

**Orren Beaty, Jr., Oral History Interview – JFK#5, 11/14/1969**  
Administrative Information

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**Biographical Note**

Beaty, administrative assistant to Congressman Stewart L. Udall during the late 1950s and assistant to Secretary of Interior Udall from 1961 to 1967, discusses the Bureau of Reclamation, other water and power agencies within the Interior Department, and the staff of the Interior Department under Udall, among other issues.

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
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Orren Beaty, Jr. – JFK#5

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Fifth of Fourteen Oral History Interviews

with

Orren Beaty, Jr.

November 14, 1969  
Washington, D.C.

By William W. Moss

For the John F. Kennedy Library

MOSS: All right. We were working last week on the Mineral Resources people, and I think there was only one we hadn't covered at all, and that is the fellow who appears in the [U. S. Government] Organization Manual rather late, John F. O'Leary, as deputy assistant secretary. Was there a post of deputy assistant secretary originally, or was this part of the reorganization?

BEATY: No, after we came in.... Oh, you know, this is a trivial sidelight on the whole thing, but Jim Carr [James K. Carr], our under secretary, met with other under secretaries. They had periodic meetings. They called it the Ball Committee because Under Secretary George Ball [George W. Ball] was the chairman of it because of the State Department seniority over everybody else.

MOSS: Was this also referred to as the 'little cabinet'?

BEATY: I suppose. They had luncheon meetings once in a while, and they had subcommittees that met on particular things, some of them involving oil imports, for example. I don't know anything about it. I don't think anything particularly was accomplished, but it was a chance to get acquainted with other people at similar levels. I was the assistant to the Secretary of Interior, and Mr. Carr brought in somebody as his assistant, an assistant to the under secretary, and each of the assistant

secretaries had an assistant to the assistant secretary. But Jim Carr found roaming around the government that there were deputy under secretaries and *deputy* assistant secretaries in other departments, and we didn't have anything like that. It was the, exact same job: it just changed the title.

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It was the same grade; there was no upgrading as far as from grade sixteen to seventeen, or fifteen to sixteen. But all of a sudden these jobs appeared as deputy assistant secretary.

Bob McConnell, [Robert C. McConnell] whom you've asked about and who wound up as our congressional liaison and finally assistant secretary for administration at the end of the Johnson [Lyndon Baines Johnson] administration, had been assistant to Secretary Kelly [John M. Kelly] in the assistant secretary's office for Mineral Resources, and he moved up to the Secretary's office as an assistant for congressional relations, or some such thing, some such title. And it was about this time that these other offices were upgraded in title to deputy assistant secretary, and that was the point that O'Leary, a career man in the department--he'd been on the staff of the assistant secretary for Mineral Resources, and he was a very bright guy and very articulate.... I think he impressed the assistant secretary with his general knowledge and his ability to express himself, and Kelly put him in charge, put him in that office with, of course, Udall's [Stewart L. Udall] approval. He's now the director of the Bureau of Mines, O'Leary is.

He's, I think, a very bureaucratic guy. I've heard him pop off against the politicians in the department or in government. I wouldn't say he was on the Kennedy [John F. Kennedy] team. It would've been ironic if he'd been kicked out by Hickel [Walter J. Hickel] in the Nixon [Richard Milhous Nixon] administration for being too close to Udall and Kennedy and Johnson; he wasn't close to any of them. [Interviewee note: He was, of course, fired for just this reason.] It was his own brightness and ability as a bureaucrat, as a career man there, that got him where he was, and it had nothing to do with politics. And I don't know if he's a Democrat or Republican.

MOSS: How much of this professionalism existed within the department outside of, say, the National Park Service where, obviously, you get an elite corps, and how much opposition to the politicians was there?

BEATY: Well, it's hard to think of a single bureau that didn't have most of its policy made or directed by professional people. And there were very few attempts to change personnel. There were some attempts, a few successful, to change policy over there against their better judgment. The Bureau of Reclamation had three or four--three positions, I think--Schedule C or Presidential that could've been changed. And none of them was changed. I think they were happy to have the administration change because money and emphasis had gone downhill in the Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] period. All of a sudden there was some renewed interest here. The Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and the Bureau of Sports Fisheries are, by act of Congress, career all the way to the top, just like in the Bureau of Land Management the director has to be--meet civil service requirements and not be a politician. They're pretty good politicians; if they weren't, they

wouldn't be where they are. It's just like the guy who gets to be general sometimes in the army because of good military politics.

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I remember when we were interviewing people for the position of Commissioner of Fish and Wildlife, which was kind of an unusual position. There were two bureaus under that particular assistant secretary, Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Bureau of Commercial Fisheries. So that assistant secretary has fewer bureaus to supervise than any other, but in between him and the bureau of chiefs there was this position of Commissioner of Fish and Wildlife, which had been started by Congress, one of these power struggles between an administration and a committee chairman who disagreed on something. I don't know exactly the background of it. I remember something happened later which might be of some interest to.... No, it probably happened after Kennedy was gone; I'm sure it did. So it wouldn't apply to this.

But we were interviewing a man for that job named Clarence Pautzke [Clarence F. Pautzke]. He's a professional, as a matter of fact, a graduate of the University of Washington. He had gone into the Washington State Fish and Wildlife Service, whatever they call it--I think he probably was a biologist to start with--and headed a bureau, headed the state operation in Washington before he retired. He took retirement in order, when Alaska became a state, to go there and head their operation. Somewhere earlier, in the course of his work, he had bumped into the man we inherited as a director of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, Don McKernan [Donald L. McKernan]. They had clashed, and he agreed to take the job only if we got rid of McKernan. McKernan doesn't sound quite right, but I think that's right.

MOSS: McKernan?

BEATY: McKernan, yeah. We kind of agreed to that, but we didn't intend to do it, I don't think. And as it worked out, it was all right because they got to know each other at a different level: one of them wasn't representing the state and one wasn't representing the federal government. And so McKernan stayed on. And there was never anything but the best of relations, as far as I know, until the State Department needed somebody as an adviser on international fishing matters, and McKernan went over there--I think with the rank of ambassador; I'm not sure--as an assistant, and he's probably still there in the State Department. I just mention this as one of the--about the professionalism; McKernan had built that bureau. When it was created, he was in the bureau--and it wasn't created; but it was changed from some other thing. Its overall structure was changed and McKernan was the first director, as far as I know. I may be wrong on it. But he was there, and we inherited him, and he stayed on until he got a better opportunity.

MOSS: Let me ask you at this point--it occurs to me since you've been saying, "We were interviewing," and, "We were reviewing people for jobs"--just what was the process of screening referrals and applicants for the jobs? How did you all go about it?

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BEATY: Well, I think mostly.... In the end, Udall saw anybody who got hired except, perhaps, an assistant to one of the assistant secretaries. He kind of felt they ought to have their own choice there as long as they weren't taking somebody out of the Eisenhower cabinet or something like that. But he didn't have time to see everybody on their first go, and so usually I visited with them and studied their resumes, the letters of recommendation we had on them, and that sort of thing. And then we'd get together. I'd take them in to see the Secretary, and we'd kick it around. So he'd get to know them. I'm sure he interviewed lots of people that I never saw. At the same time, I saw quite a few of them and formed preliminary opinions. I think I've mentioned somebody named Joe Miller [Joseph S. Miller] before. Joe very likely came in with Clarence Pautzke and we all sat around with Mr. Udall and talked about it. He'd do it differently in each case, I'm sure.

When I say we, usually it was.... I think Mr. Udall very likely delegated responsibility to and trusted the judgment of John Carver [John A. Carver, Jr.]. Anything in John's area, he expected John to come up with some kind of a recommendation. But in the other cases, I don't think he had the same confidence in the people that were selected. He didn't know them as well. There were some he had to take because the administration decided this is where the guy belonged. In John's case, he was very happy to have him. The choice had been made in his own mind within a few days after he got his own appointment.

I think what one of our--we've talked about this before. One of our problems which was resolved by a change within the first two years was Karl Landstrom [Karl S. Landstrom], the director of the Bureau of Land Management. And John Carver was given Landstrom; he didn't get a chance to interview him or talk to him. Mr. Udall just decided that he was the proper one for that job, and it was done.

MOSS: You know where the impetus for this idea came from?

BEATY: Probably Wayne Aspinall [Wayne N. Aspinall]. He'd served on Aspinall's staff. He'd been very helpful to Mr. Udall and me as well, both in Mr. Udall's position as a member of that committee. He turned out to be a different kind of person when he became director of the bureau. Instead of being a very helpful staff assistant, he became as bureaucratic as anybody and as hard to convince about any new policies. But as I think I mentioned on that other discussion we had, he did his job well when it came to justifying and carrying through the grazing fee increase, and this, of course, was the thing that got him in the outside difficulties that made dropping him necessary.

MOSS: You said that you reviewed the resumes and so on. Were there many that you felt you were authorized to exclude, just on the face of it?

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BEATY: Yeah, I think so. There were people that I think were referred to us on a pro forma basis. They had helped in the campaign or else they had been



recommended by a friendly senator or some new governor, something like this, and so you go through the motions of inviting them in and talking to them, and unless they show some real sparkling personality and ability, it's just pro forma. And there were some that I talked to that I was impressed by, and I was probably more impressionable than discriminating because I was easily impressed by some of them. But I got them on in to see the Secretary, even though at the beginning it didn't look like they had a chance, and generally they didn't, anyway. There just were too few positions and too many people for them.

MOSS:           What would you advise a man to do who really wants an assistant secretaryship?

BEATY:           Well, get active in a campaign before the convention, among other things, and participate in it, participate in the campaign. Forget your own job, just make yourself available to do whatever's necessary. This doesn't mean that some hack is going to get it, because you got to have some understanding. Generally, I think you've got to have some understanding of the field that you're shooting for. In our case, Kelly [John M. Kelly] knew quite a bit about the oil and gas business, knew something about mining, and he wound up in Minerals; but he had worked in the campaign. Ken Holum [Kenneth Holum] had been a candidate for the Senate; he'd been active in the Democratic party in his state; he had participated in these regional resources conferences, one of which provided a study for Senator Kennedy's main, and probably only, resources speech during the 1960 campaign.

MOSS:           That's the Billings, Montana, speech?

BEATY:           Yes, yes. I think he probably introduced him there, introduced Kennedy there. I seem to remember this. He had the support of organizations that had some call on return loyalty from the administration, rural electrification organizations and that sort of thing, John Carver had taken leave from his job as administrative assistant to Senator Church [Frank Church] and just devoted his full time to the campaign. I don't know when he started, but he was there when the roll was called.

The only different--the only top job that didn't involve something like that was Mr. Briggs [Frank P. Briggs] from Missouri. We just couldn't find anybody in the resources field, fish and wildlife, that sort of thing, who had professional experience or who had both that and political credentials or who had both of those and also had the desire to come to Washington. We wanted a man, who is, I'm sure, a Republican, named Goddard [Maurice K. Goddard] from Pennsylvania. He was a director of the Bureau of Forestries or something like this for the state government. But Governor Lawrence [David Leo Lawrence] felt he

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needed him there; he didn't have anybody to replace him. And Goddard had a very good reputation. We tried him on two or three different jobs. Personally, I wasn't impressed by him; he was a stuffed shirt, you know, a self-important type, but he had a hell of a good reputation, and we tried to get him. We couldn't do it.

We wanted somebody from east of the Mississippi. Everybody was winding up from the West.... We didn't want the department just to be a western department, so we wound up with Mr. Briggs from Missouri as being our easterner at the secretary level, assistant secretary level. But Senator Symington [W. Stuart Symington] and two or three other people from the Midwest recommended him. Mr. Briggs was appointed to the Senate, the United States Senate, when Harry Truman [Harry S. Truman] resigned to become vice president, and he got clobbered in the 1946 Republican resurgence. He was a newspaper publisher; he was chairman of the state game and fish commission or something like that. He had some credentials in the professional end of the business, and he was widely regarded, highly regarded, by Democratic leaders in that area. But he hadn't participated in the campaign. He belonged to another generation; he was older, I suppose by about fifteen or twenty years than most of the people.

MOSS: Okay. Then how did he come to your attention as a possibility?

BEATY: I think probably Larry O'Brien [Lawrence F. O'Brien]—somebody had talked to Larry, as I remember it, that here is a possibility. John Dingell [John D. Dingell] of Michigan was beating Larry O'Brien and Udall and everybody else over the head insisting we keep the man who was on the job, who was--had been a working Republican. He had been devoted to doing the job, and Dingell, who had taken some interest in fish and wildlife matters and water pollution, thought he should stay on the job. And I think that, as I recall it, Larry or somebody working with him called Stewart and said, "Look, here's somebody that might get John Dingell off your back. He's got good Democratic credentials." I may be making this up, but it seems to me that that's the way it happened. I also seem to recall that Udall bumped into Symington at some affair, and Symington--I know this happened; I don't know the order in which it happened--suggested this. I was in the room when he called. And Mr. Udall called Harry Truman and talked to him about Briggs and naturally, got a fine recommendation for him because he'd been active in the Democratic party in Missouri at the same time Harry Truman had, at the time he was elected to the Senate, probably. You know, here's a case of getting somebody in there by default, rather than because of his own political activities.

We talked about Chuck Stoddard [Charles H. Stoddard]. There was a man named Bruce Netchert who had some good recommendations from senators or people who'd been active in the party. He's a professional commercial

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minerals man. He's written scholarly books about minerals industry. I noticed he testified the other day, yesterday, the day before, in the Senate Interior Committee on impending shortages in oil and natural gas and what ought to be done about it. He's an authority. He makes a good appearance; he's articulate. I think he would've been a good man for the job with no ties to the oil industry or to the minerals industry. To me, he'd have been ideal, but he didn't have that kind of support. We went into this last time about should you get people from the industry. Well, if you didn't, this is the kind of guy I would've liked to have gotten in, and he was one of those that I lobbied for unsuccessfully. It might've been if he'd gotten in there

would have been endless flaps with the industries and maybe we had a more peaceful existence because he wasn't there.

MOSS: How does an assistant to a secretary lobby?

BEATY: Oh, you know. "Time's dragging; we're not getting anything done. Well, how about Bruce Netchert? Why don't we try him? Well, let's bring him in for another talk," that sort of thing. Talking in very accurate terms, it's just slipping in a new suggestion every so often.

MOSS: Well, let's see. We've sort of been kicking around Briggs and Holum. Let's take their subordinates. You mentioned both Pautzke and McKernan. Let's see, who else is there in Fish and Wildlife--Janzen [Daniel H. Janzen, Sr.], who was the director of the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife?

BEATY: Yeah. He was another career man. And he wasn't, I don't think, a very inspired guy. He knew what was expected in running the Bureau and did it that way. I'm sure he had the support of the outside organizations, the Audubon Society and the Izaak Walton League and whoever else takes an interest. Ira Gabrielson, [Ira N. Gabrielson] I remember, was giving him support. And Ira Gabrielson is a man that, I think, probably Democrats and Republicans alike have always felt they had to consult before making any changes in policy there. I don't know whether he was the director of it himself once, but he'd been the head of the outside organizations, constituent organizations, that gave it the most attention.

But I think he was on the side, as they were, of the biologists against the people; in favor of the ducks instead of the people. They wanted these huge acreages of fish and wildlife preserves maintained for the birds and with people only incidental. And this administration wanted to make use of that, some of that, land and water for recreational purposes.

I think in the end--maybe it's still not resolved--but I think in the end Udall was able to convince a lot of people. He had help from people like Tom Kimball [Thomas L. Kimball] of the National

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Wildlife Federation and some others. I think just from a practical standpoint he made his case with them that we can't keep on getting money for these areas to obtain them or to develop them and to do the things you want to do for the preservation of fish and wildlife resources without interesting more people in these areas. And you can't interest them in it if you've got a fence around them, if people can't come in, let's say, in a nonnesting season and camp or picnic or whatever you do there. There were certain areas that could be set aside to exclude people from, but some of these hundreds of thousands of acres could be used by people. Janzen would've been with the biologists, as I mentioned, and against the recreational trend. He eventually retired. He wasn't fired; he wasn't forced out; but he was encouraged to retire. I'm sure he did it in his own time.

Mr. Briggs recommended the man that we eventually wound up with, John Gottschalk, who had been head of the Fish and Wildlife regional office in Boston and the New England area. And John, I'm sure, had come in contact with the leading Democratic officials up there. It wasn't a case of somebody campaigning for the job. I think we kind of talked him into it; he wasn't really eager about coming to Washington. But coming from an area that had such a mass of people within a relatively small geographical area, he understood the recreational demands more than somebody who had been sitting here in kind of an ivory tower for a good many years talking to biologists, and it worked out a lot better. We didn't have any real serious problems with Janzen, but he just wasn't--it wasn't with it, as we wanted it to be, during the time he was there. Well, you see, we didn't bend the rules to get somebody from the outside to head the Bureau. We promoted somebody from within, a professional fish and wildlife man. Bob Paul [Robert W. Paul]--do you have his name there?

MOSS: Yes.

BEATY: Bob was from California. He'd been working back here with the Sport Fishing Institute or some such organization. There are so many of them, I... It took me a while to get acquainted with them, and now that I've been away for two or three years, I've kind of forgotten which one does just exactly what. But he had some good recommendations, and he must have been active a little bit in politics because he had some political recommendations. I think Clair Engle undoubtedly put in some support for him and probably Pat Brown [Edmund G. Brown]. He was recommended as one of several that shot for assistant secretary and were happy to get an assistant to the assistant secretary. That's what happened there.

Mr. Briggs made the decision. We recommended--I lined up appointments for him when he finally came back and agreed to take the job. And

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he met Senator Gruening [Ernest Gruening] and Senator Bartlett [Edward L. Bartlett], who were recommending somebody from Alaska who was in the bureau, in one of those bureaus. I've forgotten the man's name; I had visited with him before Mr. Briggs was appointed. And he made the mistake of--he saw Mr. Briggs was wearing a Masonic ring, and he tried to trade on his Masonism, if there's such a word. And Mr. Briggs had rather high opinions of the Masonic order, but not of people who tried to capitalize on it; and he wrote him off instantly on that basis.

And this was one of those deals where the staffs of the senators had been nagging Secretary Udall, through me, almost every week on behalf of this guy. But once the decision was made, they dropped it instantly. It wasn't one of those cases where there's real pressure. It was just that they're doing the guy a favor. You could just see him going up there once a week and saying, "Well, they've seen me, but I haven't gotten anything yet." And they'd say, "Well, okay, we'll give the Secretary another call." And I got the call.

There was somebody from Maryland, probably in the state commercial fisheries area, and the Maryland Democratic politicians through the national committee pushed him rather

hard. And when Pautzke was selected for the job of commissioner, which is what they were pushing him for, they then shifted their attention, their emphasis., to the deputy job or assistant to the Secretary. I visited with him; I read his resume frequently. I think he would've been good for that job, but he wasn't picked, and that was the end of it.

Of all the people we got, Bob Paul is kind of glib. He tosses it off pretty well. I think he probably convinced Mr. Briggs that he could do him a good job, and when Briggs made the choice, Secretary Udall accepted it. Who have we overlooked?

MOSS: I think that's all in that particular area. We've talked about Pautzke, McKernan, Janzen, and Paul. Those are the only names that I have.

BEATY: That's right. I think that's....

MOSS: On the water and power development area we've talked a bit about Kenneth Holum. There's one step in the process, though, that I think we're missing, and that is how did his name come to you specifically? Obviously, he was active and he had introduced Senator Kennedy out at Billings, Montana, but how was it made known to you that this was a job that he wanted?

BEATY: Well, I know this came from Larry O'Brien or Adam Yarmolinsky. It was one of several names referred to us. I think probably in one of Udall's visits to the Democratic National Committee,

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which was at that time on 1100 Connecticut Avenue, or something like that--it seems to me that's where I went with him on two or three occasions to see some of these people--I think probably Mr. Holum was up there in one of these visits, and he was introduced to Mr. Udall; because he first came to my attention by having the then Congressman Udall tell me, "There's a guy from South Dakota that I've met and he's the one I'm considering for assistant secretary of Water and Power. And he'll be here when I'm gone; go ahead and visit with him and see what you think about him."

He came to our office on the Hill on a couple of occasions, and we visited. On a third occasion, it seems to me--I talked to him twice before I was able to get him in to see Udall there in the office; there were too many other people around or just too many things going on--and so on the third occasion we had a rather long, strained visit because we'd covered everything, and it was clear he wanted this job, and he was a very decent guy and very sincere about it, and I'm sure he felt a great deal of insecurity about his chance of getting the job because he'd been around Washington for two weeks and hadn't seen anybody. He'd met them, but he hadn't really gotten to anybody who could say, "Okay, you're the man." And he got about two minutes with Mr. Udall that day because there just were too many other things going on, and Udall had to go someplace, had to catch a plane. In fact, I think he left, had to go back to Arizona or something like this, and left me with Holum to bid him farewell, and say, "Keep in touch."

It came straight from the national committee--or probably the Kennedy operation over at the national committee. I don't know whether Scoop Jackson [Henry M. Jackson] said anything to Mr. Udall or not on this particular thing, although I know that they knew each other. It seems to me that Jackson had pretty well folded up and had gone--you know, all these processes of getting ready for the next session of the Senate--by this time, and so I don't recall any direct intervention there.

MOSS: You mentioned Larry O'Brien and Yarmolinsky as people you talked to on appointments. Were there any others in the White House operation that you talked to on appointments?

BEATY: Oh, Dick Donahue [Richard K. Donahue] and Chuck Roche [Charles Roche] and Dick Maguire [Richard V. Maguire]. I think that's about the extent of it—perhaps, Claude Desautels [Claude John Desautels]. I was talking to Claude about a lot of things, and I'm sure some personnel things came up. But I just regarded this really as Larry saying to Claude, "Call Orren Beaty and see what's happening to so-and-so," rather than Claude doing it on his own.

MOSS: How constrained did you feel to check out everything with the White House people?

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BEATY: It's hard to say because I think I felt most of the time that we were considering people that they had already recommended to us and that it wasn't a question of once we made the decision of checking it out with them. I know, no doubt, Mr. Udall checked with somebody before he made any of the major appointments, even though, you know, they'd said, "Well, look at this one," or, "Here's one that you ought to consider." For the lesser jobs we went ahead, I think, without any regular checking out process. It got us into a little trouble from time to time, too. Did we talk about Philleo Nash? We have a little bit, haven't we?

MOSS: Yeah, a little, but I'll get to that later when we get into John Carver's area.

BEATY: Okay. I know that Udall, for example, had to convince the President-elect or some of his people that Frank Barry [Frank J. Barry, Jr.] was the right man for solicitor because here's one of the top jobs, and I'm sure that lawyers, being what they are--there had been more lawyers working in the campaign than anybody else and that they had spots for them. I mean, they had more lawyers looking for jobs and the top lawyer in any department is a job that people would aspire to. Stewart wanted somebody he knew, somebody he trusted. I think we talked about his relationship with Frank Barry. Stewart picked him and brought him back and put him to work interviewing the lawyers in the department and interviewing the people that were recommended to us for jobs below the solicitor rank.

MOSS: We had talked briefly about Barry. Specifically, why did Udall pick him, simply because of an old friendship?

BEATY: Frank had the same general philosophies that Mr. Udall has or had at that time--I don't think they've changed--about Indian problems, about civil rights, about protecting resources. Frank had been county attorney, which is an elective job like district attorney, in Santa Cruz County in Nogales, Arizona. It's a small county; the salary wasn't much; there wasn't much interest there. I think probably Mr. Udall, knowing Frank, talked him into abandoning that county and moving to Tucson, which probably happened about 1949 or a year or so after Mr. Udall got into law practice. I don't think they were ever partners in law. All the younger lawyers in those days just set up a joint operation, had one receptionist, and each of them had his office off from that; so they were practicing together, but they weren't in a partnership or anything like that. I think this was the kind of relationship that prevailed.

Frank always wanted to be a judge, and in 1956, I guess, he ran for the Supreme Court in Arizona. And Mr. Udall went all out to help him. He carried our district, but he got beaten rather badly in Maricopa

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County and was beaten in the Democratic primary. Well, the man that beat him then became the judge. There was either no opposition or only token opposition in the general election.

Perhaps it was a combination of trust in Frank and also to try to make up to him for that loss; I don't know. He had great confidence in Frank, and he felt rightly that that's a sensitive spot in the department and that he needed somebody there that he knew very well wouldn't sell out to the interests, to the oil interests, to the mineral interests, to the fishing, or the grazing interests, or whatever it was. So he convinced the administration or the President.... I know he talked to Mr. Kennedy, Senator Kennedy, about this, but where he got the final word from, I don't know. I don't know if it was Larry or somebody else.

Anyway, Frank picked his chief deputy and one of the number two, three guys in the bureau out of the bureaucracy, and we appointed them and announced it and Chuck Roche called me and chewed on me about it. "We don't know anything about these guys. What kind of Democrats are they?" It wasn't something I'd had any hand in. I assumed that Frank had talked to Udall about it and Udall had checked with somebody or something like this, and I was caught by surprise by that call. That's the reason I happen to remember it right now. So as I say, we did get in a little trouble once in a while by not checking everything out thoroughly, but my own impression was that, generally, the ones we were looking at seriously were people that had already been recommended to us.

We had lists of names; we had special letters on people, that sort of thing. I'm very sure these two people Frank Barry arranged for appointments weren't on any of those lists, although it turned out one of them had a wife who'd been--even though he's been a bureaucrat all these years--quite active in Montgomery County Democratic politics, which is about all a guy can do when he's a career civil servant--have his wife participate in local political activity.

MOSS: We keep going out on tangents here, but you've thrown in the name of Chuck Roche. Was he recommended for Interior?

BEATY: No, I don't think so.

MOSS: I got a feeling in reading some of the papers that Larry O'Brien was saying, "We've got to place this guy," and some of this information was going in your direction.

BEATY: Well, it may have been, but I wasn't aware of this. Chuck showed a lot of interest in Interior, I suppose because of his name and background and the commercial fishing out that way. I know at one time he made a bid to get on one of our new oceanographic

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vessels that the Commercial Fishery Bureau's operating. I think we had it on a dock down here at the Navy Yard, and it was going to make a run, test run, up the coast and out to one of those banks off the New England coast.

MOSS: The Newfoundland Banks?

BEATY: Newfoundland Bank, that's right.

MOSS: Grand Banks.

BEATY: Grand, that's probably right. Grand Banks off Newfoundland?

MOSS: That's right.

BEATY: We almost got Chuck on the--I mean he could've gotten on the boat for this eight-day ride or whatever it was, but it turned out he couldn't get away for it. So he did have some interest, but I don't recall having his name mentioned. He eventually worked for the national committee rather than in the organization at the White House, so it may be that they were looking for a spot for him. I saw him on the street the other night, incidentally, so he's still around here.

MOSS: All right. Back then to Water and Power Development, and run down the names. You mentioned the other day that you had a story to tell on Floyd Dominy [Floyd E. Dominy]. What's the story there?

BEATY: Well, I think Floyd properly impressed everybody in his early days in heading that bureau with his rather detailed knowledge of everything that was going on. He's not an engineer. Like most people working in a professional field that they're not a professional in, he tried to be an engineer. He seemed to treasure the certificates



that were awarded to him by the Society of Professional Engineers, this sort of thing. But he knew as much about it as any of the engineers and probably a lot more, because he worked at it very hard. He was a very able and aggressive type guy who, according to his detractors, climbed to the top in the bureau by trampling over people who were better and deserved more... [Interruption]

MOSS:           Okay. We were on Dominy.

BEATY:           While Mr. Udall was in Congress and working on the Interior Committee, I think of the bureau chiefs in Interior, the ones he got to know best were the good politicians: Dominy and Conrad Wirth [Conrad L. Wirth], the National Park Service man; and also, because we had so many Indians in Arizona, the Indian commissioner at that particular time--a man whose name I think

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I've mentioned in some of these discussions, but I can't think of it right now. Dominy was up at the office occasionally. I'm sure he was on some trips with the committee, and so we knew him better than most government men. So when it came time for Udall to become secretary of interior, he was one we really knew.

Well, Senator Hayden [Carl T. Hayden], who had been serving Arizona in Congress from the time Arizona became a state and who, I think, showed more interest in reclamation than any other thing that involved Arizona, had gotten to know Dominy very well, and Dominy had, I'm sure, wooed the old man. And this was one of the few things that Senator Hayden talked to Udall about when he was appointed. "If there's one appointment I want, I want you to keep Floyd Dominy as commissioner of reclamation." Well, in effect, really, this was a comedown because a lot of people were predicting that if Nixon'd been elected, Seaton [Frederick A. Seaton] would've gone on to some ambassadorship or something and the under secretary, Elmer Bennett [Elmer F. Bennett], would've become the secretary, and Dominy would've been the under secretary, or he at least would've been assistant secretary for Water and Power. I know he had this in mind, but having failed in that, he suddenly wanted to stay as commissioner of reclamation. And so I'm sure Secretary Udall promised Hayden, "Don't worry; I like Floyd myself." Hayden described him as "the best commissioner of reclamation I've seen in the time I've been here." Well, that covers an awful lot of time, probably every reclamation commissioner since the first two or three, because the program started in 1902 or '03, and Hayden came into Congress in 1912. Stewart talked about this with Wayne Aspinall and with Senator Engle. Engle was very much against it.

MOSS:           Why?

BEATY:           I don't know what all had happened in California, but one of the things Engle was for was what they called the eastside canal, which would've been a canal down the east side of the San Joaquin Valley or whatever that valley is. The big valley south from Sacramento, from the delta. They got the canals up the west side of the valley bringing in water in that rich agricultural area, but they wanted some others. The

Bureau of Reclamation was against it, not necessarily forever; but for the time being other things had priorities. And they blamed Dominy for.... By "they" I mean Engle and Jim Carr and I don't know who all. But those were the two that I was subjected to who didn't like Dominy because of things that had happened involving the reclamation developments in California. Engle, I don't think, would've ever been happy with this. He accepted it because it was inevitable. He probably thought that with Jim Carr in there they could balance it off and he could get what he wanted for California, anyway.

Jackson was very much opposed. This was really the story, the maneuvering to try to get Jackson to accept Dominy. Well, he was

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not obstinate about it. He recognized that Udall had to take the responsibility for the appointments. He resisted. Remember he was the national Democratic chairman as well as the senator from Washington. The state of Washington has a tremendous reclamation project on the Columbia inland. It's authorized for a million acres or something like this; and at that point only about four hundred thousand acres had been developed. The pace was going very slowly, and Dominy was blamed for slowing it down. Well, it was partly, you know, the tight money situation for reclamation project development ever since I can remember. The early-day developments, the surge, faded out, and costs, I suppose, had gone up ten times. You couldn't replace any of those old dams. Today you'd put your whole reclamation budget into one of them instead of spending a relatively few million dollars.

I seemed to have detected some active resistance in Dominy against a big development there. I think he thought they had developed about as much as they needed to, and it could go along on a slower pace: that there were other areas that were better for development. But this is just really kind of conjecture on my part rather than knowing it. [Also (1977 memory again) there was a dispute with Reclamation over repayment contracts]. The personality clash between Dominy and Carr with Carr taking the side of Jackson and Magnuson [Warren G. Magnuson] and insisting that this be done--I'm sure this caused some overreaction from Dominy which led me to this belief that maybe he wasn't as much in favor of this as Jackson would've liked and not just that the money was involved.

But I visited Senator Jackson's office two or three times in December to talk to him. I didn't talk to him these two or three times because I didn't see him. He was traveling, and he had other things to do, and I talked to his staff. I think I saw him only once. But in the end--and this was the time he told me to pass on the word to Udall, who was in Tucson. Because of the time differences and everything else, they had a hard time getting together on the phone, and that's the reason I was doing this intermediary work. He said, in effect, "Well, tell Stu if he wants Dominy, okay. I'm not going to object, but he's going to have to live with him, and he's probably going to be sorry"--words to that effect that, "Okay, he's your baby. You better watch him."

We tracked down Magnuson on the same basis. Magnuson wasn't married in those days, and when the Congress wasn't in session, he disappeared, and his staff had orders not to find him. And somebody managed to work it out so that I think I talked to him on the phone at Palm Springs, but it may be that I only talked to a staff--I've forgotten now. But anyway, we got the word from him that he wouldn't kick up a fuss on it either, and so Dominy stayed

on as commissioner and proceeded to run his own show and paid very little attention to the secretary or the under secretary or the assistant secretary.

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MOSS: How did this go along with the campaign promise to abandon the "no new starts"?

BEATY: Well, he was eager to end the "no new starts" policy.

MOSS: Oh, he was?

BEATY: Oh, yeah. He was a very enthusiastic reclamationist. So, in this case...

MOSS: All right. Just where....

BEATY: That's right. That's right. And it wasn't a new start in the State of Washington, this particular thing. It was just getting money to bring in new sections of land to build these distribution canals and that sort of thing. Oh, he was very much for the new reclamation.

MOSS: Okay, we have Charles MacGowan [Charles F. MacGowan] who is director of the Office of Saline Water. How did he come into it?

BEATY: He was recommended by George Meany directly to John Kennedy, I think.

MOSS: Why?

BEATY: Well, you know, what I know is only second- or third- or fourth-hand, but among the names we had recommended to us was a man named Roche. This is not Chuck Roche; this is Redman something Roche [Redmond H. Roche, Jr.].

MOSS: This may be the name that I ran across because I don't think I ever saw his first name in the correspondence.

BEATY: Yeah, this is very likely, the confusion there, because I remember his name very well. I don't remember Chuck Roche's having been given to us. I think he really wanted to be more a part of the national scene than get off into one of the parochial departments.

MOSS: So this was Redman Roche.

BEATY: Redman Roche, commonly known as Red Roche. And his hair is red, so the name Red Roche fitted. Red Roche, I think--no, I don't know where he came

from, Michigan, probably. He'd worked in the campaign; he has a law degree; he had a degree in chemistry or some science. He seemed to be a logical choice to head a technical or scientific bureau which is working on ways to desalinate or demineralize water. He also was recommended, apparently, by the United Auto Workers. He was from that union, as a matter of fact, or some way he had an association with the Reuthers [Walter P. Reuther, Victor G. Reuther].

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And I believe we even had a press release ready announcing his appointment as head of the Office of Saline Water. But apparently George Meany suddenly decided that Walter Reuther was getting everything and that he wasn't getting anything. And Roche was sitting in my office when we got the word that he wasn't going to get it. And I had to break the news to him.

MOSS: How did word come through?

BEATY: Oh, apparently Udall got a call. It's possible that cabinet members were sending over their daily schedule of appointments to the White House or something like this. We were already in office at that point. Somebody spotted the fact that Red Roche was coming in, or maybe he'd sent a memo that we were going to announce the appointment that day or something like this. And you know, it was being announced because they wanted it to be announced. We were satisfied he would be all right for the job, but we wouldn't have heard of him if it hadn't been for the national committee or the White House. But somebody, recognizing that an announcement was imminent, called Udall and told him signals are being changed, don't make any announcements.

So Roche is out in my office waiting to go in and see the Secretary and get the final blessing, I guess. This is the way I seem to remember it. I remember exactly the position where he was sitting on the couch and against what wall, and I told him that something had happened and that we weren't going to be able to announce it right then, and we'd have to be in touch later. And then, eventually, the news got broken to him that it was going to be somebody else. MacGowan was the name they came up with, and at this point we didn't have much choice. He was picked. Very nice guy. I enjoyed knowing him. He didn't make a good impression on Aspinall; he didn't make too good an impression on the Senate side, the Senate committee people and eventually was eased out of it.

MOSS: I have the administrators of various power administrations. I think I have enough tape to take care of at least one of them before we flip it; Charles Luce [Charles F. Luce], the Bonneville Power Administration.

BEATY: Well, Luce is a... I think anybody you talk to will tell you, who knows him, will say he's one of the brightest, most perceptive persons they've known. It turns out that he and the man who eventually wound up as the solicitor at the department had been at Wisconsin Law--University of Wisconsin together. I'm not sure where they went to law school; maybe that's where it was. But he was somebody who was

known in the department a little bit. He had been state chairman of Citizens for Kennedy and Johnson or something like this. He worked with Senator Jackson. Edith Green [Edith S. Green],

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I think, probably knew him, although she had some other choice for this job. He had good Democratic support.

The big question was would he take a job like this? Bonneville was in a lot of trouble financially. He did agree to take it, and, as you know, eventually became under secretary of Interior and probably would've been secretary if things had worked out so that he hadn't got some big, fat, private-industry job. I think Udall thought that if he moved on to something else, while there was still a Democratic administration, that Luce would be the logical man for secretary. Everything he did pleased Secretary Udall. His performance was very good. This job kept him in the Northwest, and that's what he wanted to do, apparently, at that point. He came back to Washington because he was drafted more than he was seeking the job.

MOSS: Who was the man that Edith Green wanted?

BEATY: He was in the department, somebody that she had known, worked with her, undoubtedly provided her with technical information for her job of representing that part of Oregon which was directly involved in--I mean, bordering on the Columbia River. Certainly, the whole state gets power from Bonneville. I can't think of his name [Morgan Dubrow]. She brought him down to Mr. Udall's office and we visited, and she insisted rather firmly that she thought he ought to have the job. I'll think of it before we get through.

She had some other choices. One of them was Harry Hogan [Harry J. Hogan], who wound up as the regional solicitor out there and then eventually came into the department as one of the associate solicitors in the department. He's somebody who had been active in campaigns and had been a working Democrat out there, so she didn't lose out entirely, but she lost out on this one. Luce was one of these that Jackson and Joe Miller, again, were pushing hard.

MOSS: Okay. I'm just about out of tape on this side, so let me take a break here.

BEATY: Okay.

[BEGIN SIDE II, TAPE I]

MOSS: All right. You just finished talking about Floyd Dominy and Charles Luce. Now we have a Charles Leavy. Is it Leavy or Leavy?

BEATY: Leavy is the way he pronounced it. L-E-A-V-Y, or L-E-A-V-E-Y, I forget how, but it was Charles Leavy.

MOSS: Southeastern Power Administration.

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BEATY: The Bonneville Power Administration was a real going thing, you know. It had all kinds of power dams and distribution lines and a very well-established operation. It was very prosperous in its beginning, and because of various economic factors, it was beginning to lose its surplus and get down to operating in the red when we came in. It had an extremely low power rate, was the big trouble, and they had to increase the rates, and of course, this is politically a tough thing.

Now, the Southeast Power Administration had been set up to distribute the power from Corps of Engineers dams in the southeast part of the United States dams that Interior had no control over. Interior had a lot of control over some of these dams in the Northwest. Some of them were Corps dams; some of them were Bureau of Reclamation dams. This was really kind of a skeleton organization. It had never really developed much, very small staff. I believe Leavy was on the job when we came in. I'm fairly confident he was on the job when we came in, and we just kept him on. His father had been one of the early public power campaigners, and he was the kind of guy that philosophically fitted into this kind of an operation. He hadn't had much opportunity to display any ability because it was such a small operation. We gave it increasing importance, and they kept him, and I think everybody was satisfied with his operation. I got to know him, but we had a very few contacts. And I don't know of any political pressure for anybody else who was.... It just didn't.... It was one of the things we had that we didn't do much with.

MOSS: Do you find southern congressmen taking as much interest in this as the northwest people did in Bonneville?

BEATY: No, no, no. But Chuck Leavy had some good support from people like, what's--I can't even remember who they are now. Well, Senator Russell [Richard B. Russell, Jr.], for example, would have gone to bat for him if it had been necessary. We got into two or three pretty good hassles down there over some of the dams that were proposed, some of the dams proposed by power companies that were interfering with our plans or things we planned that they objected to. And we wound up with some strange alliances. In one case we had William Jennings Bryan Dorn, a noted liberal [Interviewer's note: I think I must have been kidding] congressman from South Carolina, who was really denouncing Udall and Interior, a fight with the Duke Power Company or something like that against Leavy and against our position. Eventually, we worked things out, and W.J.B. Dorn became one of our staunchest supporters. But some little newspaper in inland South Carolina with an editor [S. C. Anderson] who was a very progressive New Deal type--you know, he ran Herblock's [Herbert Block] cartoons in South Carolina; it's almost unheard of--was pushing this particular power development, whatever it was I've forgotten. It is just something

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that I remembered only because of Leavy.

And Leavy, I think, performed very well under a difficult situation there, because everybody in that part of the country relies on the Corps of Engineers to build their dams; and anything we did that was against what the Corps was doing was difficult, and yet the Corps was working with the power companies, I believe, on some of these plans. It's not a matter of any great national policy; it's just one of those things that gets you in trouble with the politicians. Leavy had support. He was able to get along with the right people to keep us out of the worst trouble, but there wasn't any. I don't recall a single thing where anybody was pushing anybody for that job. I think it was probably a rather insignificant.... It was viewed as a rather insignificant job. Nobody really was trying for it. We had some people.... I remember one or two that the Congress--many senators tried to get us to put somebody on the staff down there, people that needed a job. But it was a patronage-type thing, not somebody going to take over and run it.

MOSS:           Okay, Douglas Wright [Douglas C. Wright] in Southwestern Power Administration.

BEATY:           Well, Southwest was a much more active thing than Southeast. It didn't have as much power to dispose of as Bonneville. Doug Wright's a real character. You could write a book about him. He was one of the original New Dealers, big public power types, and his chief sponsor when we came in was Clarence Cannon, then chairman of the House Appropriations Committee. And Doug Wright had cultivated him over the years. Doug wanted to be under secretary: he wanted to be assistant secretary. He's just like Clyde Ellis [Clyde T. Ellis]. Everybody that took power from Southwest Power Administration, every little REA [Rural Electric Administration], every little co-op, sent a telegram to Interior, to Udall or somebody indicating Doug Wright for assistant secretary. He must be easily sixty-five, maybe close to seventy now. He ran his own show. Senator Kerr [Robert Samuel Kerr] was also a good backer because it was Oklahoma, and Kerr took interest in everything that went on out there. I'm sure he did things the way some of his principal congressional backers wanted him to do them much more readily than he did what Udall thought he ought to do or Ken Holum thought he ought to do.

We had one--this happened after Johnson became president, but it's of some interest in the way he operated. Ten or twelve of the municipal power companies in northern Louisiana mostly, I think, perhaps partly in Arkansas, wanted to get a contract with Southwest Power Administration, and the private utilities were determined that they weren't going to get this. Arkansas Light and Power and some Louisiana concern were both working on Senator McClellan [John L. McClellan] and Senator Ellender [Allen Joseph Ellender] opposing this. And the administration agreed with us that we should provide service to the co-ops even in spite of the senatorial opposition. There was some Senate support for it too, but Doug Wright was working with Ellender

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and just absolutely.... He was totally disobedient, disloyal. You know, he's the kind of guy you want to get him by the neck and just strangle him. But he used his political power to the

fullest to thwart Interior's efforts. If I'd been Ken Holum, I think I'd have quit under the circumstances. But he kept on trying.

MOSS:       What did Holum in fact do?

BEATY:       Well, he suffered humiliation, I think. He'd get a decision, the decision would be passed on to Doug, Doug would resist, and nothing would happen. Wright had, through Ellender and McClellan, swung the White House around, finally. But this was, as I say, was after the Kennedy era had passed. But he was a--he put his.... Career types have built, oh, a fiefdom out in the sticks someplace, and they resist all the efforts to bring them around.

MOSS:       Okay. I have one more job here that came in a little later, the administrator of the Defense Electric Power Administration, Leslie, is it Jochimsen [Leslie N. Jochimsen]?

BEATY:       Jochimsen.

MOSS:       Jochimsen.

BEATY:       Jochimsen was a classmate, I think, of Scoop Jackson's, and Scoop wanted a job for him, and that's the reason he was picked, no other reason. It wasn't a very active office. He didn't have much to do.

MOSS:       Was it tied in with the OEP [Office of Emergency Planning] and the general mobilization planning?

BEATY:       That's right. In a big emergency it would've been a very important office. As it was, it was just a matter of bookkeeping and maintaining a liaison with private power companies and with big public agencies around the country; set up a national advisory committee or board or some such thing to.... Like the executive reserve; so we have people and production and distribution facilities ready if and when an emergency arose. I don't know whether we had anybody in that office or not, whether it was one of those that wasn't activated or was just a girl and a clerk kept the records. It was a position that was available, and Jackson filled it. Nobody else thought of this.

MOSS:       Yeah. Nobody else thought of that. And there wasn't any opposition within the department for that?

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BEATY:       Well....

MOSS:       Just there.



BEATY: That's right.

MOSS: Okay, fine. Well, next time we'll talk about John Carver's people a little bit.

BEATY: Okay. Fine.

MOSS: And then the Solicitor's also.

[END OF INTERVIEW #5]

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