

**Kathryn G. Heath Oral History Interview – JFK#2, 07/27/1971**  
Administrative Information

**Creator:** Kathryn G. Heath  
**Interviewer:** William W. Moss  
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**Biographical Note**

Heath was the Assistant for Special Studies in the Office of Education of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare [HEW]. In this interview Heath discusses how she came to join the Office of Education; the leadership within the Office of Education and different ideas on how it should be run; other agencies within HEW; changes in the status and administration of HEW; various pieces of education legislation; the 1954 Supreme Court decision on separate but equal and segregation in schools; international education affairs; the reasons for pushing for general school aid over categorical aid; the 1955 White House conference on education; coalescing all the organizations within HEW into one voice for the Department; working with other Departments; the International Labor Organization and the United Nations; getting political support from the different presidential Administrations; the nationalization of the Suez Canal; the shift to considering social matters in a much broader context; the impact of the Sputnik launch on the Office of Education; and the National Defense Education Act, among other issues.

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Second Oral History Interview

with

KATHRYN HEATH

July 27, 1971  
Washington, D. C.

By William W. Moss

For the John F. Kennedy Library

MOSS: Well, let me start off by reviewing first how you got into the Office of Education in 1950 it was, was it not?

HEATH: No, 1956. I was in the Office of the Administrator in 1950.

MOSS: All right. You were in the Office of the Administrator but it was for international relations, and did it have anything to do with education at all at that time?

HEATH: Yes, it cut across all the fields of the agency.

MOSS: All right. Let me ask you how you got into the office of the secretary as a senior staff officer for international relations.

HEATH: I didn't come in that way. I came in in a lower grade because I was working on my doctorate, and I could not get employment in those years. Nobody wanted me. Finally Florence Kerr, who was Deputy Director of the Federal Works Agency, recommended me. I wouldn't take anything that wasn't in work that I thought I'd be interested in. I decided if I had to have a GS-1, it would have to be something that was interesting!



I went in to work on the international documentation in the office of the director of international relations, and resigned before very long because I wasn't going to get my doctorate dissertation finished. The director would have none of that and asked me to go on home and finish up the dissertation and then come back to a new job, which I did. It was one working with all the international visitors whenever they had interests that cut across more than one part of our department. That was not work that I particularly wanted to continue doing, and so it was in 1952 when I moved into the policy development work in the international economic and social fields.

MOSS: Okay. Let's come back to that a little later. Let me ask you about the people who are running the Office of Education during these years. If I read the record right, when you came in in 1950, Rall Grigsby was the acting commissioner.

HEATH: He was an acting commissioner for a period of time (between July 15, 1948 and March 16, 1949) and then came (Earl J.) McGrath.

MOSS: Right. Was Grigsby simply a caretaker or did he manage to do some things?

HEATH: He was a caretaker, yes.

MOSS: What sort of man is Rall Grigsby?

HEATH: I didn't know him very well. I thought of him in terms of. . . .

MOSS: What sort of reputation did he have?

HEATH: He had a good reputation. I thought of him in terms of vocational education. I think it's worth pointing out that by 1950 there was still a bit of the repercussion from a brouhaha that had happened in 1948 when John (Ward) Studebaker resigned. Studebaker resigned ostensibly because of the low rate of pay and the inability to just keep on. He'd been commissioner for fourteen years, which was the third longest in our whole history. But after he left, there was published a diatribe on action that was taken by the Federal Security Agency to centralize certain activities.

Studebaker was a great believer that the Office of Education should be a separate entity. There were hearings on it. In fact, a long time afterwards I had occasion to look this up, and people were practically convincing me that I imagined it while I tried to find the hearings on it, and they happened to be buried in some hearings primarily on "Export Policy and Loyalty" in those days when they didn't do a very good job of indexing the material (1) Now this had a quite striking effect. (Oscar R.) Ewing had had the responsibility to try to develop HEW (Department of Health, Education and Welfare)--to try to develop the Federal Security Agency into a department, and he wanted to centralize those functions which he thought could easily be centralized.

We must keep in mind that when the Federal Security Agency was established it was a collection of separate agencies, but the law governing the authorities of those agencies wasn't really changed, so that the administrator didn't have lots of the authority that he needed. But he did attempt to get public information and purchasing and some things of this sort centralized. There was opposition all the way around on this.

The Public Health Service was the sophisticated outfit. It had been in existence since 1798 (2) The Office of Education was the second old-timer dating back to 1867.(3) They wanted to operate in their own ways. And the Social Security Administration was the upstart of the 1930's (4) which was becoming the tail that wagged the dog. So you can see these were the kinds of issues that we were faced with: at least that's the way a civil servant saw it at the time. So Earl McGrath came in I think about 1949. He was probably never completely successful in dealing with the profession.

Footnotes:

(1) United States Senate Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments. Investigations subcommittee. "Operations of the United States Office of Education "S. Res. 189: Hearings. September 27 and 28, 1948, Washington: United States Government printing office, 1948. Part 4. pp 781-998.

(2) 1 Stat. 605, July 16, 1798.

(3) 14 Stat. 434, March 2, 1867.

(4) The Social Security Administration was created on July 16, 1946 as a result of Reorganization Plan 2 of 1946. The earlier Social Security Board had been created by the Social Security Act of August 14, 1935 (49 stat. 620).



MOSS: Why?

HEATH: The professional organizations. I don't think I knew him well enough at the time to be able to judge why, except to say that he came from the higher education field and was not known at elementary and secondary education levels in the profession. He followed a man who was extremely successful with the profession. In fact, Studebaker had almost made the office into an office for the profession, an office for educators rather than an office of education.

MOSS: Well, you have an almost two year hiatus between Studebaker and McGrath in which Grigsby is taking care of the shop.

HEATH: No, Commissioner Studebaker left on July 15, 1948 and Dr. McGrath came on March 16, 1949. Remember the Office of Education was very small, very small. (1) When I joined it, 1956, there weren't more than about four or five hundred employees. (2) So when I say caretaking, I think I was substantially right. Vocational education had been set up with a separate board. That had been changed in 1933 by executive order. (3) And Mr. Studebaker had developed a reorganization plan for the Office of Education. The only group that didn't like this reorganization were the vocational educational people. They felt it was a downgrading of their responsibilities. They had most of the money. They insisted on a certain percentage which soon worked against them because as the budget increased, their percentage didn't increase at the rate that some other activities got money. So there was a long struggle of that sort that was going on.

Footnotes:

(1) There were 402 full and 5 part-time employees as of June 30, 1949.

(2) There were 402 employees at headquarters and 53 in the field as of June 30, 1956.

(3) Section 15 of Executive Order 6166, June 10, 1933.

I think one of the things McGrath did that was very beneficial was to provide a little focus in the international field. There was a study done by an outside agency which followed the one that Studebaker had had done. And as a result of that study, there was set up a central spot for international educational relations. You must realize that the UNESCO (United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) had just gotten itself organized '47, '48, around there. (1) They were going through the organization pains.

MOSS: Was this study the one that was done of the whole of FSA (Federal Security Agency)?

HEATH: Yes, but this part was done just of the Office of Education.

MOSS: Because as long as we're in that time frame I'd like to ask you about the impact of the survey that the Public Administration Services people in Chicago had on FSA.

HEATH: Yes. This is one of the studies that helped to bring this international focus a little bit differently than we had had it.

MOSS: Was this a Grigsby idea, or where did the idea of bringing in the Chicago people originate, do you know?

HEATH: I think from the office of the administrator, but I would have to check that one. I don't know. (2)

MOSS: Okay. You have McGrath coming in in 1949. And let's see, he would've only lasted for, what, a year and a half or so.

HEATH: He lasted until the new administration had come in, maybe April of 1953, somewhere around in there. (April 22, 1953) He really wanted to stay on.

Footnote:

(1) UNESCO became operational on November 19, 1946 when its First General Conference convened in Paris.

(2) A Federal Security Agency contract with Public Administration Service dated May 12, 1950 was financed by funds allotted for the office of Education from the "Special Fund for Management Improvement" appropriated to the President by Public Law 63-658, October 14, 1949 (63 Stat. 870).



Up to this time, and it amazed me, there was a general view that education was not political. As far as I'm concerned, it's been political since the days of the Mayflower Compact and the decision to have the town meetings in New England. Parents could decide how they'd educate their children. Besides, if you look at all the nations of the world, you see that education decidedly is a political facet of public life. But Studebaker held strongly that it was not, and I used to hear this everywhere I turned: "But this subject is not political." We didn't have much budget so it wasn't terribly important. When you go from a budget of half a million dollars to something over five billion dollars, you know it gets political. (1) So I don't think there's any informed person who would say today that education was not political.

MOSS: So McGrath was under the impression that he might be able to stay because of this nonpolitical character of the office.

HEATH: He wasn't the only one, though. I think that there was something else involved that caused this. The Democrats had been in power for a very long time, and some of them just felt they had squatters' rights to the positions. Jane Hoey who headed up the welfare program felt that her position really wasn't political, but she had a billion dollar budget. Another woman (Ellen S. Woodward, a prominent democrat from Mississippi) thought she ought to be the under secretary in the new administration. I watched this with fascination because an election meant to me that the people wanted a change in their government, at least on top. So I'm not critical of McGrath. I think this was the general thinking of the time.

MOSS: And you had Mrs. (Oveta Culp) Hobby coming in as the administrator and then as the department secretary.

HEATH: Yes, we did. And then by April 11 of 1953, we had become, in name at least, a Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; again, without very much change in the legislative statutes which said who had what function.

Footnote:

(1) In fiscal year 1934 just before Commissioner Studebaker entered on duty, \$11.5 million was appropriated for the Office of Education. In fiscal year 1949 when Commissioner McGrath began his service, (\$34.16 million was appropriated. The figure for fiscal year 1972 was \$5.042 billion.

MOSS: What practical effect did the two things have: one, the appointment of Mrs. Hobby, and the change to department status?

HEATH: I certainly think it was a general upgrading of the functions that were carried on in the department.

This is what the previous administration had been aiming for. So often, you know, it doesn't matter which administration is in, these things develop out of the past. I think it was quite clear in what Mrs. Hobby did in the field of education. When Mr. (Dwight D.) Eisenhower came up with his budget which was a cutback, she did point out that we couldn't take the view that we were conservative in economics and liberal in social affairs and then cut all the fat --alleged fat--out of social affairs instead of in other parts of the budget.

MOSS: I'm not sure that I follow you.

HEATH: Well, when Eisenhower was preparing his budgets there wasn't any great increase for activities in the social field. That's where the cuts tended to come, not in the economic side. And Mrs. Hobby made a very good case that it was unreasonable to have made promises in the social field and then to pull the rug out from under the budgets. And she was successful in getting some changes. I think you must realize here that Mrs. Hobby became secretary with almost no staff specially assigned, in the nature of under and assistant secretaries--very, very limited. She was also faced with a real budgetary problem because of the previous administration. The outgoing top people had all their leave which had accumulated, and that had to be paid right at the time when Mrs. Hobby came in as secretary. It helped account for a general change in the government which required the taking of this leave earlier so that you didn't completely handicap whatever new administration came in.

MOSS: All right. And in 1953 you have Herb (Herbert) Brownell's brother . . .

HEATH: Sam (Samuel M. Brownell).

MOSS: . . . Sam Brownell taking over the Office of Education.

HEATH: Yes, we did indeed. He came in after a very short term for a man by the name of Lee Thurston (John L. Thurston) who died in office right after he was



appointed. If I may go back to 1950 on one point. In 1950, in Mr. (Harry S) Truman's administration, a piece of legislation was put on the statute books that certainly was well intentioned, but in my judgment at least, became the great boondoggle in education. This is known as SAFA --School Assistance in Federally Affected Areas. It has two parts, assistance in school construction in these areas and assistance for the maintenance and operation of schools.

MOSS: This was the forerunner of the impacted aid.

HEATH: This was impacted aid. It was not the first one. There'd been an earlier bill during the wartime that had gotten through as a war measure. There was nothing wrong with the purpose of the legislation at the time. It was certainly needed. Before Truman was out of office, he would've liked it focused a different way, or at least the administration would like to have seen it focused a different way. But since this is aid at the lowest level, where you get the political action, it's just about impossible to get it off the books, and every president and every commissioner has tried to get a change since.

I think maybe we are moving toward it now, but that program started in a small amount, and it's gotten bigger and bigger and bigger, and you have organizations like the National Education Association (NEA)--I don't blame them--which really gathered together an enormous amount of political pressure from around the country with their congressmen and senators to keep this program going. I'd like to see the federal aid for education, but not focused the way it is, you see. So when Mr. Brownell came in, he inherited the problems of not getting a piece of legislation ready early enough because he didn't get there early enough on account of Thurston's death. And he conceived the idea that the time had come to get some legislation on the statute books which the administration would promote. And this was the beginning of what is now known as the cooperative research act. This act went on the books in July of 1954. (1)

You might be interested in the story that happened in connection with that. This was substantive, as distinct from appropriations, legislation that the Office of Education and the administration proposed for education. There'd been a general view, a historic view, that education was a matter for the states, and that the federal government should not dabble in it.

Footnote:

(1) Public Law 83-53, July 26, 1954 (68 Stat. 533)



This goes back to early constitutional days and as early amendment to the Constitution, (1) as well as to the New England town meeting days, you see. But I think Brownell was influenced by what had happened with the development of the National Institutes of Health. And he also was influenced by what had happened in the early history of the Office of Education when, free for nothing, we had gotten the assistance of colleges and universities in developing some very fine studies on the early educational programs throughout the country. There had been others who had proposed that we do something in the field of research legislation.

So he finally decided he'd make a drive for it. Mrs. Hobby was interested in this, and she suggested that Brownell go to a Cabinet meeting and explain it because there would probably be considerable opposition to having the federal government make such a proposal. He did, and Eisenhower, in his way, went around the table to get the views of the Cabinet members and he got opposition from everybody until he got to the one sitting at his right, who just happened to be Richard Nixon. And Nixon said he thought this was a fine idea. Anyway the proposal was made and the law went on the statute books. That was the beginning of something very significant as far as the Office of Education was concerned. The program was greatly expanded in the (Lyndon B.) Johnson era.

Another one of the big changes that came to the Office of Education was the May 17, 1954 Supreme Court of the United States opinion (3) on separate but equal--upsetting the separate but equal school policy, which related to racial segregation. What is rather interesting there is that we had a man by the name of Dr. Ambrose Caliver, a black man who had been brought on the staff by Studebaker. He had advised in the field of higher education and later he became a special assistant to the commissioner on matters of race. And when the Supreme Court was doing its probing in this field, he was over at the court helping in

(1) Article X of the Bill of Rights: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

(2) Public Law 89-10 (Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965) April 11, 1965, title IV (Educational Research and Training) at 79 Stat. 44.

(3) 347 U.S. 483

their understanding the black point of view. That opinion was, of course, world-shaking as we know as far as education in the United States is concerned. I guess I would be getting out of Mr. Brownell's era and over into (L.G.) Derthick's if I go much further on that.

MOSS: Yes. Well, let's talk about Derthick for a moment since we're talking about the various commissioners. This would've been your first commissioner you served.

HEATH: Yes. Brownell, just before he left for Detroit, called me up--it was shortly before I was going over to Geneva--to tell me how pleased he was that I was coming to the Office of Education staff, and perhaps this would be an interesting point to put in. I had talked to him many times about the agreement of the Office of Education to participate in international education affairs, but they simply didn't have the staff to do it. The office of Education might've known what they taught in the London School of Economics or what was taught at the University of Teheran or what the elementary and secondary school ladders were in different countries, but they didn't know where education fitted in the political complex. And I had argued this so much at the Office of Education finally put in their budget a plan to get the kind of information they ought to have, and they ended up asking me to come and do it. And this is why Brownell called me as he did.

Derthick was a very different person. I loved them both, actually. These were two wonderful men. Derthick had sort of a cornpone humor which was a great asset, I might add, over on the (Capitol) Hill. He used it very effectively. He was a very cheerful person. We used to have some nicknames for him. Do I dare tell one?

MOSS: Sure

HEATH: The "Blue Bird of Happiness". But I tell you this man had the right outlook, and he was big enough to say, "I'm wrong" when he was wrong. On the Supreme Court opinion he was very chary about moving. I am far from critical. If I'd been sitting where he was sitting, I would've been chary too. Between May 17, 1954 and May 31, 1955, (1) when The second Supreme Court opinion came out, a great deal was going

(1) 349 U.S. 294.



on behind the scenes to get the seventeen states and the District of Columbia which, as a matter of policy, had segregated schools, to make certain moves. And some of them, even before the 1954 decision came out, had taken certain steps. But just how far the commissioner would be free to move in encouraging action that was of an overt type was something that only the man who sat in that or a higher chair could really decide.

MOSS: All right. What were some of the obstacles facing him in attempting to move in this direction?

HEATH: States might, as Virginia did, decide to get rid of their compulsory education legislation. States were considering setting up private schools. There was rigid opposition at the levels where it really counted but there were plenty of people along the way who wanted to move in and do what needed to be done to make an easier transition.

MOSS: What was the attitude of the national organizations such as the NEA and AFT (American Federation of Teachers) and so on?

HEATH: The NEA, I think you could say, was a little freer to push for a little faster action, not entirely so though because they would have lost their financial backing in the South.

MOSS: Right. In the state chapters and so on.

HEATH: As a matter of fact, many of the associations at the local level were split. There was a black organization and a white organization, and it took the NEA quite some years to get through the idea of having integrated associations. But they were free to make certain kinds of speeches that perhaps our commissioner wouldn't want to make. I think Derthick did a pretty good job of walking the tight-rope. He really did.

MOSS: All right. There are other threads that run through this period. You have the continuing attempts to get a general school aid bill through. This is the old bugbear and it just never quite comes off. Why do they go for general school aid? What is the philosophy behind it?

HEATH: I think it's the problems of categorical aid that make us want to see general school aid. You saw it in the vocational education legislation which was categorical aid started in 1917--the Smith-Hughes (Act) legislation-- (1) which covered four fields. The result was that states were skewing their program to fit those specific kinds of vocational education in which they could get federal aid. This is not what the office ever wanted. We wanted to see them meet whatever their particular needs were, and we issued studies which show pretty well. . . . I think it was Justice (Oliver Wendell, Jr.) Holmes who said that the forty-eight states (back then) were independent laboratories. Thus, on the basis of research findings, you could copy what was done in one which was good. It would spread around to the rest. If it was bad, you would localize the problem. I think you can see in the literature that there was too much moving in the direction of where the money came from, and we wanted to see full blown development in the education system.

MOSS: And the general school aid was an attempt to answer this?

HEATH: General school aid was one of the attempts to answer it, yes. It had been fought. It depended on who was in power who fought it. During the (Franklin D.) Roosevelt era you had Albert Thomas, an old school teacher, who was promoting federal aid to education. Hugo Black is another one. And incidentally, I did look up Lister Hill, and sure enough he followed Hugo Black and he was one of the sponsors of such legislation. But when the Republicans came in in '53, they were not interested in support of the education program so much as they were in favor of support of things: building the needed classrooms, this type of legislation. But they did, as I say, support cooperative research. And of course, it was Sputnik that helped us get the National Defense Education Act of 1958 through which was really a hundred year landmark.

MOSS: You have in 1954 a national conference on education. Do you recall this at all and what impact it had?

HEATH: Was it '54 or '55?

MOSS: They're two different things. There was a White House conference on education, before that a national conference.

(1) Public Law 64-347, February 23, 1917 (39 Stat. 929).



HEATH: Oh, was this in preparation for the White House conference?

MOSS: It may have been.

HEATH: Yes. I'm not clear enough on that, I guess, to answer it without looking that one up.

MOSS: All right, fine. We'll skip over it. Let's talk about the White House conference on education. This is 28 November to 1 December '55.

HEATH: '55, yes. Uh-huh. This was a proposal to really find out where we stood. The only White House conference that related to education that I recall had been held before would've been in the field of rural education. So that this, you could say, was the first White House conference that covered the field as a whole. And the idea behind it was to have all the states have their own conferences to see where they stood, what they felt was needed, and then to come together for a big national conference.

Some of us wondered at the time if the conference might fall on the church-state issue. The federal aid to education legislation eternally ran into trouble on the church-state issue. The Catholic Church primarily felt that if there was going to be federal aid it should go to their schools, too. The Protestants and the Jews were adamant that it should not. Organizations on the separation of church and state began to be formed around this time. Actually, this didn't prove the great problem in the White House conference.

It was quite a successful conference. Out of it came a new look at higher education, a new look at the kind of legislation that ought to be proposed. There were many changes. I'd have to look back at the report to figure how many of them. But that conference report (1) was still look at; it was being look at when the 1965 White House conference on Education (2) was being planned.

(1) The Committee for the White House Conference on Education. A Report to the President. Washington. U.S. Government Printing office, April 1956. 126 p.

(2) For report on the July 20-21, 1965 conference, see "The White House Conference on Education." American Education I (No. 7) 13-28; July-August 1965.



Among results was Public Law 84-813 of July 26, 1956 to encourage and assist the states in establishing state committee on education beyond the high school.

MOSS: White House conferences on various subjects now are coming into some disrepute as simply being palliatives; that they really don't perform the function for which they are intended, a gathering of people to talk about nice things, but nothing really comes of them. You would not put this particular conference in that category?

HEATH: No, I wouldn't. I think the trouble began more with the age of dissent, when the White House conferences ceased to be used in quite the way that they were originally intended to be used. I think that 1955 conference was a very salutary thing. It got the people across the nation thinking about education, about the difficulties in getting taxes through in support of education, what the needs were for financing it. We weren't in very good shape across the country in the field of education. The whole push had been on war and then revamping the structure so that we could get onto a peacetime economy. There were desires to cut back from the enormous spending that we had had in wartime. And social fields have a way of getting hit first. I've always said you start with the political, you move to the economic, and you finally get around to the social. And this conference put a big focus on the social issues.

MOSS: Let me ask you a little bit about the relationship between not only the office but the department and the Congress particularly with respect to education and the opposition of people like Graham Barden and Adam Clayton Powell, and so on, to the general school aid. Do you have any feel for this?

HEATH: Do I have a feel for it in what way?

MOSS: In what ways was the department trying to overcome the opposition. In what ways was the opposition put. How tough was it? The public statements are all there, but do you have any feel for the way people felt about it outside of public statements?

(1) This law at 70 Stat. 676, provided for the President's Committee on Education Beyond the High School.



HEATH: I think I could get into that a little bit later on than in this early stage when I was concentrating so heavily on the international field. And you see, when I first came to the Office of Education, I was still focusing very largely in the international field. I well remember however, that Barden felt his interests were better served if the federal government didn't get too involved with education in North Carolina. As he aged, he wanted to leave the Hill. He was not in political trouble but he disliked the thought of Adam Clayton Powell, a black man, succeeding him as chairman of the Education and Labor Committee. Barden was chairman from 1955-1961 and Powell did succeed him. Barden's attitude, of course, was influenced by the Supreme Court opinion of 1954 and 1955 relating to school segregated on the basis of race.

MOSS: All right. Well, let's move to that (the international field) then. And you took over the position of senior staff officer for international relations. Just what do those words mean? Job titles are one thing, but what were you. . . .

HEATH: This was a coordination job. The office had the Public Health Service which was the U.S. technical backstopper for the World Health Organization. It had the Office of Education which had the similar function for the International Bureau of Education and UNESCO. It had the Social Security Administration which was concerned with many matters that came under the International Labour Organization as did the Office of Education for that matter. And then the Social Security Administration was the backstopper on social welfare interests under the Social Commission of the United Nations Economic and Social Council. So we cut across these areas and the Federal Security Agency in the early days and the department found our staff talking with many voices in the international field.

I had the responsibility of coordinating the views within the department and coming up with a department position instead of an Office of Education position or a PHS (Public Health Service) position. For the first time, the secretary agreed to having one person in the international multilateral field and one in the international bilateral field who would concentrate on getting department positions, and so I was named as the representative for the department on the interdepartmental committees that were thrashing out the policy on which the secretary of State (Department) or higher authority finally acted to get our positions.



That doesn't mean that I was the expert in all these fields, not by any means. I was free to take a representative from Public Health Service or the Office of Education--wherever I needed to draw them--to these meetings and to call on them for help. And so the department did start talking with one voice.

MOSS: How did the independent subordinate groups react to this?

HEATH: To some extent they were grateful because one part of the agency, you see, sometimes had upset what another part was trying to do. So, to that extent, they were grateful. There was one whoop-de-do of a case where we really had a time, and that was in the field of multilateral technical assistance. In 1953 the French government tabled a resolution in the United Nations Economic and Social Council. They said tabled. As you well know, tabling means putting it before the delegates and not the way it's used in the United States. This resolution would have shifted the whole focus of the technical assistance program.

To go back, General (George C.) Marshall had made his June 5, 1947 speech out of which had come the Economic Recovery Administration program (European Recovery Program), and President Truman had had his 1949 Point IV in his inaugural address, and the United Nations Economic and Social Council by December of '49 had enacted a basic resolution, 222 Session IX. I'll never forget it. It established the expanded program of technical assistance. This was a program based on contributions from governments as distinct from the technical assistance in the regular programs in the United Nations and the specialized agencies which were financed by dues from the member states. By 1949 there was established in the Department of State what was known as TAC, the Technical Assistance Committee.\* It took them quite a while to get organized because the departments were all scrapping among themselves. In fact, it was so difficult that by 1950 Congress was about to eliminate the appropriation for it. I remember there was a Capus (Miller) Waznick who was a former ambassador to Nicaragua who worked with Ellen Woodward of HEW.

\*The Technical Assistance Committee of the UN, consisting of the eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council, was established in 1949. The Technical Cooperation Administration was established within the Department of State by the Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950.



MOSS: What was the name again?

HEATH: Ellen Woodward

MOSS: No, I mean . . .

HEATH: Capus Waynick was concerned with TAC in the Department of State.

MOSS: Okay, I think we can look that up, but it'll be hard for the transcriber to spell.

HEATH: Yeah, I can find it for you too if you need it. He gave Ellen Woodward full credit for getting that appropriation through. She was over on the Hill at seven o'clock in the morning working to get it through. This TAC had developed government positions. The 1949 ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council of the United Nations) resolution and the TAC positions called for an automatic formula for distributing the funds to UNESCO and the World Health Organization and so on and to the Secretary General's operations in the UN itself.

The French government by '53 proposed that governments control these funds. This had a great deal of reasonableness to it. Governments were putting up the money. So did the 1949 resolution have a great deal of reasonableness to it because there were almost no viable nations in 1949 as a result of the war conditions. The United States was not quite prepared in '53 to accept the French proposal because it would've had the eighteen nations--and there were just eighteen on ECOSOC at the time--make the decisions. This would've caused some political chaos if eighteen nations decided how the money should be spent in other countries. On the other hand, the United States was sympathetic to not having the specialized agencies affiliated with the UN tell governments what they could have money for, instead of having governments make their requests for what they needed. And so there was a year allowed, largely on U.S. initiative, for governments to study and come up with what they wanted to come up with.

For us in Washington this was a traumatic thing. The Department of Agriculture which backstopped the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) was interested in FAO controlling. The Department of Labor which did the large part of the backstopping for ILO (International Labour Organisation) was interested in ILO. Our Public Health Service was interested in WHO (World Health Organization). There was



more flexibility in the Office of Education as far as UNESCO was concerned. There was no serious problem in Social Security Administration because they dealt with the UN Secretariat on the Social Commission, or, rather, they backstopped for the U.S. relating to the commission and its secretariat. So a position was drafted in the Department of State. And believe you me, it was something to try to get the departments to agree. I think the Department of State almost felt they were going to have to have an "international agreement" among our own departments.

MOSS: Interdepartmental treaties are not unheard of.

HEATH: No, they're not. I've been involved in developing a couple, so I know they are not unheard of. Anyway, we went to meeting after meeting. Finally the Department of State, the head of international organizations--maybe it was a higher person over there--sent a communication to each of the departments asking that an assistant secretary or an under secretary accompany their usual representative to a meeting. We'd try to thrash out this position. I had a good reputation for always coming to the meeting with a position for my department, and I aimed to try to get one now. I could get nowhere with the technical boys in the Public Health Service, just nowhere. And I never liked to do it, but I did call up, I guess it was Leonard Scheele, at the time, who was the surgeon general and ask if he would let me come and see him. And I explained the problem to him and I can still see him leaning back in his chair and smiling. And he said, "This is the old fight between those who have the political responsibility and those who have the technical responsibility, but I think I can arrange for my technical boys to accept the position that you have outlined, which the Department of State is interested in." And by that time I had everybody else going along with it. So our department decided not to send an assistant secretary, but to ask (Harry G.) Hal Haskell with whom I often worked. He was a special assistant to Mrs. Hobby. He's now the mayor up in Wilmington, Delaware. He was in (the 85th) Congress for a short time, probably defeated on the segregation issue in the state of Delaware--a split state. I asked him if he didn't want to present the department's position. He said, "No," because he felt I knew more about it than he did. I didn't get the decision in my department till the very last minute, and therefore. . . .

MOSS: What was the hold-up?



HEATH: Public Health Service. They're the hold-out. See, I waited until the very last minute to go see Scheele.

MOSS:Z Okay, I was wondering how much time had elapsed between. . . .

HEATH: I had meetings with all the representatives from all the different parts of the department, and the PHS (Public Health Service) just held out. They weren't any different from the boys in Agriculture and Labor (Departments) and so on.

MOSS: So your appeal to the surgeon general was a last minute thing.

HEATH: It broke it, yes. And it broke the problem. So Phil (Philip) Arnow over in Labor and the different representatives in the other departments who had called me had been unable to get our position in advance, because I was still working and trying to arrive at one. Walter Kotschnig was one of the people at the meeting. He was the dean of ECOSOC, I guess you could say, because after the first session, he'd been to every session the Economic and Social Council had had. And there was an assistant secretary of Agriculture there, high, pretty high officials. They went around the table to the right, and I was sitting pretty close to the left end of this table. The agriculture appeal had been made with great fervor. The Labor Department appeal had been made with great fervor, and I do know it was dramatic when I said the Department of HEW sided with the Department of State. Phil Arnow is sitting at the far end of the table and his mouth just dropped open because those boys were so sure that the technical agencies would win this battle. The result was we went to ECOSOC with a new position which did not favor exactly what the French wanted, but which did put responsibility on governments to request the kind of technical assistance they wanted. And then we had what was known as the technical assistance board in the UN which was made up of the secretary general of the UN and the directors general of the specialized agencies or their representatives. It acted within a policy framework that had been established by the council and included priorities for the kinds of projects that the expanded technical assistance program would support.

I think I have skipped a very significant piece in here. The Department of Agriculture was infuriated at what



happened in this Department of State meeting which resulted in the transformation of the U.S. position. And so a letter was sent from the Secretary of Agriculture to the president before we went to ECOSOC. The result was, this item was put on the Cabinet agenda. And they had a little Cabinet in those days. Hal Haskell was our person on this little Cabinet, and he used to come back from the meetings and tell me anything that was of significance that I was involved in, so he'd. . . .

MOSS: Was this a meeting of Cabinet assistants?

HEATH: Yes, from the different departments. And he'd come back from the White House and tell me things that were of significance. And he said this item was going to be on the agenda. That meant to me that I want to get a paper prepared for Mrs. Hobby so she will be fully informed. And the time was very short. I remember sitting up half the night getting that paper written. I think the Cabinet meeting was like two days later, something like that. It seems to me they were on Fridays in those days, and this was about a Wednesday. And Hal asked me if I couldn't do some kind of a chart which would show the former complicated structure on this whole multilateral technical assistance program and the one proposed by France and the one we wanted.

Well, I'm not that good a chart maker, but Nelson Rockefeller, our under secretary, had a magnificent chart maker who came in to help me. And I talked to her for an hour and a half explaining exactly what had happened historically. And she came back with a scrap of paper on which she had done a perfectly beautiful chart which explained the three different plans. There wasn't enough time, so we used that chart, that scrap of paper. It didn't even get done over. And this study went into Mrs. Hobby and she asked to see me. And I think I did a pretty good job of briefing because I was so full of this as a result of all the troubles in my own department.

She was prepared when the cabinet meeting occurred. The Secretary of Agriculture didn't speak at all although his department had initiated the letter to the White House. Mrs. Hobby did. Before I heard from Hal, I had been called by someone over in the Department of State to thank us for what HEW did in the cabinet meeting. Secretary Hobby was the one who sold the whole bill to the president and so he approved that position. I think that's an interesting sidelight.

MOSS: Yes, I think it is.

HEATH: Well, when we got to ECOSOC and tried to sell this program, we had certain governments definitely on our side. There were specialized agencies who were doing their negotiating along other lines, but the United States resolution did go through instead of the French proposal and instead of what the technical agencies really wanted.

MOSS: I think that's a very good illustration of the kind of thing you were doing. Did you get involved at all in the regional conferences and so on, for instance, the Montevideo Conference in '51, that kind of thing?

HEATH: Are you talking about UNESCO?

MOSS: This was under UNESCO and OAS (Organization of American States).

HEATH: Oh, I thought. . . . You see, there was a UNESCO general conference held down. . . .

MOSS: This was on the question of free schooling and teacher exchange programs.

HEATH: Oh, I think probably not. It was not my job. . . . I probably knew about it at the time but it was not my problem to deal with a matter that was solely within the competence of one part of our organization. I would receive the position papers, for example, that the Public Health Service had developed in connection with the WHO (World Health Organization) conference just to keep me informed, but I didn't work on those to any degree. I had all I could do with the ones that were for delegations going out on inter-governmental missions where the subjects cut across health and education, for example.

MOSS: I see. What about something like the inter-American seminar on vocational education at the University of Maryland?

HEATH: No. I knew it happened, saw the documentation.

MOSS: What sort of things, then, other than this one that you mentioned, were you getting into?

HEATH: I'll tell you some examples of things that were specialized that I did get into. When the Eisenhower administration came in, there were some people who



felt that the United States was much too much involved with ILO, and that we were agreeing to international conventions all over the place. The ILO had a lot of conventions, two hundred-odd maybe at that time. And a team was sent out, and I remember one of them coming to my place, and they were really playing one department off against the other because their questions to me were so heavily weighted about the Labor Department, and I suggested they go see the Labor Department. But I did pull out material to show them that the United States had not signed all these conventions.

What the United States had done and the president was required to do under the constitution of UNESCO and our being a member state--not of UNESCO, of ILO. Our being a member state of ILO, the president had to send these conventions to the Congress. He very seldom recommended that the United States become a party. In fact, the eight or nine that we were party to were on such matters as accommodations on ship board. This involved matters often extending beyond our territorial waters. It was something that had to come within the confines of federal action. Now that was a specialized thing that was of concern to our Public Health Service, but I had the overall picture on this more than they did. So I dealt with it.

In general, I was concerned with the world social situation report of the United Nations, the development of international surveys on action taken by governments in meeting the world's social needs, the development of a program of practical action in the social field for the United Nations. I was involved in the U.S. part of this kind of work.

The first world social situation report that was ever prepared was a preliminary one. It was presented in 1952, which was the first session of ECOSOC that I attended. It was done with special reference to standards of living. Today we would say "levels of living" as a result of a big study that we had done in the U.N. as a matter of fact, which was reported, I think, in 1954, and was an outgrowth of the needs of this world social situation report. Now the latter report anybody can read, so it isn't necessary to go into much detail, but perhaps it would give a little indication of where we stood internationally way back then.

The countries that were most dependent on agriculture had the worst agriculture in the world. More than half the people of the world could neither read nor write. Of the mass, M-A-S-S, diseases of the world such as malaria and gastro-



intestinal and nutritional diseases and yaws, diseases of this sort, tuberculosis, I think, was the only one on the list that was still a problem in the United States. These diseases were so great that you had countries like India with life expectancy being twenty-four or twenty-five years as against our sixty-seven or eight in those days.

These mass diseases masked other diseases. I think you see some of the charges against the United States that we produce more mental cases than other parts of the world. Our people live longer, and we don't have these other diseases that have been killing off people in the rest of the world. I think there were something like nine hundred thousand doctors in the world back in '52 and we had two hundred and eleven thousand of them here in the United States. This gives you some little idea of what the conditions were that we were trying to cope with. And we needed to get the international organizations to set some kinds of priority. This was a very difficult problem.

A nation would come up with some one thing it wanted to do, and it would get a great deal of support for that one activity. Perhaps it would get a resolution through. The result would be that some of these intergovernmental organizations, like UNESCO, had nearly three hundred priority projects. There just weren't enough resources to go around for that many priority projects. So we spent a great deal of time trying to develop positions in all the intergovernmental organizations that we were dealing with which would provide for concentration of resources and of efforts.

We realized that the United States likes to move too fast. We get an idea, we think it ought to be put into effect right away. But we couldn't even start with developing priorities. We had to start with developing criteria for the purpose of developing priorities. In other words, we tended to skip much too fast, and we had to pull ourselves back and face the realities of the world.

MOSS: I still have a moment or two of tape on there.

HEATH: By about 1954 after all kinds of efforts to have concentration of efforts and coordination of efforts, we got through a proposal to completely revamp the way we looked at the subject of concentration of efforts, and we did it by asking the secretary general of the U.N. and the directors general. . . .

MOSS: I have to hold it here. We are running out of tape.

BEGIN SIDE II TAPE I

MOSS: All right. Can you continue your thought there?

HEATH: Yes. We came up with a proposal to have the secretary general of the United Nations and the directors general of the specialized agencies appear before the Economic and Social Council every summer for a confrontation with governments in which they would be free to express their problems with governments--and governments were as guilty as the secretariats--and the governments express their problems with the secretariats.

This was a very wholesome thing. In the first place, it brought all these leaders together for governments to negotiate with. Sometimes in the past they would be there just for their particular subject on the agenda. This brought them together for a long enough time so that all the delegations really had an opportunity to negotiate with them.

(Dag) Hammarskjold was Secretary General in those days. We had developed a position paper in Washington which had some good in it, but it was the kind of paper that gets dreadfully skewed when it goes around to all the departments and they each want to put their little two cents worth in it.

So in 1955--and oh, this was the year of "le grand carte" which created problems--but that year I recall Walter Kotschnig bringing us all together about 10 o'clock one night. And holding up the U.S. position paper over a waste basket and dropping it in it and saying, "Look, we can't possibly use this speech that's been drafted. Everybody's wanted to put their negative stuff in it." It wasn't a position paper, it was the speech. He said, "Let's throw this away. Everybody who's sitting around this table knows what the government's position is, and let's see what we can do to draft something that is constructive, that will be meaningful for the secretary general, that will be meaningful for the directors general, and that may be meaningful to governments because our preliminary negotiations have shown all of us that all of the governments are prepared to just blast away."

We outlined all the major constructive things that we thought ought to be said. And Walter Kotschnig is an inimitable guy. I hope you interview him some day if you haven't already.



We didn't write the new speech, we simply outlined it, and he presented it and it was magnificently done. (1) That's the only time I ever recall when Dag Hammarskjöld was so indiscreet as to send around a congratulations and appreciation note--because Hammarskjöld was very careful not to overstep any of the bounds between the international secretariat and governments.

That address transformed the whole atmosphere in the council, just no question about it, and it was good for the specialized agencies in the UN family and it was good for governments. Incidentally, I think one interesting point might be made about these conferences. Every single one had something that had nothing to do with ECOSOC which had a profound effect.

MOSS: Such as?

HEATH: In 1952 we were meeting in New York. That was the first time the council chamber was ready. The UN had moved in from Flushing Meadow. It was a beastly hot summer too, and the UN hadn't fixed up its air-conditioning so it was frightfully cold in ECOSOC. That was the year of our presidential election, 1952. The nominating conventions were held during ECOSOC, and the speakers on the extreme left, the right, and in between were talking in all directions as far as what the United States policy ought to be.

We'd walk into the council chamber and there would be a New York Times, or in those days a New York Herald Tribune, which was then being published, on just about every delegate's desk, and they would use those speeches against us. It was at the time when the cold war with the Soviet Union was at its worst. We had one dreadful diatribe after another leveled at us, often using the material from these speeches. It certainly taught the United States not to have that kind of a conference on our shores when our political conventions were going on. Both the heat of the summer, which caused the foreign delegations not to want to meet in New York in the summer and prefer to have the sessions go to Geneva, and the political situation in the United States helped to get the summer conferences held in Geneva.

Footnote:

(1) Walter M. Kotschnig. "Coordinating the Programs of the United National." The Department of State Bulletin, 33(No.843): 317-24; August 22, 1955.



Those political conventions were really a real trial to us. I remember the Venezuelan chair being vacant one time and (Enriques R.) Fabregat. . . . Was it Venezuela or Uruguay? Uruguay perhaps. Uruguay sitting next to us and the five advisers' seats were vacant, and he came in from a small lounge that we had outside the Economic and Social Council chamber and said, "Miss Heath, between your political conventions and the Olympic games, we certainly ought to adjourn the Economic and Social Council!" There was more truth in that than he knew.

When the 1953 ECOSOC met, I left for a plane to New York to catch a boat to LeHavre and the White House was under picket on one side with those who favored the execution of the Rosenbergs (Julius and Ethel) and on the other side who opposed it. We didn't get much news on the (SS) Liberté. We knew that, I guess it was, Justice (William O.) Douglas had stayed the execution for awhile, so we didn't find out until we got to Geneva that the execution had taken place. I walked down the streets of Geneva and in all the bookstore windows were books about the letters from the death house from Ethel Rosenberg. They burned Uncle Sam in effigy in Belgium in Brussels.

We knew when we got there this was going to be a real problem to the delegation. It was a period of retrenchment. We didn't have all the information coming in from the states that we would have liked to have had. We had to listen to the armed forces network and programs of that sort. So we sat in our conference room and put two pieces of paper before us. And on one page we put the Rosenbergs and on the other page Willy Gittling. Does that name mean anything to you?

MOSS: No, it doesn't. Now why?

HEATH: Well, Willy Gittling, guilty or not guilty, I'm sure I don't know, was picked up in Berlin at the time of the June 16, 1953 uprising.

MOSS: Oh, yes.

HEATH: And on the next day, I think it was the seventeenth, there was the general strike that broke out, and Willy Gittling was picked up, tried and summarily shot at sunrise. So we put down the story of Willy Gittling and we all contributed our two bits from memory on what had happened with the Rosenbergs and the way in which they had been tried by their peers and had gone all the way up through the Supreme Court channels. What we came out with was very effective in eliminating any further discussion of the Rosenberg case.

That was also in the time of the (Joseph R.) McCarthy era. It may have been then or '54 when we had the (John W.) Bricker Amendment to contend with. The Bricker Amendment was very difficult indeed. I think there were sixty-six or sixty-seven senators who were sponsoring this proposal which would have greatly curtailed the responsibility of the president in the international field. There was a man by the name of Herman Phleger who was the legal adviser to (John Foster) Dulles. <sup>in the</sup> Department of State --

MOSS: I don't remember, but we can check it out.

HEATH: And he had taken the position that just anything that would interfere with not getting rid of that Bricker Amendment had to be stopped as far as our programs were concerned. This meant. . . .

MOSS: Did you have your negative in the right place <sup>in</sup> that . . .

HEATH: Maybe I didn't. I probably got myself all mixed up.

MOSS: He was against the Bricker Amendment.

HEATH: He was against the Bricker Amendment, and there'd been major studies on how this Bricker Amendment would affect all the departments. We found ourselves having to go to ECOSOC with positions in which we had to vote against something that we were already more than complying with, or we had to abstain because a favorable vote might have rippled the waters in connection with the Bricker Amendment.

MOSS: So you wouldn't give the Bricker supporters an issue to beat the drums on.

HEATH: That's right. I will give you an example. There was a political rights convention that came up from the Status of Women Commission (Commission on the Status of Women of the Economic and Social Council) to ECOSOC for action, and only had three or four paragraphs in it. The United States of America was way over and beyond anything that was required in this convention, but we had to abstain. Walter Kotschnig and I thought this would be a beautiful time to put a public member in the chair. We had a couple of those on the delegation. Besides, public members could send back word to the attorney general or the president or secretary of state on what they thought. We would work through channels that might not ever get where we wanted the message to get.



I recall that it was Brad (Elizabeth Bradley Heffelfinger) Heffelfinger who was asked to sit on this item. And I want you to know that in Social Committee before the proposed convention went to the council itself for action, there was a request to vote on it paragraph by paragraph, so we had to abstain, abstain, abstain. In fact, Brad turned around to me and said, "Jesus, three abstentions." And she certainly did write back what she thought of our having to take this position. Later on when I had been talking in this field, I was brought a broadcast picked up by Voice of America from the Soviet Union which certainly told us what they thought of me and our position. Our votes could be used against us so beautifully.

MOSS: You've anticipated my question a little bit in what you've been saying the past few minutes. I was wondering about your need for support from the administration, political support, in what you were doing, the degree of sympathy with which support was given, whether or not the support was sufficient to your needs and how many times you felt undercut because it wasn't sufficient. People who were involved in the international end sometimes tend to alienate themselves from the domestic political scene because they are more interested in the international one. How much of a dichotomy was there, really?

HEATH: I think the big problems tended to come when administrations changed, even if it was in the same party; when you had so many new people that you couldn't quite get some decisions through as fast as you needed to get them through. Once in awhile, Congress pulled the rug out from under us, as it did in objecting to the appropriation for the expanded technical assistance program (which involved a contribution from government) until a big study was made. And there we are sitting with a government position which was very solid and they pull the rug out from under us on the amount of money that could be supplied.

There were specific cases in which there was strong opposition from the administration, and I think often on very good grounds. I had an item once. It was called maintenance of obligations. (1) My popular name for it was the "runaway daddy" problem. It was a problem that had arisen as a result of the war when our boys and those from the French and all the other Allied powers had helped to bring children into the world without benefit of marriage licenses. The men came on back to

(1) Item 17 on the agenda of the XVIIth session of ECOSOC in New York, March 30-April 30, 1954.



their homelands and here were all these children left behind who were often outcasts in their own countries. And through the social welfare field, there was a desire to get some way of providing adequate support for these children.

The U.S. position, of course, was very negative on this because the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the states. It's not something the federal government can get into. Recognizing the same kind of a problem here in this country, there had been a model law proposed around 1950 or somewhere around that date, and many of the states were adopting constructive legislation so that you wouldn't have border hopping to avoid financial support responsibilities within the United States, but it was another matter internationally. And so the International Labor Organization in the UN got a special committee of experts together and had jurists on it with the result that a convention was proposed. . . . (1)

MOSS: Excuse me. Why the ILO?

HEATH: Well, let's see. I guess because they have a women's program, for one thing, but it seems to me there was a more valid reason than that which escapes me. Maybe I could tell you later. (2) Anyway they had jurists, perhaps drawn from or recommended by the International Law Commission who drafted this convention and the U.S. position was negative. It was going to come up at what is known as one of the house-keeping sessions. I think it was the seventeenth session of ECOSOC that was held in New York.

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(1) ECOSOC Resolution 527 (XVII) "Recognition and enforcement of maintenance obligations," April 26, 1954, contains as an annex the Model Convention on the Enforcement Abroad of Maintenance Orders as prepared by the Committee of Experts on the Recognition and Enforcement of Maintenance Obligations, Geneva, August 28, 1952.

(2) A later check with records reveals the action emerged from ECOSOC Resolution 390H (XIII) of August 9, 1951 recognizing preliminary work on the subject by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law revealed in the Report of the VIIth session of the Social Commission. The Resolution requested the Secretary General of the United Nations to take certain steps such as consultation with other bodies including the ILO and the action which resulted in the Committee of Experts meeting and drafting the model convention.



I hadn't planned to go because I didn't normally go to those in between sessions. I went to a couple of them because of a special item. I sat through the development of the position, and when it was first being developed I said, "God himself couldn't support that among these delegations. There's no use to our going to New York with something as negative as this. We have to have something constructive." We got a few little constructive points in it, but not much, and then I was stuck with having to go to New York. I could only sell one government, which was Ecuador, on the U.S. position.

To get some flexibility, we had to send back to Washington for more instructions because the United States didn't want to be in the position of having a resolution go through which we couldn't possibly comply with. Then because of somebody's false idea of security, our unclassified message to Washington got answered with a highly secret label by accident. I was sitting in the Social Committee and had to ask the Social Committee to adjourn temporarily until the U.S. government could establish its position. Now lots of governments have to do this, but the United States didn't like to be in this position, especially when the session was held on U.S. soil. The whole trouble was, the answer was sitting down in the code room waiting for decoding.

Well we finally came out with a resolution that was not unacceptable to the United States. We didn't particularly like it, but what the convention had aimed to do was to set up a system to process papers against people in this country to provide support for children in other parts of the world. Now I don't blame Uncle Sam for its position because we constitutionally just aren't set up that way. I also don't blame the other countries of the world for wanting the proposal.

MOSS: It's just an impasse.

HEATH: Yes. There were problems of a different nature that might interest you: one on the free flow of private capital in international channels. This was on the economic side. I would not normally have had anything to do with it, but there had been a resolution at one of the earlier sessions which had been fought at great odds, and there were many amendments and the United States won its position on all but one vote. But when the delegation returned, they came in for blasts on "Why did you people let this get in the resolution?"

forgetting that we were one of eighteen votes, and getting no credit for all the things we did get in the resolution.

That resolution was to come up again for a revamping. And it was whatever year (Gamal A.) Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. (1) The U.S. position had had to clear through God and man, the White House, everybody got in on this act. The paper had to be airmailed over to us. The economics boys were working very hard to get the U.S. position through. The reason I got involved was because I was asked to sit in the plenary session when they were discussing hydroelectric power in order to free everyone on the economic side of the U.S. delegation to work on the resolution. What I know about hydroelectric power you could put in a jigger size thimble, I think, but I had sat through all the interdepartmental development of the position.

In the afternoon, the messenger came over from the consulate and put a dispatch in front of me. We were operating under the French alphabet, so Egypt sat next to us. And the message said, "Nasser has nationalized the Suez Canal." The next morning we were engrossed early as a speaker on the free flow of private capital--not exactly a propitious moment. And so I insisted that messenger find our representative or deputy representative before stepping foot out of that Palais des Nations. It was a story that well illustrates why people sometimes have to work incredible hours, as we did then, because this nationalization, as you know, resulted in all kinds of problems, for Belgium and England and France and the United States, I might add.

When I left the council chamber, I hurried home to change clothes and was coming out to go to a party which the poor ambassador from Egypt was having that night. His government hadn't told him when Nasser was going to nationalize the Suez Canal. And I ran into a man on our delegation who'd been a minister in Czechoslovakia. And he said, "Kay, you aren't going to that party tonight, are you?" And I said, "Why not?" He said, "Well, the French and the Belgians," I guess it was, "have blackballed it." Maybe the English, too.

(1) The Government of Egypt seized the Suez Canal Company on July 26, 1956.



And I said, "Have we had instructions that the United States is blackballing it?" And he said, "No." And I said, "Well, then I'm going because I am getting nowhere on the social issues with some of these governments." Was that in 1955, that the Suez Canal. . . .

MOSS: It would've been fall of '56, I believe. (26 July 1956)

HEATH: Was it? (The action to which I refer was in the summer while ECOSOC was in session.)

MOSS: At least the British and French invasion was in the fall of '56. (October)

HEATH: Yeah. Well, anyway I said I was getting nowhere on my negotiations in the social field. And I figured this was a good chance to negotiate because they would all be in confusion on the economic side yet wanting to make some concessions. Maybe one of the adjustments would be to help me get some agreement on the social items. The ambassador greeted me, really threw his arms around me when I walked into the party. And there was almost nobody there. It was kind of sad. The African, no Asian--whatever countries were on the council from the African area were represented (Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Republic of China) and several of the nations that were really opposing us had somebody there. So the ambassador asked what he could do for me, and I said, "Oh, I was hoping to get a good position through on certain social items." And he said, "Well, if that's all your trouble, let's go talk to some of these people." So we went around to all of them, including our opponents, and sewed up the social items that night, you see. It always depends on whose ox is being gored on what you get through, and often you get things through not because you're so good, but because the situation helps you to get them through, and the situations helped there. When was "le grand carte?" Was that in 1955? (1)

MOSS: We can check that out.

HEATH: Yes, because one of the problems that had faced us in '54 was the Asian conference when the Geneva accords occurred. (2) Now '55, that was the worst

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(1) The 4-power meeting of heads of State at the summit was held in Geneva July 18-23, 1955 during the time of the XXth session of ECOSOC in that city July 5 - August 5, 1955.

(2) The Geneva Conference on Far Eastern affairs in Geneva from April 26 to July 21, 1954 was followed by an armistice on August 11 in Indo-China. The XVII session of ECOSOC met in Geneva, June 29 - August 6, 1954.

workout I had because the delegations were very heavily weighted as far as we were concerned with the economics boys. I had the main adviser job upon the social items. Sometimes there would be somebody else there. Often there would be somebody who came in from the Department of State on the technical assistance items. And the year of "le grand carte" nobody wanted to move on anything economic while the four heads of state were meeting, and so everything but the kitchen sink was dragged in on the social side, anything to stretch it out.

In fact, when that conference was over, Walter Kotschnig and Kathleen Bell, who handled the administrative things (which were tremendous that year), and I came together at the Hotel du Rhone, and Walter said, "Let's go have lunch. If we had Margaret Roberts", (who was a secretary) "with us, we'd practically have the U.S. delegation as far as anything that happened in this session is concerned." This was simply because what the four powers were deciding was so interrelated with some of the work in ECOSOC, you see. It affected anything that the governments might want to do on the economic side.

The story I told you about the nationalizing of the Suez Canal was a very good illustration of how we just worked right around the clock. We couldn't get answers out of Washington. I made one two-cent contribution to that work. Our first instruction had come from Washington not to talk at all. In Washington they were concerned with all the nations of the world. Over there we were concerned with the eighteen we were dealing with, of course. But Quai d'Orsay and 10 Downing Street were giving good instructions to their people.

One of the things we did while trying to wait for more instructions from Washington was to see that all our friendly delegations were late getting to the council meeting the next day. And my one contribution was to suggest we include in our night action dispatch that, "This is what we will do unless we have heard from you to the contrary by such and such a time," because that gets action.

MOSS: That is one of the most useful phrases in all of bureaucracy.

HEATH: Really, it is. It got the action, and we ended up being able to use the speech we had with minor



change. And the poor U.S. representative, they were already reaching him when the dispatch came in, or the message came in from the United States. It's a message from Washington out, isn't it, and a dispatch the other way. But the message came in when he was already sitting there ready to speak.

MOSS: Let's move on, I think, to your association with the Office of Education. You began to tell me a little bit as to how that came about. You were selected to do the job on gathering the information on the way that the various educational systems fit into the political structure of each country.

HEATH: This was one of the reasons--to do something of a research nature, yes. I had worked hard to get the Office of Education to put enough in their budget so that they could function on international matters. The office was pretty much an office of educators in those days, and they saw things domestically. I changed for other reasons too. I couldn't get enough help at the departmental level. I was replaced by a man, and he did get some extra help after that. It's a typical pattern, believe me.

As soon as I arrived in the Office of Education and this idea for a ministries study had developed, the international people wanted me to go over to the Department of State and talk to them. And I said, "I have been working with country desks in the Department of State, officials all over that place, and I wouldn't care to set foot in it until everything had been worked out at the Office of Education level." This idea of going and having a meeting with somebody while you explore and probe and you haven't really straightened out your own thinking is rather bad. And it would be particularly bad with the Department of State because this was not an issue in which the Department of State was involved in negotiating with governments. Therefore, it would not be in the classification of a high political issue, and the Department of State simply didn't have projects of the sort that we envisioned carried out with their approval.

My effort was to get full approval of the whole project through the department. In fact, some of this I'd done before I came down to the office. After getting all



those approvals, I made sure that the plan for the study was all drafted, that the kind of a message that we wanted to send out through the embassies abroad was drafted, in fact, everything but maybe the covering message to the ambassadors abroad. And this took a little doing.

I also had to go through the business of convincing our educators that I, at least, was not interested in educational administration per se. I was interested in public administration. Where did the Ministry of Education fit within the public administration of the particular nation? Because the Office of Education was being called on to make recommendations on how a million dollars should be spent for education in the Kingdom of Iran, let's say, and they didn't know anything about how you worked in the Kingdom of Iran. They knew how the school system worked. They knew what was taught in the courses because we interpreted foreign credentials from countries around the world, but they had little or no concept of the structure within particular nations. They would know there was a Ministry of Education or something like that.

This was probably the biggest selling job I had to do on that study. My point was that the Office of Education needed at one time in history certain basic information. You could then use the accretions that came in on the dispatches from around the world to cover your changes. But if you didn't have something to start with, these accretions didn't mean very much. And it wasn't until well after UNESCO was established--in 1952 or so, after McGrath's reorganization--that the Office of Education paid any attention to matters other than the education part per se.

When I finally was ready to go over to the Department of State, I called up the foreign economic reporting officer. He wanted to know what I wanted to come and see him about, and I was not about to give him too much information over the phone because he would've said right off the bat, "We can't do anything like that." I had all my papers prepared and a whole bundle of them ready to take over to see him.<sup>1</sup> He was a smart man. He did what I would've done if I had been in his place, but it was a little hard on me. I didn't just go to see him. He took me into a conference room with about twenty people. He had representatives from the country--the bureaus for the different countries. He had representatives from public affairs. He had some foreign service officers who'd just come back from around the world. And I never did such a job in my life trying to convince people what we wanted. And almost an hour had gone by and I thought, "I have wasted all my time. I am getting nowhere." They even insulted me enough to say, "Couldn't we use the Statesman's Handbook?" Well, we couldn't, not to answer the questions that Uncle Sam was posing to us.

And it was on October 2, 1956  
I went to see him.



I was almost in despair when I did say, "Lady and gentlemen"--there was one woman besides myself there-- "I guess I have a little story to tell you and a question to ask you, and then I'll be ready to go home." And I could see this reaction of, "Well, we've gotten over this hurdle," you see. I've always felt that the good Lord, if I've done my homework, stands by that filing cabinet, which is my mind, and pulls out the right drawer somehow or another.

And my story was this: The Department of State made over a hundred requests a week to us for assistance related to education. By the very nature of education in the United States,--and in other countries where international negotiation had been more a question of helping people travel to nongovernmental conferences and this sort of thing, intellectual cooperation, not decision making-- we were not able to answer those questions adequately unless we had some kind of a working base. And so a proposal had gone in to the commissioner of education. The commissioner had liked it. "Lady and Gentlemen, you know what happens to budgets when they go to the secretary in a department. Many things were cut, but this item stood." And of course, the budget went to what was called the Bureau of the Budget in those days. And, says I, "Lady and gentlemen, you know what happens when the Bureau of the Budget looks over the submissions of departments. And many things were cut, but this item stood." And of course, the budget came back for various adjustments before it went to the White House, and this item stood. And, says I, "Lady and gentlemen, the budget went to the White House. And I don't kid myself that President Eisenhower looked at this line item. But I will tell you that it stood. And so it went to the Hill. And, lady and gentlemen, you know what happens when a budget gets before the Ways and Means Committee. All I can tell you is that the item stood. And when it came to appropriating time, the budget was approved, and the president signed the appropriation act into law. Now President Eisenhower is the engineer on this train; Mr. Dulles and Mr. (Marion B.) Folsom are brakemen or assistants, anyway. We have been told by the administration that we will do this study. The Congress has said you may have the money to do this study. That's my story. My question is: How do we do it?" And oh, I have such feeling for that foreign service officer who said, "Dr. Heath, you have us where you want us. We'll cooperate." That's how the negotiation finally went through.



After that study was finished, I was pestered to death. A representative from the Latin American group, the Organization of American States, came to see me. "Would I consider doing this kind of a job on labor ministries for the Latin American countries?" "No, I would not." The Public Health Service asked me if I could swing this with the health ministries, and I said, "No." But if they wanted to get their whole budget through and all the groundwork done, then they could come and talk to me."

One of the reasons the Department of State finally was willing to let this study be done was that the government needed so much information that none of the nations of the world really had, in order to make the decisions that were now authorized intergovernmentally, either in the United Nations itself or in UNESCO. I never want to do another study like that I can tell you. Contrary to the belief of many that governments wouldn't answer, sixty-nine of them did. There was a potential of eighty until Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab Republic which reduced it to seventy-nine. To me it was a demonstration that education is political. The governments would like to talk about this field too--would like to propagandize about it. The material came over in forty-three languages. Some of the governments--that is, parts of the material.

MOSS: Why did you decide upon the questionnaire approach?

HEATH: This I did out of what I thought was necessity. There had been a study thirty years earlier, and a questionnaire had gone to our embassies abroad. And the embassies had answered it. I felt highly restricted by that questionnaire, and I thought it warped the questionnaire that I was developing. I know I would have had a different questionnaire if I'd started from scratch, but if we were ever going to get any comparative information, I had to start with something that already existed so that there was a basis for comparison, at least among the nations that would be represented in each study. That's the reason.

I think one of the biggest problems was the fact that nations weren't staying stable; constitutions changed right and left. The Fifth French Republic followed the Fourth and so on. On the other hand, it was quite clear as that study developed that it didn't much matter how they changed their constitutions, they still have the same basic pattern whether it was Tsarist Russia or Soviet Russia,



whether it was the kingdom of Italy or the Italian Republic. There was a general basic pattern that would stay the same. I think one of the advantages of this study was that it's something the United Nations would not be apt to do.

MOSS: I was going to ask that.

HEATH: And yet it was the kind of study that governments were very anxious to have the findings on. The study was sent around the world. There was a little trouble when I prepared the message to go out on that and tried to clear it through the Department of State. Oh, I'll go back and tell you another story about clearing the first one if you like, but there was trouble as far as Arab nations and Israel were concerned. The cover of this book has the seals from those of the ministries that were able to send them to us and when that menorah was seen on there, the Arab desk objected. This would cause trouble if this book arrived with their. . . . My view was that we were dealing with all the nations. The Arab countries had the same opportunity. It was USIA that was really fighting on this one with some support from the Department of State.

Finally, the decision was made at a higher level that the United States government on overall things had to recognize that both types of countries were represented, and so the message did go out, and the book was distributed around the world. The one good thing I can say about it is that with all the problems it entailed, no international incidents occurred, and we've had them on some single country studies.

MOSS: You said you had a problem in sending out the initial-- what was it?--the covering letter for the questionnaire, or what?

HEATH: After the Department of State said they'd cooperate, the desk that covered the Arab countries objected. I went over to see the head of that desk, and he made a great error in talking to me because I'd done my homework, and the error was that this would be an entirely unacceptable questionnaire to send to Egypt. And I said, "If you had said, 'certain other country' (Israel). I might have had to agree with you, but not Egypt. Right now, we have in our own Office of Education representatives from the ministry in Egypt who are setting up clearing house offices. They've come over at the request of the government

of Egypt to get help from us. They are quite ready to cooperate with us on this." This finally folded up their opposition.

The man over in the Department of State, Vaughn DeLong, who now is in our office of the secretary, was the one who was handling the clearances with me. He had to process the actual papers around the Department of State, and the day it was finally done, he called me up and said, "What do you think I have in my own two hands?" And I said, "What?" He said, "The message with every signature on it that you can possibly think of, and it will be out today or tomorrow depending on the number of messages that they have to send out around the world." Well, is that enough on that study?

MOSS: I was going to ask--I think that's enough on the study--what other things were you doing in the '56 to '61 period, or did that occupy pretty much all your time?

HEATH: Oh, there was one awful thing. When I arrived in the office, there was a manuscript on education in the U.S.S.R. This was 1956. Sputnik went up, when? (1)

MOSS: '58. '57, excuse me.

HEATH: '57, yeah.

MOSS: '57, fall of '57.

HEATH: That study had presumably been edited and was ready to go to the Government Printing Office. I was asked to read it. I was horrified. The office had had a great deal of trouble with it. Unfortunately, a "child" had been recruited to do an adult scholar's job. The study focused, as we might, from the grassroots up, but the Soviet Union does not work that way. It meant that it was a highly repetitious study because anything you started with, you had to tell this story over and over and over again. It was fantastic in its conversion of rubles to dollars. There were spots in it where an elementary teacher would've been earning fifty thousand dollars a year. It was just weird.

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(1) On October 4, 1957, Sputnik was the first manmade satellite to be orbited.



And it was my recommendation that it be dropped in file thirteen and forgotten about. The investment was too big, and the office wouldn't go along with that. And I said I just didn't see how this could be fixed up. I was finally asked to go over to the Department of State and talk to the people on whether they thought it ought to be done. Much earlier I had recommended that the Office of Education concentrate on Communist China because it seemed to me that was the spot where conditions were becoming such that pretty soon we wouldn't be able to get the information that we wanted, but that proposal had been lost. After all, it was just a suggestion when I was working in the office of the secretary.

I went over to the Department of State and saw people and they felt, "Yes, we ought to have a study in this field." But, of course, I was largely involved in trying to get the study put into some kind of shape, and just from the scholar's point of view, I could tell that the person who had done it really didn't know Russian. I didn't either, but I could tell just as a scholar because references to Russian texts were to page numbers in English translations, things of this sort that you could very easily spot. We had a fine person on the staff by the name of Fredricka Tandler, who had earned her doctorate in the field of Russian studies. She read the study and was more horrified than I was. The two of us tried to do something to bring the thing together, slaughtered it to about half, took the author's name off of it because it was no longer that person's study at all. One of my superiors came around and said, "I'm putting your name on it." And I said, "Indeed, you are not. I did not write it and want no part of having my name on this study. It's going to come out under protest. You think it's needed, we'll get it out. I don't think it'll be any great credit to us." We did get the propaganda stuff out. We did straighten out the money conversion spots. We straightened out a lot of things for that matter.

It was in page proof back at the Government Printing Office (GPO) when Sputnik went up. And one of our top officials was foolish enough to tell the secretary that this was coming out, and there was such need that they paid to have GPO to get that thing rushed out. I would've been so glad if GPO had been delayed about a year in getting it out. For about a month, all I did was answer press from all over, referred by the press office which didn't want to touch this.



I was telling you that Dr. Derthick was a big man in admitting when he was wrong. Dr. Derthick had tried to get all kinds of material translating rubles into dollars, and I was the one who had been absolutely adamant that we couldn't do this for him. Finally, the situation arose where he saw that he would've been in very bad hot water had he been making these shifts from one currency to the other at official rates of exchange. He had a meeting going on in his office one day, and word came for me to come up to his office. I arrived, and he greeted me warmly and said to the assembled group that he had been almost furious at me for absolute insistence that he must not make certain statements about rubles and dollars, and he now knew that he had had his head kept on his shoulders in a way that it wouldn't have been if he had walked into this trap. And he said, "I think I should tell all of you people because some of you may have heard when I was so much annoyed that I didn't get the information." That was a nice thing for the man to do, to sort of get you off the hook.

MOSS: Was there anything else you were involved in at this time that is of significance?

HEATH: Yes, I got involved in what the foundations were doing internationally in the field of education--limited myself to the foundations of general research corporation type: The Ford Foundation--which had changed, you may recall, in 1950 to a different kind of foundation--the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and the (W.K.) Kellogg Foundation-- the big ones with foreign and with internationally related domestic programs.

The corporations in those days hid what they were doing very much more than they can now as a result of change in the tax laws. I found, for example, to be able to trace certain things in the field of education, I would have to go back to 1922. I remember doing this in a Carnegie case in order to find the first step, I had to hunt through all the projects. "Was this related?" And finally, maybe some years apart, I'd see the connection. I did this partly because we wanted to know whether a certain project internationally was a prospect for the kind of help that we should try to approach in some entirely different way. It was a very tiny little publication, I didn't intend it to be a publication. I intended it for internal office use and was much amazed to discover that the head of the international division had just sent it to be printed. And I said,



"Oh, you just cannot do that. It must be recalled because I have even made statements in there that you just don't make for the public." So we did get it back. It was published later and became a useful little document because it brought together information by countries and areas on the financial support from the covered foundations for education, training, and/or related research with emphasis on grants to domestic entities for internationally related purposes and on grants to foreign entities.

At the time when the administration was going to change again--I see this would be the election of 1960--a request came over for a document on education and science in the free world. I couldn't find out really who wanted it, but I was a little suspicious. It was probably for briefing the new administration. I was offered the talent of the office in the engineering fields and so forth. And while they were fine people, they didn't know anything about the international part, so I ended up really having to do this job myself. I had the draft finished when the signals were changed, and by that time, I knew it must be for the Federal Council for Science and Technology that (James R., Jr.) Killian headed.

MOSS: Yeah, the Office of Science and Technology.

HEATH: And there was a federal council, I have the feeling. . . .

MOSS: In the White House office, yeah.

HEATH: Yeah, and they were working to get papers ready for the new administration. Since they were interested in the whole broad spread, and all we were concerned with was the technical assistance program in the social area, it seemed to me that we weren't the real agency to do it, but anyway, we were asked to submit our paper. When the signals were changed, I then sat up half the night--well, a whole weekend. I worked right straight through the weekend, sat up half the night, got the paper in just about five minutes before it had to be taken over to the White House.

This was one of the things that really crushed me flat for a while because the office didn't like my paper at all. I hadn't gone into all the little details of education. I really felt pretty bad about that, but it was too late. It had gone and I had taken the blasting. It was about ten days later that the executive secretary of that council, whoever he was, called



up and said he'd had an awful time tracing who in the Office of Education had prepared that paper. And he wanted to tell me that of the papers that had come in from the different departments, this was one they could use as it stood. I said, "Oh, aren't you nice to tell me. It's too bad my agency doesn't know it because they most assuredly did not like it, and I worked so hard." It's one of the things that you feel like somebody's thrown a bucket of cold water at you, you know. And he said, "Well, I have news for you. I'm telling your department." And so a communication came over from--I don't know whether it was Killian or the executive secretary, who sent it to the secretary--and he sent it to the commissioner and to the head of my office who was so unhappy about my paper. And to show you how quickly people can forget what they have said, I was at a meeting not long afterwards in which the same man was bragging about the paper "we" had prepared. These things happen, you know.

MOSS: Yes they do. Is there anything else from the '56 to '61 period that stands out in your mind?

HEATH: Yes. A major shift to considering social matters in a much broader context, the economic and social combined. I can perhaps give a good illustration from some work that I did and went down to ignoble defeat on, at first anyway, with our people in the Office of Vocational Rehabilitation, which was concerned with retraining and education of the disabled. There had been a continuous approach to these problems from the point of view of the client rather than who you had to sell the thing to. So I worked and worked and worked with that office to shift in terms of the economics of getting people who were disabled back on their feet, freeing the people who had to take care of them what it would mean to gross national product, in other words, to get the people working.

When the new administration came in I thought, "This is the golden opportunity. The Republicans will probably think this way." I had been led to my thinking from Isador Lubin, who had been the U.S. representative in 1952 at ECOSOC and had supported all along the way the rehabilitation when it related to countries like Yugoslavia where so many people had been injured in the war, but who violently opposed many of these projects later on. Well, I finally got the vocational rehabilitation people to agree. A paper was prepared, and it took topside approval. The woman who was working on the bilateral program said, "Kay, you will never get this through. You have wasted your time." But I was so sure this was sound that I sent it through, and it came back very quickly--Rockefeller



was out undersecretary--with a big "No" and the initials NAR. And my bilateral friend said, "I told you so." And I think all the people in vocational rehabilitation had the same negative reaction to what I had done. So I'd sort of taken them down the primrose path.

It actually came out very well in the final analysis. I was walking down the mahogany row when Rockefeller came out of his office and for some reason I had a gloomy expression on my face, and he was a very ebullient person, and he said, "What's the matter with you?" And I said, "I'm mad at you." Then I caught myself and said, "No, I guess I'm really mad at me. I had an idea that I have worked with people so hard on, sent it through to you and you said, 'No.'" And he said, "What?" I told him of the paper, and he said, "Well, come on in. Let's talk it over." And I said, "Let me go get it." And I did. It developed that he'd had so many poor papers from that office that he just considered this was another one and had given it very short shrift in the rush. Actually the philosophy of that paper became the philosophy of the Vocational Rehabilitation Amendments the following year.

MOSS: Excuse me.

BEGIN SIDE I TAPE II

MOSS: Right.

HEATH: I guess I'm skipping back. That of course, was deeply involved with education but it happened in 1953 or 1954 soon after the Eisenhower administration came to power, not between 1956 and 1961 as you asked. Although it was for our office of Rehabilitation, they were working with the Office of Education. I have a good illustration of the problems of staff people that might be interesting to you here. It really ties in to the World Health Organization and our Public Health Service. Secretariats had just as much trouble getting their documentation out as governments had in getting some of their positions ready or getting their submissions to Secretariats. A big document came in from Geneva at the very last minute. The delegation was already heading over to Geneva, and of course, it needed an answer, and it needed one quickly. We had to submit our views to the Department of State. I had worked out an arrangement with the Department of State to let those intergovernmental organizations send things directly to our organization although we, of course, answered through Department of State channels, and it meant we got the documentation as fast as the Department of State did.



When this one came in, I had it hand carried to one of the high officials, not the surgeon general, but very close to him, in the Public Health Service. So he had it as soon as I knew it was there, and by the time that that person was coming back to my office, I was already being called by the Department of State. "Did we have it? Were we going to be able to produce a position?" The official to whom it was personally delivered called me up right after the Department of State had, and I truly held the receiver way out from my ear because I really took condemnation. "What did I mean sending a paper down as large as that was, that needed a government position and to give them less than twenty-four hours to get that position?" I just held the receiver out till he finished blowing his top at me. I've always felt it doesn't do any good to answer back when it's a really competent person. You only do that when you get somebody who isn't very competent, and this was a very competent man. And a staff person is not in a good position to do what the operating official can do. So my answer to him was, "You have the option. The Public Health Service can prepare something in the time that's allowed, or you can forgo the opportunity, but just keep this one fact in mind: the United States delegation in Geneva is going to speak on this item. If the Public Health Service doesn't make its contribution, then the Department of State will decide for you. You decide which way you want it to go." I got the answer.

The second illustration of a different type is a reflection of the way in which Mrs. Hobby worked. She followed the army system of receiving material from the heads of agencies, but then asking members of her own staff to go over it from the point of view of how she would need to look at it. A big proposal on nursing education had come up, which was involved in the international field too. So Mrs. Hobby's immediate office had sent it to me to review, and it had twelve sets of initials. I remember because I counted them then, and I counted them afterwards. But its whole trouble was that it was all based on support for the proposal that the Public Health Service hoped would go into the legislative package. And of course, Mrs. Hobby was going to have to face up to the opposition.

MOSS: There'd been no devil's advocate in the proceedings.

HEATH: There'd been no devil's advocate whatsoever in this paper. So I called this same man I mentioned before. These two incidents made friends of us, but up till



then we weren't on very good terms. I said to him, "I have this paper, and I have a couple of questions I want to ask." I didn't even get them asked. He said, "Why should you have it there? The surgeon general sent that to the secretary." And he teed off again on one of these tangents where I held the receiver away from my ear. And when he was finished I said, "My good sir, I will send this to the under secretary with a buck slip on it that says "Noted." "That's what you should've done. You shouldn't have had it," he said, and so on. So I sent it in to the under secretary marked "Noted." And Rockefeller asked me what I meant by saying "Noted!" when it had come to me for some kind of presentation. I told him what had happened--I had called this man. I had wanted to ask what the secretary would do if she got questions on the other side. And he said, "Ah, we'll fix that." And he put a buck slip on top of my buck slip and he said, "Miss Heath, what happens if the secretary asks questions on the other side?" and signed it NAR.

I took that paper back to my office and put another buck slip on it and sent it to this man in the Public Health Service, and I wrote across the top of it "Noted." That got action. It also got twenty-four sets of initials on the new version of the paper. You have to resort to things like this, otherwise you would create all kinds of ill will. And this very subtly resolved the problem without causing any serious trouble.

MOSS: I would be derelict if I didn't ask you about the impact of Sputnik on the Office of Education and the NDEA. . . .

HEATH: Oh, yes, because this is the National Defense Education Act. Absolutely! The office had been trying and trying to get a broader focus to education legislation. When Sputnik went up in the air, this was the grand opportunity. By this time we had our present secretary --Elliot L. Richardson--over there in the office of legislation as an assistant secretary for legislation. Here was the golden opportunity to get some broader assistance for education. What this proposal did was to establish the first federal policy in education which cut across the states as well as the parts of the nation that traditionally are under federal jurisdiction. This was a major breakthrough, to have the federal government recognize that there were certain issues that transcended the needs of individual states and in which the federal government had to take a very specific interest.



MOSS: And it was basically on the higher education level, too, where the states were not so directly and traditionally involved.

HEATH: Well, parts of it. Not all of it. Title II is on loans. Title III is elementary and secondary. This is on assistance, equipment, this sort of thing. Title IV is higher education. There's a lot of focus on higher education, but it was the first multi-purpose law. Now you could say the Vocational Education Acts are along this line --had to a certain extent, transcended the interests of states: the 1917 Smith-Hughes Act coming at the time of the First World War, the 1936 legislation--George-Deen (Act) coming up, at the time of war clouds over in Europe which were developing--the 1946 George-Barden Act in vocational education when we were getting back to normal in the country. But they still were aid to the states to do specific things, highly specific things in one field.

This was the first peacetime move to help students go wherever they wanted to any participating accredited school through the loan system. It made the first inroads, specifically for quality education in the elementary and secondary schools, giving them some help. It was a multi-faceted law, and actually laid the groundwork for what was to happen in 1965. When you have changes in administration and every administration naturally wants to brag about its own triumphs, all of a sudden the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 was considered the great thing. My few little words of reminder in those days, that this law couldn't have gone through if there hadn't been a National Defense Education Act--well, nobody was in the mood to hear that until the tenth anniversary of the National Defense Education Act of 1958 when Wilbur Cohen made quite a dramatic speech on the fact that that 1958 legislation was the landmark that made it possible for all kinds of other things to happen--made it possible for Kennedy to come up with his massive proposal which we probably want to get to at a later time.

The National Defense Education Act was a dramatic piece of legislation. It reversed a hundred year history--the office was started in 1867--almost a hundred year history. And the office has struggled to get a broader look at education to recognize that there needed to be a national policy. We now had one national standard for education, the first one that had ever become a part of the nation's case law, and that was the Supreme Court opinion of 1954. But this was the first foot in the door



of Federal legislative enactment on behalf of quality education nationwide. It recognized that the individual is the first line of defense in a free society, and that the security of the nation is inseparably bound with education.

MOSS: Let me ask you now, how rapidly did the office appreciate the opportunity of Sputnik, and what things were done immediately, and how did the ideas develop?

HEATH: I'm not the best one to answer that because I was so involved in the international at the time, but I think we moved mighty fast, partly because the office of the secretary was moving fast. I think the move was pretty doggone fast, and a good illustration is something that Derthick did. If we get this legislation through, this will make a whole new ballgame for the Office of Education. We had better have a study of the whole place and see how we are going to be organized to handle it. Actually the legislation went through on September 2, 1958.

Derthick soon named a nongovernmental and governmental group to think about what the office should be ten years from now and how it should develop. It took a while to get this under way. One of the consulting firms--I've forgotten which one--participated in this. The man who is now the president of the University of Connecticut, Homer Daniel Babbidge, Jr. was the head of this team. He had been in the Office of the Secretary, and then had come to the Office of Education and to its Division of Higher Education. One of the conditions that Derthick made was that the report of this group should not be made until after the election. This was a very smart move in my judgment, so that whichever party came into power could use it without feeling that it was stacked by the opposite political party. The report that they came up with I thought was one of the best that I had ever seen for the Office of Education. (1) In fact, I'd taken a very dim view of almost all the previous studies. I'd felt they weren't really management studies. They were something else. I saw Homer Babbidge, and I saw the man formerly from... Lloyd E. Blauch from our. . . Well, I guess Babbidge may still

(1) Committee on Mission and Organization of the U.S. office of Education. A Federal Education Agency for the Future. Report of the Committee. OE-10010. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, April 1961. 56 p.

have been in the secretary's office. Anyway, he was involved in this, and Lloyd Blauch who had been in higher education, was consulted. And I congratulated them on the five or six points that I thought were outstanding in it, and they said to me, "Those are the first kind words we've had." The general reaction throughout the office was, "What's this going to do to me?" I'm afraid that's too often the case. And especially when you've got a new administration and you have a certain amount of upset anyway. The man who came in as commissioner was (Sterling M.) McMurrin. He tried to put in as much as he could of the recommendations which did not require a legal action on the Hill. I may be getting too far into the next history for you. After he left, (Francis C.) Keppel came.

MOSS: Yes, let's hold that for the next time.

HEATH: The next one.

MOSS: Okay, I think we've done a good morning's work here.

(1) Dr. Babbidge served successively as special assistant to the Commissioner of Education in 1955-56, assistant to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare the following year and director of the Financial Aid Branch of the Division of Higher Education in October 1958 after enactment of the NDEA of 1958. On June 1, 1959 he became an assistant commissioner of education and director of the Division of Higher Education succeeding Dr. Blauch.