

**John A. Carver, Jr. Oral History Interview – JFK#4, 09/23/1969**  
Administrative Information

**Creator:** John A. Carver, Jr.  
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**Biographical Note**

Carver was Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Public Lands Management from 1961 to 1964, Under Secretary of the Interior from 1965 to 1966, and Commissioner of the Federal Power Commission from 1966 to 1972. In this interview Carver discusses dealing with a backlog at the National Park Service from the previous Administration; working with and around both preservation lobbies and commercial interests; the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission's report (1962); the creation of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation in the Department of the Interior; and the question of self-government in the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa, among other issues.

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John A. Carver, Jr. – JFK #4

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Fourth Oral History Interview

With

JOHN A. CARVER, JR.

September 23, 1969  
Washington, D.C.

By William W. Moss

For the John F. Kennedy Library

MOSS: Right. Now, last time we were talking about the Alaska railroad and parks, and there are one or two items under parks that didn't get covered that I'd like to have a shot at. One is that in an earlier interview you indicated that one of your early problems was with a backlog of concession contracts and that sort of thing at the parks. Why was this backlogged when you came in? Was it just the normal press of business, or had something been neglected in the earlier administration?

CARVER: Well, the reason it was backlogged is because there was an unresolved policy issue which made

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it impossible for the contracts to be mutually agreed on between the National Park Service and the concessioners. There was—matter of fact, still is—a basic philosophical problem as to the terms and conditions under which people should be allowed to carry on private business in the service of the needs of the public visiting the national parks. There also, of course, was the fact, the kind of growing backlog of cases where the existing contracts were expiring and there needed to be a renewal, and in connection with a renewal it was necessary to get a considerably heightened level of investment for more

facilities. Fundamentally, the concessioners did not regard the terms as sufficiently secure for them to make the investments which were required, and the things were just at a standstill.

MOSS: So it was a matter of contract negotiation as much as a fundamental policy situation?

CARVER: Well, there was an underlying policy problem

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which was stopping the contracts. Until it could be resolved, contracts couldn't go forward. I mean, it wasn't just a straight matter of lawyers working; it was a point of the rules of the game had to be set.

MOSS: So how did it get straightened out in the long run?

CARVER: Well, I suppose that it didn't really get straightened out in the long run. The issue had to be submitted to the Congress, and eventually the Congress passed a bill straightening it out, but the bill was so unsatisfactory (or regarded as being unsatisfactory by certain elements in and out of Congress) that it was never executed, at least while I was there. Basically the question had to do with whether the concessioners had a mortgageable or pledgeable interest in the improvements which would be put on the government land. The strict view was, of course, that they were there

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as permittees and that they could be taken out of the park—bought off, if you will—simply by repaying their original cost less their depreciation. Well, in an inflationary cycle, which had begun by that time, it was pretty clear that this would represent a business loss in their terms or a loss to their stockholders, and an arbitrary view of this by a particular Administration might make it possible for a new concessioner to get a windfall by being required only to pay the book value of the concession rather than any going value or anything like that. Now, that's a fundamental policy question which permeates the whole government.

I came to the conclusion very early that if we were going to use private enterprise to do a public function in the park we had to do it under private enterprise's rules. Private enterprise rules generally include that you must

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borrow, you must have debt capital, and if you must have debt capital you must conform with the requirements of the lenders. Generally the lenders have other places to put their money so that you would get a better interest rate, thus a better deal for the users and for the public if you would facilitate this as near as may be to similar kinds of loans for similar kinds of businesses outside of parks. That was my general policy point of view.

MOSS: Now, what prevented your getting this implemented across-the-board? Who and what?

CARVER: There were two—there was a very ingrained opposition to this, centered in the Solicitor's office of the Department and an equally ingrained opposition to it in the office of the Bureau of the Budget. There also was a strong opposition to this standpoint in the Government Operations

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Committee of the House of Representatives. There was a strong bias in favor of the view I took in the House Interior committee. So you had a very complex interrelationship of forces there which very early I recognized to require legislative consideration of it, legislative review.

Meantime, of course, most of the cases had to be solved on an ad hoc basis. I think one of the earlier ones involved Yosemite Park, where the big issue pending at the time I got there was the length of the contract—the company wanted thirty years, and I think we finally worked that one out in thirty years by taking the contract up (as we had to take all of them up), letting it be before the House of Representatives Interior Committee for sixty days or ninety days, and that kind of an opportunity to veto gave us a kind of backup position to sign the contract, which we did. But I would hate

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to say that that issue was resolved during the Kennedy [John F. Kennedy] years or the Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] years—or yet. It's one of those continuing policy issues which will be around as long as the government tries to turn over to private enterprise certain fundamentally governmental functions: serving people in the National Park is such a function.

MOSS: All right, I think that covers that particular portion of the questions I had left over. I'm very curious to know exactly how the preservation lobbies operate, the Izaak Walton League of America and the Sierra Club and people like that? How do they get to you in Interior? What do they do to bring pressure on you?

CARVER: Well, the first thing I had to learn—I guess the first thing anybody in the new group in the Interior Department had to learn—was, you know the cast of characters, the proliferation of organizations asserting to speak for a widespread constituency was really quite a phenomenon

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to face. We knew—I knew, and of course naturally the Secretary [Stewart L. Udall], having been in Congress, knew—in a general way the more prestigious ones, ranging all the way from the National Reclamation Association to the National Wildlife Federation to the Sierra Club and so on. But the nuances within these groups, the relationship between the National Parks Association and some of the other organizations, had to be sort of “learned.”

Secretary Udall had a very good attitude about these things, I guess—to answer your question specifically—we adopted a policy of listening to everybody but of assuming the responsibility of finding out who was who and what was what and making our evaluations of their presentations as our own responsibility. So that right from the very start we opened the doors, and representatives, the Washington representatives or the board members, of all of these various

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groups could have their input pretty much as they wanted to make it.

We got a vast amount of highly conflicting recommendations and information out of it, but it was not very long before you began to be sensitive to whom you could rely on and who is likely to try to push you a little too much. Some of the people in these conservation organizations were pretty damn statesmanlike. They'd tell you both sides of the story, and they'd tell you where their congressmen lined up, where the political power was and where skeletons were buried. Others felt that they could kind of bulldoze you, that what you didn't know wouldn't hurt you, not realizing, of course, we'd find out anyway. Guys like Joe Penfold [Joseph W. Penfold], Pete Gutermuth [Clinton R. Gutermuth], Spencer Smith [Spencer M. Smith], these were people—Tom Kimball [Thomas L. Kimball]—no matter what their personal or organizational

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point of view, if you asked them a question they'd give you a straight answer. Guys like Devereux Butcher and Tony Smith [Anthony W. Smith] and so on were a little bit more extremist, and so we applied a discount factor to what they said.

We had more trouble with the really commercial outfits than we did with the preservationists, because where you're just dealing with a kind of preservation ethic or philosophy you've got a different problem where the guys have got kind of a money interest in, let's say, grazing or in mining or that sort of thing. But by and large, I'd say that we never felt resentful. If we were taken advantage of we regarded it as our own fault rather than the fault of anybody that was lobbying us. We had such a magnificently broad range of pressure groups that they tended to kind of give a cross-check on each other, but if a guy was an officer,

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like a Tony Smith or a Dev Butcher, or somebody like that, he could get in. If he didn't see me, he could get in to see the Park Service Director; he could get in to see the Secretary.



The Secretary had a very open policy on that, particularly in the early years. In the later years, after he'd been through this thing a thousand times, you knew what they were going to say, and you tended to be impatient, you know, "Well, hell, I've heard that before," you know. You'd say to your assistant, "Keep him out. He's just going to go over the same old ground." But in the early years we had a very good communication.

MOSS: Last time we touched on the Fire island seashore business. Briefly. I'd like to go into that a little more. There were a lot of what you might call political prima donnas involved in that, Rockefeller [Nelson A. Rockefeller] got into it, Lindsay [John V. Lindsay]

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got into it; Otis Pike [Otis G. Pike], Robert Moses, just about everybody who was within spitting distance of Fire Island got into it. just how did you manage to come around to a meeting of the minds on this?

CARVER: I don't suppose we ever really came around to a meeting of the minds, but Stewart Udall saw that Fire Island as something far more significant than just another piece of the park program; he saw it as a breakthrough for recreational opportunities. In a metropolitan, high density, high population area. The National Park Service was anything but enthusiastic about the thing because it was a hell of a lot of trouble and it would take a lot of their manpower and it hardly qualified in the old sense of a national park. So the Secretary took leadership of this himself, and he assembled around him those people—

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the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation [BOR], particularly, but guys like Max Edwards [Max N. Edwards] from the Legislative Counsel Office. They made it kind of a project deal, and they'd get those meetings with all these people you'd mentioned and others in the office, and they'd go through it, they'd send people up there, and they'd have surveys and TV shows and God knows what all. Eventually, of course, the force for legislation kind of got rolling, and they got it worked out .

But as far as my participation in it, it was largely minimal. I operated that under what I always often used to call the "Udall rule," and that was that anything the Secretary was worrying about I didn't. There were plenty of things of the more traditional park areas to take my time and attention, and if he was quarterbacking it with a team of Bill Pozen [Walter I. Pozen], others, fine. That's the way it worked. It was a good piece of work, but it didn't involve

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me much.

MOSS: This moves us fairly smoothly, I think, into the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation as the next area. The report of the review commission came in in what, January '62?

CARVER: It came in about the very end of January or early February of '62.

MOSS: Do you recall the immediate response or reaction to it in the Department?

CARVER: Oh yes, I certainly do. The significance of the report was immediately recognized by Udall. The opportunity that it presented to the Department of the Interior and to the Secretary had already been plain to us because we'd had some part in the very last phases of the commission's report, because we inherited what you might call the ex officio jobs on the commission in the ending phases of the commission's work. You know that commission was set up to have advisory council members from the

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Departments, and, of course, as we inherited the post positions, why, we got some exposure—not much—but some exposure to the work of the commission. So the squabble, or the big issues, of the commission were known to us before the report actually hit us. They fundamentally were the argument as to whether or not the Department of the Interior should be the place where a new recreation agency should be located or whether it should be in the White House.

MOSS: Why in the White House?

CARVER: Well, the commission report itself kind of details the alternatives, but it was felt that since recreation was such a broadly spread out kind of operation—the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Park Service, and the Forest Service—that there had to be a coordinating office organizationally above these various warring fiefdoms and the White House was the only place that was above the

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Cabinet departments. So there was a considerable school of thought within the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission that the recommendation should be that the President create a recreation coordinator or an office of recreation or some other damned thing to kind of run it. Actually, they came up with a recommendation which was a compromise, but organizationally they recommended the creation of a bureau within the Interior Department. That recommendation and the recommendation for a new funding were seen as the two critically important aspects of that thing by Secretary Udall within a week or two or two days after we got the report.

So, I remember having a number of conversations with the Secretary on what our response should be to the report, and I told the Secretary—and I think I was the principal one with this recommendation—that he ought to respond

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very quickly to do within the scope of his authority, all of the things he could do which didn't require legislation or money or other things which would bring the Congress into it and cause a lot of delay. And most specifically, I recommended that he create by Secretarial order, even if he didn't have any money and perhaps didn't have a real authority to do it, to create a Bureau of Outdoor Recreation.

The two of us went over and talked to Lee White [Lee C. White], who was at that time on President Kennedy's staff, and I remember telling Lee, as did Secretary Udall, that if this report wasn't to be just another dust gatherer on the shelf that we had to strike while the iron was hot, we had to take the momentum of it. So they knew and approved, you know, taking some action, and so it was very, very soon—I think, maybe, April—when the Secretary created within the Department of the Interior a Bureau of

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Outdoor Recreation and funded it by the transfer and staffed it by the transfer of money from the Park Service's appropriation, particularly in the field of state coordination. The National Park Service had a million dollars or two million or some number in a special function of coordination and technical assistance to the states. They had a program for that which was a part of their 1936 act.

Of course, Connie Wirth [Conrad L. Wirth] was kicking and screaming all the time. His idea of having this bureau within the Interior Department during the ORRRC [Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission] consideration was that it would be a part of the Park Service's deal. He felt—I think he felt; he didn't ever say this, at least not to me—but under this 1936 act they already had a built-in charter, and he felt that this particular function could be expanded and that would be the way it would happen within the Interior

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Department. And that was the first big battle that Wirth lost within the Interior Department. He was a kind of an ungracious loser, too.

But the idea of creating that bureau in advance of legislation was pretty bold because Wayne Aspinall [Wayne N. Aspinall] had already given pretty strong indications that, you know, he was the policy-maker and this sort of thing, and without the authorizing legislation he could have created a lot of special problems by exerting his considerable influence with the appropriations people not to give any money for the new bureau, and it could have been starved to death. So we had enough money to start it, as I say, for the balance of that fiscal year with the appropriation to the Park Service, who we just transferred the function. The other stroke of—I don't know whether you'd call it genius or not, but at least it represented the reason for the eventual success of the operation of the bureau

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was the decision to bring Ed Crafts [Edward C. Crafts] over from the Agriculture Department's Forest Service to the Interior Department. Ed had been in line—I guess he thought or somebody thought—to be the chief of the Forest Service, and he'd been passed over in favor of Ed Cliff [Edward P. Cliff]. Udall gives me credit for it—I'm not sure that I deserve it—of suggesting that we go over there to find the head of our Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, but I'm sure I enthusiastically supported the idea; I knew Ed Crafts, had worked with him at that time quite a bit. So Udall called Freeman [Orville Lothrop Freeman] and said he was going to try to get Crafts over there, and they set the job up at a grade eighteen. Thus Mr. Crafts got his bureau, and he just started to work.

Now the other decision that had to be made, of course, was to protect our flank with the Congress, so

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the Secretary put me in charge of a group to come up with the legislation to take care of this new bureau. And we flubbed the first round on it because we tried to put together a piece of legislation which would take care of this financing operation and the creation of the bureau all at the same time. We got that in in the 1962—that was the second session of that Congress—and it didn't pass because it was all tied up with some very, very touchy matters whose scope we didn't really understand, we'd had not much exposure to them, such as the boat tax, we didn't know anything about how violent that boat lobby was. And that turned out to be a big old disaster.

But early in—well, with the legislation pending, we kind of had ourselves protected with the Congress. And then early in '63 we separated the two bills and got, fairly early in '63, what they call the organic act for the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation introduced and passed,

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so that the bureau then was legitimized, even though the land and water conservation fund, which was the other half of it, took awhile after that, I think even a couple of years, to get passed.

With the creation of the Bureau as a Congressionally authorized part of the bureaucracy with a specified coordination function, why, we were off to the races, you know. We then had a big stake. There was created an advisory council with Cabinet membership, a rotating chairmanship, as the mechanism to prevent this from being just strictly an Interior bureau. As the service agency for this Cabinet council, it had a way of coordinating which enabled us to get around some of these protocol problems of whether Interior could order the Corps of Engineers or the Forest Service to do this or that. Actually, it didn't work very well, but the whole damned concept is just kind of permissive anyway. It's kind

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of consensual. The reason it worked at all was because there was so much to be done and plenty of room, really, for improvement to be made even though you didn't have a really strict coordinating function of the kind that maybe Congress envisioned or, certainly, of the kind that the Bureau of the Budget hoped for. They thought that with this kind of an agency they could be spared making all these tough judgments, that they'd have an agency which could referee between Forest Service and the Park Service for a limited budget and so on. That never worked. That's probably more than you care to know about the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation. [Laughter]

MOSS: No. As a matter of fact, I have one or two other points that you didn't cover. I understand that Agriculture kind of jumped the gun on you by the Forest Service leaking its own comprehensive recreation

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plan to the Congress. You had asked them to hold it back and suddenly discovered that everybody and his brother had a copy of it.

CARVER: Well, that sort of thing was going on all the time. The Park Service and the Forest Service didn't like each other much, but they certainly had a joint distaste for being supervised by the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, and neither one of them was cooperating with these various directives.

I don't know whether it was over that issue or some similar issue, but about that time Freeman and Udall had to have some kind of a hatchet burying, treaty-making operation, which they signed up and they went over and told President Kennedy about it and had a big public announcement that, you know, the ancient warfare was now over. And it was hailed as the greatest step forward in conservation in this generation and a few things like that, and, to be truthful about it, it did

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represent a great step forward. After that whatever infighting was done had to be done a damn sight more carefully than had been ever done in the two preceding generations. I don't recall whether this "go it alone" philosophy of the Forest Service was directly connected with that operation or not, but I think it was, as I now think about it. I hadn't thought about it for a long time.

MOSS: There were a couple of other bureaus in Interior that had an interest at least in a piece of the action: the Reclamation Bureau and the Public Land Bureau.

CARVER: Well, the Bureau of Land Management [BLM] had seen very early that it had to get into this recreation business, and it faced some of the same

Congressional difficulties that I've already alluded to with reference to the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation: a kind of a feeling on Mr. Aspinall's part,

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particularly, that the Forest Service was in the recreation business because it had a multiple use act, the BLM didn't have a multiple use act, ergo, the BLM couldn't be in the recreation business. Consequently, the programming of money for recreation by the BLM was uniformly chopped down by the Appropriations Committee, probably at the instance of the legislative committee.

I remember telling the Bureau of Land Management that they were just going at it wrong, that the public lands were there, they were being used for recreation, so when you were building picnic tables or building privies you weren't in the recreation business, you were protecting the land because, absent the channeling of the users to a place where you could clean up after them and so on, that the whole area would suffer, and that it was just a matter of terminology. Eventually, about three years later or two years later,

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the BLM got its multiple use act, but we had this problem for a long time.

But to go back to your original question, the problems within the Interior Department were in the Bureau of Sport Fisheries, in the BLM, and, as you mentioned, in the Bureau of Reclamation, particularly the latter. Floyd Dominy [Floyd E. Dominy] saw right away that if he could take these fine reservoirs and put some Bureau of Reclamation picnic areas and camp groups on the shoreline that he'd get a lot of friends for Reclamation which he wouldn't necessarily get if the same areas were operated by the National Park Service or by the Forest Service or somebody else who might be on the periphery of the reservoir. This represented a kind of a continuing canker within the Department in terms of coordination because, to be truthful about it, sometimes it was easier to get money for this kind of purpose

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reprogrammed in the Bureau of Reclamation than it was to get appropriations for it, either through the Park Service or anywhere else. So a certain amount of liberty was afforded to these operating agencies.

The Bureau of Sport Fisheries had a major land acquisition program, and they had their own funding for that. This had important recreation possibilities, but they were extremely jealous of their separateness, they had their own constituency, and, most importantly, they had this special kind of a fund out of the duck stamps to purchase the land, so nobody wanted to rock that boat. It hasn't been rocked yet.

But there was a problem within the Department. Once the Secretary set up this Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, then he would himself occasionally compromise its work by ordering it, as one of his bureaus, to do certain things in the coordination area which would expose

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him, the Secretary, to the charge that he was playing favorites. The minute that happened, why, of course, the effectiveness of the BOR as a coordinating agency would disappear. So I was always standing between the Director of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation and the Secretary to be sure that these things were minimized, that the Secretary, if he wanted to get his way, would have to do it a little bit more subtle than simply to exercise his command authority over Mr. Crafts in his coordinating function. It generally worked out.

MOSS:           How did Crafts take hold of the new operation? What did he do?

CARVER:       Well, Ed is a consummate bureaucrat, you know, grown up in the best, greatest bureaucracy of them all, he knew every trick in the trade. So he got in there, and the first thing he did was to build his alliances

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on the Hill. He went around to everybody up there. You know, he had very, very good Hill sense.

The second thing he did was to build himself a field operation or a field setup. A damn sight before he had anything really to do in the field, he set up regional offices in Ann Arbor and Seattle and Atlanta and other key places around the country, because it was anticipated that he was going to have this, you know, this slush fund, if you want to call it that, to pass out to the states. He had this statute, you know, that he was to set up a national recreation plan, and there was an allocation formula for all this.... At least it was anticipated that, you know, there was going to be a lot of work with the states, as the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission recommended. So he built these alliances.

Then he did a real good job through the universities. He's kind of

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an academic himself—he's a Ph.D.—and working with Sam Dana [Samuel T. Dana] at Michigan [University of Michigan] and others, he called seminars and conferences so as to kind of get the thing, you know, its input, in terms of curriculum and that sort of thing, into schools. He got a lot of people involved in it.

He went around the Department and picked up a pretty damned savvy bureau staff. He got John Shanklin [John F. Shanklin] out of my office, an old-time forester; he got Larry Stevens [Laurence N. Stevens], who worked in the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission in the number two staff spot, and he got some pretty good budget types out of the Park Service. It was a kind of a classic example of a guy taking his opportunity and getting himself dug in before his enemies could knock him over while he was weak. It was about the most un-recreation kind of a thing you ever saw, you know,

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long hours and no fun, and it was a tough, tough job. But he really did a great job of it.

MOSS: Fine, let's...

CARVER: He was the complete bureaucrat, though. He knew what to do.

MOSS: Can we move on to another area, and that's the Territories Office, for the balance of this interview, at any rate? It's been covered somewhat in an earlier interview, but there are one or two points that I think we might cover. One is the question of home rule for Guam and the Virgin Islands. Where do the initiatives for this kind of thing come from, and how much power do they have really?

CARVER: Well, the initiative for a home rule, like the initiative for home rule in the District of Columbia, starts out with the given that there's a vast sentiment for it in the areas concerned. But the initiative for making it an Administration program

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was grabbed in the Interior Department, specifically by me, and its enunciation as a kind of a policy for the new Administration was spelled out in that speech I gave at St. Thomas on the occasion of the inauguration of Governor Paiewonsky [Ralph M. Paiewonsky]. I sent that over and got White House clearance on it and also got State Department clearance on it, although why the hell I did that now I don't know, except Harlan Cleveland [J. Harlan Cleveland] was Assistant Secretary in charge of the United Nations contacts, over there, and they'd been making noise about sending an investigative team down into our non self-governing territories, the Virgin Islands and Guam, so that accounted for that business.

Well, the President sent Frank Reeves [Frank D. Reeves] down to the inauguration as his personal representative. But the key part of that inauguration was that speech in which we said that the Department of

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the Interior was not going to look upon the governor as a subordinate within the Interior Department but rather as a man appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate, with his own political constituency and with an organic act and with appropriate powers, and we looked forward to the time when they would be able to elect their own governor.

Well, that was one leg of our program for the Virgin Islands; the other one was to remove the oppressive domination of the local economy which had been carried out through the medium of the Virgin Islands Corporation. On the occasion of the first meeting of the board of directors of that corporation we enunciated another policy, which was that we were going to liquidate it, and we did.

Now the bill to give them self-government, which took the form, naturally, of a bill to elect their own governors (since



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they had self-government in terms of electing their own legislature and appropriate power and so on), was a long time coming, but it came, and in 1970 both territories will elect their own governor. So I regard that as the most shining accomplishment of my tenure in the Interior Department. I was pushing through, was conceiving, and then largely executing during my tour over there (although the job wasn't eventually finished til later) this idea of removing this block upon our ideas of freedom; that is, telling these people they weren't (quote) "ready" (end quote) to elect their own governor.

MOSS: The Samoa situation is a little more complicated, isn't it?

CARVER: Much more complicated. Samoa, of course, is very primitive, or relatively, but even here we made some remarkable progress, but we saw right away that our progress in Samoa had to have an economic base. The

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selection of Governor Lee [Hyrum Rex Lee] to be Governor of American Samoa is another thing for which I claim considerable credit. When we came into power these exotic posts—High Commissioner of the trust territory, Governor of Guam, Governor of the Virgin Islands—were coveted by a lot of politicians, some who had been in such posts in the last Democratic administration and others who had axes to grind of one kind or another, anthropologically or sociologically or some other way, to take care of our little brown primitive brothers, and so on. So we had a whole hell of a lot of would-be or aspirants to be Governor of American Samoa. One was put up by Paul Douglas, some woman whose name I can't remember. It was a big old political mess.

I told Stewart, the Secretary, that I thought the only way we could get out of it with a whole hide politically was

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to appoint a regent kind of a governor from within the bureaucracy until the heat died down on the politicians. And I suggested to him that I would scout around the Department and find the top administrators, people with the most administrative talent, who would be selected strictly on that ground since this was a Secretarial appointment. And I came up with a panel of three. I'm still proud of the panel: one was Rex Lee, who was a number two or a number three man in the Indian Bureau, an old time bureaucrat who'd had some experience in territories; another one was the number two man in the Park Service, Hillory Tolson [Hillory A. Tolson]; and the third one was a man who'd been the High Commissioner of the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands under the Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] Administration, Del Nucker [Delmas H. Nucker].

Well, Nucker failed the political test

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(he was too close to the old Administration), and Tolson turned it down, and we really had to twist Lee's arm for him to take it because he was under considerable fire by some of the Indian lobby. He didn't want to leave under circumstances that looked like he was being eased out, so we promised him faithfully—and meant it—that he would not lose his position in the Indian Bureau, that he could come back to it, and he only had to stay a year. We just wanted him to go down there and run it for a year, and then if he didn't like it, why, he could come home, and then we'd see what we could do about getting another governor. Well, it turned out to be a ten-strike because he was just exactly what the doctor ordered down there.

But in terms of self-government, which is what your question is, that situation is so entirely different from the Virgin Islands or Guam they just don't

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even discuss them together; I mean, that old Matai tribal relationship still exists down there. Lee was extremely well-prepared to handle it because of his long experience with Indian politics. It involves the kind of a careful balancing of the interests between the tribal Matai system, which was very, very deeply rooted in thousands of years of history, and the forms of self-government which the American system required. The Fono, the legislature, had to have some meaningful authority even though the real power was in the governor, and the people had to respect the legislators even though they might be different people from their traditional leaders. But most important of all, we had to get some money down in there, and this meant attracting some investment, and this meant regularizing the governmental processes so that there'd be new opportunities, and this meant—this was the most important

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of all—getting away from the old trader system, which left the off-island hierarchy in full economic control of the island.

So Lee came up with some magnificent things, such as a cooperative in which most of the local people had a share in the new hotel, and he got some new fishing business down there, and he got this hotels tourism bit, and he cleaned up the island. Then, of course, the thing which eventually led him to even higher accomplishments in the government, this educational TV business, was his own conception and his own execution. It was the kind of thing which only Rex Lee could have done. A less brave bureaucrat would have seen right off that that was, you know, enormously expensive for thirty thousand people, but he did it as a demonstration deal, and, of course, it was greatly successful.

MOSS: Let me touch one more point this morning,

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and that is the channels of communication between the territories office and the U.N. Trusteeship Council through the State Department. How did this work?

CARVER: Well, this was a problem at two levels, and you have to have clearly in mind what the two levels are. In terms of what we've just been talking about, Samoa and the Virgin Islands and Guam, this was a matter of the General Assembly and a committee of the General Assembly, whereas the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (which is a different matter entirely) was created under the Trusteeship Council, was created by an agreement of the Security Council and supervised by the Security Council as a strategic trust, so that our relationship to the U.N. was on two levels, so to speak. One was in an area where we had a veto and so did the others of the Security Council, in the trust islands.

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The other was purely what you might call propaganda or political, and that had to do with the continuing contention on the part of—actually the new President of the General Assembly was the key figure, and Miss Angie Brooks' [Angie Elizabeth Brooks] committee, which took the position that we had some non self-governing territories and that they were entitled to receive reports from the United States concerning these things. Well, Congress and the Interior Department and the territories themselves were dead set against making such reports. The State Department, which had other fish to fry, felt that this wasn't going to do any damage and, you know, why not cooperate. And there was a little bit of friction at the outset.

I had the very finest of relationships with a very, very great member of the Kennedy Administration, Harlan Cleveland, and

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we really got this thing kind of worked out on both levels. That relationship went all to pot later when he went over to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and Joe Sisco [Joseph J. Sisco] took his place, whom I regarded as something of an ass then and now, but he's gone to higher things still, so I guess I just didn't entertain that private opinion. Cleveland was very sensitive, so the coordination problem took place at the assistant secretary level and worked very well. When Sisco got in he got noisy, and when he didn't get his way, why, he wanted to get Rusk [Dean Rusk] in it, and then Rusk got Udall in it, and God knows it got to be a big old mess. But there was no problem while I was over there.

Now in terms of the actual reporting, again making the distinction I made, we are required under the terms of the trusteeship

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agreement to make an annual report to the United Nations with respect to the trust territory, and we are required to permit them to make an investigative tour whenever they want to, which they generally did every couple of years, and we cooperated fully with that. Specifically, when our reports had to be made to the United Nations, why, the high commissioner would come in and make the report. He would be accompanied by officials of

the Department—the Director of Territories, Mrs. Van Cleve [Ruth Van Cleve], other staff people—and then the House committee would send observers up to it.

We were favored, I think, in the very early years by having the opportunity of working with Jack Bingham [Jonathan B. Bingham], who at that time was on the United Nations delegation from the United States; he is now in Congress.

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But he went along with us—he's a new member of the Administration, also—on our first tour, my first tour, of the area. So we had good relationships with the State Department in those years.

MOSS: Fine. Thank you very much. That's all the tape I have this morning, and I see our time's run out, too.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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