

Howard H. Hazen Oral History Interview – JFK#1, 01/17/1966
Administrative Information

Creator: Howard H. Hazen

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Biographical Note

Hazen was a Wisconsin political figure, a staff member of John F. Kennedy's [JFK] campaign in the seventh district of Wisconsin in 1960, and a delegate to the 1960 Democratic National Convention. In this interview Hazen discusses how he came to support JFK for the 1960 presidential nomination; Paul Corbin and JFK's campaign in Wisconsin's seventh district during both the primary and the general election; how Republicans in the seventh district voted in the Wisconsin primary and the general election; JFK's ignorance of how the farm economy worked; tensions between JFK's and Hubert H. Humphrey's campaigns; the attempt to woo Humphrey's Wisconsin delegates over to JFK's side; the 1960 vice presidential nomination; and bitterness over Humphrey's loss of the Democratic nomination in 1960, among other issues.

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Oral History Interview

Of

Howard H. Hazen

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Oral History Interview

With

HOWARD H. HAZEN

January 17, 1966
Lorraine Hotel, Madison, Wisconsin

By Charles T. Morrissey

For the John F. Kennedy Library

MORRISSEY: Let me start by asking how you got involved in the Kennedy [John F. Kennedy]-Humphrey [Hubert H. Humphrey] campaign.

HAZEN: I've been a student of politics since I came out of the service in '45. I was born and raised a liberal—my father was a Progressive and became a Democrat when President Harding [Warren G. Harding] ran, a strong LaFollette [Robert M. LaFollette] man who really never forgave the LaFollettes for going Republican but nonetheless supported them—and became interested in politics in early life. I was at the National Convention [Democratic National Convention] in '56 when John Kennedy made the bid for the vice presidency.

MORRISSEY: Were you a delegate?

HAZEN: No, I was not. I was merely an observer. I was amazed at this young fellow, the stature he had. And I felt then if he ever made a bid again and I was in a position to help, I'd certainly do so. A very appealing

young politician. I suppose this was my first exposure to him. And I wanted to become involved with him. And early in—I don't know if I should say early—I suppose in 1959, Ivan Nestingen [Ivan A. Nestingen] from Madison sent out a few feelers around the state, in the press that he might head up a Kennedy campaign. So I sat down immediately and wrote Ivan and offered my services. I suppose that's how it happened.

MORRISSEY: Going back to that '56 Convention, you probably can recall better than I do the Kennedy-Kefauver [Estes Kefauver] race for the vice presidential nomination. Were you politicking at all during those hectic hours for John Kennedy?

HAZEN: No, I was not. A National Convention at that time was something new to me, the inner workings of it I was not aware of. I was sort of fascinated by it all, but I was not part of that.

MORRISSEY: The reason I ask is that the Wisconsin delegation went for Kefauver.

HAZEN: That's right. No, I was not involved. Later, as I said, I communicated with Ivan Nestingen. Later when Kennedy decided to come into Wisconsin, or at least was thinking about coming in, I was contacted by both Ivan Nestingen and later by advance man Paul Corbin who worked the seventh district. Corbin did an outstanding job for Kennedy. If I were to cite any single factor, the one reason for Kennedy taking the seventh district, the closest to it would be Paul Corbin, a great organizational man. And it was a matter, I think, of why did he carry the seventh? John Kennedy had a lot of appeal, as was shown, wherever he went. It was a matter, I think, of exposing him to a major amount of people. I think Corbin did an excellent job in this. He kicked the thing off in the seventh district to a good start when he opposed.... When I say opposed.... A dinner was held for Kennedy in Marshfield on the same evening that Vice President Nixon [Richard M. Nixon] was in Wisconsin Rapids. And here was a semi-unknown politician in John Kennedy as compared to Vice President Nixon. And yet Kennedy outdrew Nixon. I don't recall the figures anymore, but there were in excess of five thousand people at each. But Kennedy did outdraw Nixon, and I think the credit for this, along with Kennedy's own image, is the organizational ability of Paul Corbin. And it showed in the primary election. John Kennedy carried Wood County by about sixteen hundred votes over Humphrey. This had eleven [ten] counties; four of the counties in the seventh district went for Kennedy. There was Langlade, which is the Antigo, mid and northern area—a Democratic community for years, a Democratic county, but not by any large margin—and John Kennedy's appearance in Antigo, again exposure, Green Lake County, Portage County, and Wood County were the counties that carried for him. Portage County was a natural Democratic area, a highly Catholic area, Polish descent. I know that many analysts have said that Portage County was the factor. Well, it was not; I don't believe this. But the reason—they carried a five thousand majority for John Kennedy. However, if you took away the Portage County vote, he still won the seventh district by better than a thousand votes. So it wasn't the factory that won for him. I think Wood County

was probably the key in this one. And much of it was based on his competition with Nixon much earlier in that county.

MORRISSEY: Are there many Catholics in Wood County?

HAZEN: I'm not that well acquainted with the ethnic background in Wood County. I think it's an average county. I don't think that you could say it was a Catholic county; whereas Portage would be. Certainly Langlade is not. I'd say Wood was not. I don't think that religion was a factor in Wood County. I think the competitiveness of Vice President Nixon and Kennedy was the overriding factor there.

MORRISSEY: Was there a feeling that people wanted to be with the winner, and they felt that in that Nixon-Kennedy comparison Kennedy looked more like the winner?

HAZEN: Yes, I think there was some of that. However, again looking back, I think that we made the judgment early in the campaign that John Kennedy had mass appeal. If you could get him to a great amount of people, he could win. He had the same effect on all crowds—we made the judgment at least. They loved him; they liked his style. He had something new to offer; he was very refreshing, the first politician that they'd heard fighting the smoke-filled back room type of stacked deck in politics. He had to win in the primaries to beat the big bosses. This appealed to them. His youth, his articulate manner. And he just had a lot of appeal. So the job was to expose him to the greatest amount of people, which we did. And I think this was the answer.

MORRISSEY: Did you use television quite a bit?

HAZEN: Yes, we used television. However, in the district there's only one area that really reached him, and that was Wausau in Marathon County which was the headquarters both for the Humphrey camp and Kennedy camp really in the district because it was the news media center.

MORRISSEY: How about the newspapers, especially in Portage County and Wood County? Were they sympathetic towards Kennedy?

HAZEN: I don't think you could say they were completely sympathetic. They took sort of a standoffish view of it. They admired the style and the forthright approach that Kennedy used; however, they did not endorse. The family picture that he presented to the voters was also another important factor. It was a close-knit family that were willing to go out and work for the brother and the son. The sisters coming in and holding the coffee hours was very important, both Bob [Robert F. Kennedy] and Teddy [Edward M. Kennedy] coming in on their own, all this had sort of an exhilarating air about it, something new about it, an inviting thing that was well accepted.

MORRISSEY: Since Wisconsin has an open primary, did you find many Republicans voting for Kennedy?

HAZEN: Yes, I think so. I think that in the district this was also a factor. They liked what they saw in this young fellow who had appealed to them even though he was a Democrat. He was not really all that liberal. I think that since Nixon had no contest in his own political side of the sheet, they looked at the lesser of two evils and they liked what they saw in Kennedy even though they might not vote for him in the general election.

MORRISSEY: Do you think that turned out to be so?

HAZEN: Yes, I think so. They didn't like the ultra-liberal views of Hubert Humphrey. They liked the middle of the road approach that John Kennedy was using. It was more to their liking and thinking. However, as it turned out, in the general election, of course, many of them voted for Nixon. But in the primary I think a great many of them.... And I would point an example: I came from a small town, the little town of Manawa, a thousand people, that never went to a Democrat in its history. In fact, this is Waupaca County, it has never gone Democrat, even in the Roosevelt [Franklin D. Roosevelt] landslide. But the city of Manawa went for Kennedy in the primary. He appeared at the high school there and was very well accepted. It's a Republican community, but they loved him. And if they had to make a choice, as conservative as they are and were, if they had to make a choice between he and Humphrey, it was all Kennedy. However, they reverted back to Nixon in the general election.

MORRISSEY: I've heard many people say that Humphrey was Wisconsin's third senator for so many years and Wisconsin's only Democratic senator. Did the sense of loyalty between Humphrey and a lot of the established Democratic leadership in the seventh district actually show itself in terms of votes for Humphrey?

HAZEN: Yes, I think so. It probably shows up most in the district chairmanship at that time who was a strong Humphrey supporter, Philleo Nash. Nash traveled statewide for Hubert Humphrey. He was the seventh congressional—I'm sorry, he was not the district chairman. Byron Adams was the district chairman, but he and Byron were from Wisconsin Rapids both strongly for Humphrey. Philleo was a well-known politician in the state and in the seventh district, well respected in the seventh. He did an awful lot of work for Hubert Humphrey.

MORRISSEY: Who was the Kennedy man who was brought into the seventh district?

HAZEN: Paul Corbin.

MORRISSEY: Was there anybody from Massachusetts or Washington that they brought into that district?

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HAZEN: Not to my knowledge.

MORRISSEY: Was there any particular kind of exposure Kennedy wanted? Did he emphasize so-called non-partisan meetings, talking to schoolchildren, that sort of thing?

HAZEN: As I recall, he did not stress any non-partisan meetings; however, the theme was fairly well understood that this was not a party situation, that it would be a wide-open meeting. All meetings would be open and not carrying the Party label. He did not lack identification with the Democratic Party in any sense, but I think it was quite well understood that it was a fairly independent action. We worked through the Party whenever it was possible to do so, when it wasn't he went outside of it—to citizens' groups. And in all cases the leaders generally were from the Democratic ranks. They may not have been county Party officers or the district Party officers, but they were within the liberal rank. And I think again the reason for his carrying the type of vote he did in the seventh was done somewhat by the leadership. He attracted the business leader who was willing to, so to speak, stick his chin out in favor of John Kennedy, liked what he saw and did. There were many business leaders in each of the communities—Wisconsin Rapids, Wausau, the industrial centers—who were willing to be identified with John Kennedy, which certainly was a help in the primary.

MORRISSEY: Were these businessmen registered Democrats or Republicans?

HAZEN: They weren't registered either way but were commonly accepted as being Republican. An outstanding figure that was involved in that campaign was Francis Conway [Francis J. Conway] who was just outside of the seventh district—the president of Thorp Finance, a very highly respected man in the state of Wisconsin. I'm only pointing out as kind of an example of the type of people that supported John Kennedy.

MORRISSEY: Did most of these people stay with Kennedy in the autumn election?

HAZEN: Yes, they did. You're talking about the industrial leaders here, or the well-known men, yes.

MORRISSEY: When you speak about the organizational work that Paul Corbin did, could you specify exactly what kind of organizational work?

HAZEN: He set up the itinerary for John Kennedy when he came in, kept him on the move, and he met the cross section of the people of that district. He

worked from sixteen to eighteen hours a day. His ability to organize and to get crowds out was amazing. I think herein lies a part of the answer, really. As an example, in Waupaca County, again where we're talking about a very conservative area—the city of Weyauwega is a very conservative town—Corbin arranged for John

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Kennedy's appearance there in a hotel. There were two hundred and fifty people there at 11 o'clock in the morning. This is unheard of. The hotel was crowded. The area outside the hotel was crowded. He spoke to both of them, inspired them. They loved it.

MORRISSEY: Do you recall any conversations with John Kennedy when he was traveling in the seventh district?

HAZEN: Yes, we talked about the farm economy while driving to Clintonville, which is the industrial center of Waupaca County, as an example. Driving through the countryside, he asked what the income of the average farm was. We were approaching a farm that had sold at an outstanding price; it was well known in the area, I guess. So I delayed answering until we got near this farm, and I pointed out to him it was a two hundred and forty-acre farm that had sold at sixty thousand dollars, an amazing price for a farm in Wisconsin. And he asked whether or not that farm would net fifteen thousand dollars a year. I said, no, it wouldn't approach that. He said, "Then it's not worth the investment. Farming is not good." That was the comment he made. I recall one other incident on that day. He was speaking before a farm group in the morning, and as we approached the city, Pierre Salinger [Pierre E. G. Salinger] had handed him a release. I can't recall if it was Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen] or Salinger. Anyway, it dealt with the dairy problems of the state. And being the speed-reader that he was, he glanced down at the sheet—I was driving—and he looked up and he said, "What is a heifer?" And I sort of chuckled—here was a Bostonian. He sort of laughed and said, "I think I know what a heifer is, but tell me." He gave the speech about twenty minutes later and referred to the amount of cattle that we're producing in the state of Wisconsin, the amount of heifers that were in the state and would be producing. We left the high school, and a farmer was standing outside. He stopped—and he was an admirer of John Kennedy—and chatted with him and he went on. And I came along, and he said, "You know, unless I'd have heard him, I wouldn't have thought that Kennedy knew the difference between cow or a heifer." Actually that. I sort of chuckled because he hadn't really known. But he left in anybody's mind that he knew what we spoke.

MORRISSEY: Was his voting record in the Senate on agricultural issues a factor against him in that part of the state?

HAZEN: No, it was not.

MORRISSEY: Why?

HAZEN: I don't think that they felt, the average farmer felt, that a man from Boston was that well versed on the farm problems and it was that important, really. He was only one member of the House. This works inversely. His stand on the St. Lawrence Seaway had a real impact on them. The very fact that he did take a stand for the St. Lawrence Seaway, coming from the East and not bowing to the so-called New York interests, seemed to be very, very important, very well accepted.

MORRISSEY: Did you people emphasize it?

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HAZEN: Oh yes, very much.

MORRISSEY: Did you find much evidence that people were going to vote against Kennedy because of his religion?

HAZEN: Yes, a fair amount of it. We found this true in much of the district in pockets. Waupaca County had a real heavy pocket of it. The Humphrey delegates seemed to feel that they had to use this. I don't think they were sincere in their own action, but they did use it quite heavily. And I think it worked to John Kennedy's advantage rather than disadvantage. It was quite well known that it was going on, and I think it was an asset.

MORRISSEY: How did the Humphrey people use it?

HAZEN: A whispering campaign. And they didn't mind admitting it. We discussed it.

MORRISSEY: Were there many thundering from the pulpit?

HAZEN: Yes, a fair amount of it. I say a fair amount; I can recall four or five that I'm acquainted with that did. I can certainly say that we saw no evidence of any help from the Catholic clergy in support of Kennedy. If anything, it was the opposite. So we seemed to feel at that time, at least, that we were battling both elements—the Catholic religion and the Protestant religion—since there were quite a number of sermons given from the pulpit in opposition to Kennedy and his stand by both religions.

MORRISSEY: Did this die after the primary, or did it persist into the autumn election?

HAZEN: No, it persisted. In fact it was one of the factors then that I believe was the cause of his losing—the bitterness of the primary coupled with the step up of the religious bigoted feeling.

MORRISSEY: A moment ago I asked if Kennedy's religion was a reason why some people voted against him, was it also a reason why some people voted for

him?

HAZEN: Yes, I suppose this is true. I think that, in commenting on when you asked whether or not it was a factor. I think the fact that this became quite widespread and the press alerted people and it became a known thing that it was going on.... And so then I can only assume and I feel that many Catholics who are conservative by nature—and the Catholics in the seventh district are conservative, they're Republican, generally speaking—I think this raised their ire

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somewhat and I do believe it was a factor that some of them crossed over to vote for him because he was being persecuted.

MORRISSEY: I've heard people say that some newspapermen covering that campaign had a tendency to count the number of Catholics on a committee in a county or the number of Catholics that were sponsoring a dinner for Senator Kennedy. In other words, overemphasizing—I hate to call it the Catholic dimension to this campaign.

HAZEN: Yes, yes, they did.

MORRISSEY: Did you try to do anything to control it?

HAZEN: We attempted to and tried to break this image by in all cases keeping Protestant people in the fore, if it were possible—to try to break this because this was an accepted fact they were doing it, an accepted fact that we had this to fight. We never did lick that. It was impossible. I can recall my first conversation with Paul Corbin. He asked whom I thought ought to be the chairman of the Kennedy campaign in the county, and I said, "I don't know where to go, really." Waupaca County was a very bigoted county. And I said I'd offer my services, and he said, "What religion are you?" I said I was Catholic. And he said, "You're for Kennedy because you're a Catholic." He tested me and tried me out, as it turned out later. I was not. I had been for most any liberal Democrat. I explained to him, and I tried to stay out. As it turned out, I was his chairman there and worked with Paul for the Senator. But in all cases tried to play that down and get a Protestant contact. We tried to break that image, but they kept playing it up.

MORRISSEY: Corbin is from Janesville which is not in the seventh district. Why did he work in the seventh district?

HAZEN: I believe that Paul Corbin, somewhat like myself, took to the Kennedy people very early, and saw and was inspired by the Kennedy approach to politics. I know he held a dinner for him real early in Janesville, and I think offered his services on his behalf. I'm sure they probably assigned him to the seventh district.

MORRISSEY: Do you recall Kennedy commenting on the religious context of that campaign?

HAZEN: No, I don't.

MORRISSEY: Do you recall before the votes were cast whether he thought he was going to carry the seventh district?

HAZEN: No, he did not know. We discussed this at some length on one of his trips in there. As I recall, the discussion came about at the time he

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made the decision to go into West Virginia. And I asked him why he came to that decision. He said, "Well, why not?" I said, "Well, what have you got to win? You have everything to lose and nothing to win. If you win, you don't get the delegates; if you lose, you're dead." Politically, that is. And he said, "We're not going to lose it. We'll win West Virginia." And he said, "I'll assure you, I wish I were as sure of the seventh district as I am of West Virginia." And we thought this rather odd. In fact, I thought he stood a much, much better chance in the seventh than he would in West Virginia. Of course, about the only thing I knew about it was the press on West Virginia, really. As it turns out, he was right. It was closer in the seventh than it was in West Virginia really.

MORRISSEY: Did you stand as a delegate in the seventh district?

HAZEN: Yes, I did.

MORRISSEY: Could you tell me about this meeting held after the primary election to decide how many votes should be given to each congressional district?

HAZEN: The statutory committee of Milwaukee, are the speaking of?

MORRISSEY: I don't know the situation well enough to say that that's what I am speaking of. I understand there was some controversy about how many delegates should represent each district. Evidently, there was some conflict between the Kennedy people and the Humphrey people on this.

HAZEN: Well, it was my understanding—and I was not at the meeting—that at the outset, when the ground rules were set up for the primary here, it was a winner take all basis, as it always had been. As it turns out, when Kennedy won six of the ten districts, there were some second thoughts given to this by the Humphrey people who were then in charge of the statutory committee. And they decided to do what the Kennedys thought was a double cross and take their percentage of the delegates based on the ten districts. The meeting was rather heated. It was in Milwaukee. Packy McParland [Leland

S. McParland], who is now Senator—then Senator McParland and still is—was chairman; Ivan Nestingen and Philleo Nash argued at length. It became very, very heated. However, the Kennedy people were at a disadvantage since they were in the minority. We had to accept the decision of the administrative committee on the statutory committee.

MORRISSEY: After the West Virginia primary when it became apparent that Humphrey's candidacy was ended in a practical sense, some of the Humphrey delegates in Wisconsin stuck with him. The first question is why? And the second question is didn't the Kennedy people try to get these Humphrey delegates over on the Kennedy side?

HAZEN: Yes, we did. We tried repeatedly and kept trying, even at the Convention, to no avail. In fact, several of them promised—when I say

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several, I can only think of two—to vote for Kennedy and Wednesday evening, the nomination—this was on Tuesday night, volunteered the fact that they were going to, so we counted them in with the votes—reversed themselves again and did not. If you're to ask why, I don't know.

MORRISSEY: I was wondering if it was just personal loyalty to Humphrey?

HAZEN: I couldn't answer that. Humphrey was no longer in the running. They were not Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson] people. You got the feeling they were just anti-Kennedy. Their feelings were that bitter. They weren't about to change.

MORRISSEY: At the Convention did you do any missionary work with delegates from other states?

HAZEN: Yes, I worked the Iowa delegation.

MORRISSEY: With success?

HAZEN: Not a great degree.

MORRISSEY: Who were they committed to?

HAZEN: They were split. I'm trying to recall the name of the man and his son who were.... The Garst family. It seemed that Garst [Steven Garst] was willing to deliver the delegation if he had been promised the Secretary of Agriculture. I can't recall what he wanted for his son. I'm very frank in my opinion here that I don't hold him in very high regard. Whether or not he could have delivered the delegation I think is a question. But he claimed he could.

MORRISSEY: Did you work with any other states?

HAZEN: No, I didn't.

MORRISSEY: Since Wisconsin comes alphabetically near the bottom and I would assume the Kennedys were especially anxious to get as many votes as they could from those states at the end of the alphabet, did they make diligent efforts to get some of these Humphrey people?

HAZEN: You're speaking now about at California, at the Convention? No, not to my knowledge. I think that they were sure they had it wrapped up and were not that concerned, at this point at least. Early, certainly, early—Sunday and Monday of the Convention—every effort was made. But as it approached the time for nomination, it was a foregone conclusion.

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MORRISSEY: Did you hear much talk about Hubert Humphrey for the vice presidency?

HAZEN: No, practically none.

MORRISSEY: How about Orville Freeman [Orville Lothrop Freeman]?

HAZEN: Yes, there was some talk of Freeman.

MORRISSEY: I'm just fishing with this question, but I'm wondering if some of the Humphrey delegates stuck with Humphrey with this in mind?

HAZEN: They may have, however, it was not generally known. There didn't seem to be any real movement afoot by them to suggest that Humphrey be the running mate. He, the least of all. So I don't believe that they had this in mind. Gaylord Nelson [Gaylord A. Nelson] made some moves in that direction, very lightly, feelers since he was a backer of Hubert Humphrey. I'm trying to recall. Knowing that he at least held out some hopes that he might be a compromise settlement, I'm sure there was no strong effort made on Humphrey's behalf.

MORRISSEY: Did you have any forewarning that Lyndon Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] would be the selection for the vice presidential nomination?

HAZEN: No.

MORRISSEY: Were you surprised?

HAZEN: Yes, very much so. Very much so.

MORRISSEY: Was there any fear within the Wisconsin delegation that this might be too difficult to accept?

HAZEN: In some quarters. Organized labor was not happy. Senator Proxmire [William Proxmire] took upon himself to go to organized labor and to calm their fears. This was disastrous. He strongly supported Lyndon Johnson's.... He seemed to be quite effective in selling them on Lyndon Johnson.

MORRISSEY: Were the wounds created by the Kennedy-Humphrey race pretty well bandaged over by the time of the Kennedy-Nixon race?

HAZEN: I don't believe they were. I think they carried on.

MORRISSEY: Any specific examples of that?

HAZEN: I can't point out any one specific example I can think of at this point.

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I'm searching my memory trying to come up with something that might....
The seventh district, which I'm very acquainted with, the organization of the Democratic Party in those units that supported Humphrey strongly, sort of sat on their hands in the general election, so to speak, rather than take an active part in the campaign. This was widespread. They seemed to have lost their enthusiasm for it.

MORRISSEY: Did you think that the seventh district would vote for Kennedy over Nixon?

HAZEN: Yes, I thought they would.

MORRISSEY: Did it?

HAZEN: No, it didn't.

MORRISSEY: By how much did Nixon win it?

HAZEN: I can't recall, a small margin; but nonetheless, he won it.

MORRISSEY: Did you have a Democratic congressman representing that district?

HAZEN: No, we didn't. Congressman Laird [Melvin Robert Laird, Jr.] has been there for a couple of years, which is an influencing factor.

MORRISSEY: Did you ever hear Humphrey comment on why he thinks he didn't do better in the Wisconsin primary?

HAZEN: No, I never have. I've never heard his analysis of it.

MORRISSEY: Do you have any other recollections of any conversations with John Kennedy?

HAZEN: Nothing specific, no.

MORRISSEY: When the new Administration came in in January 1961, was there any likelihood that you might go to Washington?

HAZEN: I never had the desire, nor did I pursue the course of wanting to go. I was very thrilled by the fact that he won. I was very happy to have had a part in his campaign, and I liked the identification. But I had no desire to go to Washington on a fulltime or a part-time basis.

MORRISSEY: I've heard people say that although Humphrey had a good segment of the organized Democratic Party in the state, he didn't organize these people effectively. Was this your viewpoint on his organization?

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HAZEN: I don't believe so. He had, by and large, the ready organization of the Party itself. In many cases I think they were lacking in experience and in imagination; but, nonetheless, the organization was tailor-made and ready to go to work, and did. So I don't think that this is really true.

MORRISSEY: Some of the Humphrey people complain that they didn't have enough money.

HAZEN: I don't believe that that.... They may feel sincerely that this was a factor in their losing it, and certainly no campaign has enough money. However, in my dealings with the Kennedy campaign I never used any of the Kennedy money. The coffee hours, the breakfasts, the luncheons, and dinners that were set up were all self-financed on a Dutch-treat basis or on a local group financing. We never spent any of the Kennedys' money at all, never asked for any of it. So it was not a case of Kennedy's millions versus Humphrey's lack of financial support in the seventh district. This was not in it at all. We were a self-sufficing organization really.

MORRISSEY: Was it hard to raise that money?

HAZEN: Oh, it wasn't easy at any time. Raising money for political campaigns is always tough. However, we didn't raise that much that it was a big factor.

MORRISSEY: How about the money for television exposure? Did you raise that within the district?

HAZEN: I believe part of it was raised within the district, yes. Sponsoring firms and general subscription. A big majority of all the media time, other than the campaign material which was distributed by Kennedy himself, came from local sources. The tabloid I think was very effective. This was a new concept in politics again. This, of course, was not financed locally.

MORRISSEY: Were you able to attract much volunteer help?

HAZEN: Yes, yes. It was relatively easy.

MORRISSEY: Where did the volunteers come from?

HAZEN: From all walks of life. You couldn't pick any one group. You could ask.... Once they had been exposed to the Kennedy type of political approach or to a speech or even to the fact they'd seen him on TV, they were willing to help. They wanted to become involved to get closer to him. The feeling even then, much before he had won the primary, the same type of feeling, to get close to this fellow. He was magnetic, very easy to get volunteers. I've thought many times about this,

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later in the campaign and in the general election. We had a breakfast for him in Green Bay in the general election. I believe there were six, seven thousand people for breakfast, and he spoke to them. On his way out, we were trying to get him into the car to get him out to the airport, and the people were just clamoring to touch him, to get at him. Though this was magnified some from what it had been in the primary, it occurred to me then that very same feeling was evident and prevalent in the pre-primary days. People were willing to help him. He had this magnetic attraction. There was no problem.

MORRISSEY: Did you have a problem keeping the volunteers busy?

HAZEN: Yes, this was it really. What do you do?

MORRISSEY: What did you do?

HAZEN: Generally speaking, I suppose the greatest amount of labor was put forth in organizing voluntary committees and getting people to get out and organize. Women were used in the coffee klatches. And then those that were willing to lend their name and spend their time in helping to organize volunteers for the Kennedy movement—the distribution of pamphlets and the tabloid, writing letters in his behalf.

MORRISSEY: Were you surprised that Nixon carried the state by such a large number of votes?

HAZEN: Yes, I was. I suppose I began to feel, probably a little too close to it to see the total picture, which happens many times. You become so involved that the total picture somewhat escapes you. Traveling with the Kennedys when they were in the state, the acceptance was so great wherever he appeared that it would appear that he was that well known. As it turned out of course, it was, I think, the TV debates that made him President because it gave him the needed exposure. And, also, it's quite true that Wisconsin—several of the regions didn't carry. Whether it was exposure or not.... They didn't know him that well. However, he was certainly more exposed than any other candidate had ever been due to the primary fight. We just felt he was going to carry the state. I think we underestimated the feeling and the magnitude of the bitterness caused by the primary. And this was a factor because while he was losing, we were winning the governorship and attorney generalship. It was evident that the bitterness carried over.

MORRISSEY: Did Congressman Zablocki [Clement J. Zablocki] come into the seventh district and campaign in any of those Polish areas?

HAZEN: No, he did not. Not to my knowledge.

MORRISSEY: Well, I don't think I have any more questions. Do you think I've missed anything?

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HAZEN: I think you've covered it pretty well.

MORRISSEY: Thank you very much.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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