Dr. Peter V.V. Hamill Oral History Interview – JFK 3, 12/11/1969
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Biographical Note
(1926-2007) Dr. Hamill was an epidemiologist who worked as the medical coordinator to the Surgeon General's Advisory Committee on Smoking and Health (1962-1963). In this interview, he discusses preparations for the first two Advisory Committee meetings, internal conflicts with Surgeon General Luther Terry and Assistant Surgeon General James Hundley, and the strain of the job, among other issues.

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Dr. Peter V.V. Hamill– JFK #3

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Third Oral History Interview

with

DR. PETER V. V. HAMILL

December 11, 1969
Annapolis, Maryland

By William W. Moss

For the John F. Kennedy Library

HAMILL: Let me do.... I mean, I'll be going over this tape so I want to just kind of pick up my own thread, recapitulate. What I'm going to try to do is sketch out primarily what occurred between the November meeting and the May meeting. What I'm going to do is kind of describe my activities because my activities were kind of all the activities. By that I mean the scene shifts—this is new significance, I just thought of this now just the shift of characters and, you know, the focal point. Starting in 1961, the primary characters were the members of the four committees. I mean the four organizations outside of the Public Health Service (American Cancer Association, American Public Health Association, American Tuberculosis Association, American Heart Association).

MOSS: The four organizations. Right. Right.

HAMILL: For about a year things were kicking around between Ken Endicott [Kenneth Endicott], who was very important, the director of the Cancer Institute, Terry [Luther L. Terry], who was the new surgeon general. Somewhere up in the White House bounced back down that they didn't want to touch it. They wanted the Public Health Service to handle it.

MOSS: You don't know specifically where or how this worked?

HAMILL: No. No. I bet it was obviously the Office of Science and Technology, but I'm not quite sure who did what. I think Colin MacLeod was the chief medicine man then and very shrewd and quite good. Gee! I've got somewhere if you want to.... I've got some names because I had some dealings with the Office of Science and Technology. I've got some names buried in some notes if we want to explore that later on. But then the scene shifts. I'm introduced. as kind of a peripheral character coming in off the wings in early July. Herman Kraybill, who was the short-lived director, and I come in, in early July to, you might say, Terry and Hundley [James M. Hundley] focusing onto Terry and that July 24th meeting in which the volunteer agencies had their day...

MOSS: The FTC [Federal Trade Commission].

HAMILL: ... the federal agencies, you know, everybody in that.

MOSS: The FDA [Food and Drug Administration] and the Presidential Office of Science and Technology.

HAMILL: Yeah. And we kind of publicly committed ourselves. Then from then on things shifted to—they were still.... Things shifted to kind of Terry, Hundley, for a few weeks, Kraybill, and me. Kraybill drops out. Primarily from July to November, and one way of looking at it, although obviously I spent most of the time on it and did most of the kind of creating and scut work, but still kind of the decision-making and balance of authority and decision, everything was, you might say, a triumvirate, Terry, Hundley, and me. Let's put it that way. Then introduced are the ten committee members at this November meeting. Before that November meeting they were individuals. They were names and they were individuals. They become.... They get together and they're kind of a group. They first become a group in November. After that, they've got kind of an entity of their own, and from that date of that meeting on, essentially from the November meeting until, say, May 5th or 6th, all activity, well, all of our activity centers, focuses around me. There is one sidelight. Obviously there's the whatever Terry and Hundley were doing in getting instructions and so forth, leading into their decision of the May 6th meeting as to redefine the scope that I call the great, I'll call it the great betrayal. So they had a small amount of independent activity, but we'll kind of introduce that later, but from now on for the rest of this time ...

MOSS: Just you and the committee.

HAMILL: Yeah. Me and the committee.

MOSS: Okay.

HAMILL: Okay. After the November meeting, I set about personally visiting every member of the committee at his home, a one-to-one meeting. I would go visit him in his home environment. We'd more or less sketched out in the November meeting the sub-areas, how we would attack the problem. We broke the whole thing up into sub-areas and which man was going to be

identified with which area. So I had a twofold problem: One—I mean twofold program—one was to get to know each guy better and let him get to know me better. And two, to help him set up, or he and I together to set up, his kind of subcommittee, and all to start both, and the way we did it was I would meet—and I would do it differently with each guy. It depended on what he was like, and I'd play it by ear, and we'd start batting things back and forth and we'd sketch things out. I'd spend anywhere from a day to four or five days with each one of the guys. We started talking about, try to redefine the substantive scope of his problem, of his area. That was one. How it fit in with the overall. How it fit in with the overall thing, you know, the overall problem, always keeping that in mind. Then we would discuss methodology, how he would go about handling his area. Then number three was, what kind of, what did he need to...

MOSS: Get the job done.

HAMILL: ... get the job done in terms of resources from my staff in terms of consultants that we were going to bring in, roughly how many, what kind, and then it was a question of he and I together would start deciding who we wanted as consultants.

MOSS: All right. Were you making regular reports to Terry at this time?

HAMILL: No. No. No. No.

MOSS: You were not.

HAMILL: No. No. I was starting to work pretty autonomously from then on.

MOSS: Okay.

HAMILL: Now, as I say, I played this by ear and that each guy I was kind of proceeding a little differently depending on what he was like, both my estimate of him, how it was best for him to proceed and then also how he wanted to proceed. And this comprised several things: One was my decision as to how to best exploit him and then also a decision as to—my decision again—as to how I thought he would probably best operate. Some guys.... Well, one guy chose to write his whole damn report all by himself. He did all the scholar reviews. He sat down and worked like hell. And he did all his literature

review himself, the whole area, and literally wrote the whole thing himself. And that's all he wanted. He and I talked for—well, that was John [B.] Hickam-and he and I....I spent a day and a half with John Hickam and that was all that I spent with him at his home base. And there was a sidelight earlier based on this, following the first tape when I mentioned that we were going to have a committee of twelve. The eleventh man was going to be Julius Comroe, who I mentioned, who was also cardiopulmonary, the combination of heart and lungs, but that's what John Hickam kind of elected to do and were kind of volunteered or was kind of... I kind of asked him to do that area. And he's the one who elected to do this all by himself. He did it before anybody else did their job and then he said later, he was the one who said, "Hell," he said, "I don't particularly like

Comroe, and I don't see why I have to." Obviously, I was going to say, "Okay, John. You've done your job. You've got every right to make that." I wanted Comroe very much, you know, at the beginning, but that's why I completely acceded to Hickam's request. He had earned his right to say, "You know, I don't think we need him," because he did his job before anybody else, and very, very well.

MOSS: How do you spell the name Comroe, by the way?

HAMILL: C-O-M-R-O-E. Julius Comroe. Incidentally John Hickam was born in the Philippines—the Hickam Field was his, I think, his grandfather or something like that—named after the Hickam Field of World War II fame, was named after his grandfather. John was medical missionary parentage, extraordinarily bright guy. Now, that was one extreme. I think the other extreme probably was Mickey LeMaistre [Charles A. LeMaistre], who became one of my closest colleagues and friends, and it was also my own particular area of greatest knowledge, competence, and that was the epidemiology of chronic respiratory disease, bronchitis and emphysema. And this was going to be our.... On the grand scale we really built up a fairly elaborate subcommittee with some excellent men and we held, we actually held several formal subcommittee meetings independent of the larger committee and a couple, three days. We had formal transcripts. We rewrote a whole text. We wrote drafts. We rewrote the drafts.

MOSS: Let me interject something here. How much of the paperwork of the committee is on file, say, at the National Library of Medicine?

HAMILL: I don't quite know what you mean by the paperwork.

MOSS: All right. These drafts you were talking about, for instance.

HAMILL: Well.... Yeah. They're not available because a lot of them are and some of them never will be because a fair number of them are.... We had several categories of. ... It's kind of like comparable to the military classified but

confidential because of necessity, the way we went about things, we and some of our consultants, I will say I would ask, I asked Seltzer [Raymond Seltzer] from Hopkins, a very excellent epidemiologist, to do a report on, if I recall, it was heavy metals in the production of lung cancer and kind of review everything that had been done.

Now, central to this was a man in the Public Health Service, Wilhelm Hueper, who was director of environmental, something like environmental studies and cancer research for the National Cancer Institute, a real pushing martinet who would criticize the surgeon general in print, who had done a lot of good work but also was a very outspoken guy who was an immensely opinionated man who brooked no rational discourse with anybody. I mean, he just, he issued judgments and that was that. Some of his stuff was really good, and some of his stuff was not really good. Now, I'm giving this as an example. I won't have to go into this again.

So I talked Ray Seltzer into doing a really good scholarly review. Ray Seltzer had no axe to grind, none whatsoever. He had done no original work in this area, but he was knowledgeable in this area, skilled in this area and very skilled in all the

principles. So he's capable of making a scholarly review with no, you might say, no vested interest, okay? In making a review, a thing that's very important in making a really gutty review and a usable review is, you've got to attack personalities. You've got to say, in judging another man's work, frankly, "The guy's sloppy and his data is not to be trusted," or, let's say, "he claims way beyond his data," that he's highly biased, or, you know, you have to make these kind of statements to do a really useful review. Okay? I asked most of the consultants to do this kind of job because this was infinitely the most effective thing. But in so doing, I promised them almost everlasting confidentiality, which is understandable because some of them said some pretty damning things about some of their colleagues. I mean some of the guys actually accused several of their colleagues of being almost dishonest, which is important.

MOSS: Now, how did you ensure this?

HAMILL: And I never want this to get out into the public, ever.

MOSS: Yeah. How did you ensure this confidentiality?

HAMILL: Simply promised the guys.

MOSS: Yeah. Well, all right. But did you destroy the drafts or lock: them up or what?

HAMILL: Well, while I was there we had a special file for all of these confidential reviews. I had my own file at home. I've got copies of almost all of these, probably all of the first-class confidential reviews. Everybody using them in the committee, that is both the essential committee members and then—I set up an elaborate

system of consultants and kind of extra extensions of the committee. This was an immensely complex network that I built up over the months. I ended up by probably involved, I don't know, 250 people totally of professional people. I would have reviewers review reviews, you know, in areas that I didn't know real well.

Now, I had to make these things available to some other people, you know, obviously. Everything was available to the ten committee members. I don't recall anything that was not.... except a couple of highly personal things between me and Terry and/or Hundley, they were more or less administrative, a couple of things were kind of disagreements over.... And these were, you know—that everything else was committee, the ten committee members. Then I had levels of confidentiality. There were another, gee, I would say, fifteen or twenty guys who kind of transcended a small area and kind of helped integrate some things, who bridged either one or more sub-areas. In fact, there were three or four or five other guys that almost bridged everything, too. We almost made them—they were almost on a committee level as far as having an overview. And they were almost privy to everything. But these were my judgments on who these people were to be. Okay? Some people in the Public Health Service who got involved with us heavily became more and more privy to some of this information, to various kinds of reports or whole, almost like an infinite onion skin of layering. And most of this was my judgments. I mean, I would just kind of arbitrarily decide how much I would let each person know.

I had another important reason for.... Not just to protect individuals I'm promising the confidentiality, but I had another very important reason. And that is, if you recall, early in our charge was to keep all of our deliberations very secret in the sense that, as Terry rightly said several times, "We can have great repercussions on the stock market whether we like it or not." You know, things like that. So we had these kind of obligation and one of the best ways of keeping something like this, let it be known [inaudible].

In other words, what our overall conclusions were going to be was to keep limited, as limited as possible, the number of people who had the overall view. In other words, I tried to keep things as compartmentalized as possible. For example, Ray Seltzer, who was an excellent man and completely honest, who did this superb, one of the best of all, and I keep harping on him, we had one of the most scholarly of all the reviews in this one area of lung cancer. That's all he had access to. He had no idea what we were thinking in emphysema, for example, or the study of painting tars on animals and, you know, all these other sub-questions.

MOSS: Okay. Now, suppose twenty, thirty, fifty years from now some researcher, medical historian wants to assess the integrity of your committee...

HAMILL: And tries to reconstruct things?

MOSS: ... tries to reconstruct things. Where does he go for the information?

HAMILL: Well, he could go to me and my library. And in fact, I would almost say that'd probably be the best single place because, see, the last four months or three or three and a half months Guthrie [Eugene H. Guthrie] took over my office. I moved most of my [inaudible] I had copies of everything. But then after the report was issued, then an official—it's called the Tobacco Clearing House, which is still, you know, in operation it's eight years.... No. 1964 to '76, six years later, it's still in operation. All those files somewhere. I don't know.... You know, honestly, I don't know what's happened to all that stuff. How it's been transformed, whether the stuff has been thrown out, how it's been augmented, how it's been altered, and so forth. I just...

MOSS: Okay. Okay. This is the point I wanted to...

HAMILL: So if somebody wanted to reconstruct, really, what took place of this committee, which was the important thing—the subsequent committees and reports more or less just repeated what this did know about the thing. They weren't the important—this was the pivotal work, and if they want to say, as you put it, fifty years from now, how unbiased—and both on this dual criteria of both how clean were they and how competent were they, those two levels, I would say my files more than any other source would kind of contain the skeleton of everything that took place.

MOSS: But there is something somewhere else that you simply don’t...

[-98-]

HAMILL: Unless somebody else has thrown it out.

MOSS: Yeah. Okay. Unless somebody's thrown it out.

HAMILL: It did exist, but could well have been thrown out. I don't know.

MOSS: Okay. Okay. We've gone into a little digression here. Now back to where we were. You were talking about the.... what you were doing between the November meeting and the January meeting.

HAMILL: Yeah. Okay. Yeah. I met with each one of the committee members to set up their subcommittees and how they were going to proceed and also kind of was goading them a little bit, kind of pushing them to get going, and trying to also set up some.... It wasn't just I was helping them; I was also kind of directing them, too, setting up some time schedules, and say, you know, by such-and-such a time, we want to have achieved this much. Another one of my jobs, as I saw it, was not only to be kind of partners with each one of the committee members in his subcommittee, which I was, I both set up everything with them, then I attended all of his subcommittee meetings, but I was also, even more important, I was the honeybee. I went from one subcommittee to another and would cross-fertilize what one guy was doing with what another guy was doing, both in technique

and also ideas, what we would reveal in one subcommittee sometimes was applicable to something that was coming up in another one. We were kind of identifying crucial questions, as it were. And I would try to test one crucial question with another. But I didn't want to overdo this.

MOSS: So there were subcommittee meetings going on between November and January.

HAMILL: Right. Right.

MOSS: Okay. What...

HAMILL: And we were starting to bring on in this whole battery of consultants to the subcommittees and augmenting these subcommittees.

MOSS: Okay. Now what made you feel that a plenary session was needed in January?

HAMILL: Okay. Now, and let me digress for one half a minute, on this score Terry and Hundley kept their promise on unlimited support in this sense, never once was I restricted on the number of consultant. They never even asked me. I could have had, I guess, from twenty to ten thousand, you know. Nobody ever even set a limit of any kind. Either the number or how' frequently we used them. And also they went along with some schemes I had built up. I'm always.... It's just kind of my nature. I'm kind of an anti bureaucrat just by nature. And I had this for two or three months. I described earlier Owen Scott, this quite skilled executive officer, who kept me out of some trouble, but he also helped me

scheme up to a point, kind of within stretching legitimacy. And Terry and Hundley backed these up, some other extraordinary means of stretching rules of behavior on the use of consultants and payment of consultants.

Let me be specific. They waived, Luther Terry waived and I think very importantly, very importantly and it took a certain amount of guts on his part, waived some of what is controversial now, these so-called security clearances. He allowed me or allowed us to have—we used to call them one-day clearances, and he would sign. He had to sign off on everybody. And he would sign off on this. And he stuck his neck out on this. And so he had made a promise and this part he was definitely going along with because he was gambling a little bit. If we'd made a couple of big blunders, we could have gotten him in trouble. I wouldn't have gotten in trouble, but he could have gotten in, I guess, big trouble. He instructed the so-called, the clearance officers; everybody had to be specifically cleared to go along with this. And they did. And this was kind of fun and, you know, it was kind of exciting.

The other thing he really stretched, and this was very important, administratively it was much easier.... Well, contracts—we had a variety of sources of payment, but contracts you just have to do more red tape. He allowed us.... I don't know if we could do it in writing. I don't recall the details, but there was no question. He endorsed this activity and this was what I wanted to do and Scotty and I kind of cooked this up to pay the consultants. Normally you pay a consultant when he visits you or you visit him for his specific time, but we could pay them for their homework. And I would just make rough calculations. Such-and-such a job would take so many consultant days. You know, consultants, there was a statutory rate of fifty bucks a day then of—that's what you paid a consultant. All right, a report....

MOSS: That's cheap.

HAMILL: Oh, by God, to get these kind of guys. But I would pay maybe, I would end up paying, say, six hundred bucks for a report. And I was the one who always set the price. I'd set it afterwards. And here's how I arrived at it. It was quite arbitrary on my part. I would talk to the guy and get some kind of an idea how much time he spent. If it was a really good report, you know, really good quality, I would stretch out his days, the number of days because I could just kind of arbitrarily said the guy did ten days worth. You know, that's how long it took him to do his reviews. And my word was accepted from all the way up to the treasurer, you know, the guy who finally signed the check. Nobody ever questioned it. And it was right, rightly so because I was trying to be as clean as I could. If a guy did a really good report then I'd kind of stretch out the.... I would first try to capture how much time did it actually take him. Then also I tried to integrate quality in the same thing. Some pretty sleazy reports were done, some really sleazy reports, and I paid very, very damn little even though I knew that the hours spent was an awful lot more than.... I just didn't pay at the, even didn't pay up to the going rate, frankly, on several reports. They were just so poorly done. We got our money's worth, more than our money's worth out of most reports. There were a couple we really got clipped on, badly clipped, but that's.... But anyway, I just wanted to mention this in all fairness. This was a thing that…

MOSS: Were there any other ways in which you got a budget crunch?

HAMILL: Never. I was almost—moneywise we had a blank check.

MOSS: Okay.

HAMILL: Where I really got the crunch was getting personnel anywhere, decent, good personnel from the U.S. Public Health Service. I not only got a crunch, I just couldn't get a damn thing. You know, it was as simple as that. I got a few broken down cast-offs that nobody wanted. If I wanted anybody good, I had to get him from the outside in the terms of consultants, but they only had minimal utility. They could not work full-time every day on my staff. That's why I needed help. But anyway, okay, the job I'd

settled for myself, as you can kind of see, was becoming rather titanic. Here were about ten different subcommittees of which I was a full member and doing almost an equal amount of work of each one of the ten committee members. Plus I was the entire integrator of the whole thing. And it was almost beginning.... We used to talk about—it was never formalized—who was going to write the report. And for quite a number of months it was almost beginning to take shape that to, probably for artistic and intellectual unity and consistency of argument all the way through, probably one man should actually write the whole thing. And it was beginning to look like it would, you know, obviously have to be me. This wasn't talked about in the plenary sessions very much. We avoided.... This is another interesting kind of, I guess.... I don't know for what reasons we started avoiding the most important questions in the plenary sessions. I just thought of this now, like this, because obviously, who or what's going to specifically write the report is probably the most important single question that could be asked.

MOSS: Important procedural question or substantive ones?

HAMILL: Yeah. Both. Both. Both. This is kind of... Oh, procedural. I guess procedural. This is rather critical. This might be kind of important because maybe in some ways, I'm not quite as clean and virtuous as I've been putting myself for six years, you know, as against Terry and Hundley. Conceivably they could have sat over here and thought, "What is this little son of a bitch trying to pull on me," you know. "Is he trying to...." You know, "What kind of, what kind of a game is he...." That's conceivable.

MOSS: Well, this is why there was a little malice in my method when I asked you whether you were making regular reports to Terry, too.

HAMILL: That's important. I was very selective on what I would.... very selective. And selective in the sense that, well, purposely in the sense that, firstly, I didn't want to bother him. You know, I would kind of select out.... But I guess was maybe selective on a dual scale. First, I was selective on one scale, and that is what I thought was important to him. But that could be maybe in reality two ways. One is what really he should know and then also possible another one, what it was convenient for me to have him know. That's—okay. So, you know, this is maybe some kind of a self-confession. [Laughter]

MOSS: I had somebody the other day, Peter, who reported...

HAMILL: You dirty guy. [Laughter]

MOSS: It's getting to be more and more amusing. I had somebody else the other day refer to these sessions as psychoanalysis.

HAMILL: You just shot down one of my cherished myths here. Very interesting. Very interesting. Very interesting because, well.... Yeah, because we avoided that and when I say we, obviously, that means me because I'm the one who wrote the entire agenda and I more or less wrote Terry's script for him, you know, in his part of participation. Because substantive-wise there wasn't this same kind of selection and purposely. Okay.

We were proceeding on the subcommittee areas, how to tackle the different specific problems. We were.... I was breaking down the problems and I had two ways of categorizing problems: One, in an area, let's say, the etiology of pathogenesis, that is the causation and growth of emphysema and its possible relationship to cigarette smoking. That's one way of breaking an area down. This was our primary way of breaking down. Another way which I kept using was, I would kind of....had lists of key questions that I wanted to try to get answered or I wanted us to address. Some of them were key within a specific area and started crossing areas. You know, they went across to several areas and some of the questions were mythologic questions. I started building up more of these and I'd keep throwing them out. I'd throw them out at the guys. I'd kind of throw them out as challenges and kind of so that we would all be confronted with these things and more or less hopefully commit ourselves to.... Before we were finished with the report, we'd somehow kind of resolve this to the best of our ability. Okay.

While doing this, I devised another technique. Remember I was using analogy of the dialectic all the way through. And I was trying to school without trying to be an impudent pedagogue to, you know, guys much my senior and probably both in years and certainly experience. But I also had a vision that they didn't have, and that is, I had.... I mean Socrates is kind of my god. And in all due deference to them, a lot of them didn't even know who the hell Socrates was. Now this is what I was after. I was going to try to make, whether any of them knew it or not, both epidemiologists and Socratic dialecticians out of each one of these guys. Without telling, that's what I was doing, or that's what they were becoming. From Mo Seevers [Maurice H. Seevers] who was the pharmacologist to Bill Cochran [William G. Cochran] who was a statistician to Manny Farber [Emmanuel Farber] who was a pathologist. Because what my end goal was to have these ten with me making eleven great intelligences, let's just call them instruments.

After a year or a couple of years of learning, training in both these techniques and learning substance and making various.... solving sub-problems all along. In so doing steeping ourselves both in all the data that was available, that which was good, that which was not good, the methods and so forth. And then taking all this material after which we'd rather mastered this kind. It was our musical notes as our kind of music. It's the raw material, and then I had this kind of view of some kind of a great artistic triumph, that we'd all get together in some kind of great creative culmination of scientific—ah, new word—dialectic instead of dialectical materialism, some kind of

a dialectical scientifism or something like that. And each one of these men with their own special point of view of many, many years, and then their own special area of the last year, a

couple of years of the study that they had totally mastered, but with all of us with a common interest and methodology because we'd been learning these last year or two, entering a common stream and trying to get Louis [F.] Fieser, the great organic chemist, to actually think in terms of pathology, and Manny Farber, the pathologist, think in terms of polar physiology and so forth, literally, not in as great detail, but enough so that everybody could integrate all elements of the problem and that we would literally reach a higher level of integration, all of us, so that each man not only totally mastered his own sub-area as it related to the totality, but also mastered essentially all elements of the totality.

That was my dream. This was what I was heading for. And this was a problem in methodology because, as I say, I didn't want to appear, you know, too pedantic and also too visionary, I guess. So obviously, I couldn't—honestly, even though I knew this was the best way to do it, I couldn't sit down and toll each one of the guys this is what we were doing because a part of it, by so doing, would kind of destroy things. I wanted to arrive at a certain stage before they knew what had happened.

MOSS: Okay. Now, what—to get back to my...

HAMILL: This is important.

MOSS: Yeah. What made you think that a meeting in January was necessary? I assume you set the date and stated the need for the meeting. It as your assessment that a meeting was necessary.

HAMILL: No. We'd set the date in the November meeting.

MOSS: In the November meeting?

HAMILL: Right.

MOSS: Okay.

HAMILL: We'd set the November meeting.... We made three or four decisions. First, we were going to make a study. Okay? That was number one. Second, we defined areas. We started making some sketchy index of the table of contents of the problem. We started assigning different guys different sub-areas. Okay. These were some of the decisions. The next one, we could have a meeting, such-and-such a specific date in January. This was a given.

MOSS: Okay.

HAMILL: Then the other comment was I stated at that meeting before it broke up, "I will see each one of you men before the meeting in January and we will get started with the subcommittee work."

MOSS: Okay. Now what happened at the meeting in January?

HAMILL: Okay. Nothing pivotal. I mean it was a very excellent meeting. For my money it was the best single meeting we ever had, for my money. It was because at the November meeting, you might say, Terry and Hundley kind of held the whip hand, putting it that way. I did all the, or a good part of the structured thinking and kind of behind the scenes decisioning, but I'd said very little at the meeting until the last part of it, till we got down to substantive area, breaking area up and so forth. And rightly so, I mean, in trying to get the committee to start doing some talking. But things started to shift at the January meeting, although Terry chaired the meeting the first half of the day and then Hundley was, you know, titular kind of head from then on. I was more or less directing the meeting. I mean I'd more or less take over the discussion. I would lead the discussion and most of the discussions were primarily continuations of the various subcommittee meetings and bringing them out in the open and apprising the other guys as to what was happening with the other people. I guess I was kind of writing the rules as I went along, too, in a way, because I'd just play things by ear.

And if somebody forced me to sit down, we'll say in December as to how I would have done everything, I couldn't have done it. You know, I didn't know how I wanted, you know, how things should be best done. It would kind of unfold as I went along, which, you know, in all fairness to Hundley and Terry probably was a little bit exasperating. You know, yeah. But I somehow had faith in the committee and in my own.... I knew I would come up with an answer, you know, even though in December I couldn't say exactly how the best way to proceed next March was. I knew by March I would know. Okay?

MOSS: Yeah.

HAMILL: But in all fairness to Terry and Hundley, maybe they didn't: have the same.... I'm quite sure they didn't know the best way to do it, but even more important, they probably didn't have the same confidence in my ability to come up with the best answer in March. Okay? Now, February, I mean the January meeting I considered a great success. I wrote up the minutes of the November meeting and after the January meeting, when I presented the minutes at the March meeting....

Well, to give you a little bit of a sidelight on quality of staff, I had a professional writer on my staff. Well, obviously, if he could do anything, he could write up some minutes. I ended up throwing the damn thing away and I had to, you know, rewrite everything. I mean, he just couldn't even do that. But after the January meeting, by the minutes that were read at the March meeting, B.J. [Stanhope Bayne-Jones] came out with the ultimate compliment. He said, "Doctor Hamill," let's see, "were we really that wise? You made those minutes truer than life." In other words, I was trying, even refined a lot of the discussion. Like I presume Plato did with Socrates' discussions.

MOSS: With Socrates.... Yeah. Yeah.

HAMILL: And in a way almost.... I was aware of this. I was playing the role of Plato in this way.

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MOSS: You wouldn't presume to St. John. You'll presume to Plato, but not to St. John.

HAMILL: Precisely. Okay. [Laughter] Okay. And after the January meeting, we just continued on our subcommittee meetings, more of the same.

MOSS: Okay. So that between January and March, you were working at your substantive tasks.

HAMILL: Yeah. I kept going back to more subcommittee meetings. But there was one other element that was being introduced and that was an organizational component. By that I mean they took Owen Scott away from me in, I guess...

MOSS: This is your good executive man who was getting things for you.

HAMILL: Yeah. Yeah. In, I guess, February. And this really left me out on a limb badly, badly, and I knew it.

MOSS: Did you approach Terry for a substitute?

HAMILL: Oh, by all means. And this was the first of the really serious.... I'd gotten a couple of bad rebuffs before this on some professional people, but this was the first of the really serious reneges. And I'll use that term, reneges.

MOSS: Okay. In what term was the reneging?

HAMILL: Okay. Okay. The reneging was all this promise of...

MOSS: All possible support.

HAMILL: ... all possible support. Yeah. Now, all possible support, as I say, was that term used in the preface...

MOSS: Retrospectively.

HAMILL: Yeah, retrospectively. But the promise was all...

MOSS: Support.

HAMILL: ... necessary support. All support that you deemed, you, the committee, deemed necessary. In other words, it was actually more or less figuratively stated, "Your request," let's see, how's that old corny thing go? "your request is our demand," or something like that. You know, I mean, "Your wish is our command."

MOSS: Your wish is our.... Right. Okay.

[-105-]

HAMILL: Yeah. Yeah. Your wish is my command. Literally, that's what was promised the....

MOSS: Okay. Okay. When you went to Terry and wanted a replacement for Scott, what was his reaction?

HAMILL: More or less the first reaction was, "You can have anybody you want."

MOSS: Yeah. Okay. Well, let me go back a minute. Why was Scott taken away?

HAMILL: Because he was offered the job as executive officer of the Institute of General Medical Sciences, which is one of the major institutes, which was a....

MOSS: Okay. It was his choice.

HAMILL: Oh, Yeah. I couldn't possibly stand in the way of that because that's what he really wanted to do.

MOSS: Then you go to Terry and you say, "I need somebody." And he says, "Sure. You can take who you want."

HAMILL: Right.

MOSS: Okay. Then what happens?

HAMILL: Well. I made a protest right then and there as I don't know who's good and I don't know how to go about getting this person. More or less the reply is, "Tough. You better learn." Part of my fame was I've got so much to do I don't even have time to learn that and spend the time searching for the necessary tools. I don't even have that time because I'd been committing myself to some incredible, these incredible tasks. And literally, I could start to see the magnitude of, you know, some of my commitments. But some of my commitments were due to the original commitment of "we will supply you, the committee, with anything you want." And I was going to do my damnedest to fulfill that

bargain.

MOSS: Right.

HAMILL: Because I didn't have a staff, then I had to do it somehow all myself, but I could see with one eye that there aren't that many hours in the day. But I was feeling pretty energetic, in fact incredibly, frankly one of the highest levels of energy I've ever been in my life and was going at it. A couple of the committee members who I got to know pretty well actually tried to make a demand on Hundley by saying, "You promised us the support. We need, Pete Hamill needs more of a staff to deliver us some more goods. We talked this over. Therefore, you've got to get him a better staff." Okay?

[-106-]

MOSS: This was in the period between January and March?

HAMILL: Yeah. Yeah. Okay. They would not give me the gift of saying, "All right, Dr. Hamill, you'll have a great, you know, an adequate replacement for Owen Scott," just didn't work. They didn't do that. That's what I wanted. They said, "Whether you've got the time or not, if you want an executive officer you've got to find one. Okay?"—which is a lot of work because it means getting a lot of double talk. I mean a person of that level is usually guarded and is getting a lot of double talk of people who are much higher than they. Okay? And I didn't yet know how to invoke the authority of the surgeon general. As I described one time that later on I did learn how to say, "Don't tell me that crap! Tell that to Dr. Terry." But that was much later in the game when I learned that.

But anyway, I found I spent quite a bit of time getting advice from different people on who was good. And I came up with one; the guy was almost perfect. As he was described by one person, he was a young guy, very bright, very ambitious, great deal of energy, intelligent, always just barely this side of the law in the sense that—this was described to me by an older, wiser person who could give me good counsel. He used this imagery, "If you want a pint of pigeon milk, tell him that's what you want, but don't ask him where he got it." And I said, "My God! That's exactly the guy I need! You know, exactly." So I went to, you know, I bounced right down all jauntily and told both Terry and Hundley, "This is the guy I need." Well, a couple of days later they said, "Well, we'll find out about it." A couple of days later I got a bunch of double talk. "Well, he's committed to some important stuff. You just can't have him. We're sorry. Find somebody else."

So this took a lot of time and effort, and it was a very key kind of a person, especially for me who knew.... I went into a hospital before and knew that adequate or, let's say, effective, smooth administration was not my forte. And not only.... I didn't know a lot of things on what could be done and what couldn't be done and also how to do it, but also just organization, administrative organization is not my forte. So it's kind of a dual thing. This kind of a job required, even if I were good at that, would still require a damn good executive officer. But because I knew this was a shortcoming of mine and no possible way I learned, time or anything else to plug this up. I mean, you know, for me to learn it. I mean, I didn't

have the time. I didn't have either time and hours or the time in the study. I mean things had to be done right now. Like we had to get a Xerox machine. I described that when Scotty even beat the DOD [Department of Defense] out for a Xerox machine. This is the kind of thing we had to do all the time.

As I say, anybody would have needed a really good level one, but I knew my luck, so I needed even a better one, especially a wiser one and a savvier one, one that could both get it and also keep me out of trouble. Now, I got a lead on a couple of other people who were really quite good, and for various reasons I couldn't have them, either. And somebody kept mentioning, "Well, here's one person. Why don't you take this person?" Well, I happened to know her because she came from air pollution and I'd been in air pollution. I had nothing really against her, you know, as a person, but she'd been a WAC [Women's Army Corps] officer. She was really quite unimaginative. She was a strict by-the-book person. She wasn't brilliant by a long stretch of the imagination. In fact, she was not overly bright. In a regular, routine

operation, for which there was a very accurate book written and you wanted to go by the book, she'd be good. She was steady. She was reliable. She was dependable. And she was honest. But to put her in a situation like that was not fair to me. It wasn't fair to her, definitely.

MOSS: Okay. Okay. So what we wind up with...

HAMILL: And what it turned out to be.... It ended up after a month I kept resisting this because I knew her. I knew her better than Terry and Hundley did. And I kept telling what a tragedy it was. I ended up getting her because it was literally, "You take her or you don't get anybody." Now this is important because—let me go back to a promise that Jim Hundley had made to me. And that is, "If you run into trouble, promise me you'll let me know." I promised him here. I told him. I told him, "I don't need this for my comfort. I need it because I can't handle this. It's not that I'm running scared. I know fairly well what I can do and what I can't do."

MOSS: Okay. And what was his response to this?

HAMILL: "Well, we'll do the best we can."

MOSS: Yeah. Okay.

HAMILL: "We'll do the best we can."

MOSS: Okay. So what you wind up with is someone who really can't fill in for you.

HAMILL: Absolutely right! In fact, what it turned out to be, she fought me.

MOSS: Okay. Okay. So you...

HAMILL: She would throw the book at me. She became an obstructionist. And then I not only didn't have her help, but then I had to go to the added thing of devising ways to get around her.

MOSS: Okay. So between January and March you have this added inconvenience.

HAMILL: Crippling. Let's put it crippling. Because that's what it started to amount to and that's what it really came to.

MOSS: Okay. Is there anything, any other significant change between January and March?

HAMILL: Yeah. Well, it's on the same score, a specific person, a deputy for me.

MOSS: Okay. A deputy for you then.

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HAMILL: And I spent a month and a half looking for the right guy and probably talked to a hundred people, which takes a lot of time.

MOSS: Yeah.

HAMILL: And I pinpointed the specific guy just like the executive officer. You know, I pinpointed. And they promised me, "You can have anybody." And then I found the guy. There was no question about it. I also found out he really was available. I found out this much about him. I found out a lot about him. I also found out kind of through feelers that he would rather, he would probably rather like this, from some outside mutual sources. I used up a lot of things.

MOSS: Okay. What blocked this?

HAMILL: Simply his boss, who was a very powerful guy, Alex Langmuir [Alexander D. Langmuir], didn't want to let him go. And so I was invited and Alex Langmuir is a big wheel.

MOSS: What does he do?

HAMILL: He's the chief of epidemiology for the Communicable Disease Center, one of the top epidemiologists of the world and he has been for twenty-five years. He's a very tough, very egotistical, and damn good, hard driving, and very

senior man to me. So I was invited by Terry and Hundley and a friend, Murray Diamond, who was chief of personnel who I went to for help to say, "We would like to see Alex knocked down a peg." You know, they actually said it. "Go to it." Let me go do it. And, "We'll be delighted if you can knock him down a peg." What the hell I do, shoot him? Well, I did go so far as to.... We had lunch together and I kind of tried to sell him on this thing, of what.... He said, "Gee, it's a brilliant job, and it's pretty exciting. What do you have in mind?" As I say, he was a canny Scotsman, too, you know, to boot all, to boot. He said, "What do you have in mind?" He knew damn well what I had in mind. I think he had gotten tipped off. And I said, "Well, I've got a great job for somebody." And he said, "You're doing a great job." I said, "Well, you know, I can't do it all myself." He said, "Well, I know that, but what are you after?" He said, "Let me know and I'll.... if I can help you." I said, "Well"—I didn't want to tip off right then and there that I had a specific guy. He said, "I'll tell you what I'll do. I'll invite you down to my shop in Atlanta and you can tell your story and if you can talk anybody into coming, no pressure or anything like that, you talk them into freely coming, you can have them." Well, I knew then he'd thought of who I was after. That was his assistant, Don Henderson. And I also knew.... I kind of got some feedback he'd told a couple of people—it had gotten back to me—that he, that under no circumstances.... Don Henderson wasn't about to want to come. Then I went back to Hundley and Terry and said, "What should I do?" And they said, "Find somebody else."

MOSS: Okay. Let's turn this.

HAMILL: Okay.

[BEGIN SIDE II TAPE I]

HAMILL: I have to keep on this because this is very pivotal. This isn't just saying they reneged on a promise, you know, an extremely central one. But it's also laying the groundwork for a lot of subsequent things that occurred.

MOSS: Okay. You've documented several cases now in which you were not able to get the personnel you wanted nor were you able to get adequate substitutes for the personnel you wanted. Okay...

HAMILL: This person was even more important that the executive officer.

MOSS: Okay. This takes us up, what, to the March meeting?

HAMILL: Yeah.

MOSS: Okay.

HAMILL: Let me draw on this just a second further because when I talked to Hundley.... Well, no. He would almost say in a critical way, "You've got to make up your mind." Somewhere around by March—and I could see this a hell of a lot clearer than he could—of whether you're going to be the administrator or the brains. You can't kind of be both. You know, in time, you just don't have that much time.

MOSS: Okay. What was your reaction to this?

HAMILL: I could see this very clearly. We had already kind of gone through the thing that we couldn't get an executive director. We'd gone through that the previous fall. And there was nothing new on the horizon. So whether I liked it or not, I was going to have to be the executive director, and then I would have to get what I was going to do if I could get Don Henderson. And he would have to kind of pick up part of my dream and I would sketch out and kind of direct, but I would also have him a little bit of his own plan, that I'd have to change.... I was willing to make that compromise, drop part of my substantive dream to get this damn job done. I could very clearly see what I was getting committed to was going to be rather difficult in two lifetimes to carry out. But I was also getting to see that Hundley had no intention on honoring this thing. I was almost starting to, you know, a drowning type of thing, no response. No response, kind of tough. The Langmuir thing was.... I never fully recovered from that for an important reason. It wasn't only that I didn't get the necessary man, but I also knew, I mean, there was no question, but they were not going to honor some promises and commitments and I didn't, frankly, didn't know how I was going to solve some of these problems, frankly and honestly.

MOSS: Okay. So you reached for...

HAMILL: And I had nobody to go to.

MOSS: You reached back for your resources and they weren't there.

HAMILL: Right. And I had almost nobody to go to. In the meantime, I promised, on the basis of what the surgeon general had told me, the different committee members all this extraordinary support, and I meant to deliver it if it was at all humanly possible. I mean I just pledged that. And I did one other thing that kind of perhaps got me into trouble, and that is like a real good whore who every man thinks he's the only one, I think in my enthusiasm in all honesty and also to get the job done better and I don't know why else, but I won't.... I almost, with each different committee guy somehow I must have transmitted that his sub-area was special over everybody else's, and I was doing special things for his. I mean any guy could have sat back, you know, if he realized, if each one of the guys realized I was committed as heavily to the other nine guys as I was to him, any guy could have sat back and said, "Impossible." You know, "Impossible."

But I got in that deeply. I got in that deeply. And I think I knew it better than any other single person because, for a couple of reasons. I knew the area better than any other single person. I knew what the problems to be solved were because I'm the one who was, you might say, really setting the intellectual scope of this study, the heart and soul of the study. Terry and Hundley kind of set some kind of a title, you might say, but the heart and soul thing, I was setting that. I was also beginning to understand that Hundley.... I was having less and less contact with Terry now, you know, progressively, but I guess, you know, of necessity and I kind of understood it but I didn't like it because I somehow liked Terry and felt a little safer with Terry than I did with Hundley. Hundley was a hard man. I smelled this all along and it was subsequently proved. He was hard on himself. He was hard on everybody else, and he also was a rather practical man in his things proved. I smelled this. Every man responds to pressure in different ways and he responded to pressure by saving his own skin. I'll be coming back to that. I'll make this statement probably ten times during this tape. That's the way he resolved pressure by saving his own skin regardless of commitments, promises. There was no such thing as honor. I guess I smelled that. So I didn't like the idea of Terry kind of receding more in the background. I could have gone to him. He'd always said to me he's accessible, but in fact, he was just becoming more and more distant and Hundley was becoming more and more imminent. Increasingly Hundley was becoming a little more impatient to get the job done, whatever the job was.

MOSS: How did he make this known?

HAMILL: Well, in the March meeting he wanted to kind of soup up the speed with which conclusions were being reached by the different subcommittees. I was very much against this for one very important reason. I was ready to make some kinds of decisions myself, substantive decisions on such-and-such is the state of knowledge, or, let's say.... I'll give you a specific example. One of the early areas was: Is there really existing, in our whole body of scientific knowledge in the world, evidence that tobacco tars truly cause cancer of any

kind in any kind of among the human organism? That's a very key sub-question to be answered. Early in the game.... Well, there was a point at which I made up my mind in assessing all the evidence, and it was Yeah. However, the several—there were two or three, this particular kind of a question—this is one of the questions that two or three kinds of people in the larger cancer area were handling in their own different ways. One chemist from his standpoint, one of the pathologists, and the geneticist, and general cancer man.

MOSS: And you had to wait until all the perspectives were in.

HAMILL: Each individual hadn't quite made up his mind yet, or at least he hadn't revealed it to me, but so that was.... Obviously I had no right to even reveal the fact that I had come to a conclusion, and try to either in any way influence

them to come to a conclusion prematurely, but even more important was, on some of the real key areas, what I was going to try to get these guys to do even when they came to the conclusion was to not make it known to the other members of the committee for a while because this is one of the key things that I even wanted the pharmacologist, some of the other people to start making their own conclusions.

MOSS: You wanted independent conclusions.

HAMILL: Right. Right. And kind of like insights, you know, each man has to come to it at his own speed. Hundley was becoming impatient to come on. You know, come on, let's get this stuff...

MOSS: Have you got any idea why he was impatient?

HAMILL: No. No. Well, you mean at the time or in retrospect?

MOSS: Yeah. At the time. At the time. Well, let's separate the two as a book.

HAMILL: Well, that's okay. At the time, I was very annoyed with him because he had no right to do this because this was absolutely contrary to what Luther Terry had promised us. And that is, I'll go back, neither he nor Jim Hundley nor Peter Hamill would dictate the scope, speed, or nature of conclusions. Hundley was violating this.

MOSS: Okay. Did you point this out to him?

HAMILL: Not in a fighting way. He was three ranks higher. I tried to suggest this. I was, you know, kind of vulnerable. I was, in retrospect, I didn't fight with him the way I should have all along the way. I was in a vulnerable position. And I was going badly in debt personally. I mean I needed a special promotion. This kind of complicates things, and then, so forth. I was going more in debt because of this damn study.

But anyway, several things were occurring. This was rightly irritating me. I didn't know what real authority I had in the sense of not only just seemly, what was seemly for me to do in fighting with Hundley. Hell, he was the assistant surgeon

general and I was—I think I had two and a half stripes, maybe three. I don't recall. But, you know, he had two stars. You know, that's rather a wide hip [inaudible]. I found myself in a funny position, you know, in authority, and also what was bothering me even more was the fact that I was beginning to realize he was becoming less sympathetic to the real problems. I mean he's fairly superficial intellectually. I mean that's definitely my judgment today, and I was becoming.... I was hoping it wasn't quite true then, but I was reluctantly coming to that conclusion, and that he didn't really see the magnitude of a lot of the problems, the substantive problems. I mean, I tested this out quite a few times because he just didn't follow

a lot of the arguments. He didn't see quite a number of times where the real pivot point was in a lot of arguments. That's the best test of all, you know, of whether a guy really understands what's going on.

But both intellectually he was, I realized he was not quite with it and also definitely emotionally. He wanted, "Let's get on with the thing. Let's get some answers. Let's get the," you know, "Let's get the report done. Let's get some decisions made." He was actually starting to goad the committee a little bit. He had no right to do this. I was becoming very protective about the committee. This was kind of my committee. And we.... still trying to get to your question as to why, at the time, I really didn't know. He used the term one time—I think, the March meeting—we were spinning our wheels in sand. And I became quite unhappy with this and I was rather powerless to do much about it and I was trying to dope out. I would talk to B.J. about some of these things. And I was trying to dope out what some of the pressures were, why it was like that, but I was more or less just attributing to the fact that he was kind of a nervous, hard-driving guy. He was impatient. He was just impatient. I think one of the reasons I was interpreting this as impatience was the fact that, as I would get on to.... When he and I would talk about something, Hundley and I, he would listen quite carefully when I was talking about superficial substance or, you know, we're doing such-and-such and we're getting this far. As soon as I'd get to what really interested me, the real, the deeper underlying stuff, I would lose him. And then he'd become.... He would start interrupting me. He'd actually become impatient.

MOSS: Okay. Does...

HAMILL: In retro....That's in...

MOSS: Okay. Go ahead.

HAMILL: That's in trying to assess it at the time. In retrospect, I think I can give a little different kind of interpretation in retrospect. And that is, number one, he really didn't appreciate the best part of the arguments and the best part of the effort. I guess he just doesn't have the equipment to understand what we're talking about, frankly. But also, he was getting some pressure somewhere. That part I'm quite sure in retrospect, to get results, to get this report out.

MOSS: Okay. Do you know what pressure, from where?

HAMILL: No. This part I.... Well, I know...

MOSS: What leads you to that conclusion?

HAMILL: Oh, well, because of what happened in March, I mean what happened in May.

MOSS: What happened in May. Okay. Okay. We'll get to that. A couple of things happened in late February. Briggs [John F. Briggs], President of the American Chest Physicians College...

HAMILL: American College of Chest Physicians?

MOSS: Yeah.

HAMILL: Briggs?

MOSS: ... is reported as saying that the health effects are only an inference by statisticians.

HAMILL: Briggs. Briggs.

MOSS: Briggs.

HAMILL: I don't remember the name.

MOSS: American Chest Physicians College?

HAMILL: American College of Chest Physicians.

MOSS: Yeah. President. Okay. Now this...

HAMILL: He made this public? This is out of a newspaper clipping?

MOSS: This is out of the *New York Times*, February 23rd

HAMILL: 1963.

MOSS: Right.

HAMILL: Okay.

MOSS: Right. He says that the health effects of smoking are only an inference by statisticians. This is degrading the whole controversy.

HAMILL: Right.

MOSS: Okay. And on 12 March...

HAMILL: 12 March.

MOSS: ... the AMA [American Medical Association] dropped its planned study and said it would rely on the PHS [Public Health Service] study.

HAMILL: Good. Yeah.

MOSS: Okay? Now do you think these had anything to do with it? Do you think that the fact that the AMA said, "We're going to drop," would have had any effect on Hundley and Terry in pushing you harder?

HAMILL: The AMA possibly. The American College of Chest Physicians, I would say probably no because politically they weren't particularly important. They may have influenced Hundley somewhat. He was sensitive to those kinds of things and he probably would have gotten quite irritated if this came up, in fact, it probably did because I would probably have some kind of, one of my usual remarks like, "What a dumb son of a bitch," you know, to what Briggs said. And then Hundley, who was sensitive to people like that saying things like that would be irritated with me. You know, when I would make a stand like that, I was right. This guy was just stating this out of sheer ignorance.

MOSS: Okay.

HAMILL: But he would, and kind of rightly so, be immensely irritated with my kind of, you know, sweeping this thing aside. I don't think that was the chief source, though. I think as the events proved, I'm sure it was political. I'm positive of that. I know it was. He told me.

MOSS: Okay. Was there anything between March and May that is significant along these lines that you really...

HAMILL: Well, let me go back to Hundley saying, "spinning the wheels in sand," and you know, trying to goad the committee.

MOSS: Okay.

HAMILL: Why I say he had no right to because at that meeting again, this was the third time the cock crew, crowed, or whatever a cock does in retrospect. Does he crew, crow, crown? [Laughter] But anyway, at this March 8th and 9th, meeting, or whatever the dates were, Terry again.... He and I talked this over before the meeting when Hundley was there and B.J. was there, when we said the scope, the time. I used the term before this meeting, this was the March meeting, "What if it takes us seven years?" And he said, "That's your decision." Okay?

MOSS: Okay.

HAMILL: This was a half hour before the meeting. We had kind of a little briefing session because we were more or less now.... It was kind of Terry,

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Hundley, me, and B.J., we were kind of the controlling group now, I guess. This wasn't formalized, but....

MOSS: A triad.

HAMILL: Yeah. This was kind of, I guess, how it evolved, at least for that time. And it was at this meeting, probably the next day, that Hundley both criticized me and was trying to goad the committee into speeding up. And right after these remarks of Luther Terry's. So either Hundley was acceding to some other kind of pressure than Terry had, or another kind of a thing which isn't quite as pleasant and that is, Terry wasn't being honest when he made that statement, which has to be entertained. If it was because I can't quite.... In all honesty, at that time, it still could have been Jim Hundley responding to pressure as he perceived it as his job to get something done for Terry. Okay? That's a possible...

MOSS: Yeah. It's kind of like your situation with what is a cause of a disease. You may have a number of independent things acting and you can't pinpoint any one of them.

HAMILL: Also a pressure is a pressure only as it is perceived as a pressure in one way. And as I say, it could have been Hundley's perceived pressure. That's possible. I'll entertain that, you know, as a possibility in March 8th and 9th. And that is, I don't, even in retrospect, don't have the evidence to say, to accuse, which it would be an accusation, that Luther Terry actually lied to us in March 8th and 9th. I don't have that evidence. Nor do I, frankly, even want to make that interference. It's a real possibility. But I'll leave it fifty-fifty and honestly even in retrospect, in all honesty.

Now, March 8th was a critical point in that we had our first meetings with outside people in that we had the.... Let's see, Liggett & Myers was having their research done by, under contract with the Arthur D. Little Company, a very reputable, you know, great.... In fact, they were almost the original R.D. Company, and they started fifty years ago. And Charlie Kensler [Charles Kensler], professor of pharmacology, an ex-professor of pharmacology, a very bright guy, was the specific director. Dr. Kensler was the specific director of the Arthur D. Little effort. And I had several meetings with Kensler and several of.... Louis Fieser did; several committee members did. They both knew him and we had a couple of meetings, and then we brought him in to make a formal presentation in presenting their viewpoints on mechanisms, causal mechanisms, both the physical, physiologic, and pharmacologic nature of tobacco smoke, possible mechanisms in cancer causation and also bronchitis and emphysema. And they'd done a lot of work for quite a number of years and

they'd done a lot of work. Whether we can call them completely biased or unbiased or not, but I'm, even today, I'm not willing to hazard a guess, in all honesty. I would even, I would tend to discount it a little bit, just a little bit. By and large it was good work, very good work, and I mean, generally was completely honest. But I would discount it just a little tiny bit. And I think all work is biased, as I've said several times, and this just possibly a little more biased than, you know, other....

But they were very helpful in giving us some clues. They made available their data, sources of data and made a really good professional presentation, plus, this was a

prototype. It was not only we were getting our teeth into outside input, but it was also a prototype of how we might proceed in both evaluating and utilizing, the combination of the two things, outside and, you might say, almost semi-hostile, I mean on kind of an administrative level because in a way, kind of indirectly, although they were an independent scientific group, they were still being under contract to a tobacco company. So in that way they were kind of a semi-hostile, or potentially hostile source. But, as far as I was concerned, their data had to be reconciled whether they were officially enemies and foreigners or not, if they had good stuff, I don't care where it came from, whether it came from the moon or where it came from, it had to be answered. It had to be drawn into the mainstream of whatever we were talking about and either proved or disproved and allowed to speak its piece. I didn't care where it came from. The only thing I demanded was, it was intelligent. That's all I cared and that's what it was. So this kind of helped define some methodology and we were still.... While we were proceeding with our subject, we were also constantly talking about procedure, how we were going to proceed. Okay?

Now, I couldn't get an adequate executive officer and I kept telling them I wasn't satisfied. So they made another kind of a—do you mind me using expressions?

MOSS: No.

HAMILL: I mean I hope your girls don't.... another half-ass compromise. And that's all it was again. A real bright gal from the Cancer Institute, Zelda Schiffman, was kind of a special assistant to the director in her field, was kind of organizational management or whatever; let's see if I can use a.... She was an immensely bright gal and kind of a super specialist in, kind of a consultant in management, you might say, and how to devise optimal ways of tackling problems and organizing what resources you had. Okay? Do you follow me?

MOSS: Yeah.

HAMILL: Okay. Well, as Zelda.... We became quite close friends. And she explained to me later more or less the reason they were so generous with her time was that they didn't know what the hell to do with her in the Cancer Institute. This was kind of the same old story again with the broken down biostatistician they pawned off on me,

the lush for the professional writer, a couple of real clunkers as secretaries. It was the same old story again, but Zelda happened to be a very bright gal, but they weren't spending a damn penny, literally.

Now, I tried to explain to.... she had some use. But it also took to use a management consultant wisely you have to spend an immense amount of time with them. I tried to explain to Hundley, "This isn't what I need. I need somebody who can save me time, not put more demands on my time." Okay? But I did agree to go along with Zelda. She recognized the problem, what my problem was in our very first meeting. She said, "You don't need me. You need somebody who can do your work," you know, "part of your work for you. That's not what I do." She was a very bright gal, very intuitive and very sympathetic. But she couldn't solve my problems and she knew it. And I knew it. And yet, the powers that be said this is all you get or this is who you get or this is who you need. And we both knew damn well, better than anybody else, this isn't what I need. I needed somebody, but the administrative officer

that I got. And Zelda and I very quickly.... She agreed that there wasn't much I could do with this administrative or executive officer that I had. She did help me to that extent, that is, I didn't try to use her very much, but she said she didn't have a solution. You know, she couldn't get me another one. She had no power. She couldn't remake this gal. This gal didn't like her. She wouldn't even talk to her. [Laughter] So she couldn't help me there. All she could do a little bit was advise me possibly on how to get around her, which took a lot of energy and time and conniving and stuff.

And then more or less what she did was—and she knew this was happening and she really, honestly felt very sympathetic—was more or less telling me what I already knew. I didn't have the proper staff to do the job. That's what our conclusion was both at the very beginning when we first sat down and looked at each other. And then after I'd done immense hours of work that she had suggested that I do so we could really analyze the thing so we can kind of put it in writing and we made what she called, made up what she and I ended up starting to call our laundry list of what had to be done, the tasks to be performed, and then try to figure out how in God's name they were going to get performed. We were getting to this point now. These did have some use, some real use, and that is, to help focus, you know, some of the problems, not only for me and her, but also to the individual committee members. They were starting to realize, "We're in trouble." And they were starting to see.... This laundry list was listing all the different.... To start with in January I kept kind of the subcommittees apart, but now when I had these huge laundry lists, they were pages and pages. I concocted huge charts of—I forget all the columns, but one of them was the task to be performed, how we were going to go about it, what our time schedule was. I tried to get some overall integrated plans, what kind of reports we needed, how many consultants we were going to have. This was for every area. And this was maybe thirty or forty areas by now because the subcommittee areas we had even broken down into components, and how this thing was going to be accomplished, and some of these I have just big question marks. How it would be accomplished frequently was just a big damn question mark.

So then I was beginning to.... I was getting counsel from several sources and also almost out of desperation on my own started to throw more pressure on the committee, whether this is their contract or not, they're big boys. And if they're confronted with this, you know, the magnitude of the problem, some will volunteer and say, "Okay, we'll do it." And some will kind of, can be shamed into doing it. And if I protested and I really protested this to Hundley, this wasn't the agreement. This was not the bargain, absolutely. And his answer was essentially, "Well, kid, that's the realities of life." You know, "We've got to get a job done." This was the one thing I would fight about and I did when he tampered with the committee. And I would fight him on this. When he did what I call screwing me, I almost, I didn't quite know how to fight him. It was almost like a father clobbering his son, and in some ways there's no way to fight back. And I didn't know what rights I had or, you know, anything like that. And I also felt like I kind of partially got myself into it, so, you know, I'll have to get myself out.

But the committee, I'd fight them on that one. And then I was also beginning to realize that he was rather skilled at turning deaf ears to, convenient deaf ears to things like past agreements. And I also was perceiving another trick of his, which I guess is necessary for a lot of administrators, I don't know. He could ignore things that would cause both inefficiency and inconvenience to an incredible degree whether he

had what I considered an obligation or not. He could somehow.... Well, let me put it another way. He could sacrifice obligations on the altar of expediency very, very nicely, or necessity or, you know, you can use a lot of different kinds of terms.

Zelda was with me for quite a number of months. She kept protesting both to me and in all honesty because I say we became good friends, and also out in the open to these committees she was saying, "I don't know what I'm doing here. I don't know what I'm doing here." And this was in all honesty. She and I kind of agreed on balance that she did help organize some things, help my thinking. We invented the term laundry list together and kind of a way of rating some flow charts. But she also agreed that the cost of time and energy on my part which I could ill afford possibly wasn't worth it. And she was, you know, completely honest on this score that, you know, in the end it might not have even been worth it. And Hundley was becoming kind of increasingly indifferent to these kind of costs, but not willing to spend a damn thing on costs of other parts of the Public Health Service. And I guess his technique was just to kind of keep whipping the horse, you know, just kind of apply more pressure and more pressure on what you've already got and somehow you come out with something. Okay? Well, between March and May, March 8th to May 6th, or whatever it was, I never saw Jim Hundley, never saw him. He wasn't available to me by phone or anything. This was also a violation of....

MOSS: Did you try to see him?

HAMILL: Oh, you bet I did. This was also a violation of every kind of an agreement that was possible.

MOSS: What about Terry?

HAMILL: No. He was.... even then he became almost unreachable,, And I was more or less politely informed to quit trying to reach him. I mean the doors were starting to close. Hundley wouldn't answer my calls frequently. I'd put in a phone call, which, you know, legitimately he'd be busy and he'd.... But then he wouldn't return a call. I had some pretty damn crucial things to decide with him. When he did answer them, I couldn't come down to see him, ever, even though I was the one who was going to do the traveling. (But we kept on with our job and making progress the best we could.) See, I was out at the National Library. He was downtown. It would take all my time to do the traveling, but he didn't have time to see me. And when we did talk, he either really didn't understand what I was talking about or else was operating on another wavelength. He was becoming increasingly less accessible. Terry, almost totally inaccessible, and Hundley increasingly and rather abruptly.

He did make a statement, first to me and then to the committee and I don't remember whether it was at the March meeting or the May meeting, "Gentlemen, if you can't do the job, we'll do the job. We, the Public Health Service." I think it was the May meeting. I'm quite sure it was the May meeting. I think he suggested that to me at the March meeting privately, and searching around.... Yeah, I think he—in this "spinning the wheels in sand" pleasant little fatherly talk he gave me when he pulled me aside one time. I guess that's when he first broached this. Well, you can imagine how that sat with me. I had Zelda and all of her sympathy and also, in

some ways, she did more damage, not on purpose, but by forcing on me the magnitude of the problem that I already pretty well knew, that it was becoming, as we were going, damn near insoluble, that we just didn't have the resources. I didn't have that many years of my life and that many hours in the day type of thing.

Starting in March we definitely started talking in terms of how long. I was starting to agonize. I wanted to get the damn thing done just to get out of it. The committee members, some of the committee members wanted to go. Hickam had already finished most of his job. Three or four of the others, about half the guys that had really gotten under way and had done a lot of work, and they were starting to feel a lot of pressures on their own time, their regular jobs at the university. And they were a little anxious to get the job done. Some of the guys hadn't even started yet, hadn't started anything, nothing, just kept putting it off. And the most important single man who was Len Schuman [Leonard M. Schuman], the epidemiologist, hadn't done a damn thing yet, not a thing, and he was the most important single man, well, he and Bill Cochran. And Bill Cochran had started quite a bit of work. He was the statistician. But Len hadn't done a thing yet. In fact, my first meeting—I had had meetings with Len—but our first meeting with any kind of a subcommittee was in June.

MOSS: Was why?

HAMILL: He was so busy. He was a man—and he admitted—he was always five times over-committed on what he could do. That was the nature of his life. And that's what we more or less laughed and he agreed to my imagery that not only do you have to back him up in a corner and put a gun at his head, you also have to convince him that it's loaded and you also have to convince him that you've cocked the trigger, and you've also got to convince him that you're going to shoot if necessary. Then he'll start to work because he's that over-committed all the time chronically.

Our first meeting was up at Saratoga Springs, New York in, I'm sure it was the first of June, first part of June. That was our first subcommittee meeting. Okay. So I was no longer really—when I use the term seven years, I mean, I've slit my throat if it was going to take seven years. I just couldn't have endured it, at least at that pace for seven years. I was coming close to my endurance anyway, literally, and I knew it. I was still by and large feeling real good. I was still working immense hours and more or less really vigorous. But also I knew myself. Up in the Yukon, I remember when I ran a hospital I'd almost reached the breaking point one time on number of hours and tasks to be set and so forth. And I kind of went over the hill one time in the sense—what I mean by going over the hill, I mean, you're not refreshed when you sleep, you're starting to, you know, if you know yourself, you're running downhill. Each day you're a little weaker. Your spring is a little less. Your level of frustration is a little lower, not quite as optimistic. Your strength isn't quite as great. In football or boxing we call it, you don't recover from your injuries as quickly. It's the same thing, same kind of thing. They both hurt more and they last longer, and then when you know you're really over the hill is that before you recover from one, you get another injury. That's when the wise guy retires from football, when that happens. I wasn't quite to that stage yet but I knew I was, you know, not a...

MOSS: Okay.

[-120-]

HAMILL: I didn't know whether it was two months away or maybe with luck eight months away, but I knew it wasn't three years away. I knew that. There was no question about that. And I was suggesting this to Hundley. In fact, I told him. And then in April, I had a couple more subcommittee meetings. I got sick at one of them, some kind of a bug and it kind of knocked me on my fanny. It was a couple of day thing, but that kind of.... It not only knocked me on my fanny at the time, but also presaged to me that I'm not indestructible and that possibly if I stayed at this abnormal level of energy, I might be able to get the thing done with extraordinary luck. But the slightest bad luck or drop in energy and absolutely impossible. I mean I knew something about myself and sickness. I'd spent a year in bed from tuberculosis when I was in medical school, so I know something about rotting from sickness and inactivity, which is, I guess, for a vigorous person probably the worst threat that can possibly happen. And in April, as I say, I got sick. I was in New York. I got sick. And this scared me, frankly.

Anyway, let's see what other—there was another.... one other element of how the Public Health Service operates. There was one other guy who figures in the picture. His name was Dick Prindle [Richard Prindle]. He's an assistant surgeon general. He was my chief in air pollution, and he literally stole the study from me. When I was gone for two years, I'd done the best study ever done in the history of air pollution of the U.S. Public Health Service, and he published the damn thing as the author while I was gone. I didn't know anything about him publishing it. There were five authors. I wasn't even one of the authors. It was a hundred percent.... I designed the study. I thought it up. And I ran the entire thing. This is one of the.... This happens. I mean this isn't the first time anything like that's happened, but this does happen. Dick was bright, one of the most ambitious men I've ever known in my life, very slick. I still rather like him in a way, in a way. I wouldn't trust him as far as I could throw a horse....

Jim Hundley, whom I couldn't see, did me the great honor—Prindle didn't quite know what he wanted to do with the time. He was still chief of air pollution, but he was looking for bigger things. And now that I had a great access to both Hundley and Terry, he was kind of.... He'd call me periodically. And he was trying to get at Hundley, and trying to get the relationship with Hundley, which he ended up succeeding. He was selected as chief of the Division of Public Health Methods, which was very important at that time, very important. That's what he got out of this relationship. But he'd started the relationship a few months before working in his [inaudible] most heard about in January. Hundley had the great heart to.... I couldn't see Hundley, but Hundley sent Dick Prindle out to me to—I'm not quite sure what for, I never have known to kind of assess the situation, I guess, ostensibly to help. But I don't know what the hell he could have done as far as help. He wasn't going to work on my staff. Any time anybody assesses anything it takes, you know, more time again. And I'm also quite sure I'd previously told Hundley what I felt about Dick Prindle. I'm not positive. I'm not positive about that. I'm not going to make that claim, but I think I had indicated in some way or either directly or indirectly and that's the emissary that I had about a week before the May meeting.

In retrospect, I presume, Hundley and Terry were kind of assessing what the hell to do with this study. They've got certain kinds of pressures. There's no question

about that. By May they were having, there's no question, both having, you know, marked pressures. I know they got pressured directly from the White House. I don't know where all else. I just don't know.

MOSS: Okay. Okay. Now, you know they got pressures from the White House. How do you know this?

HAMILL: Because Hundley, I think, told me specifically from the White House. He told me what some of the pressures were and what some of the reasons were. I forced him to tell me.

MOSS: Okay. What did he say?

HAMILL: Well, he told me, when the May meeting came out, that the ultimatum was kind of, "Gentlemen, the game is over. The honeymoon is over. It was an illusion that you were autonomous and these, you know, you're deluded that you had various kinds of promises. In the real world we have to get a report out by the end of this year. Let's quit screwing around. Let's get the report out. We're just messing around." That's almost what he said, not, I mean, certainly not in those words, but in essence that's what he said. It was enough of a confrontation so the committee formally invoked their previous authority and kicked both Hundley and me out to have a private executive session of just the ten to almost decide how they're going to respond to this incredible new statement. First, I think, each one of them either asked me directly in a break what this meant and kind of what part I had in all this. And they were satisfied that it hit me just like it hit them, that is, I didn't know a damn thing about it until just then and there, and I was perhaps even more outraged than they were. This lasted for a couple of hours, this executive session. Then they called Hundley back in and made several kinds of both statements.... Then they broke up again. They called him back in for some clarification, first, what some of the alternatives were. And he spelled out there weren't many alternatives. "Either you guys do the report, you guys, you ten essentially do the report yourself with your own kind of resources, or else we kind of more or less, Terry and I, use the resources of the Public Health Service and write the report for you." I mean that was just about spelled out that way.

MOSS: Did anybody look on this as a bluff?

HAMILL: Yeah. In fact, several guys thought Hundley was always all bluff. None of the guys ever took Hundley really—I'm not positive—that more or less the attitude.... They more or less never took him a hundred percent seriously, not as a joker, but you know, they more or less called him a lightweight.

MOSS: Because just on the face of it, it looks as if, say, Hundley and Terry had dismissed the committee and decided to do it themselves, this would jeopardize the whole thing tremendously.

HAMILL: Oh certainly. Absolutely no question about that. Absolutely no question about that. In some ways it almost definitely was a bluff and I can't imagine anybody, you know, recognizing it wasn't. But what the prices of calling the bluff were on both sides is, you know, another story. They, I'm sure Hundley and Terry correctly assessed most of these guys had enough pride and were committed enough so that they weren't about to walk out under any circumstances, under any circumstances as a group. It was possible that a few people might, you know, a couple of individuals might. That was possible, but as a group, probably not. And they were right. Hundley later told me later in the day after he was called back in for the second time and kind of finally. He later came out to

my office since that night in October when he was so dead tired and we had reached a kind of understanding, that I was more or less doing him a favor.

At this time was about the only other time that he was a really warm human being. And he came out and almost all honesty and told me that he frankly was surprised at the amount of respect that—I think he used that—that he was surprised at the amount of respect that I had gained from all the members of the committee and that of the amount of praise for my efforts was just absolutely unlimited,. And he said he was almost stunned. And he also said.... One of the guys I was having trouble with—frankly, Louis Fieser was one of the.... and he and I actually.... He's the only one I ever really had a fight with. He was a tough old guy and Hundley said he was one of the most outspoken guys in praise of me. And he was the only committee member I ever had a fight with. I had a fight with him.

Now, I would guess that.... This is an assessment or break down even in this past six years, I've done a lot, of course, hundreds and hundreds of hours of replaying these things, but right now this is a, I think, an assessment I just came to now. I'm almost sure of that, sending Prindle out and his almost admission of how surprised he was. He more or less in some kind of words, that's what he said, how surprised he was. It wasn't just that this incredible praise, but how surprised he was that this was the case. Apparently, they made some tentative judgments of possibly scraping me or something like that, you know, trying to [inaudible] get this report done, with or without me, or, you know, anything else. And this, I would almost guess—this is interesting, you know—maybe I was part of the challenge to the committee. And it was a real challenge, and also made it part of the challenge was, you know, to find out if the thing was not proceeding as fast as they, Terry and Hundley, thought it should go, if maybe I was the bottleneck. You know, that possible and honest type of assessment from their standpoint.

I think it knocked him off his stride, I think he made up his mind on some other courses of action before these meetings ever started, you know, in this March to May interval. I think this knocked him off his stride because, for one thing, what he really believed, I don't know, you know, and what he.... but what he was told and had to believe whether he liked it or not. The committee was going to do the job, you know, both as individuals and as a group, but they were going to do it with me. I think Hundley was almost fishing, "Do you want me to get rid of him?"—which is, you know, legitimate. And after he in no uncertain terms, you know, that is absolutely unacceptable and several of the committee members later told me they literally told him, "You've got to get rid of yourself before you can do that." And they had some bitter words apparently on the status. Several of the committee members then really accused Hundley and Terry of reneging on the promise of staff support and not to

blame it on me because they knew damn well that it was not my fault because several of them had been in my office enough to know what the real situation was, that I had no staff, and they told them right out in this meeting. And Hundley admitted part of that to me. I know it knocked him off stride and he had no choice but to go along with what the committee said, but what he really, you know, deeply wanted I'll never know in my life. There's no way, you

know, to ever know. And that is whether he also, independent of what the committee demanded, would have said it is necessary for me to continue or not.

MOSS: Okay. Let me cut this.

[BEGINSIDE I TAPE II]

MOSS: Right. Now on the business of pressure from the White House, you said that Dr. Hundley told you specifically that there was such pressure and what kind of pressure it was. Did he tell you specifically who it came from?

HAMILL: Let me try to get as clearly as I possibly can on this. First, the time in which he told me, I think, it was that afternoon after this extraordinary session, but it may have been a week later when he and I started having quite a few more conferences, but it was either that day or within about a week or so. I mean, I almost demanded an explanation. Now, I'll try to reconstruct the explanation as best I possibly can. He kind of acknowledged the fact that this was, I mean, he had no.... He acknowledged the fact that this was a departure from, you know, our previous agreements. Okay. He never would tell me and, of course, I had no right to ask specifically precisely who the pressure came from. That part, I mean, as far as a person, I don't know, you know, who *the* person is.

MOSS: You never heard any name mentioned?

HAMILL: No. Oh, I mean, what he was describing.... Let me try to go back to say more or less what he said.

MOSS: Okay.

HAMILL: He said the election is in November of '64. For God's sake, they're having enough.... One of the biggest problems is the border states anyway, that, I mean, that's well known. And unfortunately these same border states are the tobacco states. So this really poses a problem for the November election. Are we still working?

MOSS: Yeah. We're okay. We're okay. I just had the volume turned up so I was getting feedback.

HAMILL: Okay. Now, it is necessary, it is necessary to get the report out in this calendar year, so that the impact of the report and repercussions of the report will be greatly diminished by the time next November comes

around. And whatever repairs and fence building are necessary can be done after the report comes out. I emphatically stated, I mean, these were the parts when I would be emphatic, but this is not only the time is agreed, you know, a change from what our promise was and also the whole spirit, the recognition of political consequences or repercussions of any kind were supposed to be totally outside. We specifically stated, "Let the chips fall where they may." As I say, it was.... and I stated this very emphatically. He was trying to be patient with me. I know he was trying to persuade me rather than bludgeon me. He was trying to persuade me or perhaps the desirability, but if not the desirabilities, then the necessity for this kind of a decision. He was being unusually patient with me, more than usual, and I was resisting quite a bit. I think it was the afternoon of the—that afternoon. He used the term White House. That part, there's no question. I know he used the term White House. Who was Gravel Gertie in the Democratic Party?

MOSS: All right.

HAMILL: He might have used this gal's name, too.

MOSS: Was it Dorothy Davies?

HAMILL: No. It's this gal from Texas.

MOSS: How about a Mrs. Bush? Randolph?

HAMILL: Names don't sound familiar.

MOSS: None of them?

HAMILL: No.

MOSS: Okay.

HAMILL: She was either Democratic National Committee woman ...

MOSS: That was Randolph.

HAMILL: What's her first name?

MOSS: The initials are R.D.

HAMILL: Unfortunately, Gravel Gertie doesn't help much.

MOSS: No.

HAMILL: Either that or a professional in the Democratic National Party who I was warned, "You better watch out for." I mean kind of friendly, too. I mean not just, you know, not as a threat, but that this gal was a mean one.

[-125-]

MOSS: Katie Louchheim?

HAMILL: No.

MOSS: No?

HAMILL: No. Definitely not that. No. She'd have been an older gal and apparently a real old pro. She had kind of a whiskey baritone and apparently tough as hell.

MOSS: I don't know from that description. I'm just sort of tossing out names.

HAMILL: As I say, the first time I became aware of her—she actually talked to me over the phone, I never met her—was just before the first release of the original committee because I talked to her on the phone. I had enough wits not to slam down the receiver. I think I called Hundley and said, "Who the hell's that?" And I punch him in the nose, you know, kind of in that attitude and he's more or less...

MOSS: Are you sure she was from Texas?

HAMILL: I could be wrong, but gee whiz, I'm almost.... It really ties in. It really ties in. Everything my memory says loads it to, absolutely to Texas. And if a name was used in this connection at this time, if one was used, hers would have been the only name. And there's about a fifty-fifty chance that it was used at this time in this particular circumstance. I think on and searching back, Hundley presented it to me in all.... Yeah. He may have stated that this is not a directive from the White House in that sense. I think now and why this gal's name comes up again, I think, he was indicating the pressure came from the Democratic National Party more than from the White House. I know he used the term White House and that the White House wished it. There's no question about that. That part there's no question that they wished it to some degree, but I think in the sense of almost a directive that that was not the White House, but somewhere in the Democratic National Party. And I think that goes back to this gal again, whoever she is. The more I think about it, the more I think she was from Texas, but she was not a volunteer, but she was a professional in the Democratic National Party.

MOSS: Okay. I may be able to run some of this down for you.

HAMILL: Who was Bailey? Who was...

MOSS: Yeah. Bailey was...

HAMILL: Yeah. Yeah. It was somebody, I'm almost sure it was in that ball park there. Now, at the time, even if this is correct, I'm not sure that I could, you know, believe what he would say. In other words, what he told me

isn't necessarily the truth. I know they got pressure. There's absolutely no question about that and on the political level, but there is a possibility that he would presume would be more acceptable to me to say it was from the Democratic National Party than from the White House. That's a very good possibility.

MOSS: Or from Celebrezze [Anthony J. Celebrezze].

HAMILL: No. Because I think we could have all ignored Celebrezze, honestly, seriously. Of the one thing we all agreed on, we could laugh at Celebrezze. He had the power of nothing. And I was almost invited a couple of times for the fact about the only time Jim Hundley was lighthearted was almost, several times almost inviting me, me to tell Celebrezze to go to hell. That was almost the game of most surgeon generals, with most of the secretaries, but infinitely most with Celebrezze was, I mean, you know, "Who the hell is he?"

Now, when I say I think it was that afternoon, still the weekend of the meeting, he more or less.... He was being quite solicitous of me again or for the first time, and he more or less said, "In view of this," you know, "what do I want to do about it?" And not that as I recall it wasn't in an ugly way or anything like that. I guess he did, and I also think he said, "I don't want your answer now. Think about it for a little bit." Because later on within just a couple of weeks, by the middle of May, he ordered me to take a couple of weeks leave. I guess in fact, it was administrative leave, a week or a couple of weeks. I only took six days and I wanted to get back to work, but he was starting definitely then for the first time to be concerned about how we were going to get the job done and also whether he really wanted to or whether it was without the committee realizing that I was necessary whether he liked it or not, and maybe he did and maybe he didn't. I don't know, and I'll never know. But to get the job done, he had to get it done with me or through me or whatever it was, but he was also able to perceive, not only what I told him, that I was.... because by this time I really started running down, really running down. And I knew it and I started taking a few sleeping pills. And I knew that the time was getting pretty short now, that it maybe.... Maybe I could last for three or four months, but possibly at the end of December, but certainly not into the end of January.

MOSS: Okay. You want to cut this here?

HAMILL: Yeah. Yeah.

MOSS: It is...

HAMILL: And this kind of wraps, this kind of wraps...

MOSS: That segment of...

HAMILL: ... the whole thing up. And you may want to re-ask this kind of question again. I may have....think about it because obviously this is one of our, this is one of...

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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