

Harvey Kitzman Oral History Interview – JFK#1, 12/06/1965
Administrative Information

Creator: Harvey Kitzman
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Biographical Note

Harvey Kitzman (1906-1977) was the regional director of Hubert Humphrey for President in Wisconsin during the 1960 Democratic primary campaign. This interview focuses on the 1960 primary campaign in Wisconsin, among other topics.

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Harvey Kitzman– JFK #1

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Oral History Interview

with

HARVEY KITZMAN

December 6, 1965
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

By Charles T. Morrissey

For the John F. Kennedy Library

MORRISSEY: Where would you like to start?

KITZMAN: Well, I suppose you'd have to go back to the summer of '59 really. In August of '59, Mr. [Hubert H.] Humphrey asked me what I thought of his getting into the Wisconsin primary the following year. I told him I thought it was a pretty good idea, and I told him that I felt--which didn't work out--that he could carry Wisconsin against almost anybody because for a number of years he really was Wisconsin's Senator as far as those of us in labor and any liberal groups were concerned. If we wanted anything to go to Washington, we had very little chance with [Joseph R.] Joe McCarthy or Alexander Wiley, so we'd go to Humphrey. Since I had known him from the days that he was mayor in Minneapolis, I said that I thought that if he had made up his mind he was going to try for the nomination in '60, he ought to get in the Wisconsin primaries. I felt he could carry them. Although around August, while everybody was speculating that Humphrey was going to do this, he really hadn't made any announcements.

MORRISSEY: Did he seem reluctant?

KITZMAN: I don't think he was reluctant. He wasn't quite sure. He looked to me like a man who was scared. Although knowing Hubert Humphrey as well as I do, I

don't think he scares very easily. But this is the kind of a reaction he had. The morning he talked to me about it in his office. . . . I was with him for about an hour, and you know, to stay with Hubert for about an hour would give me a long, long visit. [Laughter] So this is the way he looked to me although I'm sure that he had his mind made up by that time that he was going to do this. Before I left, he then said that, if he did this, whether I would serve as a member of his committee in the state. I said that I would do that and I would do everything I could to help not only financially but in every other way as far as he was concerned. Now this is how I originally got into it.

I also knew Senator Kennedy because I'd been to his office many, many times when he was in the Senate. At first I felt kind of bad for having to choose between what I really considered were both my friends. But I felt that if I was going to do anything at all, I really owed this obligation to Hubert. Not only owed him an obligation--I've always considered him one of the individuals, or among the individuals, who's got ideas and who's not for a status quo, who wants to see America progress, not only individual groups but the whole country. I've always admired his position in that direction, and he did a good job while he was mayor in Minneapolis.

So, I got mixed up in this and went to work. One of the things that I probably did was to see to it that he was able to meet with the--see, as regional director, the biggest part of my membership is in the Wisconsin area (American Motors alone has about twenty-five thousand employees)--leaders of the unions, not only in the United Automobile Workers but in some of the other internationals and locals that belong to other international unions. Now, this didn't always work in every place because I had local unions in the United Automobile Workers who were on the other side of the fence just as strong. We got into no conflict over it because people understood that this was going to happen and I certainly said that everyone had a right in this country to support whom he wanted to.

Then, of course, besides meeting the leaders of these organizations, there was also this business of. . . . Here I have to criticize my own candidate. It was kind of hard at first to get him out of bed at 5:30 in the morning when he was here to get him over to a plant gate. Now this was not true in the case of Jack Kennedy. In fact he insisted. And when 5:30 rolled around, he was out there shaking hands. Hubert sometimes balked on this a little bit.

That's the kind of a role I played, and then also in raising some funds--whatever I could.

MORRISSEY: When you talked to Senator Humphrey in the summer of 1959, at that time did he think that John Kennedy would run a strong campaign in Wisconsin?

KITZMAN: He wasn't quite sure. He felt that maybe John Kennedy would avoid Wisconsin due to the fact that it was a neighboring state to Minnesota and that in the western and northern end of Wisconsin the TV and radio programs spill over from the Twin Cities into Wisconsin. Hubert Humphrey, I'm sure, felt that in the last minute John Kennedy would avoid Wisconsin as far as running in the primary was concerned. I might say that, from what I know of it, a number of people from the state who wanted Jack to come in went into Washington two or three times before he really finally said that he'd come into Wisconsin. So I'm sure that Hubert did not think that he would be in there at first.

MORRISSEY: Were some of the labor leaders suspicious of John Kennedy because of his service on the Senate Labor Committee?

KITZMAN: That is absolutely true. The president of the state AF of L-CIO right here in Wisconsin was certainly suspicious of that, and so were some others. As far as I, personally, was concerned, this was not a factor with me because I didn't know what all the circumstances were, but I was sure that John Kennedy would never deliberately and knowingly do anything to shackle labor. This I didn't believe although there were labor leaders that believed this.

If I might go on, I think in Wisconsin one of the drawbacks that Hubert had was that he had very little organization. When I talk about organization, I mean top-notch, qualified men or women to come in and run the various headquarters. This is an important factor in a campaign. I don't care how good the candidate is, if he doesn't have himself surrounded with some capable people to carry on--to do the so-called "Jimmy Higgins" work--he's in trouble. Hubert did not have this. In fact, he only had what I would call two offices. He had a few strung out throughout the state, but they were just haphazardly run. He

had an office in Madison, and of course he had the headquarters here in Milwaukee. Those were really the only two offices where there was any kind of a coordinated organizational effort. I think this had a lot to do with . . . This was not true in the Kennedy organization. I run around the state a little bit, too, and believe me they had a good organization staffed by good people and by competent people in, I believe, every district in the state. I know there were nine of them. I don't recall whether they had one in the tenth district or not. I know that Jack spent a whole day up there when it was real cold and I was wishing it would have been even colder. [Laughter]

MORRISSEY: I'm surprised that Senator Humphrey didn't get more support from the Wisconsin Democrats--the organized Democrats.

KITZMAN: Well, you see, the chairman of the Wisconsin Democrats, of course, was [Patrick J.] Pat Lucey, who was in Jack Kennedy's corner "lock, stock, barrel, and all." This was also true of a number of the Administrative Committee. I happen to be a member of the Administrative Committee of the Democratic Party, have been ever since, at least, we started being able to meet in a hotel instead of a phone booth. [Laughter] This had a lot to do with it because, while Pat Lucey was saying he was neutral, he never told me that. Of course, he knew I wasn't neutral either. Humphrey just didn't get any support at. . . . I would say this--he didn't get any support from them at all. There's nothing that I know that they did to help him. Now there was nothing really openly done to be completely pro-John Kennedy, but I'm sure that you know as well as I do that the guys that sometimes are neutral do the best work. This I sensed very early in the campaign--that this was going to be a real factor.

Then, of course, Hubert couldn't always get in here when he wanted to either. He missed a number of appointments here. This wasn't true as far as Kennedy was concerned. He had his own plane. He could fly in here any time, fly out. And then the organizational setup.

It became apparent, I would say, as early as March--yes, even the latter end of February, but certainly as early as March--it became apparent that Hubert Humphrey was not going to run away with the state of Wisconsin. In fact, I personally said at that time to some of my very closest friends that, knowing the Milwaukee

area better than anything else in the state, it then became apparent that Jack would take most of the districts.

MORRISSEY: On the basis of a strong campaign?

KITZMAN: Well, two things. On the basis of a strong campaign-- and he campaigned hard; his brothers and sisters were in here. You know, Hubert doesn't have brothers and sisters in that amount. [Laughter] And they're all very capable. I'll say this anyway--they're very capable; they've learned this lesson of politics well. So the campaign was good and strong. The organization was good. You know, when you've got guys like [K. Lemoyne] Lem Billings running a campaign in a district . . . Hubert had nothing like this; he didn't come anywhere near it. He just had people with a big heart and very little know-how.

Then, secondly--and this was really bad--Hubert had to spend more time trying to run around the country scraping up a few dollars for pamphlets and what have you. That, Jack wasn't bothered with. This is the second point.

The third point is that I think in 1960--I have never seen the figures on this; I don't know if it can ever be broken down-- John Kennedy made a tremendous impression on the new voters. No one can tell me that this is not true because I saw him at plant gates and I saw him at meetings. The people that were in the early twenties, that were probably voting for the first time. . . . I'm confident that he got way the big share of them. And not only that. His personality was good. My mother, who is now seventy-eight--so she wasn't exactly a youngster in 1960. . . . Believe it or not, I was supporting Hubert Humphrey and was on his campaign committee, but my mother voted for John Kennedy. She made no bones about it. She told me she was going to do this and did it. She met him; she liked him. She thought he was a young man that had ideas, imagination--the kind of person we needed as president. She said we've had too many of the old ones that play too much on the status quo.

I want to say one other thing on that. This, I think, was shown in Wisconsin, particularly when you go up in some of the districts. Now this wasn't quite true in Milwaukee. This religious idea was no factor because I happen to be a Lutheran, and so's my mother, from and way back, the Missouri Synod--the real strict ones. This certainly had no idea with her. This was also true with some of my aunts and uncles. While in some

isolated localities it did--where you still have a lot of the thinking that has spilled over from the grandparents into the parents, and from the parents into the children. But, outside of that, I don't think it played any great factor.

Getting back again to what I said earlier, also one other thing that I thought hurt Hubert a little: I am sure that by the end of March--and he never said this to me--that Hubert started to sense what was happening. Now he's no naive boy at this game of politics, either. Anyone who has played it as hard as he has played it can't help but sense that not everything is well back in the home bailiwick. In the last three weeks of the campaign Hubert got very short and very sharp and completely lost that smile, and Jack just went the other way. He got more confident and more "folks-like." When he went out into the farming area--which Hubert didn't do too much of; he didn't have the time and he didn't have the organization to do it--he did a tremendous job out in the rural areas. I can remember way back in the days of old man [Robert] Bob LaFollette; he'd come in on a farmer in any time of the day or early evening and chat with him a little bit or go out in the field if it was in the summertime and visit him. That farmer would come to the cheese factory the next morning, no buttons on the shirt. "You know who was out to see me? Old Bob." Old Bob could do no wrong. It was this kind of a thing. I think Jack had a lot of that, a very lot of it. As I said earlier, he had this tremendous appeal to the younger voter--and not altogether to the younger voter, to a lot of the citizens. I think this was one of the things that really carried Wisconsin for him.

Once he was by Wisconsin, I never did have any hope for West Virginia. You know, this thing becomes like a snowball once you pass a real hard test. Now when you can go into a man's home bailiwick and whip him, you ought to be more than an equal chance when you get away from that home base.

If I might say this, I had one experience that I probably will remember as long as I live. There was a dinner, a John Kennedy dinner, in Janesville. I believe it was either the latter part of February of '60 or the early part of March. You know, if you don't have those dates written down, you don't remember them. It was in that area. Of course, the General Motors locals are in Janesville, and a lot of these had bought tickets to this dinner. My wife and I received an invitation to attend this dinner. I went to the dinner not so much to hear John Kennedy, although I always liked to hear his speeches, but since I have to stand election every two years and since my local unions were participating, it was an order for me to be there. But I purposely didn't

come early because that way I figured there wouldn't be too much talking before the dinner. I come there just about the time the dinner was ready to start. I was no more than started in that hall--and this is what I mean when you've got organization--and the first thing I knew I had Paul Corbin along side of me, telling me there was a place for me at the head table. I said, "No, I came here, and I'm staying out here by the door, and I'm not going to no head table." Well, he kept telling my why I ought to be up there, and it wasn't five minutes later when Jack himself came down. "How are you, Harvey?" and "Fine to see you." What do you do at that point? I wind up at the head table. I fought with the newspapers all night that night trying to convince them that I hadn't switched horses.

But the experience I had there I said I will probably remember as long as I live. I sat next to Jacqueline Kennedy. Not having graduated from any of these hifalutin' colleges, [Laughter] it was "Hello" and "How are you?" I spent the most horrible two and a half hours I ever spent in my life. She was not very talkative, or she was either waiting for me, and I was scared to talk to her. So it was just a word here and there. This was all during the meal, and this was all during his speech. I'm sure I wouldn't say this in a bragging fashion, or anything else, but I want to make a point of this: this was the kind of thing the guys who were running the Kennedy campaign watched, and watched very closely and they knew how to use it. I was not able to talk to every single person in that hall or anything else. But I am sure that, in spite of the fact that I was on Humphrey's campaign committee, I made some votes for Kennedy at the head table that night because I'm known in this state. And I said the newspapers just tried to. . . . "Look, have you switched horses? This must be obvious." And all of this. This is the kind of thing I'm talking about. Now Hubert had none of this, he had nothing of that. He didn't have the people who had the know-how or anything else.

So this is how I got into it, and this is how I stayed into it clean through to the April primary, and, of course, beyond the April primary I did not go. Although I was asked to come to West Virginia, I did not go.

I also did this. (I know Hubert would not feel hurt if I said it now.) The night after the election in Wisconsin I know he tried to smile and he tried to be nice. Finally he and I were in the room all alone. In one room--we had several rooms in the headquarters there. I said to him, "Hubert, as a friend I say

this, and it's hurting me harder than anything else I've ever said to you, but if I were you, I would discontinue this race right now, tonight." I was surprised; he didn't tear into me like he has on some other occasions when I've made some suggestions to him. He thought of that a little bit, I think, but somewhere along the line he decided to go down to West Virginia and take a club if it was really a bad one.

MORRISSEY: It's my impression he made that decision the night the returns were coming in here in Wisconsin.

KITZMAN: Well, if he did, then he either made it with himself or he made it with one or two people. I did not-- and I was very close to him on a lot of these things-- know that he had done that. I think I'd been told later on that that was true. This conclusion I came to all by myself when I said this to him. I felt that if he could not take Wisconsin, then he should not be humiliated any further. I'll be very frank with you, I felt that if he got out in Wisconsin and gave John a clear shot there (although whether this would have worked out this way or not, I'm not sure) I was then thinking of some bargaining power for him for the second spot. Otherwise, he was completely out. I felt that if he had any bargaining power at all, he ought to give up now and get on the other side of the fence.

MORRISSEY: Did he ever say anything about going for the vice presidential nomination?

KITZMAN: Hubert Humphrey would have taken it if it had been offered to him, in spite of the fact that he said, "Either President or Senate." They all do this. But I know, just as sure as I'm here talking to you, that had the vice presidency been offered to him, he'd have been just as happy to take as he was to take it under [Lyndon B.] Johnson.

MORRISSEY: I get the impression, as an outsider, that there was quite a tussle between the Kennedy and Humphrey people. The Kennedy people, on one hand, trying to neutralize labor, and the Humphrey people, of course, trying to get a strong endorsement.

KITZMAN: This is correct. This took place all during the campaign until about the last month. Then, of course, everybody gave up on it. This is dead right.

To give you an example of it, you see the international unions, as such, like my own international union, took no position. They allowed each one to . . . Although when Ted Sorensen went to Detroit, he made it very clear to [Walter] Reuther that, while there were some labor guys supporting Kennedy in Wisconsin, there were no regional directors supporting him. So this is saying, "Look, what's going on here?" Although--I'll be very honest with you--I was not told by Reuther that I had to do this or that. I talked to Walter, I told him what I was going to do and why, and if this embarrassed the international union, I wouldn't do it; and if there were any agreements along the line that would be violating, I wouldn't do it, although I knew of no such agreements. All I was told was to keep the facts straight and not make any distortions, which I didn't do, and to be on the friendly side with the opposition, which I tried to do--which I did, I'm sure I did. Outside of that, I was free to work as I wanted to. Now, I know how Walter felt about this. In fact, when it was all over with, he told me, and he said, "I tell you now because I didn't want to tell you during the campaign." He then told me that, had he lived in Wisconsin, he would have done exactly the same thing.

The Kennedy people there, too. You see, with the type of organization they had and the capable people, they did neutralize, and this was all they were trying to do at this point. They knew just as well as anyone else Humphrey's connection with the labor movement when we had McCarthy and Alexander Wiley in the Senate. They knew that background. They did neutralize a lot of them.

MORRISSEY: Do you think Humphrey would have been helped if your governor at that time, Gaylord Nelson, had announced his support?

KITZMAN: I think it would have helped Humphrey, yes, but whether or not this would have carried the state for him, I would not be so bold as to predict. Gaylord left the impression here and there and, you know, everybody. . . . It all depended on where he was. If he was in the right spot, he'd leave the impression that Humphrey was his man. If he was in a spot where it was ticklish situation, he was completely neutral. Of course, Gaylord already then was toying with the idea of the senatorial race, and wanted to be everybody's friend. So, again, repeating what I said, I think it would have helped him to some extent; he probably would have picked up some more votes,

but whether this would have carried the state for him or not, I doubt that very much. Had Gaylord come in very early, and had Gaylord been on the Humphrey committee, that might have made the picture completely different. As the weeks went along, it just became a weaker and weaker point all along, and a month before that it wouldn't have done any good at all because by that time Jack Kennedy had crisscrossed this state a half a dozen times. It was his appearances and his willingness to go to these little villages, ten to fifteen people, that I think had a tremendous bearing on this. He did it. I bet he knows Wisconsin better than I do, and I was born here. [Laughter]

MORRISSEY: One thing that bothered the Kennedy people was that as the campaign went on the newspapers increased their estimates of how well they thought he would do. I think on the eve of the election some newspapers were predicting that he would take ten of ten congressional districts. Of course, he won six of ten. I would gather in view of that Humphrey considered that a moral victory if not an actual victory.

KITZMAN: Yes, Humphrey said that that evening when it became apparent that this was the way it was going to come out. In spite of the fact that they had been predicting complete victory before that, he then said that he thought that this was not as bad as the papers had made it seem. The papers had painted it pretty dark a couple of weeks before. Now thinking back on what happened, this might have had some influence on his decision to stay in the thing, too. He didn't say this to me so this would only be guessing on my part, but it could have had some influence on him.

MORRISSEY: How many people were suspicious of John Kennedy because of the relationship between his family and Senator [Joseph R.] McCarthy?

KITZMAN: Well, there was some suspicion there. Although I don't think that that had a factor great enough that had really a great impact upon the outcome of the vote, I would say that there were some votes that he would have gotten had that just not been known about his relationship with Joe McCarthy. Again, I don't think it had as great an impact as a lot of people thought it would have.

MORRISSEY: You could turn that question around and say how much did it help him.

KITZMAN: Well, there too, I suppose around the Green Bay area and Appleton, where McCarthy lived and where he had a lot of his strength, it probably helped him.

MORRISSEY: Was there much of a Republican crossover to vote for Kennedy in the Democratic primary?

KITZMAN: There was some crossover. Here again, there were some accusations that all of the Republican McCarthyites and the Republican Catholics crossed over. I don't put that broad of an interpretation on it. I think there were some crossovers, that's true, but certainly not in landslide proportions.

MORRISSEY: How did the rank and file of your union look at the Kennedy-Humphrey race? Was there a lot of Kennedy sympathy?

KITZMAN: There was a lot of Kennedy sympathy. As I said a little earlier, there were local unions that took positions. In fact, I had a very large local union in my region. . . . I see no harm in naming the local, Local 72, which is the largest local they got. They have 12,500 members there now. At the time, in 1960, there were about 7,000 members.

MORRISSEY: Is that in Kenosha?

KITZMAN: That's in Kenosha. That's American Motors. Local 72, the leadership, the executive board--the great majority of them--were Kennedy supporters and the local union passed a resolution--one of the very few local unions that openly passed a resolution supporting Kennedy over Humphrey. There were other local unions around. In fact, in the month of March I was then hoping that the elections would be over real quick because we were getting conflicts inside of our local unions, the Kennedy people and the Humphrey people exchanging words and sometimes more than exchanging words. This is why I said earlier that I sensed as early as in March, or even the last week in February, that this was not going to be a runaway for Humphrey and, quite to the contrary, that Jack was making. . . .

It was then coming to the surface what was really going to happen. I was convinced by the middle of March he had Wisconsin.

MORRISSEY: Kennedy defeated Humphrey by, I think, a little more than a hundred thousand votes.

KITZMAN: Something like that.

MORRISSEY: [Richard M.] Nixon carried Wisconsin against Kennedy by sixty thousand.

KITZMAN: Yes. I don't know how you evaluate this and get any kind of a reasonable deduction out of it. This is true. Here Nixon carries Wisconsin; Nelson is re-elected governor. We didn't lose any Democratic congressional seats. We didn't gain any, but we didn't lose any either. Yet Nixon runs away with the state in the presidential election.

MORRISSEY: What's the answer?

KITZMAN: I am not a bit proud. I don't know. I will say this though--and this is probably too late to say it now--that had Kennedy been the candidate in 1964, he would have carried this state, without a doubt. This I would have bet my grandmother's hat on because I'm sure he would have.

MORRISSEY: Did you go out to the Convention in Los Angeles?

KITZMAN: Yes, I did. I was out there a few days. I was not a delegate; I could have been. I felt quite bad after that April 5th thing. When the time came to line up the delegates, since I'm a member of the Administrative Committee and since we're entitled to that many members at large, I was asked to go. I said, "Well, I got to go to Los Angeles anyway so. . . ." At that point we had more people who wanted to go to Los Angeles than there was delegate room for, so I said, "Look, you can send someone else." And I didn't stay to the end of the Convention. I came back.

MORRISSEY: Were you there when the President announced that Lyndon Johnson would be his choice for the vice presidential nomination? Did that cause you a little trouble?

KITZMAN: That caused me to take the next plane back to Milwaukee [laughter] although we should have understood this because we were forewarned. We had a meeting the day that the Convention opened in Los Angeles of the International Union Executive Board. I can remember Walter spending about thirty minutes telling every single one of the board members, or telling the whole board, not to get themselves so far out on a limb that they couldn't get back. I have never asked this question of Walter, and I probably never will ask him, but I'm not so sure that he didn't already know then what was going to happen. He made a speech to the board that evening that was altogether different than he had made the months ahead of that. I said this to myself many, many times, "I can now see why he said what he said." I'll make no bones about this--I was one very unhappy man, and I left. I would say now that I probably was foolishly discouraged because I think that history will have to show that most of the things that Jack Kennedy planned, his successor really tried to put into operation.

MORRISSEY: Did you have any hopes at the Convention that the vice presidential nomination might go to either Hubert Humphrey or Orville Freeman?

KITZMAN: Orville Freeman. I sensed there even before the Convention started that there was great feeling among the power blocs of Hubert's. . . . Well, I don't know just how to say it. I think the people that were on the inner circle, that had the votes to deliver, felt that Hubert, because of his liberal positions, would not be acceptable; that even if he were nominated, he would be rather a little hindrance in certain spots of the country than a complete asset to the ticket. Now, I did feel, though, that they might go for Orville Freeman. I happen to know Orville quite well. When Orville Freeman nominated John Kennedy, at that point, I would have bet you--I'm not a big betting man, but I would have bet you, the best drink on the top shelf that he was the guy. I mean this was a kind of a forerunner thing, and many people thought that. When they come out and announced Johnson, my God, this was really a letdown.

MORRISSEY: Let me go back to something you said a few minutes ago. It's my understanding that since about the turn of the century Wisconsin voters have always been

suspicious of big money in politics, and yet you mention that the Kennedys never had any financial problems, whereas Hubert was constantly facing this problem. Did this ever develop as an issue?

KITZMAN: No, I don't think it did. You see, the program of the big power interests was really developed by the late Bob, not Robert, Jr., but the old man Bob LaFollette. Half of his campaign every year used to be aimed at the money interests. He was always after the money interests and after the railroads. This got him a lot of votes, so this was really a good voting gimmick. Then this built up the impression that it was always the big guys from the East with a lot of money that wanted to run the state. I don't think that this had any influence in the 1960 nomination at all. If it did, I didn't see any of it because I heard no criticism of that although there was plenty of joking and laughter about "Well, if Joseph Kennedy wants a president, he'll buy one." You know, stuff like this. But to really have the kind of influence it used to have back in the twenties and even before then, it did not.

MORRISSEY: You were talking about organizational activities. You referred to it as the "Jimmy Higgins" kind of work. I never heard of a Jimmy Higgins.

KITZMAN: When I say the "Jimmy Higgins" kind of work, I don't minimize this or to put it in the posture of just ordinary work. I mean, these are the people that go out and carry out the program. In my estimation, they have to be top notch people. To give you an example of what I'm talking about, I think a congressman or a senator has to have two people--at least two people--in his office. They all don't have that. In fact, we got a congressman up there now that I give the devil to every time I see him because he hasn't done this. I think he has to have a top notch administrative assistant and he has to have a complete, competent personal secretary. This is an absolute must. This is what I'm talking about.

MORRISSEY: I never heard that expression--"Jimmy Higgins" type of work.

KITZMAN: Well, they use that around here, but this is what they really mean. They don't mean just some guy that sweeps the floor. These are the guys that go

out, and have the contacts, and lay the groundwork, and prepare the atmosphere and the time and everything that goes with it when the candidate comes in. By the way, these people are hard to find, too--good, competent people.

MORRISSEY: Do you have any final comments or observations that you'd like to put on the record?

KITZMAN: Well, yes, just this. Now looking back since 1959, or even '58, when there already was some talk--although I said I participated in none of that--I've felt many times that this country was really fortunate to come up with a man like John Kennedy. I think he killed this business of status quo and this big government idea that the Republicans are always preaching about. I think he hit that right in the head. I think he also did something else. He proved that a man's religion shouldn't have anything to do with his ability to serve the people. I think this was a tremendous stride forward. I'm not so sure that this didn't have some influence on what happened in the Vatican City, this Council meeting. I'm not so sure that this didn't have some influence with it. And I think this was great. Then, in spite of my disappointment and bad feeling when I left Los Angeles after Johnson had been nominated vice president--I now laugh at it and think that it was foolish--because I feel that Johnson has really done a job carrying out what Jack had on the drawing board and what he had in the hopper. Of course, now, in his own right, he has his own job to do. Then, in conclusion, let me say that, if it happened tomorrow, I probably would do it all over again. I think that Hubert Humphrey has a place in the American politic. I think he has made a contribution. I think he can make further contributions. I personally trust the guy. I don't think that Hubert would ever knowingly do anything to harm anyone. It's for that reason that if it took place tomorrow, I probably would do it again.

MORRISSEY: Thank you very much.