

Robert A. Wallace Oral History Interview –JFK #1, 4/26/1968
Administrative Information

Creator: Robert A. Wallace
Interviewer: John F. Stewart
Date of Interview: April 26, 1968
Place of Interview: Washington, D.C.
Length: 51 pp.

Biographical Note

Wallace, Robert A.; Special Assistant to the Secretary (1961), Assistant to the Secretary (1961-1963), Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (1963-1969). Wallace discusses John F. Kennedy's [JFK] career from 1951, when JFK was a member of Congress, to 1960, when JFK was running for president. He describes the work he did as a part of both Senator Paul H. Douglas' staff as well as JFK's campaign staff, and he discusses Theodore Sorensen's political career and influence, among other issues.

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Suggested Citation

Robert A. Wallace, recorded interview by John F. Stewart, April 26, 1968, (page number), John F. Kennedy Oral History Program.

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Robert A. Wallace – JFK #1

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Oral History Interview

with

ROBERT A. WALLACE

April 26, 1968
Washington, D.C.

By John F. Stewart

For the John F. Kennedy Library

STEWART: Why don't we start by my just asking you when you first met John Kennedy. You say it was when he was a member of the House of Representatives?

WALLACE: Yes. My first relationships with John Kennedy was when he was a Congressman, and I believe the year was 1951. He was interested in making reductions in the Federal budget, as was my boss, Senator Douglas [Paul H. Douglas]. He admired Douglas because Douglas was a liberal who nevertheless was concerned about excessive expenditures of public funds, and from that standpoint wanted to model his career along those lines, I believe. He wanted to be a liberal who was hard-headed about money matters. The Hoover Commission had made several suggestions with respect to airmail subsidies, mainly that the subsidy be separated from the air mail postage mail rates. This would clearly identify the subsidy so that it would make it more exposed and subject to reduction. At that time Kennedy had an assistant, Langdon P. Marvin, Jr., who spent all his time on this subject. In fact, he even wrote an article on airmail subsidies for the *Georgetown Law Review* and he traced Kennedy's activities on that issue. Incidentally, the library certainly ought to have that article.

STEWART: Was he actually a member of the staff or was he just involved in this

one aspect?

WALLACE: I think he was a consultant, and not a paid member of the staff. He listed himself as a research professor of economics at Georgetown University. I think he had a connection with Georgetown University, but he didn't actually teach classes. I'm not sure whether or not he was paid anything. I think he had independent wealth, and didn't need money particularly. But he was a consultant to Kennedy and Kennedy arranged for him to have a study room in the Library of Congress. He prized this study room very much.

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In fact, on his stationery he listed "Study Room number so and so, Library of Congress," as his office.

STEWART: Didn't this cause some embarrassment one time?

WALLACE: Later on it did cause some controversy. The purpose of the study rooms is for use by persons working for a congressman or senator only while making special studies. But he'd had one of the rooms for a period of several years, I believe, and since it was supposed to be used only temporarily this was pointed, his critics. I may say, though, that Marvin, who was working on this subject of air mail subsidies naturally developed enemies including the Air Transport Association which was vitally affected and definitely opposed to the separation of this subsidy, because they benefited from it. They didn't want it separated from the mail rates because it would become more subject to reduction. At that time Marvin struck me as a very bright, intelligent young fellow. I think he was about my age in 1951. I was thirty years old, and I think he was probably about thirty. And I was impressed with the article he'd done for the *Georgetown Law Review*. I have done Law Review articles myself, and some academic articles. I respected such articles because they must be done pretty carefully. But Marvin kept on driving on this one subject and so therefore the staff of the Air Transportation Association took it upon themselves to try to discredit him. Marvin himself became the center of a good deal of controversy, on which I suspect he probably thrived. And so there was that problem. But I nevertheless felt that Marvin was serving a good cause.

Well, Marvin invited both me and Kennedy to dinner one evening. I've forgotten where the dinner -- oh, I remember. It was the University Club, I believe. Both Marvin and Kennedy were single. Marvin had a date with Nancy Hanchmann, a very good looking girl on the staff of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who has since become one of the TV news commentators. She is now married and her name is Nancy Dickinson. And Kennedy, I don't know if it was a date or not, but he was with Mary McGrory of the *Washington Star*. We had dinner together and a nice long chat.

At the dinner we discussed how you could be a liberal and still go after budget cuts. That was one point. Another was the airmail subsidy itself, that issue and how to deal with it. But another thing, which Kennedy brought up himself was, he wanted my opinion about

Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., because he said he was considering running against him for the Senate. I told him that in my opinion Lodge was a liberal Republican -- not very far apart, politically, from a Democrat who was hard headed on the budget. Thus if he were to defeat Lodge he would have to do it by very intensive campaigning; go into every city and town in the state and see as many people as possible. I said I thought this would be successful

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because it worked for Senator Douglas. Douglas campaigned for the Senate for almost two solid years all over the state of Illinois and was successful. Also when Scott Lucas was Senate majority leader Everett Dirksen dropped out of the House of Representatives and spent two years going all over the state of Illinois. I told Kennedy that I thought this type of intensive campaigning was especially vital when there were not sharp differences on issues. I don't know, he may have already had this in mind, he probably did, but at any rate he agreed with me that this was what would have to be done. And in 1952 he did carry out a very intensive campaign.

STEWART: Do you remember any impressions you got as to one, his understanding, and two, his interest in budgetary matters, or some of the more technical aspects of governmental financing? The reason I ask, of course, it's been said so often that, especially when he was in the House, he just didn't get that interested or that involved in these types of things. And perhaps you could say...

WALLACE: Well, it's my impression that in the case of the airmail subsidy he was thoroughly familiar with it. He had obviously accepted the briefings that Marvin had given him and he understood them. There was never any question in my mind but what he was terribly intelligent and quick to grasp the details of issues. If he wanted to get into an issue, to take the time to do it, he certainly had the ability. Incidentally, at the time we had this dinner, Kennedy was on crutches. I guess it was his back problem that he had in 1951.

STEWART: Yes.

WALLACE: I remember thinking at the time, wondering how in the devil he was going to get around all of that state with the crutches. I still don't know how he did it, but he apparently did. I don't really know anything beyond what I said about his being able to grasp, perceive the problems of public finances. But I never had any doubt but what he could. Also, I'm restricting my comments to my knowledge of him at that time, not later.

STEWART: Yes. What more did you do then, as far as the airmail subsidies were concerned?

WALLACE: Well, we worked -- I've forgotten what form it took. I think there may

have been an amendment to an appropriations bill, which we tried to get adopted, which was probably knocked out on a point of order

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because it was legislation on an appropriations bill. We tried to dramatize the issue in the Senate. It was really, well, the cooperation was simply sort of a trading of information rather than a legislative cooperation because I don't think it ever... I don't remember whether we ever had any joint statements or anything like that. It was mainly that we were both after the same thing and interested in what each other had to say about it. Also, Kennedy, I think, had a great deal of interest in me, primarily because I was Douglas' assistant, and he admired Douglas so much. So that he was therefore very interested in what I had to say, although he didn't know me.

STEWART: Did you have any contact with him then, either during the Convention, perhaps, of 1952 or during the campaign of 1952?

WALLACE: No. I was completely out of the campaign of 1952. In 1951 I worked on some railroad retirement legislation. I did a good job on it too because it was a very delicate issue. I worked it out so that there was general agreement among operating groups and non-operating groups and even the carriers themselves.

One of the features of the legislation, which helped get it through Congress was a provision to create a special ad hoc committee to study railroad retirement legislation. So this committee was set up in 1952. It was a short term kind of a thing, eight months or so, so it was not feasible to pull in a special staff for this when it was likely to fold up very quickly. Senator Douglas was named chairman of the committee and he made me the staff director. The '52 presidential election was coming up and he planned to be gone a lot so he wouldn't be needing me as much. During that period, from the middle of '52 till the end of the year, I could be devoting my time to this study, and also help him in case other things came up.

So I became staff director of this joint committee on railroad retirement legislation. This was early in 1952. I guess I might as well move into this period now....

STEWART: Yes, yes.

WALLACE: ... which really is the beginning of my association with Ted Sorensen [Theodore Sorensen]. Well, being the staff director of that committee, I selected for the clerk of the committee Mary Nolan, who was my secretary on Douglas' staff, and is now the head of our equal employment program here at the Treasury Department, to take care of all the administrative details of the committee. I also wanted a junior lawyer and junior economist, at that time around six or seven thousand dollar annual salary -- the top salary at that time was \$11,600 -- so that I could have someone on the economic side and someone on the legal side.

The economist that I selected was a Canadian from the

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University of Chicago who had finished his master's degree and was working on his Ph.D. He had written his master's thesis on the Canadian railroad retirement system, so this made him a natural. This was Murray Herlihy.

I didn't know who to get for a legal counsel. During a lunch with Stan Gervitz, a lawyer who was head of the Washington area ADA, Americans for Democratic Action, I mentioned this situation to him. He was the one who told me about Ted Sorensen who was on the General Counsel's staff at the old Federal Security Administration. So I arranged to interview Sorensen and was very impressed with him. I think he was only about 23 years old at the time. But he was obviously very intelligent, very bright and was the kind of fellow I was looking for. I felt that the expertise on the provisions of the law itself was available among the staff of the Railroad Retirement Board. What I needed was someone who was intelligent who could understand this mass of material which would be coming, which we had to organize and present in the form of a report.

So that was how I happened to hire Sorensen. He knew that it was a temporary job, but he felt that he could probably get something after the study was over. After all, he was a career lawyer in the Federal Security Agency and there was no reason why he shouldn't be able to get another job as a lawyer in some other government agency when this study was completed.

Well, Sorensen's work was truly outstanding. He had a way of going through masses and masses of material and pulling out salient parts. A lot of it was dictated. He had a code of some sort so that he could dictate something and put it in a code so that this would show him where to find his material in his files. He had a terrific technique for doing this. Sorensen was also a very good writer. At that time I wrote quite a bit myself. I wrote articles for magazines, such as *The New Republic* and had helped Douglas write articles for magazines such as the old *American Magazine*, *Saturday Evening Post*, *Coronet* and others. I wrote an article on fair trade, or resale price maintenance, which is a fairly complicated subject. I was trying to make it acceptable for something like *Harper's Magazine* or *The Atlantic Monthly* because it was an interesting subject and something people need to learn more about. I reworked that piece several times and I was never happy with it. My writing is not very inspired -- I try to cut down on long and complicated sentences, eliminate big words, get it down as simple as possible so that the average reader can understand it. Well, after having done that I read it through and it seemed dull and pedestrian. And the meter was terrible. It was dada dada daa -- dada dada daa -- just boring as hell. One day I gave a copy of it to Sorensen and I said "You know, this is clear, but it doesn't impress anybody. Why don't you see what you can do with it?" This was about five o'clock in the evening. He said, "I'll take it home tonight

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and look at it." The next day he brought the article back with just a few edit marks on it. And I'll tell you, it just transformed that piece. It was amazing. For example, the edit I remembered most is this: the big issue in resale price maintenance, so called fair trade, is that

it permits a manufacturer to tell retailers what price they can sell their product for. The reason this was permitted was to protect their investment in the name, like General Electric. If one dealer cuts the price on toasters, say, and then everybody buys them from this discount dealer then the other dealers won't carry it. So the manufacturer would lose the value of his name because no one will carry his product. In the article, I was trying to point this out. I said an individual could "run ads in the newspapers" that he had a "certain name product at a certain price." Well, instead of "running ads in the newspapers," Sorensen changed it to read "could place in advertisements in the press and current periodicals." To me, his words seemed elegant and mine very pedestrian. So Sorensen had this flare for elegance in phraseology.

Sorensen, I felt, was a genius. But he had a knack for alienating anybody who was at this level or below him. The secretaries all disliked him intensely. Murray Herlihy, the committee economist, didn't like him. But he was always just charming as hell with me, who was his superior.

Sorensen was ambitious and gave parties at his house. I remember one party I attended. He invited everybody on the staff to it. There was a colored secretary on our staff who disliked Sorensen and refused to go. During the party, we played a game called "twenty-five squares" where you have the dots and you have letters and you connect them to form squares and this permits you to form words. The next day I came to work and this secretary, Marge Ingram, who didn't like Sorensen and refused to attend his party said, "Well, how was the party?" I said, "Oh, it was all right." "What did you do?" she asked. "We played a game called twenty-five squares," I replied. And she said, "Oh, were there that many of you there?" [Laughter] I have known persons in college and high school and in work situations who were clearly more brilliant than I, but I always had the ability to recognize this superiority and make allowances for any personal quirks. Many people can't do this. A genius will tend to lose patience with someone who simply can't keep up with him intellectually. I suppose this is not a very shining personal quality. But it should not detract from the fact that the person is very superior, intellectually. I think this was true of Sorensen. He must have had an I.Q. well over 150-- tremendously brilliant.

Now some of this aspect of Sorensen's personality and ability will come out in later discussions about his relationships and work on the Kennedy staff. I'll come back to that phase of Sorensen and what I thought about his role in this race for the presidency. But let me continue for the

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moment on another aspect of Sorensen.

When our job with the committee was almost finished Sorensen was naturally interested in where he would be going next. The Democrats had lost the '52 election and this limited area of choice. We looked over the senators that had been elected and decided that despite the fact that Eisenhower had won there wasn't such a great change in the Senate. We lost Senators like McFarland [Ernest W. McFarland] for Goldwater [Barry Goldwater] but Goldwater at that time was considered very little more conservative than McFarland. We made a chart in which we graded the liberal-conservative change in the Senate. A minus four meant a solid liberal had been replaced by a solid conservative. A plus four meant that a solid

conservative had been replaced by a solid liberal. A zero was about even -- no change. Kennedy had beaten Lodge but we didn't count that as very much of a change -- a plus one, I think.

Another thing, Sorensen did a first draft of an article for Senator Douglas for *The New Republic*. Douglas always paid me half of the fee when I did such drafts, and he did this for Sorensen.

Well, as I say, Sorensen began to get a little itchy after the Democrats lost the election about what he was going to do. There was an opening on Senator Morse's [Wayne Morse] staff. Sorensen was a dedicated liberal. He almost took a litmus paper test about how you really felt about civil rights, civil liberties and so forth. And he was really dedicated. Well, there was an opening on Morse's staff. It was for a legislative assistant, and Sorensen wanted that job very badly. I recommend him to Morse. I knew Senator Morse and Morse respected me. Morse, as a matter of fact, was on our railroad retirement committee. Well, as it turned out Sorensen didn't get the job. It went to a fellow named Mert Bernstein who had been on the labor committee staff. Sorensen was terribly disappointed when he lost out on that appointment. I often thought later that if Sorensen had gotten that job he would have been on Morse staff and that would have been that. He would never have applied for the job with Kennedy.

When I was on Douglas's staff I worked for a while with Phil Stern and Stern had been a congressional fellow on Senator Scoop Jackson's [Henry M. Jackson] staff when Jackson was in the House. Through him I knew Jackson. Jackson was elected to the Senate, of course, in '52 as was Kennedy. I recommended Sorensen to both Jackson and to Kennedy. And he was interviewed by both of them. I remember talking with Langdon Marvin, saying that I thought Sorensen would be awfully good on Kennedy's staff.

STEWART: Do you remember talking to Kennedy and getting any indication perhaps of the type of persons he was looking for?

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WALLACE: No, I didn't. I never saw Kennedy right away after he was elected. I heard from Langdon Marvin that he would be needing a research assistant, but I didn't talk to Kennedy personally then. But I wrote the recommendation and then talked with Langdon Marvin about Sorensen. As I say, Sorensen was a dedicated militant liberal. He had a few reservations about Kennedy because he didn't come out stronger against McCarthyism than he did.

Sorensen was interviewed by both Jackson and by Kennedy. I think the way he happened to go with Kennedy was simply that Kennedy offered him a job first. Jackson also offered him a job, but he had already accepted with Kennedy. My recommendation carried a hell of a lot of weight because both Jackson and Kennedy admired Douglas for his work and they probably thought his research assistant must be pretty damned good. Well, actually of course the ability was mostly with Douglas himself, but, anyway, I got a lot more credit than I deserved from these people. But at any rate Douglas...

STEWART: Excuse me. Douglas personally wasn't involved in the recommendation to your knowledge?

WALLACE: Well, I got Douglas to write a letter to Kennedy. Douglas never knew Sorensen very well. As a matter of fact, I think at some point years later it came out that Douglas had recommended Sorensen to Kennedy. He asked me, "Did I recommend him?" I said, "Yes, you sent a letter to him." Well, Douglas never was very close to Sorensen, mainly because he was out campaigning or lecturing during the period Sorensen worked for us. Sorensen told me later that when he was interviewed by Kennedy he raised the McCarthy issue, and that Kennedy had discussed it to his complete satisfaction.

Where are we? Well, I guess we're getting into 1963....

STEWART: '53.

WALLACE: '53 and Kennedy and Sorensen have just made contact.

STEWART: Can I ask you one question? Do you recall anything about the election of Lyndon Johnson as Majority Leader? I think that, according to one story anyway, Johnson made contact with Kennedy very shortly after he was elected and got a fairly firm commitment for his vote as the majority leader. I'm trying to think who opposed Johnson, if anyone, in January '53 for the election as Majority Leader. [James E. Murray, Montana]

WALLACE: Gee, that's been such a long time too. I can't quite remember. But I remember that I was disgusted with the liberals in the Senate because they let Johnson walk away with that. At the time, you know,

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there was great friction between Johnson and the liberals. If you remember back to the 1950-1951 period, during the debates over the Kerr Natural Gas Bill and the Ieland Olds nomination for the Federal Power Commission, things like that, Johnson was an enemy as far as the liberals were concerned. So when Johnson pulled this coup on the majority leadership... was Mansfield [Mike Mansfield] just elected that time, too?

STEWART: I think so, yes.

WALLACE: As I understand it Johnson would call up these various and say, "I've got so many votes. Will you be with me too?" So they figured that since he was in anyway and it would go hard on them if they went against him. So this is the way that he probably got in. But the liberals waited around so darn long before getting cranked into any kind of a campaign. You see, Douglas didn't want it.

STEWART: I may have some notes on that.

WALLACE: I've forgotten who was in the Senate at that time.

STEWART: Gee, I remember...

WALLACE: Humphrey [Herbert H. Humphrey] was around, Douglas was around, Kefauver [Estes Kefauver] was around.

STEWART: But none of those certainly would have been a...

WALLACE: Well, they were all highly individualistic...

STEWART: They wouldn't have been a candidate. And there was a liberal candidate, but I'll be darned if I can...

WALLACE: Well, there was I think a middle of the road candidate.

STEWART: It wasn't Monroney [A.S. Mike Monroney]?

WALLACE: Monroney wasn't elected. Well he was elected in '50 but he wouldn't have been there long enough. Who was in then?

STEWART: It wasn't Herbert Lehman?

WALLACE: No, he was another highly individualistic fellow. It wouldn't have been Kerr or Monroney. Was Barkley -- Barkley went to the Senate. I think he was too old then. Well...

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STEWART: I guess...

WALLACE: Anyway, I felt that the liberals fell down on the job by letting Johnson do this. In the early days Johnson would regularly infuriate the liberals. And then he would come through on public housing or something like that and then they would praise him. It was a very exasperating kind of experience because every time you wanted to criticize him, They'd say, "How about public housing?" or some other big job that he'd really pulled off. Well, at any rate, the liberals as usual, and this is still the case, just didn't organize.

Is there any other question you want to go into about the earlier Sorensen period? Well, one interesting thing, you know Sorensen was pretty young. I recommended him to different places, the Department of Justice and others. But he was too young. I said "Well, you know, your age is twenty-four but if you are well over twenty four we could put down

twenty-five and that would be pretty close.” But he said, “You’ve already done that.” He was still actually only twenty-three but we had put down twenty-four. It was hard to remember that he was so very young.

STEWART: Of course, during Kennedy’s first couple of years he stuck to New England problems pretty strictly.

WALLACE: Yes. Well, are we ready to go into that period now because that’s what I was going to get into next?

STEWART: Yes, and, of course, he was later accused of being very provincial and parochial in doing this?

WALLACE: Not any more than usual. At the time Kennedy interviewed Sorensen he told him he wanted to make a series of studies of the New England regional economy, that he wanted to represent all of New England and integrate those interests with those of the country to the maximum possible extent. This was a great approach for him because it did several things. one, it protected his flanks at home, because being interested in problems of New England, to show how they tied with a lot of legislation which was considered very liberal, which then made it possible for him to not lose conservatives while supporting some of this liberal legislation. For example, raising the minimum wage. His study showed that industry was leaving New England because of the lower wages in the South, so a higher minimum wage would help New England. This was the kind of thing that he was able to do. And also the concept of

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redevelopment, which might have been considered an excessive expenditure of money. He showed that this type of program could help rebuild the industry of New England. That’s how he got into area redevelopment. Senator Douglas generally gets credit, incidentally, for area redevelopment, and deservedly so, but Kennedy was the real originator of it. At any rate, this series of studies of New England got into textiles, it got into the minimum wage, it got into area redevelopment, it got into water power, and I think it also got into pollution.

I think the reason Kennedy was impressed with Sorensen was Sorensen’s ability which I have previously mentioned to go through masses of material, analyze it, organize it and present it in a sensible way. And also the fact that it was presented not as a political speech but as a careful, scholarly treatise which Sorensen could do. That’s why Kennedy decided to take Sorensen, because he wanted to get into this kind of a thing right away. I think for the first six or eight months of ‘53 Sorensen was immersed in this study. AND then Kennedy would periodically put a lot of it in the *Congressional Record*. When it was completed he combined it all into a single booklet, and then this went all over New England. This of course developed his stature as a New England senator. His own Massachusetts people saw that he was helping the whole region. It was really terrific. It was a good thing for

him to do as a Senator from this area; it was a good thing as a Senator of the United States, and it was a great approach.

STEWART: Yes.

WALLACE: But I think this was Kennedy's idea, not Sorensen's, as I recall. Sorensen developed it for him. And perhaps as we go on I can point out that when you try to separate Kennedy from Sorensen it becomes very difficult because they complemented each other so much that where one stopped the other carried on. But the earlier idea that Sorensen was Kennedy's brain is just utterly wrong because it was a good deal like my relationship with Douglas. I got a hell of a lot of credit for the stuff Douglas would do simply because I was his assistant. Some people assumed that an assistant does all the work. Well, that just isn't true. On the other hand, you've got to have a good assistant with a lot of ability who can complement you and get cross fertilization going and you can build into a good harmony. This, I think, is the way you characterize the Kennedy-Sorensen relationship. Take Kennedy's book that won the Pulitzer Prize. Drew Pearson and others said that Sorensen pulled together a lot of the material, worked on drafts and edited throughout. But so did Kennedy. Sorensen used staff of the Library of Congress to pull material together. So, who

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actually writes a book is a moot point. But there's no question but what the idea of the book was conceived by Kennedy and that it was organized and developed by him with help from Sorensen, with help from the Library of Congress, with suggestions from people like Allen Nevins and perhaps even Schlesinger. I don't know. Kennedy knew how to utilize help. That was the important thing about Kennedy. He was able to be both a progenitor of thought and an absorber of thought. There should be no question about that.

One of the humorous incidents occurred when Senator Homer Capehart, who was not known for being a very sophisticated Senator, got up once on the Senate floor when Kennedy was talking and bluntly raised this point about, "Who really wrote this book." Kennedy's reply was, "Well, there's one thing certain. I'm confident that no one has prepared for you the remark that you're delivering now."

[Laughter]

STEWART: I had never heard that. What about the whole McCarthy question? Do you recall talking to the President about it or talking to Sorensen at any length about it?

WALLACE: I never discussed it with Kennedy. I did discuss it with Sorensen, but I can't remember all the ins and outs. It's been so long that it's a little hazy to me. Personally, I don't think of myself as a complete liberal nut or a mere pragmatist either, or opportunist or whatever you want to call it. I think

idealism and pragmatism have to be worked in together. If you're going to contribute to society you can't do it buried in some hole. Like Franklin Roosevelt said, "You have to be in office before you can do anything." The best way to deal with a great disease like McCarthyism is to open a lot of legitimate dispute. I never felt that Kennedy either helped McCarthyism or pushed it. Everything he did with respect to McCarthyism or pushed it. Everything he did with respect to McCarthyism seemed to me a sort of defensive play. He couldn't attack it frontally. The results of attacking McCarthyism frontally were demonstrated by the defeat of Tydings [Millard Tydings], who attacked it on the floor of the Senate. Also by the defeat of Bill Benton and others. It was like attacking a tank with rocks. Those who did it were simply clobbered at the polls.

And yet there were many people who said, "If you don't attack McCarthyism you're a coward and so forth." Douglas had the same problem, it was not easy to deal with. There was a period in '51 and '52 when McCarthy had many, many Catholics in the country hoodwinked. We have great Catholic groups in Chicago where Douglas was and great Catholic groups in Boston where Kennedy was. It is interesting, if I can jump way ahead, to see what happened to many of the people who were saying, demanding that people should lay down their political lives in this regard and thought that Kennedy was a coward.

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At the 1960 Convention there were these wild eyed people demonstrating for Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson]. This was anti-Kennedy, and it was based primarily on his failure to tangle with McCarthy. And now, the same group is the one which is eulogizing Kennedy and, you know, he was great perfection. People are very whimsical.

[Laughter]

STEWART: That's the truth.

WALLACE: Now where were we?

STEWART: Well, we were still in this early period. Do you want to just first follow your direct associations chronologically through to 1959 until the time you joined the staff?

WALLACE: Yes, I think that's right. Just what little pieces that I know of. I'll say this that -- let's see '53, Sorensen went with Kennedy. We had a joint effort, I believe it was '53 or early '54, which was, again, on cutting the budget. This time it was to oppose a part of the Senate appropriation bill which provided funds for the deepening of the Delaware River. The reason for this was that one project helped only one company, U.S. Steel. We would be spending something like forty million dollars to help U.S. Steel. And it didn't seem right to me and it didn't seem right to Kennedy. So Douglas and Kennedy were joined in the effort to oppose this. We didn't win, but we did oppose it together. I worked with Sorensen on that. And in that particular case I provided

most of the information, the reports of the Corps of Engineers on the project, who got the benefits, the benefit-cost ratios, and so forth.

STEWART: The St. Lawrence Seaway, were you...

WALLACE: I really didn't work much with them on that. Well, '54 was the period of Douglas' re-election. I was pretty much concerned with that, and spent from about the middle of '54 toward the end of it, very much wrapped up in his campaign. So during the year of '54 I didn't have too much relationship with him. There were spasmodic relationships. We did have to complete our report on railroad retirement early in 1953. Sorensen at that time was, with his background at the Federal Security Agency, leaned toward pushing as much of that program into that Social Security Administration as possible. But the railroad brotherhoods were very much against this. So the railroad brotherhoods were always complaining to me about Ted Sorensen. He became their great bete noire almost like the Transport Association went after Langdon Marvin. But they went over

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Sorensen's head to Kennedy, and Kennedy himself believed that the situation could be worked out, which it ultimately was and later they became great friends.

STEWART: He didn't campaign for Douglas in '54, did he?

WALLACE: No.

STEWART: That wouldn't have been...

WALLACE: He was on the staff of Kennedy. No, there wouldn't have been any of that.

STEWART: No, I mean Kennedy didn't do anything...

WALLACE: Oh...

STEWART: ...for Douglas in Illinois in '54 that you know of.

WALLACE: Well, he may have; he may have.

STEWART: Of course, he went into the hospital in October of '54, so it -- he was actually out at the time.

WALLACE: One thing I remember during that early period was sitting next to Douglas on the floor and seeing Kennedy come in on the floor with

crutches. And he looked very ashen, he looked terrible. Douglas said, "That poor boy's going to die." I said, "Oh, really?" He said, "Yes. He's had a terrible home life. His father was never around when he needed him." Douglas blamed his father for his poor health. He didn't have enough family love and affection and so forth, which I did think was utterly wrong. I think the father was great with the kids. Douglas always had a fondness for Kennedy. I mean, it was sort of a mutual bond there. I don't know. I don't remember Kennedy coming to Illinois. Does that wrap up '53 and '54?

STEWART: Yes. Unless you'd want to at this time... I wanted to ask you about Kennedy's general reputation with various senators, various groups. It may be from this initial period it would be valuable. For example, do you recall any real efforts he made to get personally friendly with any number of liberal senators? Or did he seem to be intent on getting along with the leadership, getting along with Lyndon Johnson and keeping his peace with as many people as possible?

WALLACE: I never thought about it, but now that you mention it I will say the latter was probably true.

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Because he, being a liberal -- he was not a liberal in the sense that Douglas was a liberal. Douglas would tear into his opponents and make them mad at him, and to hell with the consequences. Kennedy, on the other hand, was generally pretty judicious as far as Lyndon Johnson was concerned, and yet he was friendly with the liberals too. If he would ever vote with the liberals on an issue against Lyndon Johnson, for example, it was never a personal matter. He didn't hate Lyndon Johnson. He didn't hate. Douglas would tend to feel very strongly about various liberal-conservative issues. A lot of other liberals did too. They tended to get personally involved. Kennedy never was that way. Douglas would occasionally look through his scrapbooks. He would tease himself, "Oh, I've got to feed the old ego," and read his press notices, this praise and so forth.

I never had a feeling that Kennedy had any sign of a personal ego. I never had any feeling that he gave a tinker's damn about applause or praise -- that he never felt good because somebody praised or cheered him. Whenever this came up, like when someone would say, "Boy, you really did well in that speech," he'd say, "Oh, do you think they liked it." I never had any feeling that he ever wanted to be President because of the great personal tribute accorded to holders of that office. He had great drives and energy, but I never believed that it was ego that was in back of it. I'm not sure I know what was back of it, but certainly not, "I feel good because I've been praised," or "I feel good because I am a terrific fellow." He was pleased that he had done well because it fitted in with this goal of becoming president or his goal of being a good president.

STEWART: What about this -- throughout most of, in fact, all of 1955, of course, he was in the hospital and came back early in '56.

WALLACE: When did he get married?

STEWART: He got married in '5-....

WALLACE: '3?

STEWART: '3.

WALLACE: And he went to the hospital in October of '54?

STEWART: Right, and then he stayed through most of...

WALLACE: '55?

STEWART: ... '55. I was going to ask, as far as the operations of his office were concerned, do you have any comments either from observations of your

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own or observations of others as to generally how effective a Senate office it was, or any of the real problems?

WALLACE: At first Langdon Marvin was supposed to be the number one legislative assistant and Ted Reardon [Timothy J. Reardon] was the administrative assistant. And I think Reardon did a good job as far as taking care of state problems and the political matters were concerned, which left Sorensen free for research, writing and legislation.

Sorensen in the beginning was concentrated almost completely on this New England study, Marvin then was working on the other stuff. But gradually Marvin's propensity for stirring people up, as he did the Air Transport Association, was causing more problems, and there was sort of a drifting over of Kennedy's almost complete reliance on Sorensen for the legislative matters, the speeches, and so forth. And I can remember talking with Sorensen briefly about this but Sorensen never had any feelings about competition with Marvin. It was just one of these things that gradually drifted this way. Sorensen simply did his job and he did it so damn well that whoever he was working with tended to rely on him instead of somebody else.

I don't remember the circumstances of how Marvin finally left, when it was, or anything else. But I know that in the beginning Marvin was supposed to be the number one legislative man, and this gradually shifted to Sorensen. Sorensen was the chief writer, and the way you express things, is where you're making your policies, so that the writer and the researcher is the one who's working on your policy. So Sorensen very quickly developed in that fashion.

In the early days, in '53, Sorensen was so wrapped up in this New England study that I didn't have too much association with him other than the wrapping up this railroad retirement report, and talking with him as a friend. We were always very good friends, and my wife and his wife are good friends, and that sort of thing. We saw each other socially.

After Douglas was re-elected to the Senate for another six-year term I got restless, because I thought, "Well, what did I do, get him re-elected just to make myself safe for another six years?" I felt that after six years with Douglas that's probably enough. So I told Douglas that I thought I would look around. I felt like an aging shortstop -- I knew where they were going to hit the ball but they ought to have a younger fellow. Of course, I was all of thirty-three years old. A younger fellow might have to run a little harder but he could do the work. When the Democrats regained control of the Senate there were two vacancies. One was the Senate Labor Committee staff director -- you see, the Democrats took over...

STEWART: Right.

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WALLACE: ... in the '54 election, and Lister Hill became chairman of that committee, and Fulbright [J. William Fulbright] became chairman of the Senate Banking Committee. The way things wound up I got offered the Labor Committee job first by Lister Hill. He was also very close to Douglas, of course. The reason he offered it to me was because he thought that since I worked for Douglas I must be awfully terrific. I felt, however, that I'd been working so much on labor and I'd done a great deal on education, but I wanted to work more on economic and financial matters and I simply thought I'd learn more on the Banking Committee. So I finally became the staff director of the Banking Committee. My Banking Committee office was across the hall from Kennedy's office where Sorensen worked. So that, as a consequence, we often had lunch together, and chatted together, and ran into each other a lot.

In one instance Sorensen wanted to know more about the details of how Douglas and I worked on articles because he and Kennedy were working on articles too, and I think Kennedy gave him all the money and profits from any articles they did together. He went to work, for Kennedy for about \$8,500 a year, but then Kennedy gave him fees for articles -- so he was doing pretty well financially. He bought a house in McLean. He asked my advice, I remember, when he was investing some of the money. That was in '55. While Kennedy was recuperating from his back operation I remember Sorensen working on things, and Sorensen was the one who cast -- who arranged the pairs on votes. By that time he was fully determining policy in the Senator's absence. Also this was the period when much of the work on this book was being prepared. And I remember when the material was being done on the book. I thought the book was a good idea.

STEWART: The area redevelopment came up a little later, I guess.

WALLACE: In 1954 Douglas campaigned in southern Illinois, and they had this problem. And he started talking about area redevelopment then. And in

'55 Douglas introduced area redevelopment then. And in '55 Douglas introduced area redevelopment legislation. As I remember it seems like Sorensen teased me about this being very similar to what Kennedy was doing. So I said, "Well, what the hell, let's all get on together." I think they got it arranged so it went to the Labor Committee first, and they were both on the Labor Committee.

STEWART: Right. And then Douglas left the...

WALLACE: Right. And then Douglas left the...

WALLACE: Then Douglas left the Labor Committee.

STEWART: ...and turned it over to Kennedy.

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WALLACE: Yes. Well, Douglas was on the Labor Committee and the Banking Committee, and I think he left in '57 to go to the Finance Committee. He gave up Labor. But Kennedy, or Sorensen, or whoever it was, never was very pleased that Douglas was taking the active role in this because it was along the lines that they were interested in.

STEWART: Wasn't there, in fact, a connection between what Kennedy had done on the New England business and what Douglas was pushing in his campaign in '54? I suppose it was....

WALLACE: I don't know. Actually, I as an individual never got, until a later time, terribly involved in area redevelopment. What happened was that he, Douglas, really started his drive for area redevelopment in '54 in the campaign, and then in '55 I went with the Banking Committee. My committee chairman, Fulbright [J. William Fulbright], was against that legislation and Douglas was for it. So I generally let somebody else work on it because of this conflict. I didn't take any sides on this particular issue.

Later on, Fulbright left to become chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, I think, early in 1959. When Robertson [A. Willis Robertson] came in as chairman of the Banking Committee I had a permanent position, so that he couldn't fire me. But with Fulbright gone from the committee I no longer had any compunctions about his differences with Douglas on area redevelopment. Robertson in effect said, "You work with Douglas on this. He's the chairman of the subcommittee; you work with Douglas's subcommittee." So then I did get involved in it in early 1959. As a matter of fact, I even wrote a speech on the subject, a draft of a speech which I gave to Sorensen to rework into a speech for Kennedy. At any rate the area redevelopment bill finally passed with the help of Kennedy as President.

STEWART: What about the 1956 Convention? Maybe this is, again, jumping a

little bit....

WALLACE: Well, maybe it's jumping a little bit. Let's get into labor reform for a minute. I've forgotten exactly when this took place, but it seems to me that when Douglas was on the Labor Committee....

STEWART: In August, '57 they introduced the Kennedy-Douglas-Ives bill, which was the pension and welfare....

WALLACE: Yes, but before that Douglas.... Well, Douglas -- going back even further -- Douglas had chaired a subcommittee on ethics, and that was back in 1952.

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And then when some of the labor scandal started up then he was head of a subcommittee going into some of these labor scandals, and then later he and Kennedy and Ives had this bill. But it was about that time, I guess, that Douglas left and went to the Finance Committee, and so left the leadership to Kennedy on that issue. Does that sound about right?

STEWART: Yes.

WALLACE: I was trying to recall that. Well, there again I wasn't terribly in that because when Douglas got into that I had gone to the Banking Committee. But I do remember that Douglas had started that and joined with Kennedy later on.

STEWART: How about the Civil Rights Act of....

WALLACE: Well, Kennedy was always very strong on civil rights. As I recall whenever they would these sporadic forays into Rule 22, or whatever it is, he was a part of the group. But I don't remember very much beyond that.

STEWART: He got into some hot water by voting for the Jury Trial Amendment in the '57 Civil Rights Bill, but...

WALLACE: Yes. Well, I just don't remember.

STEWART: Yes, again you would have been gone.

WALLACE: I wasn't directly concerned with that.

STEWART: Do you remember anything about the electoral college reform?

WALLACE: Well, I remember, in '52 working an awful lot with Douglas trying to promote a better presidential primary system. And even before I came to Washington he wanted to get into the electoral college issue.

STEWART: They worked together in opposing the Daniels-Mundt plan to do away with it or to drastically change it. And Kennedy handled most of the floor debate on it, which many say was his first real effort by himself to do something of this kind, or to....

WALLACE: Well, Lodge [Henry Cabot Lodge] had worked on that and he sort of took over from Lodge, didn't he? It's always assumed that Lodge did it in order to help him become president because he was from a small state.

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But I don't have any feeling on it.

In '55 I was involved in the early part of the year with a committee study of the stock market. And then later in the year, I'd been trying to finish my Ph.D. dissertation, and so after Congress had adjourned I turned my attention to that and got that out of the way. Also I had to get an operation which took several weeks to recuperate from.

Now, here's an interesting thing. In 1955 in the stock market study I wanted to do the same thing there that I did in the railroad retirement study. Namely, I wanted an attorney and an economist. And this time also a securities analyst to help with the stock market study.

The lawyer I got for the stock market study was Mike Feldman [Myer Feldman] from the Securities and Exchange Commission. Mike had originally done some work with Don Cook, who was chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission and very close to Lyndon Johnson. Feldman, like Sorensen, is a genius. His brain sort of exudes ideas. Mike was kind of a problem to me in that I was staff director and when he was a counsel of the committee. He had had many ideas, but the trouble was so many of them were not practical from the political standpoint, something like that. And I always had the feeling that he didn't have to answer to these problems whereas I did, and he could make these things until infinity. But he did a damn good job.

In drafting the committee's bulky staff report, "Factor Affecting the Stock Market," we had assigned the chapters to various staff members, and Feldman was assigned a chapter on over-the-counter market. For a long time I never saw any drafts or anything else on it. Finally I said to him, "Mike, we're going to have to have this stuff." And he said, "Oh, do you want it that way soon? I'll bring it up tomorrow morning." And the next day he handed me this yellow foolscap, the whole chapter written out in longhand. I read through it and it was almost perfect. The sentence structure was perfect, the paragraphs were perfect, the organization was perfect, the language was perfect. He just sat down and wrote the darn thing out, so I was terribly impressed. At any rate, Mike did work on that.

STEWART: Excuse me. Did you have contact at all with Ambassador Kennedy [Joseph P. Kennedy] on this? He, of course, had been the first chairman of SEC.

WALLACE: No, none at all. In early '56 we were doing another phase of the stock market study. I think we'd issued the basic report but we were doing a separate related study on mutual funds and the market. Oh, as a matter of fact (indicating) in this picture this is Mike Feldman, this is Fulbright, and this is our staff that was doing that stock market study.

Well, then in the middle of 1956, which now was getting into the presidential election year, '56, the Hodge [Orville E. Hodge]

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scandal in Illinois broke. He was the Republican state auditor who stole two and a half million dollars from the state funds, and it broke wide into the open. Well, it began to appear that with the Republican state administration, Governor Stratton, that whole thing would be swept under the rug, kicked out of the way until after the election. And there were those who felt that the Republicans should not be permitted to do this. Well, since some banks were involved in this scandal, it was suggested that we send the Banking Committee in to it. That's how I got involved in that situation. Well, Mike Feldman helped out some on that.

The Hodge investigation took place in Chicago and so it coincided with the Democratic National Convention. I ran into Sorensen at the Convention, and also Kennedy briefly. I saw Kennedy in an elevator and I said, "How's the race going?" He said, "Running for vice president is the hardest thing in the world to do."

Sorensen sat up all night writing. First he had to write this nominating speech for Stevenson. But he was really doing a lot of campaigning. He circulated a paper on why it would be good to have a Catholic on the ticket. But I didn't get specifically involved except I was there in Chicago while this was going on. I was always generally sympathetic to Kennedy, liked Kennedy, and was helpful to Sorensen, or to Kennedy either, to the degree that they wanted it or asked for it. I didn't try to push myself on them particularly.

Well, of course, I was surprised that Kennedy came so close to getting the vice presidential nomination, but then he didn't. And after it was over, I didn't know it at the time but I found out later that that's when he really launched his campaign for the '60 nomination. He started making political appearances all over. He had this experience at the Convention which gave him a great drawing power. So as a speaker he was pretty experienced. He and Sorensen traveled all over the country to make these various speeches, when he'd go into a place whenever people would come up and say, "You ought to run for president," they would get his name discuss it with him. Starting right away in late 1956 Kennedy made no bones with anybody he talked to about the fact that he was going to be president. At that time he was only about thirty-seven years old; he was very young. Of course, the nomination was four years off; he would be over forty by the time that occurred.

STEWART: Do you remember...

WALLACE: But he seemed awfully young -- in 1956 and '57 -- to be running for President.

STEWART: ... do you remember how early he said this to you or do you recall ever....

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WALLACE: Well, I think that probably I wasn't aware that he was doing this to the degree that he was doing it until '57. When I would talk with Sorensen

I just assumed that people were very cagey about what they said. Well, Sorensen was never cagey with me. And I would say things like, "Oh well, too bad Kennedy isn't older." He'd say, "What's wrong with that? He'd be over forty." Then I would say, "What about this Catholic thing?" And he'd say, "Well, there are just as many advantages as disadvantages." And he talked about this paper that circulated at the convention in 1956.

Not only that, but I felt that he was building a hell of an organization, even in '57, for this effort. And I thought, in effect, power to anybody who had anything to.... But I knew that Kennedy was very wealthy and he could probably have whatever he wanted.

Then I remember discussions with Douglas. Douglas always felt friendly to Kennedy. Of course, Douglas disliked Stevenson. He did not like Adlai Stevenson at all. SO that....

STEWART: I don't know if I've heard that or not.

WALLACE: Well, he was for Kefauver in '52, and had a great deal with Stevenson on a slate of convention delegates for Illinois. Stevenson said he didn't want to run, and he took him at his word. So they were going to divide up, make an agreement on the slate for delegates to the Convention. And somehow or other all the delegates that were Douglas oriented were knocked out and all that Stevenson wanted were on. And Douglas just figured this was a straight doublecross. Part of Douglas' animosity was in the '48 campaign where Stevenson would mention Douglas' name if he were in a labor group, but if he were in a business group he wouldn't mention it.

STEWART: You were talking about Douglas' feelings about -- you know, in '56 and '57 -- about Kennedy's running.

WALLACE: Well, he was always friendly to Kennedy. And incidentally, on the general issue of -- there's always this issue of church and state, and this hung behind everybody, or a lot of people, especially liberals. Back in 1949 -- I'm going back a ways just to set it as background for my position and Douglas' position vis-a-vis Kennedy and church and state. This issue was very strong as far as aid to education was concerned. I worked with Douglas on this legislation and he was on the Labor Committee which was working it out. Senator Taft [Robert A. Taft] was the

Republican who was interested and was working too. He wanted to be president so he was trying to get some kind of an agreement.

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All right. You had those who felt no state should give aid to parochial schools on the one hand, and those on the other, such as the National Catholic Welfare Conference, who felt that if any state refused to give this aid then the federal government should give it directly to the parochial schools. Those were the two poles. In working on this issue what I recommended to Douglas was to separate the educational from the non-educational, and say we'll leave it up to the states as to what they do, except that we will provide school health facilities to the school child no matter where he goes to school. The Catholics already had the school lunch provision, where the federal government provides that aid if the state refuses. In the case of the school health facilities, we could justify this aid as not being aid to education, but aid to the kids, to the Protestants and Other Americans United. And to the Catholics you could say, "Your kids are getting these health services even when states refuse to provide it." Even that was not completely acceptable and the way we broke the impasse was by having companion bills, the School Health Bill, one bill, and the Aid to Education Bill, one bill. By running those two in tandem, we passed them both in the Senate without any great problems.

We were well on our way to getting aid to education legislation in 1950, but then this Mrs. Roosevelt-Cardinal Spellman controversy broke out and just broke the thing all to pieces. But anyway, that's in the background.

Douglas got a great deal of political credit in Chicago from Catholics for working this thing out. Some of the Protestants and Other Americans United didn't like this particularly, but on the other hand they couldn't really get a political grip on him to shake him for doing it. As a liberal I never felt the need for such fanatic concern about this Catholic issue. And the idea that John Kennedy, if he were elected president, would turn the country over to the Pope was utterly stupid and so far-fetched. . . . I recognized the problem politically, but I certainly never felt anything about it with respect to myself. To me a Catholic was an individual the same as anybody else. And this is despite my own background. I grew up in Oklahoma where Catholics were thought to worship idols and that sort of thing. But there was this issue.

After we finished our Hodge investigation and our mutual funds study in the committee, why, there really wasn't enough for Mike Feldman to do in the committee. And he wanted to stay very badly but I couldn't justify it, so we had to let him go back to the SEC. But, meanwhile, while he was with us he and I and Sorensen would have lunch. And they got acquainted, and so they got to know each other. Well, I guess it was Ralph Dungan or Lee White -- I've forgotten which one -- would come in. I guess it was Lee White.

STEWART: Lee White had replaced. . .

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WALLACE: Well, Lee White -- what?

STEWART: Lee White had replaced Langdon Marvin.

WALLACE: Lee White came in -- he was from Nebraska too, and Sorensen and I. But then Lee White became John Sherman Cooper's administrative assistant, so there was this opening.

STEWART: In '57.

WALLACE: Yes. And Mike came to me and said that Sorensen had talked to him about taking it, what did I think. I said I thought it would be a good experience, Kennedy was running for president and that it would be a wonderful thing to go through an experience like that no matter what happened. At that time I still didn't know how much chance he would have. But I knew he was going through the campaign and I thought that would be interesting. So Mike took that spot of being Kennedy's legislative assistant. This was '57.

My feeling at the time was that in the '56 Convention Kennedy had the support of all the big city machines. Actually he didn't. It was only anti-Kefauver sentiment that caused them to support him. But Kennedy as a fairly glamorous Catholic was highly regarded in the big cities, like New York, Philadelphia, Chicago and so forth. So there was a good deal of popularity there and it was very early in the game that I recognized easily the strong positive potential of a candidate like Kennedy on the ticket. Regardless of the fact that he might lose some hard core anti-Catholics he could gain so darn much. It wasn't that I felt Catholics would vote for him because he was a Catholic. But the Democratic Party had been losing Catholics in tremendous numbers. After they went to the suburbs they tended to get conservative and become Republicans. But here's a fellow, I thought, who would get many of these people back. And this is tied in with the fact that Kennedy, while he had a liberal image, did not have a militant, far out, kind of an image, and his position of the budget and expenditures was fairly hard-headed. So I thought he'd have some appeal in the suburbs. I could see these positive advantages and discussed them with Sorensen from time to time.

Oh, one thing that I didn't mention was after that Hodge thing was over in 1957, I became interested in running for office myself in Illinois. The 1958 election was a situation where neither governor nor senator were up. The top of the ticket was State Treasurer and I seemed to point in this direction.

I had talked with Sorensen about this and he was very helpful. He and Dungan both were interested in helping me all

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they could with Kennedy. Kennedy put some material in the Congressional Record for me. I knew that Kennedy was very popular in Chicago so if Kennedy said nice things about me it would be very helpful.

Meanwhile Sarge Shriver, Kennedy's brother-in-law, was running the Merchandise Mart. He was interested in running for governor of Illinois. I remember once Sorensen

saying, "Well, Sarge wants to run for governor, you want to run for state treasurer. Why don't you all get together?" At any rate there was this period where Kennedy was helpful to me in -- I don't know whether you'd call it my ambition or not, but at any rate he was helpful to me.

'58 was Kennedy's campaign in his home state. Their effort there was to win as big as they possibly could, and they did. This served me very well when I was campaigning for him later because I could say to politicians who understood this kind of information that when Kennedy ran for reelection he carried it by the biggest majority in history. He carried every county, every town, every hamlet. He carried everything. And for the first time since the Revolutionary War we had a majority in the Massachusetts House of Representatives that was Democratic. This makes sense to the politician. Well, let's see. '57, '58....

STEWART: You had no further relationship with the labor rackets, did you?

WALLACE: No. I met Ralph Dungan as a friend of Colgate Prentiss -- he's a liberal Republican from New Jersey, and he often worked for Nixon. He also worked for a while for John Sherman Cooper. Dungan was one of these bright young fellows who went to Princeton and came up through the Federal management intern program. He was at the Bureau of the Budget, and I guess he was working on labor when they drafted him to come and work on this committee for labor. That's how he ultimately got into the picture.

STEWART: And you joined in April, '59.

WALLACE: Well, after Kennedy won the 1958 election in Massachusetts, the idea was they were really going to bear down on '60, starting immediately. They were really going to bear down on it. I had always assumed that he had a tremendous organization all over the country, including a stable of PR men. Once talking to Douglas in '57, somebody was criticizing Kennedy -- he got all these stories in *Life* and *Time* and other magazines -- that he was booming too early. In discussing this with Douglas we decided that such criticism was crazy, you don't turn down any of that kind of publicity, you get it whenever you can and you take it. Not only that but Kennedy had such a long ways to go. He had to hit hard and keep up the pressure. After

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Kennedy's reelection to the Senate in 1958 I was talking to Sorensen and I said, "Well, I'll tell you. Now you really ought to bear down on what I think your main problem is. You've got great strength in the big city organizations but you have no strength in the big city organizations but you have no strength at all where Kefauver was strong -- in the Midwest, the West, the Protestant areas. All your strength with the Catholic-oriented groups won't mean anything unless you can show that you've got strength outside that group. And you're going to need that strength outside the group not only to get the nomination but also to win the election because you won't win the election unless you can cut into that area too." I

assumed that this was pretty much common knowledge, that he'd say, "Yes, that's right. We are working on that." Well, he didn't. He said, "How do you overcome this?" I said, "You can't work this through your big city political organizations. They are poison to this Kefauver type of politician. Instead, you could work up a series of Kennedy-for-President clubs, stretch these kinds of clubs all over the country -- especially the Midwest and West. It's only through these clubs that you can survive and demonstrate grassroots strength." So he said, "Why don't you write a memorandum on that." So I did.

I thought a while; I wrote a memorandum on it and then showed it to him. He read it and said, "Who'd set these things up? Would you do it?" I thought for a minute and I said, "Sure." No matter how it comes out, to be part of an overall campaign would be a great experience, I thought. Of course, I was for Kennedy anyway.

But I said, "I think it's too early to do something like that. You'd have to do the background work right away but you can't sprint it out until very close to the time that he announces." I'd envisaged about September of 1958 to open up the public Kennedy for President clubs.

STEWART: September of...

WALLACE: Excuse me, '59. But the background work would have to go forward pretty quickly. Sorensen had more questions on details about how this would be set up and we discussed it further. I was no special expert on it but... He said, "Well, why don't you revise the memorandum and write it again and put that in." So I did.

The next thing I knew Kennedy wanted to see me at his Georgetown home, so I came out to see him. He had the memorandum and he read it again while I was there. He said, "This is good but what I need is somebody right now to talk to people in the West and Midwest, to the party leaders and so forth to round up delegates. Will you do this?"

I've always considered myself a person oriented towards issues, research, ideas -- the intellectual approach -- rather than an organization politician but I've always been intrigued by the political side.

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I suddenly became aware of the fact that John F. Kennedy had no national organization whatsoever at that time. He had a big organization in Massachusetts but he had no nationwide organization. What he had was Ted Sorensen, period. This was in February of 1959. So I said, yes, I thought that would be a good thing to do but I was in the middle of something at the committee and I thought I could spring loose around April. He said, "Fine."

A photographer, Jacques Lowe, for *Parade Magazine* was in the house taking pictures of Jacqueline and Caroline and John F. He said, "You and Sorensen should be in this picture." I said, "I don't think I should be in it because I'm going to be working on stuff that could be jittery. No, I'd better stay out of it."

I was involved in the area redevelopment legislation at the time because this was when the bill was coming up to the committee. Fulbright was gone and I was working more

with Douglas at the time, but generally planning to come with Kennedy around April. Jack Kennedy also wanted Bobby Kennedy to read the memorandum. He wanted me to talk to Bobby. Later Bobby read it and talked with me briefly, we didn't go into much detail. We talked somewhat about the labor rackets and those things he was in the middle of at that time. Then they scheduled this summit conference, which I think you mentioned in there. They called it a summit conference.

STEWART: Oh yes. Teddy White talked about it.

WALLACE: Did White talk about that?

STEWART: Oh yes, in great detail. This was in the fall.

WALLACE: No, no. I'm talking about earlier than that.

STEWART: There was a meeting at Palm Beach on April 1.

WALLACE: Yes, that's the one I'm talking about now, the Palm Beach thing. This was called the summit meeting. After February Steve Smith came to start devoting full time to the effort. Steve had, I think, three secretaries and they had arranged for some space in the Esso Building at Third and Constitution Avenue. Let's see, Jean Lewis and Chris Camp at the time, I think. There was another girl. But that was all they had.

At this summit conference -- at least this is the way Sorensen referred to it in his memorandums -- there was going to be John F. Kennedy, Mr. Kennedy [Joseph P. Kennedy], the ambassador, Bobby Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy], Teddy Kennedy, I think, had just gotten married and was honeymooning in Chile or someplace and would not attend. Steve Smith, Ted Sorensen, Lou Harris, Kenny O'Donnell [Kenneth P. O'Donnell] and Larry O'Brien [Lawrence J. O'Brien].

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I flew down with Sorensen. We met Lou Harris in Palm Beach. We didn't stay at the Ambassador's big house. We stayed at a motel nearby and came in the next morning for the conference. This was the first time I had met Lou Harris. I'd never met Larry O'Brien before, either. I'd met Kennedy O'Donnell because he was assistant to Bobby Kennedy when he was on the investigative committee.

This was a coming together for the first time of the basic group which was going to be involved, which was why Sorensen called it a "summit" conference. I remember sitting out on the beach facing the ocean and going through what the situation was and what had to be done in every state. We didn't go into decisions about which primaries to enter -- it contacts were, who we could count on, who you couldn't count on, what the delegate picture looked like, who the powers were and how to deal with them.

STEWART: Now, wait a minute. Who was doing this? Who was going through? You hadn't really...

WALLACE: I hadn't really joined the staff but I was invited to this meeting.

STEWART: But you hadn't done any work.

WALLACE: No, except for the Kennedy Club memo, I hadn't done any work with any of them, except Sorensen. But what this work represented was Sorensen's notes as he had traveled around with Kennedy. Of course, the father had some relationships with Daley [Richard Daley] in Chicago because he had the Merchandise Mart. The father also had some connections in Nevada. Bobby Kennedy by virtue of his work with the McClellan committee had a good deal of contacts in the South. Sorensen had some. O'Donnell had some contacts by working with Bob Kennedy among labor. O'Donnell knew the labor picture pretty well.

STEWART: What were the Nevada contacts?

WALLACE: I don't remember. Just friends, I guess. I don't know. His father is rumored to have had investments in Nevada -- possibly gambling casinos.

STEWART: That's what I was wondering.

WALLACE: What?

STEWART: That's what I was wondering.

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WALLACE: [Laughter] Is that what it was? What was it that I was going to say? Okay, we're at Hyannis.

STEWART: At Palm Beach.

WALLACE: Palm Beach, I'm sorry. Palm Beach. One of the amusing incidents at Palm Beach was when something came up about how this or that was going to cost a hell of a lot of money. Mr. Kennedy, who was sort of a crusty patriarch, said, "By golly, we've come this far. We're not going to let money stand in our way now. We're going to get this thing if it takes every dime I've got." And Bobby Kennedy looked at him and said, "Wait a minute now. There are others in the family." [Laughter]

STEWART: Had you known him before or...

WALLACE: The first I'd met Mr. Kennedy. Another funny incident, I think, was this: Mr. Kennedy had a great fondness for James M. Landis. Landis had done some kind, some kind of memorandum advising Kennedy on what he should do... Landis had been out of it for a long time and the memo was rather unsophisticated. But the father was reading from it and everybody sort of shifted in their chairs. John Kennedy was tolerant, but a little impatient. Finally, he said, "Yes, yes, okay. Well now let's go on," and he took the memorandum. But the father said, "Give that back to me! You'll probably lose it." [Laughter]

After we had finished up, Jack Kennedy was playing with Caroline and we were talking in the living room. He said, "What do you think? Can you come with us?" I said, "Well, I don't know. With Larry O'Brien you probably don't need me." And he said, "Now Larry O'Brien is very good, but he won't do for this job I need you for. I need you for this particular job because I've got to have somebody who can talk with non-Catholics and liberals and academics and politicians who can give some credibility to it. In the case of a New Englander they'd just say, "You say all this but I don't believe you." So I said, "Okay, we'll work it out for the next week or something like that." Then when I next saw him...

STEWART: Excuse me, I think Ted Sorensen says in his book that this meeting was somewhat of a disappointment, one of the reasons being that no one else had really been involved in the campaign except himself and the President. Do you recall there being any amount of confusion or uncertainty as to just what was going to happen?

WALLACE: I personally felt the main purpose of the meeting was to get all those people together and bring

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them up to date with what Sorensen and Kennedy knew. I would say, however, that Kenny O'Donnell had something to offer because he had been involved with these labor unions and probably knew those more intimately than Sorensen or Kennedy. But up to that point it was all Sorensen and Kennedy with some knowledge such as Kenny O'Donnell had. These other people were all involved in the Massachusetts campaign, but not the actual planning of the national campaign until that moment.

I flew back with Sorensen and he had one of these leather folders. There were all sorts of memorandums on these different subjects in it. He was looking at something and I said, "Can I read that?" He said, "Absolutely. You're part of our group, you read anything you want." So I read through the whole thing.

I was tremendously impressed at the kinds of memorandum that Sorensen was writing up and how far along he was on it. He had different memorandums on organization of campaigns, and he had drawn up historic parallels with how it was done under Roosevelt, how it was done under Truman, and the role that such and such as person would play. He recommended that Bobby be the *de facto* campaign manager, but not in the name. But he

would make the basic decisions, because the candidate should not make these political decisions any more. The candidate should concentrate on the speeches and the top level appointments as organized by someone else.

Sorensen took his own job, split it into five positions, and outlined the various things that each would do. Steve Smith would be in charge of the running of the campaign office and the money side. Bobby would be the *de facto* campaign manager. I think Sorensen envisaged himself along the lines of the Roosevelt pattern as a Howe [Lewis Howe], Howe's relationship which was speechwriter but also confidante and knowledgeable on all subjects. I think Sorensen hated to give up the political side but he knew that he couldn't handle everything himself and had to.

Sorensen also had good memorandums on the different states that they'd visited, who our people were and how much they could be counted on, and how good they were. It showed a tremendous amount of work that he personally had put into it. But no one else had really done that much of anything on the overall campaign up to that point. This was April 1, 1959.

STEWART: This was entirely his and no one else had worked on any of this.

WALLACE: Let me go back a little bit to Kennedy's action as a Senator. Sorensen, in working with the New England project, got involved with people at Harvard and MIT and Amherst and other places, and developed a working relationship with academic economists, political scientists and others, including John Kenneth Galbraith, Seymour

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Harris and others at Harvard. As a consequence Sorensen got an awful lot of material from these people. They would write speech drafts and position papers for Kennedy. Sorensen always reworked them and some of these people felt that they never got a heck of a lot of credit for it. This partly may have been Sorensen's fault.

I've heard it claimed that people would write a speech for Kennedy and Sorensen would talk about how terrible it was, how he had to work to death doing it all over -- but that he'd wind up taking 90 per cent of what the person had done. Sorensen probably could never have produced the speech without it. A lot of this very elegant phraseology, it has been claimed, came from Galbraith or Schlesinger or Joe Kraft or Jim Sundquist or others who had done this sort of thing. But I know that Sorensen would take the good and polish up what wasn't so good, and there was no question but what Sorensen added a hell of a lot to it. But it was discouraging to these fellows who write the speeches, the implication being that what they had done wasn't worth a damn and that it had to be done all over again.

Sorensen went through a lot of academic people. They were all enthusiastic about working with him but they'd lose their enthusiasm when they felt they weren't getting any personal credit for it with the Senator -- that Sorensen was just sort of using them for his own gain. Well, that is mostly gossip, feelings are bound to be bruised.

STEWART: You were coming back on the plane from Florida and you were reading these things.

WALLACE: At any rate, Sorensen had some terrific memorandums. He is a great reader. He could read history books or whatever and find out how something was done, and get help from somebody else how something was done, and then put his own ideas on it and talk with Kennedy about it and this was the way it would be done. I do not think that this ability was Sorensen's alone. It was, as I had said in the beginning, a cross-fertilization, a rapport, a creative interaction of Sorensen with others and Sorensen with Kennedy. But I do feel that Sorensen was a focal point and I would stake that I just don't think Kennedy would have ever become President if he hadn't gotten Sorensen with him. Sorensen had that special something which matched Kennedy's special something and made it possible. This may be biased on my part since I recommended Sorensen to him, but that is my opinion.

The next time I saw Kennedy then was about a week later where he asked me what sort of pay I wanted. He said, "Well, now if I win the election, of course, there'll be no problem about your having a future. But in the meantime you're going to have to live. I've been trying to keep down money expenses. But what do you think you need?" I knew Kennedy was very

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wealthy, but my own personality is such that I did not want to benefit financially from going with him. Moreover, I didn't want any of my liberal friends working for some other candidates to be able to say that I was being bought because that would hurt my effectiveness. So I said, "I want only what I'm making now. No more, no less." He said, "That'll be fine." This was about a sixteen thousand dollar salary which was the equivalent of what I was being paid by the Banking Committee. He called in Tim Reardon and said, "Bob is going to join the staff."

STEWART: Was that essentially the arrangement with most of the people who joined, do you know?

WALLACE: I was paid out of private funds and I'm sure the others were paid out of private funds. I think the financing for this, as I recall, came from the father's office in New York, and I don't know the details of it. And the credit cards that I had, the airline travel cards, were "Joseph P. Kennedy." But I think that this New York office handled the financial affairs of all the kids. To this day I don't know how all the expenses of a particular Kennedy campaign are paid. For example, were JFK's campaign expenses out of family funds or JFK's funds? I don't know. Douglas had always had a problem raising money because as a strong liberal he didn't get very much good from it and he didn't have any money himself. He once asked me, "How does it feel to work without any worries about money?" I said, "Well, it feels very comfortable." And it's true.

In the Kennedy preconvention campaign I never had any problems with money. Money was not a prime consideration. You had to be careful how you spent it or you'd be criticized because people were looking for ways to criticize him. But if I wanted to talk to a group of party leaders it was very simple for me to invite them out to dinner. And I could have dinner with steak... I've often thought how much time, personal time, people will give up for a five dollar steak dinner. It's incredible but they will do it. Well, of course, that mounts up. Five bucks a throw for fifty or a hundred people. It goes up, plus of course all the travelling. I never tried to figure out how many miles I travelled but I was across the country several times and also jumping around because I was covered so much of the Midwest and far West.

Well, so I went on the payroll and then I took an office down with Steve Smith in the Esso Building. I think they had only three rooms to start with. One room had all the secretaries in it. One room had Steve Smith's desk so I put my desk in the same room with Steve Smith. Steve was always sort of an enigmatic fellow, a little taciturn, but a part of the Kennedy family group.

Kennedy relied for his socializing with family, friends, and

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social and economic class contemporaries. He was not like Johnson, for example, who is very close to his staff socially. I think that Sorensen, for example, probably had been to many places, but he never pretended to be a part of it. Where was I?

STEWART: You were just settling down into Steve Smith's office.

WALLACE: Oh yes, in Steve Smith's office. Well, this was in early April and I was just beginning to campaign. The first job I had was to work out a visit to West Virginia for Sorensen and myself. We went to four places: Charleston, Huntigton, Parkersburg, and Morgantown where we had luncheons or dinners. Sorensen would talk to the group but we also brought with us an old political pro who could talk to the other pros. We only had two such politicians at this time -- John Baily, and the former governor of Rhode Island, Roberts.

STEWART: Dennis Roberts.

WALLACE: Dennis Roberts. Roberts went with us and he was pretty good at talking the pro language, and saying, for example, "The other night when I was in New York I talked with Carmine DeSapio." Well, some of these people were interested in this. Professional politicians like DeSapio were the great heroes to some of these people. Sorensen, of course, was an intellectual, and I supposed would be too. At any rate, we had no reputation as political pros, nor did anyone else in our group. We wanted to avoid the idea that ours might be an amateurish campaign. Sometimes the old pros lent some feeling of professionalism to the operation.

Well, we talked with county chairmen, state legislators, state chairmen whenever we could, national committeemen whenever we could, newspaper publishers, influential people. There were usually about thirty to forty to fifty at one of these gatherings.

In Charleston we met Charles Love, who was a state senator and he was very conservative. He was the fellow who we later decided we should have for chairman of our West Virginia group. Still later we added another chairman more acceptable to labor.

The situation in West Virginia was that Lyndon Johnson had quite a bit of following among the pros, Hubert Humphrey had considerable strength in the labor unions, Stuart Symington had some following, and there was some scattered feeling for Kennedy.

During that trip, we had a fellow by the name of Bob McDonough [Robert P. McDonough] who went with us to most of these places. McDonough was Catholic. He was not on the inside of the

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Democratic establishment but he knew the organization well. He had a very good political sense.

It was out of one of these meetings that came the idea of accepting a Kennedy speaking date in a very unlikely place in the state politically. It was from Sid Christie from the Southern part. Christie advised Kennedy to make speeches in Beckley, West Virginia. Now Beckley is a small town, population of maybe ten or fifteen thousand. Normally a presidential candidate wouldn't go to a place like that, and people thought Kennedy was crazy to go there, but there were two factors involved. One was that the fellow who invited him was very powerful in the Southern part of the state. The second factor was something that people outside West Virginia don't understand. Beckley may be a small town of fifteen thousand, but it's in an area of many small towns. The county population is very sizeable because you've got towns just two or three miles apart. Finally, it is a heavily Democratic area.

It was around the middle of April that I went to these four towns with Sorensen, and Governor Roberts. Then I believe it was early May that Sorensen, Kennedy, and I chartered a small plane and flew to Beckley for his speech. We met through McDonough and Sid Christie.

There was a cocktail party and then a dinner where Kennedy made his speech. This was my first experience with Kennedy in a hustling speech, and I thought he was terrible, just awful. He had a way of -- I think they say this of McCarthy [Eugene J. McCarthy] now -- of running lines. Whenever he would build up to a point where the audience would be ready to applaud, he'd rush through and not give them a chance to applaud. So later, through and not give them a chance to applaud. So later, after it was over, he asked Sorensen and me how we thought it went, and Sorensen said, "Well it wasn't your best." I said, "Well, I think your speaking needs improvement. I think, for example, that people that go to political meetings don't go to listen to ideas. They go to be enthusiastic participants.... They want to applaud and when you don't let them applaud, they're disappointed. There are spots where you're speaking too fast and it's hard to understand."

Kennedy responded, "Yes, I think that's right." He looked at Ted, said, "Why don't we get Father so and so. He's the speech expert. Have him listen to some of my speeches, and maybe he can help me." Sorensen said, "All we need is a Catholic priest following around listening to all your speeches."

STEWART: Who was it, do you remember?

WALLACE: I don't remember. Father somebody, who was apparently an expert on speech. He laughed and agreed that it wouldn't be a good idea. Also at that time -- it was kind of a personal thing -- but Kennedy was getting dressed for this, for some affair. I

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think it was a cocktail party. He wanted to wear a colored shirt rather than a white shirt. "Why didn't they pack me a tie that I can wear with this shirt?" he asked. I said, "I'll go out and get you one." He said, "Okay. Get a green or grey tie." So I went out but, in Beckley, West Virginia, what can you get in the way of ties? I did the best I could and came back and he looked at it, said, "Oh, no." Then he looked at me and he said, "I like your tie." So I took it off and he wore it.

Incidentally, on that West Virginia trip to Beckley, Sid Christie's very powerful in that area and when Kennedy responded to his invitation than he became a strong Kennedy supporter. When the primary was held in that area a year later, Kennedy beat Humphrey 15,000 to 2,000. So this was a definite part of Kennedy's key victory in West Virginia. Many people think that Kennedy came into that West Virginia situation three or four weeks before the election. There was an awful lot that had gone into that before, which I can get into later.

Let's see, this was in May of '59. The next thing I did was to work out a series of meetings for Sorensen and me in the Midwest and West.

STEWART: Well, let me back up a little. Had you been working on some kind of an analysis of the situation in various states? Or did you start out right at the beginning in the travelling around?

WALLACE: No, I write this general memorandum about the strength which he lacked but needed, and how this should be built up ultimately by the creation of the Kennedy for President clubs. Then I worked these meetings out to go with Sorensen, where Sorensen would make the main presentation would generally be a rundown of how Kennedy stood in all the states. And then later on I did this myself. I would go and give this roundup of where Kennedy stood and so forth. Each of these state visits resulted in a memorandum on the state.

Well then, on that trip -- early June -- Sorensen and I went to Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, and Idaho. That took a week or so to do that. In setting these trips up, you have problems, if the national committeeman or state chairman's your friend you've got fewer problems. But if he's for somebody else it's a little ticklish.

Joe Miller, who is an old pro in labor circles, was sitting and talking to Steve Smith once while I was setting up some of these meetings, and he was horrified. "God, you don't just let some unknown pick up a phone and call the national committeeman, you know." Well, what else are you going to do?

Later when O'Brien [Lawrence F. O'Brien] was aboard, and O'Brien was considered to be amateur himself at that time, comments were made that O'Brien and Wallace that many thing they were doing

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just couldn't be done. But they did them anyway. I guess if we'd been more sophisticated we'd never have done them.

STEWART: Look, let me ask you, do you think you remember enough about each state to profitably go through them, or would this be a waste?

WALLACE: You mean ad seriatum? I think it might be better first to go through my chronological experiences.

STEWART: All right, okay.

WALLACE: For one thing you can get a better development that way, because when I first go into a state then I second go into it and then third things develop.

STEWART: All right.

WALLACE: We might recapitulate by going through it state by state. But this trip that I'm talking about now took place in June of 1959. We started out in Lincoln and Omaha, Nebraska. We went to Kansas City, Kansas; Denver, Colorado; Cheyenne, Wyoming; Salt Lake City, Utah; Boise, Idaho Falls, Lewiston, and Coeur D'Alene Idaho.

In Lincoln, Nebraska, there was a former candidate for governor or senator, sort of a perennial candidate named Frank Morrisson who was a key guy in that area. He later ran and was elected to the governorship and was reelected, and then he lost when he ran for senator against Curtis.

But the main trouble in Nebraska was the Frank Morrisson and Bernard Boyle, who was the national committeeman in Omaha, cordially hated each other's guts. They couldn't stand each other. And you couldn't even mention the one's name without raising the hackle. It was just an incredibly difficult situation. The governor of the state of Nebraska was a Democrat. Golly, I've forgotten his name. Anderson? Elected in '58. Anyway, he had had a heart attack and was not very well. And obviously he was not going to run for reelection.

Morrisson wanted to run for governor in 1960. The Governor's executive assistant was a young fellow named Bob Conrad, who had also served as Executive Director of the

State Democratic Party Organization. Bernie Boyle was grooming Bob Conrad to run for governor so there was some friction between Conrad and Frank Morrisson. But Morrisson had a following, and of course Bernie Boyle had a following. The ticklish thing about this was to keep from alienating either of these followings. Neither of them were unfriendly to Kennedy. Morrisson was pretty good about recognizing that he was controversial and certainly couldn't expect to be chairman of the organization or anything like this, and was even willing, as I recall, to have Bob Conrad play a fairly leading role in it.

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I met at the time Helen Abdouch -- who is an extremely attractive woman -- about thirty I guess. She was one of these girls who was really attractive to men, but did not alienate women. And that's a rare combination. So she was very helpful and later became executive secretary of our Nebraska group. She was not tied to either the Morrisson or the Boyle group. She played a key role in helping to set up the organization.

For a chairman of the organization we decided that we wanted an indigenous name, non-Catholic. We got this state senator named Hans Jensen. Moreover Jensen was a homespun farmer who exuded honesty, sincerity, and Lutheranism. As a matter of fact, when we were discussing Hans Jensen with John F. Kennedy he said, "Are you sure you didn't get him from a Hollywood casting studio?"

STEWART: Too perfect.

WALLACE: He was just too perfect. He had no enemies, you know, and he was well known and well liked, and he had that farmer's way of talking which caused Kennedy to claim he had been cast by a Hollywood studio. In Omaha we had this fellow named Bill Green. But he'd also had a heart attack. He was having problems. I think we first had him for one of our chairmen there and he'd had this heart attack which caused problems later on, which I can discuss later. But much of our meetings led to a setting up of a tour for Kennedy to take through Nebraska as part of a broader tour later in October. So I'll get to that a little later. In Iowa we had meetings in Cedar Rapids, Des Moines, and Sioux City. Ed McDermott was our principal contact.

In Colorado our main contact point was Joe Dolan, who was in the state legislature, also a Catholic. We were wooing Whizzer White [Byron White]. Now White was fairly conservative. This was not too bad in Colorado. Colorado's not a flaming liberal state. They had all sorts of people to woo, Italians, labor union people. Charles Brannon was out there with the Farmer's Union and he was sort of a Symington man, I guess. But Dolan was the key there, and was very knowledgeable about the general situation. In Wyoming the fellow we were working with was elected to Congress later on.

STEWART: Oh, Roncalio.

WALLACE: Yes, Teno Roncalio, the Democratic State Chairman. He set up this breakfast meeting in Cheyenne. While we were in Colorado we went

up to Cheyenne then back to Denver then over to Salt Lake City. There one of the key fellows was a man by the name of L.C. Romney, who was the Commissioner of Parks for Salt Lake City. And Romney, of course, is a very good Mormon name, so he was very helpful to

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us. There was a labor attorney named Wally Sandak. And he was helpful on the labor side.

There was Frank Browning, a banker from Ogden, Utah; and a potential candidate for governor. We had a meeting in Ogden while we were in Utah. The man we were wooing for out state chairman was a young fellow.

STEWART: Rice? McConkie?

WALLACE: Rice was a Catholic and he was the lawyer for the Salt Lake City paper. Oscar McConkie was from a well known Mormon family. It was Oscar McConkie that we finally got for our state chairman.

STEWART: What about Esther Peterson? Did she...

WALLACE: Well, she had given us some leads in names, mostly labor. But she didn't -- well, she talked with Sorensen about what the situation was, and all this. She was helpful. But she was not actually doing organization work like Sorensen was.

Then we went from Salt Lake City up to Idaho Falls, Idaho. I can't remember the name of the fellow that ran the meeting in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Then on to Boise. We had a meeting in Boise and I can't remember the names of the people offhand who were in Boise.

STEWART: Tony Burke, Walter Faylin?

WALLACE: They sound familiar.

STEWART: I have a Tom Boise.

WALLACE: A what?

STEWART: I have the name Tom Boise, but maybe that's a mistake.

WALLACE: No, I think there was a Tom Boise. But he was from Lewiston.

STEWART: I don't know, I don't know.

WALLACE: Well, maybe we can do another session and I can get into more detail. Maybe I can find some of my old notes around and I can get some of

these names. Then we went to Lewiston. Tom Boise was at that meeting. Lewiston is also where the national committeeman lived. He's another fellow that had a heart attack and had to slow down anyway. And Coeur D'Alene -- what was that lady's name, the maiden lady who was strong for Kennedy. Catholic

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maiden lady in Coeur D'Alene. Anyway, when Sorensen and I went to Coeur D'Alene we went out to her house and she let us use the bedroom to rest for a while. So we laid down and looked up and here wawa this huge crucifix hanging over the bed. I said to Sorensen, "How do you think a fellow would feel if he were visiting here with his girlfriend and he looked up and saw that?" He laughed.

Kennedy was making speeches in Seattle. So we went the next day to Spokane. I then came back to Washington from Spokane. And Sorensen went on to meet Kennedy in Seattle, this was in June.

Then, in July, I had a series of meetings in the West with Sorensen. God, where did we go then, or was that all part of one state? We went to Phoenix and -- what's the name of that fellow who became Ambassador to Ghana -- from Phoenix? Mahoney. He ran for Congress. What's his first name?

STEWART: Bill.

WALLACE: Bill Mahoney, yes. Well, he set up the meeting in Phoenix. This was \ McFarland's [Ernest W. McFarland] old country, LBJ country, and you had to be very careful in dealing with the conservative wing and the liberal wing. Everywhere you go, it seems there is a liberal-conservative split. It doesn't make any difference where you are. And of course we were trying to woo both sides. This is not an easy job.

In Tucson -- of course -- Stuart Udall was friendly. His wife, Toni, was for Stevenson. There was probably this liberal syndrome of being suspicious of Kennedy's position on McCarthy. But, at any rate, we had some valuable help from Orren Beatty who was Stuart Udall's assistant when he was in Congress. And of course Stewart was from Tucson. So Frank Minarek, I think he was a national committeeman later from Tucson. He was an arthritic, and we were wooing him. Dave Ginzberg was with the party hierarchy there. I think he was in the clothing business in town. Don Hummel was mayor of Tucson. Now, he was very conservative, you see. The liberals didn't like him. And labor, I've forgotten the labor situation, how that was. Moe Udall was in there with the party, Morris Udall.

But I think the coup that I scored in that area was by getting a young woman attorney named JoAnn Diamos involved in that activity. Her father was dead and had had a theater chain. She was very controversial, very liberal; but work, my God, and organize. She was really good. I think the state chairman were wooing turned out to be for Symington or perhaps Johnson.

Arizona had a unit rule, and I forget the ins and outs of it, but JoAnn Damos knew how those state conventions ran from a to z, and in April we wound up taking the whole state under the unit rule. While Ted Kennedy got the credit for that, it

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was largely due to her parliamentary ability. He deserves credit because he made appearances there and undoubtedly helped. But JoAnn Damos was the one who organized and the one who pulled that thing off. This victory occurred the last week of April, 1960, helping to demonstrate Kennedy's delegate strength in the West.

Let's see. Then we went to Albuquerque and Santa Fe. Jack Beatty was our contact there. He set up the meeting in Albuquerque, and he also set up the meeting in Santa Fe. Sorensen had to go back after Santa Fe and I had to continue the trip by myself. I went from Santa Fe back to Salt Lake City for a conference there. And then I went up to Casper, in the middle of Wyoming. We had a fellow there named Rose, Bob Rose. He set up the meeting there and also in Green River, Wyoming.

Next I went to North Dakota -- Bismarck and Fargo. Now in Bismarck, we had two people who were very important. One was John Lord who had run for governor in 1958 and he had scored the highest percentage of any Democrat in a hell of a long time. He was a Catholic, though. The other key man was Leroy Blaylock who was an oil broker, oil leases and that sort of thing. He was not a Catholic but he was very controversial.

Now Abner Larson was in that area, but he was for Humphrey. I can't remember the juxtaposition of the convention, but they had a unit rule there too. We got the state under the unit rule, and this too was very helpful at Los Angeles -- a midwestern farm state. I can't remember whether they had that convention before or after West Virginia. It seems to me that it was in April that they had it.

STEWART: I don't know. I don't know anything here.

WALLACE: Well, at any rate, then I went to Fargo and had a meeting with some people that John Lord had set up. I was getting awfully tired by that time. I remember sleeping on the way back from Fargo to Bismarck when John Lord was driving. You can just see how you get awfully tired.

Incidentally, Sorensen was a hell of a sleeper. My God, he could sleep at the drop of a hat. But the way you get, you know, you're constantly tired unless your adrenaline in keeping you going. And once you can relax you just drop off like that and you come back. And quite often most of the sleep you get would be on an airplane or just short snatches.

Then I went down to Rapid City, South Dakota; to Pierre, South Dakota; and Sioux Falls, South Dakota. In Sioux Falls there was Jack Burke. He was a conservative and kind of controversial. That's strong Lyndon Johnson country I guess because it's cattle country.

STEWART: Yes, but Humphrey won the primary, didn't he, in South Dakota?

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WALLACE: I've forgotten. It seems to me we had two or three of the delegates. We didn't have a majority of the delegates. Recapping that, we had some of the delegates in South Dakota. We had all the delegates from North Dakota, and more than half the delegates of Nebraska.

Kansas had a unit rule, and we had a majority there, but there was some kind of foul up at Los Angeles. If you remember the Convention, Kansas caucused, and before they could get their majority finished, Wyoming had settled the nomination. But we really had a majority in Kansas and thus could have had the whole delegation under the unit rule. We got more than half in Utah. We got all of Arizona. We got a considerable number in New Mexico. We got about half in Idaho. Well, anyway, all our work did pay off later.

Well, let's see, we're in July of '59. Now at some stage, I think, it was September we started fleshing out our organization. Kennedy O'Donnell came with us, Larry O'Brien dropped what he was doing and came with us, Bobby Kennedy came full time in the fall. Also Pierre Salinger, Dave Hackett, and Ralph Dungan. Hy Raskin was also a part of the group.

STEWART: John Bailey?

WALLACE: Who?

STEWART: John Bailey.

WALLACE: Yes. Well, Bailey had been sort of a consultant. He was another of the real pros that we had. He and Dennis Roberts were our pros. But Bailey, I don't think Bailey went to -- I don't remember Bailey at Palm Beach. Maybe Bailey was there.

STEWART: I don't think so.

WALLACE: Maybe not. Ribicoff was generally for Kennedy. And Bailey was for Kennedy. But neither one was at Palm Beach. Ted Kennedy, I think, came back. Oh, I think the next thing I did was to start working out appearances for Ted Kennedy. So I worked with Sorensen, and part of it I picked by myself, and part of it I set up for and went with Ted Kennedy. There was a period where I had sort of fallen out of grace in that organization. I think it was August.

STEWART: Oh?

WALLACE: Well, as I said earlier, you sometimes do things that can't be done. You can't do things without making people mad at you. So Kennedy got some

reports from people that I was doing this and I was doing that. The specific thing at issue I think was that Hy Raskin at some point had come with us.

STEWART: Yes.

WALLACE: And Raskin said that George Rock, who was a national committeeman at Colorado, and we were wooing him, and I believe it was Raskin who said, well, they thought if we would give him some expenses or something, why he would come with us. And I supposed to have said in effect that we could “buy” George Rock. I didn’t say that. But I think probably what I did was to repeat to somebody in our organization that if we give him some expenses he would come with us. But this was inside the organization.

Well, anyway, I remember I had something to cover with Kennedy, and I rode out to the airport with him. And he brought up this matter. I said, “I don’t know what was reported, but if I said anything like that it was strictly within the organization.” He said, “Well, you probably shouldn’t say things like that to anybody, whether true or not.” But somehow or other I seemed to be in bad graces.

I also tangled once with Sorensen because of a speech I’d seen which seemed to me kind of a summary of *Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations*. You know, he’d run through all these “Samuel Taylor Coolidge said, this that and the other thing,” but you’re really not saying a damned thing. So I took one of these and I said, “Ted this is all very good to lighten something and to create interest and so forth, but the speech doesn’t say anything.” And he got mad as hell. “You talk about my speeches. That speech you did I had to completely rewrite.” And I said, “Well, I don’t have any feelings about being a speech writer. I got that together for the material, expecting you to rewrite it. But we’re going to be criticized if we don’t say something in these speeches, if there’s nothing but a bunch of Bartlett’s Quotations strung together.” God, he was mad.

But later, when Kennedy gave that speech to a university audience, he didn’t say a damned thing, just a bunch of Bartlett’s quotations. But do you know what? They just loved it. They thought it was the greatest speech they had ever heard. So after that I kept my mouth shut about Sorensen’s speeches. I figured he knew more about it than I did.

Of course, I’ve always had a feeling that if I write something I have to say something. In fact I said that to Douglas one. In his campaign I was going to do research and let somebody else write the speeches. I said, “I can’t write speeches. I can’t write something without saying something.” And he said, “What do you mean?” But it turned out that I did have to write speeches for Douglas’ campaign. And I enjoyed it very much.

Well, at any rate I had this sort of an aberration. Then

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I set up this tour for Teddy Kennedy. And I believe this was September. We went to Idaho, Utah, Colorado and Kansas -- and also Arizona and New Mexico. And when I came back we meanwhile had set up a tour for Kennedy to go through Nebraska. I believe this was October,

early October. And we were going to Omaha and Lincoln and up to -- I can't remember the town. I think it was Grand Island over to Scottsbluff going across laterally.

When I met Kennedy and Sorensen at the airport, Sorensen got off and was very friendly and he said, "Gee, I understand you've done a terrific job with Teddy's tour," and so I thought, well, maybe I'm back in the good graces of the organization. But then Kennedy went through Nebraska, and this is October, this is early October. It's getting down to the wire. He did very well. His speaking is picking up by now.

One of the things that impressed me there was that we were going through and somebody reported that there was a Catholic girls' school. He realized that it probably wouldn't be politic for Kennedy to stop there and make a speech, but if he would just drive by so the girls could see him they'd deeply appreciate it. Well, Kennedy said, "We'll do it. We'll just go up and I'll address the group. Call an assembly at a certain time." And I always admired him for that because this was not politic in Nebraska. But he did it anyway. And these girls, it truly thrilled them. I never seen a more thrilled bunch of girls in my life. There were about five hundred girls.

I admired Kennedy for doing things like that which were not in his best interest to do. The idea of Kennedy as cold and calculating is not true in my judgement because he did feel these things.

Even to this day I have a stark image in my mind landing at Scottsbluff, going into a man's john where he was going to straighten up his tie and comb his hair. And as he was combing his hair -- I remember him combing the back of his hair. Four years later this damned shot and the back of his head being blown off. These two things draw a stark contrast. I can't really shake them from my mind. Well, let's see...

STEWART: What about that big meeting in Hyannis?

WALLACE: I was just coming to that. Before that we had gone to Kansas, and Nebraska, and Iowa. I told you about Nebraska. In Kansas we went to Wichita and ate greasy fried chicken -- in Wichita there was a UAW [United Auto Workers] man, Mac somebody -- and Kansas City, Kansas. And he went to Dodge City and a place called Hays, Kansas. When he got to Hays, one of the things he said in the speech was, "I'm glad to be in Hays, Kansas. I understand that I'm the first candidate since Ulysses S. Grant to visit here." And he added, "I'm glad finally to come to a place

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where Estes Kefauver has not been."

Oh, and then we were in Iowa. We went to a Notre Dame-Iowa game. Kennedy kidded people about how he was neutral. Well, anyway, it was after that that we had the Hyannis meeting.

Now, the Hyannis meeting was sort of a second summit. But the April Palm Beach meeting was to get the initial organization, and the Hyannis was to arrange a final organization. At Hyannis -- I think it's been written up, so I won't need to go into much detail on that as to who was there. But one of the funny things was that they said, "The key

day is January the third, that's the day we will announce." And I remember going into Milwaukee with Larry O'Brien in December. They greeted us as we stepped off the plane with headlines in the *Capitol Times*, "Kennedy will announce January 3rd." What had happened was that we had decided -- we had this list, you know, of about 25,000 Party leaders all over the country, and that we would write personal letters to every one of these guys saying, "I'm announcing," and put it in the mail before the third so that it would arrive very close to that time. But, you know, 25,000 letters is a lot of letters. Steve Smith was in charge of getting this done. Well, in the Senate they have robotypers that were doing this work. So he was using them. Something like that you can't keep a secret. And so that's how that story leaked out.

I remember Kennedy talking to Steve about this, he said, "Now I know, Steve, this is a campaign and there's got to be mistakes. But must there be such big ones?" [Laughter]

The Hyannis meeting in my judgment was rather disorganized. But the main decision that was made was that O'Brien would be in general charge of the primary states. About that time I was supposed to start what I was originally supposed to do, which was to work out these "Kennedy for President" clubs. But there were still some other odds and ends to be done in these states that I had organized.

Later in October we went to downstate Illinois and covered something like nine Congressional districts in three days in Illinois. This I worked out with Ed Kelley who was on Douglas' Illinois staff. They were very good of course there. Eunice Shriver went with us on some of those trips.

I met with Kennedy at Midway Airport. We were leaving early in the morning to make an early morning breakfast meeting at Bloomington. It was a foggy, rainy, horrible day. This was in October which, as you know, is a bad time of the year. We had chartered a small Apache airplane. There wasn't anyone in it except me and Kennedy and the pilot. And it was bumpy as hell. When we got airborne we couldn't see a thing. I didn't know what we were going to hit, since the airport was busy at that time; this was before O'Hare had been developed completely.

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We finally got toward Bloomington and the pilot had to get down below the clouds to see. He said, "You know, I'm breaking regulations." Kennedy said, "I'll back you up; say I made you do it. I chartered the plane, I demanded that you do this."

We were bucking like hell and the wind was knocking us up and down. I was beginning to get a little bit green around the gills. I don't know whether he was or not. Then we came in for a landing as the wind was driving across the runway. Just as we were about to touch down the wind flipped that plane completely on its side. The pilot gunned the motor and pulled us out. He said, "I can't land that way because of the wind," so he decided to land into the wind, despite the fact that there was no runway in that direction, the field was sloppy -- a sea of mud. In landing we had to go down in the mud then up over the runway and back onto the mud again. After we taxied up to a small, wet crowd of waiting politicians, Kennedy poked his pale face out the door and said under his breath, "Fellow Americans, it's good to be here." [Laughter]

We went to Bloomington, Springfield, Joliet. Joliet is a sort of Catholic oriented town. We also went to Rockford for breakfast. DeKalb for lunch, a theater meeting, which Dorothy O'Brien worked out, and Rock Island for dinner. Then we went to Quincy for breakfast, Peoria for lunch, and Decatur for dinner. It worked out pretty well. This was in October.

Part of November and December was devoted to organization work and as things came in these had to be dealt with. And certain states were assigned to me. Generally I had the Midwest and West. But I did not have certain states which had special situations. For example, Kenny O'Donnell generally worked Pennsylvania with Dave Lawrence and that group. I think Steve Smith did most of the work, and Kennedy himself, on Ohio. This was when DiSalle was governor. It was primarily DiSalle's situation. And Michigan was a labor oriented state. I had some connections with the UAW, but not as much as Kenny O'Donnell.

I had Illinois, West Virginia, North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, Wyoming, Idaho, and Utah. Hy Raskin had Nevada. I did not have Montana for some reason.

STEWART: I don't know what was special about Montana.

WALLACE: Then when I got into the clubs. I organized clubs in Washington and Oregon and California. Then spent about a week working in the Oregon primary. There was a period in January where we took Kennedy to Salt Lake City, and Nevada, and Albuquerque, and North Dakota. And we had to fly in for filing in February in West Virginia. One trip, I remember, we went to West Virginia, North Dakota, Albuquerque.

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In Oklahoma we had primarily one person, and that was the Governor of Oklahoma, J. Howard Edmundson, and everybody else was against us. But I have family in Oklahoma and this helped somewhat, knowing....

Well, oh, the other thing. The pitch that was given, that I gave and that Sorensen gave anyway, to these people was very simple. It was that John F. Kennedy can win and no one else can. And we tried not to run down any candidate at all because we knew we wanted to draw support from the people who liked all of them. So we didn't say Lyndon Johnson was too conservative or anything else. We just simply said that our contacts in New York, Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania, California and other states indicated that he would not be accepted, and that you couldn't get the nomination without some of the big states. Stevenson said he wasn't a candidate; despite the fact that we all admired him very much he just did not have the broadness of appeal.

Then the fact that being a Catholic had positive points as well as negative points, and we'd give a rundown. It was kind of a psychological thing, giving people the feeling that the guy's moving ahead and if they wanted to get on, why, they...

STEWART: I've heard it said that there was never, or very seldom any specific promises as far as support of one faction or another, or promises of

jobs or anything else.

WALLACE: No. I don't think so. In fact, if anything like this ever came up why they'd simply say. "Well, if Kennedy's elected President and you've been very helpful to him, what do you think his attitude will be, as compared with the situation if you're not?" Most sophisticated politicians don't want to -- the real political pros, they don't expect this. In fact, it's almost considered crass or something to have an arrangement.

It was charged that we were offering the vice-presidency to Docking [George Docking] of Kansas and various people. But this was discussed only in a very general way. We would say we were looking for a vice presidential candidate and that he should probably come from the West or Midwest because Kennedy's from the East." Things like that.

STEWART: What about financial support? You mentioned a little problem you had with one fellow in, where was it -- you talked about getting some expenses from his activities. Was this ever a problem?

WALLACE: Oh, Bernie Boyle in Nebraska? We had wonderful people in Nebraska. Bernie Boyle was a national committeeman. He had an annual picnic on his lawn, it's a big place, where all the party leaders gather.

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Well, we thought it would be nice to be invited so we could meet all these party big wigs. Boyle said, okay, he'd invite us, and he did. It was a very successful affair. I imagine nearly every important Democrat was there.

Then Boyle sent Kennedy a bill for about a thousand dollars to pay for the entire expenses of the picnic. Well, we paid the bill, but that's about the last we had to do with a guy like that.

STEWART: Did this happen any place else, that you recall?

WALLACE: Well, I didn't hear about it happening in that way. Normally it's not a question of being willing to pay it. If he had said, "I will have a picnic for you. But of course I won't be able to pick up the tab, it's going to be too big. Can you pick up the tab for the picnic?" And we probably would have said, "Sure." I don't know about a thousand bucks. That's quite a bit for something like that. I mean we could pick up a tab for a hundred, two hundred bucks, three hundred dollars. But the thing was that we were given -- this was a regular annual affair and we were paying his expenses for him.

Oh, I started to say that on the polls, we would get these polls indicating that Kennedy was rising or doing well. We always made copies of these and sent them out to all of our people on our mailing list, give it to them to show other people how he was doing on the polls. And every time we got some cable with information like that we'd shoot it out to all of

our contacts and they'd use it in their talks. The polls were really good with Kennedy, a very good talking point for us.

I think it was about that time that Kennedy went into Wisconsin in earnest that I started turning my full attention to the clubs. Of course the clubs were kind of a pale thing after all this other work, the real guts of the nominating process. But I was working it out. We got clubs and used some of the people that we had to help set the clubs up so that they sort of complemented each other. But Kennedy at the time was sinking about everywhere into Wisconsin. In fact, more than he should. He was saying, "If I lose in Wisconsin, it's all over anyway. And if I win, why, if I beat Humphrey in his home area then I could be in." Well, as we know, it didn't turn out that way. He won in the Catholic areas, but he didn't win in the Protestant areas so this left this big question mark, and it remained for West Virginia.

I had spent a tremendous amount of time in West Virginia working out or organization with Bob McDonough, working out other people to bring into the operation. Before Kennedy ever even decided really that he was going to run, we had forty county chairmen ready to roll.

STEWART: Were you always confident you could win there?

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WALLACE: Yes. I was always urging him to get in. So was McDonough. But Kennedy was skeptical because of the Catholic issue.... I explained to him that the state's being only 4 ½% Catholic shouldn't frighten him. The point that he and the others missed was that 4 or 5 percent Catholic does not mean that the state's 95 percent Protestant. I said, "Do you know what the Protestant proportion is in West Virginia?" He said, "If it's not 95% what is it?" I said, "It's 27 ½ percent. There is simply a very large group without any church affiliation at all. So we have to face a hard corps of Protestant ministers, but this is not going to be a pervasive thing that swings the vast majority of the people." This was our great opportunity. Whereas West Virginia is visualized as a place where 95% of the people are anti-Catholic, it was not that kind of situation. There were too many people who didn't care or who didn't take religion at all that seriously.

I was unhappy, I've forgotten exactly how -- as I worked on this club thing I was sort of isolated out of the main thrust of working with the primaries, and here I was working with the clubs. Of course, it's the kind of thing that had to go forward. But I kept getting reports of what was going on in Wisconsin. I didn't like it all. For one thing they were running that whole darned campaign with out-of-state Catholics. And I said, "I'm here, you know. I'll go out and help to do these things." I never did really get into Wisconsin. Perhaps, I thought, my fears were ungrounded, but sure enough, all he did was carry the Catholic districts.

Well then, West Virginia came along and I was still supposed to be working primarily on the clubs. Well, God, I knew West Virginia. If we lost here it would be all over, and clubs would be meaningless. I didn't like the way several things were going there and I thought, "Well, I've just got to say something." So I got on a plane with him. We were having some kind of summit in Martinsburg, West Virginia to discuss some kind of summit in Martinsburg, West Virginia to discuss the campaign. So Kennedy on top of everything had

lost his voice. I guess that was the darkest point of the whole campaign. He had carried only the Catholic district in Wisconsin, here you have West Virginia coming and things look bleak as hell and Kennedy had lost his voice.

I made two points to Kennedy on flying out from Washington to Martinsburg where we were going to have this meeting. One was, "You've got to take the gloves off Humphrey. You've got to beat him over the head as a frontman for Lyndon Johnson, that he can't possibly be president, that his whole candidacy is a sham. You've just got to pummel him hard. You simply can't be polite anymore. And the second thing is to hit this Catholic thing head on and say, 'I am Catholic, and I'm not going to turn this government over to the Pope.' Instead of soft pedaling the religious issue and hoping it will be forgotten, tackle it directly because it's not going to be forgotten."

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When we got to Martinsburg Feldman and Sorensen were there and met us. Kennedy showed my memorandum to Sorensen and Sorensen said, "Yeah, well look at this." And then he gave him a speech which was along these lines.

Well, that was the turning point. But even so I took off and spent about a week or ten days as a non-Catholic myself going around the southern part of the state with a sound truck and speaking in all the little towns, and singing in church choirs, and I was just all over the place. I think I covered something like 150 towns in ten days.

STEWART: Was there any opposition to doing this, to bringing the Catholic issue to the forefront? Do you remember?

WALLACE: Well, it wasn't that much, but when we had done it and it was successful, and then there was a letter ready to be sent out to all the Protestant ministers in the state, in effect, appealing to them. And I single handedly stopped it. I said, "What you're doing is challenging these guys. They're the ones that have been promoting this thing. And if you send this to them you're going to have a sermon in every damned pulpit in West Virginia on the Sunday before the election. Now, don't do this." And it was killed. It's one thing to lay this out on the table publicly, and it's another to goad these ministers who I knew better than they did. They suddenly thought, well maybe these guys are reasonable human beings. But religion is not a subject for reason among fundamental Protestant preachers.

STEWART: What about the question of attacking Humphrey, or solidly bringing out the fact that he was a frontman for Johnson?

WALLACE: Well, even that was done more by FDR, Jr. But FDR, Jr. got carried away, called Humphrey a draft dodger and everything else. FDR did a real hatchet job on Humphrey.

STEWART: On his own?

WALLACE: Well, no, I wouldn't say so completely. On this draft dodging bit, that was his own. It wasn't John Kennedy anyway. He didn't have anything to do with that. John Kennedy participated in the decision to take the gloves off. He had to do it. But I don't have any recollection that Kennedy would have or did know about that particular thing.

Kennedy did not use a slashing approach. He would simply say, "Hubert Humphrey cannot be President of the United States. He does not have broad enough support to get the nomination." In other words, he didn't tear into Lyndon

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Johnson for trying to hoodwink the voters. You see, FDR could say that this guy is being devious, that they're using him for a stalking horse and so forth. But Kennedy could maintain the position of being a presidential candidate, whereas FDR could really sock him. Meanwhile, of course, we did spend one hell of a lot of money. I didn't participate in the spending of it, but I know a great deal was spent. For example on TV I'll bet that damned "PD 109" was on TV five times every night. Of course that did an awful lot to reduce the anti-Catholic feeling. I mean, to vote against a guy because he's Catholic, yet here he's risking his life, and so forth and so on.

STEART: Was there ever any talk...

WALLACE: But basically it was the organization and the stuff that had gone one before which pulled this thing off. Of course, Kennedy blitzed some places like he did. He had a guy in every congressional district, almost every country. Sarge Shriver was in Huntington, and Ben Smith was in Beckley. Ted Reardon was in Parkersburg, and he had people in all these districts. Well, one problem was that they were all out-of-staters. But despite the fact he was criticized for bringing all of these out-of-staters in, it's pretty effective. It's obviously working.

And you're talking to people in terms of what expenses they face, you know, on election day. I don't know how much money was spent or how it was spent, but I know a lot of it was spent. But that issue Kennedy always met by saying anyone who was a serious candidate for president can get money to run. So that every time if Humphrey tried to cry about these big rich people who were running, this hurt only himself because it just indicated that he was not a serious candidate.

STEWART: Were there ever any serious frictions between -- in the organization -- between people who considered themselves pros and people who were coming in totally brand new to politics?

WALLACE: Well, most of the old pros.... Well, John Bailey was as far as I could tell anyway, at least to my fact, was friendly to people like me and

Larry O'Brien. Larry wasn't exactly an amateur nor was he exactly a pro either. He had worked in previous campaigns. But as far as national politics he was an amateur.

STEWART: Excuse me. I was thinking more in terms of some of the President's personal friends who came into, for example, West Virginia and who were working in different areas, different counties.

WALLACE: There were a lot of people who came in. West

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Virginia's a good case in point. I was talking to Matt Reese who was our executive secretary during the campaign. One of his biggest jobs was to do something with people coming in from Massachusetts and make them feel like they were doing something. But you take these Italians with city slicker accents, you know they do more harm than good. So what you do is put them in something not too visible.

There was some friction in the sense that Kennedy would get his ear bent about the kinds of stuff that I would do and O'Brien would do which shouldn't be done that way. It's crude or it's not sophisticated or something like that. For me to pick up the phone and a call a national committeeman, well, in retrospect it seems kind of ridiculous that anybody shouldn't be able to call a national committeeman if you're talking for a candidate. For God's sake, it doesn't make any difference who it is, you were recognized. Like right now, what's the difference if Califano [Joseph A. Califano, Jr.] or Larry Levinson [Lawrence E. Levinson] calls me. I know they're both from the White House or Jim Jones or Marvin Watson. I'm going to pay attention to what any of them say. And politicians generally paid attention to what I said when I talked with them. I tried not to be arrogant or anything like that. I think the evidence indicates, as well as we did in all these states, that the operation was all right. But that doesn't mean that there probably wasn't real criticism.

As I say, there was one period where I seemed to be out of grace. One problem with Kennedy is that you never really knew how he felt about you. For example, in this situation where I had a feeling I may have fallen from grace, and then sort of came back, I couldn't tell when I talked with him whether he.... Now, when I was with Douglas, you know Douglas would have said, "God damn it! We can't do that. You ought to know better than that." Something like that. But Kennedy would never criticize you so you never really knew where you stood.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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