

**McGeorge Bundy Oral History Interview – JFK#2, 11/30/1970**  
Administrative Information

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**Interviewer:** William W. Moss

**Date of Interview:** November 30, 1970

**Place of Interview:** New York, New York

**Length:** 27 pages

**Biographical Note**

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (1961 - 1966); President, Ford Foundation (1966 - 1979); History Professor, New York University (1979 - 1989), discusses John F. Kennedy's [JFK] decision making style, relationship with Dean Rusk, issues in the National Security policy, and National Security personnel, among other issues.

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**Suggested Citation**

McGeorge Bundy, recorded interview by William W. Moss, November 30, 1970, (page number), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.

Oral History Interview

Of

McGeorge Bundy

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## McGeorge Bundy—JFK#2

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Second Oral History Interview

With

McGeorge Bundy

November 30, 1970  
New York, New York

By William W. Moss

For the John F. Kennedy Library

MOSS: Let me begin, Mr. Bundy, by asking you about the President [John F. Kennedy] and his decision making. There are two or three points in your interview with Professor Neustadt [Richard E. Neustadt] in which you talk about how President Kennedy made decisions. Let me refer to a couple of them. Early in the interview you talked about the weekend decision making and how he liked to show that he could make a decision on weekends. You also say that he was very reluctant to make a decision he didn't have to make. This was in reference to people who would bring him think pieces on which they wanted approval and that kind of thing. You also talk at another point with reference to the call up of reserves in the Berlin crisis that it was the result of the momentum of wise advice. In still a third

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place, talking about the Alsop [Joseph W. Alsop] and Bartlett [Charles Bartlett] article in the *Saturday Evening Post*, you indicated that the President let this happen. What I'm after is, was he the kind of man to take a situation and resolve it himself, or would he sit back and let his advisers, in effect, bring the thing to gel before he would make a decision?

BUNDY: Well, I think probably any man will act sometimes as the organizer of a decision and on other occasions as the judge among contending advocates and on still other occasions he may prefer to, quote, let things happen. And

I think examples you cite suggest that in different circumstances, with different balances of forces, President Kennedy was capable of all of these different forms of decision making or non-decision making.

MOSS: He was not prone to one or another then?

BUNDY: I would find it hard to assign one or another of these modes as his characteristic mode.

MOSS: Would you say that in his choices of decision making or non-decision making he was pretty much on top of it each time, that he let things go when he should have and made the decision when he should have? Or were there cases where he missed the mark?

BUNDY: Well, I'm sure there were cases where he missed the mark. He

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himself never had the illusion that he was always right on everything.

MOSS: I was wondering if you could finger a particular situation?

BUNDY: Well, I think, you know, one of the most obvious is, of course, the Bay of Pigs, but I've said all that can be said on that itself.

MOSS: Yes, I think so. I think so.

BUNDY: And, you know, the difficulty about generalizing in this kind of discussion is that you'd have to really look up the case and decide exactly what you did or didn't think about the way he handled that particular one, and I just don't have great of detail.

MOSS: Right. Okay. Fine. Let me ask you about the situation with Secretary Rusk [Dean Rusk] also. You indicate in the interview with Neustadt that you kept yourself apart from the relationship between the President and the Secretary of State and very deliberately so because you didn't want to intrude. And yet, there are one or two things that you say that give me the idea that you had some very definite understanding of what the problem was there. You talk, for instance, of the opaque character of communication and feeling through the Secretary of State. At another point, you say that you understood from other sources that McNamara [Robert S. McNamara] might have

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replaced Rusk after '64. And in still another place you talked about the Secretary of State being more miffed over a social snub than the whole process of the office of the Secretary of

State being assumed by someone else in a give instance. Do you have something more explicit on this that you can give us as characterizing the relationship between the two?

BUNDY: No. I think that the little I know about him—and I don't feel that I fully understand him, because I think the Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, is a very inward man. I don't think I have anything to add to what I said.

MOSS: All right. Fine. Let me talk for a minute then about the job that you were doing. You mention in your interview with Neustadt that neither you nor the President had a very clear idea of what the job was to be, that it sort of grew. And yet I don't find in the interview a developing understanding of what the job was. Do you have any way in which you can talk about how the job developed and how it changed over the course of the three years?

BUNDY: I suppose one reason that we didn't discuss it in detail is that Neustadt was very close to the work of the White House and perhaps very familiar with it and may have taken it for granted in just the kinds of questions he was asking. I'll try and give you a brief sketch of it. The President staffed

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the government on the basis of jobs and job descriptions, or at least formal job descriptions that had existed in the Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] Administration. And the job that I took was one that was first set up in 1953 by General Eisenhower and filled by Robert Cutler. It was at that time the title Special Assistant for National Security Affairs was created. And when I came in, I took over the office and the normal assignments of Gordon Gray, who held that job at the end of the Eisenhower Administration. And that job, as Cutler and Gray and Anderson [Dillon Anderson] had done it, was a job of managing the staff processes of the National Security Council machinery which was quite elaborate in the Eisenhower Administration and which, in the main, we dismantled, feeling that it was preventing the kind of executive energy, especially in the great departments and most especially in the Department of State, which the new Administration wanted. In that sense, the job that I took, we shot out from under ourselves right at the beginning. And it was a matter of many months—I would think most of 1961—before there gradually emerged a different pattern in which our office came to serve the staff function for the White House in foreign affairs and national security affairs generally that fitted in reasonably well with President Kennedy's own style and habits of work. Much of what we

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began to do, I think, had been done in a different way for General Eisenhower by a different officer, by a man who, I think, had the title of Staff Secretary, General Goodpaster [Andrew J. Goodpaster]. And in the end, that part of the work was much more important than the formal organization of committees or of National Security Council staff work, because, in the main, the National Security Council, as such, was not a major instrument of deliberation or of

action. And instead of having National Security Council staff papers prepared and processed on an interdepartmental basis, we developed a series of things which we called National Security action memoranda, which might be as simple as a direct Presidential instruction to the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense or the head of CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] or whoever, or as complicated as a memorandum governing general procedures or policy in a given area of the world, but which in either case were designed to meet the President's need for written communication rather than a staff process conceived as such.

MOSS: You had going along at the same time an effort to revise the Basic National Security Policy papers, too, didn't you, the "bean soup" business?

BUNDY: We never did rewrite the BNSP. We fussed around with it. But we found it a very frustrating

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Enterprise, because neither the President nor any of the principal Cabinet officers really believed that that was the sensible way to make policy or wanted to do it that way. And for that reason, it just wasn't an interesting instrument of deciding what would actually happen. It had been important in the Eisenhower Administration. People fought hard over the language that described the policy of the United States with respect to general war, well, because they had learned to think that if you could get the word prevail in there, then you had a stronger case for a larger strategic air force, for example. So that the fighting over the language was an extension of the fighting over real policy matters. But the Kennedy Administration just didn't work that way, and therefore that area of battle disappeared.

MOSS: I get the feeling from talking to some of the people further down the line that they were very, very much uneasy with the loss of this reference point. They've been so used to having it that they were not comfortable without it. Did you get any of this coming back up the line?

BUNDY: Not that I remember, no. I would say that they were.... I would be inclined to view that that kind of psychic discomfort is good for the troops.

MOSS: Okay, fine. What's the next step after you decide that you

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go for...

BUNDY: Let me hold one second more...

MOSS: Yeah, surely.



BUNDY: ...and say that I think that I would be more sympathetic with that kind of worry if I didn't think that one of the things that President Kennedy did extremely well was to undertake the responsibility of explaining what his policies were and on what they rested. And the fact that he did this, in the main, through public and unclassified documents, sometimes informally in press conferences, may have startled some of the people who believed that things were more important if they had "top secret" stamps on them, but I think that was one of the advantages of this way of doing business, not the other way around. The number of things that really deserve to be secret in these matters of basic policy is very, very small.

MOSS: Okay, taking off from the implementation of National Security action memoranda, what's the next thing that you do in the way of developing the job?

BUNDY: Well, I think that one very important element in it is—I think I did say this to Neustadt—is the gradual evolution of a relationship

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and what a man in this position could and couldn't do in the light of all the other things that he had in his mind as to how he wished to conduct his business with Cabinet officers and others. So, we both had a lot of learning to do. And then, it took me time, also, to find and to build the kind of staff that would help me and, still more, help him. And it wasn't really until the second year that [unclear] could and couldn't get from us [unclear] appropriate frames [unclear] areas of action [unclear] and in a way he had perceived himself that way [unclear] domestic issue or [unclear] direct [unclear] day-to-day staff work, which later became the name of the game in that particular job. Incidentally, I [unclear] Walt Rostow [Walt Whitman Rostow] [unclear] later [unclear] President Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] [unclear] himself very

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loyally and with great ability [unclear] particular [unclear] and that particular [unclear]. But in '61, it was a slow and complex process to move from the relatively detached, not so direct relationship of the Executive Office Building to the tense, daily, three or four times a day [unclear]. Four or five times a day [unclear] became the characteristic of the job more and more as we settled in the White House basement. And I would not be able to give you exact times, breaks and distances of that evolution, but it has many elements in it: my relation to the President; his growing sense of what you could use the office for; the arrival, I guess in the spring, of Carl Kaysen—or is it in the summer? [Unclear] set of skills.

MOSS: ...Carl Kaysen coming on with a new set of skills and the way that this added to the situation. Well, a situation developed—to make a long story short—in which, by 1963, the President was able to do quick business

with Kaysen on many kinds of issues, with Bob Komer [Robert W. Komer] on other kinds of issues, and occasionally even with more junior members of the staff. And this was, I think, very important for him, given the way he liked to work, because it allowed him to have quick service

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on issues that he was directly engaged in without putting an impossible burden of detailed mastery of all of these kinds of things on any one individual. It widened his span of information and of staff work. I would make a distinction here, and it's worth emphasizing, between staff support and formal decision making. When we get to Vietnam, that will become quite important, because one of the people with whom the President did deal quite directly in '63, explicitly on Southeast Asian matters, was Michael Forrestal [Michael V. Forrestal]. And the one time we had a real mix up of management on Vietnam was one of these weekend decision questions in which we, one way or another, didn't get as clear to the President as it should have been just who was and was not signed on to a particular cable. But that was the exception and not the rule, and it involved a—let me put it another way. That was the exception and not the rule, because, in the main, the President was very clear about the difference between informing himself or expressing himself informally as to what his own sense of the problem was and throwing the gears for a formal governmental decision.

MOSS: All right. Let me ask you, in this situation where different people such as Komer, and Forrestal and so on are specializing, if the barriers between the compartments ever got in the way, if they were ever really a barrier in the sense of communication

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among the staff?

BUNDY: I don't think there were barriers inside our staff, because I had a working rule that those senior officers would send anything they wanted to to the President but that I would get a copy, so that I was informed there. And if they got readout from the President, then it was very important for me to have that. And I think that held pretty well. This was a generic problem with President Kennedy. If he had something very much on his mind, he was quite likely to give something that sounded like an instruction to three or four different people in the White House during the same day or two day period. And I would find myself being told to do something about something that was really Ralph Dungan [Ralph A. Dungan] business, or I would get a comment that really needed to be passed to Ted Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen] or Kenny O'Donnell [Kenneth P. O'Donnell]. And vice versa. They would get sometimes really quite explicit instructions to busy themselves with a problem in foreign affairs. And it was very important that we should be.... And Dungan had certain staff responsibilities analogous to those of members of my staff in Latin American affairs, although he wasn't formally a member of the National Security Council staff.

MOSS: Yes, I've gotten this from other people. Were there any

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instances on which somebody failed to...

BUNDY: Well, of course. There's always some danger of failure in the razzle-dazzle game like that. But, in the main, I would say that those kinds of things got picked up. And the President himself did it in part, because, by getting three or four people to concern themselves with a question, he made sure that someone concerned himself with it effectively. Again, I would draw a distinction between saying, "I want you to put your mind on this; and we need to get a new man for thus and such," and actually deciding that I would go with somebody.

MOSS: How did you tell the difference in the signals?

BUNDY: Well, the difference in the signal was the difference between being asked to think about something or prepare a plan and being told actually to do it.

MOSS: It was quite explicit. There was nothing...

BUNDY: Well, I don't say there was never any misunderstanding. I can remember once, I thought I was told to write a letter to Mrs. Luce [Clare Boothe Luce]—this is a very minor matter. What he really wanted was a draft of a letter he could send to Mrs. Luce. And I sent off this letter and sent him a copy to show him I had done the job. And then he said, "That isn't what I had in mind at all. She won't regard that as suitable to her dignity. I have to write people like that

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myself." So then the question became: how do you get an additional letter from the President to Mrs. Luce. As I remember it, Sorensen drafted that. It's an example of the kind of mix up you could get on a little thing, and, undoubtedly, my failure of perception of what he meant when he said, "Get a letter to Mrs. Luce." I think that one of the things you need to understand about foreign affairs, and I'm sure I addressed it some way in the Neustadt discussion, is that the President really tried very hard to conduct his formal business, his formal decision making, through the Department of State. Now, he did that in a variety of ways and not all of them were textbook methods, in the sense that he did feel free to deal directly with assistant secretaries and with people for whom he had a special regard even if they weren't directly in the line, as Ambassador Harriman [William Averell Harriman] was not for part of the time—he was during the other part of the time. And this is what I really mean about the.... I think the real problem for the Secretary of State was much less in the White House staff than in the direct relations that the Secretary did not intrude upon between

the President and a number of his own subordinates. That's a real puzzle that you look back on.

MOSS: A couple of other people on the staff who are peripheral to your

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organization, Arthur Schlesinger [Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.] and Mike Feldman [Myer Feldman], both get involved in the foreign affairs [unclear]. How did they? Mike Feldman, particularly on the Mid East business?

BUNDY: Well, Feldman was, in a sense, the traditional White House input point for American-Jewish leaders and also a spokesman of certain special economic interests, so that the textile people drew up their problems for the President through Feldman.

MOSS: [Unclear].

BUNDY: [Unclear]. I don't recall that he had. I had [unclear]. I think probably Venezuelan residuals [unclear] Schlesinger's role was a little different. At one time, we tried to—the President also tried to engage him directly in the White House staff work on Latin American affairs. Well, he didn't really want to do that kind of day in and day out cable watching and message sending [unclear]. He preferred, I think a looser relationship. The President, of course, used him for a great many other purposes: As a source of information from his own, very wide circle of friends; a means of communication with people with whom he had close personal relationships—sometimes Ambassador Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson]. Arthur had a particular interest in Italian “opening to the Left.”

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MOSS: Arthur Schlesinger.

BUNDY: Well, he had a role. And then, of course, Sorensen had an important role on a variety of issues, especially if it was going to come to a speech. But, also in the critical deliberations of the missile crisis, he had a major role. And I remember he and I were together involved, in the fall of '63—almost fifty-fifty—in the wheat deal, which was a terribly complex matter involving both domestic and foreign forces. So, I would say that our arrangements for major issues simply were different from one issue to the next. We always had a great problem in finding out ahead of time just where Douglas Dillon [C. Douglas Dillon] was going to be on a monetary matter because he was a very experienced old operator in government and had a very good relation with the President, but he didn't really feel that it was his responsibility to keep in touch with the rest of the White House staff. And there wasn't anyone in the Department of State who had the kind of

constant and knowledgeable connection to international economic and financial matters—Ball [George W. Ball] was very good on trade, but he wasn't really terribly interested in money. So there was a sense in which the Treasury had a policy of its own, and they called in the President when they needed him. [Laughter]

MOSS: Let me ask you one or two quick, specific questions here in case

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we get interrupted. In the Neustadt interview the “green book” is mentioned a couple of times. At one point, it seems to refer to the Clifford [Clark M. Clifford] study on decisions the President was going to have to make early in the game. At another point, it seems to refer to the Acheson [Dean G. Acheson] study on Berlin and Europe and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and so on. Could you clarify that?

BUNDY: Well, I guess I'd have to look at the particular references. There was a green book about jobs that were available at the beginning of the Administration. That's one of them. And I don't recall the color of Mr. Acheson's reports.

MOSS: Okay. Well, it's referred to in context, definitely, to the main Acheson report. The other question is: What was the “holy writ” memo?

BUNDY: It depends on what the reference is.

MOSS: Okay. Well, let me look it up.

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MOSS: ...don't recall.

BUNDY: I'd have to see the documents...

MOSS: Okay.  
Do you think there's anything more useful to say on the organization of the national security staff, particularly from you downwards? I think we have a pretty good picture of the staff working upwards towards the President.

BUNDY: Well, if you wanted to look up a list of the people we had on the staff at different dates, I could tell you probably with some degrees of accuracy what their particular assignments were and how they related to me and to the President.

MOSS: One or two people who come into discussion every once in a while. For instance, Brubeck [William H. Brubeck]. Where does he fit in?

BUNDY: Well, he was doing African affairs at one stage, and I haven't had [unclear] didn't have [unclear] for a while [unclear] had a certain [unclear] I forget what else. These are matters that, you know, the files...

MOSS: Okay.

BUNDY: ...would show better than my memory at this stage.

MOSS: Let me ask you if you could discuss, characterize, the relationship

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between the President and several members of the press or, I think, particularly Joe Alsop. You referred to this in passing in Neustadt. Do you have anything to add in the way of insight?

BUNDY: Well, the President and Jose Alsop liked each other personally and had known each other certainly from the fifties. How well I really don't know. One thing I do recollect is that the President saw more newspapermen in his first year or so on the job than he did in the last year or so, as individuals. He did a lot more talking with and arguing with them as a beginning President than he did, let's say, a year after the Cuba crisis. Why that was, I'm not sure I know. I think he perhaps felt it less important to deal intimately and individually with journalists because he had a growing confidence in his ability to handle those problems by his own major statements and by press conferences. Perhaps he felt that he'd been signed in one or two occasions by particular cases. I really don't know the reason, but I'm sure that the record would show that there was this pronounced change in the number that he saw.

MOSS: What about his relationship to the grandees? Lippmann [Walter Lippmann], Krock [Arthur Krock], Sulzberger [Arthur Hayes Sulzberger]...

BUNDY: Well, Krock, of course, was an old, old friend of his fathers.

[-19-]

Krock had helped with the publication, I think, to his very first book. Krock was very much of an old man by 1961. And I don't think the President did see him very much, and I think that Krock was sort of sad about it. On the other hand, Henry Luce was constantly coming and going. The President never gave up on what seemed to some of us the quixotic effort to convert *Time-Life* and *Fortune*. The President was, of course, very close to Philip Graham [Philip L. Graham] right up to his death and took

a direct and personal interest in Graham's troubles during his last year and continued to be very intimate with Charles Bartlett, who was a personal friend, and with Ben Bradlee [Benjamin C. Bradlee], who was a personal friend, and with Rowland Evans [Rowland Evans, Jr.], who was an old friend, and in that sense also with Alsop. All those relations were different. The man who was closest was probably Bartlett, in terms of numbers of weekends and time spent together, and next to that probably Bradlee. Lippmann, he had a great regard for and did see him, again, I think, not so much in '63. We had a difficult time with

[-20-]

Lippmann in '63. It doesn't seem like a cosmic issue, looking back at it, but he was very critical of the notion of a trip to Europe and kept saying that all the omens were bad, it wouldn't come out well. I used to be dispatched to explain that it couldn't be as bad as that. It didn't turn out so badly. It was, in fact, a great personal success. He was nice enough to say that he'd made a mistake about that. There was, however, no... I think Walter really didn't feel comfortable with the Kennedy Administration; perhaps, vice versa.

MOSS: Were there any other reporters you'd single out as being important in this period?

BUNDY: Well, I'm not sure I would be the best judge of that.

MOSS: I was wondering how many in the foreign affairs field.

BUNDY: I would think that the President kept in touch, in the first period, pretty closely with certain foreign journalists, like Henry Brandon. But I was thinking of him when I said that the President stopped seeing some of these individual journalists as time went on. I think he saw de Segonzac [Adalbert de Segonzac] the first year or two. And he would make time for grandees of the international press world.

MOSS: I have one quote here—this is an entirely different

[-21-]

subject. One person has reported you as having said that if Kennedy had lived to write his own book about the Administration, it would be kinder than all the rest. Do you recall saying that? And if so, do you recall what you meant by it?

BUNDY: [Laughter] Well, I think he would have been extremely careful about feelings of members of his Administration. And he wasn't... The one time his guard slipped on that and let him get in print some of the temporary irritation he did feel at Ambassador Stevenson in the aftermath of the missile crisis, he was very regretful about it. And while he was capable of that kind of sharpness in private comment, he was really very much of a kind man in his sense of not wanting to

wound colleagues and associates. And I think he would have been more careful about that than anyone else has been.

MOSS: I'm skipping a little because my notes came as I was going through your interview. And I note here that I'm curious about the role of General Clifton [Chester V. Clifton, Jr.] in all this. I've noted in the files, for instance, that he's often the go-between not only between the President and the Joint Chiefs but also

[-22-]

With the CIA, particularly with Allen Dulles [Allen W. Dulles].

BUNDY: That's true I think, particularly in the early period of the Administration. Clifton, for a while, and possibly in some degree right on through—I really don't have a clear-cut recollection—was certainly the agent for carrying papers from the Joint Chiefs to the President. He was the senior of the military aids, and they did business that way. He didn't turn them off. Neither McNamara nor I felt it wise to do so or the President would have wanted us to do so. And similarly, the daily intelligence report for the President, Clifton was to take into him. Again, certainly in the early period. How far that continued to be true throughout the Administration, I wouldn't be able to recollect. De facto, I would guess that there was a shift in the channel of intelligence information. I'm sure that John McCone [John A. McCone] thought that his principal point of contact with the White House, other than his direct meetings with the President, was through our office.

MOSS: I notice one or two off the record memoranda, things that come from Dulles in the way of informal assessments of things, go through Clifton, particularly in the early days.

[-23-]

BUNDY: Well, that would very likely be true in '61. I think it would not have been the way a McCone memorandum would have come in in '63.

MOSS: I also note—we'll get on to this later in Vietnam, but Clifton sits in on a number of the National Security Council meetings on Vietnam, giving him a kind of, at least, exposure, that I wouldn't have expected a military aid to have.

BUNDY: Well, I think that's probably true. I think that...

MOSS: What was there about the man that gave...



BUNDY: Well, the President liked him, and he was actually more.... His involvement in these matters was more in relation to their public presentation than anything else. He wasn't really a military staff man in the sense that the President regarded him as a major military professional. But he did regard him as very knowledgeable in the presentation of matters of this kind and used him in that way. And in the beginning, as a channel of communication, but more, I think, than at the end.

MOSS: When do you expect to be interrupted?

BUNDY: Well, [unclear].

MOSS: Another ten minutes. Let me just begin the Vietnam

[-24-]

thing then, so you'll get an idea of the kind of [unclear] get into. The first item on my chronology is January the 28<sup>th</sup> 1961 to discuss the report by Ed Lansdale [Edward G. Lansdale] in which it was decided that there would be increased financial support for both the civil guard and the South Vietnamese military. And there was a question brought up as to how you could shift from a defensive posture to an offensive one in South Vietnam. Lansdale was present; Graham Parsons was there; Allen Dulles, Walt Rostow, you, McNamara and Rusk; Lemnitzer [Lyman L. Lemnitzer] was there. And also at the meeting the President, towards the end, asked people present to consider whether Lansdale or Kenneth Young [Kenneth T. Young] should be the next ambassador to Vietnam to replace Durbrow [Elbridge Durbrow]. Was this, in fact, the first meeting of significance you had on Vietnam? It comes quite early.

BUNDY: I can't tell you.

MOSS: Okay. Now, neither Lansdale nor Young was actually appointed, and Fritz Nolting [Frederick E. Nolting, Jr.] was. Do you know the background of this?

BUNDY: No, I don't.

MOSS: You don't.

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BUNDY: And generally speaking, I would say that I was very seldom involved in matters of appointment. The formal clearance point in the White House was Ralph Dungan's office, and my guess would be that in this case, as in many others, when the Secretary or Undersecretary—in this case it would have been the Secretary—took a direct and personal interest in the appointment, the relation would have been one between him and the President, with Dungan involved where a staff man was

involved. And the man to talk to, besides the Secretary, about that kind of question is probably more often than not Ralph Dungan.

MOSS: The same thing, I suppose, would hold true on the replacement of Nolting by Lodge [Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.].

BUNDY: Yeah. Very much so. I remember explicitly that I heard about that one, I think from the President himself after it had been decided on before.

MOSS: Do you know anything of the objections by people, either in the Pentagon or the State Department, to Lansdale as an ambassador?

BUNDY: Well, I know generically that they would have regarded him—that the Pentagon regarded him as sort of not an organization man, and the State Department

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regarded him as not their organization.

MOSS: [Laughter] Okay. The next step seems to be the setting up of the interdepartmental task force under Roswell Gilpatric [Roswell L. Gilpatric]. And I have it noted here that it has the specific task of developing plans to, quote, save, unquote, South Vietnam. How did this come about?

BUNDY: I can't recite that.

MOSS: You don't. You don't know. Okay. And how the members were chosen?

BUNDY: No.

MOSS: Do you have any idea as to what the President and you and others expected that it might be able to do?

BUNDY: No, I don't have any.... You know, these things are very difficult to reconstruct unless you have the papers.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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