A ends. Last part of conversation is repeated on the beginning of Dictabelt 17B, item 1, and continues on that belt.