

**Orren Beaty, Jr., Oral History Interview – JFK#3, 10/31/1969**  
Administrative Information

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**Biographical Note**

Beaty, administrative assistant to Congressman Stewart L. Udall during the late 1950s and assistant to Secretary of Interior Udall from 1961 to 1967, discusses appointments to the Interior Department and problems Udall ran into early in his tenure as Secretary, among other issues.

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
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Orren Beaty  
July 4, 1979  
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Orren Beaty, Jr. – JFK#3

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Third of Fourteen Oral History Interviews

with

Orren Beaty, Jr.

October 31, 1969  
Washington, D. C.

By William W. Moss

For the John F. Kennedy Library

MOSS: All right, Mr. Beaty, this morning we are going to talk about the transition period and appointments to the staff in the Interior Department. Let me ask you first of all how it came about that you wound up in your position as an assistant? Was it automatic or...

BEATY: No. I don't know. I suppose it was kind of by default. I wasn't told I was going to have the job. I just, you know, I assumed it because I had few complaints from Mr. Udall [Stewart L. Udall] in my work at the House, the House of Representatives. Things kept piling up, and I kept handling more and more of it. I did represent him at the department in the transition period. So finally it came time to swear me in for some job and this oath of office was taken, I assume, before he took his oath of office of Secretary of Interior. I've forgotten now, but I think probably on the twentieth, maybe the nineteenth.

I was on the payroll as a consultant at Interior, a couple of weeks before President Kennedy [John F. Kennedy] was inaugurated. Partly, I think this was to give me a little official status down there at the department so I could be acting on behalf of the Secretary without just being an outsider--it was noticed by the people there that I was coming in--and partly it was to make things easier for Seaton [Frederick A. Seaton]. Former Secretary Seaton and Udall worked this out, that I was put on the payroll there so I could be dropped up at the

House. I don't know whether you know it or not, but when a member dies or resigns, his payroll is frozen as of that time, and the people on the payroll continue to serve until a new man comes in, in order to

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provide services for the constituents. We needed my position up there in order to get that thing settled because the district was going to be unrepresented for three to five months, depending how long it took to have a special election to take Mr. Udall's place. So this is a lot of preliminary that doesn't have any real importance, but, the fact is, I was down there working both on the Hill and at the Interior Department for a couple of weeks before the actual change took place.

Lacking anybody else that he knew real well, that he expected to be with him, I assume he just wound up giving me the job. In a new operation you never know how people are going to work out, and we had our problems with different people, and there were some who resisted being moved or dropped. I'm talking about over a period of two or three years. And throughout that period, I tried to reassure him because he was a little bashful about firing people. But, I said, "Okay, if it looks like I'm not right in this job, and you want somebody else, don't beat around the bush about it. Just tell me, because I'm enjoying it, but we'll both be better off if there's any problem." Well, nothing like that ever happened up there. We had two or three shake-ups in the office the first year or two and people moved, but I stayed for a while.

MOSS:           What were your functions as the transition man? What did you do?

BEATY:           Well, I learned all I could about the routine procedure of the department--who did what. I worked with the administrative assistant secretary who's a career man, Otis Beasley [D. Otis Beasley]. I think he was a lawyer, but he'd never worked as a lawyer. He'd been in the department for, I suppose, almost thirty years at that time. Under Oscar Chapman [Oscar L. Chapman], the last secretary of interior under President Truman [Harry S. Truman]. He had taken this job as administrative assistant secretary and continued through McKay [J. Douglas McKay] and Seaton during the Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] years. A number of people recommended to Secretary Udall or the then Congressman Udall, that Otis Beasley was somebody he could depend on and he knew the department forwards and backwards. So I met with him two or three times a week to.... When questions developed in my mind about how certain things worked, I went to him, and usually he just told me what he thought about it. Sometimes some people referred me to other people, I think Otis thought he knew everything about it, so he didn't usually refer me to anybody else.

I also spent some time with Secretary Seaton's principal assistant, a man named Lorne Kennedy, who left the department. He didn't stay around. I spent some time with Seaton's information director, Herschel Schooley, [C. Herschel Schooley], and with two or three people in the information office because they seemed to be more alert as to what was going on in the various bureaus in the assistant secretaries' areas than--or at least, more willing to talk about it than some of the people who were already there in the executive positions.

MOSS: Any idea why this was?

BEATY: Well, I suppose it's partly the uncertainty or the mood that gets over an office when their party's been defeated and they know they're not going to be around too long. Some of them will be helpful. None of them showed any resentment or resistance to telling, but they were busy doing other things or they didn't have too much interest. I think the other thing is that the information people were looking to the future and trying to be helpful to somebody who's going to be around for a while.

I was thinking in particular about the oil import situation. I learned a lot more from the information people than I did from the people who were running the program. The under secretary then, a man named Bennett [Elmer F. Bennett], was supposedly really running the program with the solicitor's office and somebody in the mineral resources area. But all of these people were gone really for all practical purposes when I started talking.

Mr. Udall spent some time with Seaton, and Seaton told him in the first meeting that while imports [Oil Import Administration] was really a very small part of the department's responsibilities, he had to spend about a third of his time on it in the year or so that it had been in that operation. And he lined up a meeting for us with the assistant secretary for minerals [Mineral Resources], and a man named Larry O'Connor [Lawrence J. O'Connor, Jr.], who was head of the oil import program at that time. Larry, later in the Kennedy administration, was appointed to the Federal Power Commission, and he's still there. But O'Brien [Jerome J. O'Brien] and a man named Tom Sneddon, who worked in the program and still did when I left the department--I don't think he does now, but I'm not sure about that--and the assistant secretary whose name I can't think of, gave Mr. Udall and me about a two-hour briefing one day and loaded us down with papers and documents and things that we never had time to read in those days; too many other things were happening. Then I learned quite a bit about how it worked from talking to the information man after I'd gotten this initial exposure to it.

MOSS: Did you run into any surprises or any major problems that were held over, simply put on the shelf until the new administration came in?

BEATY: I know I was naïve about the whole thing, and there was an awful lot of new things being dumped on me, and I didn't have time really to be surprised or anything else. I just, each day, worked with what I could to try to keep up with it. I think Mr. Seaton disarmed Secretary Udall by offering to be helpful

and to make some tough decisions that affected Mr. Udall personally--I don't mean personally, but politically in Arizona. And, you know, "What else can I do to keep you from having to make an unpopular decision the first month or two you're here?" In other words, "I would have liked to have had that happen to me when I took over," that sort of attitude. But

in the end, he didn't make some of these decisions. They're minor looking at the overall picture of the Interior Department, but they were important to large groups of vocal constituencies in the...

MOSS: Could you give a sample of that kind of decision?

BEATY: Well, there were a lot of applications for public domain land under desert land entries in Arizona. When we took over the department, the department's operation, one of the real sore points was the Bureau of Land Management. Applications had piled up, and there was about an eighteen-month backlog, and one of the first things that Mr. Udall did was declare a moratorium on accepting new applications in order to give BLM [Bureau of Land Management] a chance to dig out from under this and to get some kind of a reorganization in order to speed up the handling of such matters. Well, this land.... The withdrawal program.... The application--let's see, how do you.... What do you call that? It isn't withdrawals. Withdrawal is when the government withdraws land on entry. "Entry" is the word. This desert entry program, was meant as an agricultural program. If people could show that they had water and could develop water, they could get the land, a hundred and sixty acres per person I assume; it may be larger, three hundred and twenty, because desert land doesn't produce as much. I'm not a BLM expert. Mr. Carver [John A. Carver, Jr.] can tell you this when you talk to him if he hasn't already. A lot of these people who were applying were either friends or acquaintances of Mr. Udall, or they were people who were prominent in the state, and it would have been very helpful if Mr. Seaton had denied the whole thing on the grounds that there was insufficient water, which was the case. People were actually trying to get the land in most cases because it was relatively close to the large, populated, growing centers, and it was increasingly valuable for urban development or eventual urban development, and wasn't good for agricultural land at all because of the lowering water tables and very limited supplies of water. This is one that comes readily to mind. There were some others.

MOSS: Why do you think he didn't follow through on it?

BEATY: Well, I think that he meant well. He just ran into a slowdown on the part of the solicitors or somebody. You know, whoever had to do the preliminary work, the intermediate work, getting it up to the point of secretarial decision, they also were in transition, and they weren't eager to put in a lot

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of extra work just to satisfy somebody who's going to be out of office in ten days or a month or whatever it was.

I didn't tell you everything when I was talking about procedures. I talked to Mr. Beasley and Lorne Kennedy and Herschel Schooley and visited with different bureau chiefs, Floyd Dominy [Floyd B. Dominy], Bureau of Reclamation and Connie Worth [Conrad L. Worth] of the Park Service are two that I remember. Mr. Udall was spending some time there. I forget the date that his appointment was announced; it was early December of 1960,



December 6 or 7. It was around Pearl Harbor Day. He came back to the office in Washington and worked for a couple of days and went back to Tucson and spent a couple of weeks out there with his family getting ready to move. During that period, of course, all of our work went on at the House Office Building, the old House Office Building. Then after he came back--and I assume that this is really after the first of January--we were given offices on the seventh floor at the Interior Department in the end of the building fairly close to the Secretary's office and the Administrative Assistant Secretary's office, right across the corridor from the information office. So it was a handy location. And after he got back there, I was down there quite a bit. He was there two or three hours a day interviewing people, mostly bureau chiefs. So he'd get his ideas, and then he'd put me to work following up on these interviews which were partly getting to know the personnel and partly learning about the programs or decisions that had to be made soon and this sort of thing. I guess that just about covers what you asked me.

MOSS:           What kind of attitudes did you have about this whole business in Interior?  
                    What were your feelings about taking over Interior?

BEATY:           Well, you know, it was exciting, something new. It was something that both he and I had been familiar with from having grown up in the Southwest. He'd served on the Interior Committee. We'd been involved in not only the usual committee work but the political fighting that goes on where you're accusing the previous administration of not doing anything about new reclamation projects, for example, or letting the public land matters get tangled up because of unwillingness to spend the money to hire the people to do the job, and, you know, these things. Here was a chance to go down and see what you could do with it, something that we thought we were familiar with. I know now I was far from familiar with it because Interior Committee just handles the things that are coming up for legislative consideration, and it takes a lot more than paying attention to the committee to know what's going on there. It was just a wide-eyed approach to wondering what's going to happen next, I think.

MOSS:           How quickly did you get your feet back on the ground?

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BEATY:           Oh, I suppose it was two years before I just got down to doing the job every day. It's not fair to the situation or to me to say I thought it was all a game, but it seemed like you were playing a role rather than doing a job, although the work started early and went late, and there wasn't any time for daydreaming. Still, at times, when you could pause for a moment, it was more like a show or a political campaign than actually administering a department. This is my view of it. I'm sure that was a minority opinion because most people were pitching in and working hard, and I don't think they had time to think like that.

MOSS:           The reason I ask is that much of the popular literature on the Kennedy administration talks about the ebullience of the new Kennedy administration

as they came in and that eventually they got their comeuppance in the Bay of Pigs and things of this sort. I wondered what your particular "Bay of Pigs" was in the Interior Department.

BEATY: Well, we had two or three of them, all of them coming right close together and the Bay of Pigs being part of it. But one of the days I was at Interior before we actually moved in, I went to lunch with Herschel Schooley and the Associated Press man who covered the Interior in those days, had for years, a man named Macfarlan [W. Joynes Macfarlan]. We have a dining room for higher ranking employees, assistant secretaries and supergrades or something like that. George Abbott [George W. Abott] who I had known and certainly Secretary Udall had known very well when he was the chief counsel for the House Interior Committee, had gone to Interior as a special assistant to Seaton and then became the legislative counsel for the solicitor, and finally in this period, was serving as assistant secretary for Public Land Management, although kind of a recess appointment thing. I don't think he'd ever been confirmed by the Senate. But he liked to talk, and he was giving me a rundown on what we could expect while we were sitting at tables across an aisle. And I remember I was in a state of somewhat--well, I was fatigued from being at the office the night before up on the Hill till ten o'clock trying to answer mail and wrap up the congressional office work, and then coming back down there early the next day. And I was saying I'd be glad when we actually make the change so I can get back on regular hours, and he informed me we would never get back on regular hours, which I don't think we ever did, really.

We started out getting there by seven o'clock in the morning, and it was a rare evening we got away before seven; and many times there were night meetings. I have a feeling that a good many of the people that came in with us weren't particularly enthusiastic about these night meetings and these early morning sessions and things like that, but most of the higher ranking types were, and they were really eager to put in all the time it took to do the job. They had this ebullience or idealism or whatever it was that kept them giving a whole lot more effort than they had given, I imagine, in their private law practices or their firms or whatever it was they were doing before they came into the administration.

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I think our first snags there at Interior were when Mr. Udall was on one of the Sunday TV new interview (panel) shows. Right after his appointment was announced, "Meet the Press" and "Face the Nation" and two or three others, I assume, made inquiries about could they get him on in the next week or so; and of course, he was willing to do it. But before he had a chance to, we got some word from Pierre Salinger [Pierre E.G. Salinger] not to accept any such invitations; that there'd be time for that later, and they didn't want any premature discussions of issues until the incoming President and the incoming Secretary and everybody else had a chance to determine exactly what their policies were.

I've thought--at that time I didn't, but since the present Interior Secretary Hickel [Walter J. Hickel] got into so much trouble popping off the first time he was interviewed by the press after his appointment was announced, it would've been most interesting if Udall could have been interviewed under those circumstances to get on the record really what he

thought, what he hoped to accomplish at the department, and then see how it worked out. When President-elect Kennedy introduced Udall to the press in New York and threw it open to questions, I don't think he was asked any questions that amounted to anything about Interior. They asked Mr. Kennedy about his appointments the rest of the day with Mr. Ormsby Gore [William David Ormsby-Gore Harlech] and with something else and "Is it true that you're...." You know, twenty other things; it had nothing to do with Interior. And the questions asked about Interior were superficial. The reporters didn't have any idea what they were talking about. They're a specialized group, I think. They follow a personality or a top guy; they don't have much broad knowledge of the government, and I have a feeling that they did the same thing with everybody else that was introduced to the press from what I could tell from reading the papers. Mostly the press interviews were about what Mr. Kennedy was doing.

MOSS:           What did you think were some of Udall's expectations, policy expectations, with regard to Interior?

BEATY:          Well, I knew he wanted to make an effort on parks because he had talked about it at times; about the rapid urbanization of the country and the movement into the mountains, forests, wilderness area by developers building summer homes and changing the nature of the land; and that because of World War II and the Korean War and various other things, the relatively static condition of the Eisenhower administration on things like that, that we'd gone for twenty years or so without adding any material land to the parks. In the meantime, the population was growing and people were supposedly working fewer hours and getting more time for recreation and yet the places where there was recreation were being overcrowded and no new areas were being added. So I knew he was interested in that. I knew he was interested in pollution, pollution control. Because of our experiences in Arizona,

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he'd spoken out quite a bit on land problems, Indians, and reclamation. I don't think--I certainly had given no attention to oil imports and the minerals policies, things like that, because we hadn't been involved in it over in the congressional office.

But anyway, I got off the subject a little bit. Maybe you want me to talk about the...

MOSS:           Yes, let's get back. I was going to say that you had indicated that there was some deflation of ebullience, and you were going to give some examples if it and, we really haven't heard anything yet.

BEATY:          Yes, that's right. [Laughter] We got an invitation that could be accepted. I'm sure it was cleared with Pierre or somebody so that it was accepted. It was neither the CBS [Columbia Broadcasting System] nor the NBC [National Broadcasting company] program; I don't remember which one it was now. Two reporters interviewed him--or at least two came over to the office for a planning session, and we went through some of this prior to the actual broadcast on Sunday. And between the time of our

preliminary session at the department and the time that Mr. Udall actually went on, went before a camera or whatever the term is, the Bay of Pigs invasion started, and it hadn't been settled yet when he got on. Well, the cabinet, generally, wasn't informed at least I don't think so--that this was going to happen. There'd been no cabinet meeting that I'm aware of to alert them that we're getting involved in an international crunch and that they ought to be on their toes about it or they ought to keep their mouths shut or anything else. It just happened, and I'm sure in the press of things at the White House, nobody thought that we've cleared Secretary Udall to go on a program.

MOSS: Excuse me. [Interruption] We were talking about the cabinet and the Bay of Pigs.

BEATY: Yeah. So instead of asking him the questions that we had talked about on Thursday or Friday or whenever it was prior to this appearance, things about Interior, they naturally led right off with a question about the Bay of Pigs. I think if you read the transcript of what he said it was a constructive effort to show that the country was all working together on this, that it was on administration carrying out policies started by a previous administration, that we're all working for the good of the country or something like that. But a few of his comments quoted in the press made it look like he was saying, "Don't blame the Democrats for this; this was Eisenhower's policy." A buck-passing sort of thing. And Nixon [Richard Milhous Nixon] and

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Dirksen [Everett M. Dirksen] and a good many others jumped on it and kicked Udall around, and he was naturally embarrassed by the whole thing. And I don't know who all talked to him from the White House, but in the end President Kennedy made a statement assuming all responsibility: "This was my operation." And whether he would have done such a thing without the Udall indiscretion, if you want to describe it that way, I don't know, and I don't know whether anybody does know that. He probably would have to because it was a mistake. I mean, it caught the whole administration a little short, and he was the President and was responsible.

MOSS: Was it at this time that there was solicited statements of confidence in Udall from the other secretaries? I've run across this in at least one place.

BEATY: I'm not aware of any such thing.

MOSS: All right. Okay. What else did you have?

BEATY: During this early period the new Congress had come in and President Kennedy felt that they had to get the Rules Committee, the House Rules Committee, reorganized or something changed in order to be sure they could get legislation out. That committee had been notorious for holding up liberal legislation, and the cabinet was asked to do what it could to get votes for the good guys, and because Stewart

had worked in the House for six years and knew a good many of the people--certain Republicans on the Interior Committee, for example--he contacted an awful lot of people, a lot of them in person, a good many more by phone. And this got into the press, as it naturally would. Somebody who'd resented being pressured by a new administration of the opposite party could make some hay with his home town correspondence by complaining that he was being pressured and...

MOSS: Beyond that, I think Charlie Halleck [Charles A. Halleck] screamed out loud, too.

BEATY: Halleck made the loudest yowls and, of course, Stewart had always relished a fight with him. They got into some hassle on the floor once and--I've forgotten what it was, but Stewart got the best of Halleck because of, I'm sure, circumstances beyond both their controls. And the *Record* [Congressional Record] was tampered with as they do in revising and extending their remarks and to make it right, I think. I'm really hazy on this, but there was this thing that had happened a couple of years before. So when Halleck popped off, Stewart was quick to jump back in and accuse Halleck

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of being a gut fighter who liked it except when somebody started working on him that way. It got quite a bit of attention. So there was some congressional sniping at Udall, but I don't think he had any problem with the Kennedy group because of this. He was actually doing what was wanted.

But one of the people we ran into on this was Alton Lennon [Alton A. Lennon] of North Carolina, a member of the House who'd once served a year or two by appointment as a senator when North Carolina was having quite a few deaths in office and that sort of thing. Some of the last minute decisions that the Eisenhower administration made in Interior had to do with location of plants for experimental work in desalinization of water. Some of it was the brackish water inland and some of it was seawater. And one of the brackish water plants, I'm sure by design, went to South Dakota where Senator Mundt [Karl E. Mundt] was a key factor. He was one of the ranking men on the Appropriations Committee, and he, if I remember right, was running that year for reelection and George McGovern just barely lost to him. Another one went to New Mexico. Senator Anderson [Clinton P. Anderson] was chairman of the Interior Committee and an important figure. I'm sure he applied the right kind of pressure to get that located there. One went to North Carolina, Wrightsville Beach, in Lennon's district. And Lennon was, of course, one of the hard-rock Southern conservatives who wasn't going to do anything to give the Rules Committee more power to put civil rights legislation on the floor in a favorable way. But, still, Stewart made the attempt with him, and when that made no progress word got out from Interior that we were considering relocating that site. Nothing had been done there, it simply was announced that it was going to be established there.

MOSS: How did you get such word out? This is an interesting question of tactics, I think. How do you leak this kind of thing deliberately?

BEATY: Well, I think some of the word went out through friendly members of Congress that there are a lot of eleventh-hour decisions that are going to be reexamined. And there was a formal announcement to this effect, if I remember right, from Interior, maybe a press conference statement that Stewart made. He didn't specify rescinding precise locations, but it was talk on the Hill and everything fitting together in the public statements and the private comments.

MOSS: Was this sort of a scatter-gun technique or was it deliberately aimed at Lennon?

BEATY: It was deliberately aimed at him, and I assume it wasn't handled too aptly because you couldn't make any headway on it. Luther Hodges [Luther H. Hodges] was a member of the Cabinet. [Interruption]

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Luther Hodges was a former governor and was the Secretary of Commerce, and he was one of the constructive Southern Democrats who helped Mr. Kennedy get the nomination, get elected. Terry Sanford [J. Terry Sanford] was a leader for the Kennedy people, and he was then governor, and, you know, you couldn't take it away from North Carolina. It was probably something we shouldn't have tried. So in the end, we issued a press release that gave credit to Sanford and Hodges for the decision rather than to Lennon. But Lennon, I'm sure, made points at home by challenging this new bunch of liberal federalists and winning and keeping the thing down in his area.

MOSS: This raises a rather general question and that is just to what extent does the power of the Interior Department--how far does it go; how much can you really pressure individual congressmen, and how much is this power circumscribed by the kind of consideration you are listing?

BEATY: Well, you know, you can go as far, I think, as your president will let you go. And we were backed up in making the effort, but we weren't backed up in putting the crunch on because we couldn't, as I explained. There were too many Democrats, leading Democrats, who felt the same way as the guy we were trying to apply the pressure to. I think I've got a copy of the press release we had.

MOSS: Well, I'm sure that's available.

BEATY: Yes, it ought to be.

MOSS: There was another situation, I believe, in connection with a Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner, oil men, and so on.

BEATY: Yeah, that happened almost immediately after the furor died down on the

other thing. It was so soon afterwards that the *Daily News, Washington Daily News* headlined the story, "It's Udall Again!" or some such thing as that. First year I was back here, I went to one of the Democratic fund-raising dinners with Mr. Udall and with Joe Duke [Joseph C. Duke] who was the then Sergeant of Arms of the Senate and was an old Arizona man--not so old, but he's old in politics, been around a long time. And one of the people that Mr. Duke came with was an oil man named Jack Evans [John K. Evans], John something Evans, who I believe was with Shell Oil Company at the time. He was a Washington based man, lobbyist, I suppose; at least he was here looking out after the company's interest, very friendly, constructive guy who'd given us some help over the years. We saw him occasionally. I suppose with things like that, maybe two years would pass when you didn't see him. But he was one of many people that Mr. Udall knew casually, who volunteered information when we started to come down to Interior about what's wrong with the oil import program

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or what's wrong with the public lands program, whatever the situation happened to be.

So along comes the time for the first fund-raising dinner under the new administration, Democratic fun-raising dinner; and I'm sure that the cabinet members were contacted one way or another and told that we'd like to get started on paying off our campaign debts, and here's our first big deal, and let's do everything we can to make it a success. I went to some meetings with people at the national committee who were working on it, planned for it. Mr. Udall and I talked about it a little bit, about what we could do, what we ought to do, because he'd been chewed on a bit by members of Congress and by the press on the pressure on the reorganization of the House Rules Committee and that sort of thing. He didn't want to get too far out in front on it, but he didn't want to look like he was being a slacker on fund-raising efforts. But I think I've got a recollection that he said, "Well, I can talk to some of the people I know and tell them that whatever they do, let it be known that they're doing it on behalf of Interior, and we'll get credit for it whether we actually sell them the tickets or not."

Well, I don't know when he talked to Jack Evans, but he did and asked Jack to do what he could to give Interior some credit for this. Well, I'll never know, I guess, what possessed Jack Evans to write that kind of a letter, but on his letterhead, with no attempt to disguise anything, he wrote a letter to every oil company in the country, I guess, everybody that he knew at least. And it started off--I'm sure this was partly to make himself look like he had an important relationship with the new Secretary of Interior, the man who's going to be administering the oil imports program; but I'm sure you can get a copy of the letter because it was printed fairly widely--"My good friend Stewart Udall has asked me to help sell tickets," and so on and so forth. When it finally did get to the big press of the country it created a tremendous storm which didn't die down completely until the dinner when President Kennedy in his acknowledgment thanked Secretary Udall for handling the publicity. And everybody laughed uproariously, and the tension was eased, but it was pretty rough for a while.

The first time I... Obviously now, I'm trying to reconstruct some of it. Herschel Schooley had been retained as information director. I don't know why, because it'd had been just like President Kennedy keeping President Eisenhower's information secretary on. It was a sensitive spot. There should be somebody there that you know and have full confidence in. The Washington press who cover things like Interior Department had been asked to--I think some kind of a letter was circulated for the correspondents to sign asking that Schooley be kept on the job. And I'm sure Schooley did this himself, and it wasn't a spontaneous effort. But some of the press that we knew asked me--they didn't want to embarrass Udall, but they didn't want to get crosswise with their fellow reporters--would it cause us any trouble if they signed the letter? I told them I felt that whatever decision was going to be made would be made anyway. But I assume that this letter was partially responsible for the fact that Schooley was kept on. And I also think that he didn't have another candidate

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readily available to put in there, and if he made a move he wanted to be sure of somebody on a substitute basis. Of course, a lot of names were being submitted to us to consider for that job, but none of them seemed to inspire Mr. Udall.

So Schooley was kept, and he came to me one day when Mr. Udall was on a trip. He either showed me a letter or told me about it--that somebody he knew in the oil business had called him or written to him and said, "Look, Udall's going to get into a lot of trouble if this letter gets out. You better get them to withdraw it"; and trying to be friendly and trying to be helpful, I think, because several days elapsed between that time and the time it actually hit the press. The Robert Allen [Robert S. Allen] column got wind of it and wrote about it, and this appeared in the *Northern Virginia Sun*, not in one of the major papers in Washington. One of the girls in the office clipped it out and brought it in, and we had it on the Secretary's desk with a note about the situation when he got back from the trip.

I'm a little hazy on the chronology of this, but it seems to me he came back and there were a lot of things waiting for his attention, and this, to him, seemed less important than anything else. It was already in print; he could see it in print; it hadn't gotten any serious attention. I think this may have lulled him into some false sense of security about it. He was irritated, you know. "I didn't tell Jack he could do anything like that. What's the matter with him?"--this sort of attitude, but not overly concerned about it. Sometime soon after that he did get in touch with Jack Evans and talk about it. And Jack had called, I think I talked to Jack. He was concerned, "What can I do to correct this?" But I wasn't privy to the conversation when he and Jack talked--probably on the telephone.

So that was it until people started bringing early editions of the *Daily News* the day they broke the story, and you know, it was pretty mean. Robert Frost was in town, and I think he had just appeared on the--I think this was the time that they started this cabinet series of cultural events. "An Evening with Robert Frost" with Mrs. Kennedy [Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy] as the cosponsor with the Cabinet. And Mr. Frost was in the office with Mr. Udall's mother [Louise Lee Udall] who had been back here for something, at the time we had a press conference, and he opened it up to questions. I don't know what was said or done between him and anybody in the White House at that time, but the story began to appear in



the press that Udall would be the first to go. And I think as you said... [Interruption] All I would have to say about it would be just conjecture or something. I don't remember the details particularly. I mean, it's pretty hazy.

One thing I might add is, during this period, right at the height of this, the Arizona special election was being held to fill

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the vacancy left by his resignation from Congress. His brother Morris [Morris K. Udall] was running for office, and Stewart's majority had dropped the year before. I think we talked about this. He campaigned hard for Kennedy, not too much for himself. Kennedy didn't carry the state by very much, and Stewart's margin dropped from something like thirty thousand from the election before to twenty thousand.

MOSS: Kennedy didn't carry the state at all.

BEATY: No. I'm sorry.

MOSS: Right.

BEATY: He got beaten badly in Arizona, and I think this was partly responsible.

But Morris was full of optimism, and he had an airplane, and he flew it, and his wife [Patricia Emery Udall] was campaigning hard for him. She was a pilot. They covered this district very thoroughly. They really did a campaign job. But they were running against the same man that Stewart had run against or had run against Stewart, and he had never quit campaigning. He apparently believed Stewart was going to be appointed to the cabinet before anybody else did, including the Udalls, and so he just kept right on campaigning. Morris was up against a pretty tough competitor. The Democrats aren't very well organized in the state; Republicans are. They get their telephone calls going a week before the election, getting everybody lined up so they get a very large percentage of their registered voters out.

So this story broke, let's say on Friday or Saturday, maybe it was Monday, before the election on Tuesday, but it was very close to the election. And there were a lot of comments in the press in Arizona that if Morris won, it wouldn't be Stewart's fault and things like this. And his majority turned out to be only about two thousand. It was a very narrow deal. And if a bunch of working Democrats from Phoenix, which wasn't involved in the election, hadn't gone to Tucson and gone door to door in the Spanish-American section and said, "Get out and vote for President Kennedy. Let's get out there. This is a Kennedy vote," he might not have made it. It was just that close. Stewart felt very low about that. He felt that he was responsible, I think that everything was going wrong.

And as I started to say or I said as I went out the door when you cut off the tape recorder, this was really the Interior's "Bay of Pigs" as far as things got a lot more serious. There was less of a carnival atmosphere about getting things going and getting down to being especially careful about every appointment and every decision, and I think from then on the party was over, and it was just a matter of doing the work.

MOSS: In each of these cases the focus was on something outside of the Interior Department. Was there anything in the Interior bailiwick that did the same kind of thing to you?

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BEATY: I don't think so. I can't think of anything. There were things that we did during that period that came back to haunt us later, but it took time, and I can't think of anything that happened the first year or so.

MOSS: Well, perhaps we can talk about those as we go along.

BEATY: Yeah.

MOSS: I'd like to get to the specific matter of appointments. Let's take Under Secretary Carr [James K. Carr] to being with. Now, what is your impression of how the under secretaryship came to be Carr's, say, rather than Frank Ellis [Frank B. Ellis] was shooting for it, wasn't he?

BEATY: Yes. Louisiana man?

MOSS: Right. Was another Ellis [Clyde T. Ellis], a different fellow? Was he shooting for it too?

BEATY: Yes.

MOSS: Okay. Tell me about this.

BEATY: Clyde Ellis had served in Congress from Arkansas, I believe. Whether he was defeated or whether he quit to take this job as the number one man for the rural electrification people, the NRECA [National Rural Electric Cooperation Association], National Rural Electrification something. But he had been the principal spokesman for the rural co-ops, electric co-ops, and so forth for a good many years. He got every one of them, I believe every individual co-op club, to send telegrams to their senators, congressmen, President Kennedy, to Stewart Udall, everybody else trying to get this job. And I think I mentioned before that when Stewart went to New York to meet with the President-elect and get the nomination or designation as secretary that Mr. Ellis had been on the phone constantly the day before and during the time we were there and trying to see Stewart. He wanted to talk to him. He had met with him once. He'd submitted a list of things of what we would do, and, in effect, he was going to be the secretary. He had all the appointments lined out. He knew a lot more about it than anybody else. And I'm sure he had had a part in organizing rural electrical co-op people for the Kennedy ticket, because four years later he was head of the National Committee of Farmers and Ranchers for Johnson [Lyndon Baines

Johnson] and Humphrey [Hubert H. Humphrey], as an example, and wound up on the National Water Commission or something as a result, at a reward for his efforts.

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Frank Ellis was a Kennedy Democrat from Louisiana who--I don't know if he had been promised this, but he kind of assumed he was going to be either under secretary or assistant secretary. But Stewart, with his conditioning on the House Interior Committee and involved as he had been on the hassling between the upper basin of the Colorado River and the lower basin between Arizona and California on the water problems, was aware that, coming from the part of the country he did, he'd be under suspicion in California and that one way to allay this would be to have a Californian. He'd served in the Interior under Clair Engle, who'd been chairman of the House Interior Committee and had in 1958 been elected to the Senate, and Engle was pushing Jim Carr for the job. And it seems to me that before Stewart went back to Arizona, after he'd been to New York for the designation ceremonies, Jim Carr showed up at the office by invitation. They'd been on the phone before I knew anything about it.

Carr had a reputation as being a good administrator. Stewart knew that we needed a good administrator because he had very little experience in that area, none at all, actually. Carr had worked on the House Interior Committee. At one time he'd been at the Bureau of Reclamation. He was a man with some experience on the Hill and in the executive--not in the executive branch, really. I think probably you'd call him a middle-level bureaucrat at his best in the Bureau of Reclamation before he went back into other things in California. He was head of the California Water Board. He had some good credentials.

So we met with Jim Carr within a day or two after Stewart's designation. And then both of them had to go back--Stewart to Arizona and Carr to California. And the thing was left unsettled for a while, but, in my mind, Stewart had made up his mind after talking to Carr that this would be the one. He mentioned Carr in talking to Kennedy at the hotel when we were waiting to go down and meet the press that day. And the President said, more or less, "It's up to you. Just keep the members of Congress happy. Don't get an appointment here that gets them all stirred up."

Well, Ellis didn't have any--not Clyde but the other Ellis--didn't have any real pull in Congress. Nobody that I can recall made any strong overtures on his behalf. It was a choice initially between Clyde Ellis, who scared everybody off by the aggressive way he was trying to take over the operation, and--he had no political base, really. He'd been away from Arkansas for so long that he was just another Washington operation. You weren't getting anything by taking him except the support of a lot of the rural co-ops who ought to be on our side anyway. I think that's what it boiled down to. Whereas Carr gave a geographical balance in the water fight and had support in Congress. He knew Wayne Aspinall [Wayne N. Aspinall] quite well. He certainly knew Clair Engle well, had been active with Pat Brown [Edmund G. Brown], governor at that point of the second largest

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state. I think it was pretty well settled before I even was aware of who the people involved were.

Towards the end though, a lot of conservationists got riled up; they didn't want Carr. It was a professor at the University of California who had been active in conservation matters. I can't think of his name. We could dig it out if it made any difference. I've got a tremendous file of letters and stuff like this--people denouncing Carr and demanding that Udall take anybody but Carr. Some of these people had access to a man named Dewey Anderson, who's based here in Washington, and they started pushing him for this at the last minute. Even after the decision was made, they wanted Udall to reverse himself and put Dewey Anderson in. I talked to him. I talked to most of them because Udall didn't have time to have repeat conversations with people like Anthony Wayne Smith, "Tony" Smith, who's head of the National Parks Association and Spencer Smith [Spencer M. Smith] who represents another coalition of conservationists. These were people we had known or we'd met, but our office had never been the focus of their attention as it now became. And all of them wanted anybody but Jim Carr. He was for ending the reclamation limitation of a hundred and sixty acres and giving the land and the federally developed water to the big farmers, big ranchers. Because of his work on water development he was for drowning out parks and canyons, and all the things that you look for in an anticonservationist. Jim Carr was labeled by these people. As I said, the decision was pretty well made, and our main job was to stave them off until Carr was appointed, until the announcement was made.

MOSS: Right. Let's talk some about the staff members then, the others who were on the staff with you. Start off, I guess, with Graham Hollister.

BEATY: Well, Graham had been chairman of the Nevada Farmers and Ranchers for Kennedy or something like that. Alan Bible and he were friends, and Bible was fairly high ranking on the Senate Interior Committee and was on the Appropriations Committee. I believe he was the only Nevadan that was pushed for a job with us. He wasn't really on the staff. I know he was listed as a special assistant or something but--he's a great guy. I like him and I'd enjoy visiting with him right now, but he didn't have a lot of administrative ability or executive ability. He hadn't been exposed to anything involving the government, and it was a matter of finding something to keep him busy rather than have him carry part of the load on the staff.

This is one of those problems that Interior had been involved with before Udall came in. The lower Colorado River area had a lot of land that had been withdrawn by the Bureau of Reclamation

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for reclamation purposes, flood control, floodplain stuff. Prior to, I suppose, the building of Boulder Dam or Hoover [Herbert C. Hoover] Dam, later on other dams were built downstream, and in some of these cases, according to the stories, the Bureau of Reclamation actually encouraged construction workers to build cottages or shacks on a lot of this land. "Nobody is using it. Why don't you guys go ahead and set up here." And nobody moved to kick them off, and other squatters moved up and down the river and settled, some of them

farming extensive acreage. They'd clear off the salt cedars and the other brush and put wells down, which really was sucking up river water, to farm the land. And in other cases they built fishing camps or trailer parks and that sort of thing without any title to the land. The Eisenhower administration moved to kick them off. It looked like one of these court things that was going to go into a century-long process of bringing an action against each one of them. In the meantime, they say here's a large area of water and unused land that was a recreation resource in the Southwest. Los Angeles, San Diego people would come over to use the fishing facilities and the boating, and people from Phoenix and Las Vegas and so forth.

So Stewart had been involved in this as a member of Congress whose district bordered that whole area. He had ideas about how to take care of it when he came in, and one of them was to set up some kind of a permit system where all the squatters start paying rent until some system had worked out and to give them some legality and then work out a recreation plan. We needed somebody to take charge of that, and Graham was the one. And this was really about the only job he had while he was there. It took quite a while to get him on, it seems to me. I'd go in and talk to Mr. Udall about every two weeks or so: "Look, we haven't gotten a thing for Graham Hollister yet," and Jack Carpenter or somebody else in Alan Bible's office has been calling, and when are we going to do something." And Graham came in thinking, I think, he was going to be an assistant secretary or, at least a head of some bureau, but he just didn't strike any sparks. And in the end, we put him on the staff as a GS 15 or 16, a special assistant to the secretary, and gave him this role. I think he performed very well in it.

MOSS: I've got to flip this tape here. Just a minute.

BEATY: Okay.

[BEGIN SIDE II, TAPE I]

BEATY: ...on the staff and that sort of thing unless you got things you want to get . . .

MOSS: I have simply the names, and I don't know whether it would be move convenient to go name by name or whether it...

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BEATY: Well, go ahead and let's see what...

MOSS: Let's take Walter Pozen [Walter I. Pozen] next.

BEATY: Okay, Bill, as Walter Pozen was known to most of us, although more and more I hear him called Walter these days. We first met him on the Hill with Bill Brubeck [William H. Brubeck], who later was the head of the secretariat in the State Department under Rusk [Dean Rusk] and then worked in the White House in the foreign affairs thing before he actually became a career State Department type and went to England; somebody we'd known real well. I met Bill Brubeck when he was working for

Edith Green [Edith S. Green], I think probably as an American political science fellow or something like that. So I'd known him for a long time, and he'd gotten to know Stewart pretty well. He brought Pozen around one day and introduced him as somebody who was working on home rule in the District of Columbia. He was a young lawyer, had practiced a bit with some of the lawyers who handled Indian matters, Dick Schifter, and I forget the name of the firm, but Art Lazarus [Arthur Lazarus, Jr.]--people that we had known because of Indian matters or at least had casually known. So Bill practiced with them. And then Bill Brubeck brought him in, introduced him and said, "He's going to work on this."

Well, Stewart had taken a very active role in getting home rule for the District of Columbia, and getting home rule for the District of Columbia meant getting a discharge petition signed to discharge the House District Committee from handling this matter because they were never going to put it out for a debate. They just took over our office for one session of Congress practically. They had a desk, and they used our phones constantly, and two or three of the women who took an active role in it were in and out of the office. And Bill was in and out of the office, and we got to know him very well in that period.

He worked with the Kennedy administration, the headquarters here--I mean the Kennedy campaign headquarters here. He had a New Jersey background and knew Thorn Lord, the national committeeman there, and Bob Burkhardt [Robert J. Burkhardt], at different times state chairman and I'm not sure what all jobs, and Governor Meyner [Robert B. Meyner] and Hughes [Richard J. Hughes], who had taken Meyner's place or was about--I guess he was elected the year after Kennedy came in. But Bill wanted to work with us. He told me up on the Hill while Stewart was still in Congress that he'd like to work for Stewart there, but there was never any vacancy, and so he continued with the home rule thing. Then he moved out in some other job, an association with a man named Jay Cerf [Jay H. Cerf] of Foreign Policy Clearing House.

Well, about the time we came in, he and his wife had taken a trip to the Bahamas or some place like that, and he came down with hepatitis

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right after he came back, and he was unavailable to us for some time. Well, when we went to Interior, I fell heir to a whole lot of jobs. I was listed as the assistant to the secretary and information director, congressional liaison, I don't know how many things. Interior had never had a real centralized congressional liaison operation. Some of the bureaus liaison their committees pretty thoroughly--Bureau of Reclamation and Park Service, for example. But the department didn't have anything like this, and I think Stewart felt that he didn't need it, that he knew so many of those people, and that I knew how it worked, and that we could just go on handling it that way in addition--our regular duties. Well, it didn't work that way, and we had increasing problems, announcements getting out to the wrong people and--you just can't do it.

And so about the time Bill was well enough to go back to work--Bill Brubeck had been nagging me from over in the State Department, "Why don't you put Bill Pozen on the job?" And I think, if I remember right, that he was telling me, because of Brubeck's connections in the White House with the people he had worked with on the campaign also, Ralph Dungan [Ralph A. Dungan] and probably Mike Feldman [Myer Feldman], that Udall's

having troubles, and he needs somebody that knows these guys and can talk to them. So we created the position of assistant to the secretary for congressional liaison and put Bill in that job.

And he and I and a man named Boyd Finch all worked in one office. It's a very large office, but it was still a little hectic with three people operating there. Boyd and I practically worked face to face right across one desk; put Bill off in another corner. But I suppose it was six or eight times as big as this office. It was roomy, but it was also the place where all the assistant secretaries and the solicitors and everybody else came to sit and wait to see the Secretary or to talk to me about things that were coming up, and it was kind of a bedlam. Bill turned out to rub both Wayne Aspinall and Clinton Anderson the wrong way, and they were our two committee chairmen.

And Boyd Finch, a very reliable and hardworking guy, loyal, devoted, all these things, didn't strike Stewart as having much imagination. He wasn't a flashy type, and when we had all these problems with the committees, and we weren't getting much stuff moved through the committees in the first year, as part of the general shakedown, we got rid of Schooley, for example, as information director, and we moved Boyd Finch into a job with the assistant secretary for mineral resources, on his staff. He was a man who recognized that he needed somebody like that and was being helpful in helping us move somebody out that the secretary thought ought to be moved.

He wanted to get rid of Bill at that time. I don't think Bill ever knew it--maybe he did. But I felt, personally, that Bill had better rapport with the working staff in the White House than either Stewart

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or I had and that it was valuable to keep him on. Well, Bill took over a lot of duties where he could see he would serve very well. Udall got involved in a good many things in the District, partly, I think, because of his interest in District government and what he tried to do when he was in the House, and partly because the Interior Department has some functions involving the Potomac River and the parks and a whole lot of things around here. And Bill had been active in things here, and so it was logical--he knew people in the newspapers and he knew community leaders. Hechinger [John W. Hechinger] for example, was somebody that he knew from the previous associations, and of course much later, he became chairman of the city council or whatever the title was, commissioner. He also worked with Stewart quite a bit on White House matters, the Park Service beautification with Mrs. Johnson [Claudia Alta "Lady Bird" Johnson], the White House Restoration, the various things that Mrs. Kennedy did that we worked on through the Park Service. Bill was our guy who handled those things. Frankly, they weren't things that struck my imagination, fired it up. I was quite happy to have somebody around who was interested and who did this. Bill and I stayed there about the same length of time. I think we left about the same time--he, because he'd been planning to get into private practice, and I, because I got another appointment, and it just happened that it came just about the same time.

MOSS: I find in the *Government Organization Manual* that Robert McConnell [Robert C. McConnell] I believe, is listed as legislative liaison. How did this

happen?

BEATY: Well, Bob, again, is one of the first people I met when I came back here like Bill Brubeck except in different context. Bob was an institution man; he played handball in the House gym with the members and was a good handball player, and so he was always in demand. He knew an awful lot of people up there. He was assistant to Tony Fernandez [Antonio M. Fernandez] of New Mexico who was, I think, probably the only southwesterner who was on the House Appropriations Committee at the time I came back. He was right in the middle of the upper Colorado storage project fight. So there were occasional meetings with Aspinall and Engle and Tony Fernandez and various other people from these states. [Interruption]

MOSS: We were talking about Bill Pozen. I think we've pretty much come to the end. You'd mentioned Boyd Finch. Why don't we...

BEATY: Well, I might also mention in Bill's connection that he had gotten to know Charles U. Daly. Chuck Daly worked with us as a congressional fellow, political science fellow, in 1960. And then when he went to the Senate the second half of the year wound up in John Kennedy's office and worked with them, got to know all of them, during the remainder of that congressional year through the convention.

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About that time he worked with the Democratic study group to help prepare their fall issues brochures, and then he took off for Europe. He was wounded in the Korean War and got some kind of a medical retirement so he could load his family on a plane, air force plane, on a space available basis. And so he went to Europe and toured around for six months or so, and came back and went to work for Stanford Research University. Then finally, when the White House was drafting more people to work on congressional liaison, they brought him back, and he worked with Larry O'Brien [Lawrence F. O'Brien] and Claude Desautels [Claude John Desautels] and these people on the House side. Bill knew Chuck fairly well--better than I did, although we worked together. Their wives--they'd gone around together socially more than I had. So that's just another name I had to throw in here. I don't know how long Chuck worked in the White House, but I think he was still there at the time of the assassination, and left shortly afterwards.

Now, Boyd Finch. Boyd had worked with Senator Metcalf [Lee Metcalf], again, in the American political science fellowship program. He was a newspaper man from California who had gone to school at the University of Arizona and married an Arizona girl that he'd met there. I assume he met her there while he was in college. So he had some Arizona connections, but nobody really put any pressure on in his behalf. He had run for Congress in a district that Democrats don't win, and he got the Democratic nomination and made his race and now wanted a job other than the newspaper job he had where he'd been working before he quit to run for Congress. Metcalf's office endorsed him. They didn't put any real pressure on. But we just needed a few people who had some Democratic credentials who were willing to work at some level below assistant secretary, and most everybody wanted to be an



assistant secretary's job was gone. Boyd was one of those who was willing to do that, and he pitched in and delivered rather well, I thought. There's very little more to say about it.

MOSS: All right, how about Max Edwards [Max N. Edwards]?

BEATY: Well, Max was somebody that Stewart knew before he came back here, I think. But Max knew Morris Udall better than he knew Stewart. I think they were probably in the same class in the University of Arizona Law School, and Stewart was a year ahead of them or something like this. Stewart, I think, got to know Max better after Max got his law degree and moved to New Mexico to practice law and was practicing at Hobbs and was state chairman or one of the campaign people for Senator Anderson's race for reelection in 1958 or some period about this time when Stewart filled a Democratic party speaking engagement in New Mexico and spent some time over there with Anderson and Max.

Max wanted to be solicitor. He got some good endorsements. His law firm when he came to Washington was Tommy Corcoran's [Thomas G. Corcoran] law firm. I bumped into Max repeatedly in December and

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early January. But Stewart had decided to bring a friend of his from Tucson whose legal ability he valued very highly, Frank Barry [Frank J. Barry, Jr.], decided to bring him back as solicitor, if he could talk Frank into coming back here. So the job wasn't open. Max wasn't very happy about it, as I remember; but he still wanted to be part of the Administration, and he knew the Udalls, and I think he preferred to be at Interior. So there was the position of legislative counsel, and Stewart told him that this was a most interesting job working with the members of Congress and with the committees, as well as doing a legal job, so he wouldn't be leaving the law; and Max accepted that. A solicitor is on the rank of an assistant secretary in the Interior Department and it paid accordingly; and this other job, I believe, was only a GS 17 at the beginning. It was an eighteen by the time we left over there. So it meant quite a bit of difference in status and pay, but Max took it; and it was very helpful because he was one of the few people who came in with us who knew anything about politics, and sensitivities, the problems.

He'd worked as an advance man for both Kennedy and Johnson at different times during the 1960 campaign. As I mentioned earlier, he'd been involved in Senator Anderson's campaign. Senator Anderson put in a very strong word for Max. And Anderson was somebody that Stewart not only knew and liked, but he recognized his importance in both Congress and in his association with Johnson and Kennedy. Max did a lot to our work, liaison with, campaigned with, the national committee and people in the White House. I did a lot of that too.

Neither Frank Barry nor John Kelly [John M. Kelly].... Well, I'm downgrading some of our people. John Carver knew a great deal about politics. He'd been involved in Idaho campaigns. He'd handled Michigan for the Kennedy campaign. So John knew quite a bit about it. Ken Holum [Kenneth Holum] had run for the Senate twice, the man who became assistant secretary for Water and Power. He had a good feel for politics, but he was less

attuned to the pace at the national level than a lot of other people, than Max was, for example. I think Stewart relied on John Carver, Jim Carr, Max Edwards, Bob McConnell, and me more than anybody else. Now I got away from Bob McConnell. I guess that's when we got interrupted.

MOSS: Right.

BEATY: John Kelly, who was a New Mexican, became the assistant secretary for Mineral Resources; came back here without knowing anybody to put on his staff. And after Tony Fernandez died, Bob worked for Joe Montoya [Joseph M. Montoya] who had taken Fernandez' place in the House and then, of course, later, was elected to the Senate where he is now. But Kelly needed an assistant who knew something about Washington, about the Hill, and apparently Montoya and others--I'm sure

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Senator Anderson, who had sponsored Kelly, told him Bob McConnell'd be a good one to get. Udall kind of left it up to the assistant secretaries to get their own assistants without regard to whether the national committee said you've got to take somebody or what. We assumed they'd pick a Democrat, but when Kelly came up with Bob McConnell's name, Stewart was happy to have him because he knew Bob very well and knew he knew the Hill very well. Bob worked there in Kelly's office for several months until--as I think probably till about the end of our first year there when Stewart decided that because of the different antagonisms, he had to move Bill off the job, away from Aspinall, particularly, but Anderson to a lesser extent, to some extent, and transferred Bob into that job and Bill into a special assistant type role.

MOSS: Specifically, what was the problem between Pozen and Aspinall?

BEATY: Oh, Aspinall's a schoolmaster type. He recognizes the power of the chairman, and he told Stewart at the beginning, "You and I have known each other quite a while, and anytime that you want to talk, I'm available. And, you know, let's keep a good thing going here. But don't send any of your assistants up to talk to me. I'm the chairman, in effect, and I can't be bothered with underlings." Of course, this was an extreme situation. He really got along very well with John Carver and Jim Carr, and there was no real problem there except Bill was young and brash and not too tactful. He didn't mean to be untactful, but he'd just come busting in with things, and Aspinall didn't like it, and he made it very clear. Jim Carr had a very close association with Sid McFarland [Sidney L. McFarland] who was Aspinall's chief of staff or whatever the title is, staff director, I suppose. And back through McFarland to Carr to Udall, I'm sure there were messages transmitted to keep Pozen away from up here. Well, you can hardly have a liaison man who can't go to the committee where most of our work's being done. On the other side, Anderson's man on the committee, a friend of mine, I've known him a long time, Jerry Verkler. Jerry is such a nice guy he never likes to be totally frank, and he never did say anything like, "Bill's not doing very good up here." He more or less defended Bill, but at the same time by defending him, I think, made it

clear that there was some reason to defend. I think it was Aspinall a lot more than Anderson that was responsible for the shift.

MOSS: Right. I see we're running pretty close to the end of the time so I'll cut this off now and pick up next time.

BEATY: Okay.

[END OF INTERVIEW #3]

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