

Orren Beaty, Jr., Oral History Interview – JFK#10, 1/9/1970
Administrative Information

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Interviewer: William W. Moss

Date of Interview: January 9, 1970

Place of Interview: Washington, D.C.

Length: 26 pages

Biographical Note

Beaty was administrative assistant to Congressman Stewart L. Udall during the late 1950s and assistant to Secretary of Interior Udall from 1961 to 1967. In this interview, he discusses potential conflicts of interest between current and former government employees and industry; various public works projects including desalinization, dams, and tidal power; and relations between the U.S. and Mexico over water rights to the Colorado River, among other issues.

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Orren Beaty, Jr., recorded interview by William W. Moss, January 9, 1970, (page number), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.

JUL 22 1970

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
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Orren Beaty
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Orren Beaty, Jr. – JFK#10

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Tenth of Fourteen Oral History Interviews

with

Orren Beaty, Jr.

January 9, 1970
Washington, D.C.

By William W. Moss

For the John F. Kennedy Library

MOSS: All right just as a sort of sidelight, we were talking a minute ago before I turned the machine on about Ken Holum [Kenneth Holum] and his working as a consultant for some electric people up in the Northern Plains areas. What's your feeling about the way that people who have been in the Interior Department tend to shift to consultant jobs in Washington with the industries that they were looking after in the public interests while they were in the Interior Department? Here's John Kelly [John M. Kelly] as an oil consultant, Ken Holum an electric--this kind of thing. People like Drew Pearson, of course, and Jack Anderson [Jack Anderson] have made a great deal about the affinity of the public servant for the industry. All this seems to be passed off as, "Well, you have to rely on the experts, and the experts are in the industry." Now, where does a public servant draw the line on this? Where does his conscience call?

BEATY: You know, I think someone probably.... Their conscience is what the law says it has to be. If you're a lawyer who's been working on some particular case, two years have to elapse after you leave the government before you can work in that particular field dealing with government, and you can't work on any cases that were in process before you left the government, and that sort of thing. Right after that they don't delay a bit beyond the limit before they get involved in it.

There are cases, and I think they're very honest and legitimate cases, where they get rulings that say that this law doesn't apply to them. I'm thinking now about the solicitor of the Interior Department at the time we left, at the time Udall [Stewart L. Udall] left--Ed Weinberg [Edward Weinberg]. Ed's a very knowledgeable guy on everything that ever happened in the Interior Department, particularly the legal field, but breaking it down even further, particularly in the water and power field. This would imply that this was something that Ken Holum was working on. But the thing that he's doing right now.... He left the department later than Udall did. He stayed on for a while and worked with the new secretary on the Santa Barbara oil spill, and I think they kind of led him on that he would be kept or that he would do something, that he would be kept in some kind of a role that would not affect his salary. Kind of a dedicated public servant, he would rather work for the government, I think, than private industry. He's a career man there.

But he got involved in the problems of the Alaskan natives while he was working in Interior and he, I am sure, provided Udall advice and certainly the legal follow-through on the land freeze that was put into effect up there. He knows about their oil drilling problems, leasing, and all these things. He's now representing the Federation of Alaskan Natives [Alaskan Federation of Natives] or whatever this association's called. The people who get the publicity are Ramsey Clark, the attorney general, ex-attorney general and Senator Kuchel [Thomas H. Kuchel] and Justice Goldberg [Arthur J. Goldberg], so on. But Ed Weinberg is probably the guy who did most of the work. He had to get a ruling on it that this wasn't in conflict with the law that said you can't handle things like this. I think he wants to do it not for the money, but because he wants to make sure the natives get their rights.

MOSS: This is sort of on the good guys side of the ledger.

BEATY: That's right. That's right. But still he's going to make some money out of it, and it could be wrong. Now, in John Kelly's case, he was an oil man in the oil business before he was in Interior and during the war, I believe World War II, he was in Washington working in some of the oil...

MOSS: The federal oil board [Petroleum Administration for War].

BEATY: Yeah, that's right.

MOSS: Right, under Ickes [Harold LeClaire Ickes].

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BEATY: So he has known people in the oil business; it's just a logical place for him to go. I don't see at this point he can do anybody any special harm or any special good because he was assistant secretary. But I think what these people are referring to really are things where you leave government--things that I really remember about that writing are colonels retiring from the air force and going in with North American Aviation [Inc.] or something like this, and instantly are negotiating contracts or something

like this for the benefit of their new company based on all of their knowledge of the defense establishment from these years in service.

I think the oil thing is so hard to pin down that people are right to be suspicious of people who were in the government for a while in the oil business and move over into the other. If you were a private-utility man, lawyer or official with the companies, you would probably view with some alarm as to whether Ken Holum, who's public-power-oriented, leaving this and going into the business. But a year has passed; Ken hasn't had a decent job since he left. What he's selling is not influence, but simply knowing how to get around Washington. A lot of these relatively small electric co-ops and their associations of electrical co-ops just don't know any.... They can't afford to have a full-time Washington representative and it's helpful to them to have somebody that can work part-time and who has had the benefit of all this day-to-day experience that an assistant secretary would have in the water and power field.

MOSS: How about a guy like Otis Beasley [D. Otis Beasley] who gone with Standard [Oil Company] of Indiana?

BEATY: He's a different kind of person.

MOSS: Yeah. How so?

BEATY: Well, I think Otis.... I think Ken is more idealistic and that Otis Beasley is more practical. He's been around government. He's seen how these things are done and how well people get paid for them. He gave forty four years or so of rather unselfish full-time devotion to serving the public. I think he probably sees nothing wrong--and maybe there is nothing wrong--in the latter years of his productivity to capitalize on it by drawing the kind of pay that these people are willing to put out. [Interruption]

Otis Beasley, when we came to Interior, he was the man I first really spent time with. This was before Kennedy [John F. Kennedy] took office. Over the years working with him, it became apparent that he was on good terms--and probably had worked with them in government--with the

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Washington representatives of the electric companies, Westinghouse [Electric Corp.], with some of the oil people. There were the helium--the companies that did the helium business. He was the man that carried on through changes in the administration and the administration of the assistant secretary's office. He got to know people better, I think, than the secretary of interior would because he worked with them regularly, not just when something reached the top for some kind of a decision. He worked with people on the Hill. He had represented Interior in all the appropriations hearings, and so people in private industry would know here's somebody who knows the people who appropriate the money.

Maybe it's not the best system. It's something that happens, and I think without any venality involved necessarily. I don't think Ken Holum, on the other hand, would take jobs like that. I just think he'd be more selective because of his own idealism.

MOSS: Now, how much effect did the President's statements on conflict of interest and so on really affect what was going on? Did they change things much?

BEATY: I don't think so, but I don't know. You know, I can't recall enough incidents that would, you know, prove what I know I'm talking about.

MOSS: Did people seem more sensitive to conflicts of interest after the...

BEATY: Well, the ones that I was around were very careful about it, about doing anything that seemed to be a conflict of interest. Stewart Udall, well, traveling for example. I can recall three or four instances where he, in making a speech someplace because some congressman wanted him to make it.... It was for an association or an organization that involved industries that we were doing--had some kind of relationship with, for example, the oil industry or chemical industry. The only way to get there without killing two days of the Secretary's time was to have him fly to one of the large terminals like Dallas--well, Dallas I'm thinking about particularly--and be picked up by a private plane. The private plane would turn out to be an oil company plane. He would insist on paying the regular fare to the company, whatever the fare would have been. It just simply was a convenience to save time and save his time getting in there.

He went over to Warm Springs [Hot Springs, Virginia], the homestead, to address some people. I think it was probably a chemical industry, and it was one of the company planes--whatever oil company was involved. They picked him up here and went over there. You know

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how there isn't that kind of service down that way. If you want to drive it's going to take eight hours or so. It's a long drive. He always made it clear ahead of time that he was going to pay for this.

A bunch of us went on an inspection trip--Ken Holum was among them. A General Electric [Company, Inc.] plant up near Rochester [New York]--what is the town where the.... Schenectady?

MOSS: Yeah.

BEATY: It must have been Schenectady. We were supposed to go to their West Springfield plant or whatever it is over in western Massachusetts, but a storm developed and a blizzard. It was this time of the year. They only had one runway and it goes into some small hills, and they didn't recommend that we go in there. We looked at some of their facilities on Long Island. It was a two-day trip, one night in New York City.

The company would have been quite happy to pick up the tab for the transportation--it was one of their planes--and the rooms overnight and entertainment and all this sort of thing. Udall insisted that we all pay our share of it and that was done that way.

The thing that hurt, I think, in a cabinet officer who isn't privately endowed, is the number of opportunities you get to write articles or make speeches that you could get paid for and which would help meet the extra costs that you have, and you couldn't do it. This just wasn't done. Now, a member of Congress could go and make a speech and get paid five hundred dollars or a thousand. Udall couldn't. He wrote this book, *The Quiet Crises*, which came out about the time that President Kennedy was killed, and it sold well. It probably sold fifty or sixty thousand copies, went into paperback, and he got nothing out of it. If there were any profits, the publisher got it. They put extra quality into the paper and the number of illustrations and things like that. So it hurt a little bit, but I think that why he paid very close attention to these orders is the "cleaner than a hounds tooth" theory.

MOSS: Okay, I'm now shifting over directly into some of the things that happened in Ken Holum's area. One of the early things that he had to deal with was the revision of the old Budget Circular A-47. Did you get into that much?

BEATY: I was aware that there was one on and I participated a little bit, but I don't remember an awful lot about it.

MOSS: Do you remember how the assignments were divided up on this? How for instance, Caulfield [Henry P. Caulfield, Jr.] was tapped to be the staff man on the....

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BEATY: Stewart worked with Jim Carr [James K. Carr] quite a bit on this because of Jim's experience in California and in the Bureau of Reclamation before he came back into Interior. He was Under Secretary. He worked with Ken. Henry.... I mean Chuck Stoddard [Charles H. Stoddard] hadn't had a lot of experience in the power area, and Chuck was the one that got Henry into our operation and brought him along to the first meeting or two we had on it. Henry was obviously quite competent, knew the people. He knew the Circular. He knew people over at the Bureau of the Budget. He knew how this thing had evolved. I think it was just, of those people who were participating at the beginning, Henry was somebody who they had most confidence in because he was working for the Secretary. He had nothing to sell to the Bureau of Reclamation, for example, if we picked up somebody from the Bureau of Reclamation to help on it.

I think Otis Beasley was helpful on this because he'd been there all the time, but he had, I think, a legitimate bias, but a bias against the Bureau of the Budget people. He fought them over the years. You usually lose. It's like fighting the umpire on some kind of decision. So somebody like Henry could sit down and talk and put up with Budget's outlandish arguments and not flare up and keep plugging away at it. I'm sure that these various things were reasons that he kind of ran the show for us.

MOSS: Do you know of any difficulties with, say, [the Department of] Agriculture or with the Corps of Engineers that cropped up during this?

BEATY: I don't. I'm sure there were some. Over the whole time we were there we had problems with Agriculture because of their total dedication to the REAs [Rural Electrification Administration] and the preference clause, opposing our attempts, which were partly dictated by appropriations committees and partly by Budget Bureau and partly by, I think, the narrowness of the Kennedy victory, of working with the private utilities so that they weren't being shut out in the new developments.

I think Interior was less doctrinaire than Agriculture, and as a result there were continuing conflicts. We would get something moving that would benefit both, but would work a disadvantage on some of the smaller REAs, and Agriculture would go to bat for the small REAs. They had the benefit of the public power organizations in publicity and letters to congressmen and getting the ear of the people in the White House, so that it was never very smooth. But exactly how these conflicts applied in this revision of A-47, I just don't...

MOSS: Okay. How about in something like the interties and the Hanford [Washington] business?

BEATY: Let me lead into it a little bit.

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MOSS: Okay.

BEATY: I think Interior people and Udall and me--and I in particular--were caught by surprise when after we had worked out the first phase of the power lines for the Colorado storage project, the Colorado reclamation project, and had gotten approval out of the House Appropriations Committee, Mike Kirwan's [Michael J. Kirwan] subcommittee approved what we're doing. It was going to be an all public power system. We got over to the Senate and here Senator Hayden [Carl T. Hayden], chairman, a lifelong advocate of building dams and using public power to help finance the operation, and he didn't control his own Committee. Senator Mundt [Karl E. Mundt] and two or three others and some Democrats from the South combined and wrote instructions into this appropriation that Interior was to negotiate with everybody, private power and so forth. Come back a year from now and report. I don't remember the details of this, but it's on the record where we can see it.

MOSS: Why do you think that happened? Do you know?

BEATY: Hayden was old and tired and wasn't aware of this even though...

MOSS: What about his staff people?

BEATY: I think they would have known if they had paid attention. I can't remember. No, I guess Paul Eaton [Paul R. Eaton] was over on the Appropriations Committee staff at this point. I think that they were more inclined to.... They were more conservative in their thinking than Hayden himself, for one thing. I don't think

they really knew. If they did, they didn't sound any warnings that something like this was going to happen. I think we were all caught a little bit by surprise by it, but I can't think--I just don't think it ever reached this point before, and all of a sudden there was a decision.

Well, we worked it out and it was one of those things that made gains for the REAs, with one or two exceptions. Utah [Utah Power and Light Company]--I think private company won almost a total victory up there. Without using the word wheeling, they agreed to get power into certain places, but kind of on their terms; and probably the town of Bountiful, Utah, and one or two others still think they've been done in by our decisions, and they may've been. They're still kind of at the mercy of one of the most rigid of the private utilities.

MOSS: As I understood it, the Interior Department still had some latitude on this. Weren't there ten lines, seven of which could be negotiated for wheeling arrangements and three public, even though Udall might have gone the whole ten public, a revision in the original instructions.

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BEATY: That's right. I think it worked out to the good.

MOSS: And then Clyde Ellis [Clyde T. Ellis] comes along and screams that Udall sold out.

BEATY: That's right.

MOSS: What was your reaction on this?

BEATY: Well, I thought Clyde was being very unfair.

MOSS: Why?

BEATY: Well, first of all, as we've talked, I thought Clyde was motivated more by his own pique at not having been picked to be secretary of interior or under secretary or assistant secretary for water and power. Two, that he thought that with a Democratic administration in, that they would go back to the period of the thirties when anything that the public power wanted, they got. It just was a different situation. Maybe they didn't. Maybe I'm overstating that too, but I think they expected us to go all out and it couldn't be done.

They were unrealistic as far as Congress was concerned, and they centered their fire on Udall when, I think, throughout the administration there was a feeling, except perhaps at Agriculture, that you can't rule negatively on 80 percent of the power industry to help people who had been getting by with 2 percent interest, or whatever the rate was for REAs, the government loans. It's an awful strong case when the opponents of public power can spend it in Congress or get on the editorial pages of newspapers and say it cost the government 3 ½ percent, or whatever it cost in those days to borrow money, and why should we turn around

and take the taxes from privately owned utilities to help subsidize their competitors with 2 percent interest money.

The REAs found out, and since then, that this kind of money is not available any more. Even though it's still in the books, they don't get appropriations to fund it. If they get in these big combines of power-producing and generating-of-transmission operations with private utilities, the private utilities won't let them in if they're paying their share of it with this kind of (low-interest) government money. They've got to pay the regular rate. I think it's worked out and fairly well, but the old war-horses are still kicking up a storm about it.

MOSS: What about on the Hanford project, the electrical generating facilities there? Where was the static coming from on this one?

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BEATY: Well, again it's the private utilities, which ones, I can't be sure. I don't remember. Idaho was probably one of them. But private utilities apparently at that point were willing to have the expensive facilities that had been built at Hanford go to waste rather than allowed to be used as a producer of power which could be sold under the preference clause in the public power operation. On the other hand, I suppose the public power people would have let it go to waste too, rather than have the government turn over a fraction of its cost to the private power combine to operate and distribute power. It looked like a total impasse.

I think a year passed with nothing happening when after one bad vote, Udall got to working on the idea of splitting up the power output on a 50-50 basis. So this compromise, kind of in line with the Colorado [River] Storage Project thing, I think, led to better working relations between public and private power, between government and the representatives of private power, and, in turn, made the intertie possible because this thing involved a combination of "public" and "private" and "government", and you know, just everything. It couldn't have been a more complex operation.

MOSS: Now, when the Upper Snake [River] was moved over to the Bonneville Power Administration, the Interior had to go out to the local people, ask them for concurrence. Is this a standard way of doing things, or can Interior sort of impose its decision without really getting the support of the local--what is it, the local board? I've forgotten what they call it--Committee of Nine, it was. I think it was in Idaho.

BEATY: I think you need their support. You can have but so much power if they're not with you. There were people in southern Idaho, southeastern Idaho, who wanted this power for production of phosphates or something to do with fertilizer. The industry also needed the low-cost power, or pumping, and various other things to do with agriculture where low-cost power is necessary. I don't think you can ever get the appropriations unless you've got some evidence of local support. If it's just a department saying, "Look, we want to extend our lines and services down into another two hundred miles, or three hundred, or whatever it is, to serve these people," if those people who want to

be served or who are represented on the boards don't put up a pretty good case for it, you're certainly not going to get the money. This was one of the problems.

I think we got all kinds of expressions of support, but we never could get Idaho Power Company--whatever their correct name is--to agree to wheel power. So we got authorization to extend lines and then you couldn't get appropriations to build those lines. But throughout this.... I don't remember where it wound up, but I believe that the company is, in effect, wheeling some power down into this area.

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But if I remember right, Senator Dworshak [Henry C. Dworshak] and who--was the other one?--I think Welker [Herman Welker] had been beaten by the time we came in. Well, Church [Frank Church], of course, was there and was working with us, but he plays a fairly cautious game too. He tries to keep his fences mended on both sides and does a very good job of it. But Dworshak was strongly against this.

There wasn't unified support in Idaho for it. I mean you would find outside the power industry field there was opposition here and there. The newspapers, with one or two exceptions, were against the extension of Bonneville. Again, I hope you get to talk to Ken Holum. I think he can help you a lot in.... Have you talked to Henry Caufield?

MOSS: No, I haven't.

BEATY: I got a Christmas card from him. He's in Fort Collins, Colorado.

MOSS: I think I'll wait till spring, then. Let me ask you about relations with the White House on this kind of thing. Did the White House express positions on a day-to-day basis on these things, or on a generalized basis, or did they leave it up to you?

BEATY: I don't know. No, I just don't think they knew or cared or paid any attention. I really don't. It's quite possible that some senator would get the President's ear on the telephone or see him at some meeting and say something. And he'd talk to Ted Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen]. And Sorensen would say something to Ralph Dungan and Ralph would say something to somebody at Budget. It was really Ralph or Lee White or Budget Bureau people that we had most of our contacts with. It was not on a day-to-day basis at all.

MOSS: Yeah. Well, let me ask on something like this. For instance, when Clyde Ellis came out in his blast on the Colorado thing, would you get a call from the White House saying, "The President noticed this in the paper. How are you handling it?"

BEATY: Yeah, I think so. He wanted to know. Was there any basis for his complaint? Was it going to have any effect? Were there any congressmen and senators

going to take him seriously? What's going to happen next? Really more than could they explain what this is all about? They already knew what it was all about to that extent because Clyde, I'm sure, could get a memo or a letter in that would be read by, if not the President, somebody close to him. I don't think there was an awful lot of contact.

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When you talk to Udall, I think he'll go over this very carefully each time before he talks to you, and I think he has access to--maybe he doesn't.... But he might have his daily telephone list. This would be a good clue to how many calls he got on that particular subject. His (Udall's) secretary kept a list of everybody that called. It may be that this stuff is stacked out in the University of Arizona library right now. But he'll remember with a great deal of accuracy, I think, how much interest was shown on things like this.

MOSS: Udall put his papers in the University of Arizona library, did he?

BEATY: Yes. And they're not.... Not very much had been done to them. I was out there in September, I think, or October-September--and was looking for something that I didn't think I had. After I went to the trouble of getting it out of the library, I came back, and the other day I was going through some things and found my copy of it. It was the Udall report on the Rainbow Bridge thing when he and Saylor [John P. Saylor] made this trip down....

MOSS: Yes, I tried to find the Saylor one for you at the Archives and didn't find it.

BEATY: Well, I can't find it either. I'm sure I must have had it at one time, but I can't locate it. And I can't remember exactly what Saylor said. But the stuff is stored in a place with easy access and they are extremely helpful about dragging it out and laying it out on tables and giving you a big room to work in. But it hasn't been indexed. It hasn't been sorted out or anything like this.

MOSS: I was going to ask is there a shelf list or something that...

BEATY: Yeah, yeah. They've got a list of what's in each box and...

MOSS: They know where to locate it. Who's the head man out there?

BEATY: I don't know. I've got it written down. I'll get it for you.

MOSS: A couple of other things now on a slightly different subject. There's the whole salt water conversion thing. When you came in there was great hope for this salt water conversion business. In recent years it sort of petered out because what--it was found impractical or what?

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BEATY: Well, you know, during the war, of necessity and, you know, hang the expense, desalination plants were built and operated in places like Aruba where we had troops down in the Caribbean on navy ships and all these things where you have to have the water regardless of the cost.

Arizona had a congressman named Dick Harless, Richard Harless [Richard F. Harless] who quit to run for governor unsuccessfully in 1948. At that point I remember hearing him talk about his introduction of bills to push government effort to find economical ways to take brackish water or saline water and make it usable. The program was set up, of course, in operation before we came in. It was, I think, lightly regarded by a lot of people; maybe not the sponsors, because the first person that--at least the person I remember Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] putting in charge of it was a defeated Nebraska congressman named Miller [Arthur L. Miller]. Dr. Miller was the ranking Republican on the House Interior Committee when he was defeated, so he knew something about it. He helped put the program together; but he wasn't a technician, and he wasn't a salesman, and he wasn't a lot of things, and I think the program kind of languished. They may have awarded a few contracts, but with all the talk about emerging nations and all these countries getting independence around Africa and Asia, the rim of the Mediterranean and places that--desert countries where we didn't have much to help them with except arms, which people didn't want to provide if they could avoid it, water looked like something that could really mean something to us on the international scene. We can be helpful (Israel was building a plant). You know, what works best. There were several different processes, still are several different processes. I think they were using a freezing process, and Frank Barry [Frank J. Barry, Jr.], the solicitor.... They wanted Udall to go over and look at it while he.... It was the start of the administration. He had much too much to do to take a trip like that.

MOSS: Who wanted him to go?

BEATY: The company that was building it. But it wasn't just a company coming to us and talking.

MOSS: An Israeli company or an American company?

BEATY: American company. Fairbanks, Morse [and Co.]? Fairbanks Whitney [Corp.]? Whichever branch of that operation it is that does the.... Their Washington man had been in Interior. I think he'd been commissioner

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of Trust Territories or something under the Truman administration [Harry S. Truman]. Maybe they didn't have a commissioner then, but I can't think of his name. He was a recognized Democrat who had helped in the campaign and had access to things.

So it wasn't just their talking to Udall or somebody in Interior. It was somebody in the administration, White House, or someplace saying, "It might be helpful if we send somebody over to visit with the Israelis and look at this plant." It hadn't been built. It was just being

started or they were talking about it. I'm not sure what state it was in. Again, here somebody else, Frank Barry, could tell you a lot more about that. But that early we sent somebody out to take a look at it. Senator Anderson [Clinton P. Anderson] was very much interested in it on the Senate side. Wayne Aspinall [Wayne N. Aspinall], on the other hand, was very skeptical of it. His face would turn red and he would flare up when anybody would talk about "making the desert bloom like a rose." You know, "It's just not practical," he says, and so far it hasn't been. You can produce water cheap enough for domestic consumption using these methods--already you can--but you can't begin to get it down low enough to dispatch available water for irrigation under present irrigation systems.

MOSS: Or industrial uses?

BEATY: I think it probably would work for industrial or.... They already talk about-- I'm thinking of the time that we came in--that it could be done for something like a dollar, a dollar and a quarter a thousand gallons. The standard viable municipal rate is something like thirty-five cents. So for the time being it didn't match up, but you get these plants that we were in that were being built and operated. They were just started, I guess, at the time we came in. The very first one that was built, was started, was dedicated under the Kennedy administration, but it had been started under the Eisenhower administration.

These were million-gallon-a-day-type plants, so the feeling was that if you could make these things work and then jack it up to fifty million gallons a day that you could knock the price down to something like thirty-five, forty cents a thousand gallons, and that this would work. But this wasn't the breakthrough, and so you had to keep all these scientific projects going, trying to find a way that would be more economical. I think that--I know--President Kennedy expressed interest in it, and I think we all felt that there was...

MOSS: Do you remember on what occasion he expressed interest?

BEATY: Well, I think he wanted something put in one of his messages about it. It may have been that something he said made us very much aware of what Aspinall felt: that "Go ahead and

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[NOTE: Originally, this page was mislabeled as 224]

talk about expanding this program and looking for things, but don't give us any more of this foolishness about making the desert bloom like a rose." Well, Johnson [Lyndon Baines Johnson] came in and he boomed ahead with it even more and in spite of what Aspinall thought. He was always throwing in something about making the desert bloom.

I think that President Kennedy, certainly Udall, thought that it was quite possible. We'd find something that would make this work. Right up to the end of Udall's tenure over there at Interior, he was trying to put together this Bolsa Island Project in Southern California which would have been a tremendous power producer and a big water producer. It would

have involved government and the city of Los Angeles and the metropolitan Water District [MWD], I guess. The expense went up so fast, the original estimate by whatever the consulting company was that made the estimates--instead of four hundred million, it was going to cost six hundred million or something like that.

The private companies started dropping out and the thing fell apart, but all this was aimed at trying to find a way to produce lots of water at a fairly reasonable cost. The thing, though, was that you get both power and water and it brings down the cost of each. A lot of effort. I think this is when there's beginning a lot of skepticism on the part of a lot of people.

But we followed along--I think we talked about this before--on the Miller appointment by putting a politician or somebody that had political support in the office instead of getting an engineer or an economist, somebody that really could grab the program and work with it instead of just trying to feel your way with the committees and with the different industries. He, [Fred McGowan] didn't work out, and he certainly didn't have Aspinall's confidence, and I don't think he did Senator Anderson's either. So after a year or two, a couple of years perhaps, we got somebody else. So far there's been no breakthrough.

MOSS: Yeah. Another similar kind of situation in that it was rather frustrating, I suppose, was the Passamaquoddy tidal power thing. This was resurrected by the Kennedy administration, wasn't it?

BEATY: That's right.

MOSS: Do you know why? It came from the White House, didn't it, the impetus on this, to resurrect it?

BEATY: I think so, although we were interested too.

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MOSS: Well, let me ask you how it first came to Udall's attention?

BEATY: Well, he had been active on the Hill with the group that included Frank Coffin [Frank M. Coffin] of Maine. Coffin was elected to the House, I think, at the same time that Muskie [Edmund S. Muskie] was elected governor. They rose together in the revival of the Democratic party in Maine and he got to know both of them. Muskie, of course, was quite interested in this as a way to revive the really broken-down economy of the Maine coastal area, for the fishing industry gone downhill and the textile industry practically disappeared, shoes, whatever else they used to manufacture in these small towns along the coast.

The engineers and everybody involved felt that this was economically sound, and perhaps was trying a tidal power project. It seemed to be a feasible thing there. Here we had all these high tides that were going unused. The power costs in New England were tremendous, much higher than any place else in the country. The Saint John River [Maine] had never been developed for hydroelectric power. It seemed to be a thought that a

combination of a dam or two on the Saint John River and Passamaquoddy could provide a stable round-the-clock, round-the-calendar power supply for northern New England.

I'm sure that Senator Muskie brought this up with the president and that the president was quite interested in it. We exchanged memos and messages, and this was something we had full support on from the White House, if not the total initiative. I think they did start it. On the other hand, I don't think that... I think there was some kind of an unfriendly relationship between Muskie and Johnson. That same support wasn't there after Johnson became president. It wasn't opposition but it never quite got the boost that would have been helpful. Passamaquoddy got dumped, and Saint John River got a project [Dickey-Lincoln School project] out, approved, and finally authorized, but they still haven't gotten the money appropriated to build it.

This is the whole New England private power operation. They knock out the support from people like O'Neill [Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill, Jr.] and Ed Boland [Edward P. Boland]. Boland's on the Appropriations Committee, and we just can't get the money to get this thing built. They knocked it out again this year. Muskie used his power in the Senate one year to force the authorization. He was going to tie up the whole bill until the House put this one back in, and they did. But authorizing it and appropriating for it, it turns out, are two different things.

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MOSS: Why did the Passamaquoddy thing die, technical or political?

BEATY: I think it's political.

MOSS: Is it technically feasible?

BEATY: Yes, I think so. I really think so. You know, I'm not an engineer, but unless somebody was fudging on the papers, this could be done. It's one of those projects that I don't think the conservationists would get too huffy about because the water level would never be any higher than it is anyway. You just hold it back a little bit. The tides come in and bring it up to a certain level and they close the gates and then let it out when the tide's gone down so that you've got this head to produce the momentum of the water to turn the turbines. It would be expensive, but if it worked out in such a way to show that you get more return than the cost--I suppose with the interest rates going up, somebody might argue now that it isn't economically feasible, but at that point, I think it was. I can't remember when this thing was scuttled. It was still a possibility, it seems to me, at the time that the president was assassinated.

I went with Mrs. Johnson [Claudia Alta "Lady Bird" Johnson] and Franklin Roosevelt, Jr. [Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.]--Senator Muskie really arranged the trip; I think he arranged a lot of the logistics up that way--into Eastport, Maine and then by boat across to Campobello, all in this area. William Hathaway [William Dodd Hathaway], now the congressman from that area, I think was only running for office at that time, and he was quite interested in Passamaquoddy. This was still being talked of as a possibility. So it must

have.... Final laying it away for another twenty years or so didn't take place till after President Kennedy died.

MOSS: Another development in the East was the Delaware River Compact, setting up the state-federal commission. Now, it was a four-to-one ratio on the commission. You had Udall as the federal representative, but in a strange sort of situation. He wasn't a full determining member of the commission because of the state-federal split. Did this have any problems for the commission, do you recall?

BEATY: Well, you know, you almost had to shoot for unanimity to get anything done, and the states.... Their technical people had been working on it and had put it together; but in implementing it, I don't think that the political leaders of the states were fully aware of what was required, and they weren't all in agreement. They never were on a lot of the development. In fact, I think it's still unsettled. There was a debate within the federal government over setting this thing up and getting congressional approval of it because it's...

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MOSS: Constitutional question.

BEATY: Yeah, right. And because of the possible precedent it might set for future such agreements around the country. I think the federal government went along reluctantly. I know Interior didn't really want to do it, and yet, the idea of fostering a multi-state agreement on developing and helping clean up rivers and things like that was something that had a lot of attraction. In the end, I think, we kind of bowed to congressional pressure and that sort of thing to approve it. But, again, I wasn't involved directly.

MOSS: How actively did Udall participate in the commission?

BEATY: I don't think he missed a meeting. He did a lot of work on it ahead of each meeting and spent a lot of time as the legislation was advancing.

MOSS: What about the state delegates?

BEATY: They were active too. I don't think any of them.... They may not have come up with any brilliant ideas--I mean, some of them may not have--but generally it was a full attendance and nobody just sat back and listened. Bill Pozen [Walter I. Pozen] went to a lot of these meetings with Stewart, and he can help you on that. And the guy that.... An old assistant secretary or under secretary of interior, who became the executive secretary of this commission, ought to be helpful to you too. I can't think of his name, but we can find it in the books, or Bill could tell you.

MOSS: Now, there was a Northeastern [Water and Related Land Resources] Compact

too under a similar commission, was there not?

BEATY: There was a New England river basin thing set up. This came along quite a bit later though. The New England governors worked together, I think, looking at it from a non-involvement type thing, much better than governors in other sections. New England members of Congress have a conference of some sort. Senator Muskie is assistant, Don Nicoll [Donald E. Nicoll] is secretary or chairman--I mean he's the working chairman of it. Whenever we got involved in anything, they were usually the first ones in. When this legislation was approved, setting up the river basin set-up, they were ready. They were applying for.... This is the thing that Henry Caulfield moved into, and they were the first to be ready to go, as I remember it. When was that? 1966 or '67?

MOSS: In the early days of the Kennedy administration, there was a big push for getting a sort of nationwide river basin development plan going. How did this fare as an idea?

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BEATY: Oh, pretty good. You know, it went back to the.... TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority] was the first one, and then seeing how that worked and how well it was accepted, the...

MOSS: Roosevelt [Franklin Delano Roosevelt] tried to get lots of TVAs going and this sort of thing.

BEATY: MVA, Missouri Valley [Authority] deal...

MOSS: Which did not go.

BEATY: It didn't go and the fights over that, apparently, were still echoing when we started on this. And Governor Morrison [Frank B. Morrison] of Nebraska was very much in favor of setting up something there involving the Dakotas and perhaps Minnesota. I forget the states that were involved. But I think it would have gone except for Senator Curtis [Carl T. Curtis] of Nebraska who kicked up such a storm about it and caused it to fall through. So we got, I think it was, the Northwest river basins. There's the Red [River]--let's see, Red Rainy [River], so forth in the north. Arkansas White Red [River], AWR in the Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas area. Several were set up. There's the Great Lakes. It was, you know, mostly lakes, not much river, but this was set up under the same operation. But that middle-America area, you get mixed up in navigation. There are the people who promote keeping the water stored so the barges can move up and down the Missouri [River] and the upper Mississippi [River]. They build dams to create power, but they don't want to divert the water out for irrigation because it affects the navigation. That's industry. Very much private power.

Here's Nebraska, a total public power state, but their public power there is much like private power any place else. They've got certain benefits, and they don't want to change it in

any way. So it creates a normal situation of a guy like Senator Curtis representing that state first in Congress--first in the House--and then in the Senate for all these years and a total, absolute opponent of any public power anyplace else. They see the MVA or the upper Missouri River Basin commission as a socialistic endeavor, giving the federal government more control over their state in operations and so forth. It just didn't go. And Henry Caulfield, again, can tell you a lot more about this than I can.

MOSS: Now, I recall our conversation about congressmen and so on. I don't think I asked you about the role of Bob Kerr [Robert Samuel Kerr] in this kind of thing. How did he operate?

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BEATY: Well, you know, Kerr is just kind of a totally overwhelming guy. He couldn't imagine anybody would oppose him, and he would kind of smother them if they did. It was well known, his success in getting the Arkansas River navigation project--whatever they call that thing--approved, and he keeps getting the money appropriated for it. I think we probably talked about how he visited with President Kennedy and got an agreement on the oil imports quota.

MOSS: Yeah. What was that story now? This business of a promise or something?

BEATY: The legend I heard was that he had something signed by the President locked up in his safe guaranteeing this 12.2 quota, that no matter how the oil import thing was adjusted, that whenever any changes were made we would still preserve that amount, that we wouldn't let in any more foreign oil than 12.2 percent of the domestic production in the eastern four districts, districts one through four. It cut off the Pacific Coast which was supposedly a oil shortage area and not subject to the same regulation. I don't know, but I think people believe it's true. I think Udall probably believes it's true.

MOSS: Kerr didn't show it to anybody.

BEATY: No, at least not to my knowledge. I'm sure this was in exchange for something else, Kerr's support on something. We go along, but we don't want our internal oil people hurt there in the Midwest by too much import. Of course, Kerr's in the oil business. He got authorization and got the funding over the years for this dredging process of building a channel up the river to get inland waterways right up to, practically to Tulsa.

Early in the.... I suppose every place politics is badly mixed up. Certainly Massachusetts had its diversion forces and Oklahoma's were so bad that now the Republicans have one of the senators and the governorship and probably got a good chance to pick up a second Senatorship when Harris [Fred R. Harris] has to run again because the party is in bad shape out there. When we came in, Mike Monroney, Jr. [Michael Monroney, Jr.] and I knew each other fairly well. He'd been assistant to Congressman Brademas [John Brademas] when

I was Udall's assistant on the Hill. He became the assistant at Post Office as I was at Interior and through him I kind of kept up with what was going on in Oklahoma although he was not really an Oklahomoman. He may have been born in Oklahoma, but his dad was in Congress for years, and he really grew up back here and actually ran for Congress once in one Maryland district. But I thought I knew relatively well what was going in Oklahoma as far as it

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affected us. The national committee was sending somebody around to see us regularly. Who was the Democratic national committeeman from Oklahoma?

There was an appointment coming up there, a general counsel or lawyer or something for the Southwestern Power Administration (SPA) which is headquartered in Oklahoma although it services a larger area. They had a recommendation that this guy be appointed. Not the national committeeman, but he was pushing the man that they wanted appointed. I took him down to see Frank Barry, and we talked about it. They sent the matter on, and we made the appointment. Kerr just blew his top. It turned out Kerr had a candidate. Governor Edmondson [James Howard Edmondson] had a different candidate. The national committee had a different candidate. You just couldn't win. I think we stood fast on it. Kerr was just furious and eventually worked it some way so this guy resigned even after having been appointed. I'm probably mixing this up, but really what I'm trying to show is how he operated. He was a total offensive, a full court press, whatever you want to call it. So he didn't understand that anybody would be opposed to what he wanted, but if they were, he'd have found ways to overwhelm them.

MOSS: Okay. Let me, since we're running towards the end of the tape, let me break it here and flip the tape.

[BEGIN SIDE II, TAPE I]

MOSS: Okay, let me talk a minute about "new starts." President Kennedy in his campaign came down hard on the Eisenhower administration, the Seaton [Frederick A. Seaton] "no new starts,"--the Budget Bureau "no new starts" thing. Yet as I look over the figures--and I think I got these from the *Congressional Quarterly*, by the way--the number, actual number, of new starts under the Kennedy administration and under the early part of the Johnson administration did not seem to be significantly above those of the Eisenhower administration.

BEATY: I think that's right.

MOSS: Just to read it in here: 1956, there were twenty-seven: '57, there were nineteen: '58, ten: '59, fifteen: '60, fourteen: '61, sixteen: '62, seventeen: '63, fourteen: '64, twelve: '65, seventeen--approximately the same. Was this kind of like the missile gap that they didn't....

BEATY: No. Well, I don't know. You probably need somebody that takes a more neutral background than I do appraise that statement fairly. I think there were two things to consider.

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There are two things to consider: one is the fact that all situations change over the years. The dams that were logical ones to build, that were easy, had been built. The ones that were yet to be built were larger. There were more complex arguments; more things were involved. Conservationists had become more active in opposing dams. That's one aspect of it, the changing situation generally. The other is the fact that it seems to me when we came into office, there were practically no feasibility studies that were ready to be submitted to Congress, so that Kennedy couldn't say, "Well, we're going to change everything now. We want this, this, and this." They weren't ready to submit like that. It required a lot of work to get some of them ready.

MOSS: The terms of feasibility changed under the new Senate Document 97.

BEATY: That's right, yeah. That's right. We were arguing over the recreation benefits for the first two or three years we were there. You know, how these apply.

MOSS: And how do you compute them.

BEATY: That's right. We did move aggressively into it to try to get somewhat running. Maybe there's a further thing too. All these new starts that add the totals up were very small things, just a few thousand acres involved in irrigation and the small cost. There weren't any big things like.... Well, there was one, the only one during the whole Eisenhower time that I'm aware of and this was this Upper Colorado [Colorado River Storage Project Act]. It was a project that involved perhaps the biggest expenditure authorized at that point, about a billion dollars and four dams or four complexes of dams, Glen Canyon and Flaming Gorge and Curecenti, which is two or three dams if I remember right, Navajo Dam. Except for that, they were very small projects.

We pushed for a project which the original feasibility studies had been done on ten or fifteen years before, the Fryingpan-Arkansas, which isn't a great big one--only about a hundred thousand acre-feet of water is involved. But it affected a rather large area. It required some trans-mountain diversion and gets into these arguments. If people on one side don't want to lose the water...

MOSS: These--both the Fryingpan-Arkansas and the Navajo, San Juan-Chomo things--were things that had really started under the Eisenhower administration, came into fruition in the Kennedy...

BEATY: That's right. Or they maybe even started under Truman. I think probably some of the recent studies were done back in that period, but you get the

internal rivalries in a state or a region and it takes a long time to work it out. It just happened that by this time some of this had been worked out. So we had something to prove that we were trying to start things going. The Oahe Project in the Dakotas is another one. Garrison [North Dakota]--I don't remember the names of them, but of course, the Central Arizona project was the one we were interested in. It took a full eight years practically to get that off the ground.

MOSS: Did Interior get involved much in the Supreme Court decision on the Arkansas-versus-California dispute over the Colorado River Storage?

BEATY: Arizona versus California. Interior intervened in that suit principally on behalf of the Indians, who were short of water, for all their descendents as long as the river has run down to the sea and that sort of thing. The ultimate decision guaranteed the Indians the water, and it's off the top of where they split up what was left. When we came in there was the usual amount of jockeying going on over who's going to get to build dams where, and who's going to get to distribute the power. The Arizona Power Authority commission was trying to get authority to build the Marble Canyon Dam in Arizona on the Colorado River. The city of Los Angeles had an application in. They were fighting over Bridge Canyon Dam site. These were the two main dam sites, Bridge Canyon and Marble Canyon.

Well, both of them involved agreements with Indian tribes. Bridge Canyon--one side of the dam would have had to be on the Walapai [also spelled "Hualapai"] Reservation and Marble Canyon--one end of it would have been anchored in Navajo.... The Navajos weren't very happy about what had happened in exchange of the lands to make way for Glen Canyon Dam and they would have been--it would have been hard to work out anything with them--tricky on behalf of the states. If the state of Arizona had gotten authority to build this one dam or if California, the city of Los Angeles, had done it, they might not have gotten an agreement out of the Indians, or it would have been very expensive.

But awaiting the Supreme Court decision, Interior was doing a lot of studying but making no particular moves that I'm aware of, remember. But the Arizona Power Authority commission was.

FPC [Federal Power Commission] was scheduling hearings and their examiner came out with the recommendation, and Interior had to get into that belatedly. Udall got criticized by FPC and by almost everybody outside government. He did it for two reasons. The principal reason was, again, the Indian. Indian rights ought to be protected--or might not be, if this were allowed to go on. But one of the principal reasons was that if one of these dams is built

privately, apart from a central Arizona project, it might make the central Arizona project unfeasible.

Now, Udall would like to think of the [Pacific Northwest-Southwest] intertie as a reclamation new start because, in effect, it's selling power which wasn't salable before, being wasted, spreading it out. It was tying everything together. It was a tremendous outlay. It's a big public works project. I don't know how many hundred million dollars it's supposed to cost, four hundred, probably a lot more when you get all the private investment into it. I don't know. I'm rambling here.

MOSS: We were talking about the Colorado River and the way it sort of leads into the question of Colorado River salinity in Mexico. I have heard that there wasn't much coordination between Interior and State on this. Is that fair?

BEATY: Yeah, yeah, I think that's fair. I don't think.... I think once the problem was really clearly out in the open, we understood it.

MOSS: But it goes all the way back to '45 under the Truman administration.

BEATY: Yeah, yeah. Let me review it as I remember it, and maybe not necessarily as the record books will show it. But during the war, Senator Hayden and Senator McFarland [Ernest W. McFarland] of Arizona.... McFarland, I think, was either chairman of the Senate Interior Committee or a ranking man on it. He was also, in the last two years, majority leader. They wanted to build the Wellton-Mohawk Project which is in southwestern Arizona along the Gila River, which is really a dry river. It's damned up. The water doesn't come down much beyond the Phoenix area. The Salt is the principal tributary of the Gila and, in fact, it actually has more water in it. Both of them are damned up before they get out of Maricopa County and this gets down to Yuma County, which is a big county geographically. The whole project's there. The Gila runs into the Colorado River just upstream from Yuma. It's to irrigate, I don't know, sixty to a hundred thousand acres--a fairly large project--and to do it by taking water out of the Colorado River, pumping it uphill in a series of pump lifts, and then letting it flow back by gravity down along the river through canals and irrigate this area.

Well, it was an area in which the soil had a great deal of salinity. The feeling was that no adequate studies had been done to show what problems would arise and the Bureau of Reclamation was lax in doing this. Of course, the bureau defends itself and has many answers for this. But

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Mexico had been using a lot of water; and Americans, American lettuce growers and others, were operating in Mexico as well as along the border in the United States over in the Mexicali-Calexico area at the bottom of California. There's an argument over how much water Mexico should have, and talking about seven hundred and fifty thousand acre-feet a year.

Well, you know, Mexico is just like California. It contributes no water to the Colorado River except an occasional flash flood, thunder storm, something like that. There are no tributaries that flow into it from Mexico or California, not too much from Arizona,

either, downstream, southern part of Arizona. So they argued that “You guys don't have any right to any water. You don't contribute any. It just flows through to the sea, and if we don't use it before it goes in the ocean, it's wasted.” But nevertheless, they'd started using it, and you develop a right to it. You can get into two or three different legal theories on water rights, but as I remember the story, as we understood it there, to make sure that Mexico didn't come back with later arguments, they signed a treaty that gave Mexico 1.5 million acre-feet a year.

No amount of water quality--nothing was mentioned about water *quality* in the treaty. Interior, Bureau of Reclamation people, Senator Hayden, Senator Anderson, everybody that had anything to do with it, all operating on a parochial (state or national interest type thing), insisted that it was understood that there would be a diminishing of quality, a deterioration of quality as additional water was used, more water was taken out of the river, more return flow came into the river after going through fairly salty soils, and that Mexico accepted this in order to get the larger amount of water. Using larger amounts, you minimize the effect of the salinity by washing it throughout through the soil.

Well, whether this was understood or not, Mexico professed not to believe it, and the growers down there insisted that it was hurting the production of their crops. Their wells that they used to supplement it were salty anyway. They weren't as good quality as originally the river water, and so they had no other source of water.

This sneaked up on us, I think. The Bureau of Reclamation didn't alert us that there was going to be any problem. We first started reading about it when there were some demonstrations in Mexico. As I remember it, I remember Jim Carr and I talking about it and talking to the Secretary and that it wasn't treated as a joke, but it just, you know, it was a passing thing. It took some prodding from State [Department] and the White House to make us face up to it. It was, you know, it's almost an impossible situation.

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MOSS: Do you recall who was doing the prodding?

BEATY: Well, I think the President called the Secretary and talked to him about it, as I recall.

MOSS: Anybody from State contact you directly?

BEATY: Yeah, we had several rather regular contacts over there: Bob Sayre [Robert H. Sayre], who is probably head of the Mexican desk--at least he was in a fairly high role there; a man named Martin [T. R. Martin]--it's a set of initials, I can't think of what his initials are, and the general counsel, Chayes, Abram Chayes. We met once with Secretary Rusk [Dean Rusk] and Chayes and--T. R. Martin is the name. T. R. Martin and Sayre and Chayes were the three that were the more regular contacts, but the ambassador, Mann [Thomas Clifton Mann], was involved in it regularly. This was a regular weekly event.

As I started to say, it was a very difficult thing for a Secretary of Interior who has to deal with the Senate and House Interior Committee, and here are the people on the

committees: Senator Anderson, who's looking out after the Upper [Colorado River] Basin, and is afraid that if Mexico gets more water that it's going.... The Upper Basin had already been dealt with badly. They're going to lose.... Very jealous of every drop of water. Senator Hayden, head of the Appropriations Committee, the leading Democrat in Arizona: Wayne Aspinall, ranking man on defending the Upper Basin water rights on the House side, and all these people saying, you know, "don't give Mexico a thing. Don't admit anything. Don't give them anything."

Here is the State Department and the administration recognizing the importance of Mexico to the United States and all the Latin American dealings. If you can't get along with your next-door neighbor, how can you--you know, these little Mexicans--disparaging remark. If you think about them like that, you're not going to make any headway with Venezuela or Brazil or anybody else. We got our instructions pretty well to work it out.

Floyd Dominy [Floyd E. Dominy] wouldn't yield an inch. It was just like he was running his own little barony in the Bureau of Reclamation. Several times I went to his office and went over it with him and tried to impress him with the utter impossibility of our sitting on our hands and doing nothing about it. We just had to do something. Udall was meeting with people on the Hill. And Jim Carr was meeting with people on the Hill. Holum and I finally cornered Dominy one day and just laid it out. The date of resisting us was over.

So they had several different processes. They were going to drill wells up in the Wellton-Mohawk area and pump out this salty water and run it down separately. Well, we were still going to contaminate the river. We've got to build a bypass channel. It's too expensive, you

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can't do that. We're going to tile the irrigated area so that the drainage will work differently and you get out the salty water at different times. Money was spent on tiling as an experimental thing. They did build a bypass channel eventually.

There was some semantics involved in whether or not this was charged against Mexico. The water that went down the bypass channel was charged against Mexico. It is charged, but it isn't charged in the sense that Mexico lost face by it theoretically. They have got a right to divert the water into their canals or let it run on down the river and into the Gulf of California.

I think once it came to our attention we worked with State very closely. I think that they will tell you we played games with them. I remember one meeting over in the Fish Room with Bob Sayre and somebody--one of the assistant secretaries. By this time it was probably Mann who had come back into the department from an ambassador's role. Probably Johnson was president by this time.

MOSS: Yes, yes. Johnson brought him back.

BEATY: The State Department people, as I recall, were rather sullen because they felt we outmaneuvered them or hadn't been utterly frank about what we were

doing. It was a tough thing--probably still isn't totally settled--but we did force the Bureau to cooperate to the extent of finding money. Hayden put some money into the pot, ordered the Appropriations Committee to build a bypass channel to add additional acreages to the tilings. Their feeling is that over the years the salinity will go down, that they will get out this worst of the salt and this salt dome center underlying the Wellton-Mohawk area, and that it will get the quality back to the point where you won't have to use the bypass channel.

MOSS: That the salt will be flushed out of the whole area.

BEATY: That's right. This is the Bureau of Reclamation theory. I think it has gone down a little bit over each year, but it's still infinitesimal as far as improvement is concerned. There's a whole lot of other things that tie into this. There is surplus water under the Yuma Valley that needs to be pumped out to keep the water table from making the land unfarmable. Mexico doesn't want to accept this as part of their one million five hundred thousand acres. Some of this water flows underground and Mexico uses it in the San Luis area on the east side of the Colorado River. All the water we've been talking about before goes along the west side over towards California on the Mexico side. They are increasing acreage irrigated in the San Luis area out of this underground water, and they're afraid if we start pumping--Mexico's afraid if we start pumping--this water on the United States side, putting it in the river and taking credit for it, it's going to cut off some of the water.

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MOSS: Okay, shall we knock this off here and pick up next time?

[END OF INTERVIEW #10]

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