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Administrative Information

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Biographical Note

Edmond C. Hutchinson was the Assistant Administrator for Africa and Europe, Agency for International Development (1961-1966). This interview focuses on Hutchinson's appointment to the Kennedy Administration, the Agency for International Development, and new attitudes towards Africa, among other things.

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First Oral History Interview

With

EDMOND C. HUTCHINSON

May 4, 1966
Washington, D.C.

By Joseph E. O'Connor

For the John F. Kennedy Library

O'CONNOR: Mr. Hutchinson, how did you happen to get the appointment with the Kennedy Administration?

HUTCHINSON: At the time of the inauguration of President Kennedy I was working in private industry for the Radio Corporation of America after having had quite a number of years of service in the government, much of which had been related to the foreign aid program either directly when I was in the Development Loan Fund or as an observer, reviewer, and analyst when I was in the Bureau of the Budget. As a part of the general attempt to bring people into the government, or back into the government who had experience in fields of particular interests and to get the new AID [Agency for International Development] program going, there was a search to find people with the required experience. I had worked at the Bureau of the Budget when Ralph Dungan was there before he had become an assistant to then Senator Kennedy, and I presume as a result of this personal knowledge, I was called and asked if I would be interested in exploring the possibilities. Our exploration proceeded over some months, and I ended up receiving and accepting an appointment to the job.

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O'CONNOR: Well, you were with the Radio Corporation of America. Does that mean that your recruitment came under what has been called "Operation

Tycoon”? Were you one of the business tycoons that they....

HUTCHINSON: No, I preceded Operation Tycoon. That was laid on after I came into the government.

O’CONNOR: I wondered if you had had any connection then with Operation Tycoon. Did you, after coming to AID, begin drafting some business executives? Did you bring some into your section as mission directors, for example?

HUTCHINSON: We did bring some people in as mission directors who were recruited under the so-called Operation Tycoon. These people’s names and backgrounds were made available to us. We reviewed the information and selected those who looked promising and then had interviews with them and their wives and did select some as mission directors and as deputy mission directors.

O’CONNOR: Do you know whose idea this was? There was a need to staff many positions. Somebody came up with the idea of “Let’s get them out of business. Let’s put on a drive to get some business executives.”

HUTCHINSON: No, I don’t know whose idea it was originally.

O’CONNOR: I wondered. This has sometimes been attributed to Lyndon B. Johnson, which I thought was a little strange.

HUTCHINSON: I had never heard this attribution. I would be surprised if this is the case, but I can’t of my personal knowledge say whether it was or was not.

O’CONNOR: I wondered if you had any opinions as to whether it was a good operation.

HUTCHINSON: I would say it was an operation that had mixed success. We were able to get a number of good people into the program. Some of them, frankly,

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were not as good as was hoped. Some of them didn’t stay as long as was hoped. On the other hand, we did get quite a number who made a significant contribution to the development of the program and to methods of its administration during the relatively short period of time they were here, and we did get some who have continued to stay with the program and want to make a career of it. So I would say that on balance it was a successful operation but probably not to the degree that was hoped for when it was originally laid out.

O’CONNOR: When you first came to AID, can you tell us something about the sort of administrative problems you had? You must have had quite a number of them.

HUTCHINSON: We had quite a number of administrative problems, basically of two types, I would say. Maybe it would be better to say, at least in the African Bureau, of three types. First, you had the problem of putting together two agencies--the previous ICA [International Cooperation Administration] and the previous Development Loan Fund--with different procedures, with different philosophies and different traditions and, very frankly, with some bureaucratic animosities between the two agencies which carried over to the people who were brought into the single agency from the two. So there was the problem of bringing together these differing approaches, differing points of view as between the two agencies.

Secondly, there was the problem for someone such as I, who, even though having had considerable previous experience in the aid program, was, nonetheless, new in the new agency and had to review the program anew and reach some personal judgments on the validities of previous projects and programs that had been carried on and attempt to give some new direction to them in the light of new emphasis coming with the change in the administration.

Thirdly, and this was probably related to the second, was the administrative problem associated with getting a really developmentally oriented effort going in Africa. Previously our assistance had been relatively small in the technical assistance field, very little in the development loans, and a significant volume of it of a supporting assistance type basically related to security considerations. The new direction

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was in the way of directing the aid much more exclusively and directly to economic developmental objectives with the new countries coming into independence in Africa and in expanding the volume of that assistance. So you had the administrative problems of getting a program with new directions and increased volume added to the other two dimensions of the problem that I have mentioned.

O'CONNOR: Well, I'd like to talk about each one of those, if we can, in connection with animosities which resulted from trying to put together the ICA and the DLF and combine this more or less under AID. The name Dr. Dennis Fitzgerald [Dennis A. Fitzgerald] has come up very often. Was he the source of opposition or one major source of opposition to the idea of AID?

HUTCHINSON: No, I don't think so. I think Fitz was one who would very much welcome, I'm sure he must have very much welcomed, the idea of the combination of the Development Loan Fund and the ICA. I think he felt from the beginning that the division of the aid program, into a lending agency and into basically a technical assistance agency, or a capital projects agency and technical assistance agency was a mistake. So I feel quite sure that he did welcome the idea of the combination of the two agencies. So I don't think there was any opposition to the idea of a single foreign aid agency on Doctor Fitz's part.

I am sure that his concerns about some of the organizational changes were probably of two kinds. One, he probably felt that there was being too great an integration of the aid

agency into the Department of State because he had always felt that there was a conflict between a shorter run, politically motivated provision of assistance and the longer run considerations of economic and social growth. And I'm sure that he probably felt that the short run political considerations had in the past been given too great a weight and that the closer integration with the Department of State would probably tend to even further unbalance that situation.

I suspect that there was a second factor in his feeling about the organization of the new agency. I can't speak to this with quite as much confidence as I do to the first one. But having known the way he operated in ICA, I suspect that he felt that the role and function of the technician, of the

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agriculturalist, of the educationalist was being downgraded to a degree that he felt was undesirable and a mistake, that the geographic emphasis was being given too great a force in relation to the technician in the agency. I feel reasonably sure that he had this feeling about the organization of the agency.

O'CONNOR: Where do you stand on this? What opinions do you have? Do you have any criticisms of the agency, the way it was set up?

HUTCHINSON: My thinking on this has changed a bit as I have lived with the agency over, well over four years. I tended, before the agency was set up and when I came into the agency, to share the concern about the closer integration into the Department of State. I felt very strongly in just the opposite direction so far as the technician is concerned, that one of the fundamental difficulties in the previous agency had been the dominance of the technician over the country program approach. As I have lived with the agency, I continue to feel that the decision to emphasize the country program over the technical specialty is the correct approach. I think our experience has demonstrated this--and that this has been one of the big strengths of the agency.

I have changed my mind on the question of the relation to the Department of State. Not because I don't agree with the point that while short term political considerations must be given account, the longer run economic and social growth considerations must be paramount, but because I've found that with the increased stature of the officers in AID--the increased rank which they have been given is what I mean by increased stature--I'm not making comparisons of persons in the agency before and after its integration--and by their having been accepted into the Department of State family that the moving in this direction has, rather than weakening the hand of the AID officer, in fact strengthened his hand and made it possible for the longer run economic and social considerations to be given greater weight than was the case in the past. I think the balance that has been struck is about as good a pragmatic compromise as can be made.

O'CONNOR: The criticism that's often leveled at State Department, of course, is that it has tended to become such an enormous bureaucracy that it's become

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stultified. It doesn't produce fresh ideas. And I should think that fresh ideas would be the most necessary thing for an AID program. Do you find that this has happened at all? Do you feel that this is a real danger to the AID program now that it is in close association with the State Department or not? Do you disagree with that?

HUTCHINSON: I would not think that this is a real danger under the present form of organization. Very frankly, I think it would be a very serious danger if you moved to complete integration. I think this is a real danger in the Latin American form of organization of the AID program. I personally think it would be a very serious mistake to have that complete an integration of the AID program and its administration into the Department of State administrative structure. The techniques required are different. The thinking that is required is different. And I'm reasonably sure that the point that you made of the necessity for doing some imaginative thinking and keeping your administrative structure in small enough units to have some flexibility would be seriously impaired with that complete an integration of the administration of AID into the Department of State.

O'CONNOR: Before we get into the second and third points that you made in connection with the idea of a fresh approach toward Africa, or a different approach toward Africa, I'd like to go back just for a minute and discuss a little bit of the administrative difficulty. Fowler Hamilton was the head of AID when you came here, and there has been some criticism and actually some very strong praise of Fowler Hamilton, some strong defense as well as some criticism. I've heard both. However, it is obvious that there was a problem, or it is obvious to certain people at any rate that a problem arose in connection with Fowler Hamilton, and Fowler Hamilton, for this reason, was kept no longer as head of AID. Do you have any particular remarks of praise or remarks of criticism regarding him? In other words, I'm asking, do you know why, what was the difficulty in his administration?

HUTCHINSON: I do not know what the basic difficulty was. There was some feeling in the agency itself that he wasn't a professional, that he had not had any

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background and experience in the AID program. He had no experience in administration. It's my own personal judgment that those kinds of criticism, while having some obvious validity, might well have been made of almost anyone who would have been brought into the agency; that anyone who was faced with the problems of putting these two stiff-necked agencies together, who was faced with the problem of a totally new approach to aid, who was faced with the problem of having the agency move into a relationship with the Department of State which was ill-defined and never before experienced would have faced most of the difficulties which Hamilton faced.

It's my personal judgment that Hamilton did a good job in the agency, and I would support his administration in the agency. Certainly he began the process of rebuilding the agency's image in the eyes of the Congress. He did a good job in this respect. And this was one of the things that it needed so desperately. I have been with him in meetings with the congressmen informally and so on. While he was not here long enough--and I don't know how it would have worked out even if he had--to get the kind of public record praise in Congress which Dave [David E. Bell] has gotten, nonetheless, unquestionably he did have the confidence of most of the people in the Congress and was making a real beginning in restoring the congressional confidence in the integrity of the agency, which had been lost.

Secondly, he did a job of getting the agency staffed in those early days. He was wise enough to basically let the operators have enough authority to carry on their operations without undue interference and, I think, did make effective the totally new approach to the administration of the AID program which was necessary. He laid on the necessary internal studies for revision of procedures which came to fruition only after he left so that he didn't, in fact, make many of the changes which were made, but he set in process the forces that led to those changes. So I am personally quite high on the job that Hamilton did in the administration of the agency. Why he obviously was not successful in inspiring confidence throughout to the degree that was required for him to stay, I'm not clear.

O'CONNOR: Well, the criticism is often leveled that AID remained sluggish under Fowler Hamilton, and this is what caused John Kennedy to be dissatisfied with him. Do you know what is meant by that?

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HUTCHINSON: I don't know; I can guess. I think, first, that this criticism ought to be reviewed in the light of such facts as the level of obligations during the period that Hamilton was here and the period after he left. I suspect that you'll find that the level of obligation was higher during those years than they've been in recent years.

O'CONNOR: What do you mean, the level of obligation?

HUTCHINSON: Well, the volume of loans made, the amount of technical assistance provided, and this sort of thing. I've not made this kind of analysis, but I do know that the amount of funds requested has been very considerably reduced, as I think it should have been. Frankly, this is one mistake I think was made during Fowler's earlier years was for the asking of too much money from the Congress.

But given the situation, which I'll comment on in a minute, I doubt that it was in the cards for anything less to have been asked for. I think what that criticism really derives from is the fact that a new administration came in with a new agency that had been created with great fanfare and study by public committees and on a wave of enthusiasm that the sixties was the decade of development and that expectations were much greater than reality could possibly make possible--this was particularly true of the Alliance--and that as a result of the

fact that the real world was quite different and things could not in fact move nearly as quickly as people had hoped.

This is one thing we've learned in AID, that the development process is a lot longer term, a whole lot slower and much more halting and limping a process than we had thought; that capital itself is not nearly as much a factor in the development process as we had thought, that it's much more an institutional problem, a cultural problem, a problem of all kinds of interrelationships; and that the infusion of capital itself is not going to have quite the effect we thought it would. Secondly, it's considerably more difficult to get the capital infused than we had thought it was. This is the one thing we've learned. We had not quite learned it while Hamilton was here. And I suspect that this is the fundamental reason for the dissatisfaction with Hamilton, that it was a dissatisfaction with the world as it actually turned out to be. These are my personal feelings.

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O'CONNOR: You referred to the matter of money. It is a striking contrast between the requests for money and the way Congress was approached in 1962-63, particularly, and 1964-65 under Lyndon B. Johnson. Now what do you feel is the difference in those? In other words, much more money was asked by AID under John Kennedy than has been asked subsequently under Lyndon B. Johnson. Now is this simply because AID knows that Congress won't give any more; or does this reflect a tightening of the belt, let's say, in AID; or just what do you think it reflects?

HUTCHINSON: I think it represents a number of things. I think it represents, first, a recognition on the Agency's part that it couldn't effectively use as much money as it had previously thought it could. I well remember at Camp David--I guess this was the last year that Hamilton was here--a long, long discussion on whether or not we shouldn't take about 'a billion dollars out of the request that we were proposing to make on the Bureau of the Budget and on the Congress. This was an internal discussion ...

O'CONNOR: With Fowler Hamilton?

HUTCHINSON: With all the assistant administrators of AID: Fowler Hamilton, Ralph Dungan, and people of this sort. I don't believe there was anyone from the Bureau there. This was internal to the Agency and the White House. And there was a strong recommendation from many people in AID that that request be reduced.

O'CONNOR: Can you tell us who might have made this recommendation? Would you have made it? Or William Gaud? Or Teodoro Moscoso?

HUTCHINSON: I, for one, made the recommendation. I don't remember what Gaud's position in the matter was. But there were quite a number who felt very

much that we could not effectively use as much money as was being proposed and, secondly, who felt that it was also very poor tactics to go to the Congress with a request that big anyhow.

O'CONNOR: Who was responsible for the proposal of this much money?

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HUTCHINSON: The way this arose was getting requests in from the field, getting the estimates of loans which might be made based on data that we had with respect to possibilities--it would be too strong to call them prospects--and then this package being put together by the office of Program [and Policy] Coordination which is responsible for bringing together all the requests. Many of us felt that a high enough rate of discount had not been applied in putting these figures together; that, sure, you could add up all the ideas that people might have and arrive at a very large total, but that, based on operating experience, you had to apply a very heavy rate of discount. He didn't think it had been heavily enough discounted. Others disagreed. The decision was ultimately made, and I don't honestly know who made the decision, to go ahead with the larger request.

O'CONNOR: That's what I'd like to find out, that's what I'd like to know. You don't recall at all not necessarily who made the decision but some of the people that felt that perhaps we should go ahead and ask for that much money?

HUTCHINSON: That's right. I suspect that Fowler's recommendation to the President was for the higher amount. I don't know this, but I am reasonably sure that this was the case. And this clearly was the decision. The Congress took out just about as much as we had recommended that we take out before we ever went to them. And we ended up not obligating all our money. Maybe that's a little self-justification, [laughter] but anyhow that's what the historical situation turned out to be.

O'CONNOR: Well, the same thing happened the following year.

HUTCHINSON: The same thing happened the following year. And again, this is something that would certainly have to be held, I am sure, similar recommendations were made to reduce the amount. And I do know this, that Dave went to President Kennedy with two figures: a higher figure and a lower figure. I'm not absolutely sure of which figure Dave recommended. I think he recommended the lower figure, but the President chose the higher figure. This one I'm a little unclear on the history of because this happened when the President

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was out of town. Dave went to see him. And the decision was made to go forward with the higher figure.

O'CONNOR: Was he thinking that this was a kind of a cut insurance? Do you know anything at all?

HUTCHINSON: I don't really know anything at all of his reasons.

O'CONNOR: Well, this is a very important problem as far as AID administration under John Kennedy.

HUTCHINSON: I would again guess, and it's dangerous to guess, that it was a combination of at least three factors. One as a cut insurance because--there was a history of the Congress taking a billion out every year, or some such figure. So I am reasonably sure that this was a factor. I suspect also a factor was that the President may very well have felt that for the Administration to so drastically reduce the request might be interpreted in the world as a flagging of our interest in development. And if the Congress cut it, you could still argue that the Administration was in favor of a higher amount and was still going to try to make a real effort. I suspect this was a factor. And I suspect that a third factor was that the President found it really awfully hard to believe, given the known need in absolute terms, that it wasn't possible to really effectively use the money if we really made the effort that he felt was required to get it effectively used. And I suspect that all three weighed in his mind. But this is all supposition.

O'CONNOR: Do you think that there could have been a more effective approach to Congress on the part of representatives of AID or of the White House in order to get a greater amount of what was asked for?

HUTCHINSON: Oh, it's always difficult to say that a more effective approach could not have been made. I know there was some criticism particularly of the White House representation to the Congress. I heard this from time to time. It was kind of corridor gossip and that sort of thing. Frankly, I would discount it very, very heavily because

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I think the real facts were that Congress had had enough experience with the aid program over the years that instinctively they recognized that we were asking for more than we could do. They were right in their statements.

Even people like Passman [Otto E. Passman] were right in spite of the great damage that he has done to the public image of AID. They were still right in their intuitive judgment that administration after administration, or the executive branch year after year maybe is a better way to put it, during the previous Administration, would come up with aid requests and insisted that this was the minimum necessary, and that there would be very serious adverse repercussions to the U.S. foreign policy and to growth if there was any significant cut. And they had cut it significantly, and still all the money wasn't used. This weighted very heavily in their minds, and it was also true that the foreign aid program was in disrepute to

some considerable degree publicly and it wasn't getting the public support that was needed. And so the Congress just wasn't about to stick its neck out too far. So that I personally think that improvement in the efforts with the Congress wouldn't have had very much effect.

O'CONNOR: Well, Kennedy has been charged many times, the Kennedy Administration has been charged many times--and not only with respect to AID-- with an improper or ineffective approach to Congress, and I had wondered, specifically, whether you knew anything that you felt was specifically improper or at least ...

HUTCHINSON: I would not have any instances of what I could have considered improper approaches or anything of that sort. Certainly, as I say, it was common gossip around that the job that was being done wasn't as effective as was the.... The present President, however, has at least had the advantage--and I'm not making comparisons between the two here--the present President had the advantage, insofar as getting the AID program through the Congress, however, of going forward with a request which had already been very substantially reduced.

O'CONNOR: Well, in connection with this very thing, the contrast is often made between John Kennedy's approach to Congress and Lyndon Johnson's

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approach to Congress. I wondered, since I had initially asked if you saw any criticism in Kennedy's approach, if you saw any major difference in Johnson's approach. But I think you

HUTCHINSON: Well, certainly the difference, insofar as AID is concerned, has been that Kennedy went up with a very, very large request which he tried to get through but wasn't successful, whereas Johnson has gone up with a much lower request which he has stood for very firmly and dealt with quite skillfully and has, by and large, gotten through. I have always thought that this is the appropriate method of approaching the Congress, that you come up with an honest estimate--I don't mean the other one was a dishonest one; now maybe that isn't the word to use--that you come up with an estimate which you know is the minimum you really need to get by, or is near the minimum you need to get by--maybe you do have to have a little bit of gamesmanship in this, but which is very near the minimum you need. And then stand on it. I think the AID program demonstrated the wisdom of that approach.

O'CONNOR: Well, who is really responsible for this new policy? There very definitely is a new policy of going to Congress with the real minimum. Is this simply the result of recommendations that occurred in the previous two years or something like that?

HUTCHINSON: I think it's a result of two things. I think it's a result of the fact that there was no longer the difference of opinion in the Agency that there had been

two years before and a real recognition by practically everyone in a responsible position in the Agency that we didn't need as much money as we'd been asking for. And secondly, I think it arose out of Dave Bell personally. I think this is one dimension he has added to it, that he also would recognize and that his Bureau of the Budget experience was significant in this respect--that we had been asking for too much money, and that he much preferred to go up with a near minimum request which he could defend. It certainly gives you much more of a feeling of confidence sitting there testifying and enables you to talk with conviction in a way you couldn't do under the previous approach. I've done both.

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O'CONNOR: I was going to ask you about one instance, the relatively famous instance where you had to testify. It's said that Otto Passman kept an unnamed administrator on the stand for something like a hundred hours, or some figure. I was told that the unnamed administrator was you.

HUTCHINSON: It was better than three weeks. There are two stories: one is twenty-one days, and one is twenty-six days. I've not counted them. I'll have to go back and do it sometime.

O'CONNOR: I imagine that's an unpleasant memory; you may not want to count it. [Laughter] Well, why was this so? Did he have any particular reason for picking on you? It seems unusual.

HUTCHINSON: I've often wondered about this. This was a time in which he was feeling very strongly that he was in control of the situation and could demonstrate his power over the AID program, and so he held everyone up there very long periods of time.

Secondly, this was the first year that a real development effort was being made in Africa, and there was a sharp increase in the amounts of money being asked for for Africa. The great number of countries just coming into independence alarmed him. When he saw that, and when he saw the increase, and when he looked back on the history of the AID program, he could see the curve of assistance to Africa taking off in a northeasterly direction at a very sharp rate. And he made predications to that effect. So I think this was a factor.

I think, very frankly, the new administrators were somewhat fresh meat, and he wanted to intimidate them. I'm quite sure this was a part of his character. I suspect that there was something of a personal element in it too, in this respect it was probably in part my fault, if it's a fault. I was disposed to argue with him. I was determined to keep the record clear. And when he would put something in the record, I would say, "But, Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show" He'd not experienced this kind of witness before, and it infuriated him. And so it led on and on and on. It was in part, I'm quite sure, a contest of wills. I'm sure it's a part of those two things.

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O'CONNOR: I wondered if the very fact that it was Africa that you were the administrator for that particularly infuriated Otto Passman. Do you think that had anything to do with it?

HUTCHINSON: I have wondered myself and asked myself that question. There had been off-the-record remarks that would tend to lend some substance to that belief, but he was meticulous in his formal questioning and in the formal statements in the record, and there is not enough evidence that this is the case to support that conclusion.

O'CONNOR: One other question, before we get into some other matters, that has to do with appropriations. Do you have any comments to make on the Clay [Lucius D. Clay] Committee? On whether it was a good idea to begin with; whether it did an effective job, for example: whether the personnel was the best personnel to choose; for example, whether Clay himself was a good man to choose?

HUTCHINSON: I thought at the time that the appointment of the Clay Committee was a mistake. Insofar as any substantive effect on the AID program's concerned, it didn't have any. And insofar as public relations with AID clients and particularly with Africans, and particularly with Africanists in the United States, is concerned, the result was bad. It may be that the Committee was useful in establishing credibility for AID with the Congress and for our requests for funds. So from that point of view it may have been good.

The report itself is rather poor. This is generally recognized. Insofar as Africa is concerned, it sounded much more restrictive, much more negative than our policy towards Africa was, is and, I suppose, will continue to be. Insofar as the specific recommendations for the program is concerned, it was nothing but what we were doing anyhow. So it had the effect of presenting what we were in fact doing in a very negative rather than a constructive way. I'm speaking only on the African portion of it. Insofar as General Clay heading it up is concerned, he was a man who carried considerable weight in the Congress, the public, and from that point of view the choice was a good one. From the point of view of putting intellectual content into the report, it was a mistake.

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O'CONNOR: Alright, I think that answers that question. It is often said--and in this we can get back to something you brought out earlier--that John Kennedy's Administration witnessed a new attitude on the part of the United States toward the continent of Africa. Now would you care to comment on that?

HUTCHINSON: Yes. It represented a new attitude in a number of respects. One, it for the first time gave clear and explicit recognition to the fact that the changes in Africa were such that Africa was going to be something of a factor in world situations, which had not existed before. Secondly, it explicitly associated the United

States with African aspirations in terms of their independence, in terms of their status as people, and in terms of their economic and social development, which had not existed before --much clearer and specific identification of the United States with those aspirations. And thirdly, it had the effect of obtaining to a surprising degree the understanding and sympathy of many Africans, even radical Africans, of the racial problem and the approach to a solution in the United States.

O'CONNOR: Okay. One frequently mentioned aspect of this change in policy was John Kennedy's relationship, his personal relationship with African leaders. Now you were in on some of the personal meetings that John Kennedy had with, for instance, Sekou Toure--I believe you were there. Well, a number of those others

HUTCHINSON: Right, quite a number of them. Yes.

O'CONNOR: Can you comment on this? In other words, the question I'm driving at is this: Some people say personal relationships have a great deal to do with affecting policy; other people say that personal relationships don't mean a thing. For example, Kwame Nkrumah and John Kennedy apparently got along very well personally. It had almost nothing to do with changing the policy or direction of Ghana. Would you care to comment on this, perhaps some indications of where it did work or where it didn't work, or in general the policy of the effect of personal contact?

[-16-]

HUTCHINSON: I doubt that the personal relations affected the internal policies of the countries significantly, as, for example, the situation in Ghana. I doubt very much that it influenced their basic position on world issues, particularly where they felt that their national interests were greatly involved. Again, the question of African independence and African unity, their nonalignment in the cold war situation. I doubt that it affected their basic positions very much in that respect. I think it did affect their understanding of the American position on some world problems and on its domestic problems.

I think it specifically ameliorated the shrillness of the attacks that they may well have made on the United States for its internal problems, particularly the racial problem. I think it may have influenced to some degree--and this is a little bit in conflict with the earlier statement although it's a question of degree--the positions they took on issues that they might have been disposed to oppose us on in the U.N. It may have had some affect on the Chinese issue. It may have, in any case, convinced Sekou Toure of our earnestness of purpose and our lack of desire to subvert and may have been a factor in persuading him to make some of the turns back towards the West which he did make.

[-17-]

[END OF INTERVIEW – JFK #1, 5/4/1966]