

Antonio Carrillo Flores Oral History Interview – JFK#1, 08/02/1969
Administrative Information

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Biographical Note

Carrillo Flores, Ambassador to the United States, Mexico (1959 - 1964), Secretary of Foreign Affairs (1964 - 1970), discusses his role as Ambassador to the United States from Mexico, Mexico's response to the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis, among other issues.

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Oral History Interview

Of

Antonio Carrillo Flores

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Antonio Carrillo Flores – JFK #1

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Oral History Interview

with

ANTONIO CARRILLO FLORES

July 2, 1969
Mexico City, Mexico

By Dennis O'Brien

For the John F. Kennedy Library

CARRILLO: Well, Mr. O'Brien, according to your wishes I'm going to speak in English, so first of all I want to apologize for my bad English.

O'BRIEN: Senor, you may do this in Spanish.

CARRILLO: In Spanish?

O'BRIEN: We can transcribe it in Spanish.

CARRILLO: All right, all right. Then I'd better do it in Spanish. You follow Spanish, no?

O'BRIEN: Not very well.

CARRILLO: Well, then I'll do it in English. I'll do it in English.

O'BRIEN: Oh, thank you.

CARRILLO: Because I think that if...The only thing that I would then ask you is that if in any moment you frankly believe that what I have said is not clear, then you ask me to repeat. And then I'll use Spanish for that part, to make it clear.

O'BRIEN: Si. Si.

CARRILLO: Well, I think that the only real contribution that I can make to this project is to give you, Mr. O'Brien, as I'll do, a copy of my own reports of the conversations that President Kennedy [John F. Kennedy] had with President López Mateos [Adolfo López Mateos] when President Kennedy visited Mexico on the 29th and 30th of June, 1962. As in all the meetings between heads of states, some of the most important things that were talked about in those meetings did not appear in the joint communiqué. This is not a secret; this is a fact. So immediately after these meetings, on the second of July—that is only forty-eight hours after President Kennedy's visit to Mexico—I put all my recollections about everything that was said in this document of twenty-four pages. And I'm not going to read it, but I'm going to give a copy of it to you. I do it because I think that it is important that what was said between Presidents Kennedy and López Mateos be known in the future by the historians, as you say, and by your scholars.

I am a Mexican. I am a friend of the United States. And I think that one of the real problems between the two countries is the diffidence that Mexicans have regarding the United States; that is something normal, as the Guatemalans have regarding us. The first time that the President of Mexico met with the President of the United States was in 1911 when President Díaz [Porfirio Díaz]—Díaz, as you say—met with President Taft [William H. Taft]; and now, almost sixty years after, it is still a mystery what they talked when they met.

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So I think that I am making a small contribution when I give you this document where future historians and scholars will find everything that was said. I don't think that it would be appropriate if this paper be known today, but I say ten years hence, beginning in 1980, I don't think that it will be any problem whatsoever if this paper is known by historians and scholars. And I don't think that this paper will have any importance at all in evaluating the policies of President Kennedy regarding the world, but it will have, I believe, some importance in evaluating the policies of President Kennedy regarding Latin America and particularly regarding Mexico. So, very happily, I give you this paper so that it will form part of the library where all the papers of President Kennedy are kept and be used by any historian or any scholar beginning in 1980.

O'BRIEN: All right. Thank you very much. I'm sure that that will be a very valuable contribution to the Kennedy Library and to the understanding of United States-Mexican relations. Mr. Minister, could we discuss some of your impressions about Washington and about your tenure as Ambassador to the United States from the Republic of Mexico?

CARRILLO: Yes, yes. I was Ambassador in Washington from January 1959 to November 1964, so I had the honor of representing my country with three American Presidents: President Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower], President Kennedy, and the first year of President Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson]. I understand that this project is relating exclusively with President Kennedy, so I will restrict all my remarks and my opinions to the period of President Kennedy. First of all, I want to tell you that, as many residents in Washington, when I arrived in 1959 there were not very many people who thought that Senator Kennedy in those days would be able to win the Democratic nomination or that, if he won the Democratic nomination, that he would be able to win the election. Most of my friends, because it happened that they were either Republicans (I was serving during a Republican administration) or if they were Democrats were friends of Senator Johnson (I am a good friend of the Johnsons and I have always been) they thought that the handicap of Senator Kennedy's religion was too great to be overcome.

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And that was the report that I made to the Mexican government in those days. Most of the people with whom I talked recalled the experience of 1924 when Mr. Al Smith [Alfred E. Smith] had been badly defeated—1928; I'm wrong, 1928—but to the surprise of many of my friends, Senator Kennedy won the nomination. I happened to be a very good friend, in fact, a client—not personally but as a government—of an attorney in Washington, Mr. Chapman [Oscar L. Chapman], who used to be Secretary of Interior under President Truman [Harry S. Truman] and who was the manager of the candidacy of Senator Johnson. So it was a surprise for him and for many of us when Senator Johnson accepted the nomination for Vice President.

I had only known Senator Kennedy when we both attended one of the famous Gridiron Dinners in Washington. You are familiar with those dinners?

O'BRIEN: Yes.

CARRILLO: But then that was a very brief introduction, so practically I didn't know him until he was elected and he was sworn in on January of 1961, but I had the opportunity of becoming acquainted with him very soon after he took over. He told me about his interest in Mexico, his desire to come to Mexico. We developed—what I can say—it was not a deep friendship; I have to say I was never an intimate friend of President, or a close friend of President Kennedy, as I consider I was of President Johnson. I feel that I was a close friend of President Johnson; I was never a very close friend of President Kennedy. But anyhow, I admire, as many people, his style, his optimism.

I remember that when Robert Frost died, knowing as I knew his close friendship with Robert Frost, who had been, as you remember, at the Inauguration—he read that famous poem—so I sent him a wire of condolence. And he answered, when I met him a few days after that, he said, "I never thought that a Mexican Ambassador was going to send me a message of condolence on Robert Frost. That was the only message of condolence that I

received from an Ambassador, but I liked it very much.” And I said, “Well, we have spiritual values; we admire spiritual values very much.”

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He, immediately after taking over, as you remember, started his program, Alliance for Progress. I think that that was a far-reaching project that was fundamentally sound, because that program recognized the necessity of modernizing social, political, and economic structures in Latin America. I think, nevertheless, speaking very frankly, that he made a mistake, and I say this very sadly. He made the mistake of appointing a former high official of Puerto Rico, Teodoro Moscoso, as the first administrator of the Alliance for Progress. Mr. Moscoso is a man of many outstanding qualifications. I think that his appointment was a mistake because even if nobody can deny that Puerto Rico has profited very much by the fact that it can send to the United States all its goods—I mean, it’s part of the United States economically—the price that Puerto Rico has paid is its sovereignty. I mean, Puerto Rico has improved its standard of living, paying as a price its independence.

And I think that that was a great failure of President Kennedy, not feeling that if a typical Latin American has to choose between a higher standard of living without sovereignty and a lower standard of living as an independent country, a Latin American will always decide to be independent at the lower standard of living. So to choose a Puerto Rican to head the Alliance for Progress, I think that it was a serious mistake. I’m sorry to say it, but you told me in your letter that you wanted frank opinions and not only eulogies.

O’BRIEN: Yes. You have been a longtime advocate of a major economic program for Latin America.

CARRILLO: Yes.

O’BRIEN: Were you consulted during the period of the late 1950’s and between the election in the United States and the Inauguration on your ideas on a major economic program for Latin America?

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CARRILLO: No. You mean if I was consulted by Senator Kennedy as President-elect? No. None whatsoever. I was consulted before and after. I mean, I think that the American government was interested in my views regarding Latin America while under President Truman, under President Eisenhower and under President Kennedy and under President Johnson, but not in the interim period after the election. No. I had a book that I cherish very much dedicated to me by Mr. Rostow [Walt Whitman Rostow], for example, in which he says—the name of the book is *View From the Seventh Floor*, the seventh floor in the State Department—he says, “To Antonio Carrillo Flores, consultant of the two governments of Mexico and the United States.” And I think that I always expressed my views. I expressed my views on several problems immediately after President Kennedy took over. You remember that in the weeks immediately after the

Inauguration President Kennedy decided to create a task force under the leadership, or chairmanship, of a former New Dealer.

O'BRIEN: Mr. Berle [Adolf A. Berle, Jr.]

CARRILLO: That's correct, Mr. Berle. I had several talks with Mr. Berle, and I gave him several suggestions. One concrete suggestion that I gave to him—I'm not sure that I would repeat the suggestion today, but that was a suggestion I gave him in those days—was that the United States should give preference to Latin America in the American market and that as a compensation for that the Latin American countries would take the commitment of buying in equal conditions and in equal circumstances the capital goods that they need in the United States. Now I am absolutely sure that this opinion would be very much criticized in Latin America, but I have to admit that it was an idea that I gave, some preference for Latin America in the United States market for its products.

O'BRIEN: There was a great fear at that time of the Common Market.

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CARRILLO: That is correct. I thought that the European Common Market was a reality, that the countries of Europe were giving, and still are giving, preferences to the former colonies that they had, so these countries, especially African countries, had preference in Europe and the possibility of selling their products in the United States market on equal conditions with Latin America. So I thought that it was only fair that if the African countries had preference in Europe that the Latin American countries should have some preference in the United States. I talked about this idea during the Eisenhower Administration with Mr. Douglas Dillon [C. Douglas Dillon], who was Under Secretary of State, and then I presented a memorandum to Mr. Berle, but fortunately nothing of that kind was done because when I came back to Mexico after the end of my tenure as Ambassador, I found that this idea was very unpopular in Mexico, as it is all over Latin America.

O'BRIEN: Well, did President Kennedy or any of the members of his Administration urge Mexico to join and participate within the Latin American Free Trade Association which was formed after...

CARRILLO: No. No. I think that the free trade zone in Latin America was an idea that started in Latin America, started in what we call the Cono Sur, the southern part of South America. Mexico had supported this idea, but was not a leader of the idea. And the reason is very clear, Mr. O'Brien. If you look at the statistics of our trade, between 65 to 70 per cent of our trade is with the United States. Now, our trade with Latin America is about 3 per cent, but in 1960 I don't think that it was more than 1 per cent of 1 ½ per cent. So for us trade with Latin America was more a question of political solidarity than an economic need. The equation is completely different in some

countries in South America.

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My frank impression, that I can tell for the guidance of future historians, is that when President López Mateos in 1960 decided to make his trip to South America, that was a very shrewd, intelligent move; he had the need of presenting something to the Mexican people as the result of his trip, so he decided that Mexico should join the free trade zone. But, and this I have said publicly recently, I think that when Mexico joined the free trade zone, we overlooked certain difficulties that we are facing now. But I give my testimony that the United States government neither encouraged nor discouraged Mexico to join the Latin American free trade zone.

O'BRIEN: At that time, Mr. Minister, I understand a major problem in U.S.-Mexican relations...

CARRILLO: Was Cuba.

O'BRIEN: ...was Cuba, as well as commodity prices. And I think perhaps both of these would be rather important for future historians.

CARRILLO: Well, it is true that the problem of commodity prices has always been important, but if I am going to say the whole truth as I see it, it has been for Mexico less serious than for other developing countries.

When the United Nations—because this is not a Latin American complaint; this is a complaint of all the underdeveloped or developing nations—decided to establish a group to study this problem, we had a meeting under the sponsorship of the United Nations precisely in the days that preceded the Inauguration of President Kennedy—I mean January of 1961. There was a report of a group that I was part of after that a meeting under the sponsorship of the Organization of American States. This second meeting took place a few months after that. When the statistics were presented, it was clear that Mexico had not suffered substantially any great fluctuation of prices, so therefore I say that this is more a political banner, a political thesis, but that regarding Mexico, because of the diversification of our economy and because of our diversification of our exports, this problem has not injured us as much as it has injured other countries.

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Nevertheless, there were two trade problems in which we were very much interested, but if I am going to be again absolutely frank, the crisis on the two problems came before President Kennedy took over. The number one was the cotton problem; the number two was the metal problem, concretely, the zinc and lead problem.

In the case of the cotton, we thought that it was very unfair that the United States was supporting the uneconomic production of cotton and paying subsidies to the American cotton to be exported to Europe and to Japan. We always thought that if the Latin American

countries, or in general the underdeveloped countries, were going to get an opportunity to compete, the only field in which we could compete realistically was in the area of basic or primary products. We can never compete with the United States in selling steel in the world markets or in selling electronics or all these sophisticated products. We can sell what we produce.

So this was our point of view, and I presented it in a meeting of the United States Foreign Trade Council in New York. We said, "If the only way out that we have is the export of raw materials—that is a very bad way out because we didn't want to be permanently exporters of primary goods—at least we'd think that we deserve to compete with the United States and the other industrialized nations in equal terms; but if, to compete with the producers of cotton in the United States, we're going to compete with producers that are getting a subsidy of four or five cents a pound, that is unfair."

I remember the day I presented my credentials to President Eisenhower. I knew that he was a golfer. I said, "Mr. President, you are a golfer. What if you believed you were going to play with Sam Snead (Sam Snead was the top golfer of these days), and instead of Sam Snead giving strokes to you, you were going to give strokes to Sam Snead?" And he laughed. That's our case. It will be understandable that the Mexican producers receive a subsidy to export all their cotton, but the case is that they have to compete with the producers of cotton in the most advanced country in the world, and the producers that are getting this subsidy are not the producers of the poor country, are the producers of the rich country. That was the case of cotton.

The case of lead and zinc are different, but was also a case in which restrictions were going to be put on lead and zinc. And these two problems were serious problems, but,

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as I told you before, the crisis in both took place before President Kennedy took over. I really can't recall that during the presidency of President Kennedy these two problems were as serious as they were before he took over.

The serious problem was Cuba. Cuba was our most serious problem under President Kennedy. And in this paper that I am giving to you, you will see that from the twenty-four pages at least eight or nine had to do with the conversations the Presidents had about Cuba and the insistence of President Kennedy trying to convince President López Mateos to break diplomatic relations with Cuba, to isolate Cuba.

O'BRIEN: Mr. Minister, Mexico has been traditionally committed to the Estrada Doctrine, haven't they?

CARRILLO: Yes, yes. The Estrada Doctrine, in fact, has not much to do with the problem of Cuba. The Estrada Doctrine only says that we don't accept the doctrine of recognition, we don't think that any country has the right either to recognize or not to recognize another government. In the case of Cuba, the questions involved were, in our view, first, the principle of self-determination...Cuba had gone socialist, had gone communist. We are not a communist country, as you know, but we thought that if Cuba either decided or accepted to be communist that no other country had the

right to impose on Cuba a different regime. And second, it was—and again I’m speaking very frankly—for us a domestic political problem. Any government in Mexico that wants to be respected by the Mexican people must show independence in front of the United States—not necessarily opposition, but independence.

So if Cuba was a Latin American country, if Cuba was undergoing a deep social revolution, we thought that we cannot condemn the effort of the Cubans to undergo that revolution because you know that we, in a sense, have passed through a similar process. We also had a revolution; we also had been condemned by the United States, not as a communist because the word used in those days was “Bolshevik.” Secretary of State Kellogg [Frank B. Kellogg] in 1925 said, “Mexico is on trial; Mexico is a Bolshevik country.” So we had suffered very much because of that. We were completely alone during that period.

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So we are morally and politically committed to our own people that in Latin America we must defend the right of any Latin American country to follow its own course even if we don’t agree with that course. As that famous saying that you have—I don’t remember the author of it—“I disagree with what you say, but I will die to defend your right to say what you are saying.” That’s our case. We have never agreed, never, with Castro [Fidel Castro], but we defend the right of Cuba to follow the course that they have followed.

O’BRIEN: Well, going back, Mr. Minister, a moment to the time of the Kennedy Administration first assuming office and then the development of the incident known as the Bay of Pigs, what was your own reaction and what was the reaction of the government of the Republic of Mexico to the Bay of Pigs?

CARRILLO: Well, that was the most difficult day of my stay in Washington. I can recall it very well. The Bay of Pigs—and President Kennedy recognized it afterwards—was the great failure and disappointment of his government. I remember I was having at the Mexican Embassy a reception for Ambassador Mann [Thomas Clifton Mann] who was coming to Mexico. I invited many people, but without believing that they were coming. I invited the Vice President, the Speaker of the House, people of that category, and we know in Washington that these people do not attend receptions. To my great surprise I saw all of them coming. That was April in 1961.

And then Vice President Johnson told me, “Well, the President wants to talk with you because the problem of the Bay of Pigs is coming to the United Nations tonight.” President Kennedy took the phone and spoke to me and told me that it was very important for him what was happening in the United Nations and that he knew the position of Mexico and he didn’t want the support of Mexico, but at least he wanted that Mexico didn’t take a very active part in condemning the United States. I don’t want to go into the technical details of the thing because it was a question of two resolutions being submitted to the United Nations, one by the majority of the Latin American countries and another resolution by Mexico. The only thing he wanted was that the Mexican resolution that had

the right to be discussed first because it had been presented first, that Mexico surrender its rights and accept that the other resolution be presented first to the vote of the Assembly.

Because of many circumstances that will be very long to go into, this didn't happen, and he resented that very much. He got mad with Mexico. That is true. I remember that I had read some literature in those days—I was an Ambassador and it was my duty to study some English—and I read some poems about the Irish character, and I have read about this Irish temperament. President Kennedy went mad with Mexico. I mean, from April or May of 1961 practically until March of the next year he was very much hurt with Mexico because of the attitude of Mexico in the case of Cuba. And in those days Vice President Johnson helped us very much. But President Kennedy didn't make a secret that he was very much hurt because of the position that Mexico had taken.

O'BRIEN: Well, Mr. Minister, did the Bay of Pigs come as a complete surprise, or did you have any—through perhaps Mexican intelligence—any idea that this was going to take place?

CARRILLO: No. Well, let me tell you this. We really don't have foreign intelligence. I knew, I knew because it was not a secret that President Kennedy had said many times that—he said it in his Inaugural Address—that the presence of a communist power in Cuba was something that was not negotiable. We knew the precedent of 1954, what had happened Guatemala when all the papers showed that really the government of Guatemala was overthrown with the active support of the United States government, so we suspected that something of this kind was going to happen. But, my impression and I think that the impression of the people of the government in Mexico those days was this: That either the United States wasn't going to do anything; or that if the United States government decided to take some action, they were going to take the action with all the energy and efficiency necessary to overthrow Castro. I remember a great Mexican politician and a former President of Mexico, a friend of mine, telling me, "Well, if the United States decides to produce a car, we know that they are going to produce a good

car." But if they tell me, well, they have produced a car and now that car can't run, that's something that we couldn't conceive.

It was a surprise for us that the United States made this intervention, made this support, but even more surprising that after they decided to intervene that they intervened in such an inefficient manner. Because that put us in a spot. I mean, in the United Nations we couldn't do anything but to say that we couldn't approve what had been done. I mean, Mexico because of its history can never say anything other than that we can never approve, we can never condone intervention by force in other Latin American countries, but I think that President Kennedy resented very much the attitude that we took.

O'BRIEN: Well, now in 1962, during the Missile Crisis, Mexico—well, as I understand it, President López Mateos was in the Philippines. Were you in Washington at the time?

CARRILLO: Yes, I was in Washington, and precisely the last part of the conversation that took place between the two had to do with this problem. We didn't know that this question was going to happen because I remember President López Mateos asking me a week before President Kennedy was due in Mexico, he asked me, "Tell me, Ambassador"—we had been colleagues in the Cabinet of previous president—"what do you think that worries most President Kennedy?" And I said, "Mr. President, I don't think that he really cares very much that we are, in this case of Cuba, supporting Cuba, because Cuba is a minor problem. Even if it's a nuisance, it's a minor problem. What I think that he worries about is that he doesn't know how far are we going to go in this policy. In the case of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, are we going as far as to be neutrals, not to speak that we are going to be in favor of the Soviet Union and against the United States? I think that is what worries President Kennedy: How far is Mexico going in this policy of supporting Cuba? Are we only supporting Cuba because it is a Latin American country, or we don't care about the spread of communism all over the world, and in the case of the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, will we be neutral or will we even show some kind of

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sympathy toward the Soviet Union?"

He said, "Well, I am not that crazy. I am not a fool. I know what are the realities." "Well, if that is the case, Mr. President, why don't you tell that frankly to President Kennedy?" And it's only a page—and I'm going to read it in English, no—that last point.

President López Mateos said that he wanted to finish by making a solemn declaration in terms that the undersigned Ambassador reproduces almost verbatim, and I quote: "The policy that Mexico has been following in the case of Cuba, because of our respect to principles that are vital to us, may have created in some sectors of the United States doubts about what would be our conduct in the case of the world conflict. I want to take advantage of this opportunity to declare solemnly that if that conflict would come, Mexico, loyal to her traditions and with her thirty-five million people, will be ready to guard the back—las espaldas—of the United States. (In other words, you will never expect or you will never fear that you will be attacked through Mexico). We'll protect the rear of the United States."

Then I put here, "President Kennedy, clearly moved, said, 'Mexico naturally will be ready to guard Mexico, Mexican soil, Mexican flancos. You say that you are going to protect our rear; we also will protect yours.'" And that was the end of the conversation, and it ended in a very cordial manner.

So when the crisis of 1962 came, President López Mateos, as you say, was in his trip to the Far Orient. The day in which President Kennedy made his famous public announcement by the radio and TV, President López Mateos was in Manila, and because of the difference in hours, it was 4 or 5 o'clock Manila time. The American Ambassador had instructions to deliver personally to President López Mateos the message, as here

Ambassador Mann had instructions to talk with the then acting Foreign Minister (who was Minister Gorostiza [José Gorostiza], because the Foreign Minister, Tello [Manuel Tello Barraund], was with López Mateos), that a very important message was coming, a message that was a very serious, that couldn't be more serious. Ambassador Mann didn't know the content of the message, only said very, very serious, grave message is coming.

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The acting Minister called me. He said, "Well, do you have any idea about what message is coming?" And I have to confess that the Ambassadors were not in the inner circle. I mean, we knew at that time that something extraordinary was happening, but even *Time* magazine—the *Time* magazine issue of that week—mentioned Berlin as a possible source of crisis. So I said, "Well, there are many ideas, but I really don't know." Later he called me and said, "Well, it's about Cuba." So the message was delivered to the President in Manila.

The United States was very much preoccupied about the vote of Mexico. They knew that they were going to have any overwhelming majority of votes in the Organization of American States, but they wanted unanimity. I mean, they thought that if Mexico either abstained and much more if Mexico voted against the resolution that it would diminish very much the political and moral value of the resolution. So Secretary Rusk [Dean Rusk] called me and said, "Well, Ambassador, this is a very serious moment. I suppose that you are very well aware of the danger we are passing through and the importance that we attach to the vote of Mexico and the position of Mexico." So I said, "Yes, I know that." I knew this declaration that President López Mateos had made, so I said, "Secretary Rusk, knowing the thoughts of President López Mateos, I know that Mexico in a case like this will be prepared to support the United States. But I am not Foreign Minister; I am not the President of Mexico."

So I called President López Mateos. This was already when President López Mateos was arriving in Honolulu. It was about 1 or 2 o'clock Washington time in the afternoon, 5 or 6 o'clock Honolulu time. I called President López Mateos. He said, "Well, I am going to speak with Mr. Tello." And Mr. Tello called me up a half hour after and told me, "Well, you may tell Secretary Rusk that we are going to vote yes on the resolution."

So Mexico voted yes. We did make a reservation. We only made a declaration, at my suggestion, that in voting yes to the resolution that did not mean that we were going to contribute in case of war with either men going to fight or accepting our territory—I mean, American forces coming into Mexico. So we didn't put it that way. We said that in voting yes we are not committing Mexico on measures that according to our constitution require the approval of Congress, and the resolutions that require the approval of

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Congress were either a declaration of war or permit to accept foreign troops in Mexico or sending Mexican troops abroad. But we voted yes to the resolution of the Organization of American States.

O'BRIEN: What were your own personal feelings, Mr. Minister, during the Cuban Missile Crisis as to the course of action that was taken?

CARRILLO: Well, that is an interesting and difficult question. My impression is that President Kennedy had no other choice, more than that, I think that he chose the moderate course. Most of the Ambassadors that were gathered in the State Department that afternoon when we already knew that the problem was the Cuban Crisis thought that what President Kennedy was going to announce was the invasion of Cuba and the bombardment of Cuba; so when he only announced a blockade or a quarantine, we thought that in the circumstances he had taken a moderate action. That was the impression in those days.

On the other hand, the question was always open: Why the Soviet Union put the missiles in Cuba? Was this really a great danger? If the United States had missiles, as it had in those days in Turkey, why if the United States considered that she had the right to have missiles in Turkey, why she denies the right of the Soviet Union to have missiles in Cuba? Well, the answer is that the politics is not logics—I mean, there is not logics in politics—and the United States considers that they have the right to have security in this area.

I don't know, and I will never know—perhaps my grandchildren will know—but one of the suggestions, you remember, one made in those days was that the United States offer as compensation that she, the United States, would withdraw its own missiles from Italy and from Turkey. The fact is that they were removed. Perhaps technical developments made it unnecessary to have those places in Turkey or perhaps it was something that was understood when the decision was taken, but I understand that for a President of the United States it was politically impossible to accept the presence of Soviet missiles with nuclear weapons ninety miles offshore of the United States. That I understand.

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O'BRIEN: Well, Mr. Minister, we're about ready to run out of tape on this side. Would you have time to...

CARRILLO: Yes, yes, I...

[BEGIN SIDE II TAPE I]

CARRILLO: ...if a vote were taken about who are, in the opinion of the average Mexican, the American Presidents more popular, the winners undoubtedly will be, number one, President Roosevelt [Franklin D. Roosevelt]; number two, President Kennedy. I am not sure that this is a fair decision. If my vote would be decisive, I would say President Johnson number one and either President Kennedy or President Roosevelt number two, but I am a minority and my opinion is not representative.

Why President Roosevelt and President Kennedy are the only two popular presidents in this century? Naturally, there's President Lincoln [Abraham Lincoln]. President Lincoln

we love. And you know the reason we love President Lincoln; as a congressman he spoke in favor of Mexico in those days of war between the two countries, but that is remote history.

Well, I think that the reason why President Roosevelt and President Kennedy were so popular and are so popular now is that Mexicans, as perhaps most Latins, will pay great value to style, manners, courtesy, moral gestures, because as I confessed a moment ago, economically many things we complain about are not as important as we say that they are. But you'll find that President Roosevelt agreed to revoke the clause in the Treaty of 1853 that granted to the United States the right to pass by the isthmus of Tehuantepec that was practically a mortgage on Mexican territory, and he accepted to sign a treaty saying, "Well, we abandon that right." In fact, the United States was not giving up anything at all because that was a right that for almost a century the United States had not used because they didn't need to use it. I mean, especially after the Panama Canal was built, what value did this have, the right to cross the isthmus? But emotionally it was very important to Mexico that that Treaty that we considered had diminished the sovereignty of Mexico in a vital point of territory was erased by President Roosevelt.

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The same thing was true of President Kennedy when he accepted that the Chamizal case be settled. And in this paper I'm leaving you is the whole story. With that wonderful style that he had, he told President López Mateos, "Mr. President, I am a politician from New England. I didn't know anything about the Chamizal until a week ago. Furthermore, this problem," he said, "arose when neither you nor I were born. So I'm ready to accept that we have been wrong in this problem, but fifty years have passed, new situations are created. I am prepared to do justice to Mexico now. Will you be willing that to accept a solution of this case be framed in a way that we don't unnecessarily injure innocent people that had nothing to do with this problem?" And you will find the answer of my President: "Well, Mr. President, if you present me the case that way, I cannot say no."

In coming back to Washington, Kennedy gave a press conference, and he said, "We are going to settle the Chamizal question. That is," he said, "a black spot or black stain on our history." I mean, he said, "That is something that we shouldn't do"—I mean, "that we shouldn't have done ever." That recognition that Mexico had been treated unfairly on the Chamizal question is something that the Mexican people will always be grateful about.

You will find in this paper that President Kennedy put this question to President López Mateos: "Mr. President, I want to know what is your interest in the Chamizal case? Is this a political question? Is this an economic question? Is it the value of the land that you are interested?" And President López Mateos said, "No. I am not a real estate dealer. It is not a question of real estate. It is a question of dignity." And he said, "The Mexican people accept that after losing a war with the United States, we had to surrender half of our territory, but what the Mexican people cannot understand is why, if we have given the United States half of our territory—now, that is the very minimum portion of land that a judicial decision said is ours—that you who took half of our territory are denying us the right to get back that very tiny, tiny piece of land. It's a moral question; it's not an economic question." That was understood clearly by President Kennedy, and that's why he was so popular in Mexico.

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Furthermore, he had glamour. He was a charismatic President, no? And I have never seen, never, an explosion of enthusiasm as the one that the Mexican people showed when Mr. Kennedy and Mrs. Kennedy [Jacqueline B. Kennedy Onassis] came to Mexico on June 29.

O'BRIEN: You came with them on that trip on the airplane?

CARRILLO: Yes, yes. Yes, I remember. There was a very interesting little anecdote. Because there were planned two official luncheons—one at the national palace, where the two presidents were going to make their official speeches, and a second luncheon at which the host was going to be President Kennedy and the guest was going to be President López Mateos—officially, there were not going to be speeches at this second luncheon, only toasts, but President Kennedy, very intelligently, accepted the suggestion that Mrs. Kennedy was going to make a brief address in Spanish. And he called me in the Air Force One about one hour before the plane was due in Mexico City, and he told me, “Well, Ambassador, the suggestion has been made, but I want you to listen what Mrs. Kennedy is about to say and tell me if because what she is going to say, because the way that she is going to pronounce Spanish, it will make a good impression in Mexico, but I want a frank, not a diplomatic answer.” It was a difficult question.

So I was there, and Mrs. Kennedy was already prepared for her landing in Mexico, beautifully dressed in a green dress, and she started saying her address. And at that moment President Kennedy interrupted me and told me, “Well, Ambassador, are you listening to her or just looking at her.” “Both, Mr. President.” I mean, he had a great sense of humor.

I remember calling on him in the White House two months after. He invited me to see the pictures taken in Mexico. And he said, “Wonderful, wonderful.” And he said, “Well, I think that the presence of Mrs. Kennedy helped a little the reception ceremony.” I said, “Yes, Mr. President, it helped.” But in fact, it was something so natural from the Mexican people that I think, I think that the warmth of the reception to President Kennedy surprised many Mexican politicians. They were surprised to find that in Mexico, at least in Mexico City, that it was not an anti-American sentiment as many politicians thought that it was.

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O'BRIEN: During these years you had as the Ambassador of the United States to Mexico...

CARRILLO: No. I represent Mexico to the United States.

O'BRIEN: No, but you were...

CARRILLO: Yes. I, I, I...Go ahead. Go ahead. Yes, well, when I was Ambassador in Washington, we had two Ambassadors—Ambassador Robert Hill [Robert C. Hill], 1959-1960, and then Ambassador Mann from 1961 to '64, and then Ambassador Freeman [Fulton Freeman] from March 1964 to the end of the

López Mateos Administration.

O'BRIEN: Was Ambassador Mann an effective Ambassador?

CARRILLO: Yes. I am going to tell you this. My experience has been a very positive one with all the Ambassadors. If I had to say which one was the best of the Ambassadors I had known, well, then I'd have to take in consideration the Ambassadors I have known not only while I was in Washington but in all the twenty-five years of my life here. But restricting my answer to the period in which you are interested, I'll say that Hill, Mann, and Freeman were three very different Ambassadors. In fact, Freeman didn't serve under Kennedy. So we are restricted to the Kennedy period, so we have to restrict only to Mann because, in fact, Hill also was Ambassador before Kennedy. The only Kennedy Ambassador was Thomas Mann.

My answer very definitely is that he was an effective Ambassador. I was sad when I knew that he was not as popular all over Latin America as he was in Mexico. In some circles of Latin America he was considered perhaps a little too conservative, and the impression in Washington was that his appointment to Mexico was not a promotion for Mann, because he had been, as you remember, Assistant Secretary for Latin America, and the Assistant Secretary for Latin America is the boss of all the American Ambassadors in Latin America. He was known as a close friend of then Vice President Johnson, and it's known that one of the first appointments that President Johnson made one day after taking over was calling him back to Washington. So relatively Mann was in a similar position during the Kennedy Administration as the one that

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Johnson was under the Kennedy Administration—I mean, relatively speaking, no?

He was conservative, undoubtedly, but he had real affection for Mexico. And the way in which he helped the solution of the two problems that we had, the important problems, I mean: The Chamizal problem, that was a very old one: and the case of the salinity of the Colorado River, that was a new one. The way in which he acted, I think that gained for him the affection and respect of the Mexican government.

There was one aspect or one angle of his work in which the judgment or the appraisal perhaps cannot be as positive as the others. He got nervous about some of the economic policies of the Mexican government, especially regarding foreign investments. I remember in one of his trips to Washington he was really very, very nervous. I mean, he thought, I believe, that President López Mateos was going too far to the left.

But, but, in every moment, in every moment, he acted with great knowledge of Mexican psychology, and he didn't make, he didn't make the mistakes that other Ambassadors in the past, not after him, in the past, had made. I think that his behavior, his demeanor was impeccable in the sense that in Mexico he never made any mistake of form because, as I told you before, we Latins and we Mexicans pay perhaps more attention than we should to questions of style and form. Some of the very serious mistakes of previous ambassadors have been questions of style and form. I think that in this respect Mann's behavior was impeccable.

O'BRIEN: Well, in his role as Ambassador of the United States to the Republic of Mexico and in your role as Ambassador of the Republic of Mexico to the United States, did you have much in the way of pressures on you in regard to the Mexicanization of business...

CARRILLO: No, no.

O'BRIEN: ...in that time? I remember the mining industry was...

CARRILLO: Well, yes, yes. There were...

O'BRIEN: ...at that time.

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CARRILLO: ...two important problems—the mining problem, as you say, and the question of the ownership of the power companies—but the power problem was settled before President Kennedy took over. That was in the years of President Eisenhower.

In the time of President Kennedy got through a law—a statute, as you say—was passed by Congress establishing that the majority of capital of companies in the mining industry should be held by Mexicans. This provoked some concern. I didn't get any pressure from the United States government, but in the papers there were articles against Mexico and there were some companies in the United States that were very much concerned; so I urged the Mexican government to find a formula in which the idea that we had could be carried out but without doing anything that could be construed as unfair or violating our own laws.

Fortunately, the member of the Cabinet of López Mateos who was principally responsible for this law—that was Eduardo Bustamante, the Secretary of the National Patrimony—is one of my best friends, so I could speak with him very, very frankly and openly, because there were two problems: One was the problem of the concessions that the companies had and that the new law restricted in several ways, and the second was that the law imposed on the companies the obligation of having a majority of Mexican capital. And the companies said, “Well, and what if there are not Mexicans interested in buying our properties or shares at their fair value? What are we going to do? How can we fulfill this obligation of selling to Mexicans 51 per cent of our shares if there are no Mexicans interested in buying?” And that was a good point?

So Eduardo Bustamante made this proposal: All right, the companies will put in escrow, or in trust, the shares for a period of time, so that they are not obliged to sell the shares at whatever price Mexicans are willing to pay; that the shares will be put in escrow, in trust, a fair appraisal would be made, and they won't be obliged to sell the shares at a lower value than the value that has been determined by an objective appraisal. And this solution, with some modifications perhaps, was accepted and the problem was settled.

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O'BRIEN: Well, Mr. Minister, we haven't said much about the salinity problem of the Colorado River, and its relationship to the cotton industry and things of that sort. Would you care to go into this?

CARRILLO: Yes, yes. Well...

O'BRIEN: Perhaps your own and Mr. Mann's role.

CARRILLO: Yes. This was a very difficult problem, perhaps the most serious problem. One of my predecessors, not my immediate predecessor, but the Foreign Minister of those days, Secretary Manuel Tello, made a statement that this problem was the most serious that Mexico had had with the United States in more than twenty years. As I am speaking for the future and not for the present, I want to say that the problem was very serious not mainly because of the real harm that Mexican farmers suffered but because of the principle involved in the whole question. The question was really this: The United States is or is not obliged to give Mexico usable water? Our answer is yes, we have entered into a treaty with the United States to receive X amount of water, and if the treaty is—and that's the title of the treaty—a "Treaty to distribute the waters of the river for the use in industry, services and farming," it is obvious that it was supposed that the water we were going to receive was water that we could use. And the American position, based on the legislative history of the approval of the treaty by the U.S. Senate, was, I think, an untenable position. The position was no, the treaty does not oblige us to guarantee the quality of the water, so even if the water is very bad water, brackish water, we fulfill our obligation if the amount of liquid we deliver to Mexico is the one that is in the treaty independently of the quality of the water. This was, I always thought, a very unfair position.

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Unfortunately we had a very powerful enemy. Our enemy was no less than the head of the Appropriations Committee of the Senate, Senator Hayden [Carl T. Hayden] of New Mexico. He is not a bad man; he was defending the interests of his state. And he was a very powerful man. I remember one of those days I had to visit Mayor Wagner [Robert Ferdinand Wagner, Jr.] of New York, and he knew about this problem. He said, "Well, with whom are you fighting in Washington in this problem?" I said, "Our main enemy is Senator Hayden." He said, "Well, you are in a bad position because he's the second most powerful man in the United States." I mean, he had the control of the expenditures and budgets. And he was adamant in his position that Mexico did not have any right to determine the quality of the water.

Fortunately—and this was one of the things that were discussed between the two presidents—we had the support of all the liberal people around President Kennedy. I have to say that we had the support of the then Legal Adviser of the State Department, a very brilliant lawyer, a former professor of Harvard University and now also a professor of Harvard University, Mr. Abram Chayes. We also had the support of the Head of the Mexican Division, the present American Ambassador to Uruguay, Robert Sayres. He is a friend of

mine. We had the support of the adviser for Latin America in the White House, later Ambassador to Chile. All of them accepted that it is impossible to maintain the idea that the United States had the right to give us water of any quality.

And independently of that there was another thing that now, fortunately, has been corrected, and I hope that has been corrected forever. We didn't know that the United States was building this reclamation project of Wellton-Mohawk. The State Department didn't know. As I told you before, we don't have an intelligence service. We should have known because it's something that took some years to build. But suddenly one day in December of 1961, suddenly from one day to the other, the level of salinity, that had been nine hundred parts a million, suddenly jumped to three thousand parts or something like that, without any explanation given to us, without anything. So I was called up from Mexico City. I remember it was December 1961. They said, "Well, what happened?" Then I found out that this system had been built.

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And really it was a very unfair situation. I recognize, I recognize that the real harm is not as great as many Mexicans have said, but the unfairness of the whole thing is very clear. Because the question was this: There had been some lands that for thirty or forty years had been covered by brackish water, and nothing could be done with them. So the farmers got from the Department of Interior, the Bureau of Reclamations, that they wanted to reclaim this land, so wells were opened in this part of land to drain water and a channel was built to take the brackish water here. They cemented the channel so that these lands wouldn't suffer anything, and the water was taken directly to the bed of the Colorado River. And they said, "Well, as the treaty says, water of any source. This is a source." So—even if this water had a content of six thousand parts of salinity when the average had been less than one thousand nine hundred. It was absolutely unfair.

From the very beginning we had the support of people I mentioned before, that knew that this thing was unbelievable. And finally, as you know, the solution was the build a new canal to bring this water directly to a dam here, and Mexico then would decide if this water was going to be thrown out to the sea or used. If it is done in winter then the United States will accept that the water thrown to the sea is not computed in our quota. If it's done in the summer, then we will accept that the water will be part of our quota. The real consequence is that we are losing about 3 percent of the water of the Treaty. That is a real consequence. But I have to say that Ambassador Mann was very, very helpful, that the people in the State Department were very helpful, and that President Kennedy was very understanding. But it was the most serious problem that I had when I was Ambassador.

Now this took place after President Kennedy's death; the two governments have decided that in the future they will consult each other before approving works that may injure the other country—I mean, there will be consultations—because really the worst part of this story is that all this thing was done without Mexico knowing anything or even the State Department knowing anything. That is a problem that I found every day in Washington: there are agencies in the U.S. government that are interested in foreign policy—naturally the State Department—but there are other agencies that don't care

much about foreign policy. They are interested in reaction in Congress and what can result. And one of those agencies was the Bureau of Reclamation. I mean, the Bureau of Reclamation was very much interested in what Senator Hayden, that had to approve all the projects, thought about this, but the Bureau of Reclamation didn't worry about Mexico's reaction. This is, I think, one of the most important problems in relations between the United States and Latin America, that some of the agencies that have to do with our problems are not interested in them; they are interested in what Congress, in what the domestic opinion of the United States believe about these questions.

O'BRIEN: In regard to the relationship between the United States and the State Department and the international finance agencies, like the International Monetary Fund, International Bank of Redevelopment, did you ever feel that there was too close of a link between United States policy and these agencies?

CARRILLO: Well, I can't say that about the IMF [International Monetary Fund] or the World Bank. But unfortunately, my conviction is that when President Kennedy, as I told you before, got very mad with us because of our attitude in the Bay of Pigs incident, that either instructions were given or something happened that in the Treasury and also in the Export-Import Bank we felt a very cold atmosphere.

I remember the stabilization agreement that we have with the United States for the stabilization of the peso; this stabilization agreement must be renewed every two years. It came for renewal in December of 1961, and it was a very difficult renewal. When finally it was renewed—Douglas Dillon was Secretary of the Treasury—he told me, “Well, my instructions are that we are going to sign this agreement but I am not going to say anything, I'm not going to make any statement whatsoever.” Because usually after the agreements of this kind, well, there were kind words of the Treasury. (Dillon is a very good friend of Mexico. President Diaz Ordaz [Gustavo Diaz Ordaz] awarded him our highest decoration sometime after the Secretary left office). So I had to call a press conference in the Embassy to announce, “Today we have signed a renewal of the stabilization agreement with the United States,” because he said, “I can't stop you from saying anything, if what you say is correct, but I

cannot say one single word of encouragement.” I knew that all this was due to the hurt feelings of President Kennedy.

But all this ended when he came to Mexico. I think that when he came to Mexico he felt the affection of Mexico. Then he got convinced that Mexican attitudes in the case of Cuba were not based on any anti-America feelings; they were based on reasons derived from our own history, from principles. And then his attitude changed completely; I mean, we had

in him a great friend after his trip of Mexico. We had a very good friend in him at the beginning, but he was very hurt with us from, I would say, April 1961 to June 1962.

O'BRIEN: Well, Mr. Minister, during those years Mexico took a very active role in problems of disarmament, as well as the Test Ban Treaty. Now what explains that?

CARRILLO: Well, that's a very good question. In this paper it's a very interesting thing, the first point that was spontaneously—how will I say it?—risen by President Kennedy was our position on disarmament problems. It is here. Number one, he expressed his satisfaction of the popular reception. Number two, conference on disarmament in Geneva, President Kennedy expressed his congratulations to the President of Mexico because of the objective spirit with which the Mexican delegation has participated in the disarmament conference. My impression is this, that the head of the Mexican delegation, who was the permanent delegate of Mexico to the United Nations in those days, Ambassador Padilla Nervo [Luis Padilla Nervo], former Foreign Minister of Mexico. And he was, first, a great technician—I mean, he was a masterful diplomat—he he had a love of these complicated technical questions, and he put all his love in making a contribution toward this problem. Second, I think that, as many Mexicans, he thought that Mexico had to express its independence before the United States, that we cannot be a satellite of the United States, and that in these world problems in which what was at stake was the peace of the world, that Mexico should speak her mind with freedom, with objectivity, and, as he could do it, in a technical way in which no one could deny that he was speaking at a level of technical respectability.

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My impression is that this was useful for the United States because, as you see, President Kennedy is spontaneously congratulating the Mexican President. Why? I think that because it was useful for the United States to have a Latin American country that on the main was a friend of the United States presenting some objective views. And I think also that the congratulation part was due to the fact that Padilla Nervo was such a great technician that the United States thought it better to congratulate his work rather than to ask President López Mateos to stop him. I mean, according to the old saying of American politics, if you can't lick him, join him. I mean, they recognized in Padilla Nervo such a great technician that they said, "Well, let's congratulate him so that the President of Mexico will know that we follow his work with interest."

Coming back to your question, I would think that it was not a high-level decision. I mean, the presidents of Mexico follow very closely foreign policy regarding the United States or regarding certain problems like world crises that endanger the peace of the world, but in matters like disarmament, decolonization and other questions that are of a more technical character they leave to the Foreign Office a very wide sphere of autonomy. And because of the fact that Luis Padilla Nervo had been Foreign Minister, his successor, Manuel Tello, was sometimes reluctant to exercise all his authority over Luis Padilla, so many of the attitudes of Luis Padilla Nervo in those conferences were more attitudes of Luis Padilla

Nervo than attitudes that reflected high-level policy decisions from Mexico. But fundamentally I think that Padilla Nervo was correct in interpreting the whole attitude of President López Mateos as one of establishing the independence of Mexican foreign policy. This is a personal view. I accept that I may be unfair to President López Mateos and to Secretary Tello, because as Ambassador to the U.S. I did not participate in formulating or executing Mexican policies on disarmament.

O'BRIEN: May we, Mr. Minister, for just a moment discuss the way that you carried on your office as Ambassador in Washington, and some of the people that you had to deal with, Secretary Rusk for example?

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CARRILLO: Yes. Well, the way I carried my Embassy, I feel that it wasn't different from the way that all the embassies are carried. I mean, I tried to give it some Mexican flavor, but that has nothing to do with the question. Secretary Rusk, I knew him from the very beginning to the very end of his administration. I think that the last dinner that he attended as Secretary of State was the one that I gave in his honor in January of 1969 when I went to Washington to present a statue of Benito Juárez. We were very good friends.

I knew, as most ambassadors knew, because this was not a secret in Washington, that in many ways President Kennedy was his own Secretary of State; that the White House was very powerful; in other words, that during the Kennedy Administration Secretary Rusk was not as important as he became under President Johnson. I don't know if, as Senator Robert Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy] said in an interview in the paper, President Kennedy was prepared to drop Secretary Rusk if he was reelected. That I don't know. It is obvious that at least Secretary Rusk was aware that among many ambassadors the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, was considered as a very powerful voice in foreign policy; that also the assistant who was the predecessor of Rostow when President Kennedy was there, the former dean of Harvard...

O'BRIEN: McGeorge Bundy?

CARRILLO: McGeorge Bundy, that he was also very powerful. Well, it was, in fact, somewhat difficult for us, because we knew that there was not one State Department but two State Departments. For example, this case of the salinity. I knew that I had to talk with the people in the State Department, but that I had also to talk with the people in the White House. And in the White House there was an equivalent of an Assistant Secretary for Latin America.

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But Secretary Rusk—I think that we were in a special position with him because he was a former president of the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation since more than twenty years has been very active in Mexico in developing new seeds, especially

in wheat, so Rusk knew a lot about Mexico. I really think that no Secretary of State had known as much about Mexico as Rusk knew. And except on one occasion that I noticed that his attitude was very cool—it was when I went to see him to tell him that Mexico offered, jointly with other countries, its good offices regarding the Cuban question. Well, it was a very inadequate moment for that. That was the only case in which his reaction was very cool, and he said, “Well, it’s for us a very important problem, and we don’t think that at this moment we are interested in anything of that kind.” Always in the proper manner, but a very cool manner. That was an interview that didn’t last more than five or six minutes.

Except for that case, he was always kind, he was always warm. Naturally that my experiences correspond to the period before the Vietnam War, before the Vietnam War became as difficult as it was after 1964, so I don’t know what my experiences might be if I had been Ambassador in 1965, 1966, 1967. But in the period that I saw him, I have to say that he was always kind, always interested.

Naturally, as it happened before and as it happened after that, the problems of Latin America very rarely reached the Secretary of State personally, I think. They are dealt more on the level of the Assistant Secretary for Latin America, except that during the Johnson Administration—but I don’t have to speak about that—because of the special interest of Johnson in Mexico, then the situation changed. But under Kennedy, even if he was very, very kind, especially after his visit to Mexico, the solutions of our problems very rarely were personal solutions of Dean Rusk. But he was always prepared to see me; I had never any difficulty at all in seeing him when I wanted to see him. And he was warm, and he was interested in Mexico.

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O’BRIEN: Well, in closing, what is your favorite remembrance, Mr. Minister, of your tenure as Ambassador?

CARRILLO: Well, really I have very many good memories. I think that it was one of the happiest periods in my life. And I have such good friends that it’s difficult for me to say, well...But restricting myself to the period of President Kennedy’s tenure, perhaps I may mention the trip of Kennedy to Mexico that was such a great success. And I have also...

Well, there is one moment—two moments—that, now that you ask me the question, I want to mention. One is when President Kennedy was very hurt with us, and I knew that the Treasury and other agencies were acting very slowly and very coolly interpreting the hurt feelings of President Kennedy. Then I called on Vice President Lyndon Johnson. He went to the White House. He came back and told me, “Yes, Ambassador, the President is hurt with you, with Mexico, but I have talked with him and is convinced, and you may be sure that things will change.” That’s when the stabilization agreement was renewed. I mean, the intervention of President Johnson in that moment, that was something that I can always remember.

The second one was a very human reaction from the then Secretary of Labor, Goldberg [Arthur J. Goldberg]. It was regarding the problem of the “green cards,” the workers that lived in Mexican cities—they had their homes on the Mexican side—and they

crossed the border every day to work on the American side. Well, the labor unions opposed this then and they oppose it now, but they got a decision from a Court in Washington, and the Labor Department was ready to declare that in fifteen days, he said, this situation had to stop. Then I was ill with high fever. I was called from this office. I called on Secretary Goldberg and I said, "Mr. Secretary, I don't want to go into the substance of the problem. I just want to tell you that this situation has been developing for thirty years, and they now want to stop it in fifteen days. Do you think that that is fair?" And he said, "No, that is completely unfair." He made a decision overruling his assistant and maintaining the situation. And

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then we presented the case before the courts and we got a favorable decision. But the way in which Secretary Goldberg reacted on this problem of our workers, that's another memory that I have.

And on a personal basis, perhaps, the way in which the Health National Institutes of Washington took care of the health of my family and myself without paying one cent either for services or for medicines, I mean, that's something that I remember. In general I can tell you this: I didn't have any disagreeable moment in Washington. All my recollections are good recollections.

O'BRIEN: Well, thank you, Mr. Minister, for a most informative and valuable interview.

CARRILLO: Naturally....There's only one thing that I want to say: I don't know if my opinions are representative of the average opinions of the Mexican people, but they are my sincere opinions. And I thank you very much for your interest in listening to me.

O'BRIEN: Thank you very much. The Kennedy Library appreciates it, and I think that people that are going to write about the U.S. and Mexico in future years are going to find this a very valuable interview.

CARRILLO: Thank you very much, and I welcome it.

O'BRIEN: Thank you again.

CARRILLO: Here is the paper.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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JOHN F. KENNEDY IN MEXICO CITY
June 29-30, 1962

by

Antonio Carrillo Flores

Translated by George S. Ulibarri

1. Report by the Ambassador of Mexico in Washington, Antonio Carrillo Flores, concerning the conversations that took place between President Adolfo López Mateos and the President of the United States John F. Kennedy, in the City of Mexico, on June 29-30, 1962.

2. There were three formal meetings (conversations):

The first meeting was held in the office of Los Pinos, on the 29th, between the hours of 12:50 and 13:30, approximately.

The second was in the presidential office in the Palacio Nacional, on the afternoon of the same day, the 29th, between the hours of 16:20 and 17:45, approximately.

The third was held on Saturday, June 30, in the presidential office of Los Pinos, after signing the loan for agricultural purposes granted in the program of the Alliance for Progress, between 11:15 and 12:15, approximately.

3. Persons present.

There were, in addition to the two Chiefs of State, the Secretary of Foreign Relations Manuel Tello, the Secretary of State for Latin America Edwin M. Martin, the Ambassador of the United States in Mexico Thomas Mann, and the undersigned. The third meeting mentioned above, was also attended by the Majority Leader, Senator Mike Mansfield.

4. Subjects discussed at the first meeting.

a) - President Kennedy expressed satisfaction for the popular reception of which he had just been the object. He said that as a politician he knew that this kind of reception required some work in organizing it, for which he wanted to congratulate the Mexican Government and to make known his appreciation.

b) - Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. - President Kennedy congratulated the President of Mexico for the objective spirit with which the Mexican delegation has participated in the Disarmament Conference. He commented that the Geneva meeting placed the United States as well as the Soviet Union in a position of having make to/known their respective viewpoints, before the world, which has stimulated both parties despite the fact that no progress has been made up to that time. Of course, he believes that the United States has submitted a much more complete and constructive plan than ever before.

President López Mateos stated, as he has on other occasions, that Mexico at the Disarmament Conference has no interest other than to collaborate with eagerness and good faith in order that formulas may be found that will put a stop to the armament race.

c) Secretary Tello suggested that while the two Presidents are holding their conversations, it would be advisable to have the Secretaries of the Treasury and Public Credit and of the National Patrimony confer with Mr. Harold F. Linder, Chairman of the Export-Import Bank in order to discuss concrete issues that the above mentioned Secretaries were interested in.

President Kennedy agreed to this suggestion and indicated that he wished that such a meeting also be attended by Ambassador Teodoro Moscoso.

d) The economic situation of the United States was discussed, and incidentally but in briefer terms, that of Canada and of Mexico.

President Kennedy said that in contradiction to the general impression, the problem that most worries him is not the aggressiveness of United States business men and their opposition to the American Government, but on the contrary, the fact that the business community seemingly does not produce men like those up to the time of the first Roosevelt who managed the private sector of the United States economy. Business men now, he added, since they do not understand the "facts of political life" become extremely fearful when the Government has to make decisions demanded by the realities of political life. And the bad thing about it,

he concluded, is that their fear has repercussions on the level of investments and the decrease of this level in turn produces innumerable problems not only for the United States for its neighbors as well. Canada, for example, "gets pneumonia when we sneeze".

President López Mateos commented that the Mexican economy is also affected just like that of Canada or perhaps even more with decreased activity in the United States and that we are also confronted with the consequences of fear, excessive and unjustified many times, on the part of business men because of social actions taken by the government, actions that are required by the times in which we live.

e) The Alliance for Progress.- The conversation then shifted to the Alliance for Progress. President Kennedy said that in his judgment one of the greatest difficulties encountered so far was that as soon as mention is made of the need to introduce agrarian and fiscal reforms into Latin America, business men from the United States who have investments in Latin America, think about abandoning the countries in that region although the United States does not want them to leave Latin America but rather that they remain there. He said, "we are not interested in promoting North American investments in the countries of the European economic community, for they do not need our capital, and are strongly

competing with us; nevertheless, it is there that United States business men want to go because of the prospects of greater benefits".

President López Mateos said with respect to the Alliance for Progress, that Mexico has declared that this program constitutes a great hope for Latin America and that it is, in his judgment, the way to bring about the indispensable social reforms that will combine economic progress with social justice and democracy.

5. Subjects discussed in the conversations held Friday afternoon.

a) Salinity of the waters of the Colorado River. -

President Kennedy said that even though the Treaty of 1944 does not explicitly mention the quality of the water, he recognizes that the delivery to Mexico of water having a high and harmful salt content, "undoubtedly constitutes a violation of the spirit of the Treaty". He added that until very recently, he was not aware of the importance this problem had for Mexico, but now that it had come to his knowledge, he could assure President López Mateos that in the future he would see to it that the kind of situation such as existed last winter would not be repeated again.

President López Mateos explained that this case was very important for Mexico because the land in the Valley of Mexicali constituted more than 10% of the entire irrigated land in the nation, providing livelihood for hundreds of thousands of persons while the Wellton-Mohawk is of interest only to a small number of farmers in the United States.

President Kennedy accepted this fact and said that actually the Wellton-Mohawk system "should not have been constructed", but that unfortunately it is already a reality that cannot be ignored. He added that it was his understanding that with the measures already adopted, specially the additional volume of water flowing next winter down the river bed of the Colorado River aiding the process of dissolving, the problem of salinity would not come up - with the characteristics it did in the past year - before October of 1963, and that in the meantime this provided the opportunity needed to find a final solution. He said that Senator Carl Hayden of Arizona, who is also Chairman of the Appropriations Committee in the Senate, is maintaining an irreconcilable position on this problem, based largely on the fact that he is engaged in a political campaign for his re-election in November, but that he feels that once the campaign is over it will be possible to obtain the Senator's collaboration for a final solution. He concluded by saying that he does not believe that he could discuss this problem any more, for he was not in a position to make a specific

commitment in Mexico City before getting additional information from the Department of the Interior concerning what concrete steps must be taken in American territory, and also he did not know if he could get the approval of the Congress of the United States for the execution of such steps; but he categorically said to the President of Mexico that he would continue personally to occupy himself with this problem and that a beneficent solution for both countries would be found in time, that is, before October of 1963.

The President of Mexico commented that one should not talk about "a beneficent solution for both countries", because the United States was not suffering the harmful effects of the excessive salinity of the waters flowing from Wellton-Mohawk; that the only one suffering harmful effects was Mexico.

President Kennedy agreed with this point of view and it was agreed that the communique should not refer to the solution as being favorable to both countries.

It was agreed to discuss this subject during the meeting to be held next day.

b) Cuba. - President Kennedy said that it would be desirable to know the opinion of President López Mateos on how he thinks the Cuban situation will develop in the future. Concretely he would like

to know, he said, if information available to the Government of Mexico tends to indicate whether Cuba might in the future pursue a policy of greater independence with respect to the Soviet Union.

President López Mateos then gave an ample explanation concerning the policy that Mexico has followed in relation to the Cuban Revolution. He repeated that this revolution had aroused great sympathy among the Mexican people because its basic aspirations and those of the Mexican Revolution coincided, but that this sympathy began to diminish when the growing subordination of the Cuban Government by the Soviet Union became obvious. "That now, he does not believe that it is feasible for Prime Minister Castro to pursue a policy independent of the Soviet Union or of the Communist Party". He added that he has information that discontent among the people of Cuba is growing more and more, but that he does not believe that this discontent is such as to force the Government of Cuba to change its policy.

President Kennedy inquired if there was anything that the countries of this Hemisphere could do in order to prevent in other areas, especially the Caribbean area, the political situation from continuing to deteriorate, since he was worried about the situation that some of those countries find themselves in, among those mentioned specifically were Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, and

even Colombia, where according to what the President-elect said in Washington a few days ago, one fourth of the territory is under the control of guerrillas trained and armed in Cuba. He added that there is an impression, specially after the Conference of Punta del Este that the United States and Mexico are in complete disagreement with regard to Cuba and that he wanted President López/^{Mateos}to know that his wish "would be that in the future the policy of the United States on Cuba be in harmony with the Mexican policy making it possible for the two countries/^{to}march forward in unison".

Secretary Tello joined in the discussion in order to explain that concerning the Conference of Punta del Este, which had been held after Peru first presented a complaint for what it termed "political aggression", and then Colombia invoked the Rio Treaty of Mutual Assistance, not to seek the application of the Treaty's provisions but rather to seek modifications that would cover situations not foreseen by the Treaty, neither of which could be agreeable to Mexico. That at this same Conference it was Mexico that came up with the formula accepted by everyone, with the exception of Cuba; formula which as is known, consisted of declaring that the adoption of a Marxist-Leninist political philosophy by a country was incompatible with the Inter-American system.

That the discrepancy arose because the majority insisted on obtaining the immediate exclusion of Cuba from the Organization of American States, notwithstanding the fact that the Charter that governs this Organization does not contemplate the possibility of exclusion.

That it was suggested to Secretary Rusk to hold a conference before attempting to vote on the exclusion of Cuba, for the purpose of modifying the Charter of the Organization of American States in a way that would include provisions for the case in question; a modification that once it was ratified by the majority, would lead to the exclusion of Cuba in accordance with the Charter and not in violation of it. Secretary Rusk did not accept this suggestion thinking that this procedure would take too long, but had it been approved, it is probably that the Charter would already have been modified making it possible to proceed legally.

President Kennedy still continuing the discussion of this matter and commenting "that it was not that the United States was mesmerized by the Cuban affair", asked the President of Mexico if he did not believe that there was a way in which the countries of the Hemisphere could "isolate Cuba politically" preventing her from sending agents that promote agitation in Latin America, specially among young people.

President López Mateos replied that young people in Latin America by nature have a revolutionary spirit, and that he did not see how any kind of political isolation would put an end to this spirit. That in his judgment two things could be done; the first of an educational nature, giving better direction to young people within the framework of the institutions and ideals of democracy, and secondly and more concrete by giving people an opportunity work because it is unemployment and the misery generated by it that produces the climate for agitation and even for guerrillas.

The undersigned then pointed out that the history of Mexico has demonstrated that in certain regions of the national territory, particularly in some of the remote ones in Huastecas, there were for many years guerrillas that disappeared with the introduction of means of communications, with the development of agriculture, and in general by providing people with an opportunity to work.

President Kennedy stated that he did not deny that the final solution lay, as indicated by President López Mateos, in carrying out the promises of the program of the Alliance for Progress, but that on the one hand this required at least a decade to see the results of those efforts, and on the other hand it was very doubtful if one could depend on getting the material resources needed to intensify those effort in the Hemisphere to the necessary level, and

that he was very fearful that continued agitation would perhaps lead in some Latin American countries to the overthrow of democratic institutions by totalitarian ones.

President López Mateos replied that although it is true that some projects would require much time to bear fruit, if one began by providing the people with employment this would be enough to deter violence, even before the final fruits were observable. In like manner he said, it takes many years for a dam to start irrigating the fields that will produce larger crops but from the moment that men start to building dams, they are kept busy doing something constructive and have no time to agitate.

Secretary Tello returning to the subject of isolation, commented that the countries mentioned by President Kennedy as among those going through serious political difficulties, such as Venezuela for example, which no longer maintains diplomatic relations with Cuba, demonstrate that the rupture of relations with Cuba does not improve and may even deteriorate the political situation in some areas in Latin America. With respect to Colombia, Secretary Tello pointed out that the unfortunate difficulties that exist in that country antedate Prime Minister Castro's establishment of the Cuban regime. Moreover he said, the Cuban government has committed errors - like the recent ones concerning the rupture with Ecuador - and continues

committing them, a fact which could possibly lead to an isolation brought ^{on} by itself, thereby making unnecessary a common action directed at achieving this end.

President López Mateos concluded his remarks on the Cuban question by saying that some time ago, through the undersigned Ambassador he informed the Government of the United States that the existence of a regime such as the present one in Cuba presented a greater problem for Mexico than it did for the United States due to the poverty of our country and therefore a more favorable climate for discontent and agitation than can be generated in the United States. That consequently it is not because of lack of interest that Mexico has resisted in collaborating in a joint policy of isolation but rather because it is convinced that such a policy could be counter-productive; moreover, it believes that in accordance with the principles that govern the Inter-American system, it is the responsibility of individual countries to take measures that will prevent foreign agents from coming to agitate within its territory. Concerning Mexico, it can be stated that Castro has ceased to be a popular figure.

President Kennedy said then that he "was not worried about Communism in the United States, and neither was he worried about Communism winning in Mexico"; that as he had said before, his

concern was for other areas of Latin America, specially the Caribbean, and for this reason was greatly interested in knowing if according to the opinion of the President of Mexico it was not possible to do something with regard to this problem; that he had listened with great interest to the frank remarks regarding the viewpoint of the former and that in the future he planned to continue communicating with President López Mateos about this problem, repeating that "he did not wish to pursue a unilateral policy with respect to Cuba", and that he wanted to assure the President of Mexico "that direct action against Cuba such as that in which the United States participated on April of last year would not be repeated again".

Finally it was agreed that the conversations about Cuba would remain confidential and that no reference would be made about it in the joint statement. The statement would mention in very general terms that both countries agreed on the need to strengthen and defend the democratic principles in the Hemisphere.

6. Subjects discussed at the final session on Saturday June 30.

a) The Colorado River. The paragraph in the joint statement corresponding to this project was examined. The final text was agreed upon.

President López Mateos said that by October of 1963, the next Presidential campaign in Mexico will probably have started and that

it would most undesirable, under those circumstances, if this problem should again come up, and for this reason he requested that President Kennedy give him assurances that if for any reason this issue remained unresolved by October of 1963, Mexico would again receive additional supply of water so that the salinity would not reach harmful levels.

President Kennedy emphatically repeated what he had said the previous day, namely: "that he assured the President of Mexico that now that he was aware of this matter, he would see to it that Mexico would not receive water with the salinity that it had last winter, that he could not say what procedures would be followed nor what operations would have to be executed, because for these answers he had to talk in Washington with the Secretary of the Interior and with Senator Hayden, but that whatever techniques or procedures were followed, Mexico could count on the fact that the problem would be resolved in a satisfactory manner.

President López Mateos was thankful for these statements.

b) Chamizal. - President Kennedy said that being a politician from Massachusetts he had not known of this problem until a very recent date, that now that he knew the basic facts, "he had no doubt concerning the recognition by the United States of the legitimacy of

the award of 1911". He asked Assistant Secretary Martin and Ambassador Mann if in their judgment there had been a valid reason for the United States denying recognition, and both answered negatively. Ambassador Mann specifically commented that it had been an error not to recognize since 1911 the legitimacy of the award.

President Kennedy then asked what fundamental interest Mexico had in this matter, whether it was economic, political or emotional.

President López Mateos said, "We are not real estate brokers; our interest is that justice be meted out to the Mexican people. The Mexican people have forgiven but not forgotten the loss of their territory in 1848 because it was the result of a war in which we were defeated. On the other hand, it cannot forgive or forget that the United States refuses to hand over to us such a small parcel of land after we obtained a favorable judgment". The undersigned Ambassador added that resistance on the part of the United States to recognize and carry out the award of 1911 had created a situation that made it politically impossible for Mexico to submit any controversy with the United States to international arbitration, and that this situation was undoubtedly bad for both countries, but particularly for the United States who would always

appear before the world as refusing to carry out a judgment affecting a small neighboring country.

"It is true", commented President Kennedy, "how can we pretend to solve complex problems such as that of Berlin if we are not capable of settling with friends such a small issue as that of Chamizal?" Immediately he added that according to information he had, the only difficulty still pending arose from the fact that so many years had transpired since the award was made, that conditions have been created for which no one can be blamed, and which if not taken into account could result in great losses to the city of El Paso; for example, the destruction of a schoolhouse or of part of a drainage system. "Would it be possible", he asked, "after the United States recognition of the award, for Mexico, in a spontaneous act of courtesy to agree that the new line for channeling the river bed, take such special situations into account, in order not to cause the city of El Paso unnecessary losses".

President López Mateos answered that since the matter was being presented in this manner, his reply was in the affirmative and it was then agreed that the text of the joint statement be amended according to the suggestion of Secretary Tello by substituting the word "equitable solution" in place of "complete solution" of the problem.

The joint statement did not mention the award of June 1911, at the request of President Kennedy who said he wanted, upon his return to Washington, "to talk with politicians from Texas who are most difficult". Instead, and again at the suggestion of Secretary Tello, the joint statement said that the history of the land should be taken into account in arriving at a solution. The phrase "without prejudice to their respective legal positions" was included at the suggestion of Assistant Secretary Martin and Ambassador Mann in order that it would not appear to the public that President Kennedy had deviated from the policy of the United States Government before the new boundary was agreed on. At any rate the undersigned, for the record would like to verify that, as has been noted before, the President of the United States categorically affirmed that his country should recognize the validity of the award of 1911.

c) Fishing. - President Kennedy said that he knew that conversations had taken place for many years between Mexico and the United States concerning exclusive fishing rights of our country in areas larger than the United States Government was willing to recognize and that he wanted to inform President López Mateos of his readiness to negotiate this problem with a view of arriving at a satisfactory understanding.

President López Mateos was thankful for this statement and

said that it would be studied by the Secretary of Foreign Relations. He added that he knew of the the difficulties that the Government of the United States had in establishing a precedent concerning the the extent (distance) of territorial waters that would affect its strategic interests, although the Mexican case is peculiar in many ways; he requested the undersigned to make a brief explanation on this particular matter. The undersigned placed special emphasis on the Supreme Court decision of May 31, 1960, which decided a suit in favor of Texas embracing the interpretation that Mexico has always given the Treaty of Guadalupe^o setting the boundary line between Mexico and the United States three marine leagues to the east of the mouth of the Rio Grande.

It was made clear - and was so stated by President López Mateos - that if and when negotiations are initiated, they should cover fishing rights which naturally does not mean that Mexico abandons its position on territorial waters but rather that it is a simple recognition of the fact that it is not now possible to reach an agreement with the United States on this matter.

d) President Kennedy in a very cordial manner said that up to that time the discussion had dealt with issues in which the United States had proceeded incorrectly, and that he wanted to know if there was something in which Mexico had also acted wrong.

Secretary Tello said there was one he wanted to mention: the Pious Fund case of California. Mexico was ordered, according to the award, to pay an annual sum to the Catholic Church of the State of California and those payments were made up to the time that the United States refused to recognize the Chamizal award, when Mexico discontinued its payments to the Pious Fund. He said that once the Chamizal affair was resolved, Mexico should start making its payments on the Pious Fund award.

e) Agrarian claims. - President López Mateos said that he had knowledge of two issues that were of interest to President Kennedy, who because of their sensitive nature had not mentioned them, for which he was very appreciative. The first concerns agrarian claims. About these, he said he would repeat what Secretary Tello had already told Ambassador ~~Mann~~: that Mexico was willing to make just and adequate compensation for property of United States citizens that had been affected by Mexcian agrarian laws.

f) Sábalo. - The second was the Sábalo matter. Concerning this, President López Mateos said that if examined strictly from a legal point of view, it was not possible for Mexico to accept any responsibility, because the decisions of the Supreme Court of Justice absolved our country; however, he told President Kennedy an attempt would be made to meet the just demands of this claim in a practical manner without injuring the respect that is due Mexican courts.

President Kennedy expressed his appreciation at the statement made by President López Mateos as well as those listed under paragraphs c) and d).

g) The Export-Import Bank. - The undersigned at the request of President López Mateos informed President Kennedy of our country's wish to use the second loan for 90 million dollars authorized in July 1961 by the Export-Import Bank before having to utilize the resource of the International Monetary Fund, for the reasons given to the Chairman of that Institution, Mr. Harold F. Linder, during the trip from Washington to Mexico on the previous day.

President Kennedy indicated that on the following day, on the return trip to Washington, he would have Mr. Linder, in the presence of the undersigned Ambassador talk about this point, for in accordance with the joint statement, the United States is willing to collaborate concerning a program for the financial stability of Mexico.

h) Fund for Social Progress held in trust by the Inter-American Development Bank. - Again at the request of President López Mateos, the undersigned Ambassador said that the President of the Inter-American Bank, Mr. Felipe Herrera, had requested that the Government of Mexico endeavor during these conversations with President Kennedy to get a statement from him about the proposal that the Fund

continue receiving resources which would permit it to pursue its operations in Latin America. Assistant Secretary Martin intervened in order to state that this problem was being discussed in Washington with Secretary Dillon. That according to estimates of the Government of the United States there were enough resources on hand to operate for at least two more years. That it is expected to arrive at a decision before the meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council which will take place next September in Mexico. That the approval by Congress of the law on financial assistance to foreign countries is pending and that it would not be advisable for the United States Government now to make what might appear to be additional commitments without the knowledge of the Legislative Branch of the United States, but that we could rely on the fact that it is the intention of the United States that this Fund will not lack needed resources, and he repeated that the American Government hoped to be able to make a more specific statement in September.

1) The Economic Conference in Cairo. - President Kennedy, at the suggestion of Assistant Secretary Martin who seemingly handed him a note on this particular matter, mentioned the Economic Conference in Cairo which will take place in the near future and he indicated to President López Mateos that it was not the Conference

itself but the fact that the time it was being convened coincided with congressional debates on legislation for foreign aid, that worried him, because Cuba who will participate in this conference may attack the Alliance for Progress and those attacks in turn would make the approval of funds for Ibero-America in the Senate and in the House of Representatives more difficult.

President López Mateos answered that he had already established the policy of Mexico with regard to the Alliance for Progress and that it was obvious that no official in his government would pursue a different line or express different ideas.

Secretary Tello intervened to emphasize the following points:

i) That Mexico would be represented at the Conference by a delegate appointed by the Bank of Mexico;

ii) That Mexico was attending the Conference because it was convened in pursuance of a resolution of the Assembly of the United Nations, and without recognizing that the Cairo Conference had any relation whatever to the Belgrade meeting of uncommitted nations, and consequently without accepting the Government of the UAR as being the one who convoked it;

iii) That the Mexican delegate had instructions to support and defend the program of the Alliance for Progress in case of attack by any of the participants; and

iv) That the Mexican delegate has also been instructed to support and defend the Latin American free trade zone in case it is attacked, a possibility about which we have some information.

j) "In case of conflict Mexico will give its support to the United States". President López Mateos said that in conclusion he wanted to make a solemn statement which the undersigned Ambassador reproduces almost verbatim: "The policy that Mexico has had to pursue with regard to Cuba, because of respect for principles that are for us of 'capital' significance, has created doubt in some sectors of United States public opinion about the direction we would follow in case of a world conflict. I want to avail myself of this opportunity to declare in a most solemn manner that if such a conflict should ever take place, Mexico, true to its tradition and with its 35 million inhabitants, would be ready to give its support to our northern neighbors".

President Kennedy, obviously moved, was thankful for this statement and said: "The United States in turn would protect the flank of Mexico".

The conversations came to an end in the spirit of absolute cordiality and frankness that they had at all times.

I have prepared and signed this report in the city of Washington, on July 2, 1962.

1. Relato que hace el Embajador de México en Washington, Antonio Carrillo Flores, de las conversaciones que tuvieron lugar entre el Presidente Adolfo López Mateos y el Presidente de Estados Unidos John F. Kennedy, en la ciudad de México los días 29 y 30 de junio de 1962.

2. Hubo tres conversaciones formales:

La primera en el despacho de Los Pinos, el día 29, entre las 12.50 y las 13.30, aproximadamente.

La segunda en el despacho presidencial del Palacio Nacional, en la tarde del mismo día 29, entre las 16.20 y las 17.45, aproximadamente; y

La tercera el sábado 30, en el despacho presidencial de Los Pinos, después de la firma del crédito para fines agrícolas concedido dentro del programa de la Alianza para el Progreso, entre las 11.15 y las 12.15, aproximadamente.

3. Personas presentes:

Además de los dos Jefes de Estado, estuvieron el Secretario de Relaciones Manuel Tello, el Secretario de Estado para América Latina Edwin M. Martin, el Embajador de Estados Unidos en México Thomas Mann y el suscrito. A la tercera de las juntas arriba enumeradas concurre también el jefe de la mayoría, Senador Mike Mansfield.

...

4. Temas abordados en la primera junta:

a) El Presidente Kennedy expresó su satisfacción por la recepción popular de que acababa de ser objeto. Dijo que como político sabe que este tipo de manifestaciones supone algún trabajo de organización por el cual quería felicitar al Gobierno de México y presentar su agradecimiento.

b) Conferencia sobre el desarme en Ginebra. - El Presidente Kennedy congratuló al Presidente de México por el espíritu objetivo con que la Delegación Mexicana ha participado en la conferencia del desarme. Comentó que la reunión de Ginebra ha puesto tanto a los Estados Unidos como a la Unión Soviética en la posición de presentar sus respectivos puntos de vista ante todo el mundo, lo cual ha sido estimulante para ambos, a pesar de que no se haya logrado progresar hasta hoy. Desde luego cree que Estados Unidos ha sometido un plan mucho más completo y constructivo que nunca antes.

El Presidente López Mateos comentó que, como lo ha dicho en diversas ocasiones, México en la conferencia del desarme no persigue otro interés que el de colaborar con empeño y buena fe a que se encuentren fórmulas que permitan detener la carrera armamentista.

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c) El Secretario Tello sugirió que sería conveniente que al mismo tiempo que los dos Presidentes conversan, hubiera una conferencia entre los Secretarios de Hacienda y Crédito Público y del Patrimonio Nacional con el señor Harold F. Linder, Presidente del Banco de Exportaciones e Importaciones, para tratar algunos asuntos concretos que interesan a los Ministros citados.

El Presidente Kennedy estuvo de acuerdo con la sugestión e indicó que desearía que a esa conferencia asistiera también el Embajador Teodoro Moscoso.

d) Se comentó la situación económica de Estados Unidos e incidentalmente, si bien en forma breve, la de Canadá y la de México.

El Presidente Kennedy dijo que contra lo que es una impresión general, el problema que más le preocupa no es la agresividad de los hombres de negocios de los Estados Unidos y su oposición al Gobierno Americano sino al contrario, el hecho de que la comunidad de hombres de negocios al parecer ya no produce hombres como los que hasta la época del primer Roosevelt dirigieron el sector privado de la economía norteamericana. Ahora los hombres de negocios, agregó, como que no entienden a veces "los hechos de la vida política" (the facts of political life) y se atemorizan exageradamente cuando el Gobierno tiene que tomar decisiones a que lo obligan esas realidades de la vida política. Y

. . .

lo malo, concluyó, es que su temor repercute en las inversiones y la caída de éstas a su vez es causa de innúmeros problemas no solamente para Estados Unidos sino para sus vecinos. Canadá, por ejemplo, "sufre pulmonía cuando nosotros estornudamos".

El Presidente López Mateos comentó que también la economía mexicana se ve afectada, como la del Canadá, o tal vez más, cuando cae la actividad en Estados Unidos y que nosotros confrontamos igualmente las consecuencias de los temores, muchas veces excesivos e injustificados, de los hombres de negocios por la acción social del gobierno, que demandan los tiempos que estamos viviendo.

e) Alianza para el Progreso. La conversación viró después hacia la Alianza para el Progreso. Comento el Presidente Kennedy que a su juicio una de las dificultades mayores con las que se tropieza, es que apenas se habla de que es necesario introducir en la América Latina reformas en materia agraria o en materia fiscal, los hombres de negocios norteamericanos que tienen inversiones en Latinoamérica, piensan en abandonar los países de la región siendo así que Estados Unidos no desea que salgan de la América Latina, sino que se queden en ella. "Nosotros, dijo, no tenemos ningún interés en fomentar las inversiones norteamericanas en los países de la comunidad económica europea, que no necesitan ya de nuestro capital y que compiten tan dura

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mente con nosotros; sin embargo es ahí donde quieren ir los hombres de negocios de Estados Unidos por las perspectivas que advierten de mayores utilidades".

El Presidente López Mateos, en relación con la Alianza para el Progreso, dijo que México ha declarado que ese programa constituye una gran esperanza para la América Latina y que es, a su juicio, el camino para hacer posibles las reformas sociales indispensables que conjuguen el progreso económico con la justicia social y con la democracia.

5. Temas abordados en la conversación del viernes por la tarde.

a) Salinidad de las aguas del Río Colorado. - El Presidente Kennedy dijo que aún cuando el Tratado de 1944 no habla expresamente de la calidad de las aguas, él reconoce que la entrega a México de aguas cuyo alto contenido salino las hace nocivas, "constituyen indudablemente una violación al espíritu del Tratado". Agregó que hasta hace poco tiempo él no estaba enterado de la importancia que revestía el problema para México, pero que ahora que ha llegado a su conocimiento, podía asegurar al Presidente López Mateos que de aquí en adelante él cuidaría de que no volviera a repetirse la situación que se creó en el último invierno.

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El Presidente López Mateos expresó que este caso es para México muy importante, pues las tierras del Valle de Mexicali constituyen más del 10% del total de las tierras irrigadas en el país; con el medio de trabajo que sustenta la vida de cientos de miles de personas, en tanto que el sistema de Wellton-Mohawk solamente interesa a un número pequeño de granjeros de Estados Unidos.

El Presidente Kennedy aceptó este hecho y dijo: que efectivamente el sistema de Wellton-Mohawk "no debía haberse construido", pero que desgraciadamente es ya una realidad que no puede ser ignorada. Agregó que entendía que con las medidas que ya se han adoptado, especialmente con el envío el próximo invierno de un volumen adicional de agua por el cauce del Río Colorado para el desazolve del mismo, el problema de la salinidad no se presentará -con las características que tuvo el año pasado- antes de octubre de 1963 y que eso da oportunidad para que mientras tanto se encuentre una solución definitiva. Dijo que el senador Carl Hayden, por Arizona, que es también Presidente de la Comisión de Presupuestos del Senado, mantiene sobre este problema una posición intransigente, derivada, en gran parte, de que está en campaña política para su reelección en noviembre, pero que confía en que una vez que pase esa campaña podrá obtener la colaboración del Senador para la solución definitiva. Concluyó diciendo que él no cree

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que podría llegar más lejos, pues no estaba en aptitud de tomar en la ciudad de México un compromiso más específico, antes de recibir información adicional del Departamento del Interior acerca de cuáles obras concretas deberán ejecutarse en territorio americano y sin saber tampoco si para la ejecución de esas obras podría contar con la aprobación del Congreso de Estados Unidos; pero que él ofrecía categóricamente al Presidente de México que seguiría ocupándose personalmente de este problema y que se encontraría una solución benéfica para ambos países con oportunidad, esto es, antes de octubre de 1963.

El Presidente de México comentó que no debería hablarse de "una solución benéfica para los dos países", ya que Estados Unidos no está sufriendo ningún perjuicio con la salinidad excesiva de las aguas que vienen de Wellton-Mohawk; que el único que sufre perjuicios es México.

El Presidente Kennedy estuvo de acuerdo con este punto de vista y se convino en que el comunicado no haría referencia a que la solución fuera favorable a los dos países.

Se quedó en volver a abordar el tema en la junta del día siguiente.

b) Cuba .- El Presidente Kennedy dijo que deseaba conocer el punto de vista del Presidente López Mateos acerca de cómo cree esto

que se desenvolverá la situación cubana en el futuro. Concretamente desearía saber, dijo, si las informaciones de que dispone el Gobierno de México son en el sentido de que pueda Cuba seguir en adelante una política de mayor independencia con respecto a la Unión Soviética.

El Presidente López Mateos hizo entonces una amplia exposición sobre la política que México ha seguido en relación con la revolución cubana. Repitió que esa revolución despertó en un principio una gran simpatía en el pueblo mexicano por la coincidencia entre sus aspiraciones básicas y las de la Revolución Mexicana, pero que esa simpatía empezó a disminuir cuando se advirtió la creciente subordinación del Gobierno Cubano con respecto a la Unión Soviética. "Que ahora él no cree ya factible que el Primer Ministro Castro pueda seguir una política independiente de la Unión Soviética o del Partido Comunista". Agregó que tiene noticias de que hay cada vez un descontento mayor entre el pueblo de Cuba, pero que no piensa que ese descontento pueda ser bastante para obligar al Gobierno de Cuba a cambiar su política.

El Presidente Kennedy preguntó si había algo que los países de este Hemisferio podrían hacer para evitar que en otras partes, especialmente en el área del Caribe, continuara deteriorándose la situación política, ya que le preocupa la situación en que se encuentran algunos de esos países, entre los cuales mencionó concretamente a Haití, a la

República Dominicana, a Venezuela y aún Colombia, en donde, según le dijo hace pocos días en Washington el Presidente Electo, una cuarta parte del territorio está bajo el control de guerrillas adiestradas e inclusive armadas en Cuba". Agregó que existe la impresión, sobre todo después de la Conferencia de Punta del Este, de que Estados Unidos y México están en completo desacuerdo acerca de Cuba y que él quería manifestar al Presidente López Mateos que su deseo "sería que en adelante la política norteamericana sobre Cuba se concertara con la política mexicana para que de ser posible los dos países marcharan de acuerdo."

Intervino el Secretario Tello para explicar, en relación con la Conferencia de Punta del Este, como había sido convocada después de que Perú presentó primero una queja por lo que llamó "agresión Política" y después Colombia invocó el Tratado de Asistencia Recíproca de Río, no para buscar la aplicación de sus ^{disposiciones} textos, sino una modificación a los mismos que cubriera situaciones no previstas por el Tratado, cosa las dos con las cuales México no pudo estar conforme. Que en la Conferencia misma fue México el que dió la fórmula que obtuvo la aceptación de todos, salvo naturalmente la de Cuba; fórmula que, como se sabe, consistió en declarar que es incompatible con el sistema interamericano la adopción por un país de una filosofía política

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marxista-leninista. Que la discrepancia apareció porque la mayoría se empeñó en obtener la exclusión inmediata de Cuba de la Organización de los Estados Americanos no obstante que la Carta que rige a dicha Organización no contempla la posibilidad de esa exclusión. Fue sugirió al Secretario Rusk que antes de tratar de votar la exclusión de Cuba se convocara a una conferencia para modificar la Carta de la Organización de los Estados Americanos en forma que previera el caso; modificación que una vez ratificada por la mayoría podría llevar a la exclusión de Cuba de acuerdo con la Carta y no en contra de ella. El Secretario Rusk no aceptó la sugestión por pensar que ese procedimiento tomaría mucho tiempo, pero que si hubiera sido aprobada, probablemente ya se hubiese modificado la Carta y ya se hubiese podido proceder en forma legal.

El Presidente Kennedy, insistiendo todavía sobre el tema, aunque comentando "que no es que Estados Unidos estuviera hipnotizado ("mesmerized") por el caso cubano", preguntó al Presidente de México si no creía que hubiera una manera en que los países del Hemisferio "aislaran políticamente a Cuba", impidiendo que ésta envíe agentes que vayan a fomentar la agitación en la América Latina, especialmente entre los elementos jóvenes.

El Presidente López Mateos replicó que los jóvenes de latinoamérica son por naturaleza de espíritu revolucionario y que él no veía la manera como ningún aislamiento político pudiera acabar con ese espíritu . Que a su juicio son dos las cosas que pueden hacerse: la primera de carácter educativo, orientando mejor a la juventud dentro de las instituciones e ideales de la democracia y la segunda más concreta, dando oportunidades de trabajo a la gente, pues es la desocupación y la miseria que ella engendra las que crea el clima para la agitación y hasta para las guerrillas .

El suscrito recordó entonces que la historia mexicana demuestra que en ciertas zonas del territorio nacional, particularmente en algunas incomunicadas de las Huastecas, existieron durante muchos años guerrillas que desaparecieron con las comunicaciones, con el desarrollo de la agricultura y en general con las oportunidades de trabajo a la gente.

El Presidente Kennedy expresó que no negaba que la solución definitiva está, como lo decía el Presidente López Mateos, en cumplir las promesas del programa de la Alianza para el Progreso, pero que por una parte se requeriría cuando menos una década para ver los resultados de esos esfuerzos y por la otra es muy dudoso que se cuente con los recursos materiales para intensificar esos esfuerzos en el Hemisferio en el grado que sería necesario y que él temía mucho que mientras

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tanto la agitación siguiera, llevando tal vez al derrocamiento de las instituciones democráticas por otras de tipo totalitario en algunos países latinoamericanos.

El Presidente López Mateos replicó que aunque es cierto que algunas de las obras reclamarían mucho tiempo para fructificar, si empezaba a darse trabajo a la gente esto sería bastante para alejarla de la violencia, aún antes de que los frutos finales se advirtieran. Así, dijo, una presa puede llevar muchos años para empezar a regar tierras y a producir mayores cosechas, pero desde el momento en que los hombres comienzan a trabajar en las presas se les tiene ocupados en cosas constructivas y no tiene tiempo para agitar.

El Secretario Tello, volviendo al tema del aislamiento, comentó que los países que el Presidente Kennedy mencionó como aquellos que pasan por graves dificultades políticas, como Venezuela, por ejemplo, no mantienen ya relaciones diplomáticas con Cuba, lo cual demuestra que la ruptura de relaciones con Cuba no mejora, sino que antes a veces deteriora, la situación política en algunas áreas latinoamericanas. En cuanto al caso colombiano el Secretario Tello hizo notar que las dificultades que lamentablemente existen en ese país, son muy anteriores al establecimiento en Cuba del régimen del Primer Ministro Castro. Además dijo, el Gobierno Cubano ha cometido errores -como los que

hace poco iban a provocar la ruptura con Ecuador- y sigue cometiendo más, por lo que es posible que él mismo vaya aislándose sin necesidad de una acción común dirigida a ese fin.

El Presidente López Mateos concluyó sus comentarios sobre la cuestión cubana diciendo que a través del suscrito Embajador hace tiempo manifestó al Gobierno de Estados Unidos que la existencia en Cuba de un régimen como el actual plantea para México un problema mayor inclusive que para los Estados Unidos, dada la pobreza de nuestro país y consecuentemente un clima más propicio para el descontento y la agitación que el que pueda causar en Estados Unidos. Que no es en consecuencia por falta de interés por lo que México se ha resistido a colaborar en una política conjunta de aislamiento sino porque está convencido de que podría ser contraproducente, aparte de que piensa que, de acuerdo con los principios que rigen el sistema interamericano, es a cada país a quien toca tomar las medidas para evitar que agentes extranjeros vayan a agitar en su territorio. Por lo que hace a México, puede afirmar que Castro ha dejado de ser una figura popular.

El Presidente Kennedy dijo entonces que "él no estaba preocupado acerca del comunismo en Estados Unidos, como tampoco lo estaba acerca de que en México pudiera triunfar el comunismo"; que, como lo

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había dicho antes, su preocupación se refiere a otras partes de la América Latina, especialmente al Caribe, y por ello había venido con un interés tan grande en saber si a juicio del Presidente de México no era posible hacer nada en relación con ese problema; que había escuchado con todo interés la exposición tan franca de los puntos de vista de aquel que esperaba en el futuro seguir en comunicación sobre este tema con el Presidente López Mateos, pues repetía que "él no deseaba seguir con Cuba una política unilateral", y que quería asegurar al Presidente de México "que no volvería a repetirse una acción directa en contra de Cuba como aquella en que Estados Unidos participó en abril del año pasado".

Finalmente se convino en que la conversación sobre Cuba se mantendría en reserva y que acerca de ella no se haría referencia en la declaración conjunta. En ésta solamente se hablaría en forma muy general de la coincidencia de ambos países en la necesidad de vigorizar y defender los principios democráticos en el Hemisferio.

6. Temas tratados en la sesión final del sábado 30;

a) Río Colorado. Se examinó el párrafo correspondiente del proyecto de declaración conjunta. Se convino en el texto final que se conoce.

El Presidente López Mateos dijo que en octubre de 1963 probablemente se habrá iniciado en México la próxima campaña presidencial

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y que sería muy inconveniente, que en esas circunstancias, volviera entonces a presentarse este problema, por lo que pedía al Presidente Kennedy que le diera seguridades de que si por cualesquiera razones en octubre de 1963 no estaba resuelto este asunto definitivamente, México volvería a recibir aguas adicionales para que la salinidad no alcanzara proporciones nocivas.

El Presidente Kennedy en forma enfática repitió lo que había dicho la víspera, a saber: "que él aseguraba al Presidente de México que ahora que había tomado conocimiento del asunto, cuidaría de que México no volviera a recibir aguas con la salinidad con que llegaron en el invierno pasado, que no podía decir cuál sería el procedimiento que seguiría ni las obras que se ejecutarían, pues para eso necesitaba hablar en Washington con el Secretario del Interior y con el Senador Hayden, pero que cualquiera que fuera la forma técnica o el procedimiento, México podía contar con que el problema quedaría resuelto en forma satisfactoria".

El Presidente López Mateos agradeció estas expresiones:

b) Chamizal - El Presidente Kennedy dijo que siendo un político de Massachusetts nada había sabido acerca de este problema sino hasta fecha muy reciente, pero que ahora que conocía los hechos básicos "no tenía ninguna duda acerca de que Estados Unidos debía reco

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nocer la legitimidad del laudo de 1911". Preguntó al Secretario Auxiliar Martín y al Embajador Mann si a juicio de ellos había habido alguna razón válida para que Estados Unidos negara ese reconocimiento, y ambos contestaron negativamente. El Embajador Mann concretamente comentó que había sido un error que no se reconociera la legitimidad del laudo desde 1911.

El Presidente Kennedy inquirió entonces cuál era el interés fundamental de México en este asunto, si de carácter económico, político o emocional.

El Presidente López Mateos dijo: "No somos tratantes en bienes raíces: nuestro interés es que se haga justicia al pueblo mexicano. El pueblo mexicano no ha olvidado pero ha perdonado ya la pérdida del territorio de 1848 porque fue consecuencia de una guerra en que fuimos vencidos. En cambio no puede olvidar ni perdonar que Estados Unidos se niegue a entregarnos una porción tan pequeña de territorio después de que obtuvimos un fallo que nos fue favorable". El suscrito Embajador agregó que la resistencia de Estados Unidos a reconocer y a cumplir el laudo de 1911, había hecho que desde entonces fuese políticamente imposible para México someter ninguna controversia con Estados Unidos al arbitraje internacional y que esa era una situación indudablemente mala para ambos países, pero particularmente para Estados

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Unidos que siempre aparecería ante el mundo como negándose a cumplir un fallo con un país vecino y pequeño.

"Es cierto, comentó el Presidente Kennedy, ¿cómo vamos a pretender resolver cuestiones tan complejas como la de Berlín si no somos capaces de arreglar como amigos un caso tan pequeño como el del Chamizal?" Agregó enseguida que según sus informaciones la única dificultad pendiente viene de que con el transcurso de tantos años desde que el laudo se dictó, se han creado, sin que nadie tenga culpa en ello, situaciones que no pueden dejar de tomarse en cuenta sin gran daño para la ciudad de El Paso, tales como serían la destrucción de una escuela y de una parte del sistema de drenaje. "Sería posible, preguntó, que una vez que los Estados Unidos reconozca el laudo, México, a su vez, en forma espontánea, y como un acto de gracia, esté dispuesto a que la nueva línea que se fije para el encauzamiento del río, tome en cuenta esas situaciones creadas, para no causar daños innecesarios a la ciudad de El Paso?"

El Presidente López Mateos contestó que así planteado el asunto, su respuesta era en sentido afirmativo y se convino entonces en el texto de la declaración que se conoce, en el que, a sugestión del Secretario Tello, se substituyeron las palabras "solución equitativa" por "solución completa" del problema.

No se hizo mención en la declaración conjunta al laudo de junio de 1911, a petición del Presidente Kennedy quien dijo que deseaba, a su regreso a Washington, "conversar con los políticos texanos que son muy difíciles". En su lugar, a sugestión también del Secretario Tello, la declaración habla de que la solución tomará en cuenta toda la historia de esos terrenos. La frase "sin perjuicio de sus respectivas posiciones legales" se incluyó a moción del Secretario Auxiliar Martin y del Embajador Mann, a fin de que no aparezca públicamente que el Presidente Kennedy varió la política del Gobierno Norteamericano antes de que se haya convenido en el trazo de la nueva línea. De todos modos, el suscrito hace constar, como lo deja anotado antes, que el Presidente de Estados Unidos en forma categórica expresó que su país debería reconocer la validez del laudo de 1911.

c) Pesca - Dijo el Presidente Kennedy que sabía de la discusión tenida por muchos años entre México y los Estados Unidos en materia de los derechos de nuestro país para la pesca exclusiva en una extensión mayor de la que el Gobierno Norteamericano ha estado dispuesto a reconocer y que quería expresar al Presidente López Mateos su disposición para negociar sobre este problema con miras a llegar a un entendimiento satisfactorio.

El Presidente López Mateos agradeció esta manifestación

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indicando que sería estudiada por el Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores. Agregó que sabía las dificultades que tenía el Gobierno de Estados Unidos para sentar un precedente sobre la extensión del mar territorial que afectara sus intereses estratégicos aún cuando el caso mexicano era peculiar en muchos sentidos y encargó al suscrito que hiciera una breve exposición sobre el particular. El suscrito puso especial énfasis en la sentencia de la Suprema Corte de Estados Unidos del 31 de mayo de 1960, que resolvió en favor de Texas un juicio acogiendo la interpretación que México siempre ha dado al Tratado de Guadalupe, que fija la frontera entre México y Estados Unidos en tres leguas marinas al este de la desembocadura del Río Bravo.

Quedó claro —y así lo indicó el Presidente López Mateos— que de entablarse negociaciones versarían sobre los derechos de pesca, lo cual, naturalmente, no significa abandono de la posición mexicana sobre mar territorial, sino simple reconocimiento del hecho de que sobre este tema no es posible, por ahora, llegar a un acuerdo con Estados Unidos.

d) El Presidente Kennedy en una forma cordial dijo que hasta ahora se había hablado de asuntos en que los Estados Unidos habían procedido mal y que quería saber si no había algunos en que México también hubiera hecho alguna cosa mal. (wrong). El Secretario Tello dijo

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que había uno que quería mencionar: el del fondo piadoso de las Californias. México fue condenado conforme a un laudo a pagar cierta anualidad a la iglesia Católica del Estado de California y así lo estuvo haciendo hasta que cuando Estados Unidos se negó a reconocer el laudo del Chamizal, México a su vez discontinuó los pagos del fondo piadoso. Dijo que una vez que se resuelva el asunto del Chamizal, México debería reanudar el cumplimiento del laudo del fondo.

e) Reclamaciones agrarias - El Presidente López Mateos dijo que sabía de dos asuntos que interesaban al Presidente Kennedy, pero que éste no había tratado por delicadeza, que mucho agradecía. Es el primero el de algunas reclamaciones agrarias. Sobre él, expresó que reiteraba lo que el Secretario Tello había manifestado ya al Embajador Mann: que México estaba dispuesto a pagar compensaciones justas y adecuadas por las propiedades de ciudadanos norteamericanos que hubiesen sido afectados por la legislación agraria mexicana.

f) Sábalo.- El segundo es el caso Sábalo - En cuanto a este, dijo el Presidente López Mateos que si bien desde el punto de vista legal no era posible que México aceptase ninguna responsabilidad, dadas las sentencias dictadas por la Suprema Corte de Justicia absolviendo a nuestro país, él ofrecía al Presidente Kennedy que se buscaría satisfacer en cuanto fuera justo esta reclamación en una forma práctica que

no lesionara el respeto que se debe a los Tribunales mexicanos.

El Presidente Kennedy agradeció esta manifestación del Presidente López Mateos, así como las que listan con la letra c) y d).

g) Banco de Exportaciones e Importaciones - El suscrito, por encargo del Presidente López Mateos, planteó al Presidente Kennedy el deseo de nuestro país de que el segundo crédito por 90 millones de dólares autorizado en julio de 1961 por el Banco de Exportaciones e Importaciones, pueda usarse sin que previamente tengamos que utilizar los recursos del Fondo Monetario Internacional, por razones expuestas al Presidente de dicha institución, señor Harold F. Linder, durante el viaje de Washington a México el día anterior.

El Presidente Kennedy manifestó que al día siguiente, en el viaje de regreso a Washington, llamaría al señor Linder para que en presencia del suscrito Embajador se hablara sobre este punto, pues como dice la declaración conjunta, Estados Unidos está dispuesto a colaborar al programa de estabilidad financiera de México.

h) Fondo para el Progreso Social fideicometido al Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo - También por encargo del Presidente López Mateos, el suscrito Embajador dijo que el Presidente del Banco Interamericano, señor Felipe Herrera, había pedido al Gobierno de México que en estas conversaciones lograra que el Presidente Kennedy

hiciera alguna expresión de su propósito de que el Fondo del Progreso Social seguiría alimentándose con recursos que le permitan continuar sus operaciones en América Latina. El Secretario Auxiliar Martin intervino para manifestar que este problema está siendo discutido en Washington con el Secretario Dillon. Que según estimaciones del Gobierno de Estados Unidos el fondo todavía tiene recursos para operar cuando menos dos años. Que espera llegar a alguna decisión antes de la reunión del Consejo Interamericano Económico y Social que tendrá lugar en septiembre en México. Que está pendiente la aprobación en el Congreso de la ley sobre la asistencia financiera al exterior y que no convendría que el Gobierno Norteamericano apareciera por ahora tomando un compromiso adicional del cual no tuviera conocimiento el Poder Legislativo de los Estados Unidos, pero que podíamos confiar en que la intención de Estados Unidos es que el fondo no carezca de recursos y que repetía que el Gobierno Americano esperaba poder hacer en septiembre una declaración más específica.

1) Conferencia Económica del Cairo - El Presidente Kennedy, a sugestión del Secretario Auxiliar Martin, quien aparentemente le pasó una nota sobre el particular, mencionó la Conferencia Económica de El Cairo que tendrá lugar próximamente e indicó al Presidente López Mateos que no la conferencia misma, sino el hecho

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de que su celebración coincida con los debates congresionales sobre la ley de asistencia al exterior, le preocupaba, pues en esa conferencia Cuba que participará en ella, puede atacar la Alianza para el Progreso y esos ataques a su vez pueden dificultar la aprobación de fondos para Iberoamérica en el Senado y en la Cámara de Representantes.

El Presidente López Mateos contestó que él había fijado ya la posición de México sobre la Alianza para el Progreso y que evidentemente ningún funcionario de su Gobierno podía seguir una línea distinta o expresar ideas diferentes.

El Secretario Tello intervino para puntualizar lo siguiente:

- i). - Que México concurrirá a la conferencia a través de un delegado que ha nombrado el Banco de México;
- ii). - Que México asiste a la conferencia porque fue convocada siguiendo una resolución de la Asamblea de las Naciones Unidas y sin reconocer que la conferencia de El Cairo tenga relación alguna con la reunión de los países no comprometidos que tuvo lugar en Belgrado y sin aceptar en consecuencia que el Gobierno de la RAU sea el convocante;
- iii). - Que el Delegado Mexicano tiene instrucciones de apoyar y defender el programa de la Alianza para el Progreso en caso de que fuese atacado por alguno de los participantes; y

1111). - Que también tiene instrucciones el Delegado de México para apoyar y defender la zona latinoamericana de comercio libre en el caso de que fuese atacada, cosa acerca de la cual han llegado noticias.

j) "En caso de conflicto México cuidará las espaldas de Estados Unidos". - El Presidente López Mateos dijo que deseaba por último hacer una declaración solemne en los siguientes términos que el suscrito Embajador reproduce en forma casi textual: "La política que México ha tenido que seguir en el caso de Cuba, por respeto a principios que para nosotros son capitales, ha creado en algunos sectores de la opinión de Estados Unidos dudas acerca de cual sería la conducta que seguiríamos en caso de que se presentara un conflicto mundial. Quiero aprovechar esta oportunidad para declarar en forma solemne que si ese conflicto llegara a presentarse, México fiel a su tradición y con sus 35 millones de gentes, estaría listo a guardar la espalda de nuestros amigos del norte".

El Presidente Kennedy, manifiestamente conmovido, agradeció esta declaración y dijo: "Estados Unidos a su vez cuidará el flanco de México".

Las conversaciones terminaron dentro del espíritu de absoluta cordialidad y franqueza que tuvieron en todo momento.

He redactado y firmo este relato en la ciudad de Washington

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a los dos días del mes de julio de 1962.

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