

William F. Haddad Oral History Interview – RFK, 02/27/1969
Administrative Information

Creator: William F. Haddad
Interviewer: Larry J. Hackman
Date of Interview: February 27, 1969
Place of Interview: New York, New York
Length: 35 pages

Biographical Note

Haddad was the Associate Director, Inspector General of the Peace Corps, 1961-1963; Special Assistant to Robert F. Kennedy, 1960 Presidential Campaign; Campaign Advisor Robert F. Kennedy for President, 1968. In this interview, he discusses his work on the campaigns of multiple politicians, the organizing of Robert Kennedy's 1968 presidential campaign, and RFK's strengths as a political leader, among other issues.

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Suggested Citation

William F. Haddad, recorded interview by Larry J. Hackman, February 27, 1969, (page number), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.

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William F. Haddad– RFK

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Oral History Interview

with

WILLIAM HADDAD

February 27, 1969
New York, New York

By Larry J. Hackman

For the Robert F. Kennedy Oral History
Program of the John F. Kennedy Library

HACKMAN: You knew him from when? From way back? [Interruption]

HADDAD: Yeah.... Kennedy on the Hill, but the first time that I was really involved with Robert Kennedy was when he was running floor fights for his brother [John F. Kennedy] in '56, and I was running the floor fight for Kefauver [C. Estes Kefauver]. I was floor manager.

HACKMAN: Yes. You put those things on the first one, didn't you? You know, it would probably be better if when you start to talk about something you've already said, I just cut you off, in terms of saving your own time.

HADDAD: Fine, fine.

HACKMAN: So, I was going to pick you up in.... There were rumors in '62 that you might come back and run for, run against Farbstein [Leonard Farbstein] at that point. I don't know if you remember that.

HADDAD: No, I don't remember that.

HACKMAN: You didn't discuss anything like that?

HADDAD: Actually no. What they were talking about doing was

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they wanted to get three of us to come back and run against Wagner [Robert F. Wagner] They wanted to take three guys in the Kennedy administration, myself, Stan Pleasent [Stanley Pleasent], who was counsel of USIA [United States Information Agency] and Ted Meyers [Tedson J. Meyers], who is assistant at that point to Newt Minow [Newton N. Minow]. And the three of us were to come back and run against the Wagner ticket. And there was a lot of discussion in the reform movement about it. Our basic problem was that we didn't have enough confidence in ourselves. If we had, we might have done it. But, you know, we just never really thought of ourselves in that manner. It never became—it became serious among certain people, but not among ourselves.

HACKMAN: Were there any discussions with either the President or Robert Kennedy on this?

HADDAD: No. I think probably we might have discussed it with Robert Kennedy at some point, but not really....We never took it as seriously as some people took it. I mean some people really thought we were going to do it, but I don't know, we just didn't. If we'd been like Cavanaugh [Jerome Cavanaugh] in Detroit, we would've done it. I mean we just—I don't know why we didn't do it, really. If we had more sense ourselves, we would have done it because it probably could have been done. I mean because Wagner was very low, and we had pretty much of a formal....It could have been an exciting moment.

HACKMAN: Can you remember any other contacts during the administration on the New York political situation, with Robert Kennedy or with the President?

HADDAD: Well, with the staff—we had constant talks with Kenny O'Donnell [Kenneth P. O'Donnell] and Dick Donahue [Richard K. Donahue] at the White House. We had constant discussions about the reform movement, a lot of it in kind of almost a bantering way, but constant discussions on it.

HACKMAN: Ever get any movement out of them?

HADDAD: Well, on a few things we were able to. I got in a big fight with them two or three times because I kept bringing New York reformers into the Peace Corps, Bill Delano [William A. Delano]. When we hired Bill Delano, Rooney [John J. Rooney] went right to the President. He was, I think, was potted one night, and he called Kenny O'Donnell and Kenny O'Donnell called the President. And it led to a

kind of a stalemate where Shriver [R. Sargent Shriver] reportedly told the President—and I remember precisely where Shriver told it to me; it was in that little French restaurant next to the Peace Corps—he told the President, “I’m not telling you how to run the White House; you don’t tell me how to run the Peace Corps. My resignation’s on your desk any time you want it.” And the President evidently backed up. He said, “What

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are you making such a big thing about it? We just want to know what Rooney is so upset about,” because Rooney was very important on the committee. And we’d had that—I also brought Stan Pleasant into the administration, and we had a big run in there.

I guess about fifty per cent of my talks with the White House staff basically and Robert Kennedy had to do with talent search people out of the reform movement. And every time we brought one in, the New York delegation had a fit, and they went right to the White House. But we never lost one battle. We never lost one battle in the Peace Corps. We hired who we wanted to hire. And the other times were really discussions about New York politics. I’d get a call and a lot of needling. I remember one time—poor Schlesinger [Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.]! I was having breakfast with Schlesinger. It was about a kind of a Latin American situation that happened in the Peace Corps that was some horrible thing that happened, and I was talking to him, was going to talk to him and have breakfast at the White House. We went down in that little mess downstairs, and I started talking to Schlesinger and in came O’Donnell, O’Brien [Lawrence F. O’Brien], Donahue, some of the others. And it was the day that DeSapio [Carmine G. DeSapio] had beat the reformers. And boy, they were really giving it to me, and I was giving it to them back in kind. I said, “Well, Kenny O’Donnell, as soon as we get finished with the Peace Corps, we’ll have one returned precinct captain in every district in the country.” You know, there was kind of a real banter back and forth—“I’m sort of a weak liberal”—but very sharp. And I looked over at Schlesinger and he was white. He couldn’t even eat his breakfast because he couldn’t take this kind of Irish bantering back and forth. And to me it was great. But a lot of it was in that thing, you know, “stupid reformers”, and “foolish, what are you fighting DeSapio for?” and all that. And then we’d give it back in kind. But that’s basically what it was all about. I think they thought of me as a kind of, they really thought of me kind of as a newspaperman, number one, and sometimes they thought of me as a guy who could provide information about reform politics or situations in New York.

HACKMAN: In ‘64 then, when you did run against Farbstein in that primary, did you have any contact with Robert Kennedy at all on that?

HADDAD: This doesn’t get printed for a long time, does it?

HACKMAN: No, not for as many years as you want to close it.

HADDAD: Yes I did and nobody knows about it. But when I ran, Joe Napolitan helped me. Joe Napolitan did my polls. And I'd had a.... let me see, what the hell? The first thing that happened was Moyers [Bill D. Moyers] talked to me about being press secretary for Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson]. Of course, when I was making this decision, Moyers said that "You know, if you make that decision, you really cut off all the chance

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of coming in the Johnson administration if you want to." He talked to me. We had dinner with his wife and my wife, and he talked to me about becoming Johnson's press secretary, and that I ought to lay off and not run. And then Julie Edelstein [Julius Edelstein], who was Wagner's assistant who's a very good friend, also talked to me. [Interruption, resumed.]

HACKMAN: Edelstein.

HADDAD: Edelstein had talked to me as well. And he had talked to Moyers, and they were making an effort not because they liked Farbstein or anything like that. They were trying to make an effort for me to go into the Administration, and Moyers said that I ought to do it the regular way, rather than the reform way, that I ought to.... Moyers and Edelstein spoke. And Edelstein said, "You know, Wagner will put you...." Wagner hated my guts. Wagner'd give me a position in the city administration. And Moyers said they'd give me something, you know, the press secretary thing at the White House. Then I could always go on and be a Congressman if I wanted. At some point in there I talked to Robert Kennedy.

I had one other thing. Duke Viggiano [P. Vincent Viggiano], who is a leader in the lower East Side. I had a lunch with him and my wife at my house. And he said he'd make me the regular candidate for Congress. Now I don't know who set it up, or what the real.... I can't remember precisely about the background or whether it related to the Kennedys or not. But he said he would make me the regular candidate for Congress and dump Farbstein if I would agree to only be a Congressman and not a political leader, if I would separate my role. And he said, "You can support Communist China if you want, and we'll get you reelected down there." And he said, "But you can't be a political leader as well; you've got to let us have the political power." If I was willing to make that deal, they'd dump Farbstein and put me in as the Congressman. I really thought about it, and I just couldn't go with it. And I told them. It was, I think, at that point I went and talked with Robert Kennedy. [Interruption, resumed]

HACKMAN: So you went to see Robert Kennedy.

HADDAD: Yes. I went to see Robert Kennedy. I think he first discouraged me because he didn't think it was too great an idea. Robert Kennedy had told me before I had left government that the best way to move up is to stay in government a little while; go out and do something; come back. He said, "Just don't get in

that, going up the regular way.” He said, “Go in and out. That’s the only way to do it.” I can’t remember about him.... I don’t think he thought it was such a good idea, me running for Congress. But what Robert Kennedy did do, I took the polls that Joe Napolitan did for me and I went down to Washington on several occasions and sat with him, and he

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analyzed the polls for me, and gave me advice. And he told me what to look for in the polls, and what my chances were, and that whole kind of thing. I started out from seven per cent of the vote. I had, against Farbstein in that district, I had seven per cent of my first poll. He was saying, however, what was important was that my views and the views of those in the district were very close, that if I could get across the fact that my views were close to the views of the people in the district, not to pay any attention about that seven per cent. And that was pretty much the guide, you know, the lead that I did in the campaign. Nobody knew I started from that kind of seven per cent recognition factor, most of it associated with the *New York Post*. So he did help me in that campaign, and he did give me advice. We never discussed it with anybody. I never told anybody because it would be embarrassing to him. I met him in Washington in his office, the Attorney General’s office. He was always very, you know, nice to me in that sense.

HACKMAN: What about then in the ‘64 Senate race here in New York, how did you get involved in that?

HADDAD: Well, I know I wanted him to come and run, and I began lining up reformers. I think I was probably working with Steve [Steven E. Smith], or...I don’t remember the precise way it started, but I got very active within the reform movement trying to get the reformers for Kennedy. There were a couple of reasons, the two basic reasons against Kennedy in New York were that he was a non-liberal, semi-fascist, right wing guy and the second one was, his cold prick. And those are the two big problems that we addressed ourselves throughout the campaign. And we thought that if we could get a lot of liberal reformers to ask him to come in, that we could avoid some of the problems. I don’t know how it all started or whether I started it on my own, but I began to become involved in meetings on this subject. God, I remember we had one meeting—was Wagner still mayor? Yes he was. We had a meeting at Gracie Mansion out on the lawn with Julie Edelstein and a lot of other people in it. And my role in that thing was really stirring up and getting the reformers involved. I remember meetings in apartment houses and all that. And there was opposition, and we—but enormous support. And I also worked with, oh the Liberal Party guy, Alex Rose ...

HACKMAN: Alex Rose.

HADDAD: He was very mad at Kennedy because when a lot of the decisions were being made, Kennedy was off on a sailboat or yacht somewhere and you couldn't reach him. And he was just madder than hell! But it all worked out. I think that's how I got started in it. And I know my first assignment was with the reformers.

HACKMAN: I think a lot of the reformers were earlier with Stratton [Samuel S. Stratton].

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HADDAD: They were. We got the West Side reformers which was the kind of the radical wing of the reform movement. There were a lot of the East Side types who were really anti-Kennedy, they were anti-Jack Kennedy, and so was I at that point—I mean earlier, because of the McCarthy [Joseph R. McCarthy] thing. But they became.... It was all based on Joe Kennedy [Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr.] and the same old things—you could close your eyes and take their name out and they said the same thing about Joe Kennedy that they said about Jack Kennedy that they said about Robert Kennedy. Our big effort was to put pressure on Bill Ryan [William Fitts Ryan], who was wiggling as usual, and Ted Weiss [Theodore S. Weiss], some of the other guys, Jerry Kretchmer [Jerome Kretchmer], Al Blumenthal [Albert H. Blumenthal], Ronnie Eldridge, who was the district leader—I knew only a few district leaders at that point. But we got to put pressure—I think our big effort was to squeeze Ryan into the open. And I remember some big meeting at somebody's apartment Lowenstein [Allard K. Lowenstein], I believe, was involved too and we finally squeezed Ryan into the open. We made him the reluctant chairman of the big liberal statement.

HACKMAN: I've listed some names of some people who weren't coming around just from the *Times* [New York Times] Fein [Arnold L. Fein], Adams [Francis W.H. Adams], Brown [Richard A. Brown], Mrs. Field [Marshall Field, Sr.], Richmond [Frederick W. Richmond]. Do any of these...

HADDAD: Yes. Let's see, start.... Well, Adams, he is one of the worst human beings that ever existed. I tell you, he really.... I tell you, unbelievable! He got in the reform movement because they wanted a Catholic, and they put him in as the house Catholic. And he got involved with the VID [Village Independent Democrats] and from the beginning he gave them advice to continue with Desapio. He did one courageous thing. He got involved with the VID in the Village. But I tell you he did some awful things. In my campaign as an example, he, supposedly speaking for the reform movement, brought me into his office and told me that the reform movement didn't want me to run against Farbstein, that it would be disruptive, that it would detract from other fights, and furthermore, he had a call from the White House, and the White House said I shouldn't run. And I was stunned. And I said, "Well, gee, you know, I'll really find out all I can on the phone." And I called Moyers. And I said, "Bill, you know you don't have to communicate

with me through Adams.” And he said, “What do you mean?” And I told him, and he said, That’s an absolute lie!

And I went back to Adams and Garrison [Lloyd K. Garrison] and those guys and I told them, “You’re damn liars. Nobody in the White House ...” “Well, I didn’t say ...” I said, “That’s exactly what you told me.” He was always that kind of a—he’s still that kind of a guy. He’s a, you know, he does just what Farley [James A. Farley] does. No, he was never the key....He got that title “reformer” and

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he’s misused it to this day. I finally got it out of my system in a column a couple of weeks ago. We had those kind of rich Stevenson [Adlai Stevenson] liberal dowagers, and they never were really enamored with Kennedy. And I guess Mrs. Field and some of those were in that group. Who was the other one? Oh, Freddie Richmond [Frederick W. Richmond]. I guess he was part of that group. I don’t remember.

HACKMAN: Yes.

HADDAD: Who were some of the others?

HACKMAN: Mrs. Field.

HADDAD: She was part of that liberal, you know, dowager, Stevenson dowager group.

HACKMAN: Can you remember Robert Kennedy being that concerned with getting the support of these people, like Buckley [Charles A. Buckley], Steingut [Stanley Steingut]?

HADDAD: Well, he knew he needed the help of that group because of whatchamacallit’s big, big point was that he was a liberal—Keating [Kenneth B. Keating]. You know he had to crack Keating’s liberalism. And I think he went after some of these people, but he wasn’t doing....And you remember during this period of time he was very comatose. He was just unbelievable. He just was uncommunicative, introspective, just. He was barely moving. My picture of him in my mind at that point was a very blurred kind of morbid guy. There was everybody else doing all the things, and he was kind of just really bad, but he snapped out of it in the middle of the campaign. In fact, we have it on tape where he snapped out of it. He was at Columbia with those students. And there was a light. And he was standing on a stage and there was a light above him. And we were filming it for TV, and he had done such lousy stuff on TV. And then someone asked him a question and he stood for about a minute or two minutes, and then he opened up. And after that he just went like hell. I mean that was the precise minute the campaign changed. We came alive. You just saw him come alive on TV. And they do have

that film. Papert, Koenig [Papert, Koenig & Lois, Inc.] has the film. And it just—he came alive! And we used that film. I mean he just suddenly in that....He'd just been dull, stuttering, uninvolved, I don't know, comatose is the word I think of. But then just boom. Right there at Columbia. And then he really came to life. He really began to move. And it's on film. It's quite a dramatic piece of film. We used it over and over. So in the early part of the campaign, people were doing things for him—Steve Smith.

HACKMAN: How did you find Smith to deal with? And vanden Heuvel [William J. vanden Heuvel], I guess, was involved at that point, too.

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HADDAD: You know they always have a kind of ... In any political campaign, I got to learn more about it later on, one's always got a ring of guys around the candidate and stuff. Joe Dolan [Joseph F. Dolan] came in. At those days I still got upset about the backbiting of the politics. And I've learned, pretty much learned not to be upset about it anymore. Steve was at those days very cold, somewhat uninformed about the reform movement, very disdainful of the reformers. You know it's a completely different Steve Smith now. He was a different kind of a guy then, and he was tough to deal with. But he was always tough and quick and all of those things. I felt he had not rally, he was dealing as if he was in Boston politics although he's not a Boston guy. I mean he was dealing with Boston power politics, and he hadn't quite made the shift to the kind of rather sophisticated nonsense that you have to deal with in New York politics the non-regular side. So he was very bad in those kind of areas and that was getting the reformers upset. What I did was carve out a role for myself in he campaign, and I just went with it and I didn't pay any attention to anybody else. I don't know what Robert Kennedy thought of me personally. You know, I don't think he was the biggest ... I think he looked at me as the guy who could get something done, probably as a creative guy and probably as a guy that had to be controlled, you know, all of that. But I just carved out—I took on the—I felt—I talked to Kennedy about it. And I think it probably wasn't unique for me. I felt those two things I've told you about, his coldness and his aloofness which was always related to his vindictiveness, his viciousness, all that, plus the liberal thing—and I went to work on both those problems. And we created, I set up the, I had this so-called negative research operation in which we really dissected everything that Keating did. And I was trying to destroy Keating as a liberal, and we did this "Myth of Keating's Liberalism"...

HACKMAN: I was wondering, that was yours?

HADDAD: Yeah, that was ours, all ours. There was one time they used something that we had not dug up. It was something about the atomic thing. But basically...

HACKMAN: Nuclear Test Ban?

HADDAD: Yeah. We didn't do that. That was stupid, idiotic on the part... because we knew that you had to be a thousand percent accurate. You couldn't make one single mistake. I got about a hundred and fifty researchers, lawyers and everybody. And we researched everything, everything on Keating, everything, every word he said, categorized. I've got the book around here. And then we began to pull out all of anti-liberal things. And I found the thing from the ACA, Americans for Constitutional Action, and we used that. And I began

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to dramatize and contrast it with Javits' [Jacob Javits] voting record, all of that, and unknown to Kennedy. In the advertising games he always was rotten beyond belief. There were a couple of creative guys at the top, I don't know why Kennedy was so enamored with them, but ...

HACKMAN: The same one they have now?

HADDAD: Yeah, awful. They're good at the top, but what they do is run out and get a couple of half-fagged or young "broad" writers who don't know a god damn thing about politics and they staff it up for it. It's awful. You spend all your time ... What we did secretly in that campaign was write all the ads. Bob Engle [Robert C. Engle] from *Newsweek* laid them out or I wrote them, or other people wrote them, and they came down. And the people at the ad agency, whom had been hired, rather than educate them which we had to do, and you spend all your god damn time doing that—we just wrote them, and they took them back to the agency. And so we did all that add stuff, even to the point of laying it out and inspecting the type, and a lot of it was on this Keating stuff. And then we found a very marvelous picture of Kennedy and his daughter, holding the daughter, and we printed a couple of a million copies of that. It was very warm picture. We did all the literature in that campaign. We set up the street corner speakers. We also had a little curb, another operation going. I did all the negative work on Miller [William E. Miller]. Operating right out of that same office, I had another team of guys and we followed Miller all over the country. And we devised a computerized system, believe it or not, where we did the same kind of negative job on Miller and we pretty much destroyed him. And we used to go to towns before he was there, and we'd get the local people, and we'd put big ads in the paper, "Miller, why don't you answer these questions: one, two three?" And it had to do with conflict of interest. We dug up that conflict of interest stuff on Miller. I had a special team doing all that. They were in another office, right at the same place where the Kennedy thing was going on.

HACKMAN: On the Keating thing on nuclear test ban, where did that come from?

HADDAD: It came from the Kennedy suite. It came from a couple of writers. It was just a wrong-o, because we had worked so god damn hard. It was a thick book, and it went through about eight levels of refinement before we did

anything with it. I mean it just, absolutely nothing was put in that book that was not backed up by the actual research that you could pull out and look at. And it was not in the book, and they did it. And it's the....We knew that you couldn't have one thing wrong, and they just shot from the hip. And we tried to justify it and all that, and we found...Kennedy called me about it and talked to me to see what I could dig up on it and

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stuff. But we tried to cover it up and stuff, but it was just a wrong-o. But we did plenty of it and that was the only thing they had wrong, but we were not responsible for that.

HACKMAN: On the book that you put together, how was something like that cleared? Did it just go to the advertising thing or...

HADDAD: No, no. This one went right to Kennedy, Steve Smith and Kennedy, and they were rather enamored of it. And I sent it to every state chairman. Then we designed campaigns based on it and speeches based on it. You know we just, we marketed it. I mean we not only produced research, but found a creative way of marketing it—fed it to newspapermen, made leaflets out of it, millions of leaflets, and that kind of stuff. I guess I was in charge of negative research in the campaign and the street corner speakers which we had out of there.

HACKMAN: Were there any people around him who were particularly good with the reform side? Anybody?

HADDAD: Well, they brought Bill Walton [William Walton] up here from 1960, and he had a nice way about him with the reformers. He began to develop some of the relationships at that point with Al Blumenthal and Ronnie Eldridge and that began to blossom. And they were very happy, you know, they began to really love him. And Al had a very nice way about him. Let's see who else did he have, Kretchmer I guess began to be involved with him and Lowenstein, some of those. But there was not any real depth in it because there was really a basic conflict of interest. And he tried, like he said in 1960 on behalf of his brother, to stay above it, and the same thing here. It was a basic conflict of interest. And we were fighting the regular organization, so you couldn't have both worlds. Actually it was in '64, yeah in '64, there was a real trouble about me in '64. Gee, I remember that they....I was helping on a convention floor; the Democratic leaders came to Kennedy to get me out of the campaign. They didn't want me in the campaign. They wanted me out. Who the hell? Some strange guy stood up for me. Was Buckley still alive?

HACKMAN: He died in '65, I believe, but he was defeated in '64.

HADDAD : Yeah. Buckley was the one that went to my bat. All the leaders were in there just because they were all afraid I was going to run again and was getting in this popularity with Kennedy—the same thing that carried over

to the whole OEO [Office of Economic Opportunity] situation. And they went to Kennedy to get rid of me. And I think Buckley was the one who stopped it. And I had done some awful stuff on Buckley, Jesus Christ! And Buckley I think just spoke up on my behalf.

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HACKMAN: This is at the state Democratic convention here?

HADDAD: Yeah, right after that convention when we were getting started when Kennedy was nominated, they came in a group to Kennedy to get me out of the campaign. Steve probably knows all about it more than I did. And I think that the guy that really stuck up for me in that situation was Buckley, although I'd written some awful stories about Buckley.

HACKMAN: How do you explain?...Any reason?

HADDAD: Well, he felt that I could do the job. Like DeSapio in my campaign—when I ran for Congress, I carried Little Italy as well as DeSapio. And DeSapio told his workers that he didn't like me and stuff, but I'd always been fair with him. And, you know, they didn't zing me in that. I carried, my vote in Little Italy was not too much different from DeSapio's vote. I was the first reformer ever to carry Little Italy, and that's because DeSapio didn't know how to campaign. And yet I wrote all those horrible stories about DeSapio, but he always felt that I was fair. And Buckley, I think, said something like that at that meeting. But they had a lot of trouble with me. Steve will tell you they had an awful lot because the regular organization—they just couldn't stand me, both for my stories in the *Post* and from my activities....I helped the council of, the group before the Committee for New York Democrats.

I organized all the insurgent groups in 1957. We met for eighteen months in the basement of my apartment in Brooklyn Heights. And we set up a technical assistance group to help all these new reform clubs, and these were the ones that had not won yet. And that brought us in conflict with Lexington Democratic Club which is the established winner and all that. And we had the Council of New York Democrats which was merged with the moneyed, prestige, anti-Kennedy group. I could guess, I could almost say that the strength of Robert Kennedy's support within the reform movement came from the, what had been called the insurgent groups, the ones who were later successful and who were growing to be more successful. And the opposition came from the wealthy, more established, liberal and reform group, very classic actually. I'm just thinking of names in my mind now. I think that was the split; the second class reformers were the ones who supported him.

HACKMAN: Can you remember getting involved in any discussions on how closely Robert Kennedy at that point should identify with the Johnson-Humphrey [Hubert H. Humphrey, Jr.] ticket?

HADDAD: Oh yeah, we wanted to do it. The pictures have been here for days, and I just took them away. We busted our ass to get a picture of Kennedy with Johnson.

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And, oh gee, I remember the Convention, too; You haven't asked me about the Convention. We got the fabulous photographer named Volaitison (?). We were just looking. We finally at the end got a picture of Johnson and Kennedy. I'll show it to you. I've got it around here. And that was our big effort. We were dying to get that picture. We were riding his coattails. I remember we put it in all the literature, and we finally got this picture. The guy had to practically climb up a.... There was about a whole series of goof-ups; our photographer kept getting excluded. And he finally climbed up a pole somewhere and took this fabulous picture that we printed millions of copies of. We got it all over television and elsewhere. The guy got killed later on, Volaitison got killed in an accident, but he got a fabulous picture we used. And I had it sitting over here. Recently I just put them all away. But very definitely there was a major effort to get involved with Johnson, to use Johnson's coattails.

HACKMAN: Was Johnson avoiding it at that point?

HADDAD: No, I don't think he was avoiding it. I don't think he was avoiding it. We just never.... Johnson was pretty popular at that point, but you know there's no great love between Kennedy and Johnson. Kennedy was very pragmatic about....

HACKMAN: There were rumors that there were problems between the Kennedy staff, Smith and these people, and I guess it was Ed Weisl [Edwin L. Weisl], who was the Johnson man at that point. Can you remember that, problems and meetings?

HADDAD: Yes it was. Yes, yes. There were problems. I remember some of those problems with Weisl and some of the other guys, too, some of the staff people. But, I just don't remember all the specifics of it. There was just a lot, there was friction, there was... You know, Weisl was a different kind of guy than the Kennedys. He's a decent human being, and there was that kind of a split. There is, A) there is always that kind of a split anytime there's a campaign, but this one was particularly difficult because the power was going through Weisl. And it's just like—I'm sure there's a senior Senate leader in Washington today but the power is Ted Kennedy [Edward M. Kennedy]. So I mean it's that same kind of thing. Weisl was the senior leader and the power of course was Kennedy, Bob Kennedy, at that point.

HACKMAN: Anything that you can recall on Burns [James MacGregor Burns]? Funds?

HADDAD: I remember being in a couple of meetings with Weisl and stuff and Jerry Finkelstein and others. I can't remember, at this point I can't remember, maybe I'll remember later. I remember being in a hotel room where there was

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a particularly violent blowup.

HACKMAN: Okay, you were going to talk about...the convention.

HADDAD: The Convention. Yeah. We tried to get...When Robert Kennedy came to the Convention, McCarthy [Eugene J. McCarthy] to this day believes that he told Sandi, who's my assistant, who was McCarthy's assistant, that Bill vanden Heuvel and I went all over the floor trying to sink McCarthy in behalf of Robert Kennedy, which wasn't true. I was a floor leader for the Freedom Democratic Party, worked with King [Martin Luther King, Jr.] and Lowenstein and stuff. I guess I was particularly useful at the Convention because I knew, I'd been there in '56 with the Kefauver people, and in '60 when I was leading that fight for Stevenson against Kennedy, and I knew a lot of people, but my only role there was that. But then when Robert Kennedy came, we stirred up a lot of things. I remember running ahead on the boardwalk and elsewhere and I'd say, "You better move your child away from that glass door. Robert Kennedy's coming." You know, just all that kind of gimmickry, get a crowd all stirred up that he's coming and you'd electrify them, and there'd be a huge mob when he turned the corner. Then I'd run on to the next place. It was kind of a Peck's Bad Boy thing, you know. We stirred up those crowds, but they wanted to see Kennedy, but he couldn't do anything on his own and all that. And we just, a lot of us, ad hoc, did that kind of thing. And I was hoping that he'd be the vice presidential candidate.

HACKMAN: No conversations with him?

HADDAD: No, I was involved with him at that point, but not in any real conversations about it. No, I think that a lot of us were there to help just like we were there to help Teddy this last time if there was anything to do. But the one thing we did do, we all just pitched in and stirred up trouble. By "stirred up trouble," I mean created demonstrations, things like that just to get the thing....We just kept it alive talking to reporters and things like that.

HACKMAN: Were the other people working with you at this time mostly the Freedom Democratic people?

HADDAD: No there were a lot of the old Kennedy guys. You know, the feeling was very much that the '64 Convention was the last year here with that kind ofYou know, you wanted the excitement and the drama again. Although

Johnson was.... Nobody was.... With Goldwater [Barry Goldwater] on the horizon, you didn't have the feeling that you had about Johnson later on. But there was a kind of a... We were looking for an opportunity for excitement. There was never a

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person... I'm sure for some people there was, but for me and some others there was never personal political advantage, because I don't get any personal political advantage out of the Kennedys because I would never ask them for anything. I don't know if they would ever grant it, if I asked them. But it was just the chance for excitement in politics. It was just the difference between somebody who was meaningful and important and exciting and a leader and the traditional Nixon [Richard M. Nixon] turn-of-the-wheel, where he's a good leader and all that but he's not a really dramatic guy. Schlesinger just called him the "invisible President."

HACKMAN: Yeah, I read that. Going back to that thing you put out on Keating, then there was response from Bruce Felknor in the ...

HADDAD: No, no. No the only response came on the... We never got a response on the... They were never able to unwind the "Myth of Keating's Liberalism." The only thing they did was that thing that was not included, which was the nuclear thing. That was not in our book. That was not in our papers. No we put out a book, oh, two inches thick, with all this data in it. I still have it somewhere—I guess you ought to have it up there. I'll find it. No we were very careful. They never were able to unravel one thing because we quoted directly. It was always a quote. We did no exposition on it. Everything was a flat out quote in quotes with the source listed, and they never got under that. I got involved with the Clay Felknor, not Clay Felknor...

HACKMAN: Bruce.

HADDAD: Bruce. Yeah, when I went up there, I talked with him about it, and went over there with vanden Heuvel. I think Kennedy asked me to go over. And I went over there—that whole mishmash that Peter Edelman was involved in and stuff. But of course they asked the questions, they did ask questions about the other stuff, about five or six, but they focused in on this thing.... No, we had it all. I mean we had this, really it was done by real tough lawyers and stuff. We never used anything that was not absolutely documented. We assembled it in a dramatic fashion to make him appear that he wasn't—and he really wasn't—Keating was not a liberal in the Kennedy sense of liberal. But we assembled it in the most dramatic way which was our...

HACKMAN: There's always some mystery as to how that Felknor letter got to the *Herald Tribune*, I believe.

HADDAD: Yeah. I know the answer, but I can't remember now. I know the answer because my father-in-law was publisher of the *Tribune*, and I know the answer and I can't remember it now. That's one thing I found out. I found

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HACKMAN: He's just written a book, *Dirty Politics*.

HADDAD: Is it in there, how it got...

HACKMAN: No, that's not in there.

HADDAD: No, I know how it went there. I remember because I traced it because I used the source...I found out for Kennedy how it got there. I can't remember it now. I was asked to find out. I'd forgotten all about that. I do know who the...Oh, I'll try to remember it, because I looked that up.

HACKMAN: You were talking about that meeting at the Gracie Mansion, can you remember anything?

HADDAD: Yeah, it was the first...Well, Debs Myers was there and Julie Edelstein, about six guys. I remember we were sitting around on metal chairs on the grass lawn and we were talking about the campaign and stuff. And there were a lot of very powerful people. I think this was before Kennedy announced, it was before Kennedy announced. It was being conducted by Julie Edelstein, and he emerged as a very strong guy. It was just planning. I can't remember all the guys that were there, very important group, very powerful group of guys.

HACKMAN: You don't know anything about any arrangements that had to be made to get Wagner to come out because for a long time it seemed questionable as to whether

HADDAD: Yeah, I'm not sure how....That's another thing that's vague in my mind because I do know the story there....But this was right at Gracie Mansion and this was before Kennedy announced, and it never got in the press, so I think....According to Julie, I think Wagner was always probably reluctant, but I think was always going to do it. He had Alex Rose, because I was an intermediary with Alex Rose on a couple of points, and he was just mad because Kennedy wasn't around like...

HACKMAN: Can you remember during the campaign then any problems in getting the Wagner people to work hard? Were they enthusiastic, or was that a real problem?

HADDAD: Well, the top Wagner people helped like Julie. I think my responsibility was basically—I developed a hell of a group of guys, an exciting group, The Citizens Committee for Metropolitan Affairs which was doing these drug surveys. And others grew out of that Kennedy group, trying to keep them together drug surveys. And others grew out of that Kennedy group, trying to keep them together.

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HACKMAN: Oh really?

HADDAD: Yeah, that sort of thing. It brought a lot of guys in my campaign in with a lot of Kennedy guys who had come back from Washington, put together a group of about seven hundred people.

HACKMAN: Can you remember doing anything on those Keating charges on the General Aniline Company [General Aniline and Film Company], the German...

HADDAD: Yes. I did. I knew about it before hand. I worked with—the key guy on that was Andy Oehman, O-e-h-m-a-n [Andrew F. Oehmann]. I worked with him on that. I did a lot of planting of stores in columns, you know, with the news-papermen I knew...

HACKMAN: For instance, for instance.

HADDAD: I think I did something with...I forget who it was. I don't, can't remember. Drew Pearson may have been negative. I don't remember who it was; I planted some stories, some answers in some newspapers. I worked with Andy Oehman on that one. I think he ended up as the director of General Aniline.

HACKMAN: Yeah.

HADDAD: Yeah. He was the one that was handling it. I did something on it; I can't remember what I did do, some investigating on it, too. What I had to do was really anticipate.... One thing that I was trying to do was anticipate all the charges that would be brought against Kennedy. We did the Kennedy record, too, plus and minus. And then we prepared stuff on the basis of that.

HACKMAN: Yeah. Do you remember getting involved at all with civil rights groups, or Ray Jones [J. Raymond Jones], or anybody that time around.

HADDAD: No.

HACKMAN: Powell [Adam Clayton Powell]?

HADDAD: I got involved with Ray Jones, but I can't remember how. No not with Powell. Ray Jones. Can't remember how now. We always paid those guys. That's how we got those guys. Ray, etcetera—we always gave them money.

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HACKMAN: Ray and who?

HADDAD: Ray and the black leadership in this town, you always bought them. You had to pay them.

HACKMAN: You mean the Robert Kennedy camp?

HADDAD: Somebody. Somebody always paid them. They were for sale to the highest bidder, and they always got money. The only time they didn't get money was in the '64 campaign, (took them on) Silverman. Was it '64 or '65?

HACKMAN: '65, '65 .

HADDAD: Samuel Silverman ...

HACKMAN: ...and Klein [Arthur Klein]. That's why he was complaining to them because he wasn't...

HADDAD: No, no. He was complaining because we were challenging the organization. However, they always got paid, every black minister, black editors, black politicians. You paid them off in money and you paid them off in judgeships—ugly.

HACKMAN: Can you remember, were the Kennedy people ever concerned with the fact that this was going....Was there ever any attempt to change?

HADDAD: No one ever discussed it. It was done by the organization. It was tradition, disgusting. The black guy didn't know what to ask for. I mean as far as the Innis(es) [Roy G. Innis] and the others, they wanted something meaningful, not very personal they were looking for real change. That's one of the real hindrances of change was the political pay off system, of course, it had always benefited a few people and they got a couple of black faces on a big white ticket, and they got a few judgeships and a token ambassador here or there. But black progress was really held up by black politicians who took their, made it very personal rewards. And they never settled for real power; they always settled for transitory or token power, never got into the heart of things. They were used. I don't know the extent of it in '64 and all. I didn't get involved in

those things. It's politics, but it's disgusting.

HACKMAN: One of the things that Kennedy did do in the '64 campaign was support district by district elections or direct election of district leaders in the Bronx.

HADDAD: Yes. Buckley was against that. I remember that that was a very tough thing. Kennedy was very very

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loyal to Buckley. He went up to the dinner when he shouldn't have gone up, all that stuff. He was very loyal to Buckley because Buckley helped him when he needed it. And DeSapio was on the other side. You know, DeSapio was against him. No, he was very loyal. He paid his debt to Buckley over and over. But he did come out for direct elections. It led to all the change up there.

HACKMAN: Did you ever have any just sit-down conversations with him on why he worked with people like Buckley, or did he ever just...

HADDAD: I don't know. Yeah, over the years, lots of times because I was a different type, you know. And you work with what you have in politics. I think that's what his theme was. He was really a different man in this last campaign than he was before. Kennedy became an institutional change guy in this last campaign. That's what the real tragedy is. He was never an institutional change guy before this last campaign.

HACKMAN: Have you seen the Halberstam [David Halberstam] *The Unfinished Odyssey* book...

HADDAD: Yes. I did just see that, yes.

HACKMAN: ... where he talks...

HADDAD: It's a fascinating dinner in Indianapolis, fascinating dinner. Boy that's really, you know, that's what the real tragedy is; that's what the real tragedy is because this guy could've done it. Now we're slowed up for fifty years. I don't think Teddy's an institutional change guy.

HACKMAN: Did you get involved then in that battle after the election on the leadership of the state legislature, the Zaretski [Joseph Zaretski]—is it Travia [Anthony J. Travia]?

HADDAD: Yes. No, not really. I got very close to Steingut. I got to like Steingut very much because I found Steingut would support us on basic issues. I got to know Steingut pretty well. And while I disagree with him as a political power, I always got him to come out and help me on wire-tap, help me on drug prices, help me on auto surveys. He really was very good on the substantive issues, and I got to like him very much on that as distinguished from the political issue. So I was very pro-Steingut, began to be very pro-Steingut at that point. I did not get involved. At this point I guess I pretty close went back to Washington.

HACKMAN: You mentioned the wire-tap. What do you mean by that?

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HADDAD: The anti-wire tap legislation, we got Steingut to support it. What we'd do, we worked out a format of having a series of press conferences that had a dramatic quality to them. For instance, on that wire-tap thing I got Al Blumenthal and Steingut who represented one reformer and one regular, and myself. I was in the background on that one. And we bugged the press conference, and we demonstrated all the ways that you can bug, the sophisticated ways. But then we bugged the press conference. I had it in two hotel rooms with sliding doors, and I held half the press conference on one side and half on the other. And we had the reporters sitting on hidden mikes and we gave a guy a pen, and we just began to expose it. The reporters were almost—not tools in it—but they.... We had them pick up their seat and a button was microphone. And we took them into the other room and showed how it had been recorded. And it gave it that dramatic impetus. We did a series of those things like the survey of drug prices and the auto-repair racket, that sort of stuff.

HACKMAN: Did you ever talk to Robert Kennedy on the wire-tap thing?

HADDAD: We disagreed on that, I guess, at some point. Yes, I did. I had some talks with him. But, you know, he's a very opinionated guy, and I'm a very opinionated guy...He put me on a committee; it wasn't the Counterinsurgency Committee, but it was the Youth Committee at the Pentagon. I was always fighting with the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] guy. I was very cantankerous.

HACKMAN: Did you know anything during the Kennedy Administration on the King wire-tap and Robert Kennedy's role at all?

HADDAD: No, the only thing I talked to Robert Kennedy about at some dinners and things like that was the Freedom Rides some of which were organized at a board of directors meeting at the Peace Corps where Jay Rockefeller [John Davidson Rockefeller IV], and Bill Coffin [William Sloan Coffin, Jr.], and some others got together, and I got involved in some of that. And I was always arguing with them, pro Freedom Rides. He always felt that the first Freedom Rides were great, but that we ought to

stop fooling around and do something important, like register. His argument was, "One or two things highlight it, dramatize it, but stop and do the homework and go out and do the tough work of politics. Go out and get black people registered in the South, then you'll change the political system." And then he quoted Russell [Richard B. Russell] of Georgia and others who indicated that the changes would come about by increased registration.

HACKMAN: Last time we were talking; you were just starting

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to talk about Jay Rockefeller and Coffin, I believe, being involved in a march on Washington, or this idea of coming out of...

HADDAD: Yeah, it came out....We actually had....I remember the place, it was at the State Department, and it was a Peace Corps Advisory Council meeting. And Jay Rockefeller....Bill Coffin went to Jay Rockefeller and began talking about the Freedom Rides, is what it was, as I recall. I think that it either started there or it got its impetus there. And some of our people, unfortunately, some of the government people got hooked up in that. And you have to be very careful about doing....

HACKMAN: Can you remember then when you went back to OEO as Inspector General, or you went there for the first time really, did you have any contacts with Robert Kennedy's Senate office on New York projects or on anything else in that period?

HADDAD: No, they left me alone. They never really asked me for anything like that. No, they really didn't. They only, there were a couple of guys that I helped, but that was a tough office to deal with. No, I don't even remember. No, I was always in a fight with the White House because I was always cutting people's money off and stuff. No, they pretty much left me alone. I didn't get involved with much of that at all. I was very tough about that type of thing. I don't even remember one request coming from his office. I think I sent resumes of ideas and stuff to people on his staff and things like that, but I don't recall ever their saying, "Here, this is a good program." I don't think I ever got one letter from him or his staff on that kind of thing.

HACKMAN: What about the drug pricing thing then when you were...

HADDAD: Well, I had a real tough time with Kennedy; they were really bad on it during Kefauver's lifetime. And then after....Well, I'd taken some of this, got this stuff in Latin America which really showed a world cartel. And I had some really exciting evidence. We only ran a little bit of it in the *Trib*, [*Herald Tribune*] so we wouldn't jeopardize any future investigation. And then I gave it to Hart [Philip A. Hart], and Hart showed it to Dirksen [Everett McKinley Dirksen], and it was awful. He shouldn't have done it, and I got mad. And I took it all back and I brought it to Robert

Kennedy. And I laid it out very coldly, and he listened to me. And he knows I'm a nut on this subject, and I knew his problem. But he really listened to me. And I said, "It's evidence and here it is, and I told him how "Tommy The Cork" [Tommy Corcoran] had lied about it. And I said Gore [Albert Gore, Sr.], Senator Gore had given me the transcript

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of the Foreign Relations [Committee] thing where "Tommy The Cork", Tommy Corcoran had gone down and represented himself on behalf of the government while he was really interested in the drug industry. And a lot of people were like that. And Gore and some others had zeroed in on Corcoran, and Corcoran said, "Kennedy sent me", and, "Which Kennedy" and all that. It turned out to be pure hogwash! And anyway I laid it all out, and I tried to get Kennedy mad, and at the same time showed him all this tough evidence. And he took me downstairs, he walked me downstairs, I think it was downstairs to the guy who was head of the anti-trust division...

HACKMAN: Loevinger [Lee Loevinger]? No, Loevinger had left by then.

HADDAD: No, it was...

HACKMAN: Not Orrick [William H Orrick, Jr.]? Was Orrick...

HADDAD: Bill Orrick, who I knew from.... Bill Orrick I think had been at State, if I'm not mistaken.

HACKMAN: Right. For awhile.

HADDAD: And he took me down there, and we began to do it. And they were very interested in stuff like this. I think that started before I went into the government as I recall, started before I went back to OEO. And then I kept it up, finding out.... They were really screwing around; they had a grand jury in but nothing every came out of it. I just stayed on top; I stayed on top with him for awhile, but that's kind of hopeless. I mentioned it to Johnson, I think, in the first interview with Johnson. When I was with the *Herald Tribune*; we had the first confidential—we had the first interview with Johnson after he was President. It was a private interview. And I got it for a couple of reasons. Johnson wanted to appeal to liberal Republicans and all that—this is right after the assassination. I mentioned it to Johnson in that discussion. I told him how I felt about the drug thing, and then he got Moyers to have me give him a thorough memo on it. But he had great buddies like Jim Rowe [James H. Rowe, Jr.] and Corcoran. It was a very tough situation. Kennedy wasn't the greatest on this thing, but he did, Robert Kennedy did take me down and give it to Orrick. And Orrick did get some things moving.

HACKMAN: And continued interest then when he was in the Senate that he could help at all on this?

HADDAD: No, I left him, you know, I left him alone on this thing. I went all over the Senate. I knocked on everybody's door and I finally through Gillis Long got to Senator Long [Russell B. Long], and got him jumping up and down about it. But I just discounted Kennedy because he had too many.... You know, he had worked it out. He got the drug industry

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to give him this stuff on Cuba and all that, so I just left him alone. I'll tell you who was.... Ted Kennedy was.... Was it Ted? Ted was good on this. I think he—maybe it was Robert. I'm not sure who was on that Committee. One of the Kennedys was on that Committee and it might have been Ted. I'm not sure. One of them was on this Committee and the Kennedy who was on the committee voted right. I believe that's the Anti-Trust-Monopoly Committee. Who was on that?

HACKMAN: I think that's Edward Kennedy.

HADDAD: He was good. He was good on the subject. Ted was better on this thing than Robert.

HACKMAN: What about the mayor's race in '65 here? For a while there was some talk that you might go with Lindsay [John V. Lindsay] on the "fusion" ticket.

HADDAD: Yeah, I know. I don't think that Lindsay ever seriously considered me to be on the ticket. In '64, I had urged Lindsay.... I had a long train ride with Lindsay, as a congressman, back to Washington. And I had known Lindsay as a reporter when I covered the paper on Title I scandals; he was very good. He challenged the Republican organization. He was a very courageous first term congressman and a very able guy and I liked him very much. And I urged him to run for mayor. And he didn't want to do it. And then when he ran this time, I said I'd help him. And I came down and talked to Bob Price [Robert Price], and I came back and helped him. And I said, "I want to do it quietly. I don't want to be seen. I don't want them to say that the Kennedy people had come over, all of that stuff." And of course, by trying to hide it we really.... You know, as soon as the first piece of literature came out, everybody knew I was in the campaign.

I wrote the two news releases a day, one in the morning and one in the afternoon, for the campaign, for the last three or four weeks of the campaign. Bob Price took about eleven of us and put us in a hotel room and we worked directly with him. And one of my assignments was the a.m. and p.m. news release. And, you know, I sent all these kind of things through Lindsay to pop away at. I did the literature, got Barry involved, and worked on it. It never got out in the paper at that point, but a lot of people knew I was involved. I told Steve Smith was involved. I cleared it with Smith, to the best of my recollections.

HACKMAN: Can you remember anything on that period about what Lindsay thought of Robert Kennedy and vice versa?

HADDAD: Well, Robert Kennedy always thought...He kept saying.... He asked me the same question every time I'd see him and that was "I hear Lindsay

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really doesn't have anything upstairs. He's a lightweight." And I'd always say, "You're wrong he's not. He's got something upstairs." We must have had that conversation forty times. But that's what he thought; he thought Lindsay was a lightweight.

And Lindsay on Kennedy—I can't remember. I think he had a great deal of respect for his ability and stuff, but I don't remember any personal comments by Lindsay about Kennedy. Well, he knew I knew him too because I used to see Lindsay socially and stuff like that.

HACKMAN: Since you were working on the Lindsay side, then you probably didn't get involved on the other side.

HADDAD: No, I did the "Myth of Beame's [Abraham D. Beame] Liberalism". The "Myth of Beame's ..." I thought up the theme. I didn't do the research on it, but it was the "Myth of Beame's..." They hired the same person who drafted mine. "The Myth of Beame's..." The "Myth of Beame's Independence." But what I thought of was that Beame was running away from Wagner, and I said, "Well, the thing we've got to do is really show that he was very much like Wagner." And then we thought and thought and thought, "God damn, they were both on the Board of Estimates." And we found there were sixteen thousand votes, and Beame had only differed from Wagner four times. I did all that kind of literature, did all the Lindsay literature stuff. And we did a lot of that one sheet leaflets etc. I helped on the other stuff too, in ideas and things like that. But as soon as the first leaflet was out, they knew our mark was in the campaign. They knew I was in there somewhere.

HACKMAN: You don't know anything about how Moynihan [Daniel Patrick Moynihan] got on that Screvane [Paul Rogers Screvane] ticket?

HADDAD: No, no, I don't.

HACKMAN: All right let's skip to something else. In '66 you were working for Cavanaugh in Detroit, did you see any Robert Kennedy involvement in this race at all?

HADDAD: He didn't like me doing it. I had gone—I guess I told him or Steve that I was going to do it, and I don't think they were.... You know, they had a commitment to Soapy Williams [G. Mennen Williams], and then there

was a little bit of flap where he came out, Kennedy came out for Williams or something. Of course, the papers made a big thing that Kennedy guys were in working for Cavanaugh. We'd had a good victory in Florida with Mayor High [Robert King High], rather upset victory over the incumbent governor. And we were fresh on top of that victory, and Governor Burns [W. Haydon Burns] had made it a Kennedy thing. So the papers were, you know, full of that. Then we ended up and came to Michigan and became page one stories about, "Kennedy people move

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in to help Cavanaugh". And then he [Burns] backed away from it when Kennedy supported Williams. I talked to Kennedy about working with the Lindsay administration. I had a poll that showed me seven points ahead of Farbstain. I went to Kennedy to ask him, talk to him, get some advice. It was in a hotel room and he was bathing and shaving and all that. We had a long talk. He suggested...

[BEGIN SIDE II, TAPE III]

HADDAD: He suggested that he didn't think I'd like Congress. He said, "I told you that before. I don't think you'll like it at all." I got the feeling that he didn't like it. It was just boring and stuff. And he thought I'd be much better in an administrative position, executive rather than legislative. And he advised me against going with the Lindsay administration. And that advice was very important to me. And I didn't go with the Lindsay administration. Maybe they wouldn't have had me, you know, maybe they wouldn't have had me. I had a deal with Bob Price that never worked out. When I went to help Lindsay, I said there's only one thing I want to do in this town; I want to be Investigations Commissioner. And Price said, "Okay". And then they couldn't do it because I wasn't a lawyer, but I think they couldn't do it for other reasons. They could've made me acting [Investigations Commissioner], but I just don't think Lindsay trusted me that much. I was too much of a Kennedy guy, and they always had colliding ambitions and all that stuff. So I don't think Lindsay really trusted me enough. And there were several other positions discussed with me in the Lindsay administration. We never really culminated.... There were a lot of guys in the Lindsay administration that were as suspicious as hell of me and advised him that I was too volatile and you couldn't control me and all that kind of stuff. But my, the guy I worked with most closely was Bob Price and he was really trying to get me a position with the Lindsay administration. But Kennedy's advice to me about not going was really my determining factor in not going with Lindsay.

HACKMAN: You just talked briefly before about the Sam Silverman-Klein thing. Do you know anything about why Kennedy got into that race and how it...

HADDAD: I know he was involved in all those original discussions and everything. I did an original paper for Kennedy which he liked except for the conclusion which said I didn't think we could do it. I mean I didn't think we could

win, and he really challenged me on that conclusion. But the rest of the paper was all right. I was advocating doing it, but I didn't think it would be good. I was part of all those instructions. I really don't know why he did it. I think they were looking for an opportunity to demonstrate some independence and this looked like a good opportunity. I don't know; I never

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know the motives of that.

HACKMAN: I know he surprised a lot of people at the time when it came out.

HADDAD: Yeah, well, it surprised me. It was an exciting campaign. It was really the first breakthrough of Kennedy—the first sign of breaking. I think it was his first step towards the presidency because it really separated the men from the boys. And he really took it on. It was an exciting victory. It electrified this town.

HACKMAN: Why Silverman? Can you remember the other people who were considered?

HADDAD: No, there were a lot of others, but they just picked Silverman, judicious, so on and so forth. Very able guy. Very tough campaign. He surrounded himself with very judicious, non-political types who were crawling up the wall about everything we were doing. Tough campaign! Steve pulled all these things together. He was the guy that made all these things go.

HACKMAN: By this time he understood the state elections?

HADDAD: By that time he really began to work with reformers and have some respect for them and develop some close personal friendships and stuff. He had a lot of respect for Blumenthal and Eldridge.

HACKMAN: Vanden Heuvel was always getting in on these things. How did you regard him, and what kind of role did he play? Was he a figure or did he really...

HADDAD: Well, I know what people say, and I know he spent a lot of time with Kennedy. I found him to be a brilliant guy. I found him to be a superb administrator. I found him to be a superb speech writer. My first encounter with vanden Heuvel was when he ran for Congress and wouldn't side with either reformers or the regulars. And it became a kind of jet set, beautiful people type campaign, and I was offended by it. I was mostly offended by the fact that he wouldn't disown DeSapio in this very crucial time. But I got to like Bill very much. I guess I'm one of the few people around then that really liked him. I thought he had enormous ability. Everybody thinks that Kennedy used him and other things, but I don't. He spent a lot of time with Kennedy, and I can't help

but think that he influenced Kennedy.

A lot of it is this god damn bitchy stuff that goes around in politics. But Bill vanden Heuvel is a very able guy. Whether he went about using his ability in the right way or not, I don't know.

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He really got screwed in this last gubernatorial thing where if he hadn't been part of the Kennedy entourage, he might have gotten on the ticket. I think it worked against him. He was asked to help pick a lieutenant governor and he would have given his left tit to be lieutenant. I don't know, I didn't like him in that beginning campaign when he first ran for congress. I always respected his ability, and I honestly got to like him; I really did. In fact I like him very much now. I just think when people talk, they're going to say a lot of bitchy things—that he carried his shirts and all that.

HACKMAN: What could you see about his relationship with the other people in the Kennedy camp?

HADDAD: Well, there's a lot of jealousy and there's always been. I remember one of my jobs with Robert Kennedy, let me work with Jack Kennedy, and I used to go out, and I tell you it was really awful. I mean, God, I remember one time we were back stage somewhere in some discussion and Jack Kennedy was really baiting everybody... [Interruption]

HACKMAN: You were talking about something backstage when Kennedy was... You were talking about jealousy among other people and something about Kennedy drawing people out.

HADDAD: Oh, yes. Jack Kennedy one time backstage in the '60 campaign or something. I was traveling with him and he was baiting his staff and they were going after each other. He was really literally very obvious, and I was just sitting back and watching it. And he, Jack Kennedy said something to me to draw me into it. And I said, "You're not going to get me into that damn rat race." I turned around and walked away. And on the airplane, for instance when I'd go to see him.... I remember the first time I went to see him on behalf of Robert Kennedy, and I went and asked Kenny O'Donnell. And I called Robert Kennedy, Robert Kennedy said, "I didn't send you out there to talk to Kenny O'Donnell; I sent you out there to talk to my brother." So I got very close to Evelyn Lincoln, and I said to her, "When I have something to talk to the Senator about, Senator Jack Kennedy, I'll just tell you, and you tell him, and he can call me. I don't want to walk through this damn plane, all his staff, and walk to the back of the plane and open the door and sit down in there." I said, "These guys will make mince meat out of me." And it's true. And it was a very.... He called me into the back of the airplane, and I'd walk through all these guys, and it was real hostility, very jealous, competitive group of guys. And Robert Kennedy had a little bit of that. He had that same kind of trait about his staff; they were kind of jealous. I

guess it was natural, but protective, politically protective. And they were all jockey and he didn't discourage it. I mean I think he encouraged it.

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HACKMAN: Halberstam, in contrast to that Witcover [Jules Witcover] *85 Days* book—I don't know if you've read Witcover, the other one that's come out on the '68 campaign—plays up the difference between the staff. Did you see much of that this time around?

HADDAD: Well, there was a classic—well, I didn't get involved. This time it broke into two separate categories, the old timers and the new guys. I had a little bit of a bridge between the two worlds, but I was really classified as an old timer. I was never that much of an intimate, but I got classified with Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen] and Salinger [Pierre E.G. Salinger] and all those. And we all got assigned the same damn roles we had in the 1960 campaign. The same damn thing we did in the '60, we did in '68. Except everybody as I said—I don't know whether I said it in writing, but I said it somewhere—that the only difference was that they were wearing three hundred dollar tailor made suits in the '68 campaign. But it broke down that way. And I found myself working very easily with Sorensen and very easily with the whole situation. We didn't have that kind of intense competition. We had a mixed kind of leadership; I mean you didn't know where the real power source was. I wrote a memo on that in the Indiana campaign. I said—it was addressed to ten people—and it said, "To whoever is the leader of this campaign, colon" and I sent it to ten people because there was no really clear decision making process. Teddy was in and out, and Dutton [Frederick G. Dutton] was in and out. It was kind of screwy. But I didn't.... I had some assignments and I worked in a little cubicle with Don Wilson [Donald M. Wilson]. We had the area of the printed and visual word. I got involved in the television and the printed word, and I worked with Don Wilson and Dick Goodwin [Richard N. Goodwin] and Sorensen and that sort of thing. I did some other stuff, but basically I was involved in that kind of preparation of the written materials and preparation, helping in the preparation of the television stuff and ads and all that business. And also I was trying to help shape some of the ideas of the campaign some of the arguments. But he had a pretty brilliant staff of his own; they were competitive.

HACKMAN: Is this strictly in Indiana?

HADDAD: Indiana. I did it in Indiana for Nebraska, Oregon, California. We reported directly to Steve Smith because he really make the ultimate decisions, and even though it was a very confused decision-making structure, ultimately it was Steve, and he was floating all around. And we related directly to Steve. We prepared the literature for all the different states, and I'd send somebody out...We did it while we were in Indiana. And then we made the decision that rather than—it wasn't really a clear decision and I could shoot myself for this one, sitting in the TV studio here, a little TV studio where we were showing the TV things here....Steve Smith, Robert Kennedy and myself were

debating whether I ought to go to

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Oregon or stay East and try to do something here in New York because we were in trouble in New York. It was the end of the Oregon campaign. Kennedy strongly wanted me on the West Coast to travel....Oh, I know what my role was in that campaign. My role was to find out what the hell was going on; that's my basic role in that campaign because I remember that's what Kennedy said. He said, "I want to know what the hell's going on, what the problems are." And I remember in Indiana we interviewed all the coordinators, and they all had Boston accents except one person who was from Indiana. I mean I think he wanted me to find out what was going on. I remember that because I heard him tell that to Teddy once too. But anyway I forgot about that. So I was finding out what was going on, what the problems were, and then I designed strategies and literature and all that from it.

I came back East and didn't do the California thing. I always felt that with my Arabic name and the fact that I had a Jewish responsibility in the campaign, the Jewish problem was one of my areas. It was one of my areas in the '64 campaign, and I met with a lot of... That's right, I forgot about that. In '64 I was the guy on this whole Jewish question. And surprisingly ... I met with the Jewish leaders and we put out all kinds of statements, but I was the guy on that, the administrative guy on it. In this campaign I was too. And I felt that with my Arabic name and that responsibility, Sirhan Sirhan might have sought me out, and it's always speculative—that maybe my newspaper instinct may have warned me. I might have seen him two or three times and I just know how I react....And I just you know, as far as I was concerned, the worst decision I ever made was ...of course Kennedy left it up in the air, and Steve left it up in the air, and I could either have gone out there or stayed here.

And I really, I think I stayed here because I thought, "Well, God, if I stay here at least I can keep one eye on the business. If I go out there...." So I feel a little guilty because of that. Steve really wanted me here, and I just feel that with that responsibility in the campaign and with my name, and with my newspaper type instinct, I might have just been that little bit of added protection. I really feel very funny about that one; I just know how I react in situations. I always, like everybody else, I always looked everywhere, and, agh!! Well, anyway. I just felt that there was the possibility that he might have sought me out, and I would have heard his venom because I had a lot of that. People would come to me and talk to me everywhere I went. But anytime someone would come in with that problem in the campaign, they'd refer them to me, on both sides, Jewish and other. And it might have just happened in California. It's crazy!

HACKMAN: I can remember when I was here last Spring you were spending your weekends or maybe a couple days a week in Indiana. How did you first get into this thing, and how much time over the whole campaign did you spend?

HADDAD: It became full time. I just moved everything to Indiana. I moved my staff to Indiana. It was crazy; I just went. I was coming back here. I just dropped the whole business. We had a meeting of the staff and we pruned off those who could help and we just did it. I took Andre McGiffen with me and Dave Seed, we just went. It got to be full time. It got to be full time coming East because we got to do a lot of the literature here. We had to do a lot of the research and stuff. But it was full time.

HACKMAN: Can you remember particularly about the problems in Indiana in any of the reports that you wrote, the things that you ...

HADDAD: Well, at the beginning, you know, Kennedy had the wrong position on most of the issues. That was one of the first conclusions. For instance, I went up on one trouble problem. I went up to northern Indiana around Gary and places like that to check on the Polish situation and things like that. And I came back and told Kennedy, "You're going to get one out of every two of those votes." And he said, "Why?" And I said, "Well, half because you're Catholic but the other half because they think you can solve the problem. They don't like you and they don't like your views, but they think you can solve the problem." And we did get one out of every two votes up there. And I think that was part of the thing. I had the crime too. I was the guy on the law and order bit. I forgot I wrote that ad, that law and order ad. But basically it was a liberal ad signed by a lot of cops. But the problems were the classic ones, urban violence. Even though they didn't have too much of that there, they had a little bit. That was it. Just the whole bit. And Kennedy had the wrong views on seventy-five percent of the issues that were important. And I saw the polls and stuff. I can't remember. I don't think I got involved in the administrative. I did a lot to the policy stuff, because I kept clearing it with Sorensen all the time. We wrote this stuff for Nebraska as well, wrote this stuff for Oregon. And this was the basic piece of literature that we printed all over the country.

HACKMAN: Halberstam in that book says a lot of the younger staff people Edelman, Walinsky [Adam Walinsky], Greenfield [Jeffrey Greenfield], I guess, these guys were upset at the things that Robert Kennedy was saying in Indiana because he was catering too much to the Indiana vote.

HADDAD: Yeah, well, there were those kind of problems there. You know, they were pretty radical fellows. Like Walinsky would say, "Africa's not important anymore. That was a mistake before...." And so he'd (slicing sound). He's a brilliant guy, but in one fell swoop, he wrote off all of Africa. "It's not important anymore", you know. Of course, during

Jack Kennedy's Administration we always zeroed in on Africa and stuff, Latin America. He

just wiped out Africa, whoomp! with a kind of arrogant brilliance that he had. Just whoomp! I mean Kennedy couldn't just wipe off Africa that way. I mean he may be right, but you just don't do it. And I know they were mad at Sorensen. They always thought that he was a conservative fellow. I don't know where they put me in that. I may have bridged both of those things, but I was writing stuff that Sorensen was accepting. So I must have been closer to the Sorensen view.

HACKMAN: Well, on the things that they were writing, would they have to send them through Sorensen, or did....

HADDAD: No, they brought a lot of it on the plane. There was never any clear procedure, but we were trying to get synched to coordinate it. God, we were dying to find all the things that Kennedy had said. Milt Gwartzman [Milton A. Gwartzman] kind of sat in the middle of all of that, and Edelman, trying to get coordinated. I did a whole booklet on what Kennedy said, and made excerpts that had a lot of power because that's what we distributed all over the country, and I pulled out the excerpts that I thought were important. And I would clear it with Edelman and Gwartzman and I think Walinsky was in there somewhere. It was a kind of confused decision making structure, but usually on money and tough political decisions it was Steve Smith; on issues it was Ted Sorensen.

HACKMAN: Were Edelman and Gwartzman out or were they back?

HADDAD: In and out. They stayed sometimes. When we were in Indiana, they stayed in that headquarters sometimes. It was either Gwartzman or Edelman who was always supposed to be located in one spot, but they—a lot of people stayed with the Senator and they did a lot of last minute stuff, press releases. We took some pretty liberal positions. We hedged a little but not really.

HACKMAN: Did you get involved at all in the thing with the *Indianapolis Star* and whatever it was, that horrible paper out there?

HADDAD: It was awful. I did a survey, pulled all the clips together and showed what they did. I think I did that survey if I'm not mistaken. I pulled all the—you know, just showed how they treated him. I knew all the reporters too just from my previous background. I spent some time with them. Although I was again trying to keep local stability because I had a number of government contracts and those things...have anybody. I divorced myself from income from this company and everything that went out separately, but I just didn't want to get very high (Unintelligible), but I did talk to reporters

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that were old drinking buddies. They were the same guys. It was just a repeat of '61, whatever '60, '61. Just an absolute repeat of the same guys, just like slow motion.

HACKMAN: How was Robert Kennedy different from John Kennedy in his relations with the press and knowing how to handle people like that? And Mankiewicz [Frank F. Mankiewicz]...

HADDAD: He didn't have the charm of Jack Kennedy, and he was tougher and sometimes more abrasive, but the press guys got to really love him because he was quick and sharp and funny, all that. And they began to think that he was brighter than Jack Kennedy. And they began to think he was more tomorrow, that Jack Kennedy was perfect for his time and that Robert Kennedy was ahead of his time. I think that's what the kind of conclusion was.

HACKMAN: About Mankiewicz and Salinger, I would think there'd be some...

HADDAD: I didn't see much of that. They knew each other. I knew Mankiewicz in the Peace Corps. And Salinger stayed put; he loved it. I mean he really loved it, pot belly and cigar and jacket off. We were in the next office to Salinger. We had the adjoining office with him and with Jim McMannis and stuff. I got involved with that press thing too. I forgot I did some stuff there. I used to try to get stuff cleared. Ted Kennedy was pretty good as far as I was concerned. I could get to him and get stuff cleared sometimes. Other times we had a press release and we couldn't reach anybody, and we'd get Ted to do it. I had a lot of problems in clearing because we were doing a half million copies of something and we'd be all over the country and we had to make sure it was right. So I had that problem. Ted would do it sometimes. I'm just trying to reconstruct it all in my mind. I've kind of blocked it out, if you want to know the truth, blocked a lot of it out.

There was a fascinating incident with Jimmy Breslin [James Breslin], sitting in that rotten hotel in Indiana looking out the window. Kennedy was getting in the car and there's Teddy White [Theodore H. White] holding him. And Jimmy Breslin looks out the window and says, "What the hell is that skinny little bastard going to do when they shoot Kennedy?" He said, "God damn it." He gets up from the table and he runs out and he was putting his big fat body between Kennedy and the crowd, Breslin. You know, and he said, "When they shoot Kennedy. " And he got up from the god damn table and went out there and sat on the car because little old skinny Teddy White was helping Kennedy in the car and Breslin got out there and sat on the car. He did it not to be close to the candidate, but to be between Kennedy and the bullet. There was a lot of that kind of psychology in the campaign.

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I remember I was at the White House right after the Jack Kennedy assassination. I don't know if I told you this. Breslin came in. He'd gotten in a fight with the police chief in Dallas, saying they were going to shoot Oswald [Lee Harvey Oswald]. And he was screaming and yelling, and they finally threw him out. And Breslin was half drunk, screaming, "They're going to kill Oswald. They're going to kill Oswald. They're going to kill Oswald." And you

know, they thought he was drunk, threw him out and all that. Then he came back to the White House. He was just in the White House and the TV went on with the shooting of Oswald. And you had to sit on Breslin. He just blew. He said, "I told them, I told them, I told them." I was standing next to Shriver when Shriver picked up the phone and was told about Oswald. He went just completely blank; Kennedy was just completely blank. I mean Sarge was completely blank, no emotion. He put down the phone. I said, "What happened?" He said, "They shot Oswald." Then you heard all the screaming and stuff.

I don't remember the chronology there, but we really had to practically put Breslin in a straight jacket. That's why it was so eerie to me when he said the damn thing in Indiana. I remember walking down the street with Kennedy in Indiana, coming back from that meeting at the restaurant house that he talks about, and all the cop guys were there [inaudible] Miller and... I'd done that law and order thing. We had all the law and order guys. And walking over with Kennedy, everybody's looking over at the windows and stuff. And walking back, I said to Kennedy, "You can't walk, it's two o'clock in the morning." I said, "It's hard to walk with you on the street, you can't talk to you; everybody's looking at the windows." And he said, "What's going to happen, is going to happen. There's nothing you can do about it." But I mean all of us had that extra protective feeling. It was just very prevalent in the campaign, very prevalent.

HACKMAN: You were talking about why you were in Indiana putting things out for other states. How exactly did that...look?

HADDAD: Well, I talked for instance, used our guy in Nebraska, and I'd send Dave Seed into Nebraska to talk and get all the information, then we'd write it and we'd get it laid out here in New York, get it type set somewhere and then we'd have the galleys made up, then we'd fly them to Nebraska, something like that. We'd change about 30 percent of the issues, 70 percent of the issues, 30 percent of the issues would be local. Then we'd go around and talk to all these guys. And I'd send somebody in and we'd collect them. I'd go right to my typewriter. Guys would do it and then I'd redo it.

HACKMAN: Did you actually then go into Nebraska and in, you didn't, I think you said...

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HADDAD: I don't think I actually went in to Nebraska, I think I just, we domiciled in Indiana and tried to get ahead of the game. We were all, I remember when we moved out in Indiana the theory was "God, well, you know, if we lose Indiana we lose everything." So we all just went out there. And I had this experience before in a campaign. Instead of taking a hotel room, I took an apartment because I knew we were going to be there, so I took an apartment in Indiana. And I stayed there. And we had to get ahead of the game in Nebraska and California, Oregon, other places, and New York. So I was trying to stay ahead of the game. But a lot of it was done, the layout and stuff was done here

in New York and the writing was done in Indiana; the printing was done in Chicago frequently... my basic associations with Kennedy directly were in Indiana. After that I was really only accidentally involved with him personally.

HACKMAN: Had you gotten involved at all in the early discussions on whether he'd run or not? February, March, and of this?

HADDAD: No, just one three hour conversation with him when we both got—airplanes were lousy—we both got on the same train. He was by himself. I was by myself. I walked into the dining room and there he was. I sat down and talked for three hours. We had fascinating talk. I wanted him to run. He hadn't made up his mind yet.

HACKMAN: This is when you...

HADDAD: I remember exactly. Right after the Tet Offensive. And he was talking to me about that because I had been talking to a lot of newspaper people that they'd lied about the whole thing. Johnson, I think, had even lied to.... My father-in-law and others had been to the White House and had been told all kinds of bull shit. Everybody was getting very bitter about the Tet Offensive. I think it was, it must have been right before he announced. I don't know when it was. I don't remember exactly how I got in the campaign. And we had a long talk, one of the most fascinating talks I ever had with him. And it was just.... We sat there for about three hours on the train, and talked about Vietnam. I felt he ought to run. He'd announced that he wasn't going to run, and I thought he ought to do it. It was a fascinating experience. We got off the train in Washington. There were these horrible beatnik types there, dirty, everything. They were yelling, "Chicken, coward". And I just saw that Irish jaw tighten up. I'm sure he wanted to knock those guys on their ass. But I remember that coming off the train.

But I remember how I got involved now. Ted Kennedy called me, reached me in Columbus, Georgia. I was having a meeting of my staff down there. And he said, "Find out about the Florida situation. See what you can do there." So I took over Florida.

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I forgot that was my first responsibility. I had a coalition worked out with the McCarthy people. Tom Adams [Thomas Burton Adams, Jr.] was the traditional Democrat in the state. And Kennedy just a kind of a front or a free... It would have been a ticket that would've gone to Kennedy, but it would have taken it away from Johnson, at that point. I can't remember whether Johnson was still in the way, yes, would have taken it away from Johnson. We were really swamping them. We had some polls done and everything. We were meeting. My father-in-law has the place at Thomasville, Georgia, which is about twenty-eight miles from Tallahassee. We were holding all of our meetings there. And I set up shop right there for the Kennedy thing in Florida. And then I was doing stuff with all Kefauver guys around the

country and stuff. But Florida was my first responsibility. We had this coalition set up twice, and we even got the McCarthy people to request Sandi Kusches to come down and be the campaign manager which was great because we could trust him. We could've really won. And then after the commitments, everything had been made twice, McCarthy killed the idea. He didn't want any joint fronts. He wanted splinters. I worked in Florida. I worked in several other states too. I can't remember. I worked in several other states, because I was flying up to Washington to see Sorensen, I'd forgotten about that.

HACKMAN: On that conversation...

HADDAD: Don Wilson was the one that got me involved in the printed media. He called me and said that Bobby wanted me to do that.

HACKMAN: On that conversation with Robert Kennedy on the train, can you remember him talking about McCarthy at all at that point? I wonder if it's before New Hampshire? Yeah, it had to be before New Hampshire.

HADDAD: No, no I don't. Not at that point. I think he shared the general view of McCarthy, being not much. I was very down on McCarthy. See I knew he never was there when we had a major fight in the Senate, never there to be counted on. And I didn't like what he was doing to the kids because he didn't give a shit about the kids. He's kind of a supercilious ass, just pontifical, pompous, ich! I just felt he was going to disappoint a lot of people. He made a good issue and all that, but I think he was exploiting... I really didn't like him politically or personally.

HACKMAN: At the time of Indiana when it was evident that a lot of the young people were for McCarthy, rather than being, I guess, what Robert Kennedy regarded as his constituency, can you remember making any efforts to bring these back in, or how was this done?

HADDAD: Oh, yeah. We had David Borden from the Peace Corps

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come in and we were getting all those kids. And Sandi Kusches by that time was the key McCarthy assistant, and I didn't want to put the pressure on him, but we were trying to get the kids back. Dave Borden, who had been in the Peace Corps with us, was Muhoz Marin's son-in-law, a hell of a guy, hell of a guy, and he began to do it. We put another Peace Corps guy from Tennessee, a guy that was with the Peace Corps came up to do it too. Yeah, we really went after the young people, trying to get some of them back. It became a war of young people. They were around the hotel. I didn't get too involved in that. I prepared some literature, helped a little bit. But that was an enormous task. I got political pros from all over the country to come in. I got a whole team of guys out of Florida. Old buddies came in. We practically flooded Indiana. We ran Indiana with outsiders.

HACKMAN: Can you remember anything on the [Martin Luther] King assassination and the impact on the Indiana campaign?

HADDAD: No, I don't remember. I know I talked to Kennedy about it.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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