

Jackson J. Holtz Oral History Interview – JFK#1, 05/07/1964
Administrative Information

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Biographical Note

Holtz was the Vice Chairman of John F. Kennedy's [JFK] 1952 Senate campaign. In this interview Holtz discusses his relationship with JFK; working on JFK's 1952 Senate campaign; comparisons between JFK and Henry Cabot Lodge during the 1952 Senate race; JFK, Holtz, and the Algerian crisis; JFK's involvement with Holtz's 1954 and 1956 congressional campaigns; discussing Senator Joseph McCarthy with JFK; the 1956 Democratic National Convention; and JFK and Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy Onassis' wedding, among other issues.

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Edith Holtz
Edith Holtz

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Oral History Interview

with

JACKSON J. HOLTZ

Boston, Massachusetts

May 7, 1964

By David Hern

For the John F. Kennedy Library

HERN: Mr. Holtz, you had considerable personal and political contact with the late President Kennedy. Would you tell us, please, how this came about?

HOLTZ: Well, we had great admiration for him since his early congressional days, but the relationship, at that time, was fairly casual. However, it was when he first ran for the Senate against Henry Cabot Lodge that I got to know him intimately and worked closely with him and for him. It was immediately after my release from my military duty on the Korean recall that he got hold of me in connection with his effort toward being United States senator.

HERN: Can you tell us some of the highlights of that particular campaign in 1952?

HOLTZ: Well, I think the campaign, in turn, reflected precisely what happened to me at the first serious sit-down I had with the president. I'd indicated to you that I had just been released from Korean military duty when the then Congressman Kennedy asked me if we may have lunch in connection with his campaign. I must confess that I went there fully determined that I was going to be somewhat helpful because I admired what I knew of him and felt that his talents should be used. But I did go there equally determined, however, that I simply could not spend the amount of time that would be required in a congressional campaign, because after the extended Korean conflict duty I had to get back to work. And it's somewhat amusing now because despite my best intentions, by the time

we were through with lunch I found myself completely and wholly committed to him and became vice chairman of his campaign.

There were many interesting and novel features of this campaign. There was a considerable departure from the customary and conventional techniques of campaigning. I think on the whole, however, that essentially the campaign reflected the man and even the changes in techniques and approaches to the electorate reflected the man. Unlike what had been broadly accepted as the customary political technique, the semi-demagoguery, the talking down to the public, Congressman Kennedy, at that time, set the tone immediately which was his trademark for the rest of his life, with the absolute intellectual integrity which he had, and with the respect for the audience that was in front of him and with the full respect for the audience which constituted the electorate. He treated them like intelligent, informed adults. And so the whole campaign took a tone, I think, more like the British tradition, of an intelligent discussion of issues, of the use of language which befit the highest legislative body in the United States, and in the introduction, too, of particular techniques there was considerable departure from the usual open air rally.

HERN: Mr. Holtz, you had served prior to the war, I believe two terms in the legislature. In this 1952 campaign did you concentrate primarily in your former legislative district? What was your role?

HOLTZ: No, I covered the state. My particular emphasis, at least initially, was on Americans of the Jewish faith. I should immediately interpolate by saying that throughout the campaign while there was a realistic recognition that different ethnic groups, different economic groups, might have different areas of concern and interest in the views of a candidate, at no time was there ever an identifiable schism among the various groups. For example, if I were concerned, as I was in great measure, with the vote of Americans of the Jewish faith. . . . There never was any such thing as a Jewish committee; there never was an Italian committee or a French committee. That kind of thing was strictly taboo, lest it contribute in any degree to a separation among peoples. So for example, I would be, as I have indicated, the vice chairman of the John F. Kennedy Campaign Committee and in that connection my concern might well be, in terms of emphasis, on a particular target of votes.

Now that might be best demonstrated by the situation which we realistically met at the beginning of the campaign. Henry Cabot Lodge had great acceptance among the electorate of Massachusetts and really quite deservedly so. He had a good record, and in terms of ethnic acceptance within the definition I made earlier, specifically in terms of Americans of the Jewish faith,

he had a fine record on those matters which might be of special sensitive concern, be it the immigration laws or civil rights or Israel recognition at that time. Now we recognized that in meeting this great acceptance for Lodge we had to go to considerable--use considerable effort and on the highest possible level. At no time, I must quickly add, was there ever any ad personum attack. Nobody ever spoke ill of Cabot Lodge and this as it should be. We were concerned with issues, and personalities only so far as they are related to issues. So beginning as we did with what we were fearful would be a heavy majority of votes for Lodge in a particular group, we undertook to try to transmit to that group the sensitive understanding which Jack Kennedy truly had for all peoples and which he truly had for minority peoples. And our problem thus became one of communication, how to give Senator Kennedy, at that time Congressman Kennedy, the hearing, how to give him the opportunity to be appraised on his points of view, and yet keep away from the archaic, conventional, political, and frequently boring techniques.

For example, in specific answer to your question as to techniques, we experimentally--instead of having rallies in a hall which required more effort to gather people than votes produced by the effort, we procured a large theater on Blue Hill Avenue in the Dorchester district of Boston where there was a heavy concentration of Americans of the Jewish faith. We had two pictures scheduled for filming. One was an American production which had a Palestine or Israel theme. Then the other was an actual travelogue in Israel. We distributed tickets to be made available to those who would like to come and, of course, they weren't difficult to get. They appeared in various grocery stores, the kosher meat shops, etc., with the result that that night the theater was literally so crowded that we were terribly fearful of the fire laws, because there just was no room for anyone to move around in. And after the first picture was shown and before the second picture was shown, the house lights went on and at that assembly Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., who had been invited down from New York to be a speaker for Congressman Kennedy for Senate at that time, John W. McCormack, now the Speaker, and the few of us who did some introducing, were there; and then Congressman Kennedy for Senate. You thus had an audience who had been brought in to see and hear, to be sure, aspirants for public office, but also with the valid sugar coating of two interesting pictures. That movie experiment at which then Congressman Kennedy presented his point of view and his natural charm and his transmitted respect for those who listened to him--it was a fine piece of exposure and was one of the great turning points in changing the views of the electorate from Lodge to Kennedy. This worked out so well that we did it again in the Chelsea area, for example, where there was a similar ethnic concentration.

Other methods that were used--at one point, for example, at the Boston Club, then on Beacon Street, we invited the heads of various Jewish organizations, the editors of various Jewish press and the Anglo-Jewish press, the heads of all kinds of philanthropic organizations which were identified with Jewish community life and the like. This audience consisted of many who were anti-Kennedy, many who were indifferent, and many who favored him. In other words, the audience was chosen not as a predetermined pro-Kennedy group, but as an audience upon whom to make an impact by candid discussion of the issues. It was probably the heaviest concentration of image producing leaders in the community that had ever been gathered in connection with either a political, or any other type of campaign. The net result of that meeting which thus concentrated some six or seven hundred leaders of the Jewish community who had come there, in many instances not at all sympathetic, was that after Senator Kennedy presented his point of view, submitted to questions, we found a tremendous favorable reaction to Senator Kennedy which in turn trickled down to the grass roots because they, in turn, either editorialized or spoke at their various fraternal or benevolent orders and all the rest of it. This was something of a departure from the usual political, conventional approach.

We had, for example, too, a tabloid, a small newspaper, where there were pictures of the Kennedy family, pictures of the prior associations of the then Congressman Kennedy, and the usual attractive things that would make a newspaper readable. This paper was intended to be mailed essentially again to the group with which I was concerned, with the emphasis on the various issues of public life with which this particular group might have been a little more concerned.

HERN: Tell me, do you recall, this is now a dozen years later, of course, if there were any issues that affected the people about whom you were most concerned in that campaign wherein the congressman had taken a stand that differed substantially from Senator Lodge?

HERTZ: Curiously enough, to pick three of the essential issues, it was not so much a difference of point of view. For example, on the immigration picture, Cabot Lodge had a fairly good record. Senator Kennedy extended the liberality, or the effort to liberalize the immigration law, somewhat further than Cabot Lodge had done and, in fact, implemented it later with the Kennedy-Lehman-Pastore act. Essentially Cabot Lodge was, on principle, in the same parlor as Congressman Kennedy. But I think the vigor with which Kennedy presented his intended action along those lines and the clearcut unequivocal views which he expressed, and the charm with which he did it, made points so to speak.

Now, on civil rights Cabot Lodge was right, as we see it, on the issue. But here again, Congressman Kennedy could point out when he served on the District of Columbia subcommittee, that long before it was fashionable he had favored an implementation of our constitutional protection for our non-white population. And so, likewise, on principle, while he and Cabot Lodge favored civil rights, Senator Kennedy--Congressman Kennedy could more effectively present his thinking on the subject and implement it by something affirmatively and unequivocally done.

On Israel, of course, they both had points of view which were essentially pro-Israel; the natural rapport of democratic nations. But I believe that it was because Congressman Kennedy had the opportunity to present his points of view that it was no longer a sole domain of Cabot Lodge. And there I think is where he made his points on it.

HERN: Was it your feeling and the feeling of those with whom you associated that a substantial block of the Jewish-Americans had voted for Mr. Lodge in 1946?

HOLTZ: The Lodges, both grandfather and grandson, had a tremendous appeal to Jewish votes. It was almost like, in some degree, Franklin Roosevelt's appeal. And Lodge was the natural beneficiary and Lodge, in fact, did in great measure go along with the point of view that found such acceptance.

HERN: Again thinking of that campaign, at the outset, what did you think were Mr. Kennedy's chances for success?

HOLTZ: Well, I assume you mean what did I think when you said "you". I must say that I had considerable optimism. We were dealing with a man, now martyred, who was tremendously capable and who implemented that capability with an uncanny industry. He was as hard a worker as I've ever seen in political life. He would wear out three shifts of men a day. And so the combination of the charm which has a political validity in attracting votes, the industry, the high level capacity to think, a political instinct--and yet curiously there are those who have a political instinct who tend to cater to it. But he had the extraordinary balance of intellectual integrity and political instinct. And yet when intellectual integrity and the political thing came in conflict he would do that which was intellectually honest. I must say there have been times, of course, when perhaps because of a politically desirable posture, one may not be as emphatic about a point of view as one would like. But when the chips were down, fundamentally, the honesty of his mind projected.

HERN: In 1952, I think it's fair to say the Democrats in Massachusetts were pretty much on the run. In that election they lost the governorship, they lost the House, they lost the office of attorney general. How was it they managed to capture a Senate seat?

HOLTZ: Well, there I think. . . . First let me say that I think that in general we were dealing with a hinge state--a swing state, which could go one way or the other. Kennedy with the same industry and capacity, political acumen, that I've alluded to, simply caught the imagination of the people and it became, in many quarters, a crusade for his election. It was almost hypnotic and in many, many respects there was a tremendous devotion to him which managed to find substantial reception on the part of the adequate number of people to have elected him.

HERN: Some years later Mr. Kennedy was in the Senate, the Algerian crisis came up. As I recall, there was an interesting aspect of that that affected you. Could you tell us about that sir?

HOLTZ: Yes, Mr. Hern. And may I say, this is the first time this has ever been recited. During his lifetime it never would have been, because very often acts of simple compassion would make him feel shy. And as you note, he would be the first to pooh-pooh some kind thing that he had done.

This is a story which, to me, is almost incredible, and perhaps a little preface would be in order. I had received a call from a very dear friend who had a French governess, and I'm leaving out the names of these people, because they are all still alive and I do not have their leave. The call was, in substance, that the governess' brother was a member of the Pères Blancs. If my French isn't too bad, that means White Fathers. That's a Catholic order devoted to charity and intimate kindness and essentially in the North African area--called the Pères Blancs, I suspect, because they wore a white garment rather than the usual black. The call came, almost naively in substance saying to me that Father X had been captured by the Algerians during the belligerent part of their national aspirations. At that time in history, as you probably recall, when the French were captured by some Algerian elements, they were put to death, and frequently after considerable torture. The call suggested to me that I undertake to release Father X. Well, I needn't tell you about the enormity of this kind of a suggestion. Here was I, certainly a private citizen and were I more, what could I do with somebody who was captive of the Algerians who were determined to put him and the other Frenchmen they captured to

death? However, the desire expressed was so sincere and so utterly humanitarian that I just couldn't bring myself, out of hand, to say, "No, this is much too bizarre and what can I do about it?" But rather I undertook to think about it and then the following happened, incredible though this may appear.

I saw Senator Kennedy. At that time he was in the Boston office that had been opened in connection with the political campaign, and with him at the time, I'm quite sure, was [Timothy J.] Ted Reardon who was then his administrative assistant. We recalled that Senator Kennedy was probably the only significant voice in the United States and I'm quite sure the only one in the United States Senate who had indicated a measure of understanding of the Algerian aspiration; who understood that the tide of history was such that the Algerian position could not and would not go on as it then was. This we later learned to be true. But at any rate, having that as background and assuming, and as it turned out, correctly, that the Algerians would be quite anxious, in some way, to say "thank you" to Senator Kennedy for his being the lonely voice that in substance supported their position, we thought that perhaps if we could reach them in some valid fashion that this extraordinary request might even be complied with and a life saved.

It appeared that the Moroccans, at that time, who were a recognized nation, did have a relationship of a sort with the Algerians, and that perhaps there was some relationship between the Moroccan officialdom and the Algerian underground. Therefore, it was suggested that perhaps if the senator could present this picture to the Moroccan officials, the Moroccan ambassador in this country, that word somehow could reach the Algerians concerning the plight of the Père Blanc, an entirely guiltless man, who would otherwise be put to death.

And then as you probably gather from the fact that I tell the story, a whole series of events took place. The senator asked that I compress my request and the history of the people concerned into appropriately capsuled, written memoranda and send it right along to Ralph Dungan who was then in the senator's office and handling international affairs. And he, in turn, called Ralph Dungan. Then events followed, the details of which I neither inquired into nor did I really know. But in substance, the Moroccans managed to contact the Algerians and then, what is really incredible, or fantastically true, the Algerians released the Père Blanc involved and, incidentally, several other Frenchmen and ultimately I got a letter from Paris from Father X and his sister here that he was released and his group saved.

I'm satisfied that this humanitarian situation and this saving of a life was brought about through that extra resourcefulness and concern which Senator Kennedy had. I'm also satisfied that by the coincidence of timing that the senator had

spoken somewhat sympathetically of the Algerian aspiration, that the Algerians, in turn, were delighted to make what they regarded as a gesture of sympathetic reciprocation.

HERN: Now, this event was never mentioned by the president at any time in public?

HOLTZ: Nobody ever did.

HERN: Mr. Holtz, going on to another subject briefly, you were the Democratic nominee for Congress in 1954 and 1956 in what was a strong Republican district. Could you tell us what role Mr. Kennedy played in your campaigns?

HOLTZ: A very significant role though I didn't win. The congressional district in which I aspired for election as a Democratic nominee was a blue-stocking Republican district. It had been represented for some years by Congressman Herter who later became governor and secretary of state. It was a very safe Republican district. He was succeeded in turn by Congressman Laurence Curtis, who likewise carried the district by a very easy 20,000 without much need for campaigning against any Democratic nominee. It was felt, at that time, that a combination of circumstances might elect a Democratic nominee. My home town is Brookline which is a Republican community, and it was felt that perhaps if I could, in a neighborly environment, do well in my own town, keep down the tremendous Republican majority in Newton, and hold the line in the Boston wards, the Democratic wards in Boston, that perhaps we could be elected.

It required considerable effort and Senator Kennedy with characteristic kindness took out of his own time and ran the range from tea parties in West Roxbury to television appearances with me, and I might say that I lost with some 900 votes. But this, I believe, was characteristic of the president. It was, I'd like to think, a gesture towards me perhaps and I'm sure I can only construe it as the warmest kind of compliment. He must have felt that I was entirely worthy of it. But also, characteristically, was his sense of gratitude to those who had helped him.

HERN: In 1954 President Kennedy had a very severe back condition. Do you recall having a picture taken with him, at that time, where that was significant, where he was, I believe, down at Hyannis at the time? Could you tell us something about that?

HOLTZ: Yes, I remember it very tenderly. It was a remarkable indication of an extraordinary self-discipline. The

senator was kind enough, as we have just indicated, to undertake to help me. In connection with that, pictures taken with the senator had capital value to me in terms of a political campaign. He was at Hyannis and it was the day before he was scheduled to go to the hospital in New York for what later turned out to be a serious operation. We knew he was scheduled to go to the hospital. Few of us, if any, realized the extent of pain which he endured on a day-to-day basis.

When we got to Hyannis, and Mrs. Holtz was with me, there was the usual regimen of pictures being taken and need I tell you that photographers shunt you here and there until they find the proper posture and proper sunlight and all the rest. Well, here was the senator being shuffled around with us taking picture after picture, and doing it with infinite patience and charm as if nothing were wrong with him. And it wasn't until later that we realized, that during that very episode with so many things on his mind, and so much to do and so much pain that he was enduring, he just as graciously and warmly as if nothing were untoward, took all these pictures and gave not the slightest indication of what must have been literally torture for him. This made--as we later learned the facts of his condition at that time--it made a contribution to our memory of him, which I'm sure you can understand, almost borders on the reverent.

HERN: There was something certainly of a lighter note in the 1956 campaign concerning a television appearance of Senator Kennedy with you. Could you tell us something about that? I believe it was--that campaign, of course, was shortly after the president had made the run for vice president, the vice presidential nomination at the Democratic convention and he was very much in demand around the country as a speaker. Could you tell us something of that situation?

HOLTZ: Yes, this was very interesting, and very often some little incident will be very revealing, though per se not of terrible historical value. The senator had undertaken to go on live television with me in connection with my campaign. It was announced in the newspapers and appropriate advertising was made of it. On the scheduled day he was asked to join in a national roundup which required his absence from the city at the appointed time. I felt, of course, that a national campaign outrated the needs of a single congressman aspirant. And so I was perfectly willing to, and did suggest to Senator Kennedy that I understood his position and, of course, he had to give priority to the national presidential duty. Characteristic of him again, was that he had made the commitment and he just wasn't not going to keep it. So he suggested what we would do, is take a taping in the afternoon and then he would fly off to where he had to go. And then we would have it.

And this was a delightful thought and we were prepared to do it.

When we got to the television studio--and these things I'm afraid do happen--Mrs. Holtz and I were there with Senator Kennedy and his people. We knew that he was in a hurry to leave. And yet there wasn't the slightest irritation, or the slightest indication of a speed-up on his part to get out. And then the following happened. The exchange with Senator Kennedy and I took place and about two-thirds of the way through it, the operator of the television machine let out a mild shriek which translated in substance meant that the audio wasn't working and had to be done all over again. There wasn't the slightest flicker of annoyance on the senator's face and we were very upset, because we knew that he was fighting time. Patiently he sat down and we went through it again. This time we were about half-way through, the machine operator again indicated with some emphasis that there was something wrong with the machine and it didn't take, would we do it again. Well, this happened literally the third time and as we were getting ready for the fourth time, he observed that Mrs. Holtz, at that point, was quite anxious about the fact that we were delaying him and we were imposing upon him and that we were, in fact, interrupting his schedule and putting him to all this needless expenditure of time due to this mechanistic breakdown. He, with the radar sensitivity that he had to people, went over to Mrs. Holtz and, instead of her reassuring him, he went to great pains to reassure her, to put her at ease, to tell her that he was delighted to do it, that these things, despite the advance planning, may well happen and they did happen. And I rather thought that while the incident was not great as events in history go, it was some indication of his essential understanding of people and of his patience and of his kindness.

HERN: Mr. Holtz, is it fair to say, thinking back to the mid-fifties, that you were particularly concerned about the activities of the late Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, the then senator?

HOLTZ: Of course, Senator McCarthy was, to put it mildly, a controversial figure and you got emotional lineups. There were those who hated him with venom and those who loved him as a virtual savior. And there were many of us who felt that the senator's activities tended toward somewhat more disruption than helpfulness.

HERN: Did you talk about this situation with Senator Kennedy?

HOLTZ: He was, of course, besieged by people on both sides of the fence and we were in a state where abundant

parts of the population were both ways on the McCarthy issue. And we did communicate that Senator McCarthy's position could well be tempered.

HERN: Was that one of the points that you raised earlier in this talk, when you said that sometimes the public posture does not necessarily permit a person to say specifically what he might like to say?

HOLTZ: That's an interesting question, Mr. Hern, and I hesitate to answer it, because I can't say that I do know precisely what his thinking was on several factors of the McCarthy picture. On the one hand, of course, Senator McCarthy was dynamic in his sensitizing the American people to the frequency with which perfectly innocent dupes are misled by communist fronts and communist propaganda and it was part of an educational campaign in sensitizing Americans to the menace of communism. The other side of the fence, of course, was what was familiar to his critics, the excessive diatribes, the introduction of a philosophy of suspicion, the absence of facts to maintain a conclusion which could destroy a man for life, the undermining in great measure of the State Department function and the like.

Now, I cannot purport to say what Senator Kennedy's literal position was. But I'm sure that he must have recognized that, on the one hand, there was this problem of meeting communism and exposing it, and on the other hand was the threat to democracy that the democratic process would be subverted in an attempt to meet the communist threat. And I would believe, although I can't say I know intimately, but I would believe that the fine balance in these opposing points of view was understood by Senator Kennedy and I would suggest that, in the main, he certainly disapproved of the tactics of Senator McCarthy. I can't say that I ever got, nor did I ever push him for, a precise delineation of his position. I do know that what McCarthy did, he would not do, and so I must assume that the techniques, the approaches, were not consistent with the Kennedy attitude toward public problems.

HERN: Now, Mr. Holtz, touching upon another aspect of President Kennedy's career, in 1956 you were a delegate from Massachusetts to the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. Could you tell us some of the incidents relating to the quick campaign for the vice presidential nomination?

HOLTZ: The vice presidential effort was fairly late in terms of campaigning. There wasn't the same Kennedy intensity toward the vice presidency that characterized his efforts.

HERN: Well, first, did anyone realize that it was going to be thrown open to the floor, that nomination?

HOLTZ: I think it was fairly well understood that the Democratic nominee for president was not going to take a foreclosing position concerning any candidate.

HERN: I see. What effect did this have on the supporters of Senator Kennedy?

HOLTZ: Well, it's history, of course, that President Kennedy almost got the vice presidential nomination. I'm satisfied that when he went into the convention there were many who pooh-poohed the aspiration of this young senator; and then as you recall, the seesaw votes, which had all the elements of an Olympic contest toward the final vote. I believe this was one of the things that made a tremendous national impact and laid the ground for the subsequent presidential election of President Kennedy. There were some interesting incidents.

By the way, I think it would be appropriate to note that when in the company of one of the other delegates, our neighbor from our neighboring city, Mr. ^{Joseph A.} DeGuglielmo, we had occasion to visit some bodies of delegates from the southern states. I was delighted to find that there was an absence of the feared religious issue. I know that later there were some rather strong indications that it existed, but certainly so far as several of the southern delegate groups are concerned, I must say that we did not run into it. I don't believe it was there and hidden, or I think our own sensitivities would have recorded something. And this was very interesting and certainly most encouraging in terms of a universal American attitude which excludes religious considerations as a qualification for office.

HERN: Well, how well organized was Senator Kennedy at that particular time for this drive?

HOLTZ: Not really. That's why the combination of it being a late candidacy--and I earlier mentioned that I'm quite sure that it didn't have the same intensity of Kennedy planning, Kennedy drive, as would normally characterize an all-out effort for office. And I'm not quite sure, even to this day, whether the Kennedy folks themselves were surprised at the extent of the reception which he did have which put him close to winning. Perhaps if they were aware of it before the campaign, there might have been the all-out drive.

HERN: If there had been, do you feel that he might have made it at that time rather easily?

HOLTZ: I'm satisfied that if there were the same Kennedy organization, Kennedy drive, Kennedy intensity, that later manifested itself for the presidency and earlier for the Senate and Congress, that he could have won the vice presidency at that time. Perhaps we were fortunate that he didn't, because you never know what effect that would have had on his subsequent presidential nomination.

HERN: Mr. Holtz, do you, in your long career with the Kennedys, do you have some reminiscences we haven't touched upon here?

HOLTZ: Well, there are many and they are very pleasant and they are made, of course, poignant by the subsequent tragedy. We recall with great warmth his wedding at Newport, Rhode Island. It was at a small church. Huge crowds gathered outside the church and indicated the tremendous attraction that he had for crowds wherever and whenever he went, as subsequent events established. From the little church in Newport, we went to the bride's home, of course, for a reception. He was not as nervous, as most nervous grooms traditionally are. Nor was he completely the public statesman. He was charming, boyish, and just a little bit reticent.

Mrs. Kennedy, of course, was a lovely bride and when I say that I sound, I'm afraid, like a society editor. She was, essentially, a reticent and diffident girl and bride, and it's most interesting to observe the impact of public office because Mrs. Kennedy from this reticence, from this diffidence, adjusted herself with magnificent poise, charm and self-confidence to her role as First Lady of the country, if not of the world.

I can think of what is always somewhat amusing to those who had occasion to be with President Kennedy while he was campaigning, after the campaign hours. Traditionally, I suppose that when the ardors of a campaign day are done, the candidate and a few people around him sit in the traditional hotel room, light a cigar, possibly have a drink of ginger ale. However, with Senator Kennedy when the campaign day was done, and it was always late when it was done, the adjournment would be to Schrafft's and the drink would be a chocolate ice cream soda. Interestingly enough, while there is some speculation as to how the considerable fortune of the Kennedys was amassed and preserved, it was something of a private theory as indicated by the fact the senator never had any money in his pocket and somebody else always picked up the check and perhaps this is how there was an accumulation of the great wealth. I'm sure it wasn't purposeful, but there was an interesting coincidence that somebody else, at Schrafft's, always paid for that chocolate ice cream soda.

HERN: Thank you, Mr. Holtz.