

**James Terry Sanford History Interview – JFK#1, 7/27/1970**  
**Administrative Information**

**Creator:** James Terry Sanford

**Interviewer:** Ann M. Campbell

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**Biographical Note**

James Terry Sanford (1917-1998) was the Governor of North Carolina from 1961 to 1965. This interview focuses on the 1960 Democratic National Convention, the 1960 gubernatorial and presidential campaigns in North Carolina, and John F. Kennedy's issues with winning support from Southern Democrats, among other topics.

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
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Terry Sanford

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Oral History Interview

with

TERRY SANFORD

July 27, 1970  
Durham, North Carolina

By Ann M. Campbell

For the John F. Kennedy Library

CAMPBELL: Maybe we could begin by my asking if you recall when you first met John Kennedy and what your impressions were at that time.

SANFORD: I'm not sure that I met John Kennedy in 1956 at the [Democratic National] Convention. I saw him. He came over and addressed our delegation. The only real enthusiastic supporter that he had then was a young lady from my hometown, as a matter of fact, of Laurinburg, a Mrs. [Gaston] McBryde, who was a very active and very fine political worker. She was extremely enthusiastic for Senator Kennedy at that Convention. She brought him over and I probably shook his hands, but the impression at that time was not much different from what I already thought of him which was, I must say, a favorable impression from what I'd read in the papers. But I didn't make any real effort to get to know him.

The next time I saw him was a couple of years later when he came to Charlotte to address a Chamber of Commerce annual meeting and brought Mrs. [Jacqueline Bouvier] Kennedy with him. The then publisher of the Charlotte News was apparently the chairman of the Chamber of Commerce. He called me and he said that Senator Kennedy was coming. He had promised him to get as many delegates as possible to meet him at a little party afterwards, and he wasn't having much success, and would I do him a favor and come. Well, I was thinking about running for governor, and I certainly wanted the support of the Charlotte News. So I did go. I was about the only delegate there from '56. But I was very much impressed--as soon as Kennedy zeroed in on the fact that I had been a delegate and probably would be a delegate again, you could feel the attention that he immediately gave me in a crowded room of Chamber of Commerce people, who obviously didn't mean anything to him in the political sense. He made a right good speech, and I was much impressed with the fact that he was doing this, it struck me, in a professional way of not just dashing around the country making speeches but was attempting to organize his politics as he went.

He did indicate to me then that he--well, he said in so many words that he was a serious candidate. I'm not sure that I thought he was prior to that or that he was quite ready or that I would have put him in the category. At any rate, I was very much impressed with him. And I think that's the first time I had any conversation with him.

He then came back to speak to a Young Democratic meeting at the invitation of Henry Wilson, who later worked in the White House. Henry was one of my close associates. We had some longer but still very much generalized conversations with him then, though it was becoming apparent that he meant to go.

CAMPBELL: May I just take you back to 1956? I think your delegation voted first ballot vice presidential votes for Governor [Luther H.] Hodges or Governor-elect Hodges at that time.

SANFORD: Oh, he was Governor because he had succeeded as Lieutenant Governor.

CAMPBELL: Oh, that's right, for the two-year term. Then you passed on the second ballot, and I believe, at the end of the voting of that ballot, cast most of your votes for John Kennedy. Do you recall what the attitude of the delegation was toward the then-Senator Kennedy?

SANFORD: Yes. As a matter of fact, an old gentleman, a friend of mine from my hometown, named Judge [James] MacRae went as my alternate. Since I'd only been in Fayetteville for six or seven years and he'd been a lifetime resident, it probably ought to have been the reverse. But I got myself elected as the delegate, and he got elected as the alternate. He asked me if he could be on the floor when the voting for the vice president took place. At the time he asked, he thought that surely [Adlai E.] Stevenson would designate somebody and he wanted his chance to be on the floor. I thought it would be great. So I said yes. I wasn't actually involved in the voting. He voted for [Estes] Kefauver. And I had told him that I would have voted for Kefauver.

I judged at the time that Senator [Sam J.] Ervin and the other people who supported Senator Kennedy did so as an anti-Kefauver vote and not at all as a pro-Kennedy vote. Later events in 1960, when I was supporting Kennedy, indicated the truth of that. They were never really for Kennedy. They simply saw this as a way of knocking down Kefauver, whom they considered a traitor to the South. That's not much in detail.

Interestingly enough, Senator Ervin, I believe, ended up voting for Senator Kennedy, but really was for Hubert Humphrey, which is another very amusing thing. He'd made a right impassioned plea on behalf of Humphrey in the caucus. And then two or three of the old guard reminded him of 1948, and he lost his nerve. But he was very much for him and had made the point that there was no more able senator in Washington, which was probably true. I think he did end up voting for Kennedy. And then one or two other people got votes: [Albert] Gore got a vote or two; Hubert Humphrey got a vote or two, and maybe somebody else. I was watching that part of it on television.

CAMPBELL: Well, you've mentioned the '58 Kennedy visit to Charlotte and then the Young Democrats meeting with Henry Hall Wilson. Was there anyone within the state in this period of time, '58 and '59, that was working for John Kennedy's candidacy? Do you recall any contacts?

SANFORD: I don't really recall anybody that was working for him. Mrs. McBryde mentioned him to me two or three times. Later, Judge [H.L., Jr.] Riddle of Morganton became his strongest supporter. But that was not until 1960.



CAMPBELL: That was early 1960.

SANFORD: Well, it was sometime during the spring of 1960. He had known some of the people in Ethel [Skakel] Kennedy's family, who had a plant at Morganton. And that probably was the first way he made that contact.

CAMPBELL: Was he in contact with you in early 1960?

SANFORD: Well, in all fairness, Judge Riddle is a great old friend, but he's not really a person of much influence. He would not have been the person that you would have picked to head up your campaign. And I thought it was a good indication of John Kennedy's ability to size up people because it didn't take him long to know that Riddle really wasn't his key man. I think he, Riddle, most of all wanted a job in the White House. And Kennedy dismissed that out of hand, in a gracious way. He made him the marshal of the Inaugural parade. When I told him that he wanted to work in the White House, he said, "Well, we've already done all we can do for him." But Riddle does assert, and with some justification, that he was the first real Kennedy supporter. I've always publicly acknowledged that he was and I think this is accurate. Though I don't think he really picked up much support.

CAMPBELL: What was your feeling about the potential presidential candidates in early 1960? By that time you were a candidate also.

SANFORD: I was a candidate and preoccupied with that. I felt that we could take these other things as we came to them. I was very careful to not position myself. I thought a lot of--still do--of Stuart Symington. At that time he looked like he might be a candidate. I thought a lot of Hubert Humphrey, but not in a personal way. I don't know that I had ever met him. But I admired him from a distance. I'm not sure that I ever thought Hubert Humphrey was strong enough to be President. But at the same time, I'm sure I didn't rule him out. Kefauver was probably dead by then.

CAMPBELL: No. He was alive, but I think not much of a factor in 1960. Of course, Lyndon Johnson was . . .

SANFORD: Now, Lyndon Johnson, I knew fairly well because I'd been Kerr Scott's campaign manager for the U.S. Senate. Lyndon Johnson was the only one I knew. I really didn't know Jack Kennedy. But I did know Lyndon Johnson. I made two or three cautious statements that I thought Lyndon Johnson's ability to get together all the factions in the Senate might indicate that he had the capacity to get together the people of the world which I considered the major challenge for the Presidency. But I stopped far short of endorsing him because I had some misgivings about some of his personal traits. And perhaps, if I'd have been less cautious, I would have gone ahead and said I was for Lyndon Johnson in the middle of my campaign. It certainly would have been a politically advisable move, but I had certain misgivings and I just didn't want to do it.

It wasn't that I was so much for John Kennedy because, like most other people, I was just beginning to observe him in that kind of a political, presidential setting. I played it on out and didn't make up my mind until after I was nominated in the second primary. I did, of course, in the meantime talk to Ramsey Potts, who was assistant to Symington. I talked to several other people from time to time about the candidates, including [Robert F.] Bobby Kennedy (for which I got into a great deal of political trouble). I talked to [Robert C.] Bobby Baker and two or three other of Lyndon's people.

CAMPBELL: Can you recall specific contacts? You've mentioned your meeting with Robert Kennedy and Bert Bennett, I believe, which did receive some publicity. Did you have contacts before that, either personally or through an intermediary with the Kennedy camp?

SANFORD: Well, I kept getting messages from Riddle that I ought to talk with them and that I should go ahead and make a commitment. Well, I wasn't anywhere near ready to risk my own political situation by making a commitment on the presidential level, and certainly not to a person that, at that time, had so little support in North Carolina.

I suppose the person that reached me most effectively on behalf of the Kennedys was Louis Harris. He'd been a friend of mine at Chapel Hill when he was an undergraduate. We weren't quite classmates, as I've later claimed. I think he was a year or two behind me. But in any event, he did all the polling for Kennedy in the primaries. And I had been in touch. In fact, I'd used him to do a poll for me. It was the first time North Carolina ever used the polls. And, incidentally, that's one thing that impressed me about Jack Kennedy, as a candidate for Congress, he had a poll done, and one of the first times, I think, in the country that a candidate used one. I was advised by Harris and Riddle that Kennedy would carry Wisconsin and that I should pledge before that date; but I did not do it. So Lou Harris suggested that I ought to talk to John Kennedy or to Robert. And I did not really want to do it until after the election.

CAMPBELL: Your second primary?

SANFORD: Yes. I didn't have any desire to get on a band-wagon. There really wasn't anything that I had to accomplish by doing that. It was nothing to me to get on early because in the final analysis it's not important. But Harris was very anxious and asked me three or four times if I would see, as it turned out, Robert. I agreed to do it. And really, it's the only serious mistake of my political career, assuming that getting into politics wasn't a serious mistake in the first place, because I didn't handle it well. It came in the middle of the second primary when all of us were physically exhausted. I'm sure Bobby Kennedy was, too. In fact, he was so ill at the time that he couldn't even eat dinner with us. I'm sure he'd been working day and night. But so had we. They flew down to Raleigh and I met them for dinner at a motel outside of town. Lou Harris was there, Bert Bennett, Hugh Cannon, who later was my Director of Administration, now is my law partner. We had dinner together and talked. I was very much impressed that they were well organized, that they had a reading on every past delegate, every delegate that we would have at the '60 Convention--not detailed, but at least they had a 8 x 5 card, which impressed me. I suppose we always used 3 x 5's. But they were well organized. And he shuffled through the cards and knew who was going. We added a little bit of information.

In effect, I told him I was much impressed, much inclined to be for him, but that I wasn't at all ready to make a statement and that I did not want to make a decision until I got out of my own campaign. I obviously wasn't absolutely certain that I would win it. It was a very difficult campaign because it was one of the worst campaigns from a point of view of the injection of the race issue that we'd had in a governor's race in forty or fifty years.

So I left it that way and he flew on back. I made my mistake because any kind of issue in a second primary can get out of hand. You don't have enough time to develop it. So when somebody hits you with something, it's just too bad; it's too late to get out of it. And I did not want it known that Luther Hodges was supporting me. He was fairly unpopular politically. That was one thing I was trying to evade. He had not supported me in the first primary and I was willing to leave it like that. The other thing, I certainly didn't want to be associated with the Kennedy candidacy at that stage of the game. I didn't see any polls, but I would have guessed that he would have been way, way down at that particular time with the race issue and the other emotionalism involved. So I really didn't want it known that I was talking to them. That's why I ate out at a motel. But I should have had sense enough to know that you don't hide things of that kind.

The next day a reporter that was obviously inclined to be unfriendly asked me, first of all, if Luther Hodges was supporting me. And I evaded that somewhat and side-stepped it. He had not announced for me so that was easy. Then he asked me if I saw Jack Kennedy when he was in town the other day. And I seized on that to say no. And he, obviously, didn't realize he said Jack Kennedy. And I knew that. But I said no on two counts. I doubt if Bobby Kennedy ever hit the city limits of Raleigh, and he certainly wasn't Jack Kennedy. But that was a terrible error, and I've never made that mistake again. I've always just told it like it was. But at that time I didn't tell it like it was. And it wasn't the fact that I saw Kennedy but that I had seen him in secret and denied seeing him, because, of course, he wrote the story that I said I hadn't seen Bobby Kennedy when, indeed, so-and-so, and so-and-so, and so-and-so said I had. It made me look very bad. And I squirmed out of it as best I could by saying that he asked me about Jack Kennedy, that I'd seen Bobby Kennedy, that I had not made a pledge to him, and he had not brought two hundred thousand dollars (or some other amount) in a satchel. I was being accused of getting money from the NAACP [National

Association for the Advancement of Colored People], from labor, from the Kennedys, that I'd bankrupt the state like Soapy Williams did. I ended up running against Soapy Williams and the NAACP, or defending them in running. But in all that setting, it was not good.

I then did something that probably would be considered a little sneaky, but I sent word to the Johnson people that, yes, I would change my earlier position, I would see their people before the election. I did not say I would be for Johnson, only that I would see them. What I obviously wanted to do was to say, "Look, I'm meeting with Johnson's people." Of course, Johnson, then, was overwhelmingly popular. At any rate, Bobby Baker and [William M.] Bill Cochrane from Senator [B. Everett] Jordan's office came down. We met in Greensboro in a motel room. The next day I leaked it to the press and said I'd been talking to him. I also pointed out that I'd seen Symington's man and somebody else maybe. Anyhow, I got out of it fairly well.

But it laid the groundwork for Drew Pearson's allegation on the day of the nomination that I had taken money from the Kennedys and that's why I was supporting Kennedy when no other reason made any sense; that why would somebody from North Carolina support a Kennedy? He later retracted that charge and he wrote it very carefully. The truth of the matter, every thing he said was true except his conclusion. He reported that a Johnson man had come to me; it's a fellow named Robert Redwine, who had been a writer for Governor Scott and had some committee job up there. He came down to see me and said that he'd like to bring me a sizable contribution, six or seven thousand dollars, which really wasn't so sizable in terms of what we needed. All I'd have to do was to say something that I believed and was going to say anyhow, namely, that I'd be for Lyndon Johnson. Well, I said, "Nothing doing. I'm not ready for that decision. And I appreciate it, but I just don't need that money." So Redwine then told Jack Anderson and Jack Anderson actually wrote the story. He said, "He turned down Lyndon Johnson's money. Therefore, everybody knows you have to have money, so it must follow that he took Kennedy money." He very carefully didn't say I did. That story did me a lot of damage, too, and still does occasionally pop up as being the truth. He did retract it after I talked to him and told him that not only had Kennedy not given us any money, but

that Bert Bennett and I had personally signed a note for fifty thousand dollars and sent it to the Democratic headquarters on behalf of Kennedy after the Convention until we could raise the money in the state, that we advanced our fifty thousand. In any event, he retracted it. But I suppose this was a technique they used: They retracted it only in North Carolina with a special story, not in his column. (Raleigh News and Observer, August 20, 1960). And I could have made a point of that because if it was libelous, it was libelous everywhere it was printed. But I didn't make a point of it; I didn't consider it that important.

CAMPBELL: When was your decision made, then, to support Senator Kennedy in Los Angeles?

SANFORD: Right after the primary, which was the last Saturday in June--this Convention started about the 10th of July, as I recall, so there wasn't much time--I talked with Bert Bennett. He and I agreed, generally, that we ought to support Kennedy because this was the voice of the future, that this was the fresh approach to the country, and it was what we believed in in North Carolina. He simply suited our philosophy and our style and our approach, and we ought to be with them.

There was no reason for us to be with Lyndon Johnson except that it would help us win our campaign. We didn't particularly see Johnson. I had no dislike for him--as a matter of fact, I rather liked him--but, that he wasn't going to win anyhow and we'd make the same old futile gesture of supporting a Southern candidate when it had no connection with reality. The easy thing to do would be to be for Lyndon and switch to Kennedy. But, the way we ought to play it as a matter of being honest with the whole thing was to be for him forthrightly. We weren't unaware of the fact that this would have some political advantage for North Carolina, as it certainly did.

But I didn't make an immediate decision. I was still worried about joining forces, even if we should, if it caused us to lose the election. You have got to win before you can be of any effectiveness anyhow. So I was still disturbed by this. I talked to Henry Hall Wilson. I remember Henry came out to the motel where I was staying. I was lying out by the pool in the sun and he was sitting there, rather awkwardly, in his black suit. And I said, "Well, I've got to make this decision." He had been my assistant campaign manager. And he says, "You don't have a choice. You've got to be for Kennedy. It's just inconceivable that you'd do anything else." And I talked to Ben Roney, who was my long time associate, assistant to Governor Kern Scott, now is the Administrative Assistant to the present Governor [Robert W.] Scott. He was kind of my hard-nosed, war<sup>a</sup>healing type, eastern North Carolina politician, rough-and-tumble type person. He was pushing for Johnson. And he said, "If you support Kennedy, everybody'll say that it was because they put money in your campaign, just as they've been charging." We talked about that. Finally, he agreed that it'd be all right to be for Kennedy. He said, as I recall the conversation, that, "I wouldn't be for him unless you have an obligation to him." And I said, "Well, I have." I suspect he thought perhaps that I really had received some money. And I meant, without spelling it out to him, that I had an obligation to play it this way for the future of the way I thought we ought to play our politics, which I hoped could be a new type of politics. So he said, "Well, in that case go ahead." [Laughter] So I had most of my campaign elements on my side.



Then, I talked to several other people, including [Dickson] Dick Phillips, who is the Dean of the Law School at Chapel Hill but was my law partner at the time. He thought that we ought to go for Kennedy on the merits. My other law partner that was also involved in my political activities was Donald McCoy, who now heads my old firm and is a very liberal and progressive force in that community. He had serious misgivings. In fact, he finally sent me word in California to go ahead and vote for him, but not to second his nomination; that that much exposure would be so damaging and look like I was doing it for the glory. And I was so impressed by that that I caught Bobby Kennedy and told him that I wouldn't do it. But he insisted anyhow. I convinced him I really didn't want to do it. He says, "You really don't want to do it?" And I said, "No." And he said, "Well, I'll talk to Jack." They came back and said, "We want you to do it." So I had to. And I never could get a call through to McCoy. It was so difficult to get a line out of Los Angeles to tell him to look out, that I was going all the way.

The other people I talked to were not extensive because I didn't want to get in a position of exposure. But I did call Bobby, oh, four or five days before the Convention and say that I'd made up my mind to vote for Jack and I hoped that we could bring a few more votes. At that time I thought I could bring about half of them. But the pressure really got on. He, then, said. . . . I think he called me back and said that Jack would like me to second the nomination. And I said, "Well, I'll think about that." Then, I said, "I'm going to announce this tomorrow when I get back to North Carolina." (I was at a South Carolina beach). He either said then or called back and said, "Don't do it until you get to California." Well, I was a little bit disturbed about this because I had said publicly that I would make my decisions and let it be known. Then I had to say that I was going to wait until I got to California, implying that I wouldn't make a decision until I got to California. I said, "I think I can predict that the

ticket will be Kennedy and Johnson or Johnson and Kennedy and I'll make my decision (at least by implication) when I get to California and see what I think's in the best interest for the state of North Carolina and the country," some such statement. That, again, was a little bit on the untruthful side and about the second time I'd been involved in that type of shading. But on the other hand, as Bennett said, "If you're going to help them, you might as well help them their way. And if they think it helps to be there, that it will be more dramatic, then we ought to do it that way." It was too late for me to recover and clearly spell out that "I've made a decision but I'll announce when I get there." I should have done that, but I'd already done it the other way. I saw Bishop Paul N. Garber, who was the Bishop of the Methodist Church in North Carolina and Virginia. I knew the attitude of the churches, the Protestant churches. I saw him in the hotel where I had my campaign headquarters as I was leaving for the airport to go to Los Angeles. I drew him away from some Methodist preachers, because I'd been very active in the Methodist Church, I said, "I want you to know that I'll probably support John Kennedy." And he said, "Good. Go to it." Well, he didn't carry many of his preachers with him, including my local preacher who withdrew the invitation that I had to make the October Layman's Day sermon. I wanted him to, in a way, but I still resented the fact that he did. I suppose that fairly well answers when and how I made a decision.

CAMPBELL: Could you have recruited more of your North Carolina delates to the Kennedy cause if you'd been able to go ahead and make your announcement a little earlier and begin working?

SANFORD: I think the only difference would have been that the public would have better understood.

I was not aware of the fact of how hard it is to get a message in detail back from the West Coast: the time difference, the fact that just the reporting process is more awkward. And the biggest thing is that somehow we gave the impression that I had decided to go with Kennedy because Kennedy was the winner. Therefore, I was just picking the winner. I didn't say that at all. I did say that Johnson couldn't win, why fool with him just for the sake of sentiment and old times sake for the old South, in so many words. I don't think I said it quite that bluntly. Then, too, the whole thing was never properly explained. Had I been sitting in a press conference, I think it would have been handled much better, a press conference in North Carolina. As far as getting people, the pressure probably would have started here before we got to California. As it was, when I made a quick, immediate survey, two-thirds of the people that were delegates were supporters of mine. We had elected Hodges chairman, though we didn't need to. And I had occasion to regret it after the Drew Pearson story. But, in any event, Hodges is a mean fighter; I'd say a dirty fighter. In any event . . .

CAMPBELL: And do you think the Pearson story can be attributed to him in some way?

SANFORD: Oh, no. I had about forty people, which would be about twenty votes out of seventy-two people and thirty-six votes that I was fairly certain would do whatever I wanted to do politically. And they started falling off the bandwagon when they got the pressure from home. My far western North Carolina manager, one of my closer friends--still is--said, "I just can't live politically with that vote. I just can't do it." He said, "And you'll lose the election." Well, we carried his part of the state in the final analysis and he came along. But they fell off one by one and we finally ended up with just twelve people instead of forty--I'd guess we had about forty--because of the tremendous pressure put on by Hodges, by Ervin, by Senator Jordan to some extent, including the pressure they were putting on me.

CAMPBELL: What were the major arguments? What sort of pressure?

SANFORD: Well, the pressure was that you are betraying the South. You know, this is the one thing that's always an emotional thing. But the main thing was that he was going to get the hell beat out of him in North Carolina and take everybody down with him. This is what worried the boys in the western part of the state. Many of them were in the legislature. Many of them were just afraid to go home and face that kind of sentiment which they read as being very unfavorable. I was reasonably well convinced that we could carry the day. I thought we had something to go with and I thought we'd carry it though.

I knew it would be difficult. I didn't know how difficult until I started getting telegrams. And I got unbelievable telegrams from people all over the state and people that amazed me, some of my county campaign managers, one or two of whom I've never made up with, roundly condemning me. I got a few telegrams praising me, but they were pretty much the other way. I could almost look at the telegram before I opened it and if it said "Terry Sanford," I didn't want to open it. It would be good if it said "The Honorable Terry Sanford"--there weren't very many of them. I threw away the first hundred or so. Then it occurred to me that these would be very valuable and funny in the future. So most all of them got back in the archives after that. There must be two or three hundred over there now.

CAMPBELL: Are they in the state archives?

SANFORD: I would think so. They, of course, like all the other papers, are under seal for a number of years. I hope they got in there.

CAMPBELL: I hope so because that's the sort of thing . . .

SANFORD: They may be in the University of North Carolina Southern Collection, where my campaign papers went. But they'll be one place or the other.

CAMPBELL: Good, I'm glad we got that down here. What . . .

SANFORD: Including a very long telegram from John Caldwell, still a friend of mine, the Chancellor of North Carolina State University at Raleigh, who is a Christian Scientist. His opposition was religious. He sent me a three or four page telegram chastising me for not being for Adlai Stevenson. And I'm sure he'd be embarrassed to ever see that telegram now. But I saved that. I know that's in there.

CAMPBELL: Who could have been considered the leader of the Johnson forces in your delegation? Would that have been Governor Hodges?

SANFORD: Sam Ervin, really. But Governor Hodges hand-in-hand. Governor Hodges really wasn't honest about it because he didn't want Lyndon Johnson. He wanted Adlai Stevenson. And he wanted Adlai Stevenson because he had concluded and told me that he'd [Hodges] be a natural for Vice President. And he really did want it. They even had brochures printed up. He had posters with his picture on it out there all ready, with his two or three boys that were among his staunchest supporters or stooges that were all set to go with the boom for Luther Hodges for Vice President. And he was so carried away with it that even after Kennedy got the nomination and even after he had embarrassed me in so many ways, he came and asked me if I thought that I could talk to Kennedy about him. I told him it was too late, that I'd already been for Lyndon Johnson. Hodges is a vicious kind of a person. He's a good friend of mine today. We've been good friends,

especially after all of this was over. Bert Bennett commented that Hodges always helps us out of the trouble he gets us in. He did get us into a lot of trouble because he's the only person that brought much bitterness into that Convention. I tell this story about the morning of the nomination, when the Pearson story appeared. This, in a way, was complimentary that Pearson would consider that on that important day he could make me his target. In a way I should have appreciated it, but I was the Democratic nominee from North Carolina for Governor and this was the Democratic caucus of the--delegation from North Carolina. And so the county chairman from a county, Greensboro, Guilford County, proposed that they pass a resolution censoring Drew Pearson for this false story. This, after all, was in the interest of the Democratic Party. Well, Hodges squirmed it around and maneuvered and managed to get it tabled. But I remember going over to the hotel. I told Jack Kennedy about it. And I said, "If I ever recommend him for anything in your Administration, I hope you'll just kick me out of the office." And I'll never forget this because this must've been about what he said about the businessmen after the steel episode. He was chewing chewing gum, relaxing sort of, and when I got through telling him about it, he said, "He is a bastard, isn't he?"

And so we got a big laugh when I went to see him in Georgetown recommending that he make Hodges Secretary of Commerce. Hodges had come to me after we got back from the Convention. And he had maneuvered through his Marshall Fields connection in Chicago to have [R. Sargent] Shriver ask him to be National [Businessmen for Kennedy] Chairman. Shriver called me and I said, "For heaven's sake, yes;" said, you know, "Forget the past. We're trying to win the election." And Hodges did a great job. He worked hard at it, like he does everything. And I say, we've been good friends. But he doesn't fight clean.

CAMPBELL: How about Senator Jordan?

SANFORD: Senator Ervin . . .

CAMPBELL: Oh, all right. Senator Ervin.

SANFORD: . . . was the most effective person. And he knew how to put the pressure on these people that. . . . And they were, in a way, pretty vile in their suggestions about what kind of person Kennedy was. It was a right vicious kind of a campaign to undermine him and to undermine me. They had Bill Cochrane, who was Jordan's Administrative Assistant, fly out to see me.

CAMPBELL: The morning you arrived in Los Angeles, very early or late at night?

SANFORD: This was the following day, after I'd made this shocking announcement. Ervin contended that I had misled him, when indeed I had not. I very carefully saw Jordan and Ervin before I left North Carolina and said, "I think we ought to see to it that Kennedy has some votes. We ought not to be so vicious in putting on the pressure because I think Kennedy will win. Why should North Carolina exclude itself?" They both agreed that it wouldn't be bad if he had ten or twelve votes, which was twice as many as he finally got. But Ervin later said, "But I didn't know you were including yourself in that group." I certainly didn't exclude myself. At any rate, Cochrane, who had been a roommate of mine and one of my closest friends, and still is, was flown out there. He didn't intend to come. And this would have been twenty-four hours after my arrival. Anyhow, he caught me and he said, "They've sent me out here." And I said, "Why don't you just go tell them that I'm not the kind of person that changes my mind and I don't have any intention of changing my mind. If I'm the last supporter he has, if he has no one else, I'll vote for him and don't intend to do anything else." He said, "Well, I know that. But I want you to go meet with. . . ."

CAMPBELL: [William H.] Bill Brawley.

SANFORD: Bill Brawley. "And I'll never forget that meeting. It must've been around midnight. We were in his suite, Brawley's suite. He was a great old boy, of course. But he'd been Lyndon's boy there a long time. We sat up there and talked and talked, and he gave me all the arguments that Bobby Baker had given me in Greensboro. And finally he shed a few tears, put his head down and he says, "Well, you have just denied Lyndon Johnson the Presidency of the United States." I couldn't help but laugh because I knew that wasn't so. But that ended that conversation.

CAMPBELL: Could the Kennedy people give you much help there in Los Angeles with your delegation?

SANFORD: No. None. Nothing but trouble. [William C.] Bill Battle reported that he was in charge of the South, and so I sent Henry Wilson or somebody to see him, probably Riddle, who was a delegate, to see him and find out, "Where is this support you've been developing over these months." So he said, "Well, Cicero Yow," who was a state senator from Wilmington, "told me that he would be for Kennedy." I said, "That's just great." He's kind of a conservative person. So I saw Cicero and the only thing I remember about that conversation of any substance was that he had two children and that he had only one badge, you know, the honorary badge. And so I was so carried away with the fact that he was going to support Kennedy, although I got no firm commitment, that I gave him my badge to give one of his children. Well, he voted for Johnson. As a matter of fact, we had all kinds of elements stacked against us. And had we known this, we would not have let Hodges serve as Chairman, though it had been traditional in the state, and I felt why stir it up-- though eight years earlier he had been a party to denying Kerr Scott that honor. They did it to embarrass Scott, and Hodges joined in it. And I had every justification, but he sent me such a pitiful plea that he wanted to be the Chairman that I thought why not start building this goodwill. He had not been for me and at the same time I wanted



his support and didn't want any more problems. I wanted his support after I was governor.

So when [George A.] Smathers came over--we gave every presidential candidate equal time--Smathers came and made a Lyndon Johnson speech, not at all for himself. Lyndon Johnson came, made a Lyndon Johnson speech. When Kennedy came, half the people wouldn't stand up when the time to applaud came. You know, it just was an indication. I'd briefed him pretty well, hurriedly, on two or three things he ought to say, including textile imports. Nobody else had thought of that. He made a big hit then with some of the conservatives that hadn't stood up. But he made a bigger hit simply because of his own personality. But we didn't pick up any votes. We didn't convert anybody. But we did get through that rather nervous ordeal. But they weren't in a position to give us any help. They didn't have any ties to North Carolina except us. And I had. . . . For the most part I had Riddle serving as liaison and to some extent Henry Wilson. They saw Bobby and Jack Kennedy more than I did at that stage of the game.

CAMPBELL: How were the arrangements made for your seconding speech, the drafting of it?

SANFORD: Well, fairly casual. I had in the meantime caught Bobby Kennedy on the floor and told him, "Let me out of it. You don't really need me now. You've got this thing sewed up." And I've already recounted that. He did not agree. So then, the day of the nominations, I went over to the hotel and said, "What do you want done?" He said, "Write out something." I said, "Yes. But we ought to sort of coordinate them so everybody doesn't say the same thing." At any rate, then I went to the little house outside of the gate, the little prefab . . .

SANFORD: Well, I got the impression that, pretty much, John Kennedy had already made up his mind and that this was part of the very skillful effort to convince some people that this was the thing to do. I'd already, pretty clearly from the very beginning--the first time I talked with Kennedy, I think, after I got there indicated that I thought it ought to be Lyndon Johnson. He never gave me any indication of his intentions. And I thought it for political reasons as well as the fact that I considered him an extremely competent, experienced person. So I was pretty well staked out and known as a man who would be for Johnson. I don't recall who all came to that particular meeting, but [Ernest F.] Fritz Hollings was there and Soapy Williams. And I remember an exchange between them. Soapy told Fritz that it would be as hard, "For me to sell Lyndon Johnson in Michigan as it would be for you to sell Hubert Humphrey in South Carolina." So somebody said to me--whether it was [Lawrence F.] O'Brien or somebody else--said, "Well, what do you think about it? I was sitting over on the corner of the bed." I said, "You know I think it ought to be Lyndon Johnson." He then said, "Why don't you just say so very forcefully and let him know?" Of course, John Kennedy was in the room. So I did. I made my little pitch for Lyndon Johnson. Williams said that he would have to oppose it, but, in effect, he said, "Don't take what I say too seriously." Therefore, when everybody else was concerned when Soapy's crowd was raising so much Cain, I was fairly relaxed because I judged, maybe improperly, that it was window dressing. I don't think the decision to ask Johnson to be the Vice President was made in that meeting. But I enjoyed being there.

CAMPBELL: You're one of the more perceptive people that attended that meeting.

What sort of race did you foresee for yourself in November at that time? Did you expect a tough race for yourself?

SANFORD: I knew we were making it tougher. I didn't know how tough. I knew from the response that I had received in Los Angeles that it would be tough. I had not anticipated that response. I had not calculated it would be that violent. It was much worse than I'd guessed. Maybe if I'd have known all of that I wouldn't have had the nerve to go on.

Anyhow, we came back--and this would have been in August, late July and August--and I was pretty well worn out. In August we went up to Lake Junaluska, which is a Methodist retreat, and got a house. We were going to stay up there two or three weeks. And I started stirring out a little bit, and I realized we were in bad trouble. I had one of my assistants up there with me, Roy Wilder, my campaign publicity man, one of them. So we started some quick forays into the west. And I think it did a lot of good. We picked the campaign up about two weeks before Labor Day. And I think one reason we ultimately did so well in that part of the state, which was the far western part, was that we did make that start. And we made it because I'd sensed that we were in serious trouble.

Then I looked at the polls, and I concluded that we could go all out for Kennedy and the only way he could carry the state was if we went all out for him and that we would give up about 10 percentage points, but that we might be able to get the Kennedy candidacy over the hump. And it turned out that way. We started off with about a 2 to 1 lead over the Republican candidate, who is a very fine person, had no experience in politics, had never done anything in a civic way, particularly, had nothing going for him except the traditional Republican vote which would not have been substantial. So with a 65 percent lead I thought I could sell some and still win. Well, in the last week, I wondered. But, my lead dropped to 55 percent in the final vote, just short of 55 percent. But Kennedy came up just over 50 percent, between 50 and 51; I've forgotten now, precisely. But our lead was decent and substantial. I said, in effect, as I went around, you know, "We've got to have Kennedy." I never made a speech, I don't believe, that I didn't plug for him. At least, never a major speech. I might have stopped at a crossroad and not mentioned his name, but I doubt that.

CAMPBELL: To what extent was your party divided? Did you count on and did you get much support from Dr. [I. Beverly] Lake's people?

SANFORD: None from Dr. Lake. Dr. Lake, as a matter of fact, went around making speeches, apparently campaigning for Thomas Jefferson. He certainly never mentioned me, though I was on the platform two or three times with him. Two or three of our congressional delegations invited him to speak, thinking that this would heal the breach. Well, it gave him an opportunity to make his same old speech, appeal to his same old prejudice, never to mention Kennedy, never to mention me.

On the other hand, his campaign manager, Robert Morgan, who is now our Attorney General and who got my strong support when he ran and who will go on, probably, to be a Governor or a Senator, came all the way. He traveled with me. He introduced me. He did everything he could to carry the slate, including for Jack Kennedy. Most of Lake's people were not the organizational sort anyhow, so we had the regulars and the party organization. Under our system, I named the chairman immediately. And so we had Bert Bennett as party chairman. And we had a very good party organization. He put together a very good county-by-county organization, building on our own campaign structure as well as the Democratic structure. So we had a great organization.

CAMPBELL: I have note here that Henry Hall Wilson and Judge Riddle served as liaison people with the [Democratic] National Committee in Washington. Now, were they working directly for the Kennedy campaign, or for yours as well?

SANFORD: Well, they were working for me, keeping us in touch with what was going on, making certain that they did it our way because there wasn't any question but what it had to be done our way if we were going to win. We knew the situation and they didn't. Matt Reese was broken in by us. He was assigned as the Kennedy man in our camp. And I have the impression, that I have never checked up on, that Richard Goodwin was down here for a while. Whether he came down as an advance man or one of the advance men for the Kennedy visit. . . . I remember we had some trouble with him with what he wanted to write and say. And I remember Matt Reese was sending in little reports to make himself look wise--I'm very fond of Matt, I might add, parenthetically, though, no historian will care about that--but Matt was sending in little intelligence reports. And obviously, we were getting a playback from Henry Wilson. I remember Bennett told Reese, "Now, let's have this understanding, you're down here to help us," and said, "Just remember this everyday: one word from me will have you assigned to North Dakota."

CAMPBELL: As the campaign started, what did you see as the most serious problems for the Kennedy campaign in North Carolina?

SANFORD: Well, basically, a lack of any identity at all. He just wasn't known. The only thing that was known about him was that the last time North Carolina had voted Republican had been when a Catholic had run for President. So our problem, basically, was to get him known. For example, we got a copy of the--was it the Houston speech?

CAMPBELL: The Ministerial Association speech.

SANFORD: Yes. We played that on television three or four times at our expense. I mean, we put it on. This is a very serious problem in a state that's almost a hundred percent Protestant. Of course, [Richard M.] Nixon sort of suited this middle class Democratic voter. He came into Greensboro and made a tremendous hit. He hurt his knee there, you may remember. So . . .

CAMPBELL: And it laid him up for a while.

SANFORD: Oh, yes. This was our small contribution. [Laughter] We had a rusty door on a car. But he made a tremendous hit over there. And it was obvious that his campaign was just going to be a tremendous success here. And it almost was, of course. And they didn't really make any mistakes, that is not in North Carolina.

CAMPBELL: The Republicans?

SANFORD: Yes.

CAMPBELL: Did the Kennedys?

SANFORD: No. I don't think so.

CAMPBELL: Not under your directions.

SANFORD: No. I wouldn't put it that way. No. Bert Bennett though, in running both campaigns, had to make the final decisions on who said what and who went where. The only way we could do it was to tie the two campaigns together. So he had to be the boss. Now, in some states the Kennedys moved in their own organization and ran it their way, their part of it. Had we not assumed the responsibility for his campaign, then I think that would have been a legitimate organizational device. But since we assumed it, Bennett and I, to that extent of backing him up, I wasn't suggesting that we ran that sharp a campaign, but it was one campaign.

BEGIN SIDE II TAPE I

CAMPBELL: Was it your decision or the decision of your people in North Carolina not to form a separate Citizens for Kennedy organization here in the state? I believe most states had some sort of Citizens setup.

SANFORD: I'm not sure. I really don't recall that we didn't have one, except I can't remember who ran it if we did. I think we had a Businessmen for Kennedy and we had two or three special little organizations. But I think that we probably felt, and certainly if we didn't have any Citizens organization at all, we did feel with the Party running it you didn't need anything else. And, you know, having been through a couple of other national elections since then, a lot of state organizations play footsie with the national campaign. And we weren't doing that. We made it our campaign. And the newspapers later said that I said that "If you don't want to vote for Kennedy, don't vote for me." I don't believe I ever made such a stupid statement. But they read my campaign as meaning that. I'd hear constantly, some newspaper man would say, "Well, he told him that 'If you can't vote for Kennedy, don't vote for me.'" Well, I'm sure that I didn't ever say that. But that was the style of our campaign.

CAMPBELL: I'm sure that you recall the trip that Senator Kennedy made into the state on September 17th, I believe, in 1960. Who worked out that itinerary? Was that you people?

SANFORD: Oh, yes. Bennett worked that out. And I think that was probably one point when there was some discussion of whether it was a good idea to do something. He finally made the choice. It was a good itinerary. It probably worked Senator Kennedy harder than some of his staff wanted him to work, but at that, we missed Asheville because of the weather.

CAMPBELL: Did you have any problems on that trip? I believe you did have the United States Senators involved in introducing him and things. Was there any trouble in encouraging those people to participate?

SANFORD: Oh, no. By that time, they were very anxious. And they are good party people. They didn't see Kennedy as a real threat and they didn't mind being associated with him either. Nobody was running except Jordan and me. Hodges introduced him; some places, as I recall, Ervin did; I don't remember about Jordan. But they all spoke when they were asked to. And they all stayed on the whole trip, I think. I introduced him somewhere where they thought I had local support. In Greensboro, maybe, where I didn't, I believe Hodges introduced him. Anyhow, they planned that in a way that would best serve the total campaign.

CAMPBELL: What was your recommendation for emphasis from candidate Kennedy on that trip? Do you recall?

SANFORD: Well, in the first place, I felt that Kennedy's strongest asset from the very beginning was the concept of world peace. He was the kind of person that could inspire the kind of confidence around the world, and that this would be the big thing of his Administration and that it was a matter of considerable concern. And we were at that time with [John Foster] Dulles committed in a fairly disorganized way. It was a good issue. I made that issue my primary statement about Kennedy in my seconding speech. He, of course, made the straightforward statement that he made everywhere else about getting the country going again and achieving the greatness.



But we had the local issues worked in. The tobacco interest in the east, he went to a tobacco auction. He made a major speech in Charlotte. And I'm sure either in the press conference or in the speech, he touched on the textile imports because we had so many people in danger of losing their jobs or going on short hours on account of the textile imports. It was, and still is, a question. President Kennedy did do something about it. I don't remember any particular issue when he came back to Raleigh that night, but we must have had some local issues that seemed important at the time. Well, I remember, for example, he was in favor of East Carolina College getting in to the Southern Conference, which got a great deal of applause on that campus when we were there. How about that for a big issue?

CAMPBELL: You mentioned that you and Bert Bennett got involved in a fifty thousand dollar note to the National Committee or the national campaign. In the end were you able to receive some funds from Washington, or did the funds basically travel from here to there?

SANFORD: I can't answer that question accurately because I very carefully kept my hands off of the finances in all three campaigns, the two primaries and this. I did it for a lot of reasons. I didn't want to, in any way, get involved in receiving funds. I certainly didn't want to take any money from anybody that might later ask for something. So I'm not sure.

My impression is that far more money went to Washington than came from it. I seem to recall that in the latter days, the . . . I think Bennett probably called Washington and said, "If you'll pay for half of this television, we'll put it on," or something like that. But nothing really substantial. We were, by that time--well, oddly enough, we never really had any problem of raising money. We never got any great contributions, but we changed the system of raising money in North Carolina. Whereas in the past, where they could, tremendous contributions came in, sometimes

from special interests, and money was always put out to the county; we changed it. We gave every country manager a quota to get up locally and send us. And so we followed that pretty well on the state level. We sent money to Washington. We were probably the first state to send in the assessment which right after the nomination was put on each state. And we sent that in by Bennett and by signing a note. I think I signed it. But it was Bennett's financial statement that made it good.

CAMPBELL: How helpful was it to you that Lyndon Johnson was on the ticket?

SANFORD: Oh, very helpful. In a way, you see, it redeemed me. Had we had almost anybody else on the ticket, I don't think either one of us could have carried North Carolina. Just the fact that he came through the state on a fairly successful tour, the LBJ Special, was extremely helpful. And it calmed a whole section of people that otherwise would have been uneasy. So I don't question that Lyndon Johnson made a tremendous contribution to the campaign.

CAMPBELL: Are there other memories that you have of the campaign we should get down?

SANFORD: Well, I don't know of anything of any great importance. Bobby came into the state and campaigned and two or three of the sisters did.

CAMPBELL: Robert Kennedy was here the Saturday before the election, I believe, at a rally in Morganton or something.

SANFORD: That's right. That's Chick Riddle's hometown. It's also Sam Ervin's hometown. Mrs. [Lady Bird] Johnson came in campaigning. In fact, Mrs. [Margaret R.] Sanford and Mrs. Johnson were traveling across the state in the plane that later crashed. But on that trip they ran off the runway and almost turned over, in a muddy storm; in fact, so much that the people standing waiting for the group to come in thought it had wrecked. But the ladies got off and finally the plane was straightened up and they went on, which I'm not sure I would have done. In any event, it was a campaign which, with the exception of Dr. Lake and his group, was a pretty harmonious thing. Everybody pitched in, Hodges and the rest of them. You know, without Hodges, without Jordan, without Henry Jordan, Everett's brother who probably didn't do much work but still he was sitting there as campaign chairman as distinguished from party chairman--all of those elements gave us a pretty good working coalition. And if we later fell out or had not been together earlier, at least we were during those crucial months.

CAMPBELL: Moving on then from the election, I believe you've already referred to a time that you discussed the possibility of Luther Hodges for Commerce with President-elect Kennedy. Can you recall meetings or discussions with him in that period between the election and his inauguration?

SANFORD: We had two meetings, Bert Bennett and I and nobody else--though Riddle wanted to go. We saw him once in Palm Beach and once in Georgetown. The purpose of our visits was to say what North Carolina wanted out of the Administration in the initial stages. We wanted several things, one that he delivered on in spite of tremendous embarrassment from Adlai Stevenson. He fulfilled his promise to us; he made Gladys Tillett the [United Nations] representative for the first year. And he called me and he says, "Is it all right if it's just a year? I'm just getting such tremendous pressure from Stevenson. It's the only way I can finally get out of it, to make Mrs.

[Mary E.] Tree the representative after the first year." That suited everybody. We asked. . . . Of course, we went to Georgetown specifically to put in a hurry-up plea for Luther. It appeared from the press that Averell Harriman might be offered that post. So Luther's friends asked me to go on up there. And we did. When I got back, I happened, a couple of nights later, to be sitting at a banquet with him honoring somebody that was going out of some office. The only time in his life that I even heard him say it, he turned over to me and said, "I really do thank you." By that time he hadn't received the appointment, but at least we had made the pitch.

And we had a few other things. I wanted to know if Kennedy would accept an honorary degree from Chapel Hill, which he did and said he would. I wanted Spencer Bell made a circuit judge. He had been one of the delegates that stayed with us--was a wonderful person--and he did in spite of violent opposition from Hodges and Ervin. Spencer Bell made one of the very fine judges. He died, unfortunately, a few years later.

We didn't have a whole long laundry list, but there were one or two other things. I can't remember exactly what. Oh, yes. We had somebody we wanted in [Department of] Agriculture. We ended up getting three top positions in Agriculture: [Charles S.] Charlie Murphy and Horace D. Godfrey headed the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service. Harry Caldwell was put on this top policy committee. He'd been the head of our Grange. So of the top five or six people in Agriculture, we had three of them.

Harold Cooley got very much upset with me. He felt I ought to have recommended him for Secretary of Agriculture and that I ought to have scuttled Hodges in favor of him. He finally got over it, but he was a little bit irritated that I hadn't supported him for that position. Well, obviously you couldn't do it. You couldn't have but one cabinet member. We didn't have any extensive requests, but felt that we ought to get them in while getting was good. And obviously, it was good because we would have missed out on two or three of those if we hadn't.

The only other thing that I can remember of any significance was that I dropped a whole cup of coffee on his rug in Georgetown. That wasn't so memorable as it was that the butler came in with a great silver pitcher of water and poured the whole thing right on top of the coffee. I have cleaned up carpet spots that way ever since.

**CAMPBELL:** Were you the person who was involved in Henry Hall Wilson's position at the White House and acquiring that for him?

**SANFORD:** No, I certainly was not. He got that purely on his merits and on the ability of Kennedy and [Lawrence F.] O'Brien to observe the merits.

I had made one of my dearest friends, Paul H. Thompson, my finance chairman and had made him National Committeeman after my nomination. And he couldn't stand it. He just didn't like political life. He'd done this purely on a personal basis. He helped at Los Angeles, and he was a good National Committeeman. He just wouldn't stay. When the general election was over, he came to my house the next morning and said, "I want out." I said, "Okay. If you really mean that, I'll work at it." He said, "I mean today." He just didn't want to be a part of anything political. I made him stay until after my inauguration which came a month before Kennedy's Inauguration. Then I put Henry Wilson in. Just by chance, I'm saying, that we even put him in this National Committee position. But then, when he got to Washington, he'd already known them, and had made a great impression on O'Brien--incidentally, he and I had been to see O'Brien a couple of times during this interim--

and at the Inauguration O'Brien asked him to be his aide for Congressional affairs, an Administrative Assistant to the President. I was somewhat surprised, and so was Bert Bennett--and Henry. I would have been glad to recommend Henry, but I had thought of Henry maybe going over and doing something in the State Department, and may have mentioned that. But Henry wasn't after anything. This was a complete surprise to me and to Henry too. And obviously, it was a wise choice. He did a great job for them.

CAMPBELL: Do you recall in this period before your inauguration and before John Kennedy's inauguration what you anticipated as far as the Administration was concerned? Do you recall having any pre-conceived notions of what the Kennedy Administration would be like for you in North Carolina?

SANFORD: No, I don't know that I'd really thought about that. I was certain that it would be beneficial for the state. I was certain that a good many things that we would like to get done and the ability to talk to people in Washington would be there. But I don't know that I thought that. I was probably spending more time thinking about what I would do in North Carolina.

Bobby came to my inauguration. One of my lines that got great applause was: "As the dynamic leadership of President John F. Kennedy moves us into the New Frontiers of a changing world, we will accept for North Carolina our responsibilities as citizens of the most powerful nation in the world, the last, ~~best~~ hope of the free world. We pledge to march with President Kennedy."

CAMPBELL: I believe that within a month of your inauguration you made an address at Fort Bragg at a meeting of the Association of the U.S. Army. It was entitled, at least in your public papers, "President Kennedy and the Quest for Peace." You came out pretty strongly endorsing the United Nations and the Administration's foreign policy, such as it was in that month. Do you recall why you chose to make that address at that time?

SANFORD: Well, in the first place, I'd promised some local fellow that I'd come and make the address to the Army Association. And I thought it would be a good thing to hit them with. If you can hit an audience with something that's slightly surprising, you know, I think it gets more attention. And it's a good group of people, too. I reminded them that it is more difficult to wage peace than to wage war, and that President Kennedy deserved our support as he began "anew the quest for peace."

CAMPBELL: Was the White House aware you were going to make that address?

SANFORD: Oh, I'm sure not.

CAMPBELL: No?

SANFORD: I wouldn't think so. Not that I was going to or did.

CAMPBELL: I imagine they were aware you did. Had you had the occasion to discuss with the President early in his Administration or before he went into office what you thought he might do in regards to the civil rights problem in your state and in the South?

SANFORD: I don't remember any specific conversations as such until we were pretty far along in the open accommodations. I'm sure that we talked about it. And I'm sure that I would have been encouraging in my remarks to go ahead and do it the right way and that there were many people in the South that would support it. I'm sure, too, that I must've said that we didn't want anything to appear to be imposed on us. The South really was tired of being the whipping boy on this issue when it was a nation-wide issue. I don't really remember getting down to advice . . . I didn't make much of a point of going to Washington to advise him. I thought he was doing all right. And usually when I was up there to see Henry about something I wanted done, Evelyn Lincoln would usually lead me in to speak to him, or [Kenneth P.] Kenny O'Donnell or somebody. I felt that we had to make the point that I wasn't riding this thing as part of the glamour group or the jet set or doing it for any personal advantage, so much so that I would never let Henry Wilson put our names on an invitation list. We never went to the White House. I regretted it after he was assassinated. But I told Mrs. Sanford, don't worry--you know, she'd say, well, why is so and so up there--and I said, "Well, don't worry about that because in the second Administration we'll go, you know, whenever we feel like it," or whenever we're invited, that is. But, right then, I felt that I ought to lean over backwards to appear that everything that I'd done was for the benefit of the state, which it really was. We even carried it to that extreme. I did go see him two or three times on invitation. And I went to see him a number of times for things that I wanted such as the Environmental Health Center. Then he came here in October of the first year. We had some good conversations then.



My position on the civil rights would have been that as far as North Carolina is concerned, we're going to handle our situation. And I'm sure, though, that in other parts of the country you're going to have to do something. I probably, though I don't recall, would have taken the position that the most important thing was the moral leadership that he could provide rather than just a lot of additional laws. Though we didn't have many laws, we had some. But I wasn't advocating a program of civil rights legislation as much as I was the question of his own moral leadership on the question which I thought in the long run was the way to handle it. Not that we shouldn't have legislation; we had to have some federal legislation. But I was looking at it from my point of view of how I could handle it in this state. And I was pretty sure that we could handle it in a decent way. And I preferred to do it that way. Politically, I could not have testified for the public accommodations. I just couldn't have unless we wanted to destroy every program we were working on and destroy our effectiveness. So I think my position on that would. . . . If you look back to the newspaper clippings, I constantly said, "Well, in North Carolina we don't need it, because we are doing our opening up on a voluntary basis."

CAMPBELL: How effective did you feel the North Carolina congressional delegation was in this period in relation to your state problems?

SANFORD: They were of very little use and still are of very little use. Herbert Bonner voted for the rules change. We put a tremendous amount of pressure on every Congressman, every way we knew how. We probably over-played our hand in trying to get some votes. Herbert Bonner always admired Kennedy, at one time had an office next to him. And after he became President he continued to admire him. He supported him very strongly in the election and was a tremendous help to us in eastern

North Carolina. He was a constant help. One or two others were frequently helpful. [Horace R.] Kornegay was of some help. Roy Taylor was of some help. Harold Cooley had played out, and everybody in Washington knew it. They were beginning to guess it in North Carolina. He was never harmful, but he really wasn't of any help. Senator Jordan, and particularly Bill Cochrane in Jordan's office, was our key contact to Washington. They could always just about get the job done.

CAMPBELL: Was there some problem with your people in Washington and the Cape Fear River Basin Project that you were interested in? I have a note on that.

SANFORD: Well, the times have changed so now that the students who are trying to protect the earth wonder how in the world I could have taken such a backward position at the time. At the time, I explained to them, everybody thought one of the greatest things we could do to protect the natural resources would be to keep this water from just washing away to the sea and washing the earth with it. But in any event, this was a thing started by Kerr Scott, carried on by Jordan, opposed by Cooley, supported by Congressman [Alton] Lennon since it was in his District. And Cooley did have a lot of influence with the Agriculture Department, obviously. He was Chairman of the Agriculture Committee. He came up with an alternate plan of small dams, the soil conservation program. And he got some support for it, including from the then-Grangemaster, Robert Scott, whose father had started the other program. I think he felt that he had to support the farm outlook. In any event, it was approved and it's been going through the various steps since. It wasn't any great problem. Harold Cooley was so anxious for me to name his law partner, whose name is [Hubert E.] May, to the bench. Well, I sort of wanted to anyhow. He was related to one of my key people. When I was president of the Young Democrats, in spite of the fact he'd been against me when I was running, he pitched in and helped. So there was no problem for me to name him. He's a very good lawyer.

But I wouldn't name him as long as Harold Cooley was bothering our dam program. Finally, when he slacked off, I did name May. I didn't make any arrangement with Cooley on that. But Cooley was smart enough to know that he couldn't knock me on one hand and ask favors on the other.

CAMPBELL: Were you consulted in advance before the President appointed his Commission on Smoking and Health?

SANFORD: I don't believe so. I don't recall.

CAMPBELL: How did you feel about that?

SANFORD: Is this the early committee that came in with the so-called Surgeon General's Report?

CAMPBELL: Surgeon General's Report. That's right.

SANFORD: I don't think I really knew that that was in the making until it came out. I don't recall any preliminary conversations.

CAMPBELL: I noticed that publicly you didn't actively oppose the report.

SANFORD: Yes, I did.

CAMPBELL: Did you?

SANFORD: Well, I raised some questions . . .

CAMPBELL: You raised some questions . . .

SANFORD: . . . about whether or not it was a sound study from a statistical point of view or scientific point of view or a medical point of view or whether it was just a conglomeration of figures. I felt that I had to give some support to the tobacco industry. Interestingly enough, I never have smoked cigarettes. It's no great trait of character on my part, I just never have been able to pick up the habit. I've tried and something's wrong with me. I just can't develop it. So I never have smoked. And at the same time there is an argument to be made on behalf of smoking. I suppose it brings a great deal of pleasure and relaxation to a great many people. At any rate, I had very little trouble in justifying, taking some positions. And I made a rather lengthy, well-researched speech to something similar to the Tobacco Institute. I don't remember precisely. And I don't know that that's in my official papers. I don't recall.

CAMPBELL: I've seen that. I think it was published in Vital Speeches.

SANFORD: It was published somewhere. I believe it was. So to that extent. . . . And I testified before the FTC [Federal Trade Commission] and I testified, I think, before a congressional committee. I was very careful not to roundly condemn the American Cancer Society or even to. . . . I didn't come out in favor of cancer. But I did attempt to do that. I remember, over here at the Duke Law School, I was making a speech and then asked questions. And I bore down right heavily on the automobile makers, a la [Ralph] Nader, although he wasn't then on the scene. But I was saying that the lack of properly-designed safety features really causes more deaths than anything else if you want to look behind the records, as we've done. And I think this has got to be done. And the federal government's failing because no state can legally do it. It involves interstate commerce. And some boy said, "Well, how can you be in favor of tobacco manufacturing and against this?" And I said, "It is very, very simple and no problem at all to explain." I said, "I don't live in Detroit. I

live in North Carolina." But I did take a position that was in favor of the tobacco industry, at least in favor of giving them a fair break. And I could hardly do less. We lead in the growth and the manufacture.

CAMPBELL: I have a note here about a few specific meetings you had with the President. In January of 1963, January 10th, our records indicate you had an off-the-record meeting, just yourself and the President. Do you recall that?

SANFORD: That probably was the meeting I had to talk about the Environmental Health Center. This is a long story and I won't burden this record with it, but we got on to this quite by accident after Dr. [Paul M.] Gross, who had been the vice president at Duke and was a distinguished scientist, recommended that this be set up--in fact, I think he invented the term or put it together--and that it be put in the Washington area. Two or three people from Chapel Hill came to see me and said, "We need it. North Carolina is ideally situated for it." So we got Oscar Ewing, who lives now in Chapel Hill and who knew all these people, to help us delay the decision. Finally, it was written into the law that it couldn't be within fifty miles of Washington. And it shouldn't have been in Washington. We were so right on this that I was pretty certain we'd ultimately get it, but we ran into all the bureaucracy, all the special interests.

And so I did go to see the President. I'd been telling him ever since I first knew about it, and through his staff, that we wanted it. This was really all we wanted. Everytime you go ask for something, that's all you want, you know. But I remember that conversation. I said, after making the case, "There're only two places in the country this ought to be. It can't possibly be in Washington and be effective. There are only two places where you've got the back-up support and that's the Harvard area and the Triangle area in North Carolina." And he said, "Now, tell me why you think North Carolina is better than Boston." And I told him that I wouldn't fall into that trap, but that

I thought that he would agree with me that we needed it more.

CAMPBELL: In April of 1961, just shortly after the Administration was in office, our records indicate that you had a meeting with the Senators, Senator Ervin and Senator Jordan, and with the President. Do you recall? Was there something specific there?

SANFORD: That was what year?

CAMPBELL: This was '61, in April, April 27th. To put it in a time frame, it would have been shortly after the Bay of Pigs, I suppose.

SANFORD: I don't remember. It had something to do with something we wanted, and it might have been the early stages of the Environmental Health Center. I can't think of anything else.

CAMPBELL: I have a record here of a couple of . . .

SANFORD: We had two or three things, but we wouldn't have bothered the President with things such as moving the Corps of Engineers out of Wilmington to Savannah. I called the White House and the White House said, "All you've got to do is get Lennon to call over here and ask that it be left there." Obviously, you understand what that game was. So I had somebody call Lennon and tell him that. And he says, "I'm not going to do it. If I ask them for a favor, they'll ask me for a favor." And they moved the Engineers to Savannah.

Then, we had some same sort of a problem, the desalinization pilot plant was in Wilmington at Wrightsville Beach. And [Stewart L.] Udall was going to move it because of Lennon. And I did make a special appeal there. I don't think to the President, though. So I can't recall, might not have been anything.

CAMPBELL: I notice that there were a couple of meetings you had, I think, with the President attending, related to the Appalachian Project, this special . . .

SANFORD: Yes. I think we had lunch one time with the various governors from the Appalachian states.

CAMPBELL: How successful an effort was that for North Carolina in the early years?

SANFORD: Well, it was all right. It wasn't ever quite put together the way I thought it ought to have been put together, but I made the point to the President--I remember making a little speech about these were the descendants of the hardiest pioneers looking for the new frontier, that then they were left isolated because transportation changed, that we really had the school support and the public health support, though obviously you need all the money you can get, but what we needed was transportation. Which meant in this case, allocation of money for super highways so that trucks could get in and that kind of transportation. Then we could build the industry. I thought that this would be the greatest thing that we could do. And if we just put all the concentration on that, the other things follow. But it got involved in too much bureaucracy. I don't think that we ought to have limited it to roads. But I was making the point that a few fundamentals would open up that country and then you don't have to worry about them. I was talking about North Carolina, though. Not Kentucky, not West Virginia where they had had an economy that collapsed. We had an economy that never emerged. And there was a distinction. I was aware of that.

CAMPBELL: I was interested in reading your book, Storm Over the States, and thought one of the theses there was that Congress was dealing with many things that could have been better handled on a state level. Did you ever have the occasion to discuss that with John Kennedy?

SANFORD: Yes, I did. And I suggested to him that we ought to make a big thing out of it--you know, maybe in the second campaign. We even had some devices worked out, later worked out, that, we thought, provided the proper presidential leadership, would encourage more states to go ahead and do these things without sitting around and waiting. We never really did develop it because we didn't get to that point. We had emergency after emergency and nobody quite thought the term would come to end in three years. So, you know, we left so many things undone. But I felt it could be a major issue for him as well as good for the country, as he turned more to domestic things. And I did make the plea very strongly. Of course, the poverty program was being put together. I thought we did have something to offer there in our own experience. And I felt again that, like the Appalachian program, got caught up in the massive bureaucracy that now has caused it pretty much to fold. I was terribly distressed that we ended up just pumping up these Administrative salaries. I wasn't in favor of paying any administrator a substantial amount of money to work. You know, you just didn't want to create this whole new bureaucracy. And people had to come and go.

Well, the first thing you knew, we'd gone from paying people eight or nine thousand dollars to paying twenty and twenty-five thousand just because of the monster that that program created. Not that it wasn't a good program, but how do you have a program without all the bureaucracy. And I think, you know, we could have made a good thing out of it if time had permitted.



CAMPBELL: Do you recall ever having any discussions with the President or people with the Democratic National Committee or at the White House about prospects for 1964?

SANFORD: Well, as a matter of fact, as early as October of 1961 when he came to Chapel Hill, I rode over and back with him, so I got that much of a chance of a visit.

I'll digress just a moment. I was going that afternoon to open the North Carolina Trade Fair, a thing we had started. He was going to Fort Bragg, which he had accepted after this. He'd long accepted our date for Chapel Hill. I saw no reason that I shouldn't go on to Charlotte and open the fair. So I didn't get in on the invitation--I did get in on the invitation, but didn't get in on the trip to Fort Bragg. But as the story build up that Kennedy was coming, all kinds of people came to see me. "Now you tell him this. Here's something that I want you to tell the President." Then the textile people, "Would you talk to him again about the import thing?" And then I'd had a special association at Fort Bragg, having been in the airborne and the Special Forces having grown out of the airborne. The first commander was a good friend of mine. In fact, I'd been made an honorary member and given a green beret because I was president of the National Airborne Association the first year it was organized. So they came to see me and they said, "The President's coming to Fort Bragg. He's going to see our demonstration. How about putting in a plea on our behalf to make the green beret the official head-gear?" It wasn't. It was just worn on an informal basis. So I picked out one or two things that I felt I could talk to him about. I did talk to him about the textile thing because it was so important and had to be done right or we'd get to where we are today, having to impose quotas. Well, it wasn't done right, which is another story. But, then, I told him this story about the green beret and what they were doing, and how I thought they could be used in a valuable way. I just gave him the story as I knew it. He approved it, as you remember. Then Mrs. Kennedy insisted that a couple of them be engaged in the funeral. So I think

that maybe the only substantial contribution that I made during the Kennedy years was to get the green beret approved. [Laughter]

Coming back from Chapel Hill, at a turn to the airport, there was a little kid holding up a sign that said, "Welcome, Nelson." And he said, "What does that mean?" I said, "I reckon it's Nelson Rockefeller." He said, "It certainly is odd to be out here with a handmade sign like that." He'd just been talking about Rockefeller as a possible candidate. I said, "The name of this little intersection is Nelson, North Carolina." He said he hoped that [Barry M.] Goldwater would be the candidate, that he thought he could really wrap up Goldwater and that he hoped it would not be Rockefeller. He felt Rockefeller would be real trouble.

CAMPBELL: There's a quote of yours reported someplace, I believe from the fall of 1963, in which you are reported to have said that you didn't think John Kennedy could win at that time in your state. I wonder if you recall what the factors would have been that would have led you to that conclusion.

SANFORD: I don't think I made that statement quite that way. I really don't recall unless I could see it and refresh my memory.

CAMPBELL: I think it's in Theodore Sorensen's book or it's in [Theodore H.] Teddy White's '64 book, one or the other. I'm really sorry I've forgotten which place it's reported.

SANFORD: Well, and what the context was, because probably it was true. But why I would have felt it was appropriate to say it, I just don't remember.

CAMPBELL: I think the context was simply. . . . It included the increasing problems of civil rights in the South and just simply the decreasing Gallup polls, I suppose.

SANFORD: Yes. I don't really recall it because it wasn't any big flap over it, as I can remember. He certainly could not have won. And this is one thing that threw us off base, that caused us to lose the Richardson Preyer contest for Governor to succeed me. Because Bert Bennett and I made the decision that we'd leave Preyer alone that we'd put our people with him and give him a start, in fact, got him into the race, but that we would not be actively associated with him because we'd save our strength to support Kennedy in '64. We didn't want to get tied in there in a way that we couldn't do it. Then after Kennedy was assassinated, Preyer was already running. It was an unusually long campaign. For some reason we never re-evaluated that decision. And it turned out to be a mistake because we had nothing to save our strength for. But we were very worried about Kennedy being able to carry the state again. And we were extremely anxious to do our share. And I know we were very much worried about it. Why I would have said it, I don't remember. There was probably a logical reason.

CAMPBELL: I'd just wondered, along the same line, what could the Kennedy Administration have done differently to have retained support in North Carolina?

SANFORD: Oh, I don't know that they could have done anything. And I wasn't in favor of their drawing in their horns. In fact, I publicly applauded his statement about sending the troops to Jackson. While I was very careful to avoid any criticism of another governor, this being one of the rules of the fraternity, I supported what he did in Mississippi and Alabama--I mean publicly supported it--that it was necessary, and that his explanation of it, I think of the Jackson thing. . . . We were in a Governors' Conference in Florida somewhere and I was the only Governor that would comment on it, at least favorably. I think it was the Southern Governors' Conference. So I don't think there's anything much different that they could have done. And I wasn't even suggesting that they do. You know, it was just some hard times that we had to weather, and I felt we would. But it had to come.

CAMPBELL: Had the President or anyone else in Washington ever discussed with you the possibility, which as you know has been reported, of your replacing Lyndon Johnson?

SANFORD: No. I don't think Evelyn Lincoln would have lied about it, of course, but I think it was one of those things that you say without really meaning and you say just to get it off your chest. He no doubt was exasperated with Lyndon, all the way through; he couldn't have helped anything but be. I don't doubt that he said it. I don't doubt that, casting his eye over the South, of probably falling on me. So that's probably how it happened. But, I don't think they ever seriously considered getting rid of Lyndon. I think it would have been a bad error politically and I don't think they would have made that kind of error. I think they could have tolerated Lyndon four more years and would have, or should have. In any event, I would have been strongly in favor of their keeping Lyndon, not me.

CAMPBELL: Well, I believe I've almost covered it. You've been very gracious to give me so much time.

Could you say a word--I was interested in the setup of the North Carolina Fund and the pilot projects that you got involved in. Did Washington help at all in the planning or the execution of any of those projects? I wondered if you got involved with the Office of Education or HEW [Department of Health, Education, and Welfare].

SANFORD: We tried to get all the money we could from the Office of Education. We had Francis Keppel down two or three times and developed a very strong friendship. But we were mostly trying to get money for some of our special education projects and new ideas, and we did. The Advancement School was made possible by a study grant from the OE, as well as other such projects. I don't recall that they got involved in the poverty program, the North Carolina Fund. This was done mostly by John Ehle in my office and Paul Ylrisaker of the Ford Foundation. We also got Labor Department money for three special schools we called operation Second Clause. Whenever we needed funds for special projects we usually got it without going through the White House. In President Johnson's Administration, we were in the process of getting a two or three million dollar grant from HEW to set up what would have been--we were going to call it a booster school. It turned out to be what they later called the Job Corps. We had the proposal in and had the money more or less committed. We had the HEW representative at the Mansion two or three times. Within a day or so of final approval President Johnson announced his program for poverty and that knocked out our booster school. It also knocked out a better approach, in my opinion, to the Job Corps' needs than what ultimately turned up. We had already even made arrangements to take over an old barracks setup at Kinston. We were going to take over an old high school in Raleigh and not have them in residence. And then we had something working in the western part of the state. So to that extent. But in planning the North

Carolina Fund effort, I don't recall ever talking to anybody at the planning stage. John Ehle probably did, and George Esser director of the Fund, would know if we got any federal money in the early stages. We did do something in connection with that. I had the idea that if we could get somebody that was non-bureaucratic out in the county worrying about these people-problems, it would be a whole lot better than just another social worker. So Ellen Winston gave me almost all of her experimental money and we hired twenty-five or thirty, as I recall, people that worked in the Welfare Department but very carefully were not social workers. This was a pilot program that we announced the same time that we announced the North Carolina Fund. They were to be concerned with people, not programs, and were to look to the needs of neglected people in employment, training, education, child care, health, a kind of on-the-scene local operating ombudsman. It did some good things. Obviously, you had to have support from the governor's office because the bureaucracy would be against that. As soon as I got out, it faded out.

CAMPBELL: What was your impression in this period of the whole Democratic National Committee operation and John Bailey's personal effectiveness?

SANFORD: Well, I think the Democratic Committee was highly ineffective. He was harmless, but he wasn't a real leader. I don't think Larry O'Brien ever let him do much anyhow. So you knew if you had some decision, you had to go talk to O'Brien. We got on extremely well with John because we understood that. He always supported anything we asked whatever it was. I don't recall anything at the moment. But very pleasant relationship. But I never had the impression that he was running it.

CAMPBELL: Were you involved at all--I know that Senators are basically involved in the appointments of judges . . . .

SANFORD: The only one was Spencer Bell. Then Richardson Preyer was named. I had nothing to do with it. The bar in Greensboro resented [Malcolm B.] Seawell being named because he did not reside in the district. Seawell was Attorney General under Hodges. He ran against me for governor as Hodges' candidate. And a lot of people thought that I cut him out. But I didn't; I didn't have anything to do with it. The only thing that I declined to do, at Hodges urgent request I declined to say to Kennedy go ahead and appoint Seawell. Then, Hodges said, "Well, let's put Seawell in the circuit court job." And I said, "That's committed to Bell." Then, they tried to knock Bell out of that. Ervin did for a while. I already had the Kennedy commitment but Bell was so distinguished, and even moreso in comparison the Ervin candidate that he could not be successfully opposed. But I had nothing to do with the district judges. I very carefully left that to the Senators. In the first place, another one of my opponents, John Larkins, was named judge in eastern North Carolina. If I'd had any reason to be vindictive, I'd have been vindictive there. But the Preyer appointment was just a happenchance. Then, in the west, Ervin named a man from his hometown, I'm satisfied to block Chick Riddle, from the same town.

CAMPBELL: [James B.] Craven.

SANFORD: Judge Craven, after he was nominated, came to see me and asked for our support. I said, "You know, of course we'll support you." He said, "I really don't know Senator Ervin, though I live in Morganton. I've never been in his house, and he's never been in mine." Now, I think he--he turned out to be a truly outstanding judge. Well, he already was a good judge. I'd tried cases before him and knew him. But Ervin must've done that to block what he feared as an effort on our part to put in Riddle. And I think it did knock it out. And I think we would have had to recommend Riddle if Riddle had pressed us. It would have been a good recommendation. I later made him a Superior Court Judge.

CAMPBELL: How about the U.S. attorneys? Were you involved in those decisions?

SANFORD: No. It turned out that they were all, I think, friends of ours. But I know I didn't initiate anything.

CAMPBELL: Well, I really have come to the end of my list. And, as I say, you've been very gracious. Is there anything else that you recall, your memories of President Kennedy or some evaluation of the Administration.

SANFORD: Well, you could talk on and on, I suppose, about the Kennedy Administration. And I truthfully did not consider that I played much of a role in it. We had so much to do in North Carolina and we were trying to do a great many things. We were trying to demonstrate, among other things, that a state can do its own business and it ought to get on with it and not sit around waiting. And for that reason I did, to some extent, avoid Washington.



We had Henry Wilson in the White House and we put all kinds of North Carolina burdens on him. Every time somebody wanted a sewer project approved in Pitt County, we'd call Henry and say get it through. And we usually got the announcements in advance of the senators and congressmen where it was important for us to know in advance. And it was very good to have Henry there. And we placed a lot of people in federal government at all levels because we had Henry. We seldom needed to bother the President or to go as far as O'Brien. I do know that he gave very sympathetic concern to the two or three things that we did take up with him, including such minor problems as where the bombing range would be in the duck hunting country. This was a matter of crucial importance to Bonner.  
[Laughter]

File

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
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Oral History Interview

with

JAMES TERRY SANFORD

July 27, 1970  
Durham, North Carolina

By Ann M. Campbell

For the John F. Kennedy Library

CAMPBELL: Maybe we could begin by my asking if you recall when you first met John Kennedy and what your impressions were at that time.

SANFORD: I'm not sure that I met John Kennedy in 1956 at the Convention [Democratic National Convention]. I saw him. He came over and addressed our delegation. The only real enthusiastic supporter that he had then was a young lady from my hometown, as a matter of fact, of Laurinburg, a Mrs. McBryde [Gaston McBryde], who was a very active and very fine political worker. She was extremely enthusiastic for Senator Kennedy at that Convention. She brought him over and I probably shook his hands, but the impression at that time was not much different from what I already thought of him which was, I must say, a favorable impression from what I'd read in the papers. But I didn't make any real effort to get to know him.

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The next time I saw him was a couple of years later when he came to Charlotte to address a Chamber of Commerce annual meeting and brought Mrs. Kennedy [Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy] with him. The then publisher of the *Charlotte News* was apparently the chairman of the Chamber of Commerce. He called me and he said that Senator Kennedy was coming. He had promised him to get as many delegates as possible to meet him at a little

party afterwards, and he wasn't having much success, and would I do him a favor and come. Well, I was thinking about running for governor, and I certainly wanted the the support of the *Charlotte News*. So I did go. I was about the only delegate there from '56. But I was very much impressed -- as soon as Kennedy zeroed in on the fact that I had been a delegate and probably would be a delegate again, you could feel the attention that he immediately gave me in a crowded room of Chamber of Commerce people, who obviously didn't mean anything to him in the political sense. He made a right good speech, and I was much impressed with the fact that he was doing this, it struck me, in a professional way of not just dashing around the country making speeches but was attempting to organize his politics as he went.

He did indicate to me then that he -- well, he said in so many words that he was a serious candidate. I'm not sure that I thought he was prior to that or that he was quite ready or that I would have put him in the category. At any rate, I was very much impressed with him. And I think that's the first time I had any conversation with him.

He then came back to speak to a Young Democratic meeting at the invitation of Henry Hilson, who later worked in the White House. Henry was one of my close associates. We had some longer but still very much generalized conversations with him then, though it was becoming apparent that he meant to go.

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CAMPBELL: May I just take you back to 1956? I think your delegation voted first ballot vice presidential votes for Governor Hodges [Luther H. Hodges] or Governor elect Hodges at that time.

SANFORD: Oh, he was Governor because he had succeeded at Lieutenant Governor.

CAMPBELL: Oh, that's right, for the two-year term. Then you passed the second ballot, and I believe, at the end of the voting of that ballot, cast most of your votes for John Kennedy. Do you recall what the attitude of the delegation was toward the then-Senator Kennedy?

SANFORD: Yes. As a matter of fact, an old gentlemen, a friend of mine from my hometown, named Judge MacRae [James MacRae] went as my alternate. Since I'd only been in Fayetteville for six or seven years and he'd been a lifetime resident, it probably ought to have been the reverse. But I got myself elected as the delegate, and he got elected as the alternate. He asked me if he could be on the floor when the voting for the vice president took place. At the time he asked, he thought that surely Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson] would designate somebody and he wanted his chance to be on the floor. I thought it would be great. So I said yes. I wasn't actually involved in the voting. He voted for Kefauver [Estes Kefauver]. And I had told him that I would have voted for Kefauver.

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I judged at the time that Senator Ervin [Sam J. Ervin] and the other people who supported Senator Kennedy did so as an anti-Kefauver vote and not at all as a pro-Kennedy vote. Later events in 1960, when I was supporting Kennedy, indicated the truth of that. They were never really for Kennedy. They simply saw this as a way of knocking down Kefauver, whom they considered a traitor to the South. That's not much in detail.

Interestingly enough, Senator Ervin, I believe, ended up voting for Senator Kennedy, but really was for Hubert Humphrey, which is another very amusing thing. He'd made a right impassioned plea on behalf of Humphrey in the caucus. And then two or three of the old guard reminded him of 1948, and he lost his never. But he was very much for him and had made the point that there was no more able senator in Washington, which was probably true. I think he did end up voting for Kennedy. And then one or two other people got votes: Gore [Albert Gore] got a vote or two; Hubert Humphrey got a vote or two, and maybe somebody else. I was watching that part of it on television.

CAMBPELL: Well, you've mentioned the '58 Kennedy visit to Charlotte and then the Young Democrats meeting with Henry Hall Wilson. Was there anyone within the state in this period of time, '58 and '59, that was working for John Kennedy's candidacy? Do you recall any contacts?

SANFORD: I don't really recall anybody that was working for him. Mrs. McBryde mentioned him to me two or three times. Later, Judge Riddle [H.L. Riddle, Jr.] of Morganton became his strongest supporter. But that was not until 1960.

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CAMPBELL: That was early 1960.

SANFORD: Well, it was sometime during the spring of 1960. He had known some of the people in Ethel Kennedy's [Ethel Skakel Kennedy] family, who had a plant at Morganton. And that probably was the first way he made that contact.

CAMPBELL: Was he in contact with you in early 1960?

SANFORD: Well, in all fairness, Judge Riddle is a great old friend, but he's not really a person of much influence. He would not have been the person that you would have picked to head up your campaign. And I thought it was a good indication of John Kennedy's ability to size up people because it didn't take him long to know that Riddle really wasn't his key man. I think he, Riddle, most of all wanted a job in the White House. And Kennedy dismissed that out of hand, in a gracious way. He made him the marshall of the Inaugural parade. When I told him that he wanted to work in the White House, he said, "Well, we've already done all we can do for him." But Riddle does assert, and with some justification, that he was the first real Kennedy supporter. I've always publicly

acknowledged that he was and I think this is accurate. Though I don't think he really picked up much support.

CAMPBELL: What was your feeling about the potential presidential candidate in early 1960? By that time you were a candidate also.

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SANFORD: I was a candidate and preoccupied with this. I felt that we could take these other things as we came to them. I was very careful to not position myself. I thought a lot of -- still do -- of Stuart Symington. At that time he looked like he might be a candidate. I thought a lot of Hubert Humphrey, but not in a personal way. I don't know that I had ever met him. But I admired him from a distance. I'm not sure that I ever thought Hubert Humphrey was strong enough to be President. But at the same time, I'm sure I didn't rule him out. Kefauver was probably dead by then.

CAMPBELL: No. He was alive, but I think not much of a factor in 1960. Of course, Lyndon Johnson was...

SANFORD: Now, Lyndon Johnson, I knew fairly well because I'd been Kerr Scott's campaign manager for the U.S. Senate. Lyndon Johnson was the only one I knew. I really didn't know Jack Kennedy. But I did know Lyndon Johnson. I made two or three cautious statements that I thought Lyndon Johnson's ability to get together all the factions in the Senate might indicate that he had the capacity to get together the people of the world which I considered the major challenge for the Presidency. But I stopped far short of endorsing him because I had some misgivings about some of his personal traits. And perhaps, if I'd have been less cautious. I would have gone ahead and said I was for Lyndon Johnson in the middle of my campaign. It certainly would have been a politically advisable move, but I had certain misgivings and I just didn't want to do it.

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It wasn't that I was so much for John Kennedy because, like most other people, I was just beginning to observe him in that kind of a political, presidential setting. I played it on out and didn't make up my mind until after I was nominated in the second primary. I did, of course, in the meantime talk to Ramsey Potts, who was assistant to Symington. I talked to several other people from time to time about the candidates, including Bobby Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy] (for which I got into a great deal of political trouble.) I talked to Bobby Baker [Robert C. Baker] and two or three other of Lyndon's people.

CAMPBELL: Can you recall specific contacts? You've mentioned your meeting with Robert Kennedy and Bert Bennet, I believe, which did receive some

publicity. Did you have contacts before that, either personally or through an intermediary with the Kennedy camp?

SANFORD: Well, I kept getting messages from Riddle that I ought to talk with them and that I should go ahead and make a commitment. Well, I wasn't anywhere near ready to risk my own political situation by making a commitment on the presidential level, and certainly not to a person that, at that time, had so little support in North Carolina.

I suppose the person that reached me most effectively on behalf of the Kennedys was Louis Harris. He'd been a friend of mine at Chapel Hill when he was an undergraduate. We weren't quite classmates, as I've later claimed. I think he was a year or two behind me. But in any event, he did all the polling for Kennedy in the primaries. And I had been in touch. In fact, I'd used him to do a poll for me. It was the first time North Carolina ever used the polls. And, incidentally, that's one thing that impressed me about Jack Kennedy, as a candidate for Congress, he had a poll done, and one of the first times, I think, in the country that a candidate used one. I was advised by Harris and Riddle that Kennedy would carry Wisconsin and that I should pledge before that date; but I did not do it. So Lou Harris suggested that I ought to talk to John Kennedy or to Robert. And I did not really want to do it until after the election.

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CAMPBELL: Your second primary?

SANFORD: Yes. I didn't have any desire to get on a bandwagon. There really wasn't anything that I had to accomplish by doing that. It was nothing to me to get on early because in the final analysis it's not important. But Harris was very anxious and asked me three or four times if I would see, as it turned out, Robert. I agreed to do it. And really, it's the only serious mistake of my political career, assuming that getting into politics wasn't a serious mistake in the first place, because I didn't handle it well. It came in the middle of the second primary when all of us were physically exhausted. I'm sure Bobby Kennedy was, too. In fact, he was so ill at the time that he couldn't even eat dinner with us. I'm sure he's been working day and night. But so had we. They flew down to Raleigh and I met them for dinner at a motel outside of town. Lou Harris was there, Bert Bennett, Hugh Cannon, who later was my Director of Administration, now is my law partner. We had dinner together and talked. I was very much impressed that they were well organized, that they had a reading on every past delegate, ever delegate that we would have at the '60 Convention -- not detailed, but at least they had a 8 x 5 card, which impressed me. I suppose we always used 3 x 5's. But they were well organized. And he shuffled through the cards and knew who was going. We added a little bit of information.

In effect, I told him I was much impressed, much inclined to be for him, but that I wasn't at all ready to make a statement and that I did not want to make a decision until I got out of my own campaign. I obviously wasn't absolutely certain that I would win it. It was a



very difficult campaign because it was one of the worst campaigns from a point of view of the injection of the race issue that we'd had in a governor's race in forty or fifty years.

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So I left it that way and he flew on back. I made my mistake because any kind of issue in a second primary can get out of hand. You don't have enough time to develop it. So when somebody hits you with something, it's just too bad; it's too late to get out of it. And I did not want it known that Luther Hodges was supporting me. He was fairly unpopular politically. That was one thing I was trying to evade. He had not supported me in the first primary and I was willing to leave it like that. The other thing, I certainly didn't want to be associated with the Kennedy candidacy at that stage of the game. I didn't see any polls, but I would have guessed that he would have been way, way down at that particular time with the race issue and the other emotionalism involved. So I really didn't want it known that I was talking to them. That's why I ate out at a motel. But I should have had sense enough to know that you don't hide things of that kind.

The next day a reporter that was obviously inclined to be unfriendly asked me, first of all, if Luther Hodges was supporting me. And I evaded that somewhat and side-stepped it. He had not announced for me so that was easy. Then he asked me if I saw Jack Kennedy when he was in town the other day. And I seized on that to say no. And he, obviously, didn't realize he said Jack Kennedy. And I knew that. But I said no on two counts. I doubt if Bobby Kennedy ever hit the city limits of Raleigh, and he certainly wasn't Jack Kennedy. But that was a terrible error, and I've never made that mistake again. I've always just told it like it was. But at that time I didn't tell it like it was. And it wasn't the fact that I saw Kennedy but that I had seen him in secret and denied seeing him, because, of course, he wrote the story that I said I hadn't seen Bobby Kennedy when, indeed, so-and-so, and so-and-so, and so-and-so said I had. It made me look very bad. And I squirmed out of it as best I could by saying that he asked me about Jack Kennedy, that I'd seen Bobby Kennedy, that I had not made a pledge to him, and he had not brought two hundred thousand dollars (or some other amount) in a satchel. I was being accused of getting money from the NAACP

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[National Association for the Advancement of Colored People], from labor, from the Kennedys, that I'd bankrupt the state like Soapy Williams [G. Mennen Williams] did. I ended up running against Soapy Williams and the NAACP, or defending them in running. But in all that setting, it was not good.

I then did something that probably would be considered a little sneaky, but I sent word to the Johnson people that, yes, I would change my earlier position, I would see their people before the election. I did not say I would be for Johnson, only that I would see them. What I obviously wanted to do was to say, "Look, I'm meeting with Johnson's people." Of course, Johnson, then, was overwhelmingly popular. At any rate, Bobby Baker and Bill Cochrane [William M. Cochrane] from Senator Jordan's [B. Everett Jordan] office came down. We met in Greensboro in a motel room. The next day I leaked it to the press and said

I'd been talking to him. I also pointed out that I'd seen Symington's man and somebody else maybe. Anyhow, I got out of it fairly well.

But it laid the groundwork for Drew Pearson's allegation on the day of the nomination that I had taken money from the Kennedys and that's why I was supporting Kennedy when no other reason made any sense; that why would somebody from North Carolina support a Kennedy? He later retracted that charge and he wrote it very carefully. The truth of the matter, everything he said was true except his conclusion. He reported that a Johnson man had to come to me; it's a fellow named Robert Redwine, who had been a writer for Governor Scott and had some committee job up there. He came down to see me and said that he'd like to bring me a sizable contribution, six or seven thousand dollars, which really wasn't so sizable in terms of what we needed. All I'd have to do was to say something that I believed and was going to say anyhow, namely, that I'd be for Lyndon Johnson. Well, I said, "Nothing doing. I'm not ready for that decision. And I appreciate it, but I just don't need that money." So Redwine then told Jack Anderson and Jack Anderson actually wrote the story. He said, "He turned down Lyndon Johnson's money. Therefore, everybody knows you have to have money, so it must follow that he took Kennedy money." He very carefully didn't say I did. That story did me a lot of damage, too, and still does occasionally pop up as being the truth. He did retract it after I talked to him and told him that not only had Kennedy given us any money, but

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that Bert Bennett and I had personally signed a note for fifty thousand dollars and sent it to the Democratic headquarters on behalf of Kennedy after the Convention until we could raise the money in the state, that we advanced our fifty thousand. In any event, he retracted it. But I suppose this was a technique they used: The retracted it only in North Carolina with a special story, not in his column. [Raleigh *News and Observer*, August 20, 1960.] And I could have made a point of that because if it was libelous, it was libelous everywhere it was printed. But I didn't make a point of it; I didn't consider it that important.

CAMPBELL:       When was your decision made, then, to support Senator Kennedy in Los Angeles?

SANFORD:        Right after the primary, which was the last Saturday in June -- this Convention started about the 10th of July, as I recall, so there wasn't much time, -- I talked with Bert Bennett. He and I agreed, generally, that we ought to support Kennedy because this was the voice of the future, that this was the fresh approach to the country, and it was what we believed in in North Carolina. He simply suited our philosophy and our style and our approach, and we ought to be with them.

There was no reason for us to be with Lyndon Johnson except that it would help us win our campaign. We didn't particularly see Johnson. I had no dislike for him -- as a matter of fact, I rather liked him -- but, that he wasn't going to win anyhow and we'd make the same old futile gesture of supporting a Southern candidate when it had no connection with reality. The easy thing to do would be for Lyndon and switch to Kennedy. But, the way we ought to

play it as a matter of being honest with the whole thing was to be for him forthrightly. We weren't unaware of the fact that this would have some political advantage for North Carolina, as it certainly did.

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But I didn't make an immediate decision. I was still worried about joining forces, even if we should, if it caused us to lose the election. You have got to win before you can be of any effectiveness anyhow. So I was still disturbed by this. I talked to Henry Hall Wilson. I remember Henry came out to the motel where I was staying. I was lying out by the pool in the sun and he was sitting there, rather awkwardly, in his black suit. And I said, "Well, I've got to make this decision." He had been my assistant campaign manager. And he says, "You don't have a choice. You've got to be for Kennedy. It's just inconceivable that you'd do anything else." And I talked to Ben Roney, who was my long time associate, assistant to Governor Kern Scott, now is the Administrative Assistant to the present Governor Scott [Robert W. Scott]. He was kind of my hard-nosed, wardhealing type, eastern North Carolina politician, rough-and-tumble type person. He was pushing for Johnson. And he said, "If you support Kennedy, everybody'll say that it was because they put money in your campaign, just as they've been chagrined." We talked about that. Finally, he agreed that it'd be alright to be for Kennedy. He said, as I recall the conversation, that, "I wouldn't be for him unless you have an obligation to him." And I said, "Well, I have." I suspect he thought perhaps that I had received some money. And I meant, without spelling it out to him, that I had an obligation to play it this way for the future of the way I thought we ought to play our politics, which I hoped could be a new type of politics. So he said, "Well, in that case go ahead." [Laughter] So I had most of my campaign elements on my side.

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Then, I talked to several other people, including Dick Phillips [Dickson Phillips], who is the Dean of the Law School at Chapel Hill but was my law partner at the time. He thought that we ought to go for Kennedy on the merits. My other law partner that was also involved in my political activities was Donald McCoy, who now heads my old firm and is a very liberal and progressive force in that community. He had serious misgivings. In fact, he finally sent me word in California to go ahead and vote for him, but not to second his nomination; that that much exposure would be so damaging and look like I was doing it for the glory. And I was so impressed by that that I caught Bobby Kennedy and told him that I wouldn't do it. But he insisted anyhow. I convinced him I really didn't want to do it. He says, "You really don't want to do it?" And I said, "No." And he said, "Well, I'll talk to Jack." They came back and said, "We want you to do it." So I had to. And I never could get a call through to McCoy. It was so difficult to get a line out of Los Angeles to tell him to look out, that I was going all the way.

The other people I talked to were not extensive because I didn't want to get in a position of exposure. But I did call Bobby, oh, four or five days before the Convention and say that I'd made up my mind to vote for Jack and I hoped that we could bring a few more

votes. At that time I thought I could bring about half of them. But the pressure really got on. He, then, said.... I think he called me back and said that Jack would like me to second the nomination. And I said, "Well, I'll think about that." Then, I said, "I'm going to announce this tomorrow when I get back to North Carolina." (I was at a South Carolina beach.) He either said then or called back and said, "Don't do it until you get to California." Well, I was a little bit disturbed about this because I had said publicly that I would make my decision and let it be known. Then I had to say that I was going to wait until I got to California, implying that I wouldn't make a decision until I got to California. I said, "I think I can predict that the

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ticket will be Kennedy and Johnson or Johnson and Kennedy and I'll make my decision (at least by implication) when I get to California and see what I think's in the best interest for the state of North Carolina and the country," some such statement. That; again, was a little bit of the untruthful side and about the second time I'd been involved in that type of shading. But on the other hand, as Bennett said, "If you're going to help them, you might as well help them their way. And if they think it helps to be there, that it will be more dramatic, then we ought to do it that way." It was too late for me to recover and clearly spell out that "I've made a decision but I'll announce when I get there." I should have done that, but I'd already done it the other way. I saw Bishop Paul N. Garber, who was the Bishop of the Methodist Church in North Carolina and Virginia. I knew the attitude of the churches, the Protestant churches. I saw him in the hotel where I had my campaign headquarters as I was leaving for the airport to go to Los Angeles. I drew him away from some Methodist preachers, because I'd been very active in the Methodist Church, I said, "I want you to know that I'll probably support John Kennedy." And he said, "Good. Go to it." Well, he didn't carry many of his preachers with him, including my local preacher who withdrew the invitation that I had to make the October Layman's Day sermon. I wanted him to, in a way, but I still resented the fact that he did. I suppose that fairly well answers when and how I made a decision.

CAMPBELL:        Could you have recruited more of your North Carolina delegates to the Kennedy cause if you'd been able to go ahead and make your announcement a little earlier and begin working?

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SANFORD:        I think the only difference would have been that the public would have better understood. I was not aware of the fact of how hard it is to get a message in detail back from the West Coast: the time difference, the fact that just the reporting process is more awkward. And the biggest thing is that somehow we gave the impression that I had decided to go with Kennedy because Kennedy was the winner. Therefore, I was just picking the winner. I didn't say that at all. I did say that Johnson couldn't win, why fool with him just for the sake of sentiment and old times sake for the old South, in so many words. I don't think I said it quite that bluntly. Then, too, the whole thing was never properly explained. Had I been sitting in a press conference, I think it would have

been handled much better, a press conference in North Carolina. As far as getting people, the pressure probably would have started here before we got to California. As it was, when I made a quick, immediate survey, two-thirds of the people that were delegates were supporters of mine. We had elected Hodges chairman, though we didn't need to. And I had occasion to regret it after the Drew Pearson story. But, in any event, Hodges is a mean fighter; I'd say a dirty fighter. In any event...

CAMPBELL: And do you think the Pearson story can be attributed to him in some way?

SANFORD: Oh, no. I had about forty people, which would be about twenty votes out of seventy-two people and thirty-six votes that I was fairly certain would do whatever I wanted to do politically. And they started off the bandwagon when they got the pressure from home. My far western North Carolina manager, one of my closer friends -- still is -- said, "I just can't live politically with that vote. I just can't do it." He said, "And you'll lose the election." Well, we carried his part of the state in the final analysis and he came along. But they fell off one by one and we finally ended up with just twelve people instead of forty -- I'd guess we had about forty -- because of the tremendous pressure put on by Hodges, by Ervin, by Senator Jordan to some extent, including the pressure they were putting on me.

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CAMPBELL: What were the major arguments? What sort of pressure?

SANFORD: Well, the pressure was that you are betraying the South. You know, this is the one thing that's always an emotional thing. But the main thing was that he was going to get the hell beat out of him in North Carolina and take everybody down with him. This is what worried the boys in the western part of the state. Many of them were in the legislature. Many of them were just afraid to go home and face that kind of sentiment which they read as being very unfavorable. I was reasonably well convinced that we could carry the day. I thought we had something to go with and I thought we'd carry it though.

I knew it would be difficult. I didn't know how difficult until I started getting telegrams. And I got unbelievable telegrams from people all over the state and people that amazed me, some of my county campaign managers, one or two of whom I've never made up with, roundly condemning me. I got a few telegrams praising me, but they were pretty much the other way. I could almost look at the telegram before I opened it and if it said "Terry Sanford," I didn't want to open it. It would be good if it said "The Honorable Terry Sanford" -- there weren't very many of them. I threw away the first hundred or so. Then it occurred to me that these would be very valuable and funny in the future. So most of all of them got back in the archives after that. There must be two or three hundred over there now.

CAMPBELL: Are they in the state archives?

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SANFORD: I would think so. They, of course, like all the other papers, are under seal for a number of years. I hope they got in there.

CAMPBELL: I hope so because that's the sort of thing...

SANFORD: They may be in the University of North Carolina Southern Collection, where my campaign papers went. But they'll be one place or the other.

CAMPBELL: Good, I'm glad we got that down here. What...

SANFORD: Including a very long telegram from John Caldwell, still a friend of mine, the Chancellor of North Carolina State University at Raleigh, who is a Christian Scientist. His opposition was religious. He sent me a three or four page telegram chastising me for not being for Adlai Stevenson. And I'm sure he'd be embarrassed to ever see that telegram now. But I saved that. I know that's in there.

CAMPBELL: Who could have been considered the leader of the Johnson forces in your delegation? Would that have been Governor Hodges?

SANFORD: Sam Ervin, really. But Governor Hodges hand-in-hand. Governor Hodges really wasn't honest about it because he didn't want Lyndon Johnson. He wanted Adlai Stevenson. And he wanted Adlai Stevenson because he had concluded and told me that he'd [Hodges] be a natural for Vice President. And he really did want it. They even had brochures printed up. He had posters with his picture on it out there already, with his two or three boys that were among his staunchest supporters or stooges that were all set to go with the boom for Luther Hodges for Vice President. And he was so carried away with it that even after Kennedy got the nomination and even after he had embarrassed me in so many ways, he came and asked me if I thought that I could talk to Kennedy about him. I told him it was too late, that I'd already been for Lyndon Johnson. Hodges is a vicious kind of a person. He's a good friend of mine today. We've been good friends,

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especially after all of this was over. Bert Bennett commented that Hodges always helps us out of the trouble he gets us in. He did get us into a lot of trouble because he's the only person that brought much bitterness into that Convention. I tell this story about the morning of the nomination, when the Pearson story appeared. This, in a way, was complimentary that Pearson would consider that on that important day he could make me his target. In a way I should have appreciated it, but I was the Democratic nominee from North Carolina for Governor and this was the Democratic caucus of the -- delegation from North Carolina. AND so the country chairman from a county, Greensboro, Guilford County, proposed that they pass a resolution censoring Drew Pearson for this false story. This, after all, was in the

interest of the Democratic Party. Well, Hodges squirmed it around and maneuvered and managed to get it tabled. But I remember going over to the hotel. I told Jack Kennedy about it. And I said, "If I ever recommend him for anything in your administration, I hope you'll just kick me out of the office." And I'll never forget this because this must've been about what he said about the businessmen after the steel episode. He was chewing chewing gum, relaxing sort of, and when I got through telling him about it, he said, "He is a bastard, isn't he?"

And so we got a big laugh when I went to see him in Georgetown recommending that he make Hodges Secretary of Commerce. Hodges had come to me after we got back from the Convention. And he had maneuvered through his Marshall Fields connection in Chicago to have Shrive [R. Sargent Shriver] ask him to be National [Businessmen for Kennedy] Chairman. Shriver called me and I said, "For heaven's sake, yes;" said, you know, "Forget the past. We're trying to win the election." And Hodges did a great job. He worked hard at it, like he does everything. And I say, we've been good friends. But he doesn't fight clean.

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CAMPBELL: How about Senator Jordan?

SANFORD: Senator Ervin...

CAMPBELL: Oh, all right. Senator Ervin.

SANFORD: ...was the most effective person. And he knew how to put the pressure on these people that.... And they were, in a way, pretty vile in their suggestions about what kind of person Kennedy was. It was a right vicious kind of a campaign to undermine him and to undermine me. They had Bill Cochrane, who was Jordan's Administrative Assistant, fly out to see me.

CAMPBELL: The morning you arrived in Los Angeles, very early or late at night?

SANFORD: This was the following day, after I'd made this shocking announcement. Ervin contended that I had misled him, when indeed I had not. I very carefully saw Jordan and Ervin before I left North Carolina and said, "I think we ought to see to it that Kennedy has some votes. We ought not to be so vicious in putting on the pressure because I think Kennedy will win. Why should North Carolina exclude itself?" They both agreed that it wouldn't be bad if he had ten or twelve votes, which was twice as many as he finally got. But Ervin later said, "But I didn't know you were including yourself in that group." I certainly didn't exclude myself. At any rate, Cochrane, who had been a roommate of mine and one of my closest friends, and still is, was flown out there. He didn't intend to come. And this would have been twenty-four hours after my arrival. Anyhow, he caught me and he said, "They've sent me out here." And I said, "Why don't you just go tell them that I'm not the kind of person that changes my mind and I don't have any intention of changing my mind. If I'm the last supporter he has, if he has no one

else, I'll vote for him and don't intend to do anything else." He said, "Well, I know that. But I want you to go meet with...."

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CAMPBELL: Bill Brawley [William H. Brawley].

SANFORD: Bill Brawley. "And I'll never forget that meeting. It must've been around midnight. We were in his suite, Brawley's suite. He was a great old boy, of course. But he'd been Lyndon's boy there for a long time. We sat up there and talked and talked, and he gave me all the arguments that Bobby Baker had given me in Greensboro. And finally he shed a few tears, put his head down and he says, "Well, you have just denied Lyndon Johnson the Presidency of the United States." I couldn't help but laugh because I knew that wasn't so. But that ended that conversation.

CAMPBELL: Could the Kennedy people give you much help there in Los Angeles with your delegation?

SANFORD: No. None. Nothing but trouble. Bill Battle [William C. Battle] reported that he was in charge of the South, and so I sent Henry Wilson or somebody to see him, probably Riddle, who was a delegate, to see him and find out, "Where is this support you've been developing over these months." So he said, "Well, Cicero Yow," who was a state senator from Wilmington, "told me that he would be for Kennedy." I said, "That's just great." He's kind of a conservative person. So I saw Cicero and the only thing I remember about that conversation of any substance was that he had two children and that he had only one badge, you know, the honorary badge. And so I was so carried away with the fact that he was going to support Kennedy, although I got no firm commitment, that I gave him my badge to give one of his children. Well, he voted for Johnson. As a matter of fact, we had all kinds of elements stacked against us. And had we known this, we would not have let Hodges serve as Chairman, though it had been traditional in the state, and I felt why stir it up -- though eight years earlier he had been a party to denying Kerr Scott that honor. They did it to embarrass Scott, and Hodges joined in it. And I had every justification, but he sent me such a pitiful plea that he wanted to be the Chairman that I thought why not start building this goodwill. He had not been for me and at the same time I wanted

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his support and didn't want any more problems. I wanted his support after I was governor.

So when Smathers [George A. Smathers] came over -- we gave every presidential candidate equal time -- Smathers came and made a Lyndon Johnson speech, not at all for himself. Lyndon Johnson came, made a Lyndon Johnson speech. When Kennedy came, half the people wouldn't stand up when the time to applaud came. You know, it was just an indication. I'd briefed him pretty well, hurriedly, on two or three things he ought to say,



including textile imports. Nobody else had thought of that. He made a big hit then with some of the conservatives that hadn't stood up. But he made a bigger hit simply because of his own personality. But we didn't pick up any votes. We didn't convert anybody. But we did get through that rather nervous ordeal. But they weren't in a position to give us any help. They didn't have any ties to North Carolina except us. And I had.... For the most part I had Riddle serving as Liaison and to some extent Henry Wilson. They say Bobby and Jack Kennedy more than I did at that stage of the game.

CAMPBELL: How were the arrangements made for your seconding speech, the drafting of it?

SANFORD: Well, fairly casual. I had in the meantime caught Bobby Kennedy on the floor and told him, "Let me get out of it. You don't really need me now. You've got this thing sewed up." And I've already recounted that. He did not agree. So then, the day of the nominations, I went over to the hotel and said, "What do you want done?" He said, "Write out something." I said, "Yes. But we ought to sort of coordinate them so everybody doesn't say the same thing." At any rate, then I went to the little house outside the gate, the little prefab...

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SANFORD: Well, I got the impression that, pretty much, John Kennedy had already made up his mind and that this was part of the very skillful effort to convince some people that this was the thing to do. I'd already, pretty clearly from the very beginning -- the first time I talked with Kennedy, I think, after I got there indicated that I thought it ought to be Lyndon Johnson. He never gave me any indication of his intentions. And I thought it for political reasons as well as the fact that I considered him an extremely competent, experienced person. So I was pretty well staked out and known as a man who would be for Johnson. I don't recall who all came to that particular meeting, but Fritz Hollings [Ernest F. Hollings] was there and Soapy Williams. And I remember an exchange between them. Soapy told Fritz that it would be as hard, "For me to sell Lyndon Johnson in Michigan as it would be for you to sell Hubert Humphrey in South Carolina." So somebody said to me -- whether it was O'Brien [Lawrence F. O'Brien] or somebody else -- said, "Well, what do you think about it? I was sitting over on the corner of the bed." I said, "You know I think it ought to be Lyndon Johnson." He then said, "Why don't you just say so very forcefully and let him know? Of course, John Kennedy was in the room. So I did. I made my little pitch for Lyndon Johnson. Williams said that he would have to oppose it, but, in effect, he said, "Don't take what I say too seriously." Therefore, when everybody else was concerned when Soapy's crowd was raising so much cain, I was fairly relaxed because I judged, maybe improperly, that it was window dressing. I don't think the decision to ask Johnson to be the Vice President was made in that meeting. But I enjoyed being there.

CAMPBELL: You're one of the more perceptive people that attended that meeting. What

sort of race did you foresee for yourself in November at that time? Did you expect a tough race for yourself?

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SANFORD: I knew we were making it tougher. I didn't know how tough. I knew from the response that I had received in Los Angeles that it would be tough. I had not anticipated that response. I had not calculated it would be that violent. It was much worse than I'd guessed. Maybe if I'd have known all all of that I wouldn't have had the nerve to go on.

Anyhow, we came back -- and this would have been in August, late July and August -- and I was pretty well worn out. In August we went up to Lake Junaluska, which is a Methodist retreat, and got a house. We were going to stay up there two or three weeks. And I started stirring out a little bit, and I realized we were in bad trouble. I had one of my assistants up there with me, Roy Wilder, my campaign publicity man, one of them. So we started some quick forays into the west. And I think it did a lot of good. We picked the campaign up about two weeks before Labor Day. And I think one reason we ultimately did so well in that part of the state, which was the far western party, was that we did make that start. And we made it because I'd sensed that we were in serious trouble.

Then I looked at the polls, and I concluded that we could go all out for Kennedy and the only way he could carry the state was if we went all out for him and that we would give up about 10 percentage points, but that we might be able to get the Kennedy candidacy over the hump. And it turned out that way. We started off with about a 2 to 1 lead over the Republican candidate, who is a very fine person, had no experience in politics, had never done anything in a civic way, particularly, had nothing going for him except the traditional Republican vote which would not have been substantial. So with a 65 percent lead I thought I could sell some and still win. Well, in the last week, I wondered. But, my lead dropped to 55 percent in the final vote, just short of 55 percent. But Kennedy came up just over 50 percent, between 50 and 51; I've forgotten now, precisely. But our lead was decent and substantial. I said, in effect, as I went around, you know, "We've got to have Kennedy." I never made a speech, I don't believe, that I didn't plug for him. At least, never a major speech. I might have stopped at a crossroad and not mentioned his name, but I doubt that.

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CAMPBELL: To what extent was your party divided? Did you count on and did you get much support from Dr. Lake's [I. Beverly Lake] people?

SANFORD: None from Dr. Lake. Dr. Lake, as a matter of fact, went around making speeches, apparently campaigning for Thomas Jefferson. He certainly never mentioned me, though I was on the platform two or three times with him. Two or three of our congressional delegations invited him to speak, thinking that this would heal the breach. Well, it gave him an opportunity to make his same old speech, appeal to his same old prejudice, never to mention Kennedy, never to mention me.

On the other hand, his campaign manager, Robert Morgan, who is now our Attorney General and who got my strong support when he ran and who will go on, probably, to be a Governor or a Senator, came all the way. He traveled with me. He introduced me. He did everything he could to carry the slate, including for Jack Kennedy. Most of the Lake's people were not the organizational sort anyhow, so we had the regulars and the party organization. Under our system, I named the chairman immediately. And so we had Bert Bennett as party chairman. And we had a very good party organization. He put together a very good county-by-county organization, building on our own campaign structure as well as the Democratic structure. So we had a great organization.

CAMPBELL: I have a note here that Henry Hall Wilson and Judge Riddle served as liaison people with the National Convention [Democratic National Convention] in Washington. Now, were they working directly for the Kennedy campaign, or for yours as well?

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SANFORD: Well, they were working for me, keeping us in touch with what was going on, making certain that they did it our way because there wasn't any question but what it had to be done our way if we were going to win. We knew the situation and they didn't. Matt Reese was broken in by us. He was assigned as the Kennedy man in our camp. And I have the impression, that I have never checked up on, that Richard Goodwin was down here for a while. Whether he came down as an advance man or one of the advance men for the Kennedy visit.... I remember we had some trouble with him with what he wanted to write and say. And I remember Matt Reese was sending in little reports to make himself look wise -- I'm very fond of Matt, I might add, parenthetically, though, no historian will care about that -- but Matt was sending in little intelligence reports. And obviously, we were getting a playback from Henry Wilson. I remember Bennett told Reese, "No, let's have this understanding, you're down here to help us," and said, "Just remember this everyday: one word from me will have you assigned to North Dakota."

CAMPBELL: As the campaign started, what did you see as the most serious problems for the Kennedy campaign in North Carolina?

SANFORD: Well, basically, a lack of any identity at all. He just wasn't known. The only thing that was known about him was that the last time North Carolina had voted Republican had been when a Catholic had run for President. So our problem, basically, was to get him known. For example, we got a copy of the -- was it the Houston speech?

CAMPBELL: The Ministerial Association speech.

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SANFORD: Yes. We played that on television three or four times at our expense. I mean, we put it on. This is a very serious problem in a state that's almost a hundred percent Protestant. Of course, Nixon [Richard M. Nixon] sort of suited this middle class Democratic voter. He came into Greensboro and made a tremendous hit. He hurt his knee there, you may remember. So...

CAMPBELL: And it laid him up for a while.

SANFORD: Oh, yes. This was our small contribution. [Laughter] We had a rusty door on a car. But he made a tremendous hit over there. And it was obvious that his campaign was just going to be a tremendous success here. And it almost was, of course. And they didn't really make any mistakes, that is not in North Carolina.

CAMPBELL: The Republicans?

SANFORD: Yes.

CAMPBELL: Did the Kennedys?

SANFORD: No. I don't think so.

CAMPBELL: Not under your directions.

SANFORD: No. I wouldn't put it that way. No. Bert Bennett though, in running both campaigns, had to make the final decisions on who said what and who went where. The only way we could do it was to tie the two campaigns together. So he had to be the boss. Now, in some states the Kennedys moved in their own organization and ran it their way, their part of it. Had we not assumed the responsibility for his campaign, then I think that would have been a legitimate organizational device. But since we assumed it, Bennett and I, to that extent of backing him up, I wasn't suggesting that we ran that sharp a campaign, but it was one campaign.

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[BEGIN SIDE II TAPE I]

CAMPBELL: Was it your decision or the decision of your people in North Carolina not to form a separate Citizens for Kennedy organization here in the state? I believe most states had some sort of Citizens setup.

SANFORD: I'm not sure. I really don't recall that we didn't have one, except I can't remember who ran it if we did. I think we had a Businessmen for Kennedy

and we had two or three special little organizations. But I think that we probably felt, and certainly if we didn't have any Citizens organization at all, we did feel with the Party running it you didn't need anything else. And, you know, having been through a couple of other national elections since then, a lot of state organizations play footsie with the national campaign. And the newspapers later said that I said that "If you don't want to vote for Kennedy, don't vote for me." I don't believe I ever made such a stupid statement. But they read my campaign as meaning that. I'd hear constantly, some newspaper man would say, "Well, he told him that 'If you can't vote for Kennedy, don't vote for me.'" Well, I'm sure that I didn't ever say that. But that was the style of our campaign.

CAMPBELL: I'm sure that you recall the trip that Senator Kennedy made into the state on September 17th, I believe, in 1960. Who worked out that itinerary? Was that you people?

SANFORD: Oh, yes. Bennett worked that out. And I think that was probably one point when there was some discussion of whether it was a good idea to do something. He finally made the choice. It was a good itinerary. It probably worked Senator Kennedy harder than some of his staff wanted him to work, but at that, we missed Asheville because of the weather.

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CAMPBELL: Did you have any problems on that trip? I believe you did have the United States Senators involved in introducing him and things. Was there any trouble in encouraging those people to participate?

SANFORD: Oh, no. By that time, they were very anxious. And they are good party people. They didn't see Kennedy as a real threat and they didn't mind being associated with him either. Nobody was running except Jordan and me. Hodges introduced him; some places, as I recall, Ervin did; I don't remember about Jordan. But they all spoke when they were asked to. And they all stayed on the whole trip, I think. I introduced him somewhere where they thought I had local support. In Greensboro, maybe, where I didn't, I believe Hodges introduced him. Anyhow, they planned that in a way that would best serve the total campaign.

CAMPBELL: What was your recommendation for emphasis from candidate Kennedy on that trip? Do you recall?

SANFORD: Well, in the first place, I felt that Kennedy's strongest asset from the very beginning was the concept of world peace. He was the kind of person that could inspire the kind of confidence around the world, and that this would be the big thing of his Administration and that it was a matter of considerable concern. And we were at that time with Dulles [John Foster Dulles] committed in a fairly disorganized way. It was a good issue. I made that issue my primary statement about Kennedy in my

seconding speech. He, of course, made the straightforward statement that he made everywhere else about getting the country going again and achieving the greatness.

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But we had the local issues worked in. The tobacco Interest in the east, he went to a tobacco auction. He made a major speech in Charlotte. And I'm sure either in the press conference or in the speech, he touched on the textile imports because we had so many people in danger of losing their jobs or going on short hours on account of the textile imports. It was, and stylish, a question. President Kennedy did do something about it. I don't remember any particular issue when he came back to Raleigh that night, but we must have had some local issues that seemed important at the time. Well, I remember, for example, he was in favor of East Carolina College getting into the Southern Conference, which got a great deal of applause on that campus when we were there. How about that for a big issue?

CAMPBELL: You mentioned that you and Bert Bennet got involved in a fifty thousand dollar note to the National Committee or the national campaign. In the end were you able to receive some funds from Washington, or did the funds basically travel from here to there?

SANFORD: I can't answer that question accurately because I very carefully kept my hands off the finances in all three campaigns, the two primaries and this. I did it for a lot of reasons. I didn't want to, in any way, get involved in receiving funds. I certainly didn't want to take any money from anybody that might later ask for something. So I'm not sure.

My impression is that far more money went to Washington than came from it. I seem to recall that in the latter days, the.... I think Bennett probably called Wasingtonand said, "If you'll pay for half of this television, we'll put it on," or something like that. But nothing really substantial. We were, by that time -- well, oddly enough, we never really had any problem of raising money. We never got any great contributions, but we changed the system of raising money in North Carolina. Whereas in the past, where they could, tremendous contributions came in, sometimes

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from special interest, and money was always put out to the county; we changed it. We gave every country manager a quota to get up locally and send us. And so we followed that pretty well on the state level. We sent money to Washington. We were probably the first state to send in the assessment which right after the nomination was put on each state. And we sent that in by Bennett and by signing a note. I think I signed it. But it was Bennett's financial statement that made it good.

CAMPBELL: How helpful was it to you that Lyndon Johnson was on the ticket?

SANFORD: Oh, very helpful. In a way, you see, it redeemed me. Had we had almost anybody else on the ticket, I don't think either one of us could have carried North Carolina. Just the fact that he came through the state on a fairly successful tour, the LBJ Special, was extremely helpful. And it calmed a whole section of people that otherwise would have been uneasy. So I don't question that Lyndon Johnson made a tremendous contribution to the campaign.

CAMPBELL: Are there other memories that you have of the campaign we should get down?

SANFORD: Well, I don't know of anything of any great importance. Bobby came into the state and campaigned and two or three of the sisters did.

CAMPBELL: Robert Kennedy was here the Saturday before the election, I believe, at a rally in Morganton or something.

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SANFORD: That's right. That's Chick Riddle's hometown. It's also Sam Ervin's hometown. Mrs. Johnson [Claudia Alta "Lady Bird" Johnson] came in campaigning. In fact, Mrs. Sanford [Margaret R. Sanford] and Mrs. Johnson were traveling across the state in the plane that later crashed. But on that trip they ran off the runway and almost turned over, in a muddy storm; in fact, so much that the people standing waiting for the group to come in thought it had wrecked. But the ladies got off and finally the plane was straightened up and they went on, which I'm not sure I would have done. In any event, it was a campaign which, with the exception of Dr. Lake and his group, was a pretty harmonious thing. Everybody pitched in, Hodges and the rest of them. You know, without Hodges, without Jordan, without Henry Jordan, Everett's brother who probably didn't do much work but still he was sitting there as campaign chairman as distinguished from party chairman -- all of those elements gave us a pretty good working coalition. And if we later fell out or had not been together earlier, at least we were during those crucial months.

CAMPBELL: Moving on then from the election, I believe you've already referred to a time that you discussed the possibility of Luther Hodges for Commerce with President-elect Kennedy. Can you recall meetings or discussions with him in that period between the election and his inauguration?

SANFORD: We had two meetings, Bert Bennett and I and nobody else -- though Riddle wanted to go. We saw him once in Palm Beach and once in Georgetown. The purpose of our visits was to say what North Carolina wanted out of the Administration in the initial stages. We wanted several things, one that he delivered on in spite of tremendous embarrassment from Adlai Stevenson. He fulfilled his promise to us; he made Gladys Tillett the [United Nations] representative for the first year.

And he called me and he says, "Is it alright if it's just a year? I'm just getting such tremendous pressure from Stevenson. It's the only way I can finally get out of it, to make Mrs.

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Tree [Mary E. Tree] the representative after the first year." That suited everybody. We asked.... Of course, we went -- to Georgetown specifically to put in a hurry-up plea for Luther. It appeared from the press that Averell Harriman might be offered that post. So Luther's friends asked me to go on up there. And we did. When I got back, I happened, a couple of nights later, to be sitting at a banquet with him honoring somebody that was going out of some office. The only time in his life that I even heard him say it, he turned over to me and said, "I really do thank you." By that time he hadn't received the appointment, but at least we had made the pitch.

And we had a few other things. I wanted to know if Kennedy would accept an honorary degree from Chapel Hill, which he did and said he would. I wanted Spencer Bell made a circuit judge. He had been one of the delegates that stayed with us -- was a wonderful person -- and he did in spite of violent opposition from Hodges and Ervin. Spencer Bell made one of the very fine judges. He died, unfortunately, a few years later.

We didn't have a whole long laundry list, but there were one or two other things. I can't remember exactly what. Oh, yes. We had somebody we wanted in Agriculture [Department of Agriculture]. We ended up getting three top positions in Agriculture: Charlie Murphy [Charles S. Murphy] and Horace D. Godfrey headed the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service. Harry Caldwell was put on this top policy committee. He'd been the head of our Grange. So of the top five or six people in Agriculture, we had three of them.

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Harold Cooley got very much upset with me. He felt I ought to have recommended him for Secretary of Agriculture and that I ought to have scuttled Hodges in favor of him. He finally got over it, but he was a little bit irritated that I hadn't supported him for that position. Well, obviously you couldn't do it. You couldn't have but one cabinet member. We didn't have any extensive requests, but felt that we ought to get them in while getting was good. And obviously, it was good because we would have missed out on two or three of those if we hadn't.

The only other thing that I can remember of any significance was that I dropped a whole cup of coffee on his rug in Georgetown. That wasn't so memorable as it was that the butler came in with a great silver pitcher of water and poured the whole thing right on top of the coffee. I have cleaned up carpet spots that way ever since.

CAMPBELL: Were you the person who was involved in Henry Hall Wilson's position at the White House and acquiring that for him?

SANFORD: No, I certainly was not. He got that purely on his merits and on the ability



of Kennedy and O'Brien [Lawrence F. O'Brien] to observe the merits. I had made one of my dearest friends, Paul H. Thompson, my finance chairman and had made him National Committeeman after my nomination. And he couldn't stand it. He just didn't like political life. He'd done this purely on a personal basis. He helped at Los Angeles, and he was a good National Committeeman. He just wouldn't stay. When the general election was over, he came to my house the next morning and said, "I want out." I said, "Okay. If you really mean that, I'll work at it." He said, "I mean today." He just didn't want to be a part of anything political. I made him stay until after my inauguration which came a month before Kennedy's Inauguration. Then I put Henry Wilson in. Just by chance, I'm saying, that we even put him in this National Committee position. But then, when he got to Washington, he'd already known them, and had made a great impression on O'Brien -- incidentally, he and I had been to see O'Brien a couple of times during this interim --

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and at the Inauguration O'Brien asked him to be his aide for Congressional affairs, an Administrative Assistant to the President. I was somewhat surprised, and so was Bert Bennett -- and Henry. I would have been glad to recommend Henry, but I had thought of Henry maybe going over and doing something in the State Department, and may have mentioned that. But Henry wasn't after anything. This was a complete surprise to me and to Henry too. And obviously, it was a wise choice. He did a great job for them.

CAMPBELL: Do you recall in this period before your inauguration and before John Kennedy's inauguration what you anticipated as far as the Administration was concerned? Do you recall having any preconceived notions of what the Kennedy Administration would be like for you in North Carolina?

SANFORD: No, I don't know that I'd really thought about that. I was certain that it would be beneficial for the state. I was certain that a good many things that we would like to get done and the ability to talk to people in Washington would be there. But I don't know that I thought that. I was probably spending more time thinking about what I would do in North Carolina.

Bobby came to my inauguration. One of my lines that got great applause was: "As the dynamic leadership of President John F. Kennedy moves us into the New Frontiers of a changing world, we will accept for North Carolina our responsibilities as citizens of the most powerful nation in the world, the last, best hope of the free world. We pledge to march with President Kennedy."

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CAMPBELL: I believe that within a month of your inauguration you made an address at Fort Bragg at a meeting of the Association of the U.S. Army. It was entitled, at least in your public papers, "President Kennedy and the Quest for Peace." You came out pretty strongly endorsing the United Nations and the

Administration's foreign policy, such as it was in that month. Do you recall why you chose to make that address at that time?

SANFORD: Well, in the first place, I'd promised some local fellow that I'd come and make the address to the Army Association. And I thought it would be a good thing to hit them with. If you can hit an audience with something that's slightly surprising, you know, I think it gets more attention. And it's a good group of people, too. I reminded them that it is more difficult to wage peace than to wage war, and that President Kennedy deserved our support as he began "anew quest for peace."

CAMPBELL: Was the White House aware you were going to make that address?

SANFORD: Oh, I'm sure not.

CAMPBELL: No?

SANFORD: I wouldn't think so. Not that I was going to or did.

CAMPBELL: I imagine they were aware you did. Had you had the occasion to discuss with the President early in his Administration or before he went into office what you thought he might do in regards to the civil rights problem in your state and in the South?

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SANFORD: I don't remember any specific conversations as such until we were pretty far along in the open accommodations. I'm sure that we talked about it. And I'm sure that I would have been encouraging in my remarks to go ahead and do it the right way and that there were many people in the South that would support it. I'm sure, too, that I must've said that we didn't want anything to appear to be imposed on us. The South really was tired of being the whipping boy on this issue when it was a nation-wide issue. I don't really remember getting down to advice... I didn't make much of a point of going to Washington to advise him. I thought he was doing all right. And usually when I was up there to see Henry about something I wanted done, Evelyn Lincoln would usually lead me in to speak with him, or Kenny O'Donnell [Kenneth P. O'Donnell] or somebody. I felt that we had to make the point that I wasn't riding this thing as part of the glamor group or the jet set or doing it for any personal advantage, so much so that I would never let Henry Wilson put our names on an invitation list. We never went to the White House. I regretted it after he was assassinated. But I told Mrs. Sanford, don't worry -- you know, she'd say, well, why is so and so up there -- and I said, "Well, don't worry about that because in the second Administration we'll go, you now, whenever we feel like it," or whenever we're invited, that is. But, right then, I felt that I ought to lean over backwards to appear that everything that I'd done was for the benefit of the state, which it really was. We even carried it to that extreme. I did go see him two or three times on invitation. And I went

to see him a number of times for things that I wanted such as the Environmental Health Center. Then he came here in October of the first year. We had some good conversations then.

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My position on the civil rights would have been that as far as North Carolina is concerned, we're going to handle our situation. And I'm sure, though, that in other parts of the country you're going to have to do something. I probably, though I don't recall, would have taken the position that the most important thing was the moral leadership that he could provide rather than just a lot of additional laws. Though we didn't have many laws, we had some. But I wasn't advocating a program of civil rights legislation as much as I was the question of his own moral leadership on the question which I thought in the long run was the way to handle it. Not that we shouldn't have legislation; we had to have some federal legislation. But I was looking at it from my point of view of how I could handle it in this state. And I was pretty sure that we could handle it in a decent way. And I preferred to do it that way. Politically, I could not have testified for the public accommodations. I just couldn't have unless we wanted to destroy every program we were working on and destroy our effectiveness. So I think my position on that would.... If you look back to the newspaper clippings, I constantly said, "Well, in North Carolina we don't need it, because we are doing our opening up on a voluntary basis."

CAMPBELL: How effective did you feel the North Carolina congressional delegation was in this period in relation to your state problems?

SANFORD: They were of very little use and still are of very little use. Herbert Bonner voted for the rules change. We put a tremendous amount of pressure on every Congressman, every way we knew how. We probably over-played our hand in trying to get some votes. Herbert Bonner always admired Kennedy, at one time had an office next to him. And after he became President he continued to admire him. He supported him very strongly in the election and was a tremendous help to us in eastern

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North Carolina. He was a constant help. One or two others were frequently helpful. Kornegay [Horace R. Kornegay] was of some help. Roy Taylor was of some help. Harold Cooley had played out, and everybody in Washington knew it. They were beginning to guess it in North Carolina. He was never harmful, but he really wasn't of any help. Senator Jordan, and particularly Bill Cochrane in Jordan's office, was our key contact to Washington. They could always just about get the job done.

CAMPBELL: Was there some problem with your people in Washington and the Cape Fear River Basin Project that you were interested in? I have a note on that.

SANFORD: Well, the times have changed so now that the students who are trying to protect the earth wonder how in the world I could have taken such a backward position at the time. At the time, I explained to them, everybody thought one of the greatest things we could do to protect the natural resources would be to keep this water from just washing away to the sea and washing the earth with it. But in any event, this was a thing started by Kerr Scott, carried on by Jordan, opposed by Cooley, supported by Congressman Lennon [Alton Lennon] since it was in his District. And Cooley did have a lot of influence with the Agriculture Department, obviously. He was Chairman of the Agriculture Committee. He came up with an alternate plan of small dams, the soil conservation program. And he got some support for it, including from the then -Grangemaster, Robert Scott, whose father had started the other program. I think he felt that he had to support the farm outlook. In any event, it was approved and it's been going through the various steps since. It wasn't any great problem. Harold Cooley was so anxious for me to name his law partner, whose name is May [Hubert E. May], to the bench. Well, I sort of wanted to anyhow. He was related to one of my key people. When I was president of the Young Democrats, in spite of the fact he'd been against me when I was running, he pitched in and helped. So there was no problem for me to name him. He's a very good lawyer.

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But I wouldn't name him as long as Harold Cooley was bothering our dam program. Finally, when he slacked off, I did name May. I didn't make any arrangement with Cooley on that. But Cooley was smart enough to know that he couldn't knock me on one hand and ask favors on the other.

CAMPBELL: Were you consulted in advance before the President appointed his Commission on Smoking and Health?

SANFORD: I don't believe so. I don't recall.

CAMPBELL: How did you feel about that?

SANFORD: Is this the early committee that came in with the so-called Surgeon General's Report?

CAMPBELL: Surgeon General's Report. That's right.

SANFORD: I don't think I really knew that that was in the making until it came out. I don't recall any preliminary conversations.

CAMPBELL: I noticed that publicly you didn't actively oppose the report.

SANFORD: Yes, I did.

CAMPBELL: Did you?

SANFORD: Well, I raised some questions...

CAMPBELL: You raised some questions...

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SANFORD: ... about whether or not it was a sound study from a statistical point of view or scientific point of view or a medical point of view or whether it was just a conglomeration of figures. I felt that I had to give some support to the tobacco industry. Interestingly enough, I never have smoked cigarettes. It's no great trait of character on my part, I just never have been able to pick up the habit. I've tried and something's wrong with me. I just can't develop it. So I never have smoked. And at the same time there is an argument to be made on behalf of smoking. I suppose it brings a great deal of pleasure and relaxation to a great many people. At any rate, I had very little trouble in justifying, taking some positions. And I made a rather lengthy, well-researched speech to something similar to the Tobacco Institute. I don't remember precisely. And I don't know that that's in my official papers. I don't recall.

CAMPBELL: I've seen that. I think it was published in *Vital Speeches*.

SANFORD: It was published somewhere. I believe it was. So to that extent.... And I testified before the FTC [Federal Trade Commission] and I testified, I think, before a congressional committee. I was very careful not to roundly condemn the American Cancer Society or even to.... I didn't come out in favor of cancer. But I did attempt to do that. I remember, over here at the Duke Law School, I was making a speech and then asked questions. And I bore down right heavily on the automobile makers, a la Nader [Ralph Nader], although he wasn't then on the scene. But I was saying that the lack of properly designed safety features really causes more deaths than anything else if you want to look behind the records, as we've done. And I think this has got to be done. And the federal government's failing because no state can legally do it. It involves interstate commerce. And some boy said, "Well, how can you be in favor of tobacco manufacturing and against this?" And I said, "It is very, very simple and no problem at all to explain." I said, "I don't live in Detroit. I

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live in North Carolina." But I did take a position that was in favor of the tobacco industry, at least in favor of giving them a fair break. And I could hardly do less. We lead in the growth and the manufacture.

CAMPBELL: I have a note here about a few specific meetings you had with the President. In January of 1963, January 10th, our records indicate you had

an off-the-record meeting, just yourself and the President. Do you recall that?

SANFORD: That probably was the meeting I had to talk about the Environmental Health Center. This is a long story and I won't burden this record with it, but we got on to this quite by accident after Dr. Gross [Paul M. Gross], who had been the vice president at Duke and was a distinguished scientist, recommended that this be set up -- in fact, I think he invented the term or put it together -- and that it be put in the Washington area. Two or three people from Chapel Hill came to see me and said, "We need it. North Carolina is ideally situated for it." So we got Oscar Ewig, who lives now in Chapel Hill and who knew all these people, to help us delay the decision. Finally, it was written into the law that it couldn't be within fifty miles of Washington. And it shouldn't have been in Washington. We were so right on this that I was pretty certain we'd ultimately get it, but we ran into all the bureaucracy, all the special interests.

And so I did go to see the President. I'd been telling him ever since I first knew about it, and through his staff, that we wanted it. This was really all we wanted. Everytime you go ask for something, that's all you want, you know. But I remember that conversation. I said, after making the case, "There're only two places in the country this ought to be. It can't possibly be in Washington and be effective. There are only two places where you've got the back-up support and that's the Harvard area and the Triangle area in North Carolina." And he said, "Now, tell me why you think North Carolina is better than Boston." And I told him that I wouldn't fall into that trap, but that

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I thought that he would agree with me that we needed it more.

CAMPBELL: In April of 1961, just shortly after the Administration was in office, our records indicate that you had a meeting with the Senators, Senator Ervin and Senator Jordan, and with the President. Do you recall? Was there something specific there?

SANFORD: That was what year?

CAMPBELL: This was '61, in April, April 27th. To put it in a time frame, it would have been shortly after the Bay of Pigs, I suppose.

SANFORD: I don't remember. It had something to do with something we wanted, and it might have been the early stages of the Environmental Health Center. I can't think of anything else.

CAMPBELL: I have a record here of a couple of...

SANFORD: We had two or three things, but we wouldn't have bothered the President

with things such as moving the Corps of Engineers out of Wilmington to Savannah. I called the White House and the White House said, "All you've got to do is get Lennon to call over here and ask that it be left there." Obviously, you understand what that game was. So I had somebody call Lennon and tell him that. And he says, "I'm not going to do it. If I ask them for a favor, they'll ask me for a favor." And they moved the Engineers to Savannah.

Then, we had some same sort of a problem, the desalination pilot plant was in Wilmington at Wrightsville Beach. And Udall [Stewart L. Udall] was going to move it because of Lennon. And I did make a special appeal there. I don't think to the President, though. So I can't recall, might not have been anything.

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CAMPBELL: I notice that there were a couple of meetings you had, I think, with the President attending, related to the Appalachian Project, this special...

SANFORD: Yes. I think we had lunch one time with the various governors from the Appalachian states.

CAMPBELL: How successful an effort was that for North Carolina in the early years?

SANFORD: Well, it was alright. It wasn't ever quite put together the way I thought it ought to have been put together, but I made the point to the President -- I remember making a little speech about these were the descendants of the hardies pioneers looking for the new frontier, that then they were left isolated because transportation changed, that we really had the school support and the public health support, though obviously you need all the money you can get, but what we needed was transportation. Which meant in this case, allocation of money for super highways so that trucks could get in and that kind of transportation. Then we could build the industry. I thought that this would be the greatest thing that we could do. And if we just put all the concentration on that, the other things follow. But it got involved in too much bureaucracy. I don't think that we ought to have limited it to roads. But I was making the point that a few fundamentals would open up that country and then you don't have to worry about them. I was talking about North Carolina, though. Not Kentucky, not West Virginia where they had had an economy that collapsed. We had an economy that never emerged. And there was a distinction. I was aware of that.

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CAMPBELL: I was interested in reading your book, *Storm Over the States*, and thought one of the theses there was that Congress was dealing with many thing that could have been better handled on a state level. Did you ever have the occasion to discuss that with John Kennedy?

SANFORD: Yes, I did. And I suggested to him that we ought to make a big thing out of it -- you know, maybe in the second campaign. We even had some devices worked out, later worked out, that, we thought, provided the proper presidential leadership, would encourage more states to go ahead and do these things without sitting around and waiting. We never really did develop it because we didn't get to that point. We had emergency after emergency and nobody quite thought the term would come to end in three years. So, you know, we left so many things undone. But I felt it could be a major issue for him as well as good for the country, as he turned more to domestic things. And I did make the plea very strongly. Of course, the poverty program was being put together. I thought we did have something to offer there in our own experience. And I felt again that, like the Appalachian program, got caught up in the massive bureaucracy that now has cause it pretty much to fold. I was terribly distressed that we ended up just pumping up these Administrative salaries. I wasn't in favor of paying any administrator a substantial amount of money to work. You know, you just didn't want to create this whole new bureaucracy. And people had to come and go.

Well, the first thing you knew, we'd gone from paying people eight or nine thousand dollars to paying twenty and twenty-five thousand just because of the monster that that program created. Not that it wasn't a good program, but how do you have a program without all the bureaucracy. And I think, you know, we could have made a good thing out of it if time had permitted.

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CAMPBELL: Do you recall ever having any discussion with the President or people with the Democratic National Committee or at the White House about prospects for 1964?

SANFORD: Well, as a matter of fact, as early as October of 1961 when he came to Chapel Hill, I rode over and back with him, so I got that much of a chance of a visit.

I'll digress just a moment. I was going that afternoon to open the North Carolina Trade Fair, a thing we had started. He was going to Fort Bragg, which he had accepted after this. He'd long accepted our date for Chapel Hill. I saw no reason that I shouldn't go on to Charlotte and open the fair. So I didn't get in on the invitation -- I did get in on the invitation, but didn't get in on the trip to Fort Bragg. But as the story build up that Kennedy was coming, all kinds of people came to see me. "Now you tell him this. Here's something that I want you to tell the President." Then the textile people, "Would you talk to him again about the import thing?" And then I'd had a special association at Fort Bragg, having been in the airborne and the Special Forces having grown out of the airborne. The first commander was a good friend of mine. In fact, I'd been made an honorary member and given a green beret because I was president of the National Airborne Association the first year it was organized. So they came to see me and they said, "The President's coming to Fort Bragg. He's going to see our demonstration. How about putting in a plea on our behalf to make the green beret the official head-gear?" It wasn't. It was just worn on an informal basis. So I picked out one or



two things that I felt I could talk to him about, I did talk to him about the textile thing because it was so important and had to be done right or we'd get to where we are today, having to impose quotas. Well, it wasn't done right, which is another story. But, then, I told him this story about the green beret and what they were doing, and how I thought they could be used in a valuable way. I just gave him the story as I knew it. He approved it, as you remember. Then Mrs. Kennedy insisted that a couple of them be engaged in the funeral. So I think

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that maybe the only substantial contribution that I made during the Kennedy years was to get the green beret approved. [Laughter]

Coming back from Chapel Hill, at a turn to the airport, there was a little kid holding up a sign that said, "Welcome, Nelson." And he said, "What does that mean?" I said, "I reckon it's Nelson Rockefeller." He said, "It certainly is odd to be out here with a handmade sign like that." He'd just been talking about Rockefeller as a possible candidate. I said, "The name of this little intersection is Nelson, North Carolina." He said he hoped that Goldwater [Barry M. Goldwater] would be the candidate, that he thought he could really wrap up Goldwater and that he hoped it would not be Rockefeller. He felt Rockefeller would be real trouble.

CAMPBELL: There's a quote of yours reported someplace, I believe from the fall of 1963, in which you are reported to have said that if you didn't think John Kennedy could win at that time in your state. I wonder if you recall what the factor would have been that would have led you to that conclusion.

SANFORD: I don't think I made that statement quite that way. I really don't recall unless I could see it and refresh my memory.

CAMPBELL: I think it's in Theodore Sorensen's book or it's in Teddy White's [Theodore White] '64 book, one or the other. I'm really sorry I've forgotten which place it's reported.

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SANFORD: Well, and what the context was, because probably it was true. But why I would have felt it was appropriate to say it, I just don't remember.

CAMPBELL: I think the context was simply.... It included the increasing problems of civil rights in the South and just simply the decreasing Gallup polls, I suppose.

SANFORD: Yes. I don't really recall it because it wasn't any big flap over it, as I can remember. He certainly could not have won. And this is one thing that

threw us off base, that caused us to lose the Richardson Preyer contest for Governor to succeed me. Because Bert Bennett and I made the decision that we'd leave Preyer alone that we'd put our people with him and give him a start, in fact, got him into the race, but that we would not be actively associated with him because we'd save our strength to support Kennedy in '64. We didn't want to get tied in there in a way that we couldn't do it. Then after Kennedy was assassinated, Preyer was already running. It was an unusually long campaign. For some reason we never re-evaluated that decision. And it turned out to be a mistake because we had nothing to save our strength for. But we were very worried about Kennedy being able to carry the state again. And we were extremely anxious to do our share. And I know we were very much worried about it. Why I would have said it. I don't remember. There was probably a logical reason.

CAMPBELL: I'd just wondered, along the same line, what could the Kennedy Administration have done differently to have retained support in North Carolina?

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SANFORD: Oh, I don't know that they could have done anything. And I wasn't in favor or their drawing in their horns. In fact, I publicly applauded his statement about sending the troops to Jackson. While I was very careful to avoid any criticism of another governor, this being one of the rules of the fraternity, I supported what he did in Mississippi and Alabama -- I mean publicly supported it -- that it was necessary, and that his explanation of it, I think of the Jackson thing.... We were in a Governor's Conference in Florida somewhere and I was the only Governor that would comment on it, at least favorably. I think it was the Southern Governor's Conference. So I don't think there's anything much different that they could have done. And I wasn't even suggesting that they do. You know, it was just some hard times that we had to weather, and I felt we would. But it had to come.

CAMPBELL: Had the President or anyone else in Washington ever discussed with you the possibility, which as you know has been reported, of your replacing Lyndon Johnson?

SANFORD: No. I don't think Evelyn Lincoln would have lied about it, of course, but I think it was one of those things that you say without really meaning and you say just to get it off your chest. He no doubt was exasperated with Lyndon, all the way through; he couldn't have helped anything but be. I don't doubt that he said it. I don't doubt that, casting his eye over the South, of probably falling on me. So that's probably how it happened. But, I don't think they ever seriously considered getting rid of Lyndon. I think it would have been a bad error politically and I don't think they would have made that kind of error. I think they could have tolerated Lyndon four more years and would have, or should have. In any event, I would have been strongly in favor of their keeping Lyndon, not me.

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CAMPBELL: Well, I believe I've almost covered it. You've been very gracious to give me so much time. Could you say a word -- I was interested in the setup of the North Carolina Fund and the pilot projects that you got involved in. Did Washington help at all in the planning or the execution of any of those projects? I wondered if you got involved with the Office of Education or HEW [Department of Health, Education, and Welfare].

SANFORD: We tried to get all the money we could from the Office of Education. We had Francis Keppel down two or three times and developed a very strong friendship. But we were mostly trying to get money for some of our special education projects and new ideas, and we did. The Advancement School was made possible by a study grant from the OE, as well as other such projects. I don't recall that they got involved in the poverty program, the North Carolina Fund. This was done mostly by John Ehle in my office and Paul Ylrisaker of the Ford Foundation. We also got Labor Department money for three special schools we called operation Second Clause. Whenever we needed funds for special projects we usually got it without going through the White House. In President Johnson's Administration, we were in the process of getting a two or three million dollar grant from HEW to set up what would have been -- we were going to call it a booster school. It turned out to be what they later called the Job Corps. We had the proposal in and had the money more or less committed. We had the HEW representatives at the Mansion two or three times. Within a day or so of final approval President Johnson announced his program for poverty and that knocked out our booster school. It also knocked out a better approach, in my opinion, to the Job Corps' needs than what ultimately turned up. We had already even made arrangements to take over an old barracks setup at Kinston. We were going to take over an old high school in Raleigh and not have them in residence. And then we had something working in the western part of the state. So to that extent. But in planning the North

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Carolina Fund effort, I don't recall ever talking to anybody at the planning stage. John Ehle probably did, and George Esser, director of the Fund, would know if we got any federal money in the early stages. We did do something in connection with that. I had the idea that if we could get somebody that was non-bureaucratic out in the country worrying about these people-problems, it would be a whole lot better than just another social worker. So Ellen Winston gave me almost all of her experimental money and we hired twenty-five or thirty, as I recall, people that worked in the Welfare Department but very carefully were not social workers. This was a pilot program that we announced the same time that we announced the North Carolina Fund. They were to be concerned with people, not programs, and were to look to the needs of neglected people in employment, training, education, child care, health, a kind of on-the-scene local operating ombudsman. It did some good things. Obviously, you

had to have support from the governor's office because the bureaucracy would be against that. As soon as I got out, it faded out.

CAMPBELL: What was your impression in this period of the whole Democratic National Committee operation and John Bailey's personal effectiveness?

SANFORD: Well, I think the Democratic Committee was highly ineffective. He was harmless, but he wasn't a real leader. I don't think Larry O'Brien ever let him do much anyhow. So you knew if you had some decision, you had to go talk to O'Brien. We got on extremely well with John because we understood that. He always supported anything we asked whatever it was. I don't recall anything at the moment. But very pleasant relationship. But I never had the impression that he was running it.

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CAMPBELL: Were you involved at all -- I know that Senators are basically involved in the appointments of judges...

SANFORD: The only one was Spence Bell. Then Richardson Preyer was named. I had nothing to do with it. The bar in Greensboro resented Seawell [Malcolm B. Seawell] being named because he did not reside in the district. Seawell was Attorney General under Hodges. He ran against me for governor as Hodges' candidate. And a lot of people thought that I cut him out. But I didn't; I didn't have anything to do with it. The only thing that I declined to do, at Hodges urgent request I declined to say to Kennedy go ahead and appoint Sewell. Then, Hodges said, "Well, let's put Seawell in the circuit court job." And I said, "That's committed to Bell." Then, they tried to knock Bell out of that. Ervin did for a while. I already had the Kennedy commitment but Bell was so distinguished, and even more so in comparison the Ervin candidate that he could not be successfully opposed. But I had nothing to do with the district judges. I very carefully left that to the Senators. In the first place, another one of my opponents, John Larkins, was named judge in eastern North Carolina. If I'd had any reason to be vindictive, I'd have been vindictive there. But the Preyer appointment was just a happenchance. Then, in the west, Ervin named a man from his hometown, I'm satisfied to block Chick Riddle, from the same time.

CAMPBELL: Craven [James B. Craven].

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SANFORD: Judge Craven, after he was nominated, came to see me and asked for our support. I said, "You know, of course we'll support you." He said, "I really don't know Senator Ervin, though I live in Morganton. I've never been in his house, and he's never been in mine." Now, I think he -- he turned out to be a truly outstanding judge. Well, he already was a good judge. I'd tried cases before him and knew him. But Ervin must've done that to block what he feared as an effort on our part to put in

Riddle. And I think it did knock it out. And I think we would have had to recommend Riddle if Riddle had pressed us. It would have been a good recommendation. I later made him a Superior Court Judge.

CAMPBELL: How about the U.S. attorneys? Were you involved in those decisions?

SANFORD: No. It turned out that they were all, I think, friends of ours. But I know I didn't initiate anything.

CAMPBELL: Well, I really have come to the end of my list. And, as I say, you've been very gracious. Is there anything else that you recall, your memories of President Kennedy or some evaluation of the Administration?

SANFORD: Well, you could talk on and on, I suppose, about the Kennedy Administration. And I truthfully did not consider that I played much of a role in it. We had so much to do in North Carolina and we were trying to do a great many things. We were trying to demonstrate, among other things, that a state can do its own business and it ought to get on with it and not sit around waiting. And for that reason I did, to some extent, avoid Washington.

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We had Henry Wilson in the White House and we put all kinds of North Carolina burdens on him. Every time somebody wanted a sewer project approved in Pitt County, we'd call Henry and say get it through. And we usually got the announcements in advance of the senators and congressmen where it was important for us to know in advance. And it was very good to have Henry there. And we placed a lot of people in federal government at all levels because we had Henry. We seldom needed to bother the President or to go as far as O'Brien. I do know that he gave very sympathetic concern to the two or three things that we did take up with him, including such minor problems as where the bombing range would be in the duck hunting country. This was a matter of crucial importance to Bonner. [Laughter]

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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