

John E. Nolan Oral History Interview – RFK#3, 08/12/1970
Administrative Information

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Biographical Note

Nolan was the administrative assistant to the Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy [RFK], from 1963 to 1964. In this interview Nolan discusses working with Jesse M. Unruh on putting together the California delegation for RFK, 1968; raising funds for RFK's presidential campaign; Carmine S. Bellino as campaign treasurer; treating California like two different states, north and south; campaign staffing issues; RFK's first campaign visit to California; working with different communities and groups in Los Angeles; campaign scheduling and advance teams; different types of campaign appearances made by RFK; and campaign security and working with the local police, among other issues.

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
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Signed: John Nolan

John Nolan

Date: April 7, 1971

Third Oral History Interview

with

JOHN NOLAN

August 12, 1970
Washington, D.C.

By Roberta W. Greene

For the Robert F. Kennedy Oral History Program
of the Kennedy Library

GREENE: For one thing, what guidelines were you given before you left Washington to go over to California to set up the delegation as far as working with Unruh [Jesse M. Unruh] and the kind of people they wanted and the kind of people they didn't want?

NOLAN: Basically none, no guidelines, except several conversations with the candidate who would, as I believe I've mentioned before, reiterate his interest in young people and students, accentuated by the McCarthy [Eugene J. McCarthy] presence in the campaign at that time; and except for guidance in a general sense from Fred Dutton [Frederick G. Dutton], who would suggest that Jesse would be very interested in maintaining his own personal strength on the delegation and would be not necessarily sympathetic to people who were outside of his scope, either in the political sphere or in the groups that he didn't think were particularly important. So I'd say, you know, three or four conversations like that, but nothing else.

GREENE: How concerned were they at that point about working with Unruh? Could they foresee a lot of the problems?

NOLAN: Well, yes, but I don't think anybody ever considered not working. He was who we worked with in California. It wasn't a question of him or somebody else; it was a question of him, and how, starting there, to make it as good as it could be--really, how to build a non-Jesse side of California into the campaign.

GREENE: Now, you mentioned--and I scribbled it down, but maybe we ought to mention it once on the tape--the people that you worked most closely with in setting up the

delegation, those who would have been directly involved.

NOLAN: Well, the key figure in setting up the delegation was Unruh. His preferences with regard to the delegation were represented by Jack Crose [Jack C. Crose] and Frank Burns. The other side of it was represented, in the actual business of putting the delegation together, by Bill Norris [William A. Norris]. Norris was an amateur, a very classy sort of a guy.

GREENE: Was he someone Unruh brought in?

NOLAN: No. He was someone who was acceptable to Unruh. Bill at that time had been active in the CDC [California Democratic Council]. He had been a member of the state Board of Education. He had been active in Tom Braden's [Thomas W. Braden] campaign for lieutenant governor shortly before that. He had managed two campaigns by a woman named Rudd Brown [Rudd Owen Brown], who ran for Congress from the 22nd or 23rd congressional district, Burbank, the wife of Harrison Brown [Harrison S. Brown], nuclear physicist at Cal Tech [California Institute of Technology].

Bill was primarily a friend of mine. He had formerly been a law clerk for Mr. Justice Douglas [William O. Douglas], and we worked together at the court that year, and our wives and families were close friends. Ever since then--this was 1955--I have maintained a close personal and professional relationship with Bill, which didn't have anything to do with his political activities. But his political activities, which he developed on his own, sort of paralleled some of the things that we were doing here.

For example, in early 1968 when I was coming back from Vietnam, I had a layover of a couple of hours in Los Angeles. We'd been on an airplane for a day and a half or something straight, and landed in Los Angeles, on a nonchange flight from Saigon, a Navy flight. It was about 11 o'clock at night. I called Bill's house and he wasn't home, but his wife knew where he was and I called him there. It was a party or some kind of a social gathering, and he said, "Where are you?" I said, "I'm at the airport." And he said, "I want to come over and talk to you." And so, you know, Los Angeles is a long ways from any place to the airport. So, we had maybe fifteen minutes to a half an hour by the time he got there to talk. Well, what he wanted to talk about was, "Is Bob Kennedy going to run for the presidency, because if he is, I'm not going to go on the Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] delegation, because I don't want to get committed if there's any possibility he's going to do that."

Bill's a great friend and sort of protege of a guy named Warren Christopher, who was deputy attorney general of the United States under Ramsey Clark. He's another Los Angeles lawyer with the

firm of O'Melveny and Myers. That's a background on Bill. But he was a close personal friend of mine and someone who ideologically and in an amateur (as distinct from professional) sense lined up with the kind of a candidacy that Bob Kennedy was trying to develop.

GREENE: Were there other people like that who, either through you or other Kennedy associates, let it be known that they wanted to know what Kennedy was going to do before they tied themselves to either a McCarthy or Johnson slate? Because you did lose a lot of people I think you would otherwise have had in that period. . .

NOLAN: Yes, well, I'm sure there were. I'm sure the answer to that question is yes, we did lose people. Oh, yeah, unquestionably. Tom [Thomas C. Lynch], you know, the attorney general, Tom Lynch, Norb Schlei [Norbert A. Schlei]. . . [Interruption]

GREENE: All right. What about stories that you see here and there about rivalry in the preparation of the delegation? Is that accurate or not? Was there any real rivalry between you and the Unruh people in just who was going to be represented and. . .

NOLAN: Well, there were a lot of. . . . The assembly of the delegation was a negotiated thing. There's nothing right or wrong, or black or white about that in whom you're picking. Our effort was to make it representative. When I say our, I mean mine, Norris', or people who didn't have a point of view which was exactly identical with Unruh's. We weren't there trying to do anything for our friends, or no personal interest in it. We were really trying to make a better delegation in order to make a better candidacy. So we were pure in that sense. And I think, from the Unruh side, that Jesse has spent his life in politics in California and he knows a lot of people, and he knows who's his friend and who isn't his friend, with the sureness that people who are active in politics know those things. He weighed them to the last particle. And that kind of loyalty is the first law of politics. So you get some difference of interest in that sense. You know, this could be exaggerated, because Jesse Unruh is working for Bob Kennedy's candidacy, too; not only is he no nut, but he's a very, very savvy political guy. And about the general, about the overall structure of the delegation, you've no difference of opinion at all. As far as who the sixth delegate from the San Francisco area was going to be, it was those kinds of questions where there would be a difference of opinion.

GREENE: Was there anybody that he wanted that you did not? Were there specifics like that or people that he kind of insisted on that you did not want to go along with

for various reasons?

NOLAN: Well, I don't think there was anybody who was a real person that he wanted that we didn't want.

GREENE: It was hypothetical then?

NOLAN: Well, it was Jack Crose or Jack Crose's secretary, or, you know, there were those kinds of fillers on the delegation. And I think that we'd be willing to let those go by, but we would not be willing to keep off somebody who we knew to be an independent and attractive young professor from the law school at Berkeley [California] just to keep a seat warm for somebody, you know, so it could be used later in some way that you couldn't really tell, just to add flexibility. Or at any rate, that was the answer to the question, What are all these stiffies doing on the delegation? You know, to give us more flexibility. They'll get off, and we can get somebody else on right at the meetings. That's the point of doing it.

GREENE: Well, how did you finally resolve it ?

NOLAN: Well, they were all different. And again I'd like to emphasize that this is the details, rather than the overall structure.

GREENE: Did either of you have the last word, or was it a question in each instance of working out a compromise as best you could?

NOLAN: It was a question in each instance of working out a compromise. I can't recall anybody that would be suggested by Jesse who would be unacceptable to us, a real person. . . . That didn't hold true the other way. There were a lot of people that we would suggest who they had great difficulty accepting.

GREENE: What types would this be?

NOLAN: Well, generally, either one of two classes of person: either somebody who has never been involved in politics before. . .

GREENE: Like an Andy Williams?

NOLAN: Yeah. Not so much Andy Williams, though, because he was a name, but somebody like a Bob Cole [Robert Cole], who's a law professor at Berkeley with no political track record at all, but the guy who did the negotiating between the students and the administration at the time of the free speech movement, and who had been a law clerk with Norris in the court, which was ten years before Bob was running. That was one

class of person. The second class of person was someone who had been active in politics but who had not been lined up with Jesse's faction of the Democratic party.

GREENE: Were those the more difficult? I would think they would have been.

NOLAN: Oh, much more. To some extent Norris knew about these things, but I knew very little about them, you know, as to where someone was in some kind of a tug-of-war between Pat Brown [Edmund G. Brown] and Jesse back in 1962 or something like that. But they knew all. . . You know, they never forget that stuff. So those were the kinds of issues that came up. But too much could be made about that whole thing. Basically it worked out all right.

GREENE: What about legal problems? Was that major in qualifying delegates? Would you know?

NOLAN: Well, it was saved by the fortuitous circumstances referred to as the little old ladies, or whatever that group was.

GREENE: But I mean, as individual delegates, there was no real problem?

NOLAN: Well, there were a few. Who was that decathlon guy?

GREENE: Rafer Johnson?

NOLAN: Yeah. Rafer Johnson had a radio program, and after he was announced as a delegate, the station -- I think it was a CBS [Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.] took the position that he was a candidate. . .

GREENE: NBC [National Broadcasting Company]

NOLAN: Was it NBC? A candidate for political office, i.e., delegate to the Democratic National Convention, and therefore that if he had his ten-minute sports program or whatever it is, they'd have to give somebody else equal time. I don't know whether that was a real. . .

GREENE: Well, he finally resigned.

NOLAN: . . .or a spurious contention. That may have been a reason that they gave for doing something that they wanted to do anyway, was what I thought, but I don't know. We represented Rafer Johnson.

GREENE: What about. . .

NOLAN: There were some other problems. You see, going on to that delegation for the first time there were people like, well, the football player.

GREENE: Gary Beman [Deane Beman].

NOLAN: Gary who?

GREENE: Is that his name? Beman?

NOLAN: No. Gary Beman is a golfer. Gary Beban.

GREENE: That's the one, from UCLA [University of California, Los Angeles]?

NOLAN: From UCLA, yeah. Who was a very impressive guy, coming in, you know, as a young man. Thoughtful, attractive, concerned. If he never had on a football suit, he'd be a guy who would make a very good impression, a good campaigner, a great. . . I mean, he was really a very impressive guy.

Well, there were people like that. And, as, of course, critics pointed out, there were not a whole lot of them, but it was more representative in that sense. And in some cases it was because the minorities were on both delegations.

GREENE: But in philosophy there was no real disagreement then?

NOLAN: No.

GREENE: Okay. The people who you lost in the interim where Robert Kennedy was assumed not to be running, how did you finally work out getting wives of people already on Lynch slate, or the. . . Well, it wouldn't have been the Lynch slate, the Johnson slate, at that time.

NOLAN: Well, those were all special situations, and I don't even remember them now. There weren't that many of them, but there were, I don't know, three, four, half a dozen maybe? Something like that. Well, I figure it was just that while the delegation was being put together there was a considerable amount of interest on the part of people who were already locked into, I think, the Lynch delegation, really. I don't think that we had much with the McCarthy.

GREENE: No.

NOLAN: Norb Schlei was one I remember particularly because I knew him, and his wife was very active, and they were very interested, and they were around a lot. I don't remember what happened, whether she went on the delegation?

GREENE: In a number of cases, I know that's what happened. I don't remember that particular one, though. Would you have worked on that, or would that have been left up to Bill Norris or someone?

NOLAN: Well, I would have worked on it. And here it would be like other delegation questions. I would arbitrate some delegation questions or would have some particular interest in some, or somebody would. . . I could go on into a particular one, but I really didn't. . . . I was secondarily rather than directly involved. I think that if I had some suggestions to make, they'd listen to them, but there were not very many suggestions that I could make in the context of the whole delegation. . .

GREENE: Were there many people from outside that were a problem, wanting to be on the delegation or protesting those that they expected to be put on? Did you have to arbitrate in that way?

NOLAN: Not any more than you would expect, you know. No. There was quite a bit of mixed feelings in California at that time. There were people who were on the so-called Lynch delegation, the Johnson delegation. That's where the established politicians of the Democratic party were for the most part.

GREENE: Okay. What about other things that you were involved in in that first week, like money for one: where the money was going to come from, how much the family had put up, how much you'd have to raise, how much. . . .

NOLAN: Well, we just started out, mostly I guess, on the basis that the Kennedys had been in political campaigns before and they had always paid their debts -- not always 100 percent sometimes, but. . . . [Laughter] But there have never been any ultimate dissatisfactions with regard to bills. I have seen both sides of those things, and I think they came out about even. And bills tend to run up awfully fast in political campaigns. So we started out with better credit than the average political candidate does. And we got whatever we needed to go. I don't think that we passed anything up because of it. You know, if we thought it should be done, we did it.

GREENE: Was fundraising tough because it was a Kennedy running?

NOLAN: Un unh.

GREENE: No. I'd always thought that maybe people really objected since there's supposed to be almost endless money, or at least that's the public's impression.

NOLAN: Well, yeah. But that's a secondary consideration. The primary consideration is who's going to win. If you win in politics, you've got plenty of money. If you don't win, fundraising is hard. And we're talking about March of 1968. At that time, the Kennedys had run in twenty-two different primary and general elections in several states and the country, and they had won all of them. And although Bob Kennedy would not be considered a favorite running for the democratic nomination at that time, he had a lot of followers, a lot of believers, and damn few people who would count him out, you know, so the expectancy in that regard was pretty high. That's a factor in fundraising. Also there's a lot of money in California. You know, there are some real. . . Just a few people can carry you a long ways. And then Jesse knows a lot about money. He's expert in the handling of. . . . He really has good sense. He knows where to get it, how to use it, how to spend it; he's got a good sense of what's worthwhile and what isn't. There are some big fund raisers out there.

GREENE: Did you rely a lot on his judgement?

NOLAN: Well, the best answer, really, to the money question is that I was in California for a period of ten days or two weeks at the beginning of the campaign. During that time we didn't really raise any money at all. We talked about and planned for financial committees to raise money. Although we tried that disastrous. . .

GREENE: The gala?

NOLAN: No. No, that was later. No, we had a cocktail party out in a motel in North Hollywood some place. It was a real flop. The only fund raising flop I've ever seen.

GREENE: Not enough people came?

NOLAN: Well, there were a lot of people there, but they were all freebies, you know. They were all people who were working on it, and they didn't pay anything. Their wives, there were enough people there, but I don't think it raised ten-thousand dollars.

GREENE: Was abuse of spending privileges a problem that you know of, either in California or elsewhere in the campaign, people spending money more freely than they should?

NOLAN: No. Well, I think a lot of people spend more freely than they should in a campaign, but it was, I suppose, less of a problem in that campaign than in most others. Well, all of the Kennedy campaigns have been pretty responsible on that. In 1964 in New York, we had Carmine Bellino [Carmine S.

Bellino] who was the world's greatest. I mean, he's the perfect campaign treasurer. Carmine if he found you eating a sandwich at noon, he would ask you if you really had to eat the whole sandwich, if you couldn't satisfy your hunger with half a sandwich. And Carmine had a little Italian car, just big enough for him when we worked in New York. He used to drive back and forth in that car, and I think that car would go fifty-five miles on a gallon of gas.

He'd go over the advance men's expense accounts. I think he had advance men on fifteen dollars a day or something. And then he was a slow payer. Oh, God! Ninety percent of the problems in the campaign in New York, talking about internal problems-- particularly with advance because we were moving fast, or you know we had to buy spots, or something-- came from Carmine. Carmine's very, very difficult. But the overall effect is good. It's a tough job to have, one of those jobs, but it put a lot of responsibility into the campaign.

GREENE: Did you see him in California or elsewhere in the campaign in '68.

NOLAN: No, I don't think I did. Well, he was around, he was always around. He was never very visible. I didn't see him in New York either, but his decisions kept crashing around me like mortar shells or something.

GREENE: I heard he used to carry a briefcase of money and dole it out, a couple dollars here and there if people absolutely proved they had to have it. Is that right?

NOLAN: Well, he would never give up two dollars at one time. He might have given somebody one dollar. He might have given them a few coins or something. I don't recall the specific, but some of the things were just hilarious, you know, if you were far enough away from them. And the guys would just get exasperated. They'd just be spluttering some place. Carmine would just say, "I don't see why you have to be doing that, John, when we could be, you know. . . ."

GREENE: That's why they trusted him.

NOLAN: Terrible. No, I don't know of any. . . Campaigns are funny as far as money is concerned. People who have never had expense or credit cards before have them, and they have cars and. . . .

GREENE: That's why I asked, because I had heard that they really did have people that were going hog-wild and that they actually planned a shakeup after California to get rid of some of those people. But they may have not been prominent members.

NOLAN: Well, that could be true. But I think, in any--see, that was going to be the longest campaign in the world, you know. And back in March when I used to look ahead at those months, it's like looking at El Capitan from the bottom or something, you know. It just took nine long months. That's an awfully long time. And in a campaign of that length, it should be shaken up periodically, because those matters, are important: how tight your organization is, how much you look at it.

GREENE: Was it always just assumed that you would split the state north and south, or was there discussion of how it should be organized?

NOLAN: It was not assumed, I don't think, that it would be split north and south. There was a lot of discussion about it.

GREENE: Were you in on it?

NOLAN: Yeah.

GREENE: What were the pros and cons?

NOLAN: Well, it always had been split before. It seems to me that it was not split, was it? Wasn't there an overall state chairman?

GREENE: Yeah, but you also had a northern chairman and a southern.

NOLAN: Well, you would have that anyway.

GREENE: So that you had a southern coordinator and a northern coordinator and then the overall campaign manager for the state.

NOLAN: Right. Well, that, I think, was different, having the overall. . . Who was he?

GREENE: Seltzer [Art Seltzer].

NOLAN: I'm not sure of this, but I think before that there was not an overall state. Really, California was treated like two different states completely. They didn't have anything to do with each other. It was like going from Iowa into Minnesota, or something like that. And I think that the general effort was to make it more coordinated. But Seltzer, Art Seltzer, is a southern California boy. He really doesn't know much about the [San Francisco] Bay area, and I don't think he ever. . . . I never knew of him to go up there. I suppose he

did if he was the statewide campaign manager. I bet Art Seltzer did not spend one-tenth of his time in San Francisco, and I bet he did not spend five percent of his time, or effort, or you know, He was LA [Los Angeles], and LA was southern California. Jesse is very southern California oriented.

GREENE: Did that make for problems? Was it hard to put the proper emphasis in the north?

NOLAN: No, not particularly, I don't think. The way it is in the south, the votes are in the south. Most of Jesse's contacts were in the south. Jesse in 1968, it was incredible how unknown he was in northern California. I don't know what the situation is now, but people just didn't know him. Everybody in the south did.

GREENE: Any discussion of Citizens for Kennedy and how the non politicians would be brought into the campaign? Was there any disagreement on that with Unruh?

NOLAN: It didn't really get developed while I was out there. Jesse was very anticitizen group, and that '60 campaign with Braden was a sore spot. And I think it was always one of Jesse's main. . . . Well, I think that was one of the things he was concerned about, not having a full-blown, free-swinging citizens movement grow up underneath him. I think that a lot of his concern was really in that direction.

GREENE: What would you do to placate him and at the same time get the citizens groups going which you needed out there?

NOLAN: That was what we did. I'd say the last week that I was out there I spent almost all of my time doing that. And it's just an endless recitation of things. Generally going to meetings, going to a meeting of young lawyers that Quentin Kopp put together in San Francisco; going to another meeting in Los Angeles of citizens type people, again, most of them lawyers, at the Park-Sheraton Hotel. This was the function of Norris; this was the function of President Kennedy's friend who was out there. . . .

GREENE: Spalding [Charles Spalding].

NOLAN: Yeah, Chuck Spalding, Red Fay [Paul B. Fay, Jr.] in San Francisco, and so on.

GREENE: Fay was out there?

NOLAN: Yes.

GREENE: I didn't realize that. What was the attitude of Unruh

to personal friends like that? Did he just put up with them?

NOLAN: I don't think he had any particular feeling toward Red Fay. He was somewhat intolerant of Chuck Spalding because of the '60 experience. We went up to see him one time. Chuck and I flew up to Sacramento, spent an afternoon with Jesse, and he was not very easy to get along with for Chuck.

GREENE: Didn't Spalding get married in the middle of the whole thing and kind of disappear for a while?

NOLAN: He got married, yeah. But, you see, Chuck and I spent a lot of time together in, well, that last week. He came out on the plane with Bob when Bob came out to California, and then he stayed out there. He stayed up in San Francisco for a while, and then he came down to LA. We lived together, or we lived in the same motel. We stayed in a motel on Wilshire Boulevard, spent quite a bit of time together. Chuck, of course, is a real citizens type personality.

I guess the short answer to your question is, we saw a lot of people. People were always coming to us and saying, "Well, I want to do something on the campaign, but I can't work with Unruh," or, "I've got all these people." Some of them were wacky, but some of them really looked awfully good; some of them were awfully attractive. And there were invitations. You know, can you come here. . . . And there are some very, very potent political groups out there. You know, women in Beverly Hills that have a lot of dough and a lot of interest in politics and so on.

GREENE: But who didn't like Unruh?

NOLAN: Well, Unruh has his own in any group like that. If you're talking about women in Beverly Hills, there'll be a group of women in Beverly Hills that are Jesse's pals, but there'll be two or three that aren't. And so, if you come up and say, "What about the west Beverly Hills women's luncheon club? They have this terrific thing and it really sounds good. "Well, the answer is, you know, "We've got the east Beverly Hills women's club, and they're terrific, because they're. . . . Those people are all goo-goos, and they're, you know. . . ." So that was really sort of. . . .

GREENE: I think what I'm trying to get at is, did this kind of thing present a problem? You know, when you had people who didn't want to work with Unruh but wanted to work for you, and you had Unruh who didn't like some of these people, did he sort of tolerate it and look the other way, or did you really have to do a lot of mediating?

NOLAN: We had to do quite a bit I would say, in all of these things, he was generally strong, generally reasonable, and frequently could sound reasonable when he wasn't. I mean, could be unreasonable, but he would never rant or rave or anything like this. And he's also quite candid and quite direct about it. I mean, he would tell you if he didn't like somebody and why he didn't like them and so on. And I remember, we were down in Los Angeles and we sort of built up a string of these things. I think at that time we were getting into the area of appointing campaign officers: who was going to be campaign manager for Los Angeles, and so on. And we still had some of our old, unresolved problems. Steve Smith [Steven Earl Smith], for example, roaming around.

GREENE: East?

NOLAN: West.

GREENE: West.

NOLAN: And, you know, he had gotten non approved for a series of other jobs, but then when they were picking campaign managers, his name would suddenly pop up as campaign manager for Los Angeles or something like that.

GREENE: Which is what he was.

NOLAN: Is that what he was?

GREENE: Well, on this roster--and there's no date on it--he was southern staff coordinator, with Ray King in the north.

NOLAN: Oh, well, this is earlier.

GREENE: That's the only one that I could find in the "black book." I don't know if they ever even made up a later formal breakdown.

NOLAN: "Sherry Bebitch, Steve Smith, southern staff coordinator, Ray King," I remember them. "Morris Bernstein."

GREENE: These never really got off the ground, huh?

NOLAN: "Amy Talisman, Dennis Michaud." Well, I don't know. These are really all Jesse people. I mean, every one of these people right down the line is Jesse, Jesse, Jesse, Jesse, Jesse. Now, in northern California, Joe Beeman [Josiah H. Beeman], who was--whatchamacallit, the congressman. . . . Are we on?

GREENE: Yes.

NOLAN: Doesn't show?

GREENE: No, it. . .

NOLAN: Just records?

GREENE: . . .just keeps turning.

NOLAN: Oh, it's a cassette.

GREENE: Yes.

NOLAN: Congressman.

GREENE: Tunney [John V. Tunney], you mean?

NOLAN: No. From San Francisco.

GREENE: Burton [Phillip Burton]? I'm not sure. . .

NOLAN: Yeah. Phil Burton. Joe Beeman was Phil Burton's administrative assistant. Big, fat. . . .

GREENE: But how many of those people actually functioned in the roles they've got them listed there for?

NOLAN: Well, Art Seltzer functioned as campaign manager.

GREENE: But concentrated almost completely in the south?

NOLAN: Yeah. Sherry Bebitch, who is listed here as the state staff student coordinator was, I guess, that. She was Jesse's student gal. She had paired off with a guy named Dennis Michaud, who was student state chairman.

GREENE: Hmm. That sounds like a compromise of some kind.

NOLAN: But most of the students that you met when you catch a real live student--they were very anti the organization, which was represented by these people. These are Jesse's students.

GREENE: Yes.

NOLAN: And Ray King is Jesse's northern staff coordinator. Now, he did not stay there very long. He's my mistake. I agreed to pick him but he moved on fairly early in the campaign.

GREENE: Did anyone really replace him?

NOLAN: Well, John Seigenthaler took over the campaign. . .

GREENE: Right. Much later.

NOLAN: . . .in the north, and he ran it for about the last month or six weeks of the thing. So, without regard to what the numbers were, or the titles or anything, John Seigenthaler ran the campaign in northern California.

GREENE: Did you anticipate in the beginning that towards the end the Kennedy people would come out--the real Kennedy people like Seigenthaler--or was that sort of a desperate effort after it didn't look so good?

NOLAN: Oh, no. We always anticipated that they'd come out. I mean California was a big deal.

GREENE: Did Unruh know that this would happen, that the Kennedy people would be coming in and, to some extent, usurping his authority? Did you ever discuss that?

NOLAN: Oh, yeah. He was never that way about it. I mean, he wanted more. He didn't want Californians in those positions.

GREENE: But the outside. . .

NOLAN: But he really didn't have any objection to any of the outsiders, as long as they were competent, you know, and practically all of them were.

GREENE: Right.

NOLAN: So we never had any problem that way with him. He didn't want you to take some guy who had been Pat Brown's man in such-and-such an assembly district and make him a big wheel in the campaign, for obvious reasons. But he didn't care if John Seigenthaler came out and ran it. That was fine, and if Seigenthaler could run it better than somebody else could, he was all for that. That was great.

GREENE: Do you know of any commitments that were given to Unruh by anyone on anything? Anything specific?

NOLAN: What kind of commitments?

GREENE: Well, things that he understood, particularly if Robert Kennedy won the nomination, benefits he might reap?

NOLAN: No.

GREENE: No deals of any kind?

NOLAN: No.

GREENE: Would O'Donnell [P. Kenneth O'Donnell], do you think, have been the one that would have been talking to Unruh about stuff like that?

NOLAN: Kenny?

GREENE: Yes. I think they were pretty close.

NOLAN: They were very close, yeah. No, I would not be inclined to think that there was much in that line. I mean, it was a very, very close relationship, but between very, very sophisticated people, and the prelude to it involved Jesse wanting Bob Kennedy to run in California when he was the active, seeking. . . . You know, the direction, the urging that was going in was all Jesse urging Bob to come in and run. There was nothing going the other way. And Bob Kennedy was not an easy person to deal with on that score. You know, there are not very many people, and nobody who knew him well, who would think of coming up to Bob Kennedy and saying, "Hey now, if you get to be president, can I be secretary of commerce?" or something like that.

GREENE: That's interesting, because Willie Morris, the editor of Harper's [Magazine], said on the David Frost Show the other night that Robert Kennedy told him that if he was elected, he'd make Bill Moyers [Bill D. Moyers] his secretary of state. And I thought that sounded like the most out of character remark. I just couldn't imagine Robert Kennedy saying that to anyone, not to mention to a newspaper editor, or magazine editor.

NOLAN: Yeah. I don't think that's the kind of a thing you take literally, really. I mean you don't take it literally. He might have said it.

GREENE: He stated it as if it were literal, but. . .

NOLAN: Yeah. No. It's not literal.

GREENE: Just sort of a compliment to Moyers, perhaps?

NOLAN: Yeah, right. Right, right. He might have said it, but he would never have said it in the sense that it would be taken literally. Things don't work that way.

GREENE: Were you still in California at the time of Robert Kennedy's first trip?

NOLAN: Yeah.

GREENE: Did you set up his political appointments and stuff like that for him? What were you doing in the way of preparation?

[END TAPE I SIDE I]
[START TAPE I SIDE II]

NOLAN: Where were we?

GREENE: We were talking about the first trip to California and contacts you said you were worried about.

NOLAN: Oh, yeah. I was concerned about San Francisco because there was no leadership there that seemed reliable. There was Burton and Willie Brown and there were a number of people, but nothing that had really very much strength to it, and it seemed to me that there was a lot more strength in the non professional side of the Democratic party in northern California. There were three or four people who were regarded as clean and attractive by the pols and by people in general. Bill Orrick [William H. Orrick, Jr.] was one. I knew him, and I talked to him about it--he was very tied up in his law practice and so on--and I was very interested in getting him into the campaign.

GREENE: He finally did come in.

NOLAN: Yeah, although not on a really active basis, I don't think. He would basically do what Bob asked him to do, but he had mixed feelings about. . . .

GREENE: Mixed feelings because of the press of duties, or mixed feelings about his candidacy?

NOLAN: No. No mixed feelings about his candidacy at all. But Orrick is very busy and involved in a lot of things. He's very public spirited and civic, and he has a very busy practice, and so on. So I talked to Bob about that, got him to call from Los Angeles, got him to call some other people, too. I didn't schedule that trip, Jerry Bruno [Gerald J. Bruno] did.

GREENE: Were they reasonably satisfied with the way it turned out?

NOLAN: Oh, yeah. It was a smash. Oh, yeah. Terrific.

GREENE: Do you remember criticism--there was quite a bit; I don't know how close you were to it--of Robert Kennedy at this point for being almost demagogic?

NOLAN: Yes.

GREENE: Was this something you felt, too, and discussed with him?

NOLAN: Yeah, I think so. But I think everybody did. That's one of the campaign sign waves, you know. Things go up and down, and they differ; nearly everybody is saying the same thing; there's a change, and everybody's saying something else.

GREENE: He seemed to go along with that, do you think? He felt that way, too?

NOLAN: Yeah, I think so. I think he was tight, tense, at the beginning of the campaign, and maybe less so from the time of that trip to California on. But that helter-skelter bash around the country--Kansas, Tennessee, and so on--and all the schools, talking to the kids, was probably more subjective than. . . . It was probably done more for inner reasons than for real value in terms of the political campaign.

He had a great urge to be doing something. He wanted to go to schools because that's where the kids were and that's where one of his great interests was. He did well there. He wanted to be critical of Johnson because he really thought Johnson was, you know, a very bad president. And so, in that week or so, and then carrying on into California, it was still that same kind of a campaign. In other words, he was saying things not because they were the things that were the best judgement of what should be said politically, but because he felt like saying them. And it came on pretty strong. But he's been holding the stuff back for two years.

GREENE: You must have left California then shortly after that trip. Is that right? Is there anything else that you remember about the period before you did leave?

NOLAN: I think I left California about five days. . . . I think that trip was over a weekend, and then, on the following Thursday or Friday, Steve came out, and we spent the day together. I was going to leave the following morning. and then I thought, "What the hell? I've been out there for a long time," and I just left, caught a plane at midnight. I think Steve came out in the morning, got there about eleven o'clock, and went to the Beverly Wilshire [Hotel]. No, we went to the place where the Coconut Grove is, where Bob was shot.

GREENE: The Ambassador?

NOLAN: The Ambassador Hotel. We spent the day talking, you

know, about what he should do, what Steve should do.

GREENE: What do you remember about that discussion? What were the things you felt Smith should be doing?

NOLAN: What were the things that I felt Smith should be doing?

GREENE: Well, you say you were talking about what you felt Smith should be doing.

NOLAN: Yeah. With Smith. Bob wasn't there.

GREENE: What kinds of things were you recommending?

NOLAN: Oh. Well, the thing about Jesse, really--I mean, getting the feel of that--and then making a campaign for those who would not reach it through Jesse's organization. That was, I suppose, the bulk of the talk. And then, us going over personalities, in the sense of campaign responsibilities; in a general way going over scheduling for the campaign; going over our recent meetings with Jesse; and questions that were, you know, pending at that time. People who were at that meeting were Steve's secretary . . .

GREENE: Pauline Fluet?

NOLAN: . . . Pauline Fluet, Chuck Spalding, Ray [Raymond O'Connell] . . .

GREENE: King?

NOLAN: No. Friend of Steve's from New York--O'Connell. Norris was there part of the time.

GREENE: Was there general agreement about what had to be done?

NOLAN: Seemed to be, yeah.

GREENE: Okay, then, if . . .

NOLAN: Steve, of course, has a lot of ideas of his own about campaigns. I mean, that's really his bag. He's very, very good at that. He doesn't talk about it a lot; I mean, he's never going to write a book on how to run a political campaign or anything, but he has instinctively the right judgment about problems and issues; and he has an instinctive feel for it --I mean, his great economy of his efforts and so on. He's great for getting into a headquarters, setting up a headquarters where he's always there. You know, he believes that you run campaigns from a central headquarters some place where you're available to everybody; you sit there with your feet on the desk and people come to you, and they can see you, and they always know that

you're there. That works out very well where it's successful. He was very eager to get that set up in California. Well, see I left then. He did. [Interruption] Getting into the headquarters in Los Angeles and establishing a desk there, for himself first, and then for somebody who would come in after him; so he would be retired out.

GREENE: How long did he stay out that first trip?

NOLAN: A week or two, I think.

GREENE: Of course you weren't there, but maybe you know anyway. Did it have any measurable effect on the way things developed after that?

NOLAN: Oh, yeah. It's bound to. It's bound to, because he was good. He's very authoritative, and he knows what he's doing. He's got a lot of clout. He's very decisive.

GREENE: Did he work fairly well with Unruh?

NOLAN: Yeah. He really works well with everybody, not by necessarily being nice to them. You know, he was very outspoken, but he has good relations with everybody.

GREENE: All right. Then you came back here, I assume? Is that right? This would be in, now, I guess we're talking about the end of March.

NOLAN: The notes from my meeting with Steve. It says, "Notes for Steve, 3/27; delegation; campaign staff; headquarters; campaign organization; meeting with Art to review campaign"--I think Seltzer came over that day too, to the Ambassador--"registration, check on current status, get UAW [United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America] money for registration; black leader arrangement with them; campaign materials; call Seltzer."

GREENE: What was involved in the UAW thing, working with what's his name, the fellow that was shot?

NOLAN: It would've been Schrade [Paul Schrade].

GREENE: Schrade. Paul Schrade.

NOLAN: Yeah, but I . . .

GREENE: You didn't handle that?

NOLAN: Well, I didn't do very much about it. I don't remember much about it.

GREENE: Did they put up most of the funds for the registration drive?

NOLAN: Yeah.

GREENE: And what about the black leaders business you just read? Who handled that? And what really were you talking about with . . .

NOLAN: Talking about the situation in Los Angeles which involved a guy named Merv Dymally [Mervyn M. Dymally], who was in some posture of outrage at the moment--I've forgotten just why--but he was going to do something, back off, or put out a statement saying that Bob Kennedy was a fink, or something like that. And so it was a question of how Dymally should be handled. He was viewed with something less than 100 percent credibility by Jesse and Frank Burns and other people.

GREENE: Where did he come from?

NOLAN: Dymally?

GREENE: Yeah, why was he . . .

NOLAN: He's a ward leader in Los Angeles, some black section of Los Angeles. He may not be there any more. But he had had some. . . .He's not a particularly idealistic politician. He represents that he has some strength in the black community, had some strength in the black community.

GREENE: Was there ever any discussion that you know of of funds to be used in the black community, and how they would be used? I know when Walter Sheridan got out there there was already quite a bit of pressure on him to use influence to hold onto the blacks.

NOLAN: Dymally was interested in funds. And whether he was interested in anything else, I don't know. He would answer that question in the negative. I think I saw him once or something. You know, he'd come out in the middle of the afternoon in the International Hotel when he had demands or something. I think he was a state senator, wasn't he?

GREENE: I don't remember. The name I know I've heard, but I don't remember what his exact position was.

NOLAN: Well, I remember his name, and there were some others like that.

GREENE: Well, later they got involved with a lot of more militant people, I think . . .

NOLAN: Yes.

GREENE: sort of on the fringes.

NOLAN: Norris's guy on the black community side was the fellow who was Tom [Thomas Bradley]--the guy who ran for mayor against Yorty [Samuel W. Yorty] and, you know, almost won, and was supposed to be winning, but lost at the last minute. It was a big upset.

GREENE: It begins with "B".

NOLAN: Bradley.

GREENE: Bradley. I wanted to say Braden, but Bradley, that's right. Tom Bradley.

NOLAN: And he was around, but he was a very upstanding sort of

GREENE: All right. Then, at what point did you get involved in the scheduling? As it ended up, it seemed like it was you and Dolan [Joseph F. Dolan] doing . . .

NOLAN: At the Ambassador that day, Steve . . . We went into the bedroom to talk, and he said that they had been having some difficulty with scheduling, and Joe was trying to do it and he was trying to do some other things at the same time, and it wasn't working out very well. He knew that it was a hell of a thing to ask, because he'd. . . . And I had worked for him, with him, in New York in 1964; and it really it is, it's terrible. I mean, maybe there's somebody who could do that and like it, but it's not the easiest job in the campaign.

GREENE: No.

NOLAN: And so he came into it very slowly and cautiously, you know, in California, but he said it would. . . . You know, he said, "I don't know how much time we have." And I said I thought I could get away. He said, "I have to get back, but could you talk to Teddy [Edward M. Kennedy] about it when you get back? If you can do anything, ask him." So I don't remember what I said. I was basically willing to do anything in the campaign, but scheduling.

GREENE: Why is that anathema?

NOLAN: It's very difficult. It's an understatement to say it's hard to please everybody. It's hard to please enough people continuously so that you can even. . . . And I don't know why it is. You know, I don't think it really

necessarily has to be. I think if you can idealize some of the conditions, you can probably schedule a lot. But it's a very, very high pressure point because almost everything is less limited than the candidate's time. If that's the basic commodity that you're working with, it is very, very limited--more limited than anything else--and the demands on him are absolutely unlimited. And then the demands vary greatly in the force with which they're asserted and the force with which they're received. You know, some things you have to do even though it doesn't make very good sense at the time. And then, the candidate is human too. The problems that he had in New York involved either underscheduling or overscheduling him.

GREENE: In the beginning, wasn't it?

NOLAN: Well, yeah, but generally all the way through. The crowds were heavier than we expected, and he would play with the crowds more than anybody. So he was always fighting. Maybe it was worse in the beginning, but it extended all the way through.

There are some other problems. There are some things that are indirectly involved with scheduling that are very, very high priority that frequently don't go through scheduling. Television, for example, which is a hell of a problem in New York. So something would come up, and when it would come up, it would have an absolutely eighteen karat, grade A priority. You know, television and stuff has a way of getting itself into that fix. You know? We just spent seventy-five thousand dollars for spots and we don't have anything to go in there, and if you don't cut it tomorrow morning at eight o'clock, you know, you've thrown all that away. So, you cut it tomorrow morning at eight o'clock, you know, you've thrown all that away. So, you cut it tomorrow morning at eight o'clock, even if you're scheduled to be in Schenectady or something, or if it's your first day off in six days.

So, the days off always filled up, and there weren't worked days off; in effect we worked every day and every night. He kept calling. I mean, he had his own physical engine to regulate you. So your scheduling, you have to keep all of these variables, some of which you can control. But really the more important ones, which you can't control. I mean, there are a lot of things about the candidates you can't control. I mean, you can't control the television stuff either, because it's too important. You can get into imperatives, which you just do.

GREENE: Talking about television, did that play a big part in your overall scheduling, particularly when you were on the West coast, scheduling things that would be suitable and ready in time to go back east for the eastern market?

NOLAN: No, it didn't then. It didn't then. It came to play a part in scheduling later, say during Indiana or something, but it was nothing like it was in New York, because there was just more time. New York was more condensed into a very short period of time.

GREENE: I have a bunch of sort of general questions on scheduling that maybe this would be a good time to go into. As specifics occur to you about the campaign, referring to the questions, maybe you could bring that in. Well, you've described some of the major problems. Who has to be brought into this whole process besides the candidate--you know, like local politicians, police, local people, this kind of thing? When you're starting out?

NOLAN: Well, the local police don't have to be brought into the scheduling, but the local politicians certainly do.

GREENE: How do you balance these forces?

NOLAN: Well, that's why it's a tough job. That's why it's a tough job. You just do it by finding out as much as you can about it and using your best judgement, and then taking the heat afterwards.

GREENE: What about the advance men? Were they ever a problem, particularly Bruno?

NOLAN: Not really. Bruno's a good advance man. The way the scheduling actually worked, after I came back, Ted called me and he talked to me about scheduling. By that time I had had some chance to think about it, and I said that I would work on scheduling if Joe stayed with us, for two reasons: I didn't want to replace Joe, number one, although he said that was fine. I couldn't understand. . . .

GREENE: He meant it was fine if you didn't replace Joe?

NOLAN: No, that Joe would have been agreeable to my replacing him.

GREENE: Oh. He didn't like it either?

NOLAN: He didn't like it either. And it wasn't that anybody thought I did it so well; it was just that they couldn't get anybody else to do it, and they thought that I hadn't done it as recently as he had, so I was more favorably looked on, you know, in that regard. No doubt that if our roles had been reversed, they would have been trying to get Joe to replace me. But I didn't want to do that, personally. The other thing was, I didn't want to take off. . . .

GREENE: Okay. What about clearance and acceptability to the candidate, and who else was involved in clearing the schedules? Who looked them over and decided?

NOLAN: Fred Dutton.

GREENE: Was this a problem? Did he frequently object?

NOLAN: No. Part of the problem was you're dealing with someone who is working, twenty-one hours a day, in the air, in motorcades, in motels, who is making many more decisions than the candidate is; he's reading all the speeches. . . . And then Dutton was everybody's all-everything, you know. I mean, he was no Kenny o'Donnell. Kenny O'Donnell handled all of that for President Kennedy--the schedules, you know--but he didn't have anything to do with the speeches. Dutton had both. And Dutton dealt with everybody who was important in the campaign, from one end of the spectrum to the other, and he was, you know, as acceptable to Pat Brown or Jesse Unruh, as he was to Adam Walinsky.

GREENE: Why did he have to clear things like schedules? Wasn't there some other way that it could work so that. . .

NOLAN: Talk to the candidate. But. . .

GREENE: He didn't make the decisions independently, then? He'd just take them to Robert Kennedy?

NOLAN: Well, I don't know. He took some, or made some himself. I can't conceive of there being a difference. If you talked to Fred, you were talking to Bob. And we never had an instance of anything getting unwrapped. So the only problem in dealing with Fred was getting a hold of him. And he was very, very good about that. And under the circumstances I don't think it could have been any better. I had a very good relationship with him.

GREENE: To what extent did what you were scheduling come from the Washington headquarters? How closely did you have to work with them?

NOLAN: We were the Washington headquarters. See, this was after I came back. I didn't schedule in California.

GREENE: And you didn't go out to Indiana next?

NOLAN: No. No, Joe Dolan went out to Indiana, Joe and Jerry. And so, during the Indiana campaign, when the candidate spent maybe eighty percent of his time, or ninety percent, most of the time in Indiana, all of the scheduling for

Indiana was done out there.

GREENE: Right. And you weren't out there, right?

NOLAN: No. And then after Indiana, I went to Oregon.

GREENE: Were you in Nebraska, too, for a little while?

NOLAN: No.

GREENE: Oh, I thought you were.

NOLAN: Scheduled Nebraska from Washington. We scheduled the other primary states, South Dakota, Nebraska, Oregon, and California, although after the others sort of cleared away, the group from Indiana went out to California.

GREENE: Oh, I see.

NOLAN: So I scheduled California for maybe two or three trips while the others were going on, and then everybody sort of moved out there, but we didn't; we stayed here in Washington.

GREENE: Were there added difficulties trying to schedule from Washington, or was it more complicated when you were in the field and had to deal with people on a person-to-person basis?

NOLAN: Well, I didn't do the other. I think it's probably easier to do from here.

GREENE: Okay. Were there particular people who were a problem to you because they were making demands, and would give inconsistent advice, or anybody that got in the way?

NOLAN: Everybody always makes demands, everybody always gives conflicting advice. That's the glory of the job, the wonder of it.

GREENE: There was nobody who was especially difficult?

NOLAN: If there's anybody in particular you want to ask me, come at me. You don't want my pet peeves. . .

GREENE: Sure I do.

NOLAN: . . .cranked into your recorder.

GREENE: Of course.

NOLAN: No, I don't think of anybody in particular. Basically,

everybody's objectionable.

GREENE: Okay. What about the problem of knowing what the candidate wants to do, and how much attention did you pay to what he wanted to do? And how much did you have to work independently of his wishes?

NOLAN: Well, I'm not trying to duck the question, but it's hard to answer that. You have to know the candidate very well to schedule him. You have to be in close touch almost daily touch, with the candidate or with somebody who is the equivalent of the candidate.

GREENE: Which would be Dutton?

NOLAN: Which would be Dutton. And, as I say, that was perfect. I never had any understanding with Fred which was later changed by Bob. So that worked out all right. And both of those are essential. That's why everybody can't schedule. There are people, you know, who might have many other qualifications with scheduling, but if they don't know the candidate that well, you really can't do it. I don't think I had any problems of the candidate saying, "My God, what have you done? I'm not going to go there."

GREENE: What were his preferences, you know, in terms of the kinds of appearances he liked best and wanted to do the most of? And things he wanted to avoid?

NOLAN: He liked kids, and he liked black people, and he liked Indians, and he liked crowds--crowds most of all. He really liked crowds.

GREENE: Most candidates do.

NOLAN: If you get enough people there, he really didn't care what kind of people they were. He didn't even care if they were voters, you know, if they were people.

GREENE: Joe Dolan said something about, at the end they were looking for ten thousand mature adults of voting age before 8:00 a.m., crowds of over ten thousand. That's what it got down to.

NOLAN: Did you interview Joe?

GREENE: Larry [Larry J. Hackman] did. That was his description of the desperation of your situation. Anyway, how much did you try to follow this? Was that a primary guideline, what he wanted to do?

NOLAN: No. No, I don't think so. No, it wasn't. What he

wanted to do was win the election. If the way to win the election was to go off and commune with nature in the wilds of the Gobi Desert, he'd do that. And he was not difficult to handle on that score. And you know, if you'd demonstrate to him that it was related to winning the election, that would satisfy the burden of proof. In terms of what he liked to do, he liked to go with the groups of people I've already mentioned; that he liked crowds, first of all, and that he liked young people. He got a lot out of crowds and young people.

GREENE: And what about things that he didn't like, such as political appearances and businessmen's luncheons? Did you try to space these so that they wouldn't become a burden, or did you just do them as you had to?

NOLAN: Well, we did much less of them. Things like businessmen's luncheons, we didn't do. . . . Except for certain kinds of things: the economic club in Detroit or something like that, or a couple of those big prestigious California forums. But as far as bar associations and Kiwanis clubs and things like that, not only did he not like to do them, but he was terrible at them. He was really awful. And so his argument there was not, "I don't like to do these and therefore we shouldn't do them," but, "I'm really not any good at those." And he wasn't, and he really just really couldn't come across in that kind of environment. and then, somehow it just sort of wasn't his thing. I mean different people have different approaches to political leadership. And it was Lyndon Johnson's thing. Lyndon Johnson wanted to get with the movers and the shakers, get with the men with power. Bob Kennedy never did. He didn't feel comfortable around them, and he really didn't. . . . He somehow always went the other way. I can't conceive of Bob Kennedy, for example, speaking to a medical society. I saw him speak to a couple of bar associations and, believe me, it was really grim. He just didn't relate to those people. Somehow he felt that what they were doing wasn't very important, and that impression was conveyed.

GREENE: What about political gatherings? Were they. . .

NOLAN: Well, he went to a lot of political gatherings. He went to a hell of a lot of them in New York, a lot of county dinners and so on. He didn't like them very much, but we kept sending him to them. Very rarely was. . . . Justin's [Justin Feldman] idea was that he would ingratiate himself with county chairmen by going to their dinners. They would plan a big dinner, he'd speak to them, and then they'd get out and work for him, and so on. And he went to a lot of dinners. I don't know how well it worked, but I know he won the election. I don't know whether he won because. . . He didn't like it at all. And when they would find out. . . .

You know, take Wannabaga County or something, a mythical county in upper New York state. They were going to have a county chairman's dinner. The people come to the dinner, and then they each pay ten dollars or something, and then you've got a slush fund for the campaign. So if he works hard as hell at it, and beats people over the head, and gets a bunch of girls on the telephone the week before, you get a hundred fifty people out to the dinner. Then Bob Kennedy accepts an invitation to speak at the dinner. So, immediately he's got four thousand people that sign up that want to come--and this is New York, 1964. So he schedules three different dinners--I'm not making this up; this is what happened in more than one county--and then he leads the candidates from one to the other. And, you know, that's just terrible; it's awful. So he gets a lot of money out of it. But Bob really objected to that; it makes you feel terrible. The food's so bad.

GREENE: Did you consider security very much in scheduling? Were you concerned about that?

NOLAN: No, not in the sense of somebody shooting him. Security in the sense of much of, much of what he did was dangerous, and a lot of it, almost all of it, was very, very, very tough physically--long hours, and the crowds would just tear him apart, you know. On several occasions when he couldn't get through the crowd, he'd get passed over the heads on the hands of the crowd back to the car and then dumped head first into the car. This happened in New York. It happened in 1968 also. So that kind of security we thought about.

GREENE: But in terms of working with local police and things like that, that wasn't your domain?

NOLAN: Well, it was.

GREENE: Generally were they cooperative?

NOLAN: Yeah.

GREENE: What about Los Angeles and Yorty?

NOLAN: I didn't work with them. I think they were all right. I think they were all right. That gut who had been the chief out there was a good friend of Bob's, Chief of Police Parker [William H. Parker] in Los Angeles. He's dead now, but I don't remember. . . Was he alive then?

GREENE: Yes, I think so.

NOLAN: Well, he was a great pal. I don't think we ever had any problems, did we, with the Los Angeles Police

Department?

GREENE: I think you did. I don't think it came from the police chief, I think it came from Yorty. At the end especially, as I understand it, they refused to give protection, and you had to hire private security forces during the last part of the California campaign.

NOLAN: Yeah. When I said that I got into that, I really didn't so much in 1968, in the scheduling. I'd done a lot of that, but when I think more, in working on his advance, I'd arrange trips, and so on.

GREENE: Okay. As far as the division of the responsibility, did you schedule the overall picture and Dolan was doing a specific state? Is that the way it broke down, or was it more that you just divided up the states?

NOLAN: When I first agreed to work on scheduling, we left it open. I said, "I'll do it if Joe says on, and we can work on it together, because I'm not going to be able to do it full time, because, you know, I've got responsibilities to clients and my partners, and I'm going to have to be back at the firm." So that was the understanding that I had with Ted Kennedy, and Ted talked to Joe about it on that basis. Joe and I talked about it at first, just in the context of Joe getting away. He'd been doing it then for about two weeks straight or something, and was really ready for a basket. So he went off some place--I think he went out to Denver for five days or something like that, at the beginning of the campaign--and when he came back, Indiana was just starting. And I think it was Jerry Bruno's idea that Joe go out, that they mod a scheduling and advance operation out to Indiana. He would take care of the advance, and Joe would take care of the scheduling. At any rate, it was Jerry that came to me about it and said, "What do you think of this?" And I said, "I think it's terrific. I think it's great! Do it. Fine." So that was the start of it, and I think it worked out fairly well out there. I think the scheduling and advance went all right. It was kind of tough on Jerry, and it was kind of tough on Joe, but as far as an operation was concerned, it worked all right. And it worked fine from the standpoint of all of the rest of the campaign. The rest of the campaign being that we would block out a certain period of time for Indiana, which was most of the time. And then the rest of the time. . . . I think Ted Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen], in the beginning, had done a master schedule, March through June or something, through the primary or something like that. At any rate, using something like that as a draft, I worded out with Ted, a fill-in on that: two days in Michigan, and then back to Indiana, and then a three-day sweep to California, and then back to Indiana, and that sort of thing. Well, everything that wasn't Indiana, we scheduled from here.

Those schedules are around are around; I don't. . .

GREENE: We have a copy of the schedules, yes.

NOLAN: Yeah. You can see how it worked.

GREENE: Did you have an overall aim in this period? Was it to touch as many places as possible and see as many people as possible? Was there a general. . . .

NOLAN: You have several aims. That's really a pretty big question. You're running for the presidency, so you want to look national and be national. At the same time, for various reasons, certain places get more emphasis because they're, you know. . . . Indiana got a lot of emphasis because it was very, very important. So you accommodate those main considerations. So then you decide how much time you're going to spend in Indiana, and how you're going to spend, in a broad way. . . . You know, you decide that you have to spend, or you should spend, three days in California in the first part of May, or something like that. Then you find the three days and sort of fill in around.

Then you know that you're going to be in California on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday. And maybe you're going there for a particular event--maybe a gala or something, you know, that you've agreed with Steve that. . . . Steve will call up and say, "I need one date in California. When is it? Make sure I've got it." So some things you get into that way, kind of back in. You pull all these things together. You're going to be out there then. Then you call Art Seltzer, Jesse, or whoever, and say, "We're coming out on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday of the week after next, three days; one of them in the south for this, the rest of the time, what do you think we should do with the rest of it?" And you do that with about six other people. They're all different, and then, you know, you sort it all out. I went out to California a couple of times, met Seltzer, worked on schedules.

GREENE: Was there any basic disagreement as far as how much time should be spent in the primary states versus the other states, or time given to different geographical areas; or was this simply logic?

NOLAN: It ain't logic, that's for sure, but I don't think there was any big disagreement about it--I mean, nothing compared to some of the things we had in New York in 1964. It was Sorensen's judgement initially and his draft, and then I worked it out with him from there, and then we went with it and it was. . .

GREENE: Did you do a lot of revising along the way, or did you

stick pretty much to what you had originally planned?

NOLAN: We stuck pretty much to the overall. It's not hard to stick to an overall. We did alot of revising within it.

GREENE: Okay.

NOLAN: What happened: we decided we were going to be three days in California in the first half of the month; we were there for those three days. But how, where we spent those three days in California was subject to a lot of revision and shifting and tugging and pulling and last-minute changes.

GREENE: Do you make permanent enemies that way or just temporary ones? I mean, is there real hostility created?

NOLAN: No. I don't think you make permanent enemies. A lot of people that I worked with in New York had very strong opinions about the way that scheduling operations was conducted. I've never had any further contact with them, you know, but. . . .

GREENE: That's sounds kind of Do you remember anything specific about the Johnson withdrawal and your activities after that for the next couple of days?