

Donald J. Stedman Oral History Interview—JFK #1, 12/18/1968
Administrative Information

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Biographical Note

Donald J. Stedman (born 1931) served as the Associate Director for Research at the Joseph P. Kennedy Jr. Foundation from 1962 to 1963. This interview focuses on the mission and inner working of the Joseph P. Kennedy Jr. Foundation, the Kennedy family's advocacy for people with intellectual disabilities, and Stedman's admiration for Eunice and Sargent Shriver, among other issues.

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Oral History Interview

with

DONALD J. STEDMAN

December 18, 1968
Nashville, Tennessee

By William McHugh

For the John F. Kennedy Library

McHUGH: Dr. Stedman, could you tell us when you first met the President [John F. Kennedy] or any member of his family?

STEDMAN: The first contact I had was when I was in California doing my internship; I was at the Child Study Center [of University of California] at Berkeley. I got a phone call one noon hour. I took the call and a voice on the other end says, "This is Sargent Shriver [R. Sargent Shriver]. I want to talk to you about coming to Washington." I'll be frank with you, I didn't even know who Sargent Shriver was. Berkeley, I think, was where the first speech was made about the Peace Corps and where the concept of the Peace Corps was introduced. That was in 1960, wasn't it? Something like that.

McHUGH: Yes.

STEDMAN: Anyway I said, "Well, I'm not sure what this is all about," something foolish, I'm sure. What he was doing was responding to a suggestion of a couple of people that one good way to formalize the Kennedy Foundation [Joseph F. Kennedy, Jr. Foundation], by way of starting a staff and developing an office in Washington, was to bring in one or two people who were trained and interested in the area of mental retardation. At that time I was doing research at Soma State Hospital in California

with mongoloid infants, and I had done some publishing of research and writing, so I guess that lead to it.

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Apparently, prior to that phone call, a decision had been made to go ahead and establish a Kennedy Foundation office in Washington. It had been headquartered in New York City -- the Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. Memorial Foundation it was called at that time. We dropped out the "memorial" about a year and a half after we started. The idea was to develop an office in Washington to be close to the Shriver's. He'd come in to head up the Peace Corps; they'd moved to Rockville [Maryland]. She, Mrs. Shriver [Eunice Kennedy Shriver], was very active and interested in it. So she wanted to be close to it. Also, the President's Panel [on Mental Retardation] was in the wind in terms of coming up, and they wanted to have a staff that was close and could implement their involvement and augment the President's panel staff, to get information, to help write reports and so forth.

A good friend of mine, Rick Heber, who also trained here, was then the quarterback for that staff, later on Leonard Mayo. But the very first thing, before either the Foundation or the President's panel formalized, both Rick and I were in Washington helping to conjure this thing up. Bert Brown [Bertram S. Brown] who is now out at NIMH [National Institute of Mental Health] was also there.

McHUGH: When you say you were helping to conjure this up, and you also said that the President's panel was in the wind, or something like this, just what do you mean? What indications did you have and where did you get them?

STEDMAN: When I went to Washington to talk about it, Mr. and Mrs. Shriver said, "Look, some of the people have been appointed to the panel and it's going to have a larger membership. We're interested in the panel's activities. It's going to be a one-year intensive look at the state of the nation in mental retardation. We'll hopefully come up with rifle shot recommendations about what can be done to improve research and services, training, the whole bit. We'd like somebody on board at the Kennedy Foundation who will work closely with the panel and its staff." At the same time, the other major interest was Sargent's idea that an international awards program [The Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. International Awards] should be started. There had been three of those already, as you probably know. So, he wanted also to have a staff to assist him in setting up the format: How do you go about getting candidates for awards? How do you go about getting information on those candidates? Setting up a review group, and so forth? So, that was the other big piece of what they wanted to do immediately. Then they also wanted to launch some grants programs to establish mental retardation centers by direct funding from the Kennedy Foundation. So, that's really how it started out, a kind of a three-pronged deal.

McHUGH: Do you know who recommended you originally? Or had you had any previous contact?

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STEDMAN: I don't know for sure, but I have a feeling that Nick Hobbs [Nicholas Hobbs] and George Tarjan probably did. Nick was selection officer for the Peace Corps at that time.

McHUGH: Oh, he was?

STEDMAN: Yes, in fact, a hell of a lot of the credit for the success of the Peace Corps -- I'm sure Sarge will say the same thing -- is the fantastic job that Nick did. You're going to meet him tomorrow, I guess.

McHUGH: Yes, that's right.

STEDMAN: Nick was already up there. The Peace Corps had gotten underway and had been going for two or three months, and I guess Sarge may have tapped into various places and tried to come up with some names. I'm sure I wasn't the only name in the pot.

Anyway, I went there and interviewed and turned it down. It broke my heart, but I had not finished my dissertation, my doctoral dissertation, and I was doing that resea. I know so many people, friends of mine, who got all the way up to their dissertation and took a job and never finished. I said, "I'm sorry, I can't do it." Well, that lay dormant for about a month and then I got a letter from Mrs. Shriver saying, "When could you come?" So, I took a hard look at it and decided if I could come back here for three months and finish my dissertation I could be in Washington on April 1, 1962. And that's what happened.

McHUGH: What month was that?

STEDMAN: April first.

McHUGH: That she wrote you, or when you decided to accept?

STEDMAN: That I got the letter from her? December '61.

McHUGH: I see. When you came to Washington in April what were your first duties? What was the situation that you found?

STEDMAN: When I arrived the only thing that was there was an empty office over on K Street, 1413 K Street. Maryanne Orlando, Sarge's secretary, had rented that. She'd gotten some furniture and that was about it; that *was* it.

I got a secretary and we set up shop. At that time Mrs. Shriver

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was in Europe on a tour of mental retardation facilities and I didn't meet her for the first six weeks. She came back along about the middle of May, I guess, and then things began to get off the ground a little more.

Sarge was up to here with the Peace Corps. I spent time with him, but technically he was executive director of the Kennedy Foundation at the same time that he was director of the Peace Corps and the same time the New Frontier was getting off the ground -- there were lots of things going on.

So, I took my wife and four kids and got a house in Silver Springs [Maryland], and we went to work and kind of established the Kennedy Foundation downtown on K Street. It was very exciting and I think, since then, the Foundation has probably had more impact than 99 percent of public and private agencies, with regard to stimulating interest and getting things moving.

McHUGH: Well, that's a very nice statement.

STEDMAN: I think it's true. A lot of people would support that. They were really very effective. It was a small foundation; as money goes, not nearly the size of Ford [Ford Foundation] or Rockefeller [Rockefeller Foundation], but boy, they had the influence and the savvy and the motivation and the drive; everybody worked like crazy. Boy, I've never worked so hard in my life since. I really learned that what you think are the outside physical limits of yourself are not really so if you start working with Sarge Shriver.

McHUGH: What duties were you first engaged in?

STEDMAN: Sarge was executive director and I took the title of associate director for research. Later on George Jervis, who is a physician and is now up in Staten Island [New York] -- you may have him in this....

McHUGH: I know of him.

STEDMAN: George came in later in the summer as research director and I spent my time divided between staff activities and the President's panel activities. George principally reviewed grant applications and advised the Shrivens on medical research programs and so forth. That's the way we got off the ground. My duties were varied all the way from speechwriting, to grant review, to trips around the country to look at the existing residential and day schools that were supported at that time by previous Kennedy family grants -- Chicago and Santa Monica [California]. I also got

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around to meet the rest of the family so that they would know who the staff people were, and so on. I had an opportunity to become involved in a wide variety of activities, primarily in the mental retardation business and assistance to the President's Panel staff. The first part was

pretty much that, and this international awards program. That came off in December, I think, of '62 -- the first one.

McHUGH: The work of the Kennedy Foundation, I think, in the late fifties had changed from service and custodial to research; that is, the support they were giving began to be more in research. Do you know who was responsible for that decision?

STEDMAN: Well, Sarge always said that it was Mr. Kennedy, Joe Kennedy [Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr.], that he had made contributions kind of around the kitchen table to the Memorial Hospital [Kennedy Memorial Hospital for Children] in Brighton [Massachusetts] up near Boston and to Palos Park [Hospital] in Chicago, largely through contacts with either Cardinal Cushing [Cardinal Richard Cushing], or Monsignor Ritter [Joseph E. Ritter] in Chicago. It seemed to be related pretty much to diocesan Catholic activities, and these were run by various second and third order nuns or teaching brothers or something like that.

He [Joseph Kennedy] felt, perhaps at the stimulation of Mr. Shriver and others, that the ultimate answer would be to prevent mental retardation in the first place, so research is the obvious route to take. If you have a small, finite amount of money, and you want to make a maximum impact, you go the research route; but you also get as much mileage out of it as you can, in terms of promoting interest in research, as well as doing research.

McHUGH: Would that have been mostly biological research or behavioral research?

STEDMAN: Initially, it was, I think, exclusively biological research. I think this was a function of the kind of advice they got; they dealt mostly with physicians and biologists. It was only later that they began to get interested in behavior research and also recreation programs for handicapped kids and special education, this kind of thing. They just kind of naturally flowed into a wider ballpark of interest in research and demonstration programs when they found out the wider scope of it. But initially it was more of a hospital, health, medical related interest.

McHUGH: How much later did they get into supporting behavioral research would you say?

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STEDMAN: It was probably six or eight months after the Foundation started. I would say it was the tail end of '62 before they began to make good, solid commitments in this area.

McHUGH: Oh, is that right?

STEDMAN: They certainly supported it, but not financially as far as the Foundation is

concerned. If you read the report of the President's panel you see a very heavy behavioral and education rehabilitation component. So it wasn't that they weren't supported, it was just....

McHUGH: I had the impression that they were more strongly arranged toward biological research, and was curious over that policy decision. Was it Shriver's or Joseph Kennedy's?

STEDMAN: I don't think there ever was a policy decision. I think that, while they had supported Jerry Schulman [Jerome L. Schulman] a little bit up at the University of Chicago children's hospital [Children's Memorial Hospital] in his behavioral, psychiatric type of research, they were not terribly impressed with it. They had not had, I don't think, contact with substantial people in the behavioral area prior to this panel, prior to their establishment of the Foundation. They began to move into a world of very substantial behavioral scientists that they had not been involved in before and therefore it became more....

McHUGH: The University of Chicago, you say? Why did they feel that was unproductive?

STEDMAN: Well, behavioral researcher doesn't have the immediate payoff and it doesn't have, for many people, the romance of the microscope because you're seldom able in behavioral research to point at immediate cause-and-effect relationships. That requires a certain kind of, oh, not patience, but reserve. And there was a certain anxiety, I think, to push into immediate payoff and to be involved more in a kind of Jonas Salk, Manhattan Project than some longer term thing.

Also, they weren't able to see the relationship, and understandably so, between behavioral research and prevention, whereas with medical research, you can move more quickly into that in terms of prenatal factors and genetics and all that.

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McHUGH: You said you were liaison and you were assisting with the work of the panel, also. Could you elaborate on that?

STEDMAN: When Leonard Mayo came and became executive director of the panel they set up a staff in the old HEW [Department of Health, Education and Welfare] South Building -- or was it North [Building]? I can't remember whether it was North or South now. Anyway, there was an obvious need to coordinate the interests and activities of Mrs. Shriver -- after all, she was the President's sister and exercised a good bit of influence on the panel's thinking, not so much with regard to the technical aspects of what they were recommending, but the way in which they could be facilitated, or the way in which the recommendations or the desires of the panel might best be packaged or

presented as a federal report. I think they relied on her heavily as a liaison to the White House.

The other thing was that Sarge was so damn creative and regardless of the fact that he's not an expert in mental retardation, he had one fantastic idea after another about how to organize or how to get things done. He would sit there and assimilate all these pontifications that he had to suffer through and say, "Well, why don't we do this?" A lot of the ideas were Sarge's ideas.

McHUGH: Even though he was involved with the Peace Corps, he was spending a good deal of time with that?

STEDMAN: Oh, yes.

McHUGH: Can you remember some of the things that he contributed that strike you particularly?

STEDMAN: He attended a large number of the panel meetings; he would organize luncheons for panel members who were coming to town on subcommittee meetings to try to keep encouraging and energizing them. A lot of these people had been on presidential or national committees before and they'd seen what happened; a nice fat report gets written and somebody puts it on his shelf. Here was the first presidential commission in a hell of a long time that had the immediate teeth to move ahead. It had the interest of the White House; it had people involved in it directly that were close to the President. He had his own special interest, much as F.D.R. [Franklin D. Roosevelt] had his interest -- I think the analogy is useful there.

So, they saw some clear opportunity to be effective, and it was kind of a new experience and they needed help. I saw Sarge's

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role there as a kind of facilitator, a guy who could help construe the importance for them and keep energizing.

McHUGH: Could you say what the opinion generally was of the role of the federal government up to this point?

STEDMAN: In mental retardation?

McHUGH: Yes. Say in the fifties especially.

STEDMAN: It was very minimal, very minimal. When I first went to Washington in 1960 there were thirty-three different agencies of the federal government that you had to go to to put together a package for research. Now you only have to go to two agencies. That's almost entirely the outcome of the President's panel and

the [Kennedy] Administration -- and what happened after the legislation that happened after it. The federal government investment, in special education, for example, totaled a million dollars in 1958. Today it's two or three hundred million. Now, you can't discount the effect of the National Association for Retarded Children [NARC] there. The parent's group peaked just about the time the President's panel peaked, I think. They really began to get hot in 1957, 58, 59, hot in the sense of having some influence.

McHUGH: Do you know what caused them to be so hot at that time?

STEDMAN: A steady buildup from 1953 and a continuing development of local units around the country. They had some twenty-five hundred local units by 1959, so there was an immediate network of information from the President's panel. Gunnar Dybwad, who was executive director at that time, was very closely related to the panel's work. He was not a member of the panel, but I spent as much time with him as I did many of the panel members.

McHUGH: I thought it was very surprising that he wasn't on the panel because he had friends on the....

STEDMAN: Well, so did he, frankly. He was not altogether happy with the fact that he wasn't, but....

McHUGH: Do you know of any particular reason why he might not have been?

STEDMAN: No, I don't. I really don't. I think what they tried to do was to have a panel of experts in the sense of the traditional disciplinary lines -- a top flight neurologist, a top flight psychologist. Gunnar has a doctor of jurisprudence from,

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I think, the University of Berlin, so it doesn't really represent research or service. He was a National Association [for Retarded Children] executive director and was expert, etcetera, but he was not the scientist or clinician that was represented. Except in Mrs. Shriver's case. She was not either, but....

McHUGH: Also, wasn't Mrs. Boggs [Elizabeth M. Boggs] sort of a representative of the National Association at that time?

STEDMAN: Yes, I think that's fair to say. Now, Dr. Boggs has a long track record of interest and effectiveness in managing associations.

McHUGH: Besides Mr. and Mrs. Shriver, could you assess the influence of other people on the panel as to their influence, all the dynamics of the thing?

STEDMAN: Well, in no special order of priority of influence, but certainly George Tarjan was one of the most influential people. The reason for that being that he had a long history -- he was superintendent of Pacific State Hospital at that time, one of the best residential centers in the country. He was also high up in the hierarchy of the American Psychiatric Association, and knew Washington like the back of his hand. He's a very effective person, and made a beautiful vice-chairman for the President's panel. I think he was very instrumental.

Nick Hobbs, a psychologist -- two years later he was president of the American Psychological Association -- a highly visible person, but a highly productive person in the sense of the behavioral sciences.

Horace Magoun was a person I thought was very effective. He's now dean of a graduate school at UCLA [University of California at Los Angeles]. He's an outstanding research scientist in psychophysiology, and it was his recommendation -- I can remember the panel meeting -- that led to the strategic placement of twelve research centers around the country. His notion was; you don't set up shop for grants for all comers. What you do is you use a rifle instead of a shotgun; you pick regional strategic centers that will affect the region as well as the country and you put all your money into those centers for research.

Bob Cooke [Robert E. Cooke] should not be discounted. He was, perhaps, the major force all along the way with the family's interests: he was one of the early people with whom Sarge and Eunice became involved. He was at Hopkins [Johns Hopkins Hospital]. He's a remarkable guy, just bright as the dickens, and a very substantial person: he's a good scientist and a good program person. Probably up until the last

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few months one of the most influential people in the health business in the country, or at least until Gardner [John W. Gardner] became HEW secretary. If I had to take one person who was the most influential, it would have to be Bob Cooke, partly because he was closest to the Shrivvers, partly because he had visibility in pediatrics nationally -- Hopkins is a good name. He'd had personal experience for a long period in training and research in mental retardation, active with the NARC. You know, he was a natural. Cooke, Tarjan, Hobbs, Magoun; I'd say those were the...

Now, the great compromiser was Leonard Mayo. I don't think the panel would have been nearly as successful, regardless of what the relationships were the White House, if it weren't for Leonard Mayo, who is one of the most magnificent balancers of highly creative individual people that I have ever seen in my life -- just beautiful.

McHUGH: Now, when you came to Washington you said that some of the panel members would still be chosen. Is that correct?

STEDMAN: Yes.

McHUGH: Who is choosing these people? Were there one or two people?

STEDMAN: Well, I don't know, but I'd say that Bob Cooke and the Shrivvers; and, perhaps, Gunnar Dybwad, the NARC, probably George Tarjan were involved in the selection, and Mike Feldman [Myer S. Feldman].

McHUGH: Mike Feldman was also involved?

STEDMAN: Well, Mike was kind of counsel on the thing, because they knew from very early that unless they began to formulate and write legislation that would flow out of the recommendations, there was a gap, say, of two years or something between the end of the report and the beginning.... Well, you know, three major pieces of legislation were in the hopper when that report was made in '62. That was part of the success of that thing.

McHUGH: Was it felt generally that they achieved a balance on the panel of the types of people on it?

STEDMAN: I think so. They had a very good spectrum of special education, behavioral sciences, medicine, neurology, psychiatry, pediatrics, physiology, law -- Judge Bazelon [David L. Bazelon] was on it, public health -- Ed Davens [Edward Davens]..

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McHUGH: Did you think there were many selections that were chosen from a political point of view?

STEDMAN: Well, that's hard for me to say. You have to realize what I was when I arrived there; just out of school. I didn't know the Washington....

McHUGH: Would you say though, many? I understand that you really weren't in a position to know.

STEDMAN: I really wouldn't say so. My feeling is that they were not political in the sense of somebody who'd follow some party line or something. They were substantial people in the mental retardation field and in their own discipline, and not political appointees in that sense. I don't know what their politics were as individuals. I couldn't tell you today.

McHUGH: What about the size of the panel? Did you think it was adequate -- the size wasn't too big?

STEDMAN: No, I think it was just about right. If it had gotten much bigger, it would have been unwieldy; if it had been smaller, it would have been accused of

being a little power that represented special interests and nothing more.

McHUGH: Were there any particular communication problems because of the size of the task forces?

STEDMAN: Well, when they broke down into task forces, it became a little more difficult for Mayo to keep them tucked in. But I think that would happen with any group. You know, the amount of time that that panel spent in Washington in one year was phenomenal. They must have been on airplanes half the time. And, aside from the panel meetings, there were all kinds of trips -- they made task force trips to Europe, Russia, all over this country. And the writing was magnificent. They delivered that thing on October 16th, I think, 1962, right on the button, packaged, printed and the whole schmear; it was just a beautiful case of systems management.

McHUGH: Were there any particular people other than Gunnar Dybwad who you thought should have been on the panel?

STEDMAN: Well, there was a little bit of flack at one point about the fact that Dick Masland [Richard L. Masland] -- who at that time was the director of the National Institute of Neurological Diseases [and Blindness] -- as a federal agency director, was a member of the panel. That was not any problem with any of the professionals

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because they knew that he was one of the top neurological types in the country. But there was some flak, as you might expect, from some of the other agencies about why they might not have been...

McHUGH: ...chosen.

STEDMAN: You know, for example, like the head of NIMH. The minute you open up one, the others wonder about themselves, I suppose. I think Tarjan represented any special interests of psychiatry or mental health very admirably, and there wasn't any need for Bob Felix [Robert H. Felix] to be on the panel. I can't think of anybody else who would be a better substitute for any of the disciplines.

McHUGH: What about the role that NIMH had been playing in mental retardation?

STEDMAN: Well, it had been minimal. Most of it was in the area of psychiatric research. They had not mounted a very substantial program. They might have been moving toward it, but I doubt that they could have moved substantially into it without a multidisciplinary panel to come up with something the way they did. The nature of mental retardation requires so many different approaches, and it's

such a complex problem that it's not a mental health problem to start with, in the sense of emotional disturbance or mental illness. It's a different problem. It requires the involvement of public health and education and rehab [rehabilitation] and the various other disciplines that need to be involved. That's been demonstrated nicely since '62 in terms of the way programs have been developed.

McHUGH: Initially the panel was broken down -- before it was broken into task forces -- into research and service. Do you know why they decided to change that particular breakdown?

STEDMAN: Why they decided to change it?

McHUGH: Well, break it down further into....

STEDMAN: Well, it was obvious that those were two kinds of amorphous lumps, that there was so much interaction between the two. Also, they almost immediately identified the huge gap between research and services; if they had kept approaching it on two tracks they would have helped maintain that, you see. As a result, they broke into task forces that cross-pollinated service and research people. I think that was why. I don't think the current Joint Commission on Mental Health [Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health] is doing the same thing, and they should have.

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McHUGH: How about the contributions of the different task forces? Could you make any assessment, do you think? That's kind of difficult for you to do.

STEDMAN: The relative contribution?

McHUGH: Yes.

STEDMAN: Well, I think, as far as the professionals in the field were concerned, the task force reports did not contribute anything specifically new. What they did do was to draw together and to present in a more unified fashion what existed, and they made some intelligent recommendations about what ought to be done. That was the purpose of the task force reports. From very early in the game it was recognized, appropriately I think, that the deliberations of the panel, the way in which the recommendations were made or said, had to be written in such a fashion that they could easily be understood by legislators and by the public. From the very beginning it was fashioned to be readable and not to be some kind of technical report.

As a matter of fact, if you looked at the Macy Foundation [Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation] report on mental retardation that came out in 1954 or 5 -- some place in there -- that was a result of a three-day meeting at which some of these same people were present, many of the same kinds of things that were discussed and recommended at the President's

panel were also discussed and recommended at the Macy Foundation conference. But what was lacking was a coherent, cohesive kind of report that was immediately translated into legislative action, that also had the power of the White House behind it, and the energy of other people such as the Shrivvers so that it became viable.

McHUGH: That reminds me. Well, you mentioned the work that the Macy Foundation did. Also, I think there was the report put together under the sponsorship of NARC on mental subnormality. Did the fact that those things were still fairly recent make people feel at all that this panel might be superfluous?

STEDMAN: No. No, that wasn't a concern because the National Association for Retarded Children was simply ecstatic at the thought of a Presidential panel, and they were willing to turn over everything they had if that was the best funnel to put it through. I mean, they were interested in results. They didn't care who got them, who got the kudos; they wanted to get something moving. Can we take a break just a second?

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McHUGH: Sure. [Interruption] You said from the first there was the expectation that the important goal of the panel would be to generate legislation. Was there any opposition to this on the basis that it might be too narrowly conceived a goal for a panel?

STEDMAN: Too narrowly conceived? The goal of writing legislation?

McHUGH: Of preparing legislation.

STEDMAN: No, because as I said, the people on the panel had been involved at the national level in other ways and were very experienced in the ways in which you get some impetus for national level things. They recognized that this would cost money. One of the important things they could do as they went along would be to translate these recommendations into legislative form. The other reason was that there was a clear necessity. If you remember, there was a national plan to combat mental retardation. It had many of the same kinds of tactical war terms that the war on poverty had -- they were talking about battles and strategies, and it got into the language of the thing. The recommendations themselves were fairly precise. They had to be spelled out in terms of how they would be accomplished, and they took other forms than legislation, suggestions for program development and the like.

McHUGH: There was some feeling -- someone on this panel felt -- that they should encourage research on a very broad basis, not just, perhaps, for mental retardation. I think, for instance, that Lederberg [Joshua Lederberg] wanted that approach. How widespread a feeling was that?

STEDMAN: That was a significant minority flavor all the while. The reason that it never achieved any strong impetus was because the majority of people felt at that time, and still do, that mental retardation -- as a specific thing that needed to be looked at and to be worked on -- had such short shrift for so long that there was a real unwillingness to move away from this specific focus.

Now, the legislation, in my opinion, has been watered down since '65, because if you see the changes in the wording of the legislation that now exists -- construction, research, service report. It says "mental retardation and related aspects of human development." Now, that wouldn't have stood a chance in 1962, because there was a real drive to do something about it. There was an appropriate investment in the fact that it's been a hell of a long while since this thing has really been looked at, and they

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needed to be careful that they didn't dilute it. But there was this kind of continued feeling that it ought to be a broader based thing.

McHUGH: How large would you say that minority was, as the members of the panel? Can you think of any names of people who generally felt that a broader....

STEDMAN: I think Ed Davens felt that it should be broader. I think that's probably understandable from a public health person who sees a broad need across the board. Lederberg, as a basic, pure scientist in genetics, saw the implications for this in a broader base. It may be that those people who addressed themselves to the larger social issues, such as Judge Bazelon, might have been persuaded, and might have been of the persuasion that a broader thing.... A lot of that was kept in check by the NARC, as well as Shriver. Shriver was committed. "Look, this has got to be MR [mental retardation]."

McHUGH: How did NARC keep that in check?

STEDMAN: Oh, by continuous influence. "Look, we need this for the retarded; we need that for the retarded." They didn't come out and say, "To hell with the cerebral palsied," or something like that. What they did say was, "We need this for the retarded."

McHUGH: How could they be sure of a hearing on such a regular basis?

STEDMAN: Dr. Boggs, Dr. Dybwad. There were a lot of hearing, a lot of consultants, a lot of inputs to the staff -- other than just directly to the panel, through the panel members from elsewhere. There were lots of hearings around the country. Leonard Mayo, I think, would go out like a flock of sparrows every so often and settle down some place, in Denver, or San Francisco, or Boston, or Atlanta, and listen to the

people, and that's what they heard. They heard people out there in the boondocks who hadn't had anything for a long, long time, as far as service for the retarded. They went to the academic centers and found need for basic research in retardation. So that helped keep it in that ballpark.

McHUGH: Was anyone of the feeling that the work of the panel was too closely identified with NARC's name? That was not a problem, as you said before.

STEDMAN: No, no, I don't think so.

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McHUGH: There seemed to be some jealousy on the part of people working on retardation towards people working on mental health. Were you aware of that particularly?

STEDMAN: Sure. It's true now. As I say, for years mental retardation was kind of buried in the general mental health field, and the retarded still suffer from a lot of the taboos that the whole problem of emotional disturbance suffers from. The average guy in the street today would identify mental retardation with mental illness. One of the most difficult things is to define the difference, and to point out the difference in approach to the solution.

McHUGH: To what extent would you say this is true among the professionals, say, on the panel?

STEDMAN: No, the panel was made up of people who were quite experienced in the area of mental retardation, and were able to see the clear difference between mental illness and mental retardation. The trick, the problem, was to try to provide the information that was required to help discriminate between the two, and to mount a significant national program that would ripple down to the state and the local level that would help to differentiate between the two problems. That's still one of the largest problems at the local level, in terms of program development.

McHUGH: Did you work with anyone of the task force, in writing the recommendations?

STEDMAN: I helped edit the report of the task force on the behavioral sciences, education and rehabilitation. There are two reasons for that; one, that's my own field, and two, Anne Ritter, who was a psychologist member, died before that task force report was complete. She was a good friend of mine, and I knew that was hanging fire. Lloyd Dunn suggested that I help him, so I jumped in there and I helped

edit it. It's hard to know; I'd be hard pressed to identify the exact specific source for each of those recommendations, in terms of who recommended it.

McHUGH: Was there much disagreement on any particular recommendation?

STEDMAN: No, there wasn't much disagreement on the recommendations. There was disagreement on how to implement them. There were a variety of points of view as to how you went about taking these recommendations and then putting them to work, in terms of what agency responsibilities, what public-private mix, what kind of funding. So, there was agreement on recommendations, but how to do it was the place where there was some disagreement; and the implementation of it represents pretty much a compromise.

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McHUGH: What was the type of thing that there might be a disagreement on? Could you think of any specific....

STEDMAN: Well, at one level, where the moneys from the legislation would be dispensed from -- what federal agencies, how they would be dispensed, whether they should go directly to local or through state channels. When it began to get into legislative and money dispensing, well, everybody had an idea. There was some question as to whether the existing agencies could in fact do the job; that's what led to the creation of the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development [NICHD], primarily. There was an obvious need, here, for something in the broader areas. Now, here's where you saw some broadening. They recognized, also, you couldn't have a national institute on mental retardation as you do on mental health, or as you do on neurological diseases.

McHUGH: Or on cancer.

STEDMAN: Or on cancer, yes. So what they did was a very wise thing. They established something called child health and human development that had eight major divisions, one of which was the mental retardation division.

McHUGH: I think there was some feeling at NIH [National Institutes of Health] that the institutes should be, or had been traditionally, organized along disease, and this one was not clearly human development, but something that couldn't really be identified.

STEDMAN: Well, yes, I think you'd have a hard time today starting a National Heart Institute. By that time there was more of an ecumenical movement, in the sense of putting relevant pieces together to form a more comprehensive unit. You see it in hospital construction now. You see institutes and centers and.... That was

as much a gathering development in general, as it was a specific phenomenon there, with child health and human development.

The first director, Bob Aldrich [Robert A. Aldrich], was a guy who clearly understood that concept, and was able to get NICHD off the ground in a way that most people could not have done, because he represented a very good mix of medical pediatric, and behavioral, and at the same time basic research.

McHUGH: Who was responsible for choosing him?

STEDMAN: Aldrich?

McHUGH: Yes.

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STEDMAN: Well, I don't know, but I'd say Shriver and Cooke.

McHUGH: That's interesting.

STEDMAN: Why?

McHUGH: Well, Cooke, one might think, wouldn't.... Well, let us say, I might have expected it to come from a higher up. Not that Shriver wasn't particularly, but....

STEDMAN: Well, but Shriver is a guy....

McHUGH: Or from a different one perhaps. Possible someone at HEW....

STEDMAN: No. You have to remember that Celebrezze [Anthony J. Celebrezze] was.... It was obvious that the best thing he could do, in terms of getting good information, would be to defer to the people who had the best information. In that case it was Shriver and Cooke and the panel. They obviously conjured it up, and I'm sure other people's judgment must have been involved, but I think it's significant that it was a pediatrician. There was no hanky-panky; it was almost unanimously applauded when Aldrich came up. It wasn't bootlegging somebody in; it was just a marvelous choice.

The other thing is, he had not been involved heavily in all the panel and all that business. He essentially came in fresh, but yet had all substantial background and credentials to move in there and do a hell of a job. Now he's -- of course you know -- the head of the President's Committee on Mental Retardation. He essentially picked up the torch after NICHD and is now moving that.

McHUGH: In working out the recommendations that were differences between behavioral scientists and physical scientists at one point there. Can you say

the.... how they worked out the problems there? I'm trying to recall exactly what

STEDMAN: Differences between the behaviorists and the biologists?

McHUGH: Well, as to certain recommendations, whether they were solidly based, whether they had....

STEDMAN: Oh, I see. Oh yes, sure. Well, that's a problem.... As I said, you get into something like cultural deprivation, and the relationship between cultural deprivation and mental retardation; the data are much softer there than between....

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McHUGH: Is that so?

STEDMAN: Well, of course. It's the nature.... There's an enormous difference between biological research and behavioral research, not only at the operational level, but also at the conceptual level. It's a very large problem; I run into it everyday. While many behavioral scientists are convinced that a lot of biological research people are pursuing rainbows, there are probably twice as many biologists who feel that behavioral research has no relevance because it tends to deal with larger, less controllable variables, and don't really understand the basic differences between behavioral research and the way you go about it. It's not a defensive thing.

I think it was largely that that was a basis for contention as to what would be the best ways to go about it. But if you check back with any of the people -- any of the biologists, say -- on the panel, who at that point differed, I suspect that they would have changed their tune, because we're getting some clear data, about nutrition behavior, for example.

McHUGH: You were getting it at that time, or it was presented to you, and that enabled them to resolve this problem?

STEDMAN: No, no. At that time there weren't the data available to say, "Look, this is definitely a cause-and-effect relationship," or what have you.

McHUGH: How were the behavioral scientists able to make the point that cultural deprivation, especially, as you say, where the data was sound.... How did they arrive at a solution where they could offer a recommendation on this that was acceptable?

STEDMAN: Well, I think they couched it appropriately in terms such as, "the incidence of mental retardation is noted to be larger in areas where there are extreme

conditions of environmental deprivation. It's important to pursue these variables to see whether or not there are cause-and-effect relationships.' I think it was in that route. And also to do research in the area of mental illness as it may relate to learning ability to see whether there was a relationship there; this kind of thing. I must say, I just really can't report serious differences.

McHUGH: Yeah. Were there any other areas where there was a feeling that the data were soft or needed more buttressing for a particular recommendation?

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STEDMAN: Well, I think as you got out into the whole area of recreation and rehabilitation it became obvious that, aside from occupying leisure time, it was pretty difficult to point at definite intellectual improvement that would accrue to camping programs or recreation. Yet everyone agreed that there were benefits that accrued to the family and to the child. It's very much like evaluation of [Project] Head Start programs; there aren't any two alike, but anybody who's ever been involved with any head start program will say to you, "Those kids got better." They can't tell you exactly what it is that's making them get better.

McHUGH: You mentioned the Head Start Program and it's been said, I don't know with what real knowledge.... [Laughter] I guess you're probably aware of what....

STEDMAN: Nothing on that hot scene. Okay, go ahead.

McHUGH: Well, it's been said that the work of Head Start was a direct outgrowth of the work of the panel. Do you have any evidence that that is true?

STEDMAN: Well, it's partly true. First of all, at that time it was more and more evident that there were large groups of retarded kids in conditions of poverty. At the same time, there were increasing hard data coming in from the early childhood education field that indicated that preschool program were definite -- you know, Sam Kirk's [Samuel A. Kirk] research; Susan Gray's research right here. As a matter of fact, the model for national Head Start programs was started right here at Peabody [George Peabody College for Teachers] in 1957 by Susan Gray and she was on the first Head Start Council.

Shriver says himself -- he's gone on record as saying -- that the model for the Head Start program in the poverty program came from Susan Gray's program. Now, that's by way of saying that her information filtered through Hobbs into the panel, and the awareness of her program, and the effects on these kids in this program as well as elsewhere. Sam Kirk's program, other stuff in the child development literature, made it look like a very hot bet, in terms of a way to prevent mental retardation or greatly soften the effects of environmental

conditions on intellectual development. But, on the other hand, there were no specific recommendations such as a head start program. It took the poverty issue to move that.

McHUGH: Now, you worked on the White House Conference on Mental Retardation.

STEDMAN: Yes.

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McHUGH: How much of your time was spent on that? Was that your major effort, would you say?

STEDMAN: Well, I essentially cut away, at Sarge's request, from the Foundation staff along about June of 1963 to go over and work, essentially, as a member of the White House staff. Staff Warren [Stafford L. Warren] was there, the first special assistant to the president on mental retardation. Warren's office was in the old Executive Office Building there, that great big wedding cake next to the White House. And from June through September I coordinated the planning and all the program development and so forth for the White House conference. That was probably the most difficult thing I've ever done in my life because everybody and their brother knew exactly how that ought to run, except me, as far as they were concerned.

Then we took the most enormous gamble ever taken by and White House staff in the entire universe, and that is we decided to have meetings outdoors in September during the hurricane season. We had constructed huge tents out there and put all kinds of "prime beef" in them for meetings. Doyle [Patrick Doyle], who was a deputy special assistant to the President at that time, was absolutely scared to death. He just knew we were going to have a hurricane the day that Terry Sanford talked or the day that the secretary came on, or what have you.

But that was essentially a conference that was developed to try to move the recommendations of the President's panel and information about the legislation down to the state level as fast as we could get it there. It first was called the State-Federal Conference on Mental Retardation. No, no. It was first called the Federal-State Conference on Mental Retardation. That seemed to touch some sensibilities, so we changed it to the state-federal. Then we changed it to the national-state, and then we finally said, "the heck with it. Let's call it the White House Conference." There was resistance against that initially because there is a [Welfare] White House Conference for Children and Youth, every ten years and they didn't want to get it mixed up.

We started out by inviting five key people from each state, in state government, to come and to break down into work groups and to sit with the members of the federal agencies to discuss the recommendations of the panel, how the legislation was written, what the states would have to do in order to get money, or what kinds of programs would be recommended, and so forth. I don't know how you could evaluate the outcome of that conference. I think everybody remembers it because it was a good conference by way of information and so forth. But it was a kickoff, kind of to bring

state.... This had all been pretty much a national thing. A lot of people observed it; there were hearings; but this was the first time when they threw a bunch of people in the same box for three or four days and got moving.

McHUGH: You felt generally the conference was a success?

STEDMAN: Well, you'd have to ask.... I mean, I would.

McHUGH: In short, you can't identify the results as such, actually.

STEDMAN: No, but after all I coordinated it, so I thought it was. But I think so. The goal was very simply to begin to generate interest and information at the state level. We recognized -- and I was totally committed and kept trying to make this point with Sarge -- that the effectiveness of the panel would only be good if it was implemented by the states. You can't implement a program from the federal level, because every state government's interest is different.

And coupled with the White House conference, we took advantage of a situation.... This is interesting. Dave Ray [David B. Ray, Jr.], who's now executive director of the President's Committee on Mental Retardation, came up a little later to Washington, joined Staff Warren's staff. Just prior to the White House conference, President Kennedy was having a series of talks, one or two at a time, with the governors of every state about the civil rights legislation. We took advantage of these governors coming into town to get with them and their staffs to talk with them about the mental retardation legislation; that really worked beautifully. I think we talked to about thirty-five governors and their staffs.

McHUGH: Were they all receptive right away?

STEDMAN: No. No, they weren't. But the majority of them, I think, got some education. I think there were at least one or two members of every staff that were impressed, and we felt we'd made some gains with.

McHUGH: Of the one that you didn't get anywhere with, what was the reason for that?

STEDMAN: Conservative governments -- Virginia, Alabama. You know, this kind of thing.

McHUGH: They felt that the government did not have any role there. Was that part of it?

STEDMAN: Well, what they wanted was block grants; they didn't want to have earmarked money. This money was pretty earmarked. There had to be a state agency that was designated by the governor to receive these funds. There had to be a comprehensive plan developed in each state before any money went in. This was smart because otherwise it would just have gone down the rat hole.

McHUGH: Where did that idea originate of having a comprehensive plan?

STEDMAN: It came out of the panel. I'm not sure who suggested it. I don't recall, anyway.

McHUGH: But there have been similar things, I think, other grants made for urban renewal; they also require comprehensive planning.

STEDMAN: Yeah. Well, we felt from the beginning that there had to be a demonstration of some clear planning at the local level. Some Joe Moe couldn't be hired to sit down in the office next to yours and write a fancy grant application or some kind of thing. There had to be clear demonstration that there was not only a willingness and an interest, but the mechanisms present to put those moneys to work, whether there were matching moneys or not. Now, even the universities had to do that. They had to do a campus-wide assessment of their ability and their desires and needs. There had to be a university-level council on mental retardation, or a committee or something, that drew together the various pieces of that university that were relevant so they could demonstrate a broad, cohesive backup. It also gave it some staying power because, interestingly enough, every one of these interagency councils or organizations that were established, in some cases by executive order at the state level, in some cases by legislation, still exist; they still exist. And at least half of them have been institutionalized in the form of a deputy commissioner or a special assistant to the governor or something like that. That's proof that it was of value and had some staying power.

McHUGH: You mention the universities. I was curious, what kind of reaction did you get to the limitation of the number of research centers to -- what was it? -- ten or twelve?

STEDMAN: Well, they started out with ten and they ended with twelve. The initial reaction was, "Well, what will probably happen is that them what's got, gets," and Harvard [University] and Yale [University] and Princeton [University] and Cal [University of California at Berkeley] will end up with one. Well, that's not what happened. The agency that was given the

responsibility to generate competitive applications for these centers was NICHD. The smartest move they made. They were able to stick to the regional, strategic thing.

Now, the other thing, and this is interesting: the Kennedy Foundation immediately undertook.... An information program went out to universities by selective stimulation which said, "If you're interested in a research center, we'll give you a planning grant." So, essentially what happened there is that the Foundation, with the assistance of its consultation, was able to signal out ahead of time -- they rode point on that essentially -- good hots; and they'd go in ahead of time.

McHUGH: You said that they what on that? Excuse me, I didn't understand you. They "rode point?"

STEDMAN: Well, that's an old Texas saying. The guy who rides way up ahead of the herd to look and see if the Indians are going to get them. [Laughter] We went to Denver and said, "Look, would you like a planning grant? This will help you to cut away some ice. This will give you the resources you need to put in a competitive application." Well, as it turns out, the majority of these existing twelve centers now got started with Kennedy Foundation planning grants. There are some who got planning grants who didn't get centers, but ten of the twelve had planning grants.

McHUGH: Well, wasn't it felt.... I would think this would be pretty controversial. In effect you were saying, "If you do this, we'll give you some money."

STEDMAN: Every college and university president in this United States got a letter from Sarge Shriver telling about the availability of planning money.

McHUGH: Oh, is that so?

STEDMAN: Yes. So it was wide open competition, fair as it could be.

McHUGH: This was generally taken seriously, you think?

STEDMAN: No.

McHUGH: It was not.

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STEDMAN: No, because the majority of the colleges and universities weren't interested in that kind of earmarked money; the kind of apathy that you found outside the campus was also present on the campus. Or they didn't have the resources. or that wasn't their bag. They'd say, "We're not interested in the biological or the behavioral research route."

McHUGH: Was there a feeling that mental retardation was a low status priority?

STEDMAN: Dead horse. Dead horse.

McHUGH: Oh, even the universities felt that it was a dead horse?

STEDMAN: Sure. Sure.

McHUGH: One would think that they would have been a little further....

STEDMAN: No, sir. In my judgment, the universities were harder to breathe life into than the states and the communities.

McHUGH: Is that right?

STEDMAN: Sure. Besides, they weren't too interested in trafficking with, partly, a cresting issue that may not last. Universities are strange organisms. They have to be careful of their finances, especially a private university.

McHUGH: In other words, they thought this was a fad that would probably pass?

STEDMAN: Yeah. And they'd be stuck with a program with no operational supports. That's happening now; it happens all the time. We're wooed constantly by some programs, and you have to be careful. If you just look at it from the financial point of view.... That's why the construction legislation was so effective, because when they saw that this was coupled with construction and that it had a twenty-year limitation on it, this sweetened it up a little bit. And it wasn't just to sweeten it up; you can't do research without space, you know. John Fogarty made one of the most eloquent pitches for the construction law you ever saw. He said, "We can't ask a doctor to do his research in a clothes closet," or something. He was so beautiful in the way in which he'd do it.

McHUGH: Did you work at all on congressional liaison?

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STEDMAN: Not officially.

McHUGH: Or even unofficially?

STEDMAN: Well, I guess you could say that. I responded to congressional staff inquiries or requests for information about things.

McHUGH: Which staff members were particularly helpful, would you say, for the legislation?

STEDMAN: Fogarty, Hill [J. Lister Hill].

McHUGH: Their staffs were...

STEDMAN: Sure.

McHUGH: ...very good?

STEDMAN: I wouldn't say that there was special resistance. In the first place, it was not that massive a program dollarwise that it would affect the national economy, or anything like that. And from the very beginning the traditional effective advocates of health and social bills were interested in actively pushing for it. Ribicoff [Abraham A. Ribicoff]....

McHUGH: Did you have to do much work to get them to do....

STEDMAN: Ribicoff was quite active at that time.

McHUGH: Oh, was he?

STEDMAN: Yeah.

McHUGH: Oh, I hadn't heard that. What was he doing in particular?

STEDMAN: Well, he's a very eloquent guy and he's data based. He never says five words unless he's got twelve pounds of data to back it up, which is smart. And he has been interested for a long time in the whole area of health; this is one of the reasons he was interested, I guess, in the HEW post, at least for a short period of time.

McHUGH: But you felt he was effective on working for mental retardation?

STEDMAN: Yes.

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McHUGH: What in particular was he doing, can you say?

STEDMAN: Well, he made a couple of speeches. He introduced one of the bills. I think it was the child health bill. Yeah. I think it was the child health bill. Yeah. I think it was the child health bill -- Maternal Child Health [and Mental Retardation Planning Amendments of 1963] bill -- pretty sure it was. That was one of the three big ones.

And, of course, he was congenial to the administration. He was interested in, oh, I think most of the administration's bill. And an eloquent guy and a sharp guy. So, he was helpful there.

McHUGH: What about the work of the secretary's committee [called the Advisory Committee on Mental Retardation] in HEW? Were you aware of that?

STEDMAN: Well, Luther Stringham was an aide to Wilbur Cohen at the time that there was seen to be a need. It was related to the earlier point I made, that when I first went to Washington, you had to go to thirty-three offices to get what you needed, that today you can get in two. And Luther was assigned to be, oh, I guess -- what do you call him -- chairman or coordinator of the secretary's committee. The idea of drawing together all the federal agencies, or representatives from those agencies, to improve the information sharing and to get their heads together when they got into legislative writing or legislative interpretation or guideline interpretation for agency activities. I never saw it as much more than simply a good source of data. I could call Luther or Wally Babington [Wallace Babington] and have some immediate and great data, in terms of head counts or numbers from federal agencies that was very helpful, if we needed to support ourselves in point of a bill, or back up a recommendation with more specific....

McHUGH: When you say we, whom are you referring to?

STEDMAN: Well, the Foundation staff, or when I was with Staff Warren's staff.

McHUGH: Did you feel there was much jealousy among federal agencies as to what contribution they would make or were they trying to be independent? Or were you aware of that? You probably wouldn't have been particularly aware of that on your level.

STEDMAN: Well, I wouldn't say there was a terrible lot of jealousy over and above.... I would like it if there were jealousy because it meant they had a stake in it. I'm

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not sure, but what there was.... Well, let me put it this way: there were a lot of agency people, I can recall, who had to be dragged by the napes of their necks into an interest in doing something.

McHUGH: What agencies in particular?

STEDMAN: Office of Education. I never had so much trouble in my life trying to stimulate interest, and Shriver had the same feeling.

McHUGH: Why? One would think that with their special education programs they would have had an interest. Do you know why there was a seeming lack of interest?

STEDMAN: Well, you'd think so, but as I said, at that time there was only one source of input for mental retardation, one million bucks to train educators, most of whom went into state government in some state, in 1958. And that was zilch; I mean, that didn't begin to do anything. At that time, in my judgment, the Office of Education was an almost totally closed system, burned out and just....

McHUGH: Whom were you dealing with over there at that time?

STEDMAN: Well, there was a thing called the Division of Handicapped Children and Youth in one of the bureaus. That place has been reorganized several times since I've been there. But you couldn't begin to compare today's U.S. Office of Education with ten years ago or eight years ago. Unbelievable.

McHUGH: You mean the whole Office of Education?

STEDMAN: The whole thing. The whole thing.

McHUGH: Well, what....

STEDMAN: Management. Harold Howe came in; Keppel [Francis Keppel]: Gardner [John W. Gardner]: Gallagher [James J. Gallagher]. There's a bunch of bright people that are in there, creative; they were able to move it. It's an example of how a federal agency can be moved by creative people.

McHUGH: Who was in there when you were dealing with them?

STEDMAN: Well, the person I dealt with most was Romaine Mackie who was head of this Division of Handicapped Children and Youth.

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McHUGH: Well, was he....

STEDMAN: She.

McHUGH: Excuse me. Was she receptive or....

STEDMAN: Well, I think she was receptive, but she couldn't cut it. That was my impression. Nice gal, but never did really grasp the opportunity that might

be there. For her it was more than a little shaky. She wasn't quite sure where the action was, or quite sure where the power was, or was too much concerned about it really, and not so much interested in getting down to it. That's my judgment.

McHUGH: Did they have anything to do with the recommendation that an institute of learning be established?

STEDMAN: No. The national institute of learning idea came from Lloyd Dunn. At that time he was chairman of special education here. I think it was partly patterned after the Russian notion. The Russians have a centralized national institute of learning. At that time there were two reasons why that didn't gain anything. One is facetious and that is it would have spelled N-I-L, NIL; you couldn't possibly have a Federal agency like that. [Laughter]

McHUGH: Well, you can throw in another. N-I-H-L and make it national institute of human learning.

STEDMAN: I see. Okay. Then it would be NIHL.

McHUGH: Maybe NIHL would be worse.

STEDMAN: So anyway, no, the notion was -- and I think it's appropriate and that's what finally happened -- that education needed to have a decentralized research effort.

McHUGH: Oh, really. Who made this decision? How was this finally arrived at?

STEDMAN: I think educators in general agreed on that. I think this was in the zeitgeist.... The national institute of learning concept would not have gained the support of educators in this country, educational researchers, because you have to do educational research where people are. It's not like Bethesda [Maryland] where you can ship a bunch of blood or urine or something and do the research. You've got to decentralize. That's what happened. Right now there are nine regional educational research institutes, you see. That's happened since '65.

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McHUGH: When that was first proposed, was that thought to be a particularly unrealistic type of thing?

STEDMAN: No. It could have been built. I think it wasn't considered to be unrealistic; it was considered to be ineffective. Maybe that amounts to the same thing. An unrealistic way of going about doing learning research is to build some monument up in Bethesda.

McHUGH: I understand that the Office of Education wasn't altogether.... Now, I don't know whether they were against, or for that institute of learning.

STEDMAN: I don't think it got that far. I mean, I don't think it....

McHUGH: Came before their consideration?

STEDMAN: Well, there may have been large and extensive discussions on that, but I was never involved in it. I think I would have been at some point. In fact, one of my responsibilities was to pay close attention to all the minutes, all the correspondence, because I was responsible to try to boil down things.

McHUGH: You mean you were doing this at this time for the Kennedy Foundation?

STEDMAN: Sure. Primarily for Mrs. Shriver as a member of the committee. But I had the responsibility of taking all of the results of all the hearings all over the country and boiling them down into what seemed to constitute the major gripes or major recommendations that came out of the grass roots kind of thing.

McHUGH: What became of the notes on all this? Are they destroyed? Are they existent?

STEDMAN: Well, no, I don't think they're destroyed. That all belongs to the Kennedy Foundation, and I suspect that it's either still there or shipped off someplace else.

McHUGH: It might be interesting if they could.... If it hasn't been done -- I don't know that it has; I think it probably hasn't -- it would be a useful addition, I would think possibly, to the Library [John F. Kennedy Library]. Maybe they could decide what should be kept and what's useful.

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STEDMAN: Well, of course, those materials were also made available directly to Leonard Mayo so they should be in the President's panel files, too. These memoranda, these boildowns were made available to Leonard[; that was the point.

McHUGH: Maybe he has them somewhere.

STEDMAN: Well, no, I doubt that. I think they're in the file.

McHUGH: In the presidential papers somewhere.

STEDMAN: No. I think they're in the files of the President's panel which were turned over to the President's committee. They may be in the President's Committee on Mental Retardation. Now, Ruth Gray at that time was Leonard Mayo's office manager and she still is to the President's committee. She's the gal who would know where they are.

McHUGH: Oh, is that so? That's very interesting. I should probably speak with her.

STEDMAN: Yeah.

McHUGH: You mentioned before working with Stafford Warren. Could you say what the estimate was generally, or the effectiveness of the follow-up on the recommendations?

STEDMAN: Stafford Warren came onto the scene almost as an unknown in the MR group. He's a fantastic person. He's a really tremendous guy. He was on the Manhattan Project and the Oak Ridge [Tennessee] project. He was president emeritus of UCLA [University of California Los Angeles] and all that jazz. And he's a character, a cigar chomping big guy. I used to do a lot of speechwriting and I used to just cringe because he never would stick with speeches. Boy, he'd go way off into left field. And he got himself into jams several times doing that.

But he saw his mission, his role as special assistant, as being asked to engage in a mission of personal diplomacy for the mentally retarded and for the White House. He spent most of his time making sorties out to national conventions and professional groups and bringing in Labor Department staff and seeing how we could get some retarded person hired. He just did a lot of infiltration and proselytizing and advocating. He was very good at it because he was an impressive character; he had great credentials, and he was special assistant to the President.

But I think that most people feel, and I think he would agree,

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that the extent to which he made substantial contributions in an organized way was severely limited by a lack of opportunity to more formally organize his office and to have it take place over a longer period of time. It was rather a short-lived thing; after the assassination the flavor went out of the chewing gum for the whole retardation effort.

McHUGH: Oh, was that so? Well, President Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] has taken it up, hasn't he?

STEDMAN: Well, he created the President's Committee on Mental Retardation by executive order. And it's hard to say whether that will continue now with

the Nixon [Richard M. Nixon] Administration. But it was clear that it suddenly became....

McHUGH: A dead issue?

STEDMAN: No, it wasn't a dead issue, but the committee was imbedded within the secretary of HEW's budget. It was moved remotely, geographically, back into HEW South. The budget was adequate and President Johnson occasionally hit the hoop. I don't think Secretary Gardner was terribly impressed or terribly interested one way or the other, but a lot of doors closed...

McHUGH: Oh, is that so?

STEDMAN: ...that were easily opened and shut. I'm not saying there was any kind of, you know....

McHUGH: Conspiracy?

STEDMAN: No, not at all. As a matter of fact, Mrs. Krim [Mathilde G. Krim], who's close friend of President Johnson's, and Horace Busby, former staff writer, who both became members of the President's Committee on Mental Retardation, made good contributions. So there were inputs to the committee and from the committee to the White House. But it was not of the same kind at all.

McHUGH: So, the budget was adequate, but it was simply that you had to have the pressure from a higher level?

STEDMAN: Well, you see, one of the major reasons that the Kennedy Administration was able to mount such a fantastic push for mental retardation was the obvious close relationship, the fact that the President's sister is mentally retarded and the fact that he would often speak out. And there were so many of the family who were constantly in it. My gosh, if you had a washout

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speech, you knew you had backups like Ted [Edward M. Kennedy], or Joan [Joan Bennett Kennedy] or Ethel [Ethel Skakel Kennedy]. It was like a bullpen full of topflight pitchers; you couldn't miss. It was a delight. It was fantastic. I never had such a great experience in my life in terms of that. There were just really topflight people that were always available to give it that "kazowie" when it needed to be pushed.

McHUGH: What was Ted's position now at this time? He at one point was president of the Foundation, was he not?

STEDMAN: Yeah.

McHUGH: Was he at this time?

STEDMAN: Yes.

McHUGH: I thought he was. Was that in the late fifties that he... When did he become the president?

STEDMAN: Well, I think it was from roughly 19 -- maybe 60. When it became formalized, they made presidents and vice presidents and all that, and they got kind of a kick out of it. But Sarge was the executive director. Ted was never too much involved. There was the first time I met him and he was just really, I thought, one of the greatest people I've met.

Sarge had to wash out of a press conference in Boston. We had just given a big grant to Massachusetts General Hospital, Ray Adams [Raymond D. Adams] and that group, Phil Dodge [Philip R. Dodge]. And Sarge couldn't make it, so Ted filled in. He came fifteen minutes before that press conference with no knowledge about what in the hell the grant was about, why they were getting it. I mean, he'd been doing his thing somewhere else. He got us off in a room and said, "What is this all about?" And we gave him more input than I think anybody could possibly have done. He went out there and faced that press conference like he knew from ground zero what it was. He just did a marvelous job. And he was interested. He knew when to lateral a question and when not to. I just thought that was a terrific piece of behavior. That's the first time I met him. That was the only real point in my whole experience there where he was specifically related to something. I'm sure he was in the background. I'm sure he was interested.

McHUGH: At one point Eunice Shriver decided to write the article for *Saturday Evening Post* on Rosemary [Rosemary Kennedy]. Do you know what prompted her to do that?

STEDMAN: Well, I can tell you what I think did.

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McHUGH: I don't expect you to read her mind. I was curious.

STEDMAN: Well, the reason I kind of grinned is because there's a very interesting little story involved in that whole thing for me personally.

McHUGH: Oh, can you tell it? Do you want to tell it?

STEDMAN: Well, let me just say this: People would ask me when I would go out someplace to talk or would go somewhere, "what about Rosemary? Where

is she?" They had heard -- it was kind of at the rumor level -- and I think that may have something to do with wanting to have a one-shot, "Here it is," and to avoid making it look as if they were kind of holding her down someplace. At the same time, I think the President generated it. I think he felt that it would be important to help highlight the whole problem of mental retardation, and by a demonstration of his obvious willingness to be involved in something like that. Even today that's kind of a taboo thing: People don't run around talking about retarded relatives, at least not self-initiated.

So, Mrs. Shriver asked me to put together a technical draft. And Sarge said, "I'll get you a writer." So he called a guy named Dave Goldman, who was working for the *New York Post* at that time and was doing some freelance work for the Peace Corps. The two of us put together a draft. It was in the summertime; it was in July or August. Everybody was up at Hyannis Port [Massachusetts], so we all went up there, and we hung around there for about ten days putting this draft together. Dave was a nighthawk and I was an early morning worker, so we worked very well, see. I would get up early in the morning, whang out technical stuff, and he'd pick it up about noon and turn it into public-ese so people could understand it.

One Sunday morning I was sitting on the screen porch of the Shriver's house there, in the compound, kind of typing away, and I heard the screen door rattle. I looked and there was the President. He had come over from Squaw Island; had come over to go to Massachusetts. He was in, I think, a chartreuse or a pink shirt, some kind of pastel shirt, as I remember, and slacks and sandals and all that. My God, I almost fell off my chair. But the door was hooked, so what was I supposed to do? I got up. I went over and unhooked it, and he came in and he said, "How are you doing?" I don't remember what I said. I was lost. But I mumbled something about writing. He said, "Oh, about Rosemary?" I said, "Yeah." "Well, may I look at it?" I said, "Well, we're still kind of putting it together." He said, "That's all right." I had forty-five pages in about three minutes. I never saw such a . . . Just, psheew-ew-ew. There's plenty of basis for this

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story about him as being a speed reader with high comprehension, because I saw it. When he put it down, he said, "There are two or three points there that ought to be improved and there are a couple of places where we can add some more," and he gave me a whole thing. He put it down, and turned around and hollered at the top of his voice, "Eunice." She was upstairs. He wanted to get her to go to church with him, too. She finally came down and the two of them went off.

I sat there in disarray for two hours, finally pulled myself back together and tried to remember what corrections he'd suggested. But anyway, Dave and I put that thing together, came back to Washington, and at that point made our first contact with Don Oberdorfer [Donald Oberdorfer, Jr.], who was a writer for the *Post* [*New York Post*]. Between the three of us we finished up the draft and sold it to the *Post*.

So, that was kind of the story of that thing. But it was triggered, I think, by a definite interest in making the story known publicly in a good way, through a decent medium, and at the same time feeling that it would advance the current crest of things. I think it was a week

after.... No, no. That was September 22, wasn't it? Yeah. It was about a month before the panel report came out.

McHUGH: I know that there was a lot of confusion. Some people thought that she was schizophrenic. I remember reading an account that she had cerebral palsy. There was, apparently, a lot of misinformation as to what.... I don't think she said exactly what the degree of the defect was.

STEDMAN: Well, there had been a *Reader's Digest* article; I'm not sure what magazine the Digest got it from. But some physician in Boston was quoted as saying that it was post measles encephalitis, in other words, a brain damage that caused a moderate to severe amount of mental retardation. I'm not so sure myself what.... You know, in those days it's pretty hard to know what happened to kids, and whether it's prenatal or postnatal I don't know. But I would say that she's probably moderately mentally retarded and doing well in St. Coletta's in Wisconsin.

McHUGH: She's still there?

STEDMAN: Yeah.

McHUGH: I may have to turn this tape over shortly.

STEDMAN: Okay. Hope I'm not talking too much.

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McHUGH: I want to see if there are any important things that we haven't covered. If you think of things, please feel free to speak.

STEDMAN: Yeah.

McHUGH: That article, I think was supposed to be a part of a policy, I think so-called, new openness, or something: it was no longer necessary to keep the mentally retarded in a closet, or something. Did that go very far?

STEDMAN: Well, there was a general agreement, and there had been prior to that, that one was the basic obstacles to positive change for the mentally retarded was good public education and public information about the mentally retarded, what they were and what they weren't, who they were and who they weren't. I don't know as anybody sat down and said, "Okay, we're going to have a policy of 'openness.' Now, let's concoct a number of novels and articles and steady PR [public relations] stuff." I don't think anybody did it in that fashion. I think later on when we were able to get the Advertising Council to commit itself to mental retardation, this was primarily through Sarge's efforts. I can remember the first meeting with Ted Riplear over in

Washington, some club. The notion was first introduced to him that maybe the Advertising Council should take mental retardation on as a... You know, they have this public service write-off that they can use. And at that point they got interested and involved. Then, Young and Rubicam [International, Inc.] were appointed as the PR firm, and they did some beautiful stuff. And it was unheard of. You'd see full page ads in *Time* magazine, great stuff; that was unheard of in 1962; nobody talked about it. So, whether there was a policy or not, that's what happened.

McHUGH: Sarge was continually.... He was involved here, too?

STEDMAN: Absolutely. Every step. That guy is, in my judgment, the most phenomenal human being alive.

McHUGH: Were there any other crucial points where he made his influence felt that you can think of?

STEDMAN: Creation of NICHD, helping to move the mental retardation legislation.

McHUGH: How was he particularly concerned with the creation of....

STEDMAN: He knew the federal establishment well enough to know where things should be done, how, when -- appropriately

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and legitimately -- but he helped guide a relatively amateurish staff in how they should work, all the while running the Peace Corps and twelve other things. There are very few people I'd jump off the roof of this building for, but he'd be one of them because he's that kind of a model. I've seen him on the phone persuade high paid, industrial executives to quit their job for a year and come to the Peace Corps to work for a quarter as much money because it's something they ought to do -- on the phone. He's fantastic.

McHUGH: He has an unusual talent, I guess.

STEDMAN: Well, persuasion is what he's got. He's got star quality. There is such a thing. He walks into the room and you know he's there, and he makes it work.

McHUGH: Well, can you think of anything else that's significant that we haven't covered, things that you were involved in in that period?

STEDMAN: Well, I can think of one thing of interest. Sarge's style as far as the Foundation was concerned was, oh, to have lunches or dinners and bring

appropriate people into his sphere of activity so that we could have an opportunity to present them with information about what ought to be done, and how it could be done, and what you could do to help, kind of thing. My role was to gather the information and help plan the strategy for the use of that information when we would have access to these people. One example it, it came to our attention -- I forget how -- that the Civil Service [Civil Service Commission] effectively prevented retarded from having civil service jobs because of the way in which civil service jobs are gotten, a written exam and all that jazz, see. So, we developed a luncheon with John Macy who at that time was -- maybe still is -- the head of the civil service. I guess he still is. He was flabbergasted to find himself meeting with the director of the Peace Corps and suddenly we were starting to talk about mental retardation. These people, lots of times, would come with no idea what the hell was going to happen.

Out of that came a hundred jobs allocated by the civil service for the retarded as a pilot study. First, the identification of jobs they could do as adults, elevator operators and decision free jobs and the like. Now, almost every state has opened up its state civil service; it's snowballed. That was, I think, as much Mrs. Shriver's doing as Mr. Shriver.

McHUGH: You mean she worked with states?

STEDMAN: No. In terms of the initial idea and trying to get to

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the right people. The philosophy is that no amount of cajoling is effective unless you're talking to the right people. The idea is to find other people who are creative, who are....

[BEGIN SIDE II, TAPE I]

McHUGH: You said you had to find people who were in a position to make it work.

STEDMAN: Yeah. The idea is that you don't go to the federal agency staff, or some other Foundation, or some group: you single out the people who are in a position to make a decision, the hopefully creative people, people who are willing to take risks, who see the value in something.

I don't think it would be proper at all to characterize Shriver as a man who makes illegitimate use of whatever influence he might have. His persuasion, his influence was always eminently correct and data based, a proper mix of humanity where it's appropriate. I mean, certainly that's the only way the Peace Corps could have flown. But he was most persuasive. And he always went with several ideas of how the guy could do it. He never went and said, "Could you do it?" or "Is there some way in which you could do it?" He'd say, "Now, this is the way your organization works and all you have to do it...." He knew more about the guy's agency than he did in many cases, because he would take the pains, through people like myself -- I wasn't the only person -- to find out what it was, the data, you know. That backfired once.

McHUGH: How was that?

STEDMAN: Mrs. Shriver was supposed to give a speech on mental retardation to the Washington State Association for Retarded Children and all the faculty and staff at the University of Washington in Seattle; a big thing, two thousand, three thousand people. She always got up-tight about speeches and she still does. I get letters every week, "More data for this and that." She's going all over France giving talks, but she hates it; she really gets up-tight.

Well, anyway, we had a group meeting. Dick Goodwin [Richard Goodwin] was there; Bob Aldrich was there; Dick Masland, Bob Cooke, myself, maybe a couple of others. What kind of speech is she going to give. It was going to be a major speech. We wanted to get good press coverage and make a national story out of it, because it was a big event up there. Governor Rosellini [Albert D. Rosellini] had just gone in and so forth. So Sarge says, "You know, there was a railroad back in the thirties or something that said that a hog could ride from some place to some place else without changing trains, but you had to change three times." I don't know what, the New York Central [Railroad Co.] or somebody. Remember that?

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McHUGH: I heard something like that.

STEDMAN: Anyway, there was a big splash and it really made a point; I mean, things happened. So he said, "Don, find out something about what kind of care animals get compared to what we're spending or what's benign done for humans." So, I went to the Department of Agriculture and all over the place, and I found out that the budget for the Department of Agriculture's program for taking care of pregnant cows was ten times the money we had for an annual budget for NICHD. I further found out that the King Ranch in Oklahoma has eight full-time obstetricians riding around the range making sure that pregnant cows are going to have good calves. Boy, did we run into a bundle.

Well, I wrote all that stuff up. Well, no single person ever wrote a speech; it always went to forty-five people, you know. By the time it got all the way into a final draft and it had been looked at by appropriate people, because she was the President's sister, it got boiled down to the fact that more money is spent in this country for pregnant cows than is spent for pregnant women. Then after she gave the speech, it got boiled down to a single two-line eight-column banner in the *San Francisco Examiner* the next morning. "Cows Outstrip Women, President's Sister Says."

Well, boy, the stuff hit the fan. Agriculture was upset. The State of Washington was upset. The State of Oklahoma was upset. NICHD was upset. And, of course, the buck went all the way back down to the lowest guy in the whole stack, and suddenly I got a call from the White House wanting to know where I got my data. And a week later I got a little brown envelope on my desk. I opened it up and there was just a picture there. It was a picture of a cow looking around the edge of a barn. I know Shriver sent me that, but it was not signed. I

got some insight into the preparation that went into it but was not signed. I got some insight into the preparation that went into it and the importance that they attached to this thing. They really went all out for even things like a speech to a state association.

McHUGH: You mentioned Macy's work in the hiring of retarded adults to do jobs that were within their competence. Did you attempt to deal with labor unions at all on the matter of hiring?

STEDMAN: No. It was later that we began to talk to Joe Bierne [Joseph A. Beirne] and that was much later. That was a couple of years later though -- the Communications Workers of America. Joe Beirne was a member of the President's committee up until last year. There were no formal or, even as far as I know, informal relationship, I guess, except at the level of trying to

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find ways in which insurance companies might offer benefits to unions or something for retarded children or something. We never got anywhere with the insurance route. As far as I know, there's no -- at least up until.... I left in November of 1963 and John Throne took my place there. He stayed for about two years. Right now the Foundation office is boiled down to about one or two als. Diane Sheahan is kind of holding the fort, sends out correspondence for everybody else to respond to. But it's down to bare bones, and I suspect as much a function of the Shriver's being in Paris as anything else.

From the very beginning it was obvious that part of the reason for the staff was the presence of the Shriver's in Washington. If they went back to Chicago or if he does go into the UN [United Nations] or whatever, why I suspect it may move to New York.

McHUGH: Well, if you have nothing else that you can think of.

STEDMAN: Well, I think in terms of relevant information about the President's panel and that era, and the relationship of the Foundation's activity. There are other areas in which the Foundation was active. The whole area of camping and recreation was a pet area of Mrs. Shriver's. I think it was very effective. Many, many camps have started because of that. And there still is a granting program from the Kennedy Foundation for day camping for the retarded.

McHUGH: I'm just not sure we've covered all the areas you were involved in. You said you got into multifarious activities. Do you think of anything, other things that you were doing, that you might want to comment on?

STEDMAN: Well, the Shriver's had other areas of interest. When you worked for Shriver, or when you work for the Foundation, you don't just do what's involved as far as mental retardation works. They have a wide variety of interests. You find yourself doing lots of things. I did a good bit of Peace Corps work, in

terms of helping him do this, that, or the other thing. There was no job specification, no one, two, three, four about what you were supposed to do. I wouldn't have been interested if there were. It was just high velocity, sixteen, seventeen hours a day, seven days a week. You take about two years of that stuff and you start looking for a good college to go back to.

[Laughter]

But I think as far as the majority of what the Foundation was involved in, I mean we haven't talked at all about the [Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. Foundation] International Awards program, but that's pretty much specifically Foundation activity, and not related to

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the President's panel and federal agencies or the like. They were very interesting. Lots of very interesting people were involved in those things. A lot of work involved, especially the first one that was held in Washington. The next one was planned for the December following the assassination, but put off until the following February because of obvious problems there. The third one was in Chicago. I suspect if there is another one, it will be in Los Angeles. It's kind of moved where the Kennedy children are -- Washington, New York, Chicago, probably LA [Los Angeles] or maybe Boston.

McHUGH: Well, thank you very much then, Doctor Stedman. Thank you.

STEDMAN: I appreciated the chance to talk with you.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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