

John E. Horne Oral History Interview – JFK#1, 04/21/1967
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Biographical Note

John E. Horne (1908-1985) was the administrative assistant to Senator John Sparkman of Alabama from 1947 to 1951 and from 1953 to 1961, a campaign worker in Citizens for Kennedy-Johnson, and administrator of the Small Business Administration from 1961 to 1963. This interview focuses on Citizens for Kennedy Johnson's work in the 1960 presidential campaign, particularly in the Southern states, among other topics.

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John E. Horne – JFK #1

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Oral History Interview

with

JOHN HORNE

April 21, 1967
Washington, D.C.

By John F. Stewart

For the John F. Kennedy Library

STEWART: Mr. Horne, why don't we start by my asking you if you recall the circumstances of your first meeting John Kennedy.

HORNE: I do not recall the details of the circumstances, but the first time that I got to know him personally is when I was working as administrative assistant to Senator [John J.] Sparkman of Alabama. And President Kennedy at that time was Senator Kennedy. I had read about him and knew of him, and I knew he had served, of course, in the House of Representatives, but I first met him in the Senate Chamber after he became Senator and while I was working, as I just said, for Senator Sparkman.

STEWART: You hadn't, then, had any contact at the 1952 Convention with him that you recall?

HORNE: Not in the 1952 Convention, but I had close contact with him prior to the 1956 Convention. Of course, this was after he became Senator. At the 1956 Convention, I'm sure you realize, or remember, that he was a strong supporter of Adlai Stevenson. Getting to the nomination again in 1956, he helped Stevenson receive the nomination and then he also made an effort at the Convention to be nominated as Vice President. He almost made it. I'm rather of the opinion it was better for him that he didn't get the nomination. I think it enhanced what happened in 1960. I think if he had gotten the nomination, it might have mitigated against what happened in 1960.

STEWART: Were you at the 1956 Convention?

HORNE: Yes, I was, John. I had taken a leave of absence from Senator Sparkman's office in December of 1955 to help find headquarters for the volunteer group for Stevenson in his efforts to get the nomination for '56. I went out to Chicago with John Sharon, a Washington lawyer, and we found headquarters, and then I came back to Washington in April to open up headquarters here for Governor Stevenson. I had liaison with members of Congress. Then after he got the nomination, John Sharon and I found and opened up headquarters for the volunteer activities, and so I stayed on with Governor Stevenson through the 1956 campaign.

STEWART: Let me ask you this, before the Convention do you recall what your ideas were, if any, about the possibilities of Kennedy becoming the vice-presidential nominee?

HORNE: Yes, I recall them quite well. From the time I first got to know Senator Kennedy, who was Senator at that time, by virtue of his being a member of the Small Business Committee of which Senator Sparkman was Chairman--and as I worked on common problems, with his staff, like [Myer] Mike Feldman and Ralph Dungan, who was not in his office but who was on the Senate Labor Committee, and Lee White, who later was with him at the White House, and [Theodore C.] Ted Sorensen--I noticed several things about Kennedy: He had a lot of sparkle; he had a lot of ambition; had a lot of ability; and it was obvious that he had ambition to go further, to me at least, than just to be Senator. And I was glad that he did have the ambition because as I told him I sensed in him the potential of a very great American leader. And so I was aware of the possibility that he might be a candidate for the Vice President to run with Stevenson, but at that time I was so closely tied in with Stevenson that I stayed out of other campaigns. As you recall, there were others, Senator [Estes] Kefauver, for example, and Senator [Stuart] Symington and some others that wanted to be Vice President. So those of us who were working directly with Stevenson stayed out of the other campaigns. We even did that on through the Convention at the time that Governor Stevenson announced to the Convention in '56 that he wanted the Convention to decide what his nominee would be without his naming him. Several of the Kennedy people and several of the Kefauver people asked me to participate on either side, but I refrained from doing so because Governor Stevenson had asked that those on his staff stay neutral in the matter.

STEWART: Did you have any part in the decision to throw this thing open? John Sharon, I believe, was the person who really pushed this whole idea, wasn't he?

HORNE: I don't recall sufficiently that I could put my finger that pointedly on any one person. It was something that was discussed by several. I should think that, perhaps, [James A.] Jim Finnegan may have been the deciding factor, or maybe the Governor himself was the deciding factor. I do recall that I leaned that way because there was so many good Democrats who wanted it. But I made no great pressure in that direction.

STEWART: Did you have any contacts with the Alabama delegation? I believe I've read that they were ready to switch to Kennedy on the, well, it would have been on the third ballot, I think. Do you recall any conversations with anyone in the Alabama delegation?

HORNE: Yes, I do. I do not remember the details, but the Alabama delegation was fairly well divided as between the two. There were two or three people--by the way, all of the people in the Alabama delegation at that time were people that I knew--there were two or three of them who were very strong Kefauver people. Senator Kefauver had done an excellent job of laying a good foundation for himself among certain strong Alabamians. And, while I do not remember the details of their being willing to switch to President Kennedy, it would not surprise me at all that they would have done so. I think, actually, the majority of the sentiment in the Alabama delegation would have been for President Kennedy. But because of the strength and the aggressiveness of a few in the delegation who were such pro-Kefauver people, it prevented the delegation, as I remember, from voting for Kennedy prior to the time the contest was finished.

STEWART: Did you have any contact with Senator Kennedy during the campaign? He did quite a bit of speaking and other work during that campaign.

HORNE: I had some contact with him, but most of my activity during the '56 campaign was to serve as executive director of the Volunteers for Stevenson-Kefauver. So practically all of my time, except for an occasional time at which I would go out and make a speech in behalf of the ticket, I was in the Washington office helping to run the internal affairs of the office and working with the staff and serving Barry Bingham and Jane Dick, and [Archibald S.] Archie Alexander, who were the three top managers, co-managers so to speak, of that effort.

STEWART: Could we talk for a little bit about your contact with Senator Kennedy and his office on legislative matters? You mentioned that he served on the Small Business Committee with Senator Sparkman, and that you were definitely involved in. Do you recall what your attitudes were as far as his effectiveness on this Committee and on other matters that you had contact with him on?

HORNE: Yes. I would say, in all honesty, that he was not at that time, the most effective Senator by any means. He was a very well liked Senator; he did have influence, primarily because of his charm; and also, he showed, even then, great ability in mastering a piece of legislation; and he presented well his views on the Senator floor. But also, during this time, he was not in the Senate as frequently as some of the other senators were; he was out; he was in such great demand for speeches all over the country, and he was out making a lot of speeches. And part of this was attributed not only to the fact that he enjoyed getting out and meeting people but many of us at the staff level and at the Senate level, even at the time, felt that he was looking toward 1960. And of course, as things turned out, he was looking towards 1960.

But so far as his philosophy was concerned, it was pretty much middle-of-the-road. I assume it would be called more liberal than conservative although he was not by any means, as I remember his position, what could be termed a flaming liberal. He was liberal enough that he had a lot of support among the liberal elements. I always felt that in spite of his great wealth, he'd had enough experience and had studied sufficiently that he realized there were many peoples in different parts of the world that never had adequate opportunity and that there were segments of our domestic population about which the same was true, that in this regard he wanted to move forward and give them this opportunity. But he did not want to bite off so much legislative desires that he would have been beaten in all of his efforts. He was willing to take less than he wanted in order to make some progress. In other words, he was a practical legislator, as I remember.

I do recall working sometimes with members of his staff, particularly as it related to legislation in which the South was primarily interested. And I also recall working with Ted Sorensen, in particular, who did much of his speech writing. When he was going to the South to make a speech, Ted, on occasions, would ask me to review the contents of his speech. I recall one, particularly, that he was going to be making in Tennessee in which I suggested some changes on what he was going to say about TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority]. And Ted accepted my suggestions, and the speech was quite well received. And this was one of the reasons why, when he became a candidate for nomination in 1960, he had more support in the South than he otherwise would have had because we helped to lay the foundation somewhat for him. And after he got the nomination, when he carried all the southern states, he and Vice President [Lyndon B.] Johnson, working together, carried more southern states than some of the opposition felt they would carry.

STEWART: Do you recall any examples of things that he was specifically concerned with as far as these speeches in the South?

HORNE: Well, I recall he was, of course, torn on the position of race as to how far to go in the South in an effort to get across his position that he felt changes had to be made and that we had not sufficiently, in the South, taken steps. Even though we've made changes voluntarily, we had not gone as far as the President felt, as Senator Kennedy at that time felt, we should go, and yet he didn't want to alienate the South. In my opinion, he handled the difficulty quite well when he would touch on this issue. He didn't retreat, but he held the position in such a way that there was no great outflow of antagonism toward him.

Then I remember one of the major--getting back to legislation for a moment--one of the, I thought, superb jobs he handled on the Senate floor, which showed his capacity when he really wanted to get into the depths of something. It had to do with an important piece of labor legislation. I don't remember the details of that. I just remember how well he handled himself and the plus results that came from his showing on this particular occasion that he could master legislation and legislative techniques, and he could handle himself exceedingly well on the floor in a debate or crossfire of comments with any other senator, whether they agreed with him or disagreed with him.

STEWART: Would you say that this genuinely impressed many senators?

HORNE: I thought it did. This particular incident that I'm talking about I felt genuinely impressed a good many senators because, if my memory serves me correctly, this was the first occasion he had taken hold of a major piece of legislation, sponsored it, and done a superb job of debating it on the Senate floor, which showed he did have this capacity.

As I'm sure you would recognize, any senator that would have a dual ambition and a dual responsibility of doing his homework well and being a good senator and also, in a measure, running for a nomination--as was the case with Senator Kennedy--would be away from the Senate more than some Senators and would not have an opportunity, as would those who would stay around more regularly, to take positions and to master situations and to show on the Senate floor that they did have the capacity which he displayed in this particular instance.

STEWART: Was Senator Sparkman on the Foreign Relations Committee in late 1950's?

HORNE: Yes.

STEWART: And, if so, did you have any contacts regarding that whole area?

HORNE: Yes, I did have. My contact primarily was in that I worked with the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Carl Marcy and several others. And Senator Sparkman being one of the ranking people on the Committee, I helped to write some of his speeches. I don't remember the details of the positions taken by Senator Kennedy at that time, except generally I recall his interest in international affairs and his recognizing that the days of isolation, while they really had never existed, had certainly passed as far as anybody who would take a look at worldly affairs, international affairs, was concerned, and his position of being completely opposed to isolation but believing in international cooperation and recognizing that this country had to be the leader in the free world. He supported those sentiments.

STEWART: Moving on, when, if you recall, did you become really aware that Senator Kennedy was going to make a run for it in 1960? Was this quite evident to you, for example, in '57 and early '58, or. . . .

HORNE: It was. I sensed that this is the way he was moving, and in '58 and '59 it was obvious that this is where he was heading. Well, the people in my part of the country, even at that time, still primarily were for Johnson. Even though some of them felt he could not get the nomination in 1960, they generally supported him more than they supported President Kennedy. Although, as you may recall, in my state of Alabama, the Governor of Alabama came out quite early for Kennedy.

STEWART: Right. Governor [John] Patterson.

HORNE: Governor Patterson came out quite early for Kennedy. Senator Sparkman, as I recall, was up for reelection and stayed pretty much aloof from taking a firm position in this regard. People in Alabama were quite divided on it, the Governor supporting Kennedy, a lot of young people supporting Johnson. Sparkman, up for reelection, stayed out of this situation.

STEWART: What was the primary appeal of Kennedy among the Alabamians who were strong in favor of him?

HORNE: I'd say youth, charm, the ability to express himself, the sense that he made on issues on which his stand was known. Many of them felt, as I recall, and as the President showed after he became President, that his youth was not a great handicap. Of course, anybody matures with experience and age. But many of the people in Alabama felt that here was a person that had great potential and great confidence, and they wanted him to have the opportunity.

Also, I'm sure, as you know, at this time--and maybe it was partly created by the people supporting Kennedy--there was a feeling that, let's give young people in this country a chance to show their ability. Kennedy had evidenced that he had the ability to take on this responsibility if it came his way. Many people took the position that he was sort of a breath of fresh air, that he had charm. I remember some people comparing him, and also Mrs. Kennedy, people my age, for example, with Clara Bow of the movies as having "It." They weren't intending to put Mr. and Mrs. Kennedy on levels with Clara Bow so far as intelligence was concerned, but there were opinions expressed that, so far as they're concerned, Senator and Mrs. Kennedy had IT, spelled in capital letters.

STEWART: Did all of the problems that Senator Kennedy was having with Negro and civil rights leaders in the North because of a certain amount of support he was getting in the South--were people in Alabama quite aware of this problem that Senator Kennedy was having? For example, I think he had a breakfast meeting late in 1959 with Governor Patterson which later became somewhat of a rallying cry and an issue with civil rights people in the North. Were people very well aware of this problem?

HORNE: Yes, John, we were aware of it, and there was quite a good deal of talk, more talk quietly than publicized. But we had two or three opinions about it: one was we didn't want to embarrass Kennedy by trying to put him on both sides of an issue; secondly, it wouldn't have been appropriate to place him on both sides of the issue. He always made clear, as I said earlier, where he stood on the race issue, that there was need to have more legislation here and to bring about more equality of opportunity, particularly in publicly supported entities, such as public schools or public parks or places that served the public. He never kidded any of the people in Alabama on this issue.

But I think there was a feeling on the part of many people in the South that, while he felt as I have described, he was willing to be somewhat moderate on it. He was moderate on it. He didn't think that you could undo overnight a pattern that had been set for many, many years. His position in this area was really somewhat closely akin to what Stevenson's position was. Stevenson never made any bones about where he stood on this issue. But he also always recognized that it would take a long time to work these things out. He simply wanted to make progress and start moving in what he thought was the right direction.

So we understood these things about Kennedy, and we knew that he was having difficulty up North with certain groups because he also wanted southern support, naturally, and because a lot of people in the South who were segregationists, including Governor Patterson, at that time were still supporting Kennedy. We in the South felt we'd get a fair shake out of Kennedy's position. He never tried to mislead any of us.

STEWART: Moving on then to the Convention, were you at the 1960 Convention in Los Angeles?

HORNE: No, I didn't go. I did not go to the Convention. One reason I did not go to the Convention is that, as I've just explained, I was doing a great deal of the work in connection with Senator Sparkman's campaign for reelection, and as the Senator avoided getting caught between the rival factions for the nomination at the 1960 Convention, I was so close to him and was his administrative assistant and worked so close in his campaign that I did not go to the Convention. I also stayed aloof from the efforts of any of the groups at that time seeking the nomination.

STEWART: Senator Sparkman was at the Convention, or was he?

HORNE: I do not think he was. I wouldn't want to say for certain, but I don't believe he went to the Convention either.

STEWART: He maintained a pretty good neutrality throughout the whole thing. It's often been said, again, maybe from your knowledge of the delegates in the Alabama delegation, it's often been said that Kennedy would have gotten a considerable number of votes had it gone to a second ballot. Do you feel. . . .

HORNE: I think he would have, I think he would have. Here, again, there were very strong people at this particular Convention for President Johnson, which, of course, was understandable in many ways. We all recognized he's a very able person, and, of course, he was a candidate in 1960 also. But in spite of the fact that Governor Patterson was for President Kennedy, the delegation voted for President Johnson as a whole. I don't recall whether it was unanimous or not. I always felt, though, that the Governor could break that if he felt it was necessary to do so, could break into the Johnson support. And I always felt that if it had gone another ballot or two, he would have done so. I think if you will check with Governor Patterson and Charlie Meriwether, who was Governor Patterson's right arm in this particular area of operation, both of them will tell you that if they had felt it necessary to do so or had decided to do so, they could have gotten quite a few people in Alabama to vote for President Kennedy. I'm reasonably certain this is true because some of the people who were elected as delegates and who attended the Convention were there by virtue of the support given them by Governor Patterson.

STEWART: Were you ever asked by the Kennedy people to assist them in their efforts either in Alabama or elsewhere in the South before the Convention?

HORNE: I was never asked per se to give them assistance. I was asked on two or three occasions how I viewed the Alabama situation. In other words, the questions of me were for intelligence more than to ask me to lay it on the line in their behalf. They recognized Senator Sparkman's position. They recognized the sentiment that naturally existed throughout Alabama at that time more in favor of Johnson, primarily because he had come from the South, than existed at that time overall for Kennedy. And this was another very good thing about Kennedy: He seldom would put someone on the spot when he knew that doing so could be embarrassing or it would not improve his chances. He was playing for a longer haul rather than for the short haul. He was playing for the time that, after he got the nomination, if he hadn't alienated people by pressures, he could get increased active support from them.

STEWART: Moving on then, how did it come about that you got involved in the Citizens for Kennedy-Johnson group?

HORNE: Well, after the nomination was over and Kennedy was heading the ticket and Johnson was running for Vice President, was also on the ticket, I had two or three feelings about it: One was that both the people in whom I had a primary interest were on the ticket; secondly, I felt that I could be of some help to the citizens group because I had not only worked with the professional group from time to time with the Democratic organization, had not only worked in helping to run Senator Sparkman's campaigns, but also had worked with Stevenson in 1956. I felt that I could be of help in several ways to the citizens group as liaison somewhat between the citizens group and the regular Democratic groups. And also I was just completely enthusiastic about the ticket, and I would have been chafing at the bit

during the entire time if I had been forced to remain aloof or had not had an opportunity to become part of the active efforts to elect these two men. So I asked for a chance to participate in the program in the citizens group. And fortunately, in a way, I had met Byron White, who headed up that activity, as you know, prior to the time even the nomination was made although he was a Kennedy man all the way through. So as soon as I knew that he was going to head this operation, I got in touch with him and offered my services, which he, I'm glad to say, accepted.

STEWART: In the early stages of setting up the group, do you recall any differences as to exactly how it should operate, particularly insofar as its independence from the rest of the campaign organization?

HORNE: Well, it was set up, of course, on paper as an independent operation, as any volunteer citizens group usually is. It was recognized, though, by Byron and by the rest of us who were working with him somewhat as a board of directors that we had to maintain close liaison in Washington with the regulars and close liaison in the states with the regulars. This is what we did. You may be interested in knowing that while Byron White was chairman, [Frederick G.] Fred Dutton was vice chairman. Among my duties was that to serve as executive secretary, which meant that I had responsibility for office management; I also had responsibility for liaison with Lyndon Johnson's own organization; and I was given then the direct responsibility for determining whether or not, and then for setting up if I determined that it should and could be done, a citizens group in several southern states. About eleven or twelve in all, as I recall.

STEWART: Let me just ask you one question about the mechanics of the office. Was there any problem in recruiting people to work in the office, and how large a staff did you have in the citizens headquarters?

HORNE: I really don't remember how many we had. We had quite a good size staff. In addition to the three names I've given, we had Mr. Harvey Poe who had several states under his supervision; Philip Kaiser, who had several states under his; and [Joseph F.] Joe Dolan, who later served as administrative assistant to Senator Robert Kennedy, who had several states under him. Now each of us had secretaries, and each of us had the necessary staff. It wasn't a question of having inadequate staff because there were so many people volunteering. Of course, we had some funds and some workers were on the payroll. Most of us, though, were volunteers. And there was such an enthusiastic support for the ticket that we had no difficulty having adequate staff. And I would just have to make a guess as to how many people we had, but I'd say it was probably a hundred or more. I just don't remember. I know, though, that we had secretaries; we had volunteers coming in at night and during the day; we had people responsible for shipping out materials. We also provided space for some groups who operated somewhat independently--on paper it was under Byron White. The voters' registration activities for example, which was quite a vigorous activity in connection with the 1960 campaign, that is, the registration of new voters. The thing that I remember most, as I said, is not how many we had, but that we had an adequate number.

STEWART: The registration, how was the decision made not to conduct much of an effort in the South? You said there was a certain effort made during the registration drive in the South. Could you describe . . .

HORNE: Some registration effort had been made in the South. And we made some effort somewhat in a quiet manner in behalf of Negro registration in particular certain Southern States. But by and large, up until very recent years, the South has always been so solidly Democratic that the effort has never been made in the South to promote voter registration as has been made outside the South. This situation, by the way, is changed now. I'm sure we will see more and more voter registration effort since we have a two-party setup in the South, thus more and more effort made both by Republicans and by Democrats to have voters register for their respective parties. We're still, though, I think, in the South, primarily for the fact there was only one party represented so long, farther away from real vigorous voter registration activities than is being carried out in certain other states.

STEWART: Was there any opposition to this decision not to make a large effort particularly among Negro people in the South?

HORNE: Yes, there would have been opposition, particularly at that time, if it had been done vigorously.

STEWART: No, did some people, for example, in the civil rights groups in the campaign want to make a big effort in the South?

HORNE: Not at this particular time. I do not recall any pressures by civil rights groups or Negro groups that really a vigorous registration drive be put on in the South for Negroes at that time, no. I think what might be of interest, the Negro leaders who were actively supporting the ticket recognized that it was practical at this particular time not to make this particular effort. They were practical enough in the throes of the campaign. They also wanted to elect the ticket they were supporting, and they didn't want to take measures during the campaign that they might be vigorously willing to take at other times. And this probably accounted for some of the reasons, too, that no pressures were made. But I sensed this situation at that time, as I recall it. You could have gone so far in this direction that you could have alienated many more voters than you could possibly have gathered. And so it made sense to await a time later down the road when it would be more opportune and more appropriate so far as political realities are concerned.

STEWART: Would you say that your first big job was to decide which states to set up organizations in?

HORNE: Yes, that was a consideration I'm sure. I feel that the others who had some of the responsibilities in other states didn't have quite the problem that I had on several counts in the Southeast and in the South. And one of the interesting things about a citizens group might be that while ordinarily a citizen or a volunteer organization is to give an umbrella for political activity to people who are not part of independent voters, so to speak, the people who are not so closely aligned and identified with either party, still you want to enlist their active support, but there are times--and I found this true in the South, which had been more or less a one-party area for many years--that what is ordinarily the regularly aligned party groups, that is Democrats, develop factions, frictions, and divisions. So there were occasions in which, under the auspices of the citizens group, we were able to give a vehicle for regular Democrats to work because they were the out faction at that particular time. And where we could not bring the Democratic factions together, we found it helpful at times to set up citizens groups even though most of the manning of the jobs, so to speak, might be people who were regular Democrats but who were at outs with the Democratic faction who controlled that state at that particular time.

STEWART: As far as the actual decisions, I assume the primary decision was yours, and generally who else got involved in the final decision as to whether to set up or not to set up?

HORNE: Yes. The way that decision was made, as a general rule, was close liaison between us and the regular Democratic factions. And, of course, you recall that Senator George Smathers at that time was Southern campaign manager.

STEWART: Right.

HORNE: And we would work with his offices to make sure that we weren't doing something that would be more harmful than helpful in the long run. I recall, for example, that in the Senator's home state there was some delay in getting a citizens group established. Yet, there are enough diversity of voting desires in a state like Florida where so much migration is taking place from other states that Senator Smathers and all of us felt that we should have it. We finally did have a fairly active group in Florida, but we were careful enough in setting it up to get people who had an appeal to a diversity of population and who also could work with and not work at cross purposes with the regular Democratic organization in the State of Florida. This always, of course, is desirable as to avoid friction with the regular Democratic group that's theoretically in charge of handling the campaign from the professional point of the operations, so to speak.

And as you've indicated, as to whether or not we set up such a citizens group would be determined and a close analysis of the situation after contact with the appropriate people in the national Democratic setup, which in this instance was Senator Smathers so far as action in much of my territory was concerned, and then also with the people at the local level who were carrying on the duties or functions of the regular organized Democratic Party operation.

STEWART: Did Robert Kennedy get involved in many of these decisions as far as the Southern States were concerned?

HORNE: No. He did not as I recall. I, of course, worked with Whizzer White, who was my chairman, before I would take a move, as well as keeping in close contact with Senator Smathers and with the Democratic parties in the states under my supervision. Now Whizzer White did, as I recall, at least once a week, and sometimes more frequently, meet with Senator Robert Kennedy and with other people who were running the regular Democratic organization. And so to this extent there were times I'm sure when Robert Kennedy was involved. But by and large in the South, in the Southern States, it pretty much followed what recommendations I had to make regarding the setting up of such groups, and as I've explained, I carefully took inventory of what the situation was before I would try to set up such a group, and I also checked very carefully as to the selection of the persons who would be the head of such groups.

STEWART: Could we move through some of the other states, starting, say, with Virginia and moving down? You did set up an organization in Virginia?

HORNE: Yes, we had an organization in Virginia. It was never a very widely organized one. There were obstacles in doing so. We had a fairly active Negro organization in Florida, I mean in Virginia. Most of the assistance, of course, was given through the Democratic organization, the regular Democratic Committee. The Negro activities there were headed by Congressman [William L.] Dawson and Mrs. Belford Lawson. I worked very closely with Mrs. Lawson. She was able to understand exactly the point that I made a moment ago: Go as far as you can without alienating. Get as many votes as you can, but don't do it in such a manner that you drive more votes away from you. She and I recognized this and worked very closely together in Virginia and elsewhere throughout the South.

Now South Carolina we did not set up, for example, a separate citizens group. It was unnecessary. It would have done more harm than good. Surprisingly enough we had a very active, very effective group in the State of Texas, which was Vice President Johnson's home state. It was done, though, with the full knowledge and cooperation of those who were handling the State of Texas for the ticket, on behalf of the ticket under regular Democratic Party auspices. We got a young man who was well known, who liked Kennedy and Johnson, enthusiastic about both of them, but who had no political scars, who was looked to as an appropriate person to give an umbrella to the independents and also to the liberal forces in Texas who at times in the past had been on the outs with the Vice President.

STEWART: Who was this?

HORNE: This was some of Senator [Ralph W.] Yarborough's strong supporters, for example. The person's name that headed up the operation in Texas was a young man by the name of Harvey, I believe. I'm trying to find his full name for you. Robert W. Harvey, a young man from Houston. By utilizing his enthusiasm and helping supply names to him, we got a very active organization going, working in several of the important areas surrounding Texas. And in each place we were able to get them to coordinate and work hand in hand with, even though they were set up separately, the regular Democratic groups.

STEWART: Was there any opposition to your working this way in Texas?

HORNE: No, no, everybody was in unison. Everybody felt the need for having such a group, and everybody was very enthusiastic about setting up such a group. The Vice President, his campaign managers, the regular Democratic auspices as well as this group here.

STEWART: Did you handle states west of Arizona and New Mexico and those?

HORNE: No, I didn't get into that area. Texas, as I recall, is as far west as I went. In Louisiana, for example, as I recall, we had difficulty getting some groups going. Finally, we had some very good efforts going on. And here again, we did a similar thing to what we did in Texas. We worked very closely with the regular professional group. A person by the name of Frank Ellis, whom I'm sure you will recall, was campaign manager. Frank understood sufficiently and appreciated sufficiently well what I was trying to do, what the citizens group was trying to do, that he set up something a little different from what we had in most states; he set up an advisory committee. He carefully chose people to be on this advisory committee who were also leaders in citizens efforts. So now in their regular meetings they were able to allocate particular things to citizens groups that could be done better by the citizens group than could be done by the regular groups. And both of them recognized that the main thing they want to do is to elect the ticket. And everybody recognized that citizens volunteer groups are in existence only until the campaign is over, and they then disappear.

STEWART: Were there ever situations where people saw the possibilities of a citizens group, in fact, lasting beyond the election or at least that faction that became citizens, who organized a citizens group, turning into a very realistic factor?

HORNE: That may have taken place in some states. It did not take place in any of my states, and I doubt if it took place to any great degree in any state because we made pretty clear at the beginning that the citizens group was a temporary group. Now, I'm sure that some people who had experiences in political activity with citizens groups became so enthusiastic about this kind of work that they later on joined the regular Democratic organizations and played important parts with the regular Democratic organization. I'm sure the Republicans with their volunteer groups would have a similar experience. But by and large, as I have said, we made clear to our groups that they were not to replace the regular organization, that they were to supplement, that they were to serve a purpose which the regular organizations couldn't serve; they were to offer a house to people who didn't want to work in the regular Democratic house over here; and that their functions were temporary and that they would disappear when the campaign was over. We did encourage them that when the campaign was over to join the regular Democratic organization, become a regular Democrat. We didn't apply pressure that they do so. And we left them free to fade back into nonpolitical activity until another election came up.

STEWART: Could we go through some of the other states in which you recall there being significant problems? Oklahoma, for example.

HORNE: Well, Oklahoma did present a significant problem because the Democratic elements there were pretty bitterly divided. On one group was Senator Kerr, who was at that time the head of the Oklahoma Democratic Executive Committee; and on the other side was Governor [J. Howard] Edmondson, whose term was coming to a close, as I recall, and who was an enthusiastic Kennedy person. But we never could bring these Democratic groups together, and we lost valuable time in trying to do so. Finally sensing that we were failing, and working with one of the Kennedy coordinators, we did set up some citizens groups in Oklahoma. But we got to it too late. It wasn't as effective as I had hoped that it would be, and it couldn't bridge the gap between what was not being done by the regular Democrats and the loss of time that occurred because of Democratic splits. We simply couldn't close this gap, and so we lost the State of Oklahoma.

STEWART: What appeals, other than the appeals of people to be loyal and to elect the ticket, did you have to bring factions together or to try to bring factions together?

HORNE: Upon analysis the appeal was that we have a good ticket. We would try to sell Kennedy and Johnson, would try to sell their programs and try to sell, if the accomplishment of their program was realized, what it would mean to the country as a whole. And the need that we had for these people to help us win, to help us elect this ticket. That's about the only appeal we could possibly have, the appeal of the candidates and the appeal of their programs.

STEWART: Did you have much leverage as far as explaining to people the effects of bad national organization on their local campaigns?

HORNE: No, I don't recall, John, that I, in setting up of citizens groups, used the leverage in persuading them to become active the defects that I saw at the national level. I'd want to point out wherein they could fill the gap, but I was careful to do it in terms that would avoid direct criticism of what was not being done by the regular organization. I think we got at what we wanted, but in a manner that avoided direct criticism of any persons or any lack of effort on the part of the regular group. Of course, there was implied criticism, as you can see. We were saying, "Here is an area that you can serve to fill a gap that otherwise isn't being filled by other activities, and here's an area also where you can serve without aligning yourself with a political party, unless you prefer to work with a party."

And there were times, speaking of the national operation, in some areas in which there was much less effectiveness or efficiency than you want, but this is also true of any large undertaking that's primarily done with volunteers. You have a large group that you put together for a special purpose, and you know that most of them are going to leave when that purpose has been served or the time has expired for the serving of that purpose.

One of the weaknesses that I felt that we had in the regular organizational setup was in the preparation of literature and getting it out to the campaign workers whether they be regular workers or citizen workers. I remember having calls from all over my territory, and the other people had similar calls, "Please get me something to work with." To overcome part of this delay, we encouraged and issued instructions as to how they at the local level could go about preparing their own campaign literature. As a matter of fact, we wrote at the national level some things we sent out to them--that is, to the citizens organization--and we gave them information they could use in preparing their own product.

STEWART: As far as the literature that did come out of your organization and the differences between the literature that came out of the regular Democratic headquarters, there was, of course, an attempt in your material to be somewhat nonpartisan. Can you think of specific examples of things that you would include in your pamphlets to really push this whole matter of non-partisanship?

HORNE: Well, we had, for example, a campaign manual prepared specifically for the citizens groups. It was called "The Citizens for Kennedy and Johnson Campaign Manual." In our campaign manual, we did not put quite the emphasis on partisanship activity as would be put by the regular Democratic National Committee. We also would consult with our citizen leaders and see what particular things they thought would be helpful at their own local level to appeal to voters who did not belong to either the Democratic or Republican organizational setup. Then we'd be careful in what we'd send them or in what we'd prepare ourselves to send them. We would move in that direction. That would be our thrust, to appeal to what they said, what they advised us would get the most votes or be most effective at that particular level. Sometimes it might very well be a conservation matter or sometimes it might very well be a particular idea or project that would not be included in a manual but that would appeal generally to many people of the area. Often, too, we would embrace certain things directly.

STEWART: Were there ever any problems of determining precisely what the position was of the national ticket or was this all. . . . Were there ever any problems as far as you putting emphasis on a certain area in a certain way that were inconsistent with what had been done in other areas of the campaign?

HORNE: No, we must be careful in a campaign to avoid casting your ticket in a way that would conflict in one area with what the overall position of the candidates are.

STEWART: Right.

HORNE: You can though, short of that, cast your local literature in a way that you get a particular thrust to particular groups that you are trying to reach. And so no, we never would, at a local level or at state level through the citizens organization, be in conflict with the position of the candidates. But we would from time to time give more emphasis to particular things than would be the case through the regular organization setup.

STEWART: What kind of feedback, what kind of reports did you regularly get from your citizens groups, the ones that you did have set up in your areas?

HORNE: We would ask for regular weekly reports. Sometimes we didn't always get them, but we got some very excellent reports as to what organization efforts had been made, how successful they'd been, what kind of materials they needed from us, what kind of activities they were engaging in themselves.

Of course, throughout the campaign generally and through our encouragement of them to be free in taking steps on their own, we got a lot of independent effort on their part, a lot of ideas we at the national level hadn't even thought about that they felt to be the correct sentiments at their local levels. And we kept in touch, as I say, with them, hopefully on a weekly basis. Sometimes it would go two or three weeks, and sometimes if we hadn't heard from them, we would telephone through the state organizer if we had a state office. Sometimes we didn't even have a state office, we'd have the city offices or geographical areas. I had an understanding in those places where we did have state managers that if I wanted

to go direct, I would do so. Sometimes I would go directly, but I would apprise the state office of what I had done so that there would not be misunderstanding and lack of coordination.

I felt that where we were able to develop effective groups, we had a good liaison and good reporting from them as to what they were doing and, as I say, appeals for help from us but also suggestions to us which we frequently would feed out into other areas.

I do not recall any particular detail, but I do recall that in several places we had suggestions as to what the local groups were doing and the state groups that I felt was good enough that I would pass this on to other groups. And I would also make it available to the other people on the President's staff who had other states. We would exchange with each other things that had proven to be helpful, and feed this back to our own headquarters.

STEWART: Do you recall any specific problems you ran into regarding the whole religious area, the whole religious issue?

HORNE: This is. . . .

STEWART: Other than the fact that it was always there and always. . . .

HORNE: I would say that two of the most difficult areas in the area for which I was responsible had to do with how to handle the race issue and how to reduce the harm that was being done in the religious area--the fact that President Kennedy was a Catholic. These were two of my most crucial problems. As regarding the race issue, I've already spoken on that. As regards the religious issue, we simply fought that as best we could by getting Protestants to speak out, leading Protestants, to speak out for the ticket. And if not speak out directly for the ticket, at least speak out in a way that would help to nullify and to reduce the effectiveness that was being experienced in some places by those who were against Kennedy simply because he was a Catholic. I remember, for example, down in my hometown, that one of the Protestant ministers, as was reported to me, was campaigning from store to store and from home to home against Kennedy simply because Kennedy was a Catholic. I remember several friends of mine who were really strong supporters of the Democratic Party but who deserted the Democratic Party because Kennedy was a Catholic. I remember distributing through the citizens group many pieces of literature and a very excellent speech that was made by Kennedy before a group of ministers in Texas. Do you recall that episode?

STEWART: Yes.

HORNE: We reproduced that and distributed literally thousands of copies of it through the mail and through our campaign workers trying to overcome the harm that was being done. You see, in the South--not only in the South but in certain other states, in southern Indiana, for example, there was quite a strong feeling against Catholics, and I suppose this has been true over a long period of time. Really, there was in this instance quite a strong move by some Protestant people against a Catholic being President. The unfounded fear that the Pope was going to dictate to him and the United States would lose its identity, would become part of the Catholic Church, insofar as running its affairs were concerned. This was really a problem in the South more so, perhaps, than in any other section of the country as a whole. But you would find it in certain other areas of other sections of the country. I mentioned one. Now, this, of course, was offset to a great degree by the fact that many Catholics, many people voted for him for President because he was a Catholic. Now I don't know how to evaluate which was the greater harm, the fact that he was a Catholic or the fact that he wasn't . . .

BEGIN SIDE II TAPE I

HORNE: My responsibility, as I saw it, was to make sure that the President benefited as much as he could by virtue of the fact that he was a Catholic, but to reduce to the minimum the harm that was being done by the loss of votes from non-Catholics who were not only non-Catholic but anti-Catholic.

STEWART: What possible actions by the Nixon campaign did you feel most in the South? What things, in other words, do you feel that Nixon might have done or done more to come out better than he actually did in the areas that you were concerned with?

HORNE: Well, my first answer would be, of course, a general answer: that is, to have refrained from getting on television with President Kennedy. There's no question but what these television shows, particularly the first one, helped Kennedy and hurt Nixon.

So far as specific things now that would pertain to the South, Nixon ran, as I viewed it, about as effective a campaign in the South as could have been run by anybody other than his predecessor, President [Dwight D.] Eisenhower. He, of course, appealed to the conservative elements in the South more than Kennedy did. He did not have the anti-Catholic stigma that Kennedy, of course, carried. Unfortunately for Nixon, at that time, and fortunately for our side, the Republican Party as such had not made as much headway as it has made now. And also fortunate for us and for the Kennedy people at that time, the race issue had not become quite so bitter as it later became. And while Nixon was more acceptable by many people in the South, racially speaking--it is the segregationists I am speaking of now--than Kennedy, still Nixon had said enough so far as integration was concerned that people sort of pinpointed him, pinned him to the mast and say, "Well, if you can believe him, his position on this subject is really no different than what Kennedy himself has expressed."

So I don't know how I would answer your question other than the points that I have made. The main opposition, again, to Kennedy, so far as Nixon's effect was concerned, really was more conservative views on the part of Nixon, and he did not have the religious handicap to carry that Kennedy was carrying.

STEWART: Do you recall any specific efforts that you made to get endorsements from Democrats who just weren't that enthused with the national ticket?

HORNE: Nothing except, here again, to appeal to the Democrats on the basis of what the Democratic Party had meant all over the country, but particularly had done for the South. I realize in this respect, for example, that many Southerners, particularly well-to-do Southerners, and now some who are not so well-to-do, have let race interfere with their original belief in and overall respect for the Democratic Party--at least this is my analysis of it--and are not as enthusiastic today, and many of them even weren't then, about the Democratic Party.

But the fact remains, as you review the record, that it's the Democratic Party that has meant so much to the South. And even today it's Democratic programs that in so many ways benefit low-income states on a per capita basis. And certainly this is the situation in which most states in the South find themselves. In this regard, for example, one could point out the importance of such programs, particularly to rural people, as the rural electrification program; we would especially send this information to rural people. We would point out to all the people the importance of such health programs as the Hill-Burton hospitals, which is a Democratic program, how under Democratic auspices this program was balanced in favor of the South. We built many Hill-Burton hospitals, for example, in Alabama. The state and local authorities put up about one dollar for every two from

the Federal Government, whereas in most other states that have a much higher per capita income, when they build a Hill-Burton hospital, they only get about one dollar from the Federal Government for every two they put in--exactly the reverse.

And we emphasized the housing program in which Senator Sparkman had played such a large part. This is true throughout the South. As long as you stayed away in the South from the public housing aspects of it, and we would stay away from the public housing aspects, except that we might go to a public housing group and explain to them quietly our literature in reference to them, what this program is all about, and that it was the Democratic Party that brought it into being, no harm was done.

We emphasized heavily in the South the Social Security program which was a Democratic program and what the Republicans had said about it when it came into being. And this is one of the areas in which we made a special appeal, especially to the South, on how the South had profited and benefited from the programs more than any other part of the country. That isn't being done as much today in the South as it should be. But the South still is benefiting in many, many ways from federal programs to a greater degree than the richer states are.

STEWART: As far as endorsements--well, I guess Harry Byrd is the example, but he hadn't supported a Democratic candidate for some time, I don't think, but. . . .

HORNE: I don't think since 19--oh, golly, I don't . . .

STEWART: Since [Franklin D.] Roosevelt.

HORNE: Since maybe Roosevelt's first or second term.

STEWART: I'm trying to think of other people who for the first time didn't support the Democratic candidate. I can't offhand. Possibly you can.

HORNE: Well.

STEWART: Certainly people like . . . In fact, I think Senator [Richard B.] Russell did very little. In fact I don't . . .

HORNE: I was going to say Senator Russell spoke out, said he was going to vote the Democratic ticket, but there was little or no campaigning on his part. In Alabama the two Senators did campaign for the ticket, and so did Governor Patterson in 1960 campaign vigorously for the ticket.

I believe if you stopped, John, to review the leading Democrats at that time, and I don't recall them right now, you would find that there was hardly a state in which some Democratic officeholder at that time or a prominent Democrat who had been an officeholder in the past failed to support the ticket. Now, of course, there was also hardly a state in which you wouldn't have at least one or more prominent Democrats support the ticket. In Georgia, for example, you mentioned Senator Russell, Governor [Carl E.] Sanders vigorously supported the 1960 ticket. In South Carolina, where [James F.] Byrnes and other prominent Democrats opposed the ticket, Sen. Olin Johnston did vigorously support the ticket. He was the person who really carried the load in South Carolina. In Tennessee, most of the Democratic officeholders, as I recall, supported the ticket. No doubt, if you review far enough, you would find that some prominent Democrat switched over and supported the other ticket. The support primarily of the Republican ticket in 1960 by prominent Democrats in the South, was based either on the racial situation or more the feeling of conservatism which they felt that Nixon had more of than Kennedy. Some of them no doubt were influenced by Kennedy's religion,

but I don't recall any of them saying so in public.

STEWART: Did you make much of an effort with these people? Did you spend much time with people like the few in each state who didn't go along?

HORNE: No, the ones who had been prominent Democrats or who were prominent Democratic officeholders, I made a little effort with them. This responsibility was more the effort of the regularly organized groups such as, for example, Senator Smathers, or the regular Democratic groups here in Washington. But I would contact those regular Democrats supporting the ticket for advice on the citizens operation. For example, in South Carolina, I made contact with Sen. Olin Johnston and his brother, who was with him at the time. And also the person in charge, the person who was chairman of the committee in South Carolina, as I recall, supported the ticket. But I didn't spend much time, no, with the prominent Democrats who were opposing the ticket. That was more somebody else's responsibility than my own.

STEWART: As far as fundraising, how, if at all, were you involved in either raising funds for the national citizens organization or helping state citizens organizations raise funds?

HORNE: Well, actually, while not vested with any direct responsibility in raising funds for the National Democratic Committee, I did raise some. I don't remember the amount, but I'd say for one person who was working only with the citizens group quite a few thousand dollars, by virtue of having known people who wanted to contribute to the national organization. They knew the citizens groups would disappear within time, and they wanted to be on the permanent record of having made contributions to the national forces. And I would take them over there from time to time, I remember taking several people contributing quite handsomely. One person I remember, for example, gave five thousand dollars, which I think was the limit at that particular time from one person. This was done not only with several people in Alabama but with people who didn't live in Alabama. Through the citizens activities we had a regular program of raising funds. We had tickets that we were to sell--five, ten, fifteen, twenty-five dollars, I forget all the denominations now. I'm pretty sure though that we had one you could even sell for a dollar. We made a special appeal to our citizens groups and gave ideas to our citizens leaders on the state and local level as to what they could do to support themselves.

We had some people who made pretty handsome contributions to the citizens group, but by and large I think the record would show that most of our funds were raised by our own workers, by people who made up the citizens activities throughout the country as a whole, by appealing to people locally for a dollar or two dollars, or any amount that they would contribute. I don't remember how much we raised through the citizens group as a whole. I think it would amount to several thousands of dollars. We did have planned programs and methods of doing so.

And sometimes, you know, you'd find a person who would be an excellent contributor, but who wanted to do it on a nonpartisan basis. And these people would come in and contribute through the citizens group. And while you'd have some handsome contributors that would want to go to the regular party organization, the Democratic National Committee, to be on the record, you had others who didn't want to be on record as being a partisan, but wanted to be on record as contributing to the ticket itself. And they could do this through the citizens group. This is another purpose of the citizen or volunteer groups' service, to offer a vehicle through which people may make contributions on a non-party basis.

STEWART: In actual fact, were all of the funds pretty well controlled from the central point?

HORNE: In actual fact, yes. There had to be some coordination here although much of the money was also raised and spent statewide and locally. And this would be controlled statewide and locally. We would not insist that that come into Washington and we control it here. So there was quite a good deal of money that was raised and spent locally and never came to Washington. The amounts that did come to Washington would, through Whizzer White, be coordinated to some degree with the regular, with Bobby Kennedy and [Stephen E.] Steve Smith, the brother-in-law.

STEWART: Right, that's right. Did you travel to any great extent?

HORNE: I traveled, but not to any great extent. I did go out to some of the states in helping to set up citizens groups, and I did serve at one time as advance man for one of the speaking tours made by Kennedy. In Florida, for example, I went to Florida with [H.W.] Bill Brawley, who was the coordinator for the state on all the stops that Kennedy made, and worked both in Miami, Tampa, and Jacksonville, but I worked with him primarily in Miami. You may recall the trip that Kennedy took at the timewhen the American Legion Convention was being held in Miami. The American Legion invited him to go, he did go and gave a very outstanding speech. I felt that after his speech he had made some converts among the Legionnaires.

But we took advantage of his going down there to arrange speeches for him elsewhere. In addition to speaking at the American Legion, he also spoke at three different places, if I recall correctly, in Miami. And it was this part of his speaking responsibility that I did a great deal of work with a group of Miami supporters. For us at this time was Congressman Dante Fascell and his Chief Aide, John Shipley. I recall riding this tour at 3 o'clock one morning making sure that all the drivers knew, that is particularly lead drivers, exactly what route they were to follow, when they were supposed to be there, and told them of the responsibility of moving the candidate off. There were such crowds gathering around him to touch him and talk to him that sometimes it was really difficult getting through the crowds, getting him from one place to another. We had help from the police authorities in assisting him to get through a group, sort of forming an advance guard for him, so to speak, to blaze a way so he could get through all of these big crowds and get on to his next engagement.

STEWART: Did you have occasion to talk to him on this or any other occasion during the campaign?

HORNE: Yes, I talked to him several times during the campaign, and on this particular one I had a very good visit with him immediately after his arrival. We met him at the International Airport. He stayed at the airport that night, and I was in his room with him. I remember the enthusiasm that he had, but he also had the trials of any campaign. But he had the vitality as a young man to bounce back. He also had another characteristic I wish everybody had, and I wish I had, of being able to relax and take a nap between speeches, especially when he was up late at night going from one place to another. His afternoon was arranged so that he could lie down and relax. And he had the ability to relax efficiently and work things out of his mind so he could sleep and get a pretty good rest. Also I remember at the American Legion Convention in Miami, which he spoke to, his back was paining him. But you would never know it except as you were right close to him and could sense that he was in pain. But once he began speaking and once he got in the crowds, he either did a good job of hiding it or the enthusiasm of the people caused him temporarily to forget it.

STEWART: Do you recall what kinds of things he was asking you about as far as the campaign was concerned?

HORNE: Generally how I felt things were going and did I feel that the trip that he was to take was sufficiently well prepared, would things go on smoothly. I felt that they were, and it turned out that they had done a very good job in preparing for it.

One thing I remember about Kennedy so well, he always was so thoughtful about other people. Even during the campaign, he was always thoughtful of other people. He'd inquire about their health and how things were going with them. At the time in Miami, and elsewhere where I met him, I never heard him voice a complaint except when something would go so badly wrong that he had an excuse for saying it, then he might explode temporarily, but he would subside quickly.

STEWART: What were the other occasions during the campaign that you had any contact with him, do you recall?

HORNE: Well, from time to time when he was in Washington and we were having meetings. And also I recall his visiting the citizens headquarters and talking with people there. I did not have a very close contact with him on many occasions here during the campaign because he was away from Washington most of the time, and when he was here, he was planning his tours. And the citizens group, while it was tied in with coordinating what was going on, this liaison was primarily through our chairman, Whizzer White. Whizzer had more connections with him than any of the others had.

STEWART: You mentioned before that you felt there was a letdown near the end of the campaign, and this concerned you somewhat. Could you describe, if you could, any examples of this letdown, any things that you specifically saw that indicated people were getting a little overconfident?

HORNE: Well, this is one of the things that bothered me, and it may have been an unnecessary bother, but I've worked in enough campaigns, and I'm cautious enough in my approach to campaigns, that I never feel confident that an election is in the bag until the votes have been made and certification as to the amount of votes has been given by appropriate authorities. Having the experience of working in campaigns, I think you learn how to sense things and probably sense them fairly accurately. And I sensed, following the great reception for Senator Kennedy in New York, that too many people among the Kennedy campaign forces felt that the race was in the bag and that we hadn't anything to worry about. I felt that Nixon was making more headway than that. I felt that he was recouping some of his losses that had been experienced during the campaign. He started out ahead, in my opinion, no question about it. But after the debate and after the very vigorous campaigning done by our two candidates, the tide turned. And there was a time there when I felt we were further ahead than we were when the voting was actually held. I felt that things were shifting back toward Nixon. And I felt that we were premature, in some areas, in assuming that following the great reception given in New York, we had everything won. And I sensed particularly that the citizens in the national headquarters, the volunteers and even some of the paid staff members, became more lackadaisical in their efforts. Not at the top level, not where I was, but down below. And it was up to us, I felt at the top level to prevent this from happening and to reinvigorate them with the feeling that we still had a lot of campaigning even though we were only two, three, or four weeks away from voting day.

Then to follow through on your question a little bit more. The fact that this had spread throughout other areas of the country was evidenced by the fact that even in my part of the country--and I'm sure the people who were handling other states, as I was handling the Southeast and Southwest, had similar experiences. I had calls from some of our leaders that, "Listen, we feel that efforts are being trimmed down too rapidly. We want something from headquarters that will give us something in hand to go to our workers and go to our local leaders and impress them with the fact that the better part of wisdom is for us to pursue strenuously our efforts to make sure we get out every vote that we can, keep on talking about the ticket, and not assume that the campaign has now been won." And I may be wrong in my analysis, but this feeling, which I think we were able to correct to some degree, but I believe it resulted in the campaign being as close as it was. I believe it is one of the reasons why I and others sat up all night worrying about the outcome of this campaign.

I remember going down to the Mayflower Hotel in the early parts of the campaign when the original votes coming in from the East were so good, and some of the people were giving victory yells and saying it was over. And my attitude was, "Listen, we're not coming in from these early areas with a sufficient strength, in my opinion, to offset the rest of the country where we're not as strong. And we're going to have a drop in other parts of the country from our anticipated strength as we already are experiencing here in the East. We're going to be in real trouble before the night is over." And I recall their telling me that I was a "kill joy." This is early in the evening, and as things wore on, they began to say, "Well, how did you sense this? What made you have this feeling that we were going to be in trouble?" And part of the reason I had this feeling was not only because we weren't getting quite the majorities I had hoped for in the East, but because I felt that we had

eased off too early in our efforts. Some had felt that the campaign was won and relaxed their efforts.

STEWART: Well, that's about all of the questions I have on the campaign. Unless there's anything else you want to go over.

HORNE: I don't know of anything that relates to the campaign that I could say, except what we have discussed. I would like to say that after the election and President Kennedy took office, and even prior to his taking office, I was quite pleased that I was asked to become a part of his official family downtown. I can also say, quite proud that from the minute he became President he did not disappoint me; he lived up to the high expectations that I had for him. I think he made a great record in the short time in office. I think that if he had survived, he would have accomplished many more of the things he set out to accomplish and would have left a record that we could all be proud of, or a record of a longer list of achievements than he did leave. But his record was so good that I think that any American who voted for him and even those who didn't vote for him take pride in what this man did for this country. He did rebuild much of the confidence we needed to have rebuilt. He did get the country moving. He did set the stage for many of the proposals that have been enacted since his death.

STEWART: Well, I have a lot of questions on the work in the SBA [Small Business Administration]. Now it's noontime now, do you want to cut it here and have me come back for another time or. . . .

HORNE: Whatever you want.

STEWART: I would sort of prefer to come back later if
it's. . . .