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Biographical Note
Katie Louchheim (1903-1991) was the Director of Women's Activities for the Democratic National Committee from 1953-1960 and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from 1966 to 1969. This interview focuses on the 1960 Democratic National Convention and the leadership within the Democratic National Committee, among other topics.

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Katie Louchheim– JFK #2

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Second Oral History Interview

with

KATIE LOUCHHEIM

June 14, 1968
Washington, D.C.

By Larry J. Hackman

For the John F. Kennedy Library

HACKMAN: Yes, you can go ahead if you want to.

LOUCHHEIM: Well, in reference to your question about the changeover at the 1956 Convention when Stevenson appointed [James E.] Finnegan as campaign director and at first had asked that Mr. Butler, Paul M. Butler, the chairman of the Democratic Committee, be replaced, and Finnegan be put in his spot, I found a clipping which describes in rather terse fashion what took place at a Democratic National Committee meeting. But let's back up a minute and say that the evening before the Democratic National Committee meeting, which is always traditionally held on a Saturday after the end of the Convention, there apparently was a conference which included the Speaker [Rayburn] and others to restore Paul M. Butler to his chairmanship. Word had come to them that Adlai Stevenson had made this decision, and that Hale Boggs and the Speaker and some others who were friends, such as Camille Gravel, the committeeman of Louisiana, met and decided to go see Stevenson and tell him that they could not dispense with his advice and services, and that he was loyal and that he was an essential cog in the forthcoming campaign. That morning, in somewhat emotional fashion, Butler spoke of the resignation that he had

been asked to tender and he wept. There were some stories in the press about his weeping. This does not happen to be one. And there was a general feeling among the committee members that, I suspect, that he was making a fairly advantageous grandstand play. This article, which is by [G. Gould] Lincoln, correspondent for the Star in Chicago, August 18th, says that, "Adlai Stevenson today announced he was appointing James E. Finnegan of Pennsylvania as his campaign director. He urged strongly that the Democratic National Committee re-elect Paul M. Butler. Mr. Butler had earlier told the Committee he was resigning." That's the only reference there is to this episode. "The Committee promptly followed Mr. Stevenson's advice and re-elected Mr. Butler. Mr. Butler, when he told the Committee he was quitting, was so moved by the many expressions of members of the Committee praising his work that he shed tears." So it does say that he shed tears. "Later committeeman Camille S. Gravel of Louisiana moved that Mr. Butler be asked not to resign at this time. His resolution was adopted on a voice vote with one loud, No, uttered by George Rock, the committeeman from Colorado." Mr. Rock was the favorite antagonist of Paul M. Butler's. "Mr. Rock, it is understood, had been greatly incensed because members of the National Committee were unable to get as many tickets for the convention as they wanted. When Mr. Stevenson had been introduced to the Committee by Mr. Butler, the candidate said that he was urging the Chairman not to resign, and called on the Committee to re-elect Butler. His remarks were greeted with loud applause, etc. Technically it was necessary to elect a chairman since the National Committee who had met today was in itself a new committee, etc." And at this moment in history I was also elected for the first time, as vice chairman "Mrs. Katie Louchheim, the new Democratic National Committeewoman from the District of Columbia was elected as vice chairman, succeeding Mrs. India Edwards." And then it says who I was and what I've done, so forth. There was an amusing behind the scenes comment. There had been a great many speeches on my behalf because at such times the committee members, both male and female, feel the need to go on the record as approving or being a devotee of whoever is the nominee, and I happened to be it. And some of them were very flattering. And Mr. [Clarence] Cannon, who was one of my favorite characters for his asides and his terse remark, turned to me and said, "Do you think maybe I should start an anti-Louchheim movement? Do

you think I'd get anywhere?" And that--I've forgotten how he put it--but that created a little laughter on the platform. And at that point I turned to him and I said, "Please try to do something to call this off. It's becoming embarrassing." You know, they all felt they had to be for me. And he did say that the end of the nominations was in order. What lay behind this, which is more interesting, the Butler and Stevenson cooling off seems to me had been brewing for many months. I remember in July that when I visited with Governor Stevenson overnight at Libertyville, he asked me about Butler. And I told him that I thought he was an extremely efficient and able chairman, and that although he had his problems and sometimes some difficulties in dealing with people, that he had very strong feelings about things, that he was as good a chairman as Adlai would ever get. There were feelings I think, mainly, that the sophistication of Mr. Finnegan, who had successfully elected governors and senators, etc., in Pennsylvania, was more helpful or would be more helpful in a campaign where a great many amateurs were involved. The subsequent event which I think rather points out the irony of the situation was that despite Mr. [Sam] Rayburn's defense of Mr. Butler, Mr. Rayburn, to the best of my knowledge, was the only person who ever really chastised Butler in public. And it was at a hundred dollar a dinner a good many years later, that is either two or three, I don't remember, where he was incensed at what had been going on. The main cause, I suppose, over the years was the formation of the Advisory Council which occurred after the 1956 November defeat.

HACKMAN: You mentioned, I believe, the first time we talked, about Mr. Butler at this time in terms of not giving Rayburn and Johnson enough time when this was set up. Can you go into that a little bit?

LOUCHHEIM: Yes, I looked up my notes. Unfortunately, they're not as satisfactory as I would have liked them to be. It does point out that he did call them on the phone. One of them I believe was away on a hunting trip, but one of them was there. And I presume that it was Johnson that was away on a hunting trip. But the idea was that it was announced as a fact to them and they were the, quote, "leaders" of the party and they were not given a chance to explore or

discuss this matter in some detail. I did find a very detailed report--and I'll bring it to our next meeting if you want--in my journal, of the first Democratic National Committee meeting after the Advisory Council, in which various expressions, pro and con, were made. And I did find the reasons that were given by the majority leaders, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Rayburn, for not participating, and the resignation of certain people who had been invited and who subsequently withdrew. I think the timing element was part of it, but I also think it was the sort of "stated fact": Here we are, and we're advising you that we really don't think you are representing the Democratic Party, so we're going to form a body of people whose policies and pronouncements will more accurately reflect our thinking.

HACKMAN: Had you discussed this idea with Butler as it developed? Where did this idea come from?

LOUCHHEIM: The idea, I suspect, came from Philip Perlman. There were three men, as I believe I told you before, that were very closely associated with Paul. And one was Philip Perlman, and the other was Paul Ziffren, of Los Angeles, and Camille Gravel of Louisiana. And they were the movers and shakers and they were the ones who rode with Butler's ascendency, and naturally sought to preserve it in whatever way they could. But I think Perlman was the real instigator of the Advisory Council, or perhaps the idea, shall I say, came from him. He was here in Washington. He was a liberal. He was a lawyer, and I suspect quite often found himself at odds with the leadership.

HACKMAN: Who else at the Democratic National Committee gave strong support to Butler in this period, particularly when his leadership was challenged in different areas? I've heard from one person a very brief explanation of the midwestern conference, the caucus that would operate at Democratic National Committee meetings where people who were strong supporters of Butler would sometimes meet by themselves? Can you go into that at all, the Michigan people, some of the midwestern people like Frank Theis from Kansas and [Thomas H.E.] Quimby from Michigan and some of these people?

LOUCHHEIM: That's right. They were there, and they could always be counted on to support Butler. I think Butler had a broader support. I remember he used his powers, such as they were, with a great deal of skill when he appointed people to committees. And again I'm sadly lacking the dates. I didn't bring the journals, but I did find a description of the Committee on Arrangements and how this was handled for the '60 Convention. And how when they did meet, they weren't really allowed to deliberate. They were kept amused. They were taken on trips. And those on the committee who were not Butler votes communicated with me. Libby Smith was one of them, for instance. And I kept on the telephone with her. She kept saying, "We're not allowed in on anything." In other words even when he had a committee, he had a group within the committee who were carrying out his purposes, which is all very clever and what a skillful politician would do. I think that what made me try to enlarge his geographic area (not limited to the midwest) was the thought of a woman who was frequently used by Butler, whose name was Delores Martin, a very delightful woman, the committeewoman from Hawaii. She was a Butler stooge. And there were others. I don't have to look up my notes. I think there was a woman from Florida who was a liberal who was rather at odds with the rest of the Party in Florida, Peggy Ehrmann. The main thing is that he knew how to use the tools that were given him; the Convention tools, the meeting of the Committee, the meetings with the midwest conference and other conferences. Wherever he went he had a very careful hold on the group. I don't recall, to my knowledge, anytime at which he discussed any prospective plans with me. He was a secretive man. And he would let you know when it was an accomplished fact. I remember when Neil Staebler, who was a very competent chairman in Michigan, had a great influence on Butler, set up a--heavens, I can't even think of the name of the group. But it was a group that was supposed to do organization work.

HACKMAN: I've seen the name. I know what you mean.

LOUCHHEIM: And Drexel Sprecher was put at the head of it. He was a man from Maryland. And as far as I can remember, it was announced to me as an accomplished

fact. And at the time it was very difficult because it placed the organization which I was dealing with outside of the limits of the new idea, the new thrust, or it made it subservient to it, either one or the other. And he used a lot of language about cooperation, etc., and we were all supposed to cooperate. But it was like anything else. You throw some food into a tank of porpoises and they'll all jump for it. And this was the Butler method. It worked very well.

HACKMAN: What was your relationship with people like Staebler and Quimby and some of the people who had been involved in this? Did your ideas differ strongly from theirs or was this . . .

LOUCHHEIM: No. I felt very strongly though that, to begin at the end and give you a very short answer, I think that President Kennedy had a chance to appoint Neil Staebler National Chairman, that is in the end when I was deprived of my position with the Democratic Committee and it was given to Margaret Price. It was done because there was nothing else left and also because they had to do something for Michigan. And Kennedy, President Kennedy, I think would have subtly, if not openly, agreed with me. And that was that Staebler's methods and techniques were not universally applicable, and he deliberately overlooked Staebler in order to choose the more professional type, what we now call the "old pro", and chose John Bailey. So that I would say that all along I would consider myself on the old pro side. I don't think Michigan was typical. I think Michigan was in a very, very bad stage at the point at which Governor Williams rose to prominence. It had been Republicans solidly for so long, and the Democratic Party was in decay. It's always a good idea, if you can, to wipe away everything. And I think the new look Williams and company gave it was very important. And the thrust was to go out to the people and talk to them and hold meetings, and have everybody participate. I believe in this. But I don't necessarily believe in it for every part of the country.

HACKMAN: This is the only real question I had about the "Plan for Suburbia" thing, and that is how it contrasted to the ideas that Staebler and some of these people

were putting forward. Was this completely your own idea or . . .

LOUCHHEIM: Yes, it was my own idea because I felt that in looking at the voting record I noticed that throughout my journals and scrap books there was a constant recurring argument between my Republican counterpart and myself about women's votes. I stoutly defended the fact that there was quote; "no women's vote," that they didn't vote in a bloc. I still believe I'm right about that. But then the statistics, and even in the Michigan survey, I remember this, proved after the various [Dwight D.] Eisenhower elections, back to the landslide '56, that more women had voted for Eisenhower than men. They were correct, because for a very simple reason, and that was that in the lower income groups that were usually heavily Democratic, the women don't vote. They either have no wish to vote or the men don't consider it important for their wives to vote, or there is a perhaps growing resentment, for instance, between the labor union member and his wife. He goes to a Political Action Committee meeting, and he's already been to three meetings of the regular union that week. She gets mad because he's gone out for another night and he's bound to stay at the tavern on the way home. I mean this--part of my life was spent with the Labor League for Political Education in the '49 to '52 period trying to interest their wives in the issues, trying to make them realize what it could mean to have a favorable candidate and what was at stake. So, to come back to the suburbia, therefore, I agreed that the upper income group voted Republican mostly, and that they lived in the suburbs. But, there was also beginning at this time to be the effect of the 1954 school decision of the Supreme Court, and this was the beginning of the flight to the suburbs on the part of regular, lower middle--lower upper income, let's say. And they were Democrats. And I knew we were losing them because it was the correct thing in the suburbs, the snob thing, to be a Republican. If a young married woman had a husband working in the bank and everybody in the bank was a Republican, then it was the thing for her to be a Republican. And I was trying to reach into the suburbs, to make a dent, and to make them realize that there were some kudos and some style attached to the Democratic Party. And I think that's what I mentioned to you earlier, this meeting in Bronxville, which was

described in the paper here, where Mrs. Roosevelt and Mrs. [W. Averall] Harriman and others spoke. We would not have held it in Bronxville if it hadn't been thought to be a good idea to reach into that beginning-to-be-burgeoning Republican area; Yonkers, Bronxville, Westchester, etc. We held it at a place called the Garmatan, and Governor Harriman, I see here, made a dramatic surprise entrance. "Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt passed over the issues to concentrate on how to capture not only Westchester, but national suburbia. Her powers of persuasion undimmed by time, Mrs. Roosevelt talked detailed techniques of local organization, stressed keeping women workers busy twelve months a year. For an issue she returned to her long championed plea for a draft of all young people for a period of three months intensive conventional training for armed service," it's interesting, isnt' it? "to be followed by two weeks annual training as a part of a smaller, higher trained military force." I'd forgotten about that, I suspect most people have. "How to capture the suburbs in America was the theme of every dinner speaker last night. Dynamic Katie Louchheim, national vice-chairman, made personally important to the national welfare by passing over issues to praise dozens of women from the nine states represented in the conference." And then I spoke on the importance of suburbia. That morning we had what we called a "brainstorming session." And those techniques, I must admit, came to the Committee, not through Drexel himself, but through people that he hired and who were working in group dynamics. And the very simple answer that I've been hearing ever since, that is, that you let people participate; that people don't remember a meeting at which they have been talked at all day and haven't had a chance to say anything, that they must be allowed to turn their chairs around and be given a question for each group, time to discuss it, and then given an answer.

HACKMAN: Was this Butler's reaction to your idea, too, in this. . . .

LOUCHHEIM: To what, the group dynamics?

HACKMAN: Well, his reaction to your suburban plan; was this his general reaction?

LOUCHHEIM: That it was a good idea, you mean?

HACKMAN: No, that it wouldn't . . .

LOUCHHEIM: Wouldn't work?

HACKMAN: . . . wouldn't be that successful, this participation thing.

LOUCHHEIM: Oh, that the group dynamics wouldn't work?

HACKMAN: No, that your plan wouldn't work, but the group dynamics thing would.

LOUCHHEIM: Dear, I wouldn't know how to answer that.

HACKMAN: I just wondered where you found support for your idea. Did Butler support this or. . . .

LOUCHHEIM: Butler supported the idea, definitely, of working in suburbia. That I must say for him, he was always interested in new ideas, especially if they had any relation to the voting pattern. There were other things that distinguished Butler. I think he was the first chairman--and I'm sure you've heard this before--to call meetings of the leading Negroes from around the country. And at these meetings he would also get very emotional.

HACKMAN: To change the subject a little bit--one of the things you had mentioned the first time we talked was Butler's keeping a fairly close reign on you financially in the efforts you were trying to make. Can you recall what this prevented you from doing, or what you were trying to do?

LOUCHHEIM: Well, the main way I can recall it is that he did not disallow any speaking tours or materials within a certain limit. He always fussed about the numbers, but he gave in eventually. The main way in which we tangled financially was after '56 when he objected when I went to big meetings such as, let's say there was a Democratic National Committee meeting in San Francisco, one I remember. He did not want me to take my assistant. He said it was too expensive and too costly, and that he wasn't taking any assistant.

Well, of course, he was taking the whole staff of the Democratic National Committee. And I tried pointing out that we had women who had problems and that I would have to hear them and that was the purpose of my going, and that I would also be more helpful if I had somebody to take notes and keep records and make suggestions. He would not relent. Then the day before the meeting he left a note on my desk saying he would approve it. His holdouts were never as complete as they started out or seemed to be. But I think the difficulty always lay in this direction. And then there was the famous battle in 1960 when no secretaries were allowed to go to the Convention, and this really shattered the morale of the Committee. Of course these women felt, quite properly, that they weren't paid as much as other secretaries; they could have done better in the government. And generally speaking they made sacrifices, working weekends and overtime. And they had no future to look forward to, no retirement funds, no pension funds; and that they were entitled to the little bit of glory, shall I say, or at least participation glory, participation in the VIP activities that took them to the Convention. And it was shattering, particularly in my instance where this very capable Marion Donahue made me feel that I was responsible. And there was nothing I could do to convince Butler that he was not only ruining a relationship but creating a very difficult situation for me. In the end, in the spring of 1960 things began to grind down with Butler, and he became stranger and stranger. I can't really say that I had too much trouble with him over the years, to answer your question, financially, no. I think normally, now, when I realize that I've been in government seven years and you go in on a budget and you either get a yes or a no from your superior officer. I mean, you don't take it personally. It depends on the availability of funds. I do feel, if I may interject at this moment a very strong conviction that I have and I tried to carry out, is that women must participate more in fund raisings than they do. And there were programs that, as you know, I planned and brought this about. And therefore I felt that I had a claim on the funds, and I made this very clear. But I don't think that fund raising by women was ever done to the extent that I would like to have seen it done.

HACKMAN: You had mentioned that at one point you went to Mrs. Agnes Meyer, I believe to . . .

LOUCHHEIM: That's right. And just to prove to Paul Butler that I had power outside of his power to bestow or not bestow funds, I asked that she write a letter with a thousand dollar check, and say that these funds were to be used solely and exclusively for the women's division.

HACKMAN: Were there any other instances like this or was this . . .

LOUCHHEIM: Oh, I only thought I needed to do it once to him, and it took. I think once in a while you have to fight back with whatever tools or weapons that you can lay hands on. Agnes Meyer was very obliging about it.

HACKMAN: All right, let me skip back to something else you mentioned the first time we talked, and that was a conversation you had with Senator Kennedy about removing . . .

LOUCHHEIM: Maggie O'Riordan. And do you know I have searched all my journals and I can't trace it. Tell me first what was the year that the Senator came into the Senate from the House.

HACKMAN: '52.

LOUCHHEIM: '52. Well, I didn't come to the Committee until '53. And it must have been, I would say safely I think it would be after the Convention. Simply because I really don't feel that I had any knowledge or any acquaintance with him to presume on before then. But I did go to see him after Mrs. O'Riordan successfully blocked every suggestion I made for broader participation in Democratic Party politics in Massachusetts. It was not a personal matter. I found her rather delightful. She represented a character, a type, that you wouldn't believe unless you really met her. She was majestic, commanding, and enormously--well, powerful is the wrong word. But because of her oblique and rather old fashioned methods of keeping her supporters happy, she managed to keep a stranglehold on Massachusetts politics. I think she dictated to the state chairman. Can you tell me his name, again, the Massachusetts state chairman?

HACKMAN: I've forgotten.

LOUCHHEIM: Well, he was absolutely helpless and powerless.

HACKMAN: Was it [John M.] Lynch in that period?

LOUCHHEIM: It could have been.

HACKMAN: I'll find out.

LOUCHHEIM: Well, I remember her saying to me at times--and I bit the bullet once, and that was enough--"You know, it's so-and-so Lynch"--or whatever his name was--"who won't let me do these things." And of course then I took one look at Lynch and he would cower under the desk if Maggie O'Riordan appeared. But anyway, to make a long story short, there was a successful operation finally launched by a woman called Petey McClintock. I had known her here in the District of Columbia, and she was what we called the cruise director type, very attractive, very good PR approach to people. And she went to Massachusetts because her husband was transferred there. I said to her, "As a good Democrat, see what you can do. We can't get past the rather large body of Maggie O'Riordan." So I wrote a letter to Mrs. O'Riordan. And of course Mrs. O'Riordan answered that she'd be glad to see McClintock. I think she did. And McClintock wanted to start something called an "Operation on Wheels", which became eventually very successful, or at least in a limited sense successful; so much so that I think it did come to the attention of Senator Kennedy and/or his staff, I don't know whether O'Donnell or O'Brien, or whoever it was. So I had real grounds for going to Senator Kennedy because McClintock had complained constantly of the fact that, you know, her people weren't anywhere, they still weren't part of the Democratic machinery. And I told him that I would appreciate him putting in somebody more cooperative. And he said he would do it. When I saw him again, it was at a Democratic Committee meeting, it seems to me, or at some public function, and he gave me one of those delightful half smiles that he had and he said, "Well, I told you I would, didn't I. And I did." That was all there was to it. That, presumably if there had been a changeover, it could have been '58. I don't know. I

don't remember. And Betsy [Elizabeth] Stanton came in, and she was helpful. She wasn't busily involved in practical politics because she was in the state legislature. She was a senator. He understood immediately. As I think I've said before in talking with you, you didn't have to tell him anything. You didn't have to tell him anything twice, and you didn't have to finish the sentence for him to understand what you wanted or what you were about. I think for the record also its amusing that Mrs. O'Riordan's presence at the Democratic Committee created an enormous flutter amongst all the old-timers. And they included my secretary and the Chairman's secretary, and everybody else. I don't think the Chairman's secretary ever went out. But the others all went out with her to the Mayflower and had a few drinks. This was part of Mrs. O'Riordan's charm and her ability to get tickets at convention time and take care of her friends in the way of rooms, and so forth. She did, as I say. And then she was very, very close to India Edwards. And there were a few of those women who felt that way and who felt that I was an intruder and who wanted to be faithful to India and who therefore looked at me with a jaundiced eye. And I counted Maggie amongst those, although I never really objected to that.

HACKMAN: Did John McCormack get involved in this at all at the time?

LOUCHHEIM: No. But you know, I must say this for the record, again, during the recent, dreadfully tragic services for Senator Robert Kennedy--I listened attentively of course--there was always this abysmal ignorance of the television reporters who announced at one point, in speaking of McCormack's presence and so forth, that he was a close friend of the Kennedy family. And I couldn't help but think, you know, they don't even read the political news, those TV reporters. They don't know what the score is.

HACKMAN: What can you recall about this relationship during the '56 to '60 period, when there were so many rumors of hard feelings? Did you ever get involved in this at all?

LOUCHHEIM: Oh no. I heard about it and heard that they had decided to make a frontal attack on the McCormack forces. I suspect that Maggie and Mr. Lynch and

the others were McCormack people in the end, too. No, because I never, of course, went to state conventions. That was never part of our assignment. But I heard plenty.

HACKMAN: Did you ever, can you recall any conversations with Senator Kennedy or his staff people about Massachusetts politics in general in terms of . . .

LOUCHHEIM: Well, I can recall enough conversations with Mike Feldman over the years and Ted Sorensen--both of whom I would count as close friends--speaking in terms of that being a state they'd have to do something about; that in the Senator's own back yard there were people who were not really. . . . Machinery was lacking and there was no real feeling of rapport, and there was nothing one could do about it but make it over and put in a new team.

HACKMAN: I know that Staebler and some of the Michigan people were very concerned at the time, before Governor Williams made his endorsement, with getting these ideas across to Senator Kennedy on party development and what they wanted. I had wondered if you remembered this.

LOUCHHEIM: Yes, I do. I think they were all hipped on this subject, that they believed, as people do believe when either they're defeated or they become victorious, that they can lay out on a kind of a piece of paper what the factors were and what the reasons were, completely, to my way of thinking, overlooking the personality of the candidate, the personal pulling power of the candidate, the charisma that he creates or doesn't create. Governor Williams, when he first came into power, had an enormously attractive appeal. He was the first person to embrace the unions, he was the first person to recognize the Negro. His first administration and all subsequent administrations were studded with Negro--whether you call them cabinet officers I don't remember--or people who were judges, etc. I think this was so important. Instead of which Staebler and Williams and company lay the entire credit for their victory to their political strategies, which was to increase participation. I simply say to you that you can increase participation ad nauseum and still not win. This is my theory. And I think you have to do it all. I think you do. I worked with Senator Robert Kennedy, as you may recall, in 1960 on a registration drive. The Democratic National Committee, although they called their efforts a registration drive, had Claiborne Pell, who was not

then a Senator, heading it up, etc., never really did anything but distribute his picture. Now Robert Kennedy didn't let it go at that. I remember going over to Baltimore and hearing him and others really talk about how you did it. And then in turn paying people, which is the only thing you can do at a certain point. So that I come back to the thing which haunts me, I still believe in it, and that is that organization is terribly important, but in the end it doesn't do you any good if you haven't got the right issues and the right candidate.

HACKMAN: Let me ask you one other thing about the Democratic National Committee, between the '56 to '60 period. Can you remember anything about the origin of the plan to change the number of delegates and the delegate mix at the '60 Convention, and how that developed, where it came from? In a September 1959 Democratic National Committee meeting, this resolution "G" was presented, I believe by Bernard Boutin, but it had been sent around by Butler to all the Democratic National Committee members.

LOUCHHEIM: For whatever it was worth, I remember it being to increase the delegates according to the numbers of Representatives, etc., they had recently elected.

HACKMAN: It went up to 1511, was the total it would go up to. And there was--let me just turn this off for a minute. Let me ask you something else. Can you remember anything about the development of this idea to give votes to the Democratic National committeemen and committeewomen at the '60 Convention?

LOUCHHEIM: To give them extra votes?

HACKMAN: No, to give them votes, for the first time. To require that each delegation allow their Democratic National committeeman and committeewoman to have, as it eventually worked out, a half a vote each.

LOUCHHEIM: In other words, even if they were not members of the delegation?

HACKMAN: That's right.

LOUCHHEIM: Again, I would say to you, off the top of my head, that it would be another move of some sort to help Butler control some votes. Butler did a lot of things. Another thing that he did for the Democratic National committeemen and women, which some of us didn't approve of, was he allowed them to have free dinner tickets for the fund raising dinners. And it was always understood, I think, in any party arrangements that anybody who filed or who became a candidate for the Democratic National Committee could afford to pay their travel, to pay their hotel, and also to contribute, although not too much, at least some amount of money to the Party every year. And the way he dispensed these special favors was always interesting because, of course, it won him friendship and admiration. I think particularly a great many of the women, as I recall, were not in the same circumstances, or some of the women anyway, that the men were, and maybe depended on their husbands. But the Butler strategy worked very well. He attached himself to the Democratic Committee. He had been a committeeman. And I think it was natural for him to be interested in the welfare, or shall I say the position, or status, of the Democratic Committee members. And furthermore, he aligned himself with the liberal wing of the Party, and instituted a real drive for Negro support. These are things that no one can question the value of. They're important in terms of politics and the political chess game. And I don't think anybody who's in that position ought to be moved by other considerations. I did point out recently when Stephen Mitchell was in town, since I've seen you last, that it was Stephen Mitchell who kept the Party together. At the time when he came in there was a not too subtle move to weed the Southerners out of the Party. And he kept the Party together. He featured the Southerners in many ways, and used them in a way that Butler in turn used the people from Michigan and the triumvirate, or the "three horsemen," as I like to call them, that assisted him. Every chairman has a strategy. He has to have to survive. Of course Mitchell made a great mistake by saying that he wouldn't stay on for more than a year.

HACKMAN: Do you remember last time we talked a little bit about Butler's thinking toward Hale Boggs as the chairman of the Convention. How did this develop that Governor [LeRoy] Collins then was chosen in his place, being also a southerner? What was Butler's reason . . .

LOUCHHEIM: That I think was done for two reasons. One, to deliberately show that there was no prejudice against the South, as such, and that if you could find a pure, Ivory soap liberal that would float, you could appoint him. And Collins had a good record as Governor. I suspect that all this was developed in cooperation with people who were working with Senator Kennedy.

HACKMAN: You had said that at the time it was being discussed, or having known that Boggs wouldn't be appointed, that Millie Jeffries and some of the UAW people were suggesting other names. Can you remember who they were suggesting? Did they favor Collins, was this their idea, or were they for people other than Southerners? Do you recall?

LOUCHHEIM: I don't recall.

HACKMAN: Okay. Did you get involved at all in the discussion of the site for the Convention even though you weren't on the Arrangements Committee?

LOUCHHEIM: No, Butler deliberately kept me off the Arrangements Committee. He announced at the time that he could not appoint me because it would seem to be another vote for him. You know, you couldn't argue that point. The difference was that formerly the vice-chairman was always expected to be a member of any committee. In other words, if you do have a standard and you do say that the women and their support is important, you include the vice chairman in all strategy, including arrangements.

HACKMAN: One of the things that was passed in the Democratic National Committee, I believe in '59 or early '60, was a resolution that would make it mandatory that a man and a woman take a seat on committees at the Convention, Rules Committee. Where did this come from?

LOUCHHEIM: I'm sure that I had something to do with that because occasionally I would look back in the records and there would be a man chairman and a man co-chairman of the Platform, not necessarily, but in other committees,

Credentials, very important committees, and by far the most interesting committees to participate in. I remember my first experience in 1952 at the Convention. I was a member for the District of Columbia of the Platform Committee. And it was fascinating. We won in the committee and lost on the floor. And I remember the various comments that were made, and the people who said, "Well, we really won the civil war tonight," and very broad ranging statements of this sort. Blair Moody, poor unhappy fellow who has since died, who was leading the fight for the liberals again in Michigan, made someremarks of this sort when he and I rode together in a limousine to the Convention floor to present the platform.

HACKMAN: Can we talk a minute about the Convention itself? There were a lot of complaints made at the time as far as facilities. Can you remember these and what people were complaining?

LOUCHHEIM: Well, yes.

HACKMAN: How did you get involved in this as vice-chairman? Would people come to you with these complaints?

LOUCHHEIM: Oh yes, they would always come to you. You do more listening in this position than actual remedying. I mean, people are satisfied if they have an ear for a while. They feel a little better. Their rooms, their facilities, transportation was a terrible problem in Los Angeles. People who didn't have the use of a car depended on busses to get back and forth to the auditorium. You know how it is. No matter how often you run them or when you run them people are never satisfied. They weren't run often enough. Delegates couldn't leave the floor and come back again. There were also, I'm sure, delegates--excuse me, there were presidential headquarters debates about who was to be where, in what hotel. Facilities were not, I'm sure, bestowed impartially by Mr. Butler. I remember the problem I had trying to get an office in the Biltmore. And the one thing that I was smart enough to do was when I was finally given an office--and it was a fairly large room and I believe there was a room adjoining, I'm not sure any more. Yes, there was. It was just a hotel room, you know, done over as an office. It was on the fourth floor. And my room, which I was assigned, was on the--whatever it was--40th. I don't know how high the

Biltmore is any more, but it was way up. And I took one look at the elevator service and I said, "I want my room, my bedroom, on the fourth floor, too." It was the smartest thing I ever did because you spent the entire time otherwise waiting in the lobby for an elevator. And I could always walk to the fourth floor and back. Then I had people sleeping in the office, because they wouldn't give me rooms for my assistants, on roll-away cots. So if that's the way my situation was handled, you can imagine what happened to lesser lights.

HACKMAN: I think you mentioned that there was quite a problem with tickets and that people were very upset with Butler on that.

LOUCHHEIM: There was hysteria practically. There was this, a 750 Club. And the answer was that if you gave--I'm sure it was a thousand dollars, or was it seven hundred and fifty dollars--but, anyway . . .

HACKMAN: I believe it was a thousand.

LOUCHHEIM: It was a thousand dollars, and you became a member of the 750 Club, and you were guaranteed a certain number of tickets--let's just say two, I'm sure it wasn't more than that--for the Convention. And Ed Foley, who couldn't be nicer and have a better disposition, was in charge of this club and presented himself at various times and on various occasions to Mr. Butler who always managed to say the tickets weren't ready or the tickets weren't available or he wasn't available. He had, well, I suppose they're plainclothes policemen outside his office door. They were forbidding entry. You couldn't just sail into his office. And finally one night I was involved in it because I happened to know Foley and I had worked with him, and there was general hysteria. I said, "Let's go in," and we marched in. This was the night before the Convention, and we practically stormed the office and said, "We're not leaving until we get the tickets." And then Butler went ferreting around into a locked closet and came out with, I think, half the number of promised tickets. I don't remember what happened, but there were great disappointments and turmoil over these tickets. Let's just make a superficial generalization and say that the Convention went to Los Angeles to please Ziffren.

And let's say that there were, generally, inadequate facilities, and I think we'd be pretty near the mark, whether it was tickets or rooms or transportation. And that's what Butler was trying to defend and conceal, and so forth.

HACKMAN: In the amount of room that there was available, was any of the room that had been promised or should have gone to the 750 Club people given to the supporters of other people?

LOUCHHEIM: Oh, I'm sure there was. I would have to go back and look at charts and be reminded of names, but there was no question in my mind that Butler supervised each room and bath, let's say, in the sense of dispensing these favors. And, of course, it was better to have your people in the Biltmore if you were a presidential candidate. We used the basement room, which is really where the television usually was placed, for our "Coffee with Katie" in the morning. And that was, I think, quite successful. We got good coverage and good press. I really don't think I had too many complaints at the Convention, except for my spot on the program, which was probably the most cruel and difficult spot to put a woman in, right after the keynoter when everybody immediately flipped off their dial. And it turned out that what I said--which was all right, I m sure it wasn't a great speech--was not even heard on the floor of the Convention because the sound went off.

HACKMAN: I didn't realize that.

LOUCHHEIM: Oh yes. I remember this very dear friend of mine who was in the California delegation seated there, although the hall emptied very fast, he sat there smiling at me and encouraging, and nodding his head. And I afterwards said to him, "That was very nice of you, Jimmy. When I got depressed, I would look at you and get encouragement." And he said, "Well yes, that's fine, but I couldn't hear a word you were saying." And I said, "What?" He said, "No, nobody could hear you. The sound wasn't working." So I don't know whether that was done on purpose or not, but I was really given the treatment that day. I remember the night--it was pre-convention and had nothing to do with Senator Kennedy, I'm

sure. It had to do with Ziffren. I think it was a testimonial dinner to Butler. And there were two head tables. All afternoon I'd been asking where I was supposed to sit, and all afternoon Butler would say to me, "Go see Ziffren." And then when I'd finally get Ziffren, Ziffren would say, "Go see Butler." You know how unnerving this can be. And I finally called Ziffren's wife, and she said, "Don't ask me, Katie." Well, to make a long story short, they didn't have any provisions for any women at the head table because--now this angered me--they did not want to recognize Mrs. Elizabeth Smith, who was the committeewoman--imagine how petty men can be--from California and whom Ziffren didn't like because she fought him, you see, on all these moves on one affair or another. So we were all punished. And at the time I went to the dinner table, more or less in a nervous state, I had a real screaming fit with Butler. And I've never raised my voice, that I can remember, in my career before or after this moment. But I was so harassed by having women come up to me and saying, "Who's going to be at the head table?" and having constant pushing and shoving on this subject and not getting an answer. The treatment worked, so that I was in the back room with the television people before the dinner, and you were falling over television sets,and Adlai came on. And I really let poor Adlai have it. I said, "You at least could speak up for women, and not have this disgrace occur." He said, "Katie, calm yourself. Calm yourself!" He was very upset. He didn't do one thing about it. And we all went into dinner, and Doris Fleeson, who'd had a few drinks, and Mary McGrory came to my table and said, "What's going on around here," you know. "Where are the women at the head table?" I said, "Why don't you go look?" I said, "I've been fighting this all day." And they said, "Well, we're going to do something about it." I said, "Well, more power to you because I really have tried. I've done too much because I got upset about it, and I can't do any more." They came back and they sent Ann Butler over, Mrs. Butler, to ask me to come and sit at the head table. And I said I wouldn't do it. And then she said, "You've got to, for Paul's sake. For Paul's sake." Oh, such patent hypocrisy. So I finally traipsed up to the head table--oh, excuse me, they did have a woman at the head table. They had the singer, Judy Garland. This was the gracious insult. And this was what inflamed, I think, Doris and Mary, who are both proper feminists. And so we got settled and I said, "They

must have Dorothy Vredenburgh and Libby Smith." But I couldn't get that done. I couldn't get them to take Smith, you see. Then Mrs. Roosevelt came in late for dinner. And I never saw anybody fall under the table so fast as Ziffren to give up his seat. And I remember she came strolling up and they all moved and put her right front in the center. But this was the kind of personal vendetta that you wouldn't think grown men would indulge in.

HACKMAN: Can you remember anything about the efforts of some of the Kennedy people with Mrs. Roosevelt, because I know she had some objections to the President.

LOUCHHEIM: Oh yes. She was obdurate. Mrs. Roosevelt, interestingly enough, I think quite late in life developed a very strong obstinate streak that you could not deal with. First of all, I think she had a relationship with President Kennedy's father which left its mark. And no matter what was said it could not be dislodged from her mind. And then I suspect that she also became enmeshed, shall we say--because you couldn't say about Mrs. Roosevelt that she became enamored--but she did become involved with Adlai Stevenson. So you were up against those two very strong feelings on her part. I don't know how much is in the Library record about the relationships of the senior Kennedy when he was Ambassador in Great Britain with FDR. But there must have been something there that Mrs. Roosevelt felt strongly about. And she just didn't have any use for his son, and she couldn't believe that there could be any disassociation from generation to generation, which was very narrow minded of her, but was rather typical. And she clung to... [BEGIN SIDE II TAPE I] . . . the old fashioned theory of liberals.

HACKMAN: Can you remember anything about--you said you had talked to Adlai Stevenson in that instance--about Stevenson and his supporters' reaction to the facilities and the seating, and all of this? I have heard that they felt that just no arrangements at all had been made.

LOUCHHEIM: That's right, there was no provision at all made. This was an effort to obliterate them. The evening of my dismissal, which was very late Friday night--I had wind of it during the day. And

in the afternoon I started calling a few people. At one point I called Stuart Symington. And he said to me, "You are calling the wrong man." He said, "I have my own problems and disappointments." And he said, "As a matter of fact, Adlai Stevenson is sitting here. And I think he would agree that this has been a rough week for him." And I know they felt that way because Stevenson, I do know, was approached to make the nominating speech and refused, and then finally that night did speak at the--what was it called, the Hollywood Bowl? Where were we?

HACKMAN: Yes, that's right, the Bowl.

LOUCHHEIM: I found a note in my files about this, that night. You've probably been told that the Fife and Drum Corps descended on the green. Have you heard about this?

HACKMAN: I don't remember. I probably read it . . .

LOUCHHEIM: Well, it did. And it was absolutely wild. No one knew what it was all about, or whether it belonged or didn't belong. And I found in my journal a note that Mrs. [Edmund G.] Pat Brown, who was sitting next to me, turned to me and said, "Katie, you can always rely on something kooky happening in California. Didn't I tell you so?" When we were leaving the auditorium and some of us gathered--I don't know, I guess I must have. . . . I came with Mrs. Green, Edith Green, in her car--or mine, I've forgotten--and lost her. And I went out sort of in the Stevenson group because he had made the speech, and naturally we all moved in that direction. And as we got to the top of the hill, there was a mob. And the mob surged in on Adlai and we were all seized with the most terrific fear. It was the only time in my life I was afraid of being crushed to death. If it hadn't been for Bill Wirtz and a couple of others, we might have been. And one of them was this boy with the flag who had been in this fife and drum corps, probably the leader. He wanted the Governor to have that flag and he handed it to him. Nobody ever found out to this day, as far as I'm concerned--at least nobody's ever told me--what happened and who he was and why he wanted the Governor. . . . But we were all almost killed by him and his troop. I got into the first car that was available. We were afraid. They started

banging on the car door. I don't know who they were. Sometime I think you should probably interview [William McCormick] Bill Blair about this. Maybe he can explain it.

End of interview