

Barbara J. Coleman, Oral History Interview – JFK#2, 10/24/1969
Administrative Information

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Biographical Note

Coleman was a journalist, a White House press aide (1961-1962), a member of Robert Kennedy's Senate staff, and presidential campaign aide (1968). In this interview she discusses the White House photographers, Pierre Salinger's policies, White House press operations, and the Kennedy family's reaction to press coverage, among other issues.

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Barbara Coleman
Barbara Coleman

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Second Oral History Interview

With

BARBARA COLEMAN

October 24, 1969
Washington, D.C.

By Ann M. Campbell

For the John F. Kennedy Library

CAMPBELL: You joined Senator Kennedy's [John F. Kennedy] staff on a temporary basis in 1959. Could you talk a little bit about that? What qualifications were they looking for? What sort of interview did you have?

COLEMAN: It was a very casual process because it wasn't at all clear that there was any need for somebody in the press office on a full-time basis. I think just because I happened to wander into the Senate office and Evelyn Lincoln [Evelyn N. Lincoln] was probably just being nice to me and wanted to suggest that there was something—perhaps she was just trying to get rid of me. You know, send you on down to this other office and see whether or not I was interested in that kind of job, because I had gone to her and asked if there were any jobs in the office, which is a very, of course, routine way of going about looking for a job in a Senate office. You don't usually get the Senator's secretary in that kind of thing, which I suppose maybe suggests something about the Senate office. I forget how I got referred to her in the first place. I'm surprised I got past the receptionist.

It's been my experience since, if you were looking for a job on a Senate staff, you'd go in—particularly, one with a senator like John Kennedy, who was at that time in November of '59 already well known—you would think that the receptionist would say, “Leave your resume, and we'll get in touch with you.” So I don't know.... I mean getting a “break” starts out simply—break in quotation marks—the “break” part starts out simply from the fact that

somebody referred me on to the Senator's secretary in that case, who then referred me on to the Esso Building and Pierre Salinger [Pierre E.G. Salinger].

Well, Pierre didn't need a full-time person, and he may have

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thought that since this eager, young girl was asking for this job and was willing to work mornings and Saturdays to type lists for him, he might as well hire her. And I think my impression was that he was kind of a softie and somebody who could be conned by an eager, young female into a full-time job.

I was surprised at the lack of staff at the time. There were very few people. There was Pierre and his secretary. Pierre's secretary had been with him a while. She had been with him—that is to say, she worked for him previously—in California, and this was the pattern on the staffing as far as I knew it at the beginning. Larry O'Brien's [Lawrence F. O'Brien] secretary, Phyllis [Phyllis Maddock], had worked for him in his advertising-public relations firm in Springfield. I don't think Dave Hackett [David L. Hackett] had anybody working for him who'd been there before. Of course the Senate staff people—Ted Reardon [Timothy J. Reardon, Jr.] had been with the Senator for some time and a number of women in the office had been there for some time. Others had been with the Senator for some period between 1952 when he came in and 1959, people like Ted Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen]; I've forgotten what year he came on, but it wasn't at the very beginning. And Sue Vogelsinger [Sue M. Vogelsinger], who later came on to work in the press office at the time of the Convention, actually, she'd been working on the Senate staff for Fred Holborn [Frederick L. Holborn] for a couple years, I think. New people were picked up all the time, but there was this core of people.

CAMPBELL: Of old timers.

COLEMAN: Old timers, sort of. And, of course, that does have an impact on your later relations with other people that you....you know, were there first.

CAMPBELL: Any question...

COLEMAN: But let me just add here, about Pierre in this regard, that one of the reasons why we had, it seems to me, so many people come in and out of the press office, to a larger degree than in the other offices where many of the people who started, remained through and into the White House, was that Pierre was vulnerable to people coming in, and this wasn't just women, either. We had a few girls come in who didn't stay the whole time, and we had some who came in, were hired and stayed. Jill [Jill Cowan] and Priscilla [Priscilla Wear] are a good case in point. Now, these were two very cute, young girls, very eager and willing to work at no pay for the Convention, very hard for anybody to resist. But, in addition, Pierre did the same thing with men. He would be willing to hire somebody whose credentials looked pretty good, which would generally mean newspaper background, without really knowing much more about them, and, of course, this caused us later on to have shifts as some of these men worked out and some did not.

But Pierre was reluctant to fire anybody except for the guy who apparently got drunk and threw the phone out of the hotel room window in Wisconsin during the primary campaign in that state. There was clearly no problem in that decision. But some of the other men who didn't seem to....And when I say "work out," it's not necessarily that they weren't efficient, but—and I think Pierre was right about this—a lot of this is, you know, how they worked with him in the given situation. And when they didn't work out well with him, then they were generally put into something else, as efficiently as possible. And another thing to say about working out well with him is that often could mean, too, that Pierre was somewhat protective of his own position, and I think was being careful to guard it and may have been a little bit hesitant about possible threats to it. Some people were not, in my opinion, threats to his position at all. They were not as competent as he, nor would Senator Kennedy, in my opinion, have looked upon them particularly favorably, but that doesn't mean that Pierre didn't see them as a possible threat. Excuse me a minute.

[Interruption]

CAMPBELL: Let's talk a little bit about the specific White House staff, the staff when you go to the White House. Andrew Hatcher [Andrew T. Hatcher] is number two.

COLEMAN: Well, Andrew Hatcher, as I said before, had come on at the Convention. Pierre knew Andy from working with him in California. So I thought at the time, and have always been convinced since, that Pierre wanted somebody close to him working with him in the press office whom he could trust, whom he felt sure of, and who was no threat to his position. It was also, of course, a very wise political move because here is a Negro going into the White House. I really don't know whether that had been a factor, whether, they had actually been searching for a black, or whether Andy had volunteered himself and then.... I think possibly, knowing Pierre, that the factor of his having known Andy and having trusted him would have been much more important to him than whether he was a black or not. That's probably incidental to it. But, of course, you know, in California politics it would be much more likely that you would know that Negroes would be involved in the kinds of positions Andy was in...

CAMPBELL: High level.

COLEMAN: ...working in campaigns as Andy had—on the ones Pierre had worked on.

CAMPBELL: What are his initial responsibilities at the White House? How does he fit in?

COLEMAN: Well, as usual, with most things....We had to be the most unorganized press office I'd ever seen. [Laughter]

I don't know that it was ever spelled out. He was going to be a deputy press secretary and handle briefings when Pierre wasn't there. I think Pierre did think he was going to do a fair amount of traveling, and that there would have to be somebody to handle briefings and the routine stuff when he wasn't there and spell him off. And that's the way it worked out pretty much. Andy also—I don't remember at what point in time this developed—he also did take the responsibility for photographers and cameramen and that whole photo part of the press office. And that became quite a controversial area. It never stopped being a controversial area.

I got the photographers, too, as an assignment for the very routine thing of taking the photographers into the President's office when the President wanted a photo taken. The photographers, of course, were on call. They could not wander around freely in the White House. They could only respond and get a picture when we called the photographers and literally go out of our office into the corridor and into that big reception room where the photographers sat around.

CAMPBELL: No candid shots?

COLEMAN: No candid shots, but big problems developed when the photographers knew the schedule for the day and generally wanted everything they could possibly get out of it without us being able to entirely control what they were going to get. There was, for example, the problem of the family. This became quite acute and a source of endless problems which Andy used to defer to Pierre. As a matter of fact, the photographers generally took up their problems of this nature with Pierre.

They started shooting through—the cameramen started shooting through the fence with long lens cameras to get pictures of the children when they were playing on the back of Charlie, the dog. I think Charlie was always the favorite for some reason. Another dog, Pushinka, was a gift from the Russians, but nobody seemed to be as interested in her, for some reason, as Charlie. Charlie would chase the ducks that were around the pond. But it was the children. There was the magnificent picture, for instance (that was such a good camera shot), of Mrs. Kennedy [Jacqueline B. Kennedy] with a carriage and a horse—it was around Christmas time—taking the children for a ride around the back of the White House. It's hard to see how the photographers could have resisted this. But on the other hand, Mrs. Kennedy did not like it and was constantly complaining about it. Those were the candid, if you call those candid.

CAMPBELL: How does the reaction come to the press office when one of those photographers has appeared? How do you get the feedback?

COLEMAN: Oh, Mrs. Kennedy would call Pierre when the picture would appear saying, "How did this happen?" And there was, of course, no way for him, really, to explain there wasn't much he could do about it. He couldn't do anything about it except to ask the photographers, again, not to do it. But their usual response was (and it's always the response of newspaper people) that if one guy gets it, they have to get it as well; they can't take a chance on the competition when you have all the networks and the still photographers. These still photographers covering the White House, if one does something, the others have to do it, too. And I don't think we ever worked out a satisfactory arrangement on that, although it somewhat abated as a problem, I think, partially because Mrs. Kennedy gave up a little bit on it and partially because the photographers somewhat eased up themselves, to some degree about it.

It happened when we'd go to Hyannis and when we'd go to Palm Beach. They would hire a boat. As a matter of fact, I went out with them—for my own pleasure and not to try and direct their picture-taking. The Secret Service kept them at a certain distance from the boats, but with long lens cameras that was no problem to them. They'd often get pictures of the President and Mrs. Kennedy, and Mrs. Kennedy would be unhappy if she were shown, you know, in a bathing suit or pink trousers or whatever.

CAMPBELL: What else did your job entail in the press office?

COLEMAN: Well, working with the photographers required often calling the photographers for picture-taking sessions, going in with them to the office, and permitting them a certain amount of time. The latter became a problem, too, because they always thought I didn't give them enough time. I would literally call time. My only way of judging when to call time—I'd try to give them as much time as possible—was when the President started fingering his tie. [Laughter] He was either shoving his hand in his pocket or fingering his tie or pulling on his pocket flap or any number of little aimless gestures which always suggested to me he'd had enough. And sometimes he'd look pointedly at me, and then I'd call time. But if it was a large bill signing session or something, there was always left to right identification to do for the photographers.

And then there were always special kinds of photo arrangements that I would have to handle. I'd spend an awful lot of time, for instance, just having to walk somebody over to the mansion and stand there with him while he took pictures of flower—floral arrangements. There was a man who did that for some—like *Home and Garden* magazine or something. Since someone from the press staff would have to accompany a photographer when he was taking pictures in the mansion or the offices, I spent a lot of my time doing that. And then there was handling photo queries and film queries and mostly doing the things that everybody else in the office did, and that's answering the phone endlessly. The phone rang constantly. Six lines, at least, going constantly. I don't remember

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how many lines, but there were always at least five or six going constantly. We also had to go to all of Pierre's briefings so we would know what was going on. During Pierre's briefings the phones were cut off. The operators would tell people that a briefing's being held. I don't

know if they'd done that before, but I noticed they still do it at the White House. It's because it's terribly important for you to know what's being asked and what the press secretary is responding so that you can handle phone queries for the rest of the day. We did almost no typing of speeches or press releases. Small press releases announcing the appointment of somebody would sometimes be done by us.

CAMPBELL: Who handled the large ones?

COLEMAN: Well, it came from whatever office was responsible for them. If it's a speech, Sorensen's people were doing it; if it was something else, it would come from that office. Particularly in the first few months, we had a number of messages going to Congress, and Pierre would say, "The message will be ready at 11 o'clock," so the reporters would start lining up at 10:30. We would spend the next half hour saying, "No, it's not ready yet. No, it's not ready yet." Then, at 11 o'clock, we'd say, "It's going to be ready at 1 o'clock and then...." It went on all day long very often and that kind of thing, misjudging.... We were always promising people things and then having to spend an awful lot of time explaining why we didn't have it ready.

One other thing is Pierre was always too optimistic and too ready to satisfy the lust of the reporters—if you'd call it that—for news by promising things he couldn't deliver. The other problem, over which he had no control, was that there was just a great deal of—the volume was so considerable on messages going up and other kinds of things happening that the first ninety days were just incredibly active. Until we got a feel for how these things were handled and how fast other offices could turn out material, we had to go through this kind of problem.

CAMPBELL: Now, you came to the White House with a press office staff of five or six?

COLEMAN: Let's see, there was Pierre and Andy. Andy had for a secretary, Barbara Gamarekian, who worked on the campaign, but not with us. She worked for Dungan [Ralph A. Dungan] at the end I guess, in the interim period. I'm not sure. I've forgotten what she did before that. Jill and Priscilla—only Priscilla then went into the President's office to be secretary or receptionist. And so it was Jill and I and Chris [Christine Camp] and Sue and Barbara—five girls—and one other woman, Helen Ganss. Pierre met

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her when he first went over to the White House in the interim period, said she'd worked there since Truman [Harry S. Truman] and was terribly knowledgeable about how everything happened. She indexed briefings and answered the phone and did a number of other things. So there were six of us and the two of them and then Jay Gildner came on somewhat later to....

Don Wilson [Donald M. Wilson] had worked with us in the campaign, but he went on over to USIA [United States Information Agency] as deputy. I never quite understood what happened about Don because I thought he was a likely possibility for the press office, but it

may have been—it occurred to me at the time that his experience had been such that he didn't want anything less than press secretary itself. That's simply my impression of it. Also, I wouldn't think that Pierre would have liked to have had him around in a lesser capacity because he would have been another possible threat. There's the one person I thought was a potential threat to Pierre because he had a kind of personal relationship with the family. He was in the category of “personal friend” as well as staff person although I don't know how close the relationship was. This is different from, of course, the Larry O'Brien-O'Donnell [Kenneth P. O'Donnell] thing, where they had been around...

CAMPBELL: Massachusetts pols.

COLEMAN: ...in Massachusetts politics. But this was a different kind of category.

CAMPBELL: How useful was it to have Helen Ganss around? Did she help with the transition?

COLEMAN: Not...Mostly because we didn't use her right because Pierre had his own style, largely, which, of course, forced all of us to adapt to it. There was any number of things that she could have told us which would have been more efficient, but unless Pierre from the top tried to implement those kinds of things—and then again, because of the pace of the activity, it was impossible to be terribly organized. How useful she was to the reporters is another thing. Many of them said that she was, because if they wanted to check back on something that had been said in a briefing, she could always find it in her card file. She had everything indexed. I thought that took a lot of time that was unnecessary. I mean, I really didn't understand it, never did till the day I left, that it was that important to keep such a complete, detailed card file on the press briefings. I took an awful lot of her time, you see.

The thing she was best at was that she had a marvelous personality. She just never got upset, and there were several of

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us, myself included, who were very flappable. When you consider that one of our most important functions was to be nice to the press, to service them, I think some of us were awfully hard on the press a lot of the time, faced with the pressures. I recall one time when they were hounding us about a briefing to be held on a message, I finally said, “We are shutting the door! I can't stand it! I won't listen to them once more!” [Laughter] They could drive you up the wall, they really could. She was very good, very, very good.

CAMPBELL: Experienced hand at that.

COLEMAN: There were times when I know a few reporters said, “She's the only one who will speak civilly to us.”[Laughter]

CAMPBELL: When Jay Gildner comes, what's his job to be?

COLEMAN: His job was to handle....We met him—maybe I should go back a minute to say where we met him—we met him on a trip to Canada, the one in which the President injured his back. He was the press officer for USIA and handled that very well. Pierre had had a number of foreign correspondents coming in asking help of one kind or another and decided to hire somebody to do that, to handle the foreign press, which was what his responsibility was, to try and deal with their problems.

I think what happened, though, was that while Jay could do that very well, knew the foreign press very well, he was too used to his USIA kind of role. He subsequently did go back to USIA. Very nice person. I worked with him. I was detailed to help him, too, in addition to my other responsibilities, which didn't consist of an awful lot of extra work because he tended to deal with the foreign press by telephone and personal contact. It wasn't a question of typing things for him or anything. But he could do this specialized thing. But it was harder for him to transfer into anything else that happened in the press office to which he was not at all accustomed, and he was not accustomed to a political kind of environment, which, of course, you're operating in all the time there, be it a press office or not. "Political", in the larger sense of the word, how things are done, sort of. And so therefore I don't think he made that kind of transition very easily.

And the work for the foreign correspondents was not that considerable. What you really needed was a third man in the press office to do a number of things of which foreign correspondents would be one, and I just don't think that Andy had had any great interest in the problem or awareness of some of the small things that you had to do to really help the foreign press, although their requests are very similar to those that anybody else makes.

CAMPBELL: Then Gildner made the trip to India with Mrs. Kennedy. Were you still at the White House when that...

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COLEMAN: Uh huh. I wanted to go. [Laughter]

CAMPBELL: Did anybody from the press office advance that trip or....

COLEMAN: I don't think Gildner did. I'm pretty sure that I recall endless cablegrams and things going through Gildner's office, and that there was a great deal of give-and-take, beforehand from India. He tended, of course, to trust the Foreign Service people on these kind of things, too. His link on this kind of thing would have been with the State Department and USIA people. He did that, of course, very heavily, was very used to dealing with those people and did—as opposed to anybody who would have been White House people. And I think the Indian trip was left up largely to the State Department and the USIA people.

CAMPBELL: There seemed to be some concern over the press operation on that trip. Did you people get...

COLEMAN: I'd forgotten all about that.

CAMPBELL: ...feedback on that? Did he leave the White House soon after that?

COLEMAN: He left the White House the same time I did. Now I've forgotten when the Indian trip was, but—yes, it wasn't too far from when I...I think it was just another factor. Again, it's the same sort of thing: his being accustomed to a certain kind of milieu and operating under the usual rules of that milieu, which didn't apply to the White House, particularly again, to Mrs. Kennedy. She did not want to be disturbed by press people a lot of the time, and that makes a problem for any press person. I don't think Jay could have been any more responsible for difficulties there than anybody else would have been.

CAMPBELL: Did your office make conscious efforts to change her mind about the press? She was certainly an asset when she was cooperative with the press.

COLEMAN: I think Pierre's feeling was as much as possible he'd try to honor what she wanted and, also, at the same time, try to convince her that a great deal of it was impossible—like protecting the children from cameras outside the White House grounds. It was just a never-ending struggle. No, she did not, I think, change her mind at all. She just did what she had to do when she had to do it, you know, in terms of something like a public trip where she couldn't do anything about it. She was inconsistent, of course, too, because there were any number of times she'd see photographs she'd love and then ask Pierre to order them. That was one of his most embarrassing moments, of course, because he'd have to turn around and ask the photographers he'd just been lacing out if they

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wouldn't mind getting a picture for Mrs. Kennedy. And they realized how silly it was for him and gave him a hard time from time to time about that sort of thing. The family had a photographer around the first year who fell into disfavor. What was his name?

CAMPBELL: Was this Cecil Stoughton?

COLEMAN: No, Cecil was an army photographer., That was another thing. We had our own White House lobbying operation for photographers. The National Park Service runs the White House, the building and the grounds; the Navy Department runs the mess in the White House and various other things. These come out of tradition. I don't know how far back they go....And then General Clifton [Chester V. Clifton, Jr.] was hired, was taken on as...

CAMPBELL: Military aide.

COLEMAN: ...military aide. Well, Clifton's background was sort of as an army PR [Public Relations] guy. Cecil Stoughton came from the Clifton operation; Clifton brought him in.

In the meanwhile, we had a navy photographer [Robert C. Knudsen] who...The navy, for some reason, had added on to its responsibilities for the mess, the responsibility of providing the color pictures which the President gave to guests who were like heads of state and people like that. The President would make a present of a picture of the two of them together. Well, the navy photographer did all the color shots.

The National Park Service photographer, Abbie Rowe, was assigned to the White House to just do black and white pictures of all events. And then his pictures would go to an office in the White House. The woman who ran—whose name I've forgotten already, I can see her in my mind—but she ran an office where they clipped articles from papers and put them in a scrapbook for the President as well as putting these pictures together for him. I always thought that was the most ridiculous thing that the President of the United States should have somebody collecting clippings in a scrapbook for him. But these, again, were things that had come through the years and probably from the day when there wasn't that much to keep for the President. So all these photographers competed with each other and were a problem to us, too.

CAMPBELL: The official photographers.

COLEMAN: The official photographers because they got in the way of the press photographers and would often get privileged access, of course. The navy photographer and Cecil Stoughton, who was fairly aggressive in his own right would be present at parties and inside events that the press photographers were not allowed to shoot. Then we'd turn around and, release some of

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Stoughton's pictures, which never made for good relations with the press either.

CAMPBELL: There seems to be some indication that General Clifton with his army PIO [Public Information Officer] background gets a little bit involved in press relations himself in the White House. How did that work out?

COLEMAN: Well, I think there was a little minor confrontation between Pierre and he on that, and I don't recall what sparked it; whether there was a series of things. But it was early, when Clifton came in, and it was just maybe more a question of making his presence known and also coming to the press briefings and just sort of being around. I don't know exactly what he expected to do, or how he expected to be involved in the press operation; but it was clear that he was interested in it, and the photographer was one way of seeing to that.

I think the photographers gave him an excuse for participating in an awful lot of events over which he had no real responsibility. Cecil started going on trips, political trips and every other kind of trip that the President would make. So Cecil was kind of his wedge

into a lot of other activities. And Cecil, as I said, was not unambitious himself so he used every opportunity he had. Then he'd get special kinds of shots at these trips and events, and he'd come to us and say, "Well look, don't you want to give this to the President? Don't you want to release it? That was usually Cecil himself and not Clifton although I think Clifton did that from time to time too. It seemed to be just a question of stabilizing their influence at some time.

CAMPBELL: Clifton...

COLEMAN: And although Pierre, as I recall, was unhappy with Clifton—and I don't know if it came to a...I said something about Pierre and he squared off on it. I'm not quite sure that's really accurate. I know Pierre expressed himself on the subject of it. Whether he ever expressed himself to Clifton is another question because Stoughton kept on being around. Although I fussed extremely about it because on behalf of the photographers.

CAMPBELL: The press photographers?

COLEMAN: Yes. I really found his presence more upsetting than the others.

CAMPBELL: There seems to be some indication that Clifton gets involved in some of these highly publicized leaks from the White House of news stories and acting as some kind of a super press secretary once in awhile. Do you...

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COLEMAN: He might have if he were on a trip or something where Pierre wasn't—or maybe it was those weekends to Glen Ora or something where he may have been. I don't really remember an incident.

CAMPBELL: It didn't come up.

COLEMAN: Pierre leaked so much himself—of course, the White House always does you know. We have great examples of it in this administration, enormous examples of leaking something as trial balloons. Pierre understood that technique very well. Pierre had had long and continuing conversations with Hagerty [James C. Hagerty], whom he greatly admired. He met him, I think, only after the election. He mentions it in his book when he first met him. But he was very impressed with him, and they remained good friends afterwards.

CAMPBELL: And yet his operation is very different from Hagerty's.

COLEMAN: I was just going to say...Yes. Of course while Pierre was not organized, he was a great believer in an active press office, quite obviously, and in his being an active Press Secretary. And I think it's that aspect of Hagerty's

behavior that interested him how you could really direct a very active press office.

The organization didn't really matter that much. It was inconvenient for the reporters on a day-to-day basis; and it was inconvenient for us who worked for him on a day-to-day basis. It made it that much harder to work with that much chaos. If we knew things ahead of time or if we had a good system of running the press briefings and all the other delivery of information, it just would have been easier on all of us. But I don't think people can complain that they had in any way, shape, or form less access to the White House through the press office; there was much more. It just meant a great deal of confusion. But Pierre was sometimes—quite often—poor on details, and he really needed a good detail back-up man, which Andy wasn't either, unfortunately. But again, as I may have said before, the kinds of detail that he was inaccurate about or incomplete on would probably have been a number of minor things in a press briefing, not the major kinds of policy decisions or a thing like that. But, of course, on major policy decisions, reporters would have to go to other inside White House people as well, anyway.

CAMPBELL: And here's a great difference, again, between the Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] press office and the Kennedy press office, the so-called “open beat,” the availability of other White House staff members to the press.

COLEMAN: Yes, that's right. Pierre wanted that and encouraged that. The only thing is that there, of course, he got hung up in a bind that was so personal in terms of his personality that

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he also wanted to know what was going on in terms of what people were saying to reporters. So it was very difficult to have everybody channeled through him; you really couldn't do that. And he couldn't have tried to do it because Ted Sorensen or Larry O'Brien is going to talk to a reporter he likes or knows or trusts or respects, and he's not going to think he has to clear it with Pierre or tell Pierre about it afterwards. Pierre, in no way, shape, or form, could have stopped that kind of thing, even if he wanted to.

CAMPBELL: And so you clearly didn't act then as an appointment secretary for other staff members with the press.

COLEMAN: I'm trying to think. Maybe somebody should ask Chris this if they haven't already because there was something about this question of how people went to other White House staffers. I seem to remember it arising in some way and I can't believe Pierre was suggesting at some point that everybody clear things through him.

CAMPBELL: Because the open beat was, in fact, his idea, his policy.

COLEMAN: Well, I don't remember how it came....

CAMPBELL: How were the relations between the press office and, say, O'Donnell?

COLEMAN: I remember—because it was my area to worry about that on our photographers, for instance—I finally tried to work out an arrangement with O'Donnell myself because he was the appointment secretary—I don't know what his exact title was. It was easier if I finally said to Kenny, “Well, why don't you just tell me what you want to do. When you want to have something, you call me or have Helen [Helen Lempart]—his secretary—call me and indicate.” And Kenny would come and say, “Call the photographers in, Barbara,” or something like that. So we could work directly, and we didn't get into any kinds of flaps about what we had and what we didn't get in terms of pictures, or having photographers line up thinking they were going to get some sort of picture and not having it done by my decision. But at any rate, you could certainly work: there was no reason to go through Pierre to Kenny on something like that. It's a small matter, this business with the photographers, but I think Kenny really preferred me to do that, going directly to him on that matter.

As a matter of fact, I seem to recall going to him about that simply because I was trying to avoid a Pierre-Kenny fuss—asking Pierre to go to Kenny—because I knew that their relationship wasn't that good. I think Kenny basically disagreed with Pierre's—what you just called open beat—attitude about news. And Pierre was always fighting for more news and more availability of people and information, it seemed to me—and I think probably understandably so and rightly so, probably—for the major news-gathering organizations rather than across the board for all

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newspaper people: but still, in all, he was. And Kenny was just characteristically opposed to something like that. There were probably any number of incidents, too, of leaks and the kinds of things where Pierre may have, on his own hook, released information to privileged people, again privileged newspaper people, which Kenny objected to—maybe to—maybe to some others, too.

CAMPBELL Do you remember anything specific?

COLEMAN No, I think that they would have seized on it at that point in time because the antagonism had already developed to some point. There's a small illustration of how this antagonism between the two of them had been around for longer than the White House, and that involved me. I had been left behind in the campaign to stay in Washington and kind of coordinate the people trying to pick up the campaign at different points. I think there was a little power play someplace—a heavy term for this little feud in the office—but I think a couple of the girls aced me out, in effect, to go on the trip. And these girls had gotten to Pierre on this subject, and he was always vulnerable to the latest one who got to him, and it was this kind of little, small situation.

But Kenny knew about it at one point because I had, at some point, sort of cried on the shoulder of his secretary just because I knew her. She passed it on to Kenny. Kenny

arranged for me to come up to New York on the trip in which I stayed. And I think Kenny was deliberately doing that because he was trying to disturb something that Pierre had done—right—something if you want to put it that way. But at any rate, it was a clear, on his own hook, kind of overriding Pierre on a small issue. That was back in the last few weeks of the campaign. I know their relationship must have developed this way further back into the campaign, but I don't know where it started.

CAMPBELL: How about...

COLEMAN: So anything Pierre had done after that would have been suspected by Kenny. Not so with the others; Pierre got along well with Larry.

CAMPBELL: With Larry O'Brien. And Sorensen?

COLEMAN: And Sorensen to a...Sorensen and he had problems that Sorensen could have had with anybody, too. Sorensen wanted to do things in his time and—this problem of speeches and when they should be released and all the rest of it. But Pierre pretty much deferred to Sorensen.

CAMPBELL: How did the staff in general feel about Salinger's high visibility? Salinger becomes a personality in the

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administration. He became, perhaps, the presidential aide that's best known.

COLEMAN: Well, of course, I'll never know what kinds of small, personal jealousies come out of that. I would assume that some do to some degree. Also, it tended to make Pierre—a role he somewhat easily accepted because it was comfortable for him—he tended to become the funny guy. You know, everybody could sort of make fun of Pierre in a pleasant way.

I think most of the people in the White House liked him pretty much even though they might have disagreed with his judgment on a number of things. I think the President and Mrs. Kennedy liked him very well. She liked him and she got along well with him even when she was unhappy with the photo things. They liked to have him around; they enjoyed him. And you could always make a joke out of Pierre and whatever Pierre had done.

When I say Pierre may have used it, too, it's because Pierre could get into trouble about something and have it come out as a funny thing. "Well, that's Pierre, you know, again." You know, he could get away with a lot which he might have been more in trouble for. Small things and some of them....Some of the press briefing goofs, in a way, where he talked about the agreement that had to be signed in the White House by the staff people. And you know, when it came to that kind of thing which may have annoyed the President or may have been embarrassing in a way to get out, still you could ride over that kind of thing and not get in a lot of trouble for it.

And some things, of course, were not his fault. I remember one of the first things was a guy in the tour office decided to change the tour hours which would mean that fewer people could go through the White House. Some absurd regulation....And then he released it or made it apparent without clearing it through the press office and, of course, then.... You know, Pierre had to ride herd on things like that. He was so good at taking small incidents like the rabbit in the White House and making a good story out of them and giving what, in effect, became the story that day.

CAMPBELL: Were you still at the White House when he gets involved in his efforts at diplomacy with the Russians, his personal contacts with....

COLEMAN: Yeah, I think I was. I seem to know that so well. I think that.... Well, the State Department people were unhappy, of course. Anybody who works along neat lines would be unhappy with Pierre. But he did very well with that, and he had some debate with Adzhubei [Aleksi I. Adzhubei] afterwards I recall, too, which he got in. And he was, of course, very helpful to Lucy Jarvis in her special show on Russia, on the Kremlin. So there was a great deal and, of course, a great deal more than that, which I guess I don't know anything about and

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never will till it comes out on how else he might have been helpful. I don't think, you know, unusual kinds of diplomacy like that are very bad, and I don't think the President thought there was anything wrong. The President was quite willing to be very flexible on all kinds of things like this.

Pierre also got into a situation on that trip to Vienna to meet Khrushchev [Nikita S. Khrushchev]—it was in Paris before we went on to Vienna—where he thought the reporters knew that the Dominican Republic president [Rafael Trujillo] had been assassinated, and he just mentioned it in passing, thinking they knew it, and he released the information. You know, he was just prone to be that casual that he would never think to be secretive. It's part of his whole personality not to be reticent.

CAMPBELL: How did he react after, well say, the early Trujillo announcement?

COLEMAN: Oh, well, he was terrified. He was just horrified that, you know, Trujillo may not have been assassinated, or they didn't know why, or he may have just changed international politics. Of course, as usual, he made a joke about it. I remember seeing him shortly after that. But he got saved very rapidly. I mean the situation moved so quickly that it became apparent what he had said was true, and it didn't become as major an incident as it might have been.

CAMPBELL: Was there ever any effort in your open beat policy to restrict the press' access to some White House members? Was that possible?

COLEMAN: I don't think it was possible except on a lower level staff where it really wouldn't be terribly important anyway. I don't think for the major White House people that you could do anything like that.

CAMPBELL: Was there ever any complaint from a White House staffer who thought he was, perhaps, being bothered too much by the press; that would have liked your office to act as some sort of intermediary?

COLEMAN: If that were true, I never heard about it. I can't imagine if a White House staffer had any problems with too many reporters that they would....I mean, they always have secretaries to say they're not in or they're not available. But they built up their own people whom they would talk to. Well, I don't know what happened, of course, in the Cuban missile crisis time when they may not have wanted to talk, but....

CAMPBELL: Let's talk a little bit about just the spirit and morale, if you will, of the staff. You've come in from the campaign, and there's been the gung ho, go go attitude. Did that carry through into the White House?

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COLEMAN: Oh, very exciting at first. It was very exciting....

CAMPBELL: At first.

COLEMAN: ...the first terribly hectic period, both the excitement of being in the White House and having all these new things happening. The President used to walk through the offices himself. He didn't do that for very long when he saw that he could get caught by reporters too easily if he came into our office. He still continued to use the back door to Pierre's office. He could come down a corridor from his office and go in the back door of Pierre's office. But even that he couldn't do after a while because he never knew who would be in there with Pierre. But he would come on through the offices, and Mrs. Kennedy did, once or twice, at the beginning. They were just kind of intrigued to see what the rest of the place looked like, and everybody was always horrified by what the press quarters were. We did make some changes during that period of time on the press rooms although it didn't come out to be much better in the long run. I always wondered why they didn't come up with some new plan for extending the west wing back like the east wing is.

CAMPBELL: For more room.

COLEMAN: For more room. But at any rate, there were so many things happening in those first months that I think it was very exciting. And even the fatigue didn't seem to me to be as bothersome as it later became when you knew

you were going to get six phone calls every two minutes every day for the rest of your life, practically—it seemed like.

CAMPBELL: Were there normal working hours?

COLEMAN: There never were, but of course those first few months were really very bad in those terms. We worked into the night. I don't know what time generally. I would—say—I don't recall ever getting out before 7:00, but of course, from 7:00 to 9:00 or 10:00 lots of evenings. It was more a case, too—even when it wasn't long, particularly long hours—it was a case of working steadily every second of the time you were in there to the point of missing lunch frequently or getting a sandwich from the machine we had in the basement. And there was, of course, constant Saturday work. We were called in occasionally on Sunday, but that wasn't....

You were on call. You were always on call. The White House operators, and the Signal Corps people, when we were on a trip, always had to know where you were at all times. If you were on a trip, for instance, and you were leaving the hotel, you had to call and tell them where you were going and where you could be reached. This was, of course, true when you were home, the White House operators assumed they could get you at home and if it was anything important, you really were supposed to—at night when you might have to be called back for

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something....I remember going to a ball game, and I don't recall what the flap was at that time, but you know, calling the White House in the middle of the game to say, "Would you need me to come back," or something like that.

One time Pierre, in the middle of the day, suddenly said mysteriously, "Can you come back to the White House at 3 o'clock this morning—the next morning?" I looked at him, and I said, "What?" "Three o'clock tomorrow morning." I said, "Well, you know, if you want me too, Pierre, I guess I'll come back at 3 o'clock in the morning." He wouldn't say what it was for. I came back at 3 o'clock in the morning—or, actually, at 2:00. What it was, was that Francis Gary Powers was being released at 3:00 a.m. or something like that, and what we had to do was start calling the reporters at 2:00 o'clock in the morning to tell them to come to the White House for a briefing, and we were not allowed to say what they would come to the briefing for. Well, you know, you wake up fifty reporters at night, and they think that we've gone to war. It was awful. I almost wish we could have told them. A number of them couldn't have done anything, anyway, in terms of deadlines, but you couldn't call selected ones. You couldn't decide which ones would want to know.

All of them agreed afterwards that given that kind of situation, they wanted us to call them. They preferred for us to call them and have them come even if it was something they didn't need to know because they want to decide whether they needed to know it. So Pierre was right about that. I mean, we had to do it that way. But that was the most unusual case. Most of the time we just worked steadily.

CAMPBELL: What was the procedure for just preparing his ordinary twice-a-day briefing? How did that get put together?

COLEMAN: Well, since it was mostly a question of answering questions that the press would put to him, the only way that we had to get prepared for it was in terms of the formal announcements he would make, which were generally —after the first few months, again—were generally housekeeping details like: “We will have the briefing at 3 o'clock instead of 4 o'clock in the afternoon,” or, “We have a special message”—or rather, “a special briefing”.... We have a special message to go up so you'll be briefed by so and so from the Department of Labor. It's a manpower message, so we'll have a special briefing.” And then, of course, announcements of appointments, and there were all kinds of things like that going on endlessly—people to boards and commissions and other kinds of appointments. So we'd have to do press releases on them, which generally came over from whatever office was.... And he would try to background himself on whatever issues were developing that he knew about, but that was, of course, something he could do only himself. I mean, if something was developing that clearly came under the purview of another department, he would call them.

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He had periodic meetings with other agency press information people, but that was largely in terms of coordinated information policy, first of all. I don't think that really worked, too well, but they tried to do that for a while. They tried to clear speeches through the White House from other agencies—a number of steps to coordinate the other agency efforts in the information field. They'd generally have those press briefings with the other agency guys, I think, pretty much before the press conferences, the presidential press conference. They'd all have books with a series of questions that the President might be asked and the answers. There was a great deal of very good briefing for the press conferences, briefing of the President, and Pierre would play a large-part in that.

CAMPBELL: Some of this coordination, perhaps, led to the charge of managed news, news management. How did that hit your office?

COLEMAN: That was a very serious problem and a very serious complaint. The managed news thing was fed more by things like the Cuban missile crisis period. The President made a speech to the, I think, American Society of Newspaper Editors in which he suggested that it was important for the administration to guard certain information at certain periods of time. Now, that standing issue raises its head again as an issue when something like the Cuban missile crisis happens. This brings it to the forefront. I think it was always around. John Moss [John E. Moss], as I recall, Congressman Moss, was having freedom of information hearings at the time, or had long been interested in this whole problem of freedom of information, and sort of fanned the issue, at one point in there, of managed news. I think some of the smaller incidents like requiring White House staff to sign a paper saying they wouldn't publish things were really blown out of context, but they all sort of happened about the same time so that they all fed on each other.

The inter-agency kind of coordination was not—it looked more diabolical, somehow, on the face of it than it seemed to me it really was because agency people were much more likely to be reticent about putting out information, much more likely to hold back information than to put it out. You're always going to get agency people on their own hook, individual agency people, who are going to leak something for their own interests or for their department's interests. I don't think you can control that at all. I think Pierre's attempt to get together with the other press information guys and coordinate information was to some degree really more important in the sense that it gave them all an awareness of what the others were doing—and like a mini-cabinet or something—so they can all know what's happening, and they can all know the administration line on it. I think that was useful, but in no way, shape, or form can they control what's happening with thousands of bureaucrats around town. The information officers, you know, just don't have that much power in

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many agencies.

I think newspaper people tend to do this all the time though. They just fan an issue and look at the wrong parts of the whole question and take something and blow it up beyond the really legitimate questions that really need to be asked. They generalize the whole issue so much that you miss some of the finer points of what really is important there.

The government is such an enormous thing today that there'd be no possibility of managing the news. Whether the White House itself manages its news, that's a different thing entirely, and that's the Cuban missile crisis incident, and there's a much more serious question involved in that. But the other things were to a large degree trivial, in my opinion, although they did constitute a constant problem. Once that phrase got going we could not live with it. I mean, we could not get out from under it.

CAMPBELL: Did you mix the...

COLEMAN: And Pierre reacted to it, unfortunately, too. He reacted as if he was really being, threatened by it. I always thought he overreacted to it. He should have taken it in stride. It's a logical kind of thing the newspapers are going to levy at the White House, anyway, and the government in power.

CAMPBELL: Did you make any...

COLEMAN: Of course, any administration manages the news to the degree it can, and to a large degree, it can't. That's all I'm saying, really.

CAMPBELL: Any specific moves made to counter this sort of charge after it becomes a household word?

COLEMAN: Well, Pierre denied it and gave a number of speeches. He was traveling to some degree and giving speeches to newspaper groups. But one thing, he denied it in some ways and then, on the other hand, he exacerbated the

whole situation to some degree, too, by defensively maintaining that the White House had a perfect right to do so. So he was, in effect, really admitting a part of the whole problem, and he was, you know, admitting that and challenging anybody to prove that there was anything else an administration should do. And the argument became one of the legitimacy of managing news, but managing news had never really been defined on all levels as to what you were managing. As a matter of fact, I suppose you can maintain there was a legitimacy to managing news on the smallest kinds of levels like the signing affidavits kind of thing. This gets to what, in terms of what level of gossip, should be passed on to anybody.

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CAMPBELL: But along the lines of the pledge not to publish, how far did that extend in the White House? Not to you?

COLEMAN: No. No. As a matter of fact, I think it was only the domestic servants. And it was prompted by Mrs. Kennedy, as I recall, to avoid a kind of backstairs book like one that had been published not too long before by a maid or White House domestic. I don't think Pierre thought that was very important. Again, it was a Mrs. Kennedy wish so there wasn't much you could do about it.

CAMPBELL: How did your office work with her press operation?

COLEMAN: Pam Turnure [Pamela Turnure] used to come to our press briefings, Pierre's press briefings, so she'd know what was being said and be available to answer questions on Mrs. Kennedy, particularly on her social schedule if there were a number of things to be announced. And there were from time to time, so she'd bring a schedule or something. She didn't have her own press briefings. She'd check with Pierre before she was going to release some things. We had good coordination, but that developed after we—it had to evolve. I don't think Pierre recognized the problem he was going to have there, again. I think he thought because she had her own press secretary, that was going to take care of it. His efforts to divert queries to Pam proved fruitless. He still had to deal with a number of things directly because he would be asked. And then, of course, some of the issues were of such a nature, like the never-ending fight about the photographers, that they would go to him, and he would try to resolve them.

[BEGIN SIDE II, TAPE I]

COLEMAN: I think he finally came to the conclusion that Pam was going to handle a number of the routine things, including the social events and the arrangements for them. But he even got to the point, as I recall, where he picked the pool among the women reporters—for social events that you pick a limited number, three or four reporters, to attend the function and report back to the others by filing a—what they do is they write some kind of report and file it in the press room. We had the same sort of arrangement with photographers, although Mrs. Kennedy often asked that there

wouldn't be a pool of photographers at all, but that worked out. No, I shouldn't say; "often asked"; I think she originally didn't want it.

I remember one time Tish Baldrige [Letitia K. Baldrige] was unhappy with me for bringing some photographers over on a winter day. She said that they were going to muddy the rugs, which was possible, I suppose. [Laughter] I didn't think I should ask them to clean their feet before they came in. We had some small difficulties of that kind in simply assuming that we would have usual access to a number of social events and, occasionally, having more of a problem, I think, with Miss Baldrige than Pam on these things. They grew accustomed to expecting that they were going to have to tolerate a certain number of photographers and cameramen. But, as I

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say, the large questions were really still left with Pierre, about Mrs. Kennedy, with Pam handling the day-to-day operations and information giving activities.

CAMPBELL: What specifically were the photographers' guidelines where the family was concerned?

COLEMAN: Well, there were no specific guidelines, of course. Obviously, they couldn't get inside pictures anyway so that anything else was just a matter of asking them to observe certain discretionary lines when the children were outside, in particular. We never had to ask them, really, not to try and get pictures of Mrs. Kennedy. You could ask them about the children simply because you'd maintain, "Well, they're children." You know, somehow that makes them different. Of course, the photographers had a good answer: "How does it affect the children if we're nowhere near them with cameras? You know, if their picture appears in the paper, I mean, what does that do to their lives?" I think Pierre agreed with them; there was no real damage to the children's privacy or to Mrs. Kennedy's privacy by having pictures taken of them.

CAMPBELL: Did you get involved—for instance, I think in the first month or two of the Administration, *U. S. News* [*& World Report*] ran a several page feature on, "A Day In The Life of President Kennedy," and there were innumerable photographs.

COLEMAN: Oh, yes, we had, it seems to me at the time, we had at least fifty of those. I've forgotten, but we did have a lot of those at the beginning. And yes, they would follow the President around. George Tames did it for the *New York Times*, I remember.

And some people were putting out a book, Simon and Schuster. I never agreed with Pierre on allowing this thing because it was a poor book, as a matter of fact, if history wants to know my opinion of it. It was a very rushed job and a sleazy job, and I think just from talking to them, somebody should have realized this. But they were going to do the first ninety days—first one hundred days in pictures and a small amount of text. And they did. But

we had to have them around for a great deal of time, and it required, you know, a lot of time to spend with them.

I don't think it ever bothered the President, really. The President was so much easier about most of these things than Mrs. Kennedy, very tolerant of having photographers trailing after him. And when he didn't want them around, he would just ask them very nicely, you know, if they would mind leaving at this point because he wanted to talk to somebody.

Of course, even in the cases where they were following him around, it was limited access. I wouldn't follow as well, we would just assume with a George Tames, for instance, and the others you—almost always it was somebody you could trust. I mean, you trust their discretion, and would know....They would take a picture of the President coming

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through the White House to his office in the morning, let's say. They would take some pictures around his office. There are some marvelous pictures of—I've forgotten whether that was a White House photographer or not—the pictures of John-John [John F. Kennedy, Jr.] underneath the desk and this kind of thing. That may have been George Tames, whom the President liked very much and who has got great discretion in doing this kind of thing, and so he generally got access. And, of course, he is from the *New York Times*. But he's done any number of important political figures because he's an unobtrusive person.

And then they'd take like fifteen minutes of pictures in his office, leave, then at some point later on with the rest of the photographers might get the formal pictures and then have another fifteen minutes. They'd look at the schedule, see what they wanted; that would be different. It always would antagonize the other photographers though for these specials to go on. These things were always called specials, and we had any number of them going on during the White House, not just this kind of thing, but specials of any—you know, Cuban missile crisis or....Somebody gets in, generally, and if it isn't a news photographer, it's one of the White House photographers. And then the next thing you know, you think it's so good, and it serves a publicity purpose that the White House wants to serve, so then you release them.

CAMPBELL: In a...

COLEMAN: But they accepted that much better after a while because—of course the individual photographers would object, but the news services don't care, really, where they got the pictures from. So long as they're allowed to run them, they want them. So, you know, in a way you can easily seduce them, I'm afraid, to muting their grievances as long as you give them something, as long as you manipulate the situation.

CAMPBELL: On one of the long picture story sessions, did you make any review of the pictures to be used?

COLEMAN: No.

CAMPBELL: There was no review?

COLEMAN: Well, it very well may have gone through Pierre. I'm not sure in every case whether he was allowed to censor what they would use. It's unlikely that there would be anything used that would be difficult because they wouldn't have been in a situation where there would be a picture they couldn't use. The President would have asked them to leave, I'm sure, if he wanted to have privacy. It's very difficult to think of something that wouldn't look good for the President. We had few problems with private shots, and I think this is because the photographers liked the President.

And generally, for all of the complaints about the White House, they maintain now when I run into them that they miss the White House when we were there. That wasn't what they said at the time. I had a nervous

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breakdown with several of the photographers who have since become my friends. But I think they really, for all—they're under a great deal of strain. Photographers are under an incredible amount of strain. I really do like a number of them and got along with them, although we would fight in given situations.

But they did have more access. The problem was that they had more access. The problem was that they had more access, so therefore they became accustomed to it and wanted more. And they really realized, I think afterwards, in the Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] situation where he used Okamoto [Yoichi R. Okamoto] so much and the Nixon [Richard M. Nixon] situation where they can't get to him much at all, they can see—and Eisenhower, too, for that matter....The fact is that they thought they had a really open situation and resented any kinds of limitations on it. They had an incredibly open situation, and they got a great deal. The President was very attuned to news, news gathering. Very sympathetic. He liked a number of reporters and photographers personally, got to know them quite well. Of course he'd known a lot of them before he even came in.

So the kinds of things we had—I mean, Mrs. Kennedy problems, too, as a matter of fact, simply stem from the fact that she was so photogenic and such good copy along with her marvelous children. It was too much to resist. As a matter of fact, I think, you know, it unfortunately conditioned the public to expecting a lot of that, too. You saw her an awful lot, much too much, of them all.

CAMPBELL: Was there a concern about overexposure?

COLEMAN: Yes, there was very clearly a concern about overexposure.

CAMPBELL: What sort of indication did you get of that concern.? Did it start from the President or....

COLEMAN: I recall, of course, Pierre talking about it. When you prompt me like that I tend to think that the President may have suggested it. I'm not really sure that this is at all valid. I think Pierre was really concerned about it at some

point But it was an accelerating thing you couldn't stop. You never really knew whether the public really wanted to see that much of the Kennedys, or they had just become used to seeing pictures of the Kennedys. But there was a great deal of interest in the public. There was no question about it. And it was a question about at what point they were saturated with it. And there was a question about whether there was overexposure in that sense. I mean, the press office people would be concerned about it. Pierre would be concerned about it, but he wasn't sure it was valid, you know, that the people didn't just want more and more and more.. That's what the reporters and the photographers maintained with us, that....

CAMPBELL: Was there any...

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COLEMAN: ...there was no end to the amount that they could take.

CAMPBELL: Any effort made to discourage certain stories or features?

COLEMAN: We may have gotten to that point, too. I think we did. I'm sure there was a certain amount of Congressional sniping that raised this problem, probably close—more into '62. I think the infatuation of the public with the Kennedys, almost complete infatuation, was pretty strong in the first year, both because there was such an activist administration which stimulated. the thing, and then because of the family and the boy (John) was small. I just have a feeling that there was somewhat less of it in '62. But then it may have, again, slowed down to some degree. And the public was maybe showing signs through—the kinds of things where people start writing letters to the editor and congressmen start talking. But it never eased off really very much.

CAMPBELL: Did you get involved at all in press relations for the extended Kennedy family, for Robert Kennedy and his family or Mrs. Rose Kennedy?

COLEMAN: We always got questions. We rarely had to do anything more. Of course, if somebody wanted to interview Robert Kennedy, they'd go to the Justice Department. But we got the kinds of questions we'd always gotten during the campaign. The simple routine questions never stopped, you know, in terms of how many children there are in the family or what somebody's doing. If somebody was doing something particularly interesting, I suppose they'd come up into the news. I'm trying to think what the....I suppose the reason I can't remember many incidences about the women is that I suppose many of those queries were handled by the social side of the White House as well, although I'm sure we still had a fair number of routine questions.

CAMPBELL: Who established...

COLEMAN: By this time, the major newspapers, wire services, television units, everybody else, has an awful lot of background material so you don't get into that too much. Whether or not people were asking, it's very likely on

Mrs. Rose Kennedy whom there was always a great deal of interest about. And we would refer people to her secretary in Boston or Hyannis.

CAMPBELL: There's some personal areas of concern for press coverage of—how does your office get guidelines on, for instance, how to handle the various Presidential illnesses? Does it vary in every case?

COLEMAN: Well, the famous cold, of course, Pierre didn't know anything about. I mean he was told—and this is a good case of the Kenny O'Donnell example, as a matter of fact (you see, my memory is jogged somewhat by these kinds of questions) because Kenny told Pierre, as I recall, that the President had a cold when

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the President did not have a cold. And Pierre was really upset afterwards at having been lied to and then having passed the lie on. But on the kinds of illnesses, no. We always had a never ending series of questions about what he was supposed to have that he was taking cortisone for....

CAMPBELL: Addison's disease.

COLEMAN: Yeah. Adrenalin deficiency or something. Adrenalin deficiency. Well, that started in the convention, and we got routine questions about that from time to time. About his back...Oh, there was a problem with Doctor Travell [Janet G. Travell] for a while there, as I recall, too, because when she took that job, she thought she could just talk to reporters. Now there's question of somebody having to clear with Pierre. But she did because Pierre knew she had had no experience with newspaper people, and frankly, I think he thought she was a little bit dumb about how to handle a great deal of these things, a number of these things. She had an office in the White House and was on the other side of the building in the basement, I guess, and therefore, she wasn't anywhere nearby where she could check things with Pierre, and she didn't think to check things with Pierre. So after she granted a few interviews or talked to a few people—and I don't think anything especially outstanding came out of those; I don't think there's anything terribly controversial about it; he just heard she was doing it, is the way I seem to recall it happening—then he said that she'd better check with him before she answered questions—and apart from interviews, even answered questions. And if he knew that he was going to get questions, he would check with her and find out what he needed to know and then report it back to the press.

We had Doctor Burkley [George G. Burkley], a navy doctor, who treated the rest of us, too. Thank goodness. And some good people he had working for him would feed us pills when we needed them, as we often did, for colds and all kinds of things. The President used him from time to time because, of course, Doctor Travell was not a general doctor. But Doctor Burkley was a navy doctor, and so he was circumspect. He wasn't likely to hold forth with interviews. And so anything that would come up....Newspaper people would generally

know they couldn't ask Burkley something, I guess. Pierre would check with Burkley. I'm trying to remember if the President really did get sick at all, apart from the back thing.

CAMPBELL: But the back was a serious thing, sometimes. Was there a...

COLEMAN: It was, and there were pictures which were of concern to Pierre at the time of the President looking—I've forgotten how, but he held himself strangely. Did he have crutches at one point? Was he going with crutches? And there was a picture of him on the crutches, was it, after the Canada trip. And they didn't like that. Of course, you didn't want to suggest the President had any trouble. As a matter of fact, the President's trouble with his back,

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he didn't tell Pierre about until it was too obvious that he couldn't appear without the crutches and that's when it became....I don't know that the President told anybody, as a matter of fact, except Mrs. Kennedy. But there wasn't much they could do about it, and he wasn't going to be on the crutches long, so....

That was one of the reasons, of course, that Pierre had to understand early, soon came to accept—except for Glen Ora and places like that—that the photographers and reporters, at least the wire service people, had to be with the President at all times in the event something happened to him or....Yes, in the event something happened to him. Therefore, they were outside when the President took off in a helicopter from the back lawn on any trip to any place—anything. And the President tried to go to the movies the first—you know, all presidents I guess, try to do this. They try to go to a movie downtown in the first month or so and then the photographers and reporters are very angry that Pierre didn't tell them. Well, Pierre couldn't tell them because he didn't know the President was going to the movies. Thereafter, the President went to the movies in the White House, I guess, most of the time, invited people in.

But this business of illnesses or something serious happening, of course, required them to have constant presence as much as possible. And when I say it came up about Glen Ora, it's because, of course, they wanted to be closer to the President at Glen Ora than they were allowed to be. They could not get into the grounds, period, that's all there was. They did, then, proceed to stay at the Red Fox Inn in Middleburg. I always wanted to go to Middleburg, stay at the Red Fox Inn one week.

CAMPBELL: You didn't make that trip?

COLEMAN: Well, it was a very small place. The reporters and photographers went down in droves the first weekend and soon discovered that Middleburg was not a swinging place on weekends; the Red Fox Inn was not equipped to deal with them. And thereafter, it was just the wire service people.

CAMPBELL: Were there special efforts made by your office...

COLEMAN: Mrs. Kennedy had that baby who died—that was...

CAMPBELL: That was in '63.

COLEMAN: Of course Pierre provided information on things like that.

CAMPBELL: Was there some change in policy in your office on the information on Rosemary Kennedy or were you always...

COLEMAN: No, we never really had a problem with that. I noticed that in the notes I had before. I said something about we just

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said she was in an institution. I think it was only, probably, my own initial discomfort at not knowing what I was supposed to say. But thereafter, I recall, I always said that she was mentally retarded and she was in an institution for the mentally retarded. Again, more and more, I suppose as information's available, people seem to know this sort of thing. And there were never any detailed questions about that.

CAMPBELL: How about the flap over...

COLEMAN: It's interesting the reticence that arises over some things and not over others, because you could be asked the most incredible things.

CAMPBELL: How about the flap that came about the President's supposed former marriage, the Blauvelt genealogy [The Blauvelt Family Genealogy].

COLEMAN: Yes. I mentioned that in the transcript, too, and Mr. Stewart was surprised that it came up during the campaign. It did. And thinking back again, I'm sure it came up at least once during the campaign, but it was a very minor thing. Whoever asked was quickly answered, and it was disposed of—it did not become more of an issue during the campaign although Pierre was concerned that it would be because it was a spurious issue.

It was the kind of thing that once started would cause a lot of problems as it did in the White House when it came up again. It was an annoying and persistent story and even your efforts to dispose of it, although it seemed to me they were very reasonable and rational, just sort of left it unclear and hanging in the minds of a number of people. But the reporters again, generally, on that sort of thing, they didn't like asking about it. They didn't like dealing with it, at least the ones I was accustomed to know. They didn't believe it, and they didn't like to fool around with that kind of thing. So they were just as happy to get the official statement on it and dispose of the matter that way. And then it wouldn't generally haunt you again except in a kind of *Parade Magazine* question about, "Is it true that..."

CAMPBELL: We read that the President...

COLEMAN: The President could get excited about something small like that. You never knew when he was going to be....

CAMPBELL: You heard from him often, did you?

COLEMAN: Oh, well, Pierre did.

CAMPBELL: He read every newspaper.

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COLEMAN: Oh, yes.

CAMPBELL: You hear that he was a person that was concerned with his image. He was very sensitive to what was written about him in the press. Did that seem to change with his time in the White House, the sensitivity?

COLEMAN: No, but I think, you know, the being interested in the small things to some degree reflected—I suppose ego—but again a kind of relaxation point on serious matters. You could be all concerned about some small thing about whether he wears a hat or he doesn't wear a hat. Of course, he didn't, but that was a campaign issue with the people who make hats.

No, it didn't change. He was intensely interested in what was written about him and reacted as most politicians do to criticisms of policies. He could get annoyed about personal stuff or pleased by personal stuff, but I can't recall an incident where he was pleased by something. I think he....I can't recall an incident where he was annoyed by something, although I seem to think—what I'm groping for is whether or not he was annoyed by the same kinds of things that annoyed Mrs. Kennedy. I think he liked the pictures that he saw from time to time too and wanted them of the children and other family kinds of things like that.

CAMPBELL: Did he become concerned over certain kinds of pictures? Did he like to see himself in a certain way?

COLEMAN: I don't think so. I never recall him being really concerned with any kinds of pictures taken, certainly not about himself. He'd be interested in pictures of the children sometimes or things like that, but I can't recall that he had any ego about his own attractiveness, for instance.

CAMPBELL: No concern for...

COLEMAN: He never seemed to be even aware of photographers taking pictures of him. I mean there were always routine things that were just never....He never seemed to be—well, I'm going to use an extreme expression—

preening in any way. Totally self...

CAMPBELL: Self-conscious?

COLEMAN: Self-conscious-less? Unself-conscious.

CAMPBELL: It's been suggested someplace that on the weekends to Hyannis, the weekends to Palm Beach, there was a conscious press office effort to portray this time as a working time.

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COLEMAN: Oh, well they all do that. You know, you still see that, you always see that. You always say, "He spent his morning hours on work." I don't know the degree to which they work. Since he went out on the boat in the afternoons, generally, there was a fair routine about these things when they could see that he was out on a boat. Who knows whether he was discussing affairs of state with a guest, with a Harriman [W. Averell Harriman] or somebody. I think it's likely he worked a great deal, too. I don't say that in any defense of him or any concern of whether he worked or he didn't work, but just the kind of person he was and the fact of the presidency, I assume, a certain amount is conferences and telephone concerns.

CAMPBELL: On a weekend, a period of time in Hyannis, what sort of press staff, press office staff, went along?

COLEMAN: Hyannis and Palm Beach became fairly routine matters depending on length of time, too, how many people you took. Probably if it was a Hyannis weekend, one secretary and Pierre—or Andy, depending on whether Pierre wanted to spend some time with his family. Pierre stayed at the Yachtsman [Hotel] like everybody else. But there would be just one press officer and one secretary on a weekend.

If it was Palm Beach for a week or ten days, there would probably be two secretaries, two press officers, press briefings periodically, because a Palm Beach week would be more extensive. You'd have probably two press briefings a day, and you'd probably have people coming down to see the President and confer with him, so there were people you could bring to a press briefing and let them answer questions about what they'd seen the President on. Also, it would be in wintertime. It would be generally around Christmas time. It would be before the start of a new session of Congress and so there would be a great deal of word and much more domestic kind of policy activities during one of those than there would have been on a Hyannis weekend.

CAMPBELL: How do people get chosen to go along as....Was this sort of thing passed around the office?

COLEMAN: No, no. Chris and Sue wanted to go on most of them and did. They were both working for Pierre. Barbara went on very few, except Andy took her, I guess, when he went along once or twice. Sometimes when it seemed that I hadn't had a go at it for some time, they'd ask me. I didn't like to travel so I saved them all a lot of problems because Chris and Sue really did want to go. So it was just a matter of give-and-take. Jill went down a few times on Palm Beach trips. I don't recall her going to Hyannis.

On the long trips, on the domestic long trips or European trips, there'd be enough of us going that probably we'd all be covered. Helen never went on a trip. Barbara probably got the short end of it. Chris and Sue were in a good position to get the trips, of course, because they worked directly with Pierre. Also, I was not a real secretary; I couldn't take shorthand, and I'm a terrible typist. I always got out of things in a way, that way, except I got to go on the trips I wanted to

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go on. I went to Europe; I went to South America; I went to Canada; and I went on a number of domestic trips and Hyannis and Palm Beach from time to time, so I had quite enough.

When they went on a trip, it was a chance to relax at home, of course, which I felt I badly needed from the tension of the White House. Some people feed on tension.

It's interesting, the kinds of people who work in these environments are actually terribly stimulated by the pace that you go on. But I found that one had to wind down from time to time—at least I did.

CAMPBELL: You, I think, went on the trip...

COLEMAN: The phone calls alone, the telephone was terrible. I used to love for them to go away. The phone would stop ringing immediately. I got so that when I answered the phone at home, I'd automatically pick up the phone and say, "Press office," it became such a habit.

CAMPBELL: You had a press officer always here in town, did you?

COLEMAN: Yes, we always had somebody who had to be on call, if not in the office, to handle an emergency. After Jay left, of course we had Malcolm Kilduff [Malcolm M. Kilduff]. Malcolm got taken on in much the same way that Jay did, which is interesting, because Malcolm—Mac as he was known—was a press officer at the State Department. I may be wrong about that. He was at state, but I don't know if he was a press officer. And he was handling some of the advance work on the European trip—he was in Paris when we went there, when we arrived there—and very efficient and very well-known to a number of the press guys, as a matter of fact. Pierre was impressed by him and asked him to come on over. So Mac came on as I left because he was replacing Jay, who left at the same time. And I think Mac was very good. I don't have any personal knowledge of

how he worked, although I know him, but he's the kind of guy that fits easily into the other kinds of routines in the press office, as well as knowing the foreign end of the work as well.

CAMPBELL: I think that you made a trip to California with the President, the time he called on President Eisenhower.

COLEMAN: Oh, yes. That was part of a trip to—my, that was a nice trip; I really liked it. We went to Palm Springs, is where we were going. And the President had a chance to use somebody's house in Palm Springs, and we stopped and saw President Eisenhower, who looked incredibly healthy. And it was one of those nice little vignette kind of things out of a White House series of events because all the newspaper people knew Eisenhower from the days when they covered him and he had little chats with Smitty, Merriman Smith, whom everybody knew. It was interesting.

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President Kennedy had a number of favorites among White House reporters. As a matter of fact, some of them became well-known in their field because they had established a good rapport with him during the campaign. Sandy Vanocur is a good case in point. It seemed to me that Sandy's career was, in effect, made by the good relationship that he developed with President Kennedy. Hugh Sidey did fairly well in terms of the good relationship with the President. He wrote a book out of it, which was full of a lot of detail of the kind that I tend to think is terribly unimportant—"as the President sipped his orange juice by the pool" kind of thing—but it meant that he'd been there sitting next to the President at the pool. But the President, as I said, liked a number of newspaper men and was available to a great degree to a number of them for these kinds of things. I don't know how much background he really gave Hugh Sidey, but...

CAMPBELL: How difficult was that, his personal friendship, well, of long standing with Charles Bartlett, for instance? He saw many newspapermen on a social basis. Sometimes he made leaks himself.

COLEMAN: That's true. That's true. And I think to some degree this may have reinforced Pierre's outsideness; you know, outside the circle. There was a great deal that Pierre couldn't do anything about, and that was a personal problem for Pierre to the degree that it—humiliate is a little bit of a strong word—but it is to some degree humiliating in that you can't control these things yourself. But Pierre's an awfully resilient person, and I think he had, certainly had more than enough feedback in the whole process to his ego so that he did not remain discouraged by anything too long. There were things that would discourage him considerably from time to time, but I don't think that the President's being his own press secretary, which people have often said, discouraged him too much.

I think this is why Pierre may well have done that sort of Russian foray, if you want to call it that, because Pierre needed to do a number of things and had the opportunity and the

potential, I think, for doing a number of things outside of the press area since the President did conduct a lot of his press relations himself. Well, on the one hand, Pierre didn't have to take care of a number of those kinds of things for the President because people could interview and make their connections with Ted Sorensen and Larry O'Brien, over which Pierre had little control. On the other-hand, Pierre was very little interested in the detailed kind of things that a Ron Ziegler [Ronald L. Ziegler] seems to be very happy with. It's unfair to Ron Ziegler. I don't know what major things, but they do a number of those technical things there. You know, it's important to do those technical things, and in my opinion a deputy press secretary should be around for just that reason.

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Well, Pierre did set up some good policies and establish an atmosphere in the press office, which was partially his own doing and partially as a natural result of the kind of president he was working for—and he freely admits that himself. The President made it easy for him to have a set of televised news conferences and to have free access at the White House.

So lots of times he had to put out fires and stay on top of an incredible amount of things, which just means calling everybody constantly to know what the true situation is on a number of things. Pierre had a great deal more, I think in his defense—and I'm very fond of him—he had a great deal more intelligence than some people gave him credit for. He wasn't just a funny fellow. He's a very competent man in lots of ways; not a detail man; not an organized man, but a very competent man. Very fast mind, very quick in learning everything he needed to know, the major outlines of what he needed to know; he just wasn't good on details. And a very attractive personality. I don't believe there's a reporter who didn't like him. They could be terribly frustrated by him, but. . . .

CAMPBELL: Another columnist whose career seems to have at least begun with President Kennedy is Marianne Means [Marianne Hansen Means]. Do you have any personal recollection of that or. . .

COLEMAN: I don't understand, really, how Marianne did as well as she did, frankly. She was one of a few women reporters. They liked Mary McGrory, too, but she wasn't around very much. Of course I remember Mary mostly from her early relationship and friendship with Robert Kennedy, whose house she was very frequently at for parties and other things.

But Marianne just, I think, started to cover the White House for Hearst [Publishing Company, Inc.], and she's an attractive girl, and to some degree, I think both Pierre and the President responded to her that way. First of all, you don't get very many young women reporters in the White House. Without meaning to be—I won't say, critical—catty perhaps, is a more appropriate word. Sarah McClendon and at the time. . . .

CAMPBELL: May Craig [Elizabeth May Craig].

COLEMAN: . . . May Craig were the typical types of women reporters and the ones you were most aware of. I can't recall who else. Bonnie Angelo. Bonnie may have been, working for *Newsday* then or some newspaper chain. I know she covered the campaign. She wasn't at the White House too much. The President liked her to the degree he knew her, but she wasn't around that much. At any rate, you don't have very many women covering the White House fairly regularly and the ones you do have are generally older women.

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So Marianne just stood out, really, in effect, she stood out, and Pierre would tell her some things. And she wasn't a problem. You could tell her some things, and it wasn't that much of a challenge, let me say, to the other reporters. She wasn't given outstanding information. The only thing she did is trade in on a relationship that she had.

CAMPBELL: She came up with same ambassadorial appointment scoops or something on that level.

COLEMAN: I think there were others. I'm trying to recall who else other than Sandy. Well, let's see, Bob Pierpoint [Robert C. Pierpoint] was covering for CBS [Columbia Broadcasting Systems] for a while.

CAMPBELL: And Bill Lawrence [William H. Lawrence] plays golf with them.

COLEMAN: Oh, well, of course, I'd forgotten Bill. Oh my goodness, how could I forget? There were some people who stood out by their very nature. Bill Lawrence was the most aggressive guy. He really gave Pierre a hard time and meant it, as a matter of fact. I mean, he really did not expect Pierre to be as unorganized and inaccurate as he occasionally was and would ride Pierre unmercifully in a press briefing. Pierre took it pretty well, considering the fact that Bill Lawrence could deflate you very fast.

But I think part of it may have been an attempt by Bill Lawrence to push Pierre into doing what Bill Lawrence wanted to do. And I was really surprised at Pierre's being able to stand up to him as well as he did because it was a very tight situation many times there. As a matter of fact, I think they shouted at each other a couple of times at a briefing.

He, was difficult, but you couldn't ignore him by just saying he was difficult. He was also a *New York Times* reporter and was a very intelligent guy who knew his way around, and he was often right. He was just so obnoxious about it half the time, but he was often right, as I said, and I think Pierre, handled it as well as he could. I'm trying to remember something awful that he gave him a hard time about. I have to go back over those press briefings.

CAMPBELL: I think he started out opposing live press conferences and then went with ABC [American Broadcasting Companies] and. . .

COLEMAN: Oh, that's true. That's right. Of course, there was that argument. That was heated at the beginning. The newspaper people were, of course, upset about live press conferences. It was an instant reaction kind of thing. They were just registering their protest. There wasn't anything in the world they knew they could do about it. It would have been an attempt to stop a very

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natural process in news information. And it was quite beyond the White House, I mean, the fact that the television people have become so important in providing news to the public. The White House couldn't do anything about it; they were just acting on it. So it was just natural.

They were so often cranky about—there's no other word to use for it than cranky, newspaper reporters and the camera people and the rest of it—cranky about any number of small things. They used to drive me crazy about it and irritated me to no end; I had no sympathy a great deal of the time for their complaints because they seemed childish and petty to me, but when you consider the strain that they're under and the competitive position they're in, it's very natural. It's very difficult on people to work in a press office to satisfy all their demands. And the fact of the matter is, is that they were being satisfied because they. . . Certainly the *New York Times* and the [*New York*] *Herald Tribune*, at the time, got all kinds of inside information from all kinds of sources. So they did as well on news breaks as anybody.

CAMPBELL: Did you get involved in the original decision to televise the news conferences, the original planning in that?

COLEMAN: No. I don't recall how it started at all. I think it arose out of Hagerty's conversations with Pierre. I think it was part of, you know, "what-you-could-do-next" kind of I just have that feeling. There was another thing, and I think that this is. . . . I don't recall whether it was Pierre's idea—he may credit himself with it, at any rate, in his book—about having newspaper editors in to meet the President thing.

CAMPBELL: Yeah, the luncheons.

COLEMAN: The luncheons, yes. Small newspaper editors from all over the country occasionally gave the President a hard time. I think he was sorry to some degree he was involved in it after a while because you'd get some small editor from Podunk who would just read the President out over lunch. But most of the time there was somebody who did that. The reason why I think about that is there was one very awkward case—and I can't remember who it was—in which that happened. It was a very bad luncheon.

CAMPBELL: Man from Texas, maybe?

COLEMAN: Yeah, well, perhaps. But by and large they went well. The president was pleased with them. The editors were overwhelmed with them. I thought it was a very good idea because, you see, so much of the time is spent in the White House with the national correspondents.

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CAMPBELL: How did you go about selecting a guest list for something like that? Do you know how it was compiled?

COLEMAN: No, I don't recall. I'm sure some geographic considerations were taken into consideration, and I don't know whether the size of the paper was or not. Clearly it wasn't on the basis of politics.

CAMPBELL: How did you get involved with—or did you get involved with—authors: the Jim Bishop [James A. Bishop] type that are going to come in and do a book on the President? Did your office handle that sort of thing too?

COLEMAN: They didn't of course have to come in and talk to us at all—I mean if they had some sources other than the White House to start with. But yes, they would inevitably get in touch with Pierre. Sometimes you had to provide routine information to people like that, but there wasn't very much else that one had to do.

Andy Tully [Andrew F. Tully, Jr.] wrote a book. Well, was he writing a book on the White House? He became a friend of Pierre's during the campaign prior to the regular campaign, prior to the Convention. That's interesting because for some reason that reminds me that the people I may have mentioned before, like Earl Mazo, Andy Tully, and Mollenhoff [Clark R. Mollenhoff], who were around prior to the Convention period, very seldom showed up afterwards. I suppose what we had done was make the transition to White House reporters from political reporters. I don't know why. I suppose it has something to do with newspapers and their assignments because I know, of course, we had men covering in the White House who never covered during the campaign, but that was because they were White House reporters.

CAMPBELL: How often did your office have contact with the institutions here in town, Walter Lippmann or James Reston [James B. Reston]? Did they work through your office at all?

COLEMAN: Well, Reston would show up from time to time. I bet that Reston had more dealings with other people on the White House staff than our office. Certainly they didn't have any relationship with us on a regular basis.

To get back, for a minute, to the question of television versus newspapers versus magazines, I hadn't mentioned the magazines in that whole situation. And, of course, we always had a lot of push from them on what they could get. And it was always possible: to give them the scoops, however, or leaks, because of their timing. Something was going to

happen over the weekend, you know, and they were going to come out on Monday. so it wasn't really a leak. But their

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deadlines were on Saturday so you'd have to give them information ahead of time on the assumption that it would not be used until Monday.

Chuck Roberts [Charles W. Roberts] was covering for *Newsweek*, and I've forgotten who for *U. S. News and World Report*. Sidey's stories used to drive us crazy because Sidey's stories, as *Time* does, were full of this little trivia, which was inevitably wrong. And poor Sidey, we used to give him a hard time about it on Monday when we'd get the issue, and he'd say, "I didn't write it that way." It had been changed in New York.

CAMPBELL: Was edited.

COLEMAN: I don't know if that's true. That was a good defense they had, but they got a fair amount of tension.

CAMPBELL: Did you feel that. . . You've said. there were some special stories or special treatment, perhaps, for the large dailies, the New York papers.

COLEMAN: Not just the New York, of course. *The Washington Post* and the *Washington Evening Star* to a lesser, degree than the *Post*, the *New York Times*, the *Herald Tribune*, the wire services—although the wire services had to fight to get Pierre to understand their role, their constant role. He was more accustomed to dealing with newspaper people, and then he easily made the switch to the television people whom he soon became, you know, used to treating in the most favored position. *The Washington Post* had lots of leaks in those early days, as they still do: not all of them, by any means, from our office. As a matter of fact, you tend to think most of the leaks in any way, shape, or form probably didn't come from our office.

CAMPBELL: Any attempt by your office to track down the source of some of those?

COLEMAN: Oh, Pierre really. . . . Yes, especially if' it was something, you know, he didn't know about, which was very often the case. And I don't think he objected to anybody leaking as long as he knew about it. It was the problem, of his always looking stupid about these things. You know, not knowing about it ahead of time. It wasn't a question of his coming in at 9 o'clock in the morning and then being able to get on the phone and track down some information on something. He's called at home at 3 o'clock in the morning or 5 o'clock in the morning or any. . . . I don't know how he stood it, but he had a list of people who the White House operators could put through at any time of the day or night. Now, who was on it, I don't know, except that I know the wire services were clearly on it. I know all those people I've mentioned already, the major newspapers and T.V. people were on it. And, as a matter of fact, he kept on expanding the list, which probably drove

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his wife crazy. The White House operators had a list of people who could call him at any time.

CAMPBELL: At any time. Let's stop it for today and do some more. We're about . . .

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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