

**Frank Mankiewicz Oral History Interview – RFK #3, 8/12/1969**  
Administrative Information

**Creator:** Frank Mankiewicz  
**Interviewer:** Larry J. Hackman  
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**Biographical Note**

Mankiewicz was director of the Peace Corps in Lima, Peru from 1962 to 1964, Latin America regional director from 1964 to 1966 and then press secretary to Senator Robert F. Kennedy from 1966 to 1968. In the interview Mankiewicz discusses Robert Kennedy's relationship with President Johnson and the Johnson administration, the foreign and domestic press, Robert Kennedy's speech on Vietnam and campaigning, among other issues.

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FRANK MANKIEWICZ  
RFK #3

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Third Oral History Interview

with

FRANK MANKIEWICZ

August 12, 1969  
Bethesda, Maryland

By Larry J. Hackman


For the John F. Kennedy Library

HACKMAN: This is the third interview with Frank Mankiewicz. The date is August 12, 1969. The interview is taking place at Mr. Mankiewicz's home.

MANKIEWICZ: It was kind of interesting because he'd [Robert F. Kennedy] look at those clippings and then he'd give them back and then we would send them periodically to young Joe [Joseph P. Kennedy III] and to Kathleen [Kathleen H. Kennedy] and to his father [Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr.] You might check them. They might have a lot of clippings too because I'm sure they never sent them back.

HACKMAN: Well, some of the things I wanted to talk about, today may well be on the tape you've done for the Lyndon Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] people because I was

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going to get you to talk about the Robert Kennedy-Johnson relationship at the time you came on and how it developed and the problems it created in your mind.

MANKIEWICZ: I don't think that's on there.

HACKMAN: Okay. Why don't you start talking about what you can recall about early conversations with Robert Kennedy about Johnson and where they stood.

MANKIEWICZ: I really, wasn't aware at the time I came on the staff wasn't aware of the really intense feeling that appeared existed. That is, I had thought, obviously, from reading and just from listening and observing what was going on around Washington that certainly the Johnson Administration did not wish Robert Kennedy well. But I had thought, in my general naiveté, that that was confined to issues, that is, that he had a position on Latin America which was against that of the Administration and so they would frustrate him in those areas if they could. But I hadn't realized that--in fact to the extent

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that the president had influence in agencies and he had, of course, considerable at the top of most of them - it was almost all sort of a primary mission of the Johnson Administration was to see to it that Robert Kennedy didn't get to be president. And I had the feeling as '67 came on and '68 that that was really the major mission of the United States of America. It depressed me terribly. I had the feeling that Johnson would act or not act in almost every area, domestic policy as well as foreign policy, to that stimulus rather than any other responsibility.

I thought that was rather depressing and unfortunate. And that began to build up really through '66. Bill Moyers [William D. Moyers] told me that that, of course, was one of the reasons that he left or was fired or asked to go or that--I guess really he left but because his influence had so declined. And I remember Bill said a very pathetic thing to me. He said he had thought when he went to work for Johnson, he said, "I thought I could make him more like me, but I've

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found in the last several months that I'm becoming more like him; so I got out." And he also told me -- and I verified that from a couple of people involved who had worked with me over at the Peace Corps--that when Moyers left, Johnson either called or had called, caused to be called, the head of almost every department and executive agency in the government giving them a list of Bill Moyers staff people and instructions that they were not to be hired. That's apparently quite true. That applied, you know, to Hayes Redman, Carol Welsh. Carol sneaked into a job somewhere. I helped her. I can't remember where it was. I can't remember if it was OEO [Office of Economic Opportunity] or the Peace Corps or somewhere. She was

sort. of undercover for awhile and then she finally came to work for us. But that kind of thing sort of soured the atmosphere rather quickly.

And I also had the feeling that a great many of Robert Kennedy's people were much more explicit in their hostility to Johnson than Senator Kennedy

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was himself. I mean, he may have felt it inside but I never heard him publicly or privately until, I guess until he came back from that trip to Europe and had that unfortunate session over at the White House, I never heard him say anything derogatory about the President. Obviously, on issues he'd say, "His position is this and I think so forth," but he never sort of joined in the occasionally raillery that some of the guys would do. And, of course, in 1966 some of the people on the staff -- Adam [Adam Walinsky], I guess particularly -- were much, much more passionate about the war and consequently about Johnson than Robert Kennedy was himself or at least than he was publicly and in conversation. And, of course, almost as soon as I started, within two or three months anyway....The campaign in 1966 was difficult because obviously I didn't want to contribute to the Kennedy-Johnson feud. I had no personal reason to. And, obviously, it was in the interest of the way I saw my job to minimize it. And the press played it up enough and I saw no

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reason to feed it and I'm sure Senator Kennedy saw no reason to feed it so that, in general, whenever I was asked about it I would sort of laugh and say that I guess there wasn't anything I could do about the stories but that they weren't true -- and indeed they weren't. That is to say, there was no conscious feeling in the Kennedy camp that we were going to get Johnson and indeed the feeling was that he was going to run for reelection and probably win, and that our problem was going to be a reelection campaign in New York in 1970 against John Lindsay [John V. Lindsay] before we could think about anything else. So that the Johnson business didn't really come up in any really official way until probably mid-'67.

For the end of '66, almost all of '66, because, you see, I wasn't there for that "fox in the chicken coup" business back and forth on Viet Nam, I came after that. And it wasn't really until the campaign tour in 1966 that we began to get the flavor of it. And then out at Berkeley he gave a marvelous speech at the Greek theater on Viet Nam

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and then afterward he answered some questions from the students. And somebody asked him about the South Vietnamese government and he said well, he was convinced that the people of South Viet Nam didn't want Ho Chi Minh and they also certainly didn't want Marshal [Nguyen Cao Ky] Ky, which is a quite reasonable thing to say and, of course, like all those things quite true. But then it occurred to some people in the press, particularly Dave Broder [David S. Broder] (who I always thought was rather pedestrian), that somehow this was highly critical of Johnson because, as it turned out, he was out in Manila at the time talking to Marshal Ky. Well, you know, it was the kind of thing Johnson used to do that was so

artificial that you never paid any attention to it. I mean, I don't think anybody knew or cared that he was out in Manila with Marshal Ky. I mean, he could have been at the White House with Marshal Ky or at Johnson City with Walt Rostow [Walt W. Rostow]. I mean, it didn't matter, you know, it wasn't as though this was a great national leader that he

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was talking to. But the press, particularly Broder, insisted on making a big thing of it that he criticized the President in the course of his speech. Well, then it made a major flap. And I could see that it bothered Senator Kennedy, which bothered me because I didn't think it was a major thing to worry about.

And I remember we were in a restaurant in Oakland at a reception—he'd given the speech in Berkeley and then we went over to Jack London Square for a reception for a Congressman [Jeffery Cohelan] Cohelan and some others. And there was this long reception line and I was hanging around with the press and they were all buzzing about how he criticized Marshal Ky in the middle of the Manila conference or the Honolulu--I think this was Manila--and I said, "What the hell is the Manila conference?" I said, "Oh, yes, that's right. They're out there discussing the progress of the war." And Dave Broder was saying that he was going to change his lead, and I was worried about that because I thought the speech at Berkeley was such a great

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speech that it should be the lead, and the *New York Times* was going to carry some text on it. So I went through the reception line just as a guest in the reception line and the Senator was shaking hands and sort of smiling and saying, "Nice to see you." And I got up to him and he was rather surprised and I shook his hand and smiled, and as I was smiling I said, "Dave Broder is rewriting his lead to say that you criticized the President while he was out there in Manila seeing Marshal Ky." And he was smiling and shaking hands with me and saying, "What is the attitude in the rest of the press group?" And I said, "Well, they're all a little concerned. I think probably you ought to come back and talk to Broder and see if you can't make it clear that you intended no attack, you've just stating a fact." So he cut off the reception line after four or five more guests and came back. And it was an unfortunate meeting because it then permitted some people later to say-- and I think a couple of the books carried this-- that he tried to pressure Dave Broder into changing

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his story, which, of course, Dave denied. But it didn't help. I think-- I'm trying to remember how Victor Lasky fits in--no, it wasn't --it was either Victor Lasky or Ralph de Toledano but somehow I think it was Lasky, but why would he be involved he wasn't writing his book then? But he called Broder. He desperately wanted to verify that story and he couldn't get it anywhere. And Broder finally told him it wasn't true. Maybe he was writing a column or something, I don't know. But it was an unfortunate incident all the way around and I felt that Dick Goodwin [Richard N. Goodwin] and others who were traveling with the Senator



magnified it too much and got him too scared about it. I mean I didn't think it was terribly important and I had a feeling that, you know, even if Dave Broder did rewrite his lead, that it wasn't all that important. But it showed the sensitivity to the Johnson issue. And it was extremely difficult because he was over-sensitive to that issue and he would always get asked questions on that 1966 tour and he was always

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very soft on it and never criticized Johnson. He would say that he had reservations about our war policy and he would not do things exactly the same way. And that always depressed the kids because they wanted to hear a strong attack. And he knew that, and I think he was really shackled by it enormously because the press would build it up so and he just didn't want to give them any further ammunition. But, of course, as we look back on it now, there was no way he could not have given them ammunition. And I think he probably unnecessarily defended against that charge.

HACKMAN: Can you remember before that fall campaign started ever just sitting down and discussing how he was going to handle this? Would he ever do this with the Staff?

MANKIEWICZ: Yes, we'd do it from time to time. I don't know what he talked about with the rest of the staff. We never had staff meetings. I would think I never really had a serious conversation with him with more than maybe one other, two maybe. Sometimes on a speech, on a particular speech, Peter [Peter B. Edelman] and Adam

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might be there and Joe Dolan [Joseph F. Dolan] at the point at which we were finally deciding whether indeed that was the draft and should this go here, what should be the lead. But I did talk to him alone on some occasions, usually in cars. You know, we'd come back from somewhere and I'd drive him home or we'd be going somewhere, walking across to the Capitol. And he was concerned about it and he didn't see any way out of it. He assumed that Johnson was going to run. He felt that by '66 that there was a chance that Johnson could lose. But he didn't see how that was going to affect his situation either. And he would occasionally say something that would indicate that he knew that they were going to block this or that, particularly in the Senate, stuff on Latin American aid or some of the poverty program stuff or some of his proposals. And then of course by 1967 when he had his major legislative program it was clear what the President was up to. I think I'll put in here -- it's out of time, but I think it's worth noting -- I'd worked, oh I guess three or four months, I'm not sure, not very

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long, and we were doing the rounds one afternoon, a couple of speeches, interns, and maybe a TV interview. And we spoke to a group of State Department interns -- probably late in the summer -- and then he wanted to go home. He was over at the State Department. It was about 5:30 and I said, "Well, just drop me off here somewhere and I'll get a cab back to the office." He said, "Well, let's go on talking. Why don't you come on home with me and then Jim can take you back." So forget what it was we were talking about. I guess getting ready for the trip. So we drove home. We went across Memorial Bridge and he said something to Jim. He was sitting in the front and I was sitting in the back. And then I realized that we were going to go on up to Arlington [Arlington National Cemetery]. So we did. And we drove in and parked up there by the President's grave. He started to get out of the car and he said. "Do you want to come with me?" And I said, "Sure do." So I went with him and it was after closing. And we walked over to the

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President's grave for a moment and then we walked over to where they were building the new one. And we looked at that and they had just put up the stone wall and they were starting to cut some of the words from the inaugural into the stone. We walked around for awhile and then we jumped over the fence and started to go back to the car. And he asked me what did I think of it. And I said, "Well, I'll be quite honest. I like the old grave better. I don't like -- it's too much; it's too calm. It's too much of a monument. It could be any President who died. I liked the other one. It was kind of immediate and raw, upsetting and I don't know why you couldn't just leave it that way." And he thought for a moment and then he said, "Well, I agree with you. I think that's right but it's too late now." And I was very moved by that. And I remembered it and I reminded some of the people in the family of it a few months ago, a year ago, in the hopes that his own grave would be somewhat simpler and would indicate somehow not only the kind of person

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he was but how he died, which I think is important about both of them. But he saw that. We talked about that for about fifteen minutes then on the way back to the house.

But in most of those conversations whenever we'd talk about Johnson he was always very resigned to the fact that he didn't have the guns, he just didn't have the horsepower to do anything about it even if he wanted to. He just, I think, had never permitted himself even to think in terms of overturning that and that he just knew that Johnson was going frustrate him whenever he could.

HACKMAN: Did he ever comment on what he felt Johnson's motives were in this whole thing or what parts of his psychological makeup made him this way?

MANKIEWICZ: He never talked about that very much. I would suggest to him from time to time -- I see some article that one of Johnson's friends would have

written, you know, this fairly constant line of Johnson's that the only reason people didn't like him was because he hadn't been to Harvard, you know, and wasn't cultured and that's why they didn't

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like him in Georgetown. And he'd laugh at that for two reasons. The first being that that wasn't at all the reason why people didn't like Johnson and secondly, that he really did have enormous support in those quarters, you know, the Clark Clifford [Clark M. Clifford], Abe Fortas, Dean Acheson -- I mean, that was the real power in Washington, and that to suggest that because the handful of liberals didn't like him in Georgetown was somehow the reason he was dropping so fast, in popularity in the country was really absurd.

He also told me that story that Jack Newfield has in his book about when Johnson told him that when he was campaigning among Mexican-Americans he used to, when he finished speaking, he'd take his hat and throw it into the crowd because he liked to see them fight for it. You know, when a guy tells you a story like that it says a lot. You don't have to pursue the conversation very far.

HACKMAN: Did he ever feel that the relationship could be improved at all? I mean, do you think he was

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really making attempts or wanted you to make attempts to do that when you came on?

MANKIEWICZ: No, not explicitly, although I think he was always trying with other people. Whenever I would tell him that I'd had a chance or was about to see or had seen or was going to see or was a friend with someone in the White House, you know, I mean, he was anxious to get as much good contact with people like [Joseph A. Califano, Jr.] Joe Califano and Harry McPherson [Harry C. McPherson Jr.] and anybody who was close to Johnson to sort of keep down the warfare. And, you know, from time to time he'd say, "Well, what does Califano say about that?" or "What do your friends say?" I think he was always concerned but I think he knew, really, that you just couldn't overcome it. But he never talked in large terms about, you know, Johnson was always this or always that. I mean, he would always laugh and tell me that one day he'd tell me what had happened in 1960 about the vice-presidency, but he never did and I'm sure

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never really intended too. He'd always say, "Well, I'll tell you about that some day."

HACKMAN: Who of the people around Johnson, both at the White House and within the Administration, are particularly helpful to the Kennedy Senate office

and to you, either information or programs, and who were the people who really create a lot of problems?

MANKIEWICZ: Well, of course McNamara [Robert S. McNamara] I assume was a good friend to Robert Kennedy. I never talked to McNamara, we didn't talk to him. Curiously enough, not OEO --never had any real cooperation over there at all, indeed, quite a bit of hostility from a couple of people. Califano, McPherson, Jack Valenti now and then, Nick [Nicholas deB. Katzenbach]. Who else over in State? Wayne Fredericks in Africa. Occasionally Robert Wood at HUD [Housing and Urban Development]. I'm trying to think of HEW [Health Education and Welfare] I don't know. I didn't have too much to do with those agencies. And, of course, at Justice there were still same people who remembered and were part of the team over there. Was Mortimer Caplin --I guess he was out at Internal Revenue,

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but his successor was quite helpful and would always give us statistics and, you know, would help out on things of that sort.

HACKMAN: What about the White House press office? Did you have much contact directly with these people?

MANKIEWICZ: No, not after Bill left. Who took Bill's place? I guess ultimately it was George Christian. No, I don't think I talked to George Christian twice. I talked to him once when *Time* had that story that Senator Kennedy had called the President a son of a bitch and he [Robert F. Kennedy] said it hadn't been said and Nick, who was there, was prepared to say that it hadn't and Walt Rostow was there. I think that was all. And I called George Christian to see if we couldn't work out a joint statement, maybe a letter to *Time* signed by everybody but the President saying that it just wasn't so. And he talked about it and I think finally decided that he would not do it. But they did something. I don't remember what it was. I think he said he would tell Hugh Sidey or he would see that

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Walt Rostow told Hugh Sidey. And then Senator Kennedy wrote a letter to *Time* which they printed. I don't remember whether any other of the participants wrote that letter or not. But that's the only time I ever really had anything to do with George Christian.

HACKMAN: I can remember Rostow making a statement. But that's the only...

MANKIEWICZ: Yes, yes. And Christian's guys, Tom Johnson [Wyatt Thomas Johnson] and the other fellows, I never had very much to do with at all.

HACKMAN: You talked about other members of the staff, people other than yourself on the staff, who were more outspoken against Johnson. Did Robert Kennedy ever tell people not to say these things?

MANKIEWICZ: I think so, I think so. I never heard him do it but I had the feeling that he would occasionally tell Adam to cool it.

HACKMAN: Any problems for you in these people ever talking to the press in these terms?

MANKIEWICZ: No. No, they were all very good about it. Oh,

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we had a couple of friends in the press and we'd joke but it was always understood with those guys it was off the record. It was more jokes, more kind of Washington jokes, about Johnson rather than real personal hostility. Joe Dolan had very deep, deep, deep hostility to Johnson, but never brought it up to the surface.

HACKMAN: What about people outside the Senate office -- vanden Heuval [William J. vanden Heuval], Tom Johnston, Earl Graves, anybody else, social friends-- did these create problems for you in press relations?

MANKIEWICZ: Yes, problems, sure because, obviously, I didn't know what they were doing and they were all sort of semi-public figures -- guys like vanden Heuval, Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen], Arthur [Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.]. And occasionally, you know, obviously they'd say things, write articles, take positions but not so much. What did bother me from time to time -- bother is a strong word, I guess, but concern -- that he'd get a million projects going with these people

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and I never knew how serious they were. I mean, Bill vanden Heuval would call me and say the editor of some magazine wants -- you know, it was usually foreign or a special of some kind -- wants Bob to write an article on such and such, and he said he would, so will you get going on it, you know. And I never knew really whether he had or not. So I'd check it and sometimes he'd say yes and sometimes no. And you know, he had all these different worlds that frequently lead to commitments of various kinds. I mean he was very active in some social things that would lead to, you know, the opening of Lincoln Center or a series of plays for ghetto kids. Or skiing, that was a whole area, you know, and things would come out of that. All the sailing and going down the river in boats....I was always sure whenever he went to New York -- he'd go up there for a day, to go around town with Tom Johnston and meet the reform leaders and then Bill vanden Heuval would always have some big

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social thing for him in the evening, some Italian-American, you know, Florentine Restoration Society or whatever it was.

HACKMAN:       Something for people important.

MANKIEWICZ:   Yes. And I always knew that a couple of days in New York and that would be a week for me trying to pick my way through that debris and see what, in fact, he had said yes to do and what he had said to vanden Heuval, "Well, okay, if you think so," you know, and then figuring maybe we could get out of it when he gets back. It's all very good-natured, but it was tough to kind of keep abreast of all of that.

HACKMAN:       You've mentioned the foreign press. How much attention did he pay to the foreign press. How much time did he want to give to them or what are the problems that came over to you?

MANKIEWICZ:   More than he should have, more than he should have. I think a lot of these people had become his friends or at least he knew them while John Kennedy was President. And he was much more kind to them than I thought he should have. He took a lot of time.

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A couple of guys-you know *Paris-Match*, he was always a push-over for *Paris-Match*. For one thing, a lot of them were Angie's friends and she used to encourage them. And he didn't want to make her feel bad. So some enthusiastic, you know, hand-kisser would come in and charm Angie and there'd be an hour interviewing and pictures. And it would wind up in, you know in *Paris-Match* or some magazine in Milan. He was friendly to the Latin Americans too. But, on balance, he didn't spend an awful lot of time with them, but I would say a couple hours a week were probably devoted to foreign press of one kind or another. Any serious English journalist who came to town he'd see. I'd send him a memo and say the financial editor of *The Economist* or the foreign editor of *London Financial Times* or whatever was going to be in town for three days on such and such and wants to see you. And he always would.

HACKMAN:       Why do you think he was interested in this, seeing these people?

MANKIEWICZ:   I think it was carry-over from President Kennedy's

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Administration. I think he felt -- I think now that he probably felt in the back of his mind that he was going to be president someday, there was a chance that he would, and these were important--it was important to sort of keep those

avenues open and important to have a channel of communication to those people. Also, I think he found that the foreign press, particularly the English press, that those guys were so much smarter than the run of American reporters that he interviewed that he enjoyed it. And I think that was true. And part of it's the accent, you know, somehow you get the feeling that a fellow that talks that civilized must be civilized. But they almost always were. I mean, you get these guys from *London Financial Times* and the *London Observer* and the *Manchester Guardian*, you know, these are smart guys, and a lot of them knew enormous amounts about American politics or at least they had a fresh slant on American politics that wasn't sort of covered with the standard gloss.

HACKMAN: What kinds of foreign press people won't he see

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either by country or importance?

MANKIEWICZ: He would not, as a general rule, see anybody where the indication was that the guy was more interested in personal things than in serious matters. In other words, somebody who wanted to talk to the family or to take pictures of him and Ethel [Ethel Skakel Kennedy] and the kids and the dogs. He just wasn't interested in that. In fact, a lot of those I never even bothered to bring to his attention. He also tended to reject anybody who it was clear was going to take a lot of time, you know, like somebody who had to bring in his cameras and set up and wanted to meet him at 9 o'clock in the morning and run through and so forth. He had very little patience for that.

Otherwise I don't think he had any particular objections or any classes of objections. He was always wary with the eastern Europeans. He'd see the Russians and the Poles, but the rest of it, you know, he felt what the hell, they're going to – it's all going to come out the same anyway. And, of course, you know, he didn't like to talk to anybody who didn't speak English because, you know,

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the interpreting was always a burden. But Bill Macomber [William B. Macomber, Jr.] over at the State Department could get anybody in. Wayne Fredericks, you know, would have some visiting fellow from Africa or something and he would always see them. And there were some other people in the State Department that he liked and for whom he'd do favors. And he would almost always do anything for kids. I mean, if there was a group of thirty young Bolivians in town who wanted to see him, he'd see them -- bring them over to the office and he'd spend time with them and talk to them and ask them questions, wherever they were from.

HACKMAN: Okay. What were some of the things you routinely do on a major speech or a major release to try to keep the RFK-Johnson split from being the focus of the story?

MANKIEWICZ: Well, I think the people who would do the drafts would be aware that that was a problem so that that would be the first...What usually happened is he'd sit down and talk to Adam, if it was a foreign policy thing or even if it was some domestic stuff,

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or Peter, and usually to me, and we'd go over it. And he'd say, "Well, this is what I want to say. I want to say this and I want to say that." And then they'd come up with a draft which we'd all then look at separately. And then without Adam or Peter I might go on in and see him and say, "I think this section here is too hard on the Administration. I agree it's correct, but isn't there some way of saying it to suggest that so forth?" And he'd agree. Then I'd go talk to Adam and we'd change it around I always tried to get things into the speech that would carry back -- if it was critical of the present policy -- that would carry back through the Kennedy Administration. In other words, if he said, "This has been going on for seven years," then we were all right.

HACKMAN: Yes. Did he ever resist something like that?

MANKIEWICZ: No, not on those grounds. Only if it was true. I mean, the Latin America stuff was impossible because, obviously, the policy had changed very sharply. But on things like welfare, poverty, housing, education, I mean, he knew as well as

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anybody else and felt even more strongly that we hadn't done the job in those areas even during the Kennedy Administration.

HACKMAN: Viet Nam, ever any resistance on Viet Nam in this regard?

MANKIEWICZ: No, I think he saw the importance of doing that with respect to Viet Nam. I mean, he more and more came to realize that the Viet Nam thing was a mistake and, indeed, for the last year or so he began putting a sort of a standard disclaimer in that "there's plenty of blame to go around and I have more than my share," so that there was no problem there. But occasionally it would slip, you know, and we wouldn't get the right thing in or I wouldn't see the phrase that was going to get picked up and then the press would be on it. And it didn't matter, you know, I mean, he could say as he did in those speeches about tax incentives and about poverty and about housing, jobs, he could say that this is a failure of thirty years and the AP lead would still come out the same way, you know "In his sharpest attack yet on the

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Johnson Administration's poverty program, Robert Kennedy said today..." There was nothing you could do about it. They were determined to find it. And, in a sense, of course, they were right.

HACKMAN: You talked about in the March '67 Viet Nam speech having Jack Bell [Jack L. Bell] and the UPI guy in early. Was this done on other occasions? How often would you contact people in the press before something came out?

MANKIEWICZ: Very rarely. We would do it only if there was a serious problem with deadlines. In other words, if we were going to do something on Monday, we might let *Time* and *Newsweek* see it if possible Friday or Saturday so they could have the story if they came out Monday. Occasionally, when a thing was running late in the afternoon, we'd try to get an advanced text to the *New York Times* and *Post* if they were going to start to run up to their deadlines, because by 5 or 6 o'clock you've lost those papers.

HACKMAN: Does this mean just sending it or does this mean talking to the people who are probably going to

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be writing it?

MANKIEWICZ: It can mean sending it or it can mean, you know, the *New York Post*, for instance, I don't think I talked I've talked an hour in my life to Warren Hoge, their one man bureau in Washington. But I would frequently make sure, if we had to get somebody from the office to get in a car, that he would have the text of his speech and an analysis of it or whatever we had by 8 o'clock at night so that he could write his overnight story and have it in the first edition in the morning. Sometimes it would take the form just of delivery; sometimes they'd come over to the office and I'd give them the text and they could read it, and then after they'd read it they could ask me questions about it. Sometimes they'd get Adam in or Peter if there was something technical about it. And sometimes we'd bring them in to talk to the Senator. But it depended on how serious it was and what the time problems were.

But, you see, the thing to remember is the extraordinary pressure on that office from the press. I mean, if there was wind that a speech

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was coming up, there would likely be fifteen or twenty reporters hanging around with a couple of cameras out in the aisles. I mean, it was a rare day when you would come into that office at 2 o'clock in the afternoon and not see a camera somewhere in the corridor. You probably know -- I don't know if you were over there. So that it was never very hard to get to somebody, I mean, there was sort of always a network around, you know, if not NBC then

ABC or CBS. The *New York Times* guy would come in twice a day just routinely. It was a port of call for Pete Lisagor [Peter I. Lisagor] and Hugh Sidey and Dick Harwood [Richard Lee Harwood] and Andy Glass [Andrew J. Glass] and Marty Nolan [Martin F. Nolan] and Jim Doyle and, you know, these guys would come around. "What are you doing today? What have you got on?" And if we had something, they'd be right over.

HACKMAN: How much does the Johnson problem with the press interpreting things in terms of Johnson, or just knowing what the Johnson Administration's response is going to be, how much does this prevent him from doing in the way of programs? Are there certain

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things that he just doesn't do?

MANKIEWICZ: Yes. I think so, I think so. I think it's why he didn't pursue the Latin America stuff, because it was clear that it would have been sort of a direct, you know, "how come you stopped what John Kennedy was doing?" There's no other way to interpret it. And I think on many things he laid off because of that. And I think that's part of his reluctance to get in on the war as hard and as often as he would have wanted to. And also, in a sense, politically there wasn't much need to do that because everybody knew it anyway. I mean, it was curious that he got credit, in a sense, for a lot more than he did because people assumed that had he been able to, he would have. I mean, he made one press conference appearance on Viet Nam in '66 and a speech in '67, a couple of other statements here and there and was regarded internationally as one of the country's leading doves, you know, where some guys could make ten, fifteen senate speeches and they'd sort of follow along at the end of the

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paragraph. So that he didn't have to do much more than he did, politically. But there were a number of issues, I think, that he would liked to have got into that he didn't because it simply would have stirred up more....you know, and he'd say sometimes mock despairingly, "Can't we come up with something that isn't a Johnson issue?" But, of course, it's damn hard.

HACKMAN: Looking at that fall '66 campaign again, can you remember talking about, one, how much campaigning to do and, two, whom to support and what the reaction is going to be from the Administration, if any? Any resentment there?

MANKIEWICZ: Yes, well, you know, he could have gone into almost every state, certainly every state where there was a contest. He had a lot of requests. In general, what he did in that campaign was to go out and support people he liked -- Paul Douglas -- and people who had a claim on the family, that is people who had risked

some thing to support John Kennedy in 1960. I remember the first or second stop was to come out for some 65-year old, eight-term

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congressman from southern Indiana named Winfield K. Denton who was in trouble and, as it turned out, lost. They redistricted him down in New Albany or something. And Sandy Vanocur [Sander Vanocur] and others were saying, "Well, this is the new politics, this vigorous, young, progressive fellow -- what are we doing here?" And I asked the Senator about that and he said, "Well, Denton was the first Indiana congressman to come out for John Kennedy." He had a phrase he would use. He would say, "He was awfully good to us in 1960." And that was enough. So that same of the stops had that in mind. Otherwise, it was almost capricious and sometimes it was determined, of course, by, you know, if two congressmen wanted him and one of them was in a district where the landing strip was long enough to take a 727 we'd go there, even though that guy might be a hawk. You know, it drove Adam crazy that there was no high principle on the war, I mean we went up and spoke for Soapy Williams [G. Mennen "Soapy" Williams], who I suppose wasn't very dovish.

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HACKMAN: Duncan [Robert B. Duncan] against Morgan [Howard Morgan] in Oregon.

MANKIEWICZ: That's right, that's right. That was a tough one. I think he did that because Edith Green wanted him to, and also because he wasn't at all that clear that the only people he wanted to support were people who were against the war. Duncan had been a good congressman. But he got in a lot of trouble on that. Let's see, who was Duncan running against -- he wasn't running against...

HACKMAN: A guy named Howard Morgan wasn't it? I mean, that's his primary.

MANKIEWICZ: No, that was his primary, but that was over. We didn't get into the primary.

HACKMAN: Yes, and then he lost to Hatfield [Mark O. Hatfield].

MANKIEWICZ: That's right. He was against Hatfield. That's right. And Hatfield was a dove. That's right. And a couple of those guys in Washington -- Foley [Thomas S. Foley] -- I don't know, I think he's a congressman. Neither senator was running in '66, not Magnuson [Warren G. Magnuson] and probably not Jackson [Henry M. Jackson].

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A congressman in Montana. Indiana, we did a couple, we came down and supported Lee Hamilton in Columbus. Well, Paul Douglas, of course, was hardly a soft liner on the war. Pat Brown [Edmund G. Brown], we spent a lot of time in California.

HACKMAN: Yes. I thought maybe California for you, you'd be able to discuss in more detail Braden's [Thomas W. Braden] running then for lieutenant governor.

MANKIEWICZ: No he wasn't. He'd lost in the primary.

HACKMAN: Yes, right. Does he know Braden? I mean, did he know Braden well?

MANKIEWICZ: Oh yes.

HACKMAN: What did he think of him?

MANKIEWICZ: Well, he knew both of them. Joan [Joan Braden] worked very hard with him in 1960 and, you know, Tom, I think, was on all kinds of commissions. No, he liked them, but I don't think he intervened in that primary campaign at all. He may have sent him some money. That was widely believed to be one of our campaigns – that one and the guy in Florida, Robert King High and Hooker [John J. Hooker, Jr.] in Tennessee were the three primaries.... but we didn't take any part in those at all. But by the time we got out

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to California the Bradens were, you know, active in Brown's campaign, rode on the plane, he saw them quite a bit. But he didn't go out for Tom.

HACKMAN: What's his opinion of Brown by this time?

MANKIEWICZ: He never had a very high opinion of Brown. You mean of Pat Brown?

HACKMAN: Yes.

MANKIEWICZ: And he also told me that, within two hours after he got to California, that Brown was going to lose. He said, "There's a smell of losers, losing around here." He could tell from the crowd, I think.

HACKMAN: In talking to him about California politics, who did he really rely on for advice on California? Or did he....

MANKIEWICZ: At that time. Jesse [Jesse Unruh] and Fred Dutton [Frederick G. Dutton]

HACKMAN: Did his opinion of Unruh change over time?

MANKIEWICZ: A little bit, a little bit. Very high during the second half of '67. During the campaign, I think -- Jesus, I hope this, you know, is suppressed -- but I had the feeling that he got a little annoyed with Jesse during the campaign, that he felt Jesse was

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taking a lot of credit for not a hell of a lot of work.

HACKMAN: Who were some of the other people? Anyone outside of the Unruh people? What does he think of the CDC [California Democratic Council] people or some of the California liberals? Any respect for them?

MANKIEWICZ: No. No. He shared my feeling, I think, about them. No, he really had very little feeling for people who would rather lose gallantly. And I think that's harsh because there's something to be said for people who would rather lose gallantly. You know those were people who had delayed in 1960 and had sort of clung to Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson] and permitted themselves, I think, to be manipulated by Johnson as a result. He liked the people in 1960 who had been with John Kennedy from the beginning. That meant Jesse and some of his people, I don't think very many others.

HACKMAN: Did you ever hear him talk just about the nature of California politics? You know, a lot of, so many people say you can't understand California politics, you can't put anything together out

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there. Did this really...

MANKIEWICZ: Yes. Well, he did understand how tough it was and that demographically it was, you know. And he asked me about it from time to time and I'd tell him.... You know, you'd put an organization together and two years later it's gone. Everybody's moved. But I always thought he understood California pretty well. And he marveled at the state, you know, he just couldn't believe that any administration could do as much for the state as Brown had and be as weak as it was, which he felt was bad politics. You know, I mean, you drive on those freeways and you fly over the beaches and you look at the parks and the schools and the new community colleges and the state colleges in every city. It's a remarkable, remarkable achievement, and without an increase in taxes. But he was amused at the fact that they had managed to screw it up politically. But he didn't have much sympathy or real feeling for most of those sort of committed liberals out there. And, indeed, they almost all went for McCarthy.

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HACKMAN: How did he look to you for political advice? How did he see you on this

side do you think? Did he ever...

MANKIEWICZ: He always talked to me about California. He wanted to know from me about California, about Latin America, about Jews, and about the press – what were they thinking, what would they say if this, what would they do if that, what were people watching- what were they paying attention to, what kinds of things were papers around the country playing up? – and generally about sort of liberal politics. But he rarely sought advice, you know. I mean, I suppose there were some issues where he did, but frequently the kinds of things he'd want to know would be "I'm going to do this. What will be the reaction?" not "Should I do this or that?" and what would be the reaction.

HACKMAN: Okay. On deciding what congressmen to support in '66, does he just take the list of names that he sees of people that are running and pick them on his own or does he go to a lot of people to get advice?

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MANKIEWICZ: No, Joe Dolan takes that input and makes a rough cut himself and then he'll go to him and they'll grunt and, you know, snort at each other a little bit and arrive at a, you know, "This guy's ....". "No not this fellow because you remember...". "Oh yes, that other guy, that's right," you know. I never was quite sure what they were talking about but they seemed to know. But I'd make things too. In other words, I'd say, "So and so wants you to do a thing for him while you're in Oakland. He was a Kennedy delegate in 1960 all he's this," and then he'd frequently cut me off and say. "Yes, yes. I know him. He's a good fellow. Let's do it." Or he'd say. "Well, if we can work it in." You know, so that everybody sort of made a few little inputs. But, in fact, only Joe and I would because we were the only ones who were really concerned at that level of politics.

I mean, Adam would say, "Why are you supporting Duncan?" you know, and we'd give him some answer. But people would call me, but mostly they'd call Joe. Now, at that time, also in '66, he had –

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I've got that list somewhere--something like one hundred and sixty-five congressmen wanted him to do tapes with them.

HACKMAN: Yes, I think you put .... Is this the time when he has to go see Eunice [Eunice Kennedy Shriver] when he's over at the House?

MANKIEWICZ: That's right, that's right. But, you know, we had to make some kind of cut on them. So I did most of that, you know. But for the most part, if the DSG [Democratic Study Group] lined them up, we said okay.

HACKMAN: Can you remember the Berkeley speech that fall, getting ready for that?

Who he looked to for advice on how he'd be received and what to put in that speech? Any...

MANKIEWICZ: Dutton. We never worried about how he'd be received. We thought there might be some hecklers, but not very many. You remember Goldberg [Arthur J. Goldberg] had been there a couple of weeks before with that terrible outburst, everybody holding up signs, "Doctor of War," you know. The speech itself was Adam's and Dick Goodwin, and then I got in at the last

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night. We wrote the last draft in Fresno the last night. And then he went over it early in the morning, in fact all day, on the bus. That was a funny day because I was writing him little tags in Spanish at every stop, because we were going through places like San Jose and elsewhere where there's a large Spanish-speaking population. So I'd have to spell that out for him phonetically. In the middle of all that he was going over the Berkeley speech. That's right, he had a speech after that, that night, that I did, nobody cared about. I couldn't get anybody even to read it. He was speaking at the University of San Francisco. I said, "Don't you want to look at this text?" He said, "No, no. Do you think it's pretty good?" I said, "No, I don't really." He said, "Well, make it better." And then he gave it. It was bad scheduling. The evening should have ended with the Berkeley speech and it should have ended without that question period, which sort of put a kind of sour note on the ....

HACKMAN: Would he usually want to put those things in, or

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how did something like that get put in, a question period?

MANKIEWICZ: Oh no, he always wanted it, you had to restrain him, because he liked it and he was good at it. But mostly he got a feeling from the questions, you know, what was going on. And, you know, he'd get the same questions all over the country. But they'd shift. You could see the changing preoccupation of the students.

HACKMAN: Other than Walinsky, through the fall of '66, were a lot of people pushing him to speak on Viet Nam that he really respected?

MANKIEWICZ: Mary McGrory. Yes. And I suspect Ethel. I think Ethel. Ted Sorensen was always a restraining influence. But, you see, Adam was at him all the time. And he had great respect for Adam, you know, he never turned him off. I think that was very important.

HACKMAN: Would he reply? What kind of reasons would he give for not speaking?

MANKIEWICZ: Wouldn't accomplish anything. He also had the feeling in '66 -- and I

think he was right -- and in

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'67 that he almost had the power to increase the bombing to escalate the war, and that, if he really made a strong pitch to cut down the bombing, the President would step it up. If he said, you know, don't put in troops, he'd put in ten thousand more. And he really had that feeling that when he spoke out on the war it had an adverse effect. He really believed that. And I think he was right. And certainly a couple of times when he tested it, it turned out to be right. So that was one major argument that he used. And another was that people knew what his position was anyway, that he would just be grandstanding to say it again -- if he had something new to say, all right. And then finally in the fall of '67 when he sort of had a peace plan, he put that forward, or whenever that was -- I guess that was earlier.

HACKMAN: How important is the involvement of people like Maxwell Taylor [Maxwell D. Taylor] and McNamara in keeping him from speaking out? I mean can you see that this is really on his mind undercutting these people in some way?

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MANKIEWICZ: I don't think he talked much to Max Taylor about the war. He played tennis with him a couple of times. But I think McNamara probably told him during '67 that things were going to get better or, you know, something like that. And I think he felt that McNamara was in a very difficult position and he didn't want to make it any more difficult for him. You know, McNamara in a sense was feeding information to the public, if you wanted to read it all through '67, that the bombing wasn't accomplishing anything. And Adam, of course, always wanted to pick that up and put it in speeches. He resisted that because he felt other people should do it. He was always very happy to get into a colloquy with another senator who had made a speech on Viet Nam. But he didn't want to get in it himself for those reasons. Let me see if I can scrounge a ....

[END TAPE 1, SIDE 1]

[BEGIN TAPE 1, SIDE 2]

HACKMAN: Can you remember him ever talking about President Johnson's role in the elections of '68? A lot of people say, you know, he really didn't go out and campaign at all.

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MANKIEWICZ: Yes. He didn't. I gave him a long memo after the election of '66 telling him what I thought he ought to do. And we talked about that and he said



he agreed with it and he felt that Johnson was probably right, that if he had gone out and campaigned he would have lost more -- not that he was so unpopular, but that the trend was running all the other way. He didn't talk too much about that although he did, for the first time, begin to talk about the fact that the President of the United States couldn't travel, which he thought was just a terrible disgrace. And I remember talking to him about it at the time Johnson went to Punta del Este, and that the significance of that was that here was the President of the United States going to Latin America and he couldn't stop anywhere on the way back, and, indeed, he couldn't even go to Uruguay. He didn't even go to Montevideo. You know, he went to Punta del Este which is sort of a fortified.... I mean it's like De Gaulle [Charles A. De Gaulle] coming to the United States and going only to Miami Beach. I mean, it's just unheard of -- or Fire Island, maybe.

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And he had begun to observe that. You know, Johnson was only going where there were naval bases and air bases. He spoke once at a college in 1967. Johnson did, Mount Hood or some -- I'll think of the name of the college.

HACKMAN: About as bad as General Beadle [State College], huh?

MANKIEWICZ: Well. General Beadle at least is a college. This college that Johnson spoke at is a college entirely surrounded by Fort Hood. It's a little bull's-eye in the middle of Fort Hood. And that really did concern him. Not so much in terms of Johnson, but in terms of what it meant to the country.

HACKMAN: Can you remember other things in that memo that you discussed with him?

MANKIEWICZ: Well, I said I thought Johnson was down and that it was a mistake to kick a man when he was down, and that he ought to limit sharply any issues that would seem to be criticism of Johnson for awhile. And that whether or not he was going to run for president in '68, we'd have to await the event, but that it would be very unseemly for him to step out now.

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It was fairly obvious advice. And he agreed with that and tried to lie low, but, you see, immediately after that election all the trouble started. That was November and by December J. Edgar Hoover was in full cry and no sooner had we got through with that than he called me in his office one afternoon, December -- it must have been around the 15th of December, 10th, I don't know -- and said .... He looked at the clock, he had a clock, it was then about 1 o'clock, and said, "I think you better get the 2 o'clock shuttle to New York." And I said, "Why?" And he said, "Because my sister-in-law is going to need some help. She's suing Bill Manchester [William Manchester]." It's the first I'd heard of that -- not really, but the first I'd been involved in it at all directly. So that he never had a chance really to lie low and things

really started to move right then. I can't remember when it was that Ethel was on trial for stealing a horse. I think that was right after that, or right before. But, you know, there suddenly just

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came a precipitous series of events that, you know, knocked his popularity points down and gave him a lot of trouble.

HACKMAN: About the same time you wrote your memo must have been then the time that Walinsky was writing ...

MANKIEWICZ: Same day.

HACKMAN: ...a memo that said Johnson's a lame duck.

MANKIEWICZ: Same day, yes.

HACKMAN: Can you remember him responding to that at all?

MANKIEWICZ: I don't know how he responded to Adam's, no. I'm sure he talked to him about it. But it was curious because Adam and I did a memo, in a sense, on the same day -or the same week anyway. Mine was not that strong, but I did say that I thought he was certainly at his weakest and at the weakest that any American president had been, weaker than Harry Truman, but that I thought he'd come back. Of course, it all really so depended on the war.

HACKMAN: Would he ever discuss his own political future openly with the staff, with individual members of the staff since there weren't staff meetings. I

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mean, would he talk about the possibility of '68 or the possibility of '72 or really, you know, what he saw his own future being?

MANKIEWICZ: Yes, but he was always reluctant to, you know, take any steps that would lead to it. I mean even in '67 he didn't want to think that he would take a position or do something because of what he might want to do in '68. He told me a couple of times, "You know, you start doing that, you're destroyed. You have to do what has to be done today. And if you start trimming and saying, "Well, I won't say this now because I'm going to need that fellow a year from now or five years from now," he said, "then you're in bad trouble, you know you can't function as a human being." He talked about it on that philosophical level. In terms of really running in '68, I don't think he ever took it seriously until the summer of '67. I think he just thought in '66 and early '67 that it just

wasn't in the cards because he always talked about 1970. He really was worried about 1970, and he really used to get mad at

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Adam -- and to some extent at me and Joey -- because we were thinking nationally. And he said, "You know, we've got a terrible problem and," he said, "anything I do after '68 in New York will be suspect. I mean I can't spend 1969 and 1970 getting around New York because then it's too late, then people say it's just electioneering." And so in '67 I set up a very ambitious series of monthly TV programs for New York State and got together with Jerry Bruno [Gerald J. Bruno] and insisted on getting him up there at least once a month to Rochester or Buffalo or Syracuse or somewhere and was always working Joe to line up things that he could do up there. And I started calling a couple of editors every day. And he used to really bug me on that. He'd ask me every morning, you know, "Who did you talk to yesterday?"

HACKMAN: Well, there's one long upstate trip in early '68 even, isn't there, where he makes, in January maybe, where he makes an extended swing up upstate?

MAKIEWICZ: Yes. Was that in '68; yes, it was. That's right -- Buffalo and Rochester. We got in a blizzard up

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there in Rochester. Yes, that was very significant too, that appearance in Rochester because -- I think I told you about this last time -- he took a poll of the audience on Viet Nam, which he always did, and for the first time he had an overwhelming majority in favor of his position rather than the present's. One of them was always should we pull out, should we keep our present policy; should we escalate or should we withdraw with a view to negotiations and de-escalation. And for the first time, that got a heavy majority, which he thought was damned interesting because it was the Rochester Chamber of Commerce not a very .... And, also, he found in Syracuse on that trip too that the labor guys were very hostile to him, but the businessmen were enormously receptive. He began to see what was happening in the country there that, in a sense, the businessmen who were out on the frontier with profits and worrying about public response and tight money and the war, were beginning to see the dangers in the war, whereas, the labor guys who are, you know, getting

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their \$7.25 an hour or whatever the hell it was and successfully keeping blacks out of their unions, were not too concerned about these larger issues.

HACKMAN: Going back ...

MANKIEWICZ: That's right, that's right. He was in upstate New York as late as January. In

fact, I think I told you that the night before he announced his candidacy, he was entertaining some thirty upstate New York weekly newspaper publishers at his house. So he was very serious about that New York business. I spent an awful lot of time in and around New York, I mean working on New York matters all through '67, setting up the television show, arranging for him to go on television when he'd go up to Syracuse and Rochester, and then just putting in calls around the state every day to Oneonta or Auburn or wherever these places were, talking to editors and TV guys. So that he really wasn't thinking about the national race. He'd talk about it now and then, but he'd say, "This just can't be done." You know, and it worried him too that a hell of a lot of good guys were up for reelection in '68 in the Senate, doves, and none of

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them wanted him to run.

HACKMAN: Let me shift back to that thing. The winter of '66-'67, by March of '67 he makes the big Viet Nam speech again. What over the winter has really brought him this far, since he's sort of been reticent?

MANKEWICZ: I think the European trip. I think the European trip and a realization that, you know, there wasn't a man of any sense in Europe who didn't think the policy was mad. You know, he was in England, he was in France, he talked to De Gaulle. He talked to people at the foreign office. He went to Bonn, he went to Rome, and, you know, talked to an awful lot of people along the way.

HACKMAN: What did you have to do on a trip like that? Do you have much to set up?

MANKIEWICZ: No. I didn't go on that one. He didn't want me to go on that one because he felt that would sort of make it more of a circus than it was. [Interruption] Where were we?

HACKMAN: We were talking about your role in...

MANKIEWICZ: Oh, on that European trip. Very little because we

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talked about that and he said, "Let's not make it a big thing." See, he wanted to conceal the fact that he was going to make this major European swing because he didn't want it to be with reporters and television and, you know. He took Bill vanden Heuval. I think Bill is the only one who went along. And he was only going to go to Ditchley [Ditchley Foundation] in England to this inter-parliamentary [Conference on Anglo-American Affairs] something or other. Teddy [Edward M. Kennedy] had been invited and Teddy couldn't go. And they asked the Ditchley people if it's okay if he went and they said sure. And that was all that was laid on when he left. And we sort of did a little

prearranging. I did some of that work with the embassies. But we didn't have anything laid on by the time he left so that it was perfectly in order for me to say that he didn't have any firm schedule after that, I said, "Well, he might go to the continent." Then they'd make the arrangements in each city for the next one. You know, in London they made the arrangements to go to Paris, and I guess while they were in Paris, they fixed up Bonn,

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and in Bonn they fixed up Italy.

HACKMAN: Mostly embassies doing the work though.

MANKIEWICZ: Yes. Yes. Yes. And we tried to do it as low key as we could. In fact, I remember just a week ago a guy who works up at WTOP who had worked up at *Newsweek* at the time told me that he was very sore at me because he had called me and he had a tip that Kennedy was going to see De Gaulle the following week. And he asked me if that were true and I said no, that he had no appointment to see De Gaulle. And he got very mad because it turned out his tip was right. His tip had probably come from somebody in the State Department who had seen the cables. But I didn't know about it, and, indeed, I was quite right, there was no appointment. I mean I knew that he would like to see De Gaulle and that if everything worked out okay he would. But I was telling the truth. I wasn't telling, maybe, the whole truth. But that was the way we did that trip. If I'd had an itinerary in advance, you see, then I would have had to tell them all about it. And he frequently told me on

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many things that he just wasn't going to tell me what he was going to do because he didn't ever want me to lie to anybody, and I didn't. That was the whole Manchester problem. He never told me about the Manchester controversy all through 1966. I said to him finally when I got up there to New York, I said, "My god, you know, maybe I could have done something about this." And he said, "Well, maybe you could, but you realize what a story it would have been all year? Is he going to? Is he, you know, this that?" He said, "Because you can't conceal that stuff." So the European thing I had not too much to do except, you know, field stuff after it would come out of there. You know, he'd come out from seeing De Gaulle and say this or that and then they'd say, "Now what did he mean by that?" I hadn't the foggiest idea what he meant by that. [Interruption]

This is all enormously helpful to me. In fact, if you'll tell me the next time the kinds of things you want to ask about, I'll go dig out some notes to it.

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HACKMAN: I was even thinking I can take that half drawer of stuff and go through it myself in preparation. Well, I don't know, what your feelings are about

putting that in the Kennedy Library. I mean, that can be classified too, as long as this is closed.

MANKIEWICZ: You mean the stuff I have.

HACKMAN: Yes.

MANKIEWICZ: Most of it I'll give to the library, I'm fairly sure.

HACKMAN: We can microfilm it or something

MANKIEWICZ: Yes. Yes. I have some wonderful little scraps of paper, you know, a little note. I also have three or four letters -- we'll get into that too -- three or four letters that we drafted for spleen venting.

HACKMAN: Yes, you mentioned that. The ones that weren't sent.

MANKIEWICZ: That's right. And that we knew were never going to be sent, but we have them all drafted very formally with the address and the signature and all that.

HACKMAN: Okay. Could you see that there was a problem because he didn't have someone along to handle

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the press in Europe?

MANKIEWICZ: Oh yes. Yes. Yes. No question of it. And he agreed with that when he got back. He agreed with that and as a matter of fact, he never went out alone again. I think he realized at that point that he was, in fact, an international celebrity of enormous proportions and that there was no way to avoid it and that when he went to see De Gaulle there were going to be forty television cameramen and photogs and reporters and girls and autograph people and crowds, and that he might just as well have somebody with him who could help, because he never did it again.

HACKMAN: Can you recall your conversations with him then when he gets back about what took place in France and how to handle this with the press?

MANKIEWICZ: Yes. You mean the peace feeler?

HACKMAN: Right.

MANKIEWICZ: Yes. Well, I called him that night because *Newsweek* had that story. Now, was he back?

HACKMAN: He got back February 4th and I think it's the 5th that the *Newsweek* ...

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MANKIEWICZ: Well, he came back on Sunday. My only question is -- and that was the 4th. The only question was was he in New York or was he here? The 5th was a Monday and that was the day he went over to see the President. But, you see, *Newsweek*, and I guess they still do, put out an advance edition and got out a story to all the papers so that the Sunday night news, the 6 o'clock news on Sunday would say, "*Newsweek* magazine says tomorrow morning that Robert F. Kennedy brought a peace feeler back with him from Paris." And somehow I have the feeling that he was hit with it at the airport when he landed -- not sure. But in any event, I talked to him that night about it. And he said, "I haven't the foggiest idea what it is. I don't know what they're talking about." And I said, "Well, then I'll say that." So I put that out Sunday night that he's certainly not aware of any peace feeler, that he had conversations with officials of the French foreign ministry, with De Gaulle, all of which he will report to the President on his

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return to Washington. That's right. He was in New York. I guess he was spending the night at the apartment. And then he came down early in the morning and we talked about it. And he was trying to reconstruct it, and he finally decided that it was the conversation that he had with Manach [Etienne Manach], you know, by the way, is the ambassador to Peking now.

HACKMAN: Oh really.

MANKIEWICZ: Yes, the French ambassador to Peking, and a terrible waste of talent. \_\_\_\_\_ who is the foreign editor of *Ce Soir* was here a month ago and I asked him about Manach because I'd seen a little item in the paper that he had been made ambassador to Peking. He said it was absolute lunacy, that De Gaulle, in effect, exiled him, and that hopefully Pompidou [Georges Pompidou] would try to get him back. But it's very difficult to appoint an ambassador and bring him back six months later, particularly to Peking, you know. But that's just a little footnote. I mean, Manach was sort of a career Bill Bundy [William P. Bundy], you know, I mean, he was the Asia man, Southeast

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Asia man, in the French foreign office. And the way Kennedy described this to me was marvelous because he said, you know, he said it was one of these things the State Department does. And he said, "I wasn't even sure I should do it. But I went and this guy from the department was there and he and Manach were talking in French. And then he'd interpret to me and then I'd ask some questions. And then I remember at one point Manach said that he thought he had heard from the North Vietnamese that they might be willing," and as he put it, you know, to do something or other to have a troop withdrawal of some point or something

and he thought that was rather important. It was something the North Vietnamese had said to Manach that Manach thought they hadn't said before. And he [Robert F. Kennedy] said "I remember the State Department fellow's very excited and wrote it all down and as we were driving away in the car said to me, 'Well, I think that was extremely important what he said.' So I said, 'Well, sure, I'm sure it was very important,' you know.

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But you know the way those fellows are, they're always talking like that." He said, "And then before I left Paris, the State Department fellow showed me a cable that he was going to send and wanted to know if I agreed that it was an accurate account of our conversation." He said, "Well, I had no idea whether it was an accurate account of our conversation or not. I mean, if he said it was, then I assumed it was because Manach spoke in French. So I said, 'Sure I suppose it was.' And as I think about it, I guess it was that cable, which then went back to the department here." And then we figured that Teddy Weintal [Edward Weintal] of *Newsweek* had somehow gotten a hold of it, some excited fellow in the Department had thought gee this is a great story and leaked it out to Weintal who had run with it. And probably the cable said, it gave some suggestion that Manach had said this because Kennedy was there and that he thought somehow this was a major .... I think Manach maybe understood Southeast Asian politics better than he understood American

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politics. So we pieced that together and then I said to him, "Gee, you should have had me along on I that trip." I said, "I think in retrospect it would have saved you a lot of trouble. I saw some of those pictures. I think I could have avoided those pictures with the Countess Crespi [Consuela Crespi] there in Rome." And he laughed and he said, "Well, I think Ethel would have preferred that." And we sort of talked then about the fact that, you know, I said to him "You can't, you just can't do that. You can't go anonymously anywhere, I mean, unless you're going to go with your family swimming or something." And he agreed.

And then we started trying to put together what to do with the peace feeler. And he said. "Do you think I should call the White House?" And I said. "Well, why don't you have Angie call somebody at the White House, the appointments office, and say that you would like to talk to the President or come over to see the President, whatever is his pleasure. Don't you call." So we did that and Angie talked to Marvin Watson. And Marvin Watson said well he thought the President wanted

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to see him. And then Nick [Nicholas deB. Katzenbach] came over. Now why was that? I think Nick wanted to come over. I think the President probably asked Nick to come over. But he came over early, around 11 o'clock in the morning and they had lunch and talked for a long time about everything he'd gotten from Europe. I guess, in effect, he was sort of making a report to Nick because he obviously wasn't going to make a long report to the President. And by this time all the excitement is building up about the peace feeler and we must have



had a hundred reporters outside and everybody calling. And he and Nick are having lunch. And then they got a phone call that the President wanted them both to come over right now. So we worked out a -- what did we do? Nick came out. That's right. Nick came out first alone and had a brief noncommittal press conference, they both came out and had a brief noncommittal press conference. And then Nick left and Bob went back to his office. And the reporters sort of scattered. And then he and I came out

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together and walked down the other end of the hall as though we were going to the Senate and got in the car and drove part way down and then I dropped off and he went on down to the White House. And I don't think the reporters knew where he was going because he and Nick did not leave together. We worked that out. But that was a funny tempest, you know, because it really wasn't anything. I mean it just demonstrated the real hypersensitivity of the administration. My god, they went out of their mind.

HACKMAN: Did you ever track down the lead through Weintal or ...

MANKIEWICZ: Yes. I'm satisfied that it was Weintal. Somebody told me once who it was in the Department of State.

HACKMAN: Just a desk officer or something?

MANKIEWICZ: Just a desk officer who really thought, you know, I mean, he was not a Johnson man or a Kennedy man, he was a Weintal man and he just thought this was news, and I suppose it was. The cable probably sounded a little more excited than the situation warranted and it probably linked

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Kennedy more strongly than he had been. And he hadn't really read it, you know, and the cable probably said: Senator Kennedy has read the text of this cable and approves it, you know, or something like that. And he didn't give a damn, you know, he really couldn't focus on that kind of thing. I mean if there were a document that was prepared by someone who appeared competent or whom he knew to be competent that wasn't supposed to be in his words, he really just, you know, didn't focus on those things. You know, I'd show him things. I'd say, "This is what we're going to get out on" -- even as a statement of his -- on, you know "Indian affairs or something." And he'd say, Well, who gave you the facts?" And I'd say, "Well, I got them from this guy and that guy." And he'd say, "Well, are you satisfied that it's all correct?" And I'd say, "Oh yes, and there's nothing startling in it, you're not going to get into a fight about it." And he said, "Fine, go ahead." And that's what he'd done on that cable. It was Weintal and it was some career guy.

And the President thought that we

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had leaked it. That's right. That was a major problem. They believed that we had told *Newsweek* that he had gotten a peace feeler. And I denied it. I never talked to them about it. And that's when Bob said to him, "Well, I think the leak came from somebody in your state Department." And the President said to him, "It's not my State Department, god damn it, it's your State Department." And then when he came back he told me that story and I said "Now, what did he mean by that?" I said, "Did he mean it's your State Department in the sense that they're all Kennedy people and they're loyal to you or did he mean you're an American; it's your State Department?" And he said, "I don't think he meant the latter. He doesn't talk that way" He was really mad at Johnson. He was really mad at him after that. Johnson had said to him, "I'm going to destroy you in six months."

HACKMAN: Can you remember any of the almost verbatim things he said when he came back from Johnson?

MANKIEWICZ: Yes. Yes. Yes. He was really furious, really

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furious. You know, he couldn't wait to talk about it, "come on," you know. I can't remember who else was there while he was talking about it. I have the feeling somebody else was but I don't think it was Adam or Joe, it might have been Angie. It was just anybody, whoever was in the office at the time. He came back late and I was still there. And he said Rostow was there and Nick, and he said he thought the conversation, unquestionably had been taped ... And he said, "The President started right in by getting mad at me for leaking the story, you know. And I said I didn't leak that story; I didn't even know about it." He said, "I didn't even know there was a peace feeler, and to this day I don't think there was a peace feeler." And then he told me about the State Department thing. And then he said, "And the President started going ... Those guys," he said, "those guys are out of their minds. They think they're going to win a military victory in Viet Nam by summer. They really believe it." And then he said, "The President was saying that by July or

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August the war will be over, and you guys will be destroyed. He said, "I'll destroy you and everyone of your dove friends in six months. You'll be dead politically in six months." And I think he named Frank Church and Fullbright [J. Williams Fullbright] and a couple others. [TAPE OFF] And, let's see, he said the President got off on a long diatribe about doves and the war, him....Oh, and then he said, "So I said to the President, 'If you want to know what, I think you should do ...' And the President said, "Yes, go ahead." And so he said, "So I told him. I said, I think you should stop the bombing, I think you should, you know, do this -- invite them to the negotiating table, say that you'll stop the bombing if they'll come to the negotiating table, and then you should be prepared to negotiate." Pretty much the thing that he had finally worked out by the time he wrote his book in the fall of '67 about a staged

cease fire and an expanded international commission and to create a coalition government to conduct elections or to conduct something leading to a final solution.

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He said and he got through and the President said, "There just isn't a chance in hell that I will do that, not the slightest chance in the world," and then he went on and on denouncing him. And the Senator said, "I finally said 'Look, I don't have to take that from you.'" He may even have said, "I don't even have to take that shit," I think, I'm not sure. And he started to leave. That's right. Then he got up and started to leave, said, "I don't have to sit here and take that." And then Nick, somebody else, quieted the President down, and then they tried to get him to come out and make a joint statement with Nick that he had not received any peace feelers or... And he said he wouldn't do it. He said they wanted him to go out and say that nothing that had been said to him in any way constituted a peace feeler or a change of position by the North Vietnamese. And he said, "I wouldn't do it because I didn't know that that was true." He said, "I didn't know what the hell had been said to me." He said, "Whatever was said to me

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is know only to \_\_\_\_\_ and maybe the State Department interpreter." He was more than an interpreter; he was a good fellow, Jack [John Gunther Dean].

HACKMAN: Yes. Yes. I remember. Yes. It's in that book, *The Secret Search for Peace in Viet Nam*, whatever.

MANKIEWICZ: Yes, and the guy got in trouble. He wound up as a, you know, vice consul somewhere, Tangiers or something like that, I think. But he said, "It's up to them, you know, it's up to the State Department to say what's a peace feeler. I know what was said and I'm perfectly willing to go out and say what the interpreter told me Manach said that North Vietnamese Mai Van Bo said to him. But I'm not going to characterize it as a peace feeler or not a peace feeler." -- That's right. They wanted him to say there was nothing new in the North Vietnamese approach. He says, "I'm not going to say that because I don't know what they'd said before." He said, "I'm certainly not going to do that." He wouldn't do it. So then they asked him to make a joint statement with Nick that they had had a cordial meeting or something and... I don't know. He made some minimal statement or

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permitted Nick to make it in his name. But he was furious. And I think he probably realized then there wasn't going to be any peace.

And then -- what came after that? I guess then his speech on Viet Nam and a couple of other things that didn't help him very much. I guess the Manchester was -- that's right. The Manchester thing was sort of still going on because one of the things he did in Europe was to

work out a deal on that runaway German publisher of the *Stern* who was going to use the unexpurgated Manchester stuff anyway, the 2600 words that we managed to get out of the *Look* article. It was a lot of turmoil. Then he had a speech at the Gridiron dinner about a month later.

HACKMAN: What can you remember about putting together that speech? Is this mostly the office staff putting it together or is a lot of outsiders on this?

MANKIEWICZ: No. That was really a great speech. I have that. Incidentally, that's something else I have that you might want to look at is a joke file. I mean I was the absolute custodian of the joke file and also the

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HACKMAN: You should talk about that.

MANKIEWICZ: ...number one supplier of jokes. I mean, I didn't think them up all on my own, but I was the contact man. And, you know, I'd call guys from time to time. Alan King was a very fruitful source of political humor. The Gridiron Dinner speech was fun because I started working on it about a month ahead of time, collecting stuff, putting things on sheets of paper. And I'd go in and show him. He liked that because it took his mind off things. And I'd go in every couple of days and say, "Well, how do you like this?" and I'd try some out on him. "Terrible. Why don't you get some help," he'd say. "Get somebody funny to think of something." And then I'd come in with something and he'd say. "That's pretty good, that's pretty good. You think of that yourself?" And finally we had about -- I had a lot of stuff, most of which I'd done on my own but I'd gotten a little bit from Alan King and I'd talked to Ted Sorensen who had a kind of sort of old-fashioned political joke sense. He's very

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good at county dinners. But he's also got a nice wry sense of humor. Privately, if you can ever get him not to think about a speech for a dinner but just get him to talking funny.... And then we had a pretty good draft and we had one session at Hickory Hill two nights before the speech -- yes, two nights before with.... This was all the collaboration there was. I was there; Herb Block [Herbert L. Block] was there and contributed a couple of very, very funny, funny lines; Art Buchwald [Arthur Buchwald] and Sorensen. And Buchwald was of great help because he had been to a lot of Gridiron Dinners and he knew the style and he knew what in the past had bombed. And one thing, of course, that the Gridiron is absolutely death on is any kind of humor that even verges toward dirty or sex or anything. I mean even good fine humor that you'd, you know, tell at a mixed dinner party, no good for the Gridiron. It has to be all political. And John Lindsay the year before had told some blue jokes and suffered badly as a result. Of course, this time we were

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up against Ronald Reagan so we could have some good Reagan jokes too. And it came off very, very well. It was a great Gridiron speech. It was Sorensen who thought of the great line about....He said, "I want to tell you about my relations with President Johnson. They were not always as strained as they are now. In fact, as the Kennedy Administration began in 1961, we were on the best of terms, warm, friendly, cordial, understanding." He said, "And then as we left the inaugural stand...." I think that was beautiful.

HACKMAN: That was Sorensen.

MANKIEWICZ: First or second thing he said in the speech. It went very well. Herblock suggested that he acknowledge the introduction -- the President of the Gridiron was Walter Trohan -- that he say, you know, President Trohan and then say, "he's the nicest president I know," something like that, you know. So it got off to a good start. And Reagan was terrible. In fact, Reagan was even a little dirty; Reagan used the word "ass."

HACKMAN: Out of bounds.

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MANKIEWICZ: Oh yes, oh yes. Well, it was the old story about, I don't know, about an old peasant who's crossing a river or something with a donkey and.... Anyway, he winds up with the donkey drowning because he tries to do something and the moral is: If you try to help everybody, you lose your ass. And they didn't like that, didn't like that.

HACKMAN: What about putting together the Viet Nam speech in March?

MANKIEWICZ: That was less successful, I think, because he sought too much help. I mean I always thought the best speeches were the ones where he and one collaborator worked on them -- and almost invariably Adam. In all that time I would think there were only one or two speeches that anybody else really seriously worked on, and that would be Dick Goodwin. Well, now that's not true. Some of the New York stuff Bill vanden Heuval would occasionally come in with a draft on New York power stuff and the Constitutional Convention and Bill vanden Heuval sort of did a couple of things there.

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But on the Viet Nam speech he got a good draft from Adam.

You see, what he'd do, he'd go to Adam on something like that and then he would get a very, very tough bellicose draft. And then he'd start chopping it down -- and properly so. I mean he didn't want to give that kind of speech. But by the time that speech was over

everybody'd had a shot at it. Dick Goodwin contributed in a major way to that speech. Burke Marshall contributed some ideas. And the trouble is, you see, he'd get almost ready with it, it would be ready, and then somebody'd come into the office to see him about something, Sorensen or Marshall, and they'd read it. And they'd say, "Well, I think this or I think that." And it was all fine advice but the result is that when the speech was finally over, it was not an architectonic speech. It didn't build from one premise to another. It had a lot of things in it, some were hedged, some were not hedged. And I think it lost some of the impact it could have had had he stuck with an original draft and then chopped it down himself, which was his impulse. If he'd taken

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Adam's indication of what he wanted to say and then said, "No, I'd rather soften this or strengthen that," but there were too many chunks. And then we wound up rewriting it the night before. Adam and Dick and I were out at the house all night, we stayed up till about 4 doing a final rewrite. And he stayed with us until about 2 and by that time we knew where we were going.

So that I think it was not as successful a collaboration.... I think that was true on everything he did where he got more than one draft because also he was very aware of the competing personalities so that when it came time to pick an approach or a set of language, I mean there might be something that he wanted to say that Dick Goodwin had put in a certain way and Adam had put in another way and Ted Sorensen maybe put in a third way. And I know that one thing that bothered him was not only the question of what's best for this speech but – I [Robert F. Kennedy] don't want to depress Adam, you know, or Ted Sorensen was awfully nice to come down here and give us all this time and do it; I don't want to

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just not take any of what he said. In a sense, he was too soft-hearted about that sort of thing. And I thought that speech was a little humpbacked. But it didn't matter really because it was a Kennedy speech against the war and that's really all that came out finally anyway.

HACKMAN: Is this speech a really big step for him? Some people have said that he regarded the March '67 speech as a much greater break than he did the earlier '66 speech. Do you read this this way at all?

MANKIEWICZ: Yes. Yes, except that I think it was only evidence of a break that had taken place a month earlier. I think he realized when he came back from Europe and had that meeting at the White House that there was no point in trying to be conciliatory or to mute his criticism of the war. And also, he was much more upset about the war and much more upset about the bombing and the damage. And he talked to McNamara and was pretty well convinced that the bombing wasn't accomplishing any purpose anyway. And he was very, very annoyed at the way in which the White House had

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treated that whole peace offer. I mean you could see in Kraslow's [David Kraslow] book -- and Kraslow got a hell of a lot of that from Bob -- that he was convinced because of the sequence of events that the President did not want peace and that infuriated him, the notion that he was somehow carrying off all this enormous diplomacy all over the world, but the fact is when he had his chance he went ahead and bombed even though Kosygin [Aleksei Kosygin] was in Hanoi. I mean it was outrageous. And then you remember -- I'll go back and look at this but there was a sequence where the President then made a statement later when he resumed the bombing or something and we came out with a statement just bang that afternoon because the President said that he will stop the bombing when he is assured that all infiltration from the North is stopped. Well, that was a.... I mean he had gone way beyond what he had said before as a reciprocal gesture for stopping the bombing. He said he wouldn't stop the bombing, in effect, until they first stopped the war. Well, that was really a very significant step, that he was willing to go ahead with that

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strong a statement in the face of what was believed to be a conciliatory statement by the President, you know. I mean the President would .... Guys like Chal Roberts [Chalmers M. Roberts] and others were making the President's statement appear to be another step toward peace, which it wasn't at all. So that by that time I think he was ready to go. But the speech was a significant step. There's no question that he kept postponing it, I think, in the hope that something would happen. But then when the bombing resumed and, you know, he just figured he ought to do it.

HACKMAN: Then the basic had been written very soon after his meeting with the President...

MANKIEWICZ: That's right.

HACKMAN: ... and then it was put off for a number of days.

MANKIEWICZ: That's right. That's right. He could have given that speech -- when did he finally give it? March?

HACKMAN: March 4?

MANKIEWICZ: March 4, something like that?

HACKMAN: I don't think I've got an exact date for anything.

MANKIEWICZ: Yes, well, he could have given it by the 20th of

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February.

HACKMAN: And it was primarily put off because he hoped for some peace move from the White House as opposed to people who were continually feeding advice like Sorensen.

MANKIEWICZ: That's right. That's right. That's right.

HACKMAN: Okay.

MANKIEWICZ: And, of course, the way the President tried to smother the speech was just further evidence to him, you know, there was a war on.

HACKMAN: Can You remember you taking other steps with the press other than having Bell and the UPI guy, Theis, in early?

MANKIEWICZ: No, it was damn tough because we never knew what day he was going to give the speech. As I remember, when he finally gave it, I was holding out for waiting a couple of days. I don't remember why. And he said, "No, when you're ready to go, you go." So I only had a couple hours to get ready for it anyhow. Well, I did do a hell of a lot of backgrounding with an awful lot of people from the press, depending on their point of view.

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HACKMAN: After the speech?

MANKIEWICZ: During it, just before, once it was ready to be released, you know, depending on deadlines. I had a long talk with sort of dove reporters explaining to them what the key things were, you know, that they shouldn't look to some of the general language about the enemy and think that this was in anyway a speech in support of the policy.

HACKMAN: Did that speech have any impact then on what he said the rest of the year in terms of criticizing the Johnson Administration.

MANKIEWICZ: Yes. Yes, because it was then his Viet Nam policy and he could always go back to that.

HACKMAN: What about on other areas, the domestic side? I mean is this so much of a break that he begins...

MANKIEWICZ: No. No, the domestic break didn't come until the riots. The domestic break didn't come till the .... The key of that on the domestic.... I think now as I



look back on it that the key event on the foreign side was his return from Europe and his meeting at the White House. And the key event

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on the domestic side was the President's reaction to the Detroit riots. And he said, to anybody, he said to me at great length, "The President is just not going to do anything more. That's it. He's through with the domestic problems, with the cities. That's it. He's not going to do anything, and he's the only man who can."

HACKMAN: During the rest of '67 then, is Walinsky or are other people on the staff pushing him to go further on Viet Nam? Are there still things that....

MANKIEWICZ: Well, you see, then we were writing the book so that that pressure was there all the time. He wanted a chapter on Viet Nam that was strong, so that we didn't worry about it, about giving another speech because the book was going to take care of that. And then when the book came out, then we also had a long.... We took the whole Viet Nam chapter and excerpted it for *Look*, a 17,000 word chapter which we took 8,000 words of and ran in *Look*. We thought at the time that would be enough. That was, in effect, another speech on Viet Nam.

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HACKMAN: Let me just do one thing. I'm just about out of tape and you're probably just about ready to break. For next time, when we're talking about the campaign, why don't you just run through where you were when, during the campaign, so that I have a good idea what's going on? You're on the Kansas trip?

MANKIEWICZ: Yes. I was on everything.

HACKMAN: On the Southern trip with him?

MANKIEWICZ: Everything. Everything up to the Indiana primary.

HACKMAN: Okay.

MANKIEWICZ: The day after the Indiana primary at 5 o'clock in the morning I flew to California and stayed there.

HACKMAN: I didn't realize you stayed that long in Indiana. You were there all the way through?

MANKIEWICZ: Oh yes. Well, I went to California for about four days or five days the last week of the Indiana campaign. Then I came back to Indiana for the last three days, for Friday, Saturday and Sunday, Monday and for election day.

HACKMAN: During Indiana where are you most of the time?

MANKIEWICZ: With the press.

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HACKMAN: In Indianapolis, or staying with him as he travels?

MANKIEWICZ: Yes, I traveled with him. I spent a lot of time with him on the airplane, but in the evenings with the press. And what we did in Indiana for the last two or three weeks was we headquartered at the Holiday Inn at the Indianapolis airport. And then every day we'd go out and then always come back there at night. So it was kind of convenient for the press. They could sort of leave their clothes there and, you know, get some laundry done and not have to worry about packing all the time. We didn't overnight anywhere except Indianapolis. You know, it's a small enough state and you can go out and you can go to Gary and Hammond and Fort Wayne and then come back. Then the next day you go south and come back.

HACKMAN: Okay. Then in California how much of your time was with the press and how much is completely on the political side, on the organizational side?

MANKIEWICZ: Oh, I spent very little time with the press. Yes. Yes. That really wasn't my job in California. I

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did some of it but... I did it in a special way. In other words, I did a lot of work of a sort on the special guests that we brought in. We had a major campaign to shake the liberals. And, I worked very closely with that and I did a lot of press work in connection with that, setting up TV interviews and that kind of thing. But mostly it was high strategy rather than detail. I mean I wasn't getting out any releases. I did do some coordinating. I talked to Dick Dwayne two or three times a day and I was clearing the position papers that came out the last four Sundays of the campaign, and, you know, some major stuff here and there. I never went to Oregon. I didn't go to Nebraska during that campaign. I wrote one speech for the Nebraska campaign, that Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner where he and Humphrey [Hubert H. Humphrey] both appeared. It was a very short sort of funny thing. But I didn't go to Nebraska that week at all. I'd been to Nebraska a couple of days when we had campaigned before the Indiana primary. I was with Senator Kennedy from the day he announced his candidacy

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until the night of the Indiana primary. Where ever he was, I was.

HACKMAN: You took the side trips too then?

MANKIEWICZ: Yes, all of them.

HACKMAN: Did you go to Atlanta for the King [Martin Luther King, Jr.] thing?

MANKIEWICZ: No, no, I didn't go to Atlanta. I forget what I was doing, something else that needed to be done. No, I didn't go to Atlanta, but I think that's all.

HACKMAN: The things like Michigan or Columbus or whatever.

MANKIEWICZ: Yes. Yes. Well, now, Columbus was after Indiana.

HACKMAN: Well, there was one Ohio trip in there somewhere.

MANKIEWICZ: Well. I went once to Ohio.

HACKMAN: Maybe it wasn't Columbus.

MANKIEWICZ: Cleveland.

HACKMAN: Cleveland, that's right.

MANKIEWICZ: Cleveland, the day after Martin Luther King's assassination. Oh yes, I went to Cleveland. And then May 7<sup>th</sup>, the day of the Indiana -- the day after—I went out to California. And then when he was in California I'd pick him up and we'd go -- some of the time. I was in San Francisco for the debate.

HACKMAN: Where did you work from in California though, Los

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Angeles or San Francisco?

MANKIEWICZ: Yes, Los Angeles. I moved back and forth, but I stayed at the Ambassador and I worked at that headquarters on Wilshire Boulevard.

HACKMAN: Okay.

MANKIEWICZ: Right.

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