

Thomas A. Kennedy Oral History Interview – JFK#1, 08/15/1972
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Biographical Note

Transportation and Public Utilities Service, U. S. General Services Administration (1953 - 1962); Director, Management Inspection Staff, U. S. Agency for International Development (1962 - 1966). In this interview, Kennedy discusses his personal relationships with John F. Kennedy [JFK] and his family, JFK's early career, and what it was like to work under his administration, among other issues.

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Oral History Interview

Of

Thomas A. Kennedy

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Thomas A. Kennedy – JFK #1

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Oral History Interview

with

THOMAS A. KENNEDY

August 15, 1972
Waltham, Massachusetts

by

William W. Moss
For the John F. Kennedy Library

MOSS: Let me start off by asking you about your general background. You are from Chicago, correct?

KENNEDY: Right.

MOSS: I think the place to begin perhaps is your war experience, in which you say you met Joe Kennedy [Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr.], young Joe.

KENNEDY: Yes, Joe junior.

MOSS: Right. How did this come about?

KENNEDY: Actually he was naval air, and I was not naval air. I was in the intelligence group. So I met him at the Copley Plaza [Copley Plaza Hotel] in a social way.

MOSS: Were you in ONI [Office of Naval Intelligence] . . .

KENNEDY: Yes.

MOSS: . . . or was it the security, the communications. . . .

KENNEDY: No. Office of Naval Intelligence.

MOSS: Yeah. Okay. And where was it you met him?

KENNEDY: In the Copley Plaza . . .

MOSS: Oh, yeah. Okay.

KENNEDY: . . . at a social event. And the thing is that his

grandfather had been some kind of a shirttail relative of my mother's--that was Fitzgerald [John F. Fitzgerald].

MOSS: Yeah.

KENNEDY: At the time that he ran for mayor in Boston he had. . . . She was in this area and lived in this area at the time and then later went on out to Chicago. So that she has always told me, "Well, look him up," or something like that. So I did look up his grandfather, Honey Fitz, and he was an amiable ward politician type that I was quite familiar with in Chicago. [Interruption]

MOSS: Excuse me. Okay. You were telling me about your meeting with Honey Fitz.

KENNEDY: Yes.

MOSS: Under what circumstances did you meet him, at his house or. . . .

KENNEDY: No, it was down at the hotel. I think it was called the Parker House or something like that. I forget offhand, but it was in the hotel. And, of course, he was amiable and I had rather good references in the sense that Roger Sullivan [Roger C. Sullivan] in Chicago who was quite the boss of that period had met him and they were chief executors of. . . . Roger Sullivan didn't hold the mayor's post, but he ran the party. Then there were a whole. . . .

MOSS: What was your contact with Sullivan?

KENNEDY: My father and my uncles were active in politics. It was Chicago free-for-all, as they say.

MOSS: Right.

KENNEDY: So, of course, he. . . . Normally, I guess, he wouldn't have been as expansive, but having the credentials of the group out there, and he had met them in New York, or he had met them in Bronxville, I believe it was, a couple of times. Ed Flynn [] was a rising politician at the time. He also was a. . . . And so he had checked me out so that he knew I wasn't. . . . And largely, Bill, it was one of those circumstances where you're doing it because your folks asked you to do it. It wasn't exactly one of those types of meetings that you'd say to yourself, "Well, I'm going to bounce around and meet up with the fellow."

MOSS: Yeah, yeah.

KENNEDY: So that, in that way, of course I was aware that Joe junior's father had been an ambassador, and the

circumstances when I was in London after that was that the people who had associated with Joe junior there were known to me and I had chatted with them and all that. The story was going around at that time that he had wanted very active duty, I mean combat type, and that his father knew some captain in the detail section in Bu Pers [Bureau of Personnel], and that through Admiral Land [Emory S. Land] and a few others who had been on the maritime commission he had contacted them and had sought on behalf of Joe junior whatever type of assignment he was involved in. So I often thought afterwards that, you know, if he had kind of--'cause naval air was not an active arm in the European theater--if he hadn't pressed for his own boy's transfer in Bu Pers it might have been a different version which. . . .

In a sense, of the two fellows, Jack versus Joe, Joe was what I would call polished and suave at an earlier age. Jack was rough as a cob at that point.

MOSS: Yeah.

KENNEDY: And the other fellow has a certain charm that was much more encouraging. I mean, he was the type of fellow that if you were leaning against a bar and you said something, he'd probably comment and leave it that way but maybe keep the conversation going. Jack was hard as the devil to get to talk in his earlier days. He was a more introvert personality.

MOSS: You say you met Joe junior at Copley Square?

KENNEDY: Yeah, and then, see, we had liberty quite a bit. I was working in the yard [Charlestown Naval Yard]. He invited me down to Squantum [Squantum, Massachusetts], since I had never been to Squantum, or Quonset Point [Quonset Point Naval Air Station, Rhode Island], or any of those places up to that point. So I went down. I spent a weekend with him and his gang down there and took in the local haunts.

I must say that, in contrast to Bob [Robert F. Kennedy] and Jack in that period, and in the time that I had any great amount of relationship with them, there was a decided difference among the three. Joe paid, and the other two were the first to put their hand in their pocket and keep it there till the danger was over.
[Laughter]

I can remember at one point when Bob came up from University of Virginia and Jack was a congressman and, why, he said. . . . I ordered, I said, "I'll have a martini," or something like that, and Jack said he'd have a daiquiri, and the other fellow says, "I'll have a scotch and water," or soda or something like that. So I had put a five-dollar bill on the bar, and I didn't see anything from them, so I said, "One martini and two beers." They said, "We didn't order beer." I said, "Well, when Kennedy drinks, everybody drinks,

but when Kennedy pays, everybody pays." They didn't particularly appreciate it. So, rather dourly they scraped up five bucks between them and put it up on the bar. I never found them being anything-- what in Gaelic is called flaithiul, expansive, with their money.

MOSS: Yeah. Yeah.

KENNEDY: They were very. . . . Rarely, I doubt if he carried any. I know Jack didn't carry very much. Particularly like going to the movies or something like that, it was. . . . He liked cowboy movies. I think Randolph Scott and those were great, see? That was what he liked. He didn't. . . . Not the big message. He didn't think Hollywood had much of a message, opposition. But I suppose later on. . . . I'm talking about in the. . . .

MOSS: Yeah.

KENNEDY: He wanted an escape, that was all.

MOSS: Were there other occasions on which you met Joe junior?

KENNEDY: Well, no. That went on for a period of, I'd say, maybe two months or so, weekends and all that. I was able to round up a couple of girls up in Boston. You know, one thing that always I used to twit them about was that they really didn't know Boston very well. They were people who had gone to Harvard [Harvard College] but that. . . . To me, I said, "You know, frankly you people are more Bronxville people than you are Boston." And he confessed to me that when he went to Cambridge to run for Congress he had some fellow who, I can't think of his name. Does the name Lally, Jack Lally?

MOSS: Yeah, that sounds. . . .

KENNEDY: Jack Lally was a friend of his father's, and then there was the fellow who was the director of GSA [General Services Administration] in Boston and he was a councilman. I can't think of his name.

MOSS: Well, we can, we can. . . .

KENNEDY: He was the regional director.

MOSS: We can get these into the record later.

KENNEDY: They stood in back of him and prompted him as to the names and who was important, although there weren't wildly enthusiastic for his candidacy. And the story was the, had gone the rounds, of the fact that he, I believe. . . . At the time when I came here in '46, I think he was working, just before the election, for The Boston Globe, I think the

newspaper. A newspaper, anyhow.

MOSS: We can check that out for statistics, following this.

KENNEDY: He was a kind of freelance writer and. . . . One of the vagaries of his life which I have thought about in passing is that the editor of the Globe, I believe it was, we went to a place down the street and he told him. . . . We were sitting around having a couple of drinks, and he said, "Why don't you learn the newspaper work?" And he said, "Well, I'm thinking of running for public office." He says, "Well, why don't you learn this job and then go on?" And then a couple of years later I remember him talking to Sam Rayburn. I was standing in the hall with him, and Sam Rayburn said, "I hear you're thinking of running for the Senate [United States Senate]." He said, "Yeah." He said, "Why don't you learn this job? You have an absentee record, you never show up when you're wanted, you always want everybody to rally around for your roll calls, but you never rally for anybody." And then afterwards, he never was in the Senate very much--you know, he was much more absent than Ted Kennedy [Edward M. Kennedy]. And among the staff it was hopeless to try to get him to the floor, other than on some crucial issue of domestic concern for Massachusetts. And the feeling you always got was that when he was a reporter he never really gave it full charge, because he was running for Congress and the House [United States House of Representatives].

He was so busy lining up, I believe, some athletic houses or. . . . His father had some interest in having a gymnasium in every little town over ten thousand in Massachusetts. Some deal that he was working on, where they. . . . See, the idea was that they'd have a Joseph Kennedy, Jr., athletic center then that would be a rallying point that he could always go to and hold a mass meeting and it had a built-in deal.

But then when he got into the Senate, he wasn't around, so he was running for the presidency. This is in a period when I was exposed to, like, Estes Kefauver [C. Estes Kefauver] and the other groups, who were all candidates. You couldn't throw a ball in a room without hitting a potential nominee.

I felt that, even when he was president, he was more intent on the second term without getting the thing functioning the first thing. Really, I'll tell you quite frankly, he didn't understand government.

MOSS: Yeah?

KENNEDY: No, and that's strange. I mean, you take Frank Coffin [Frank M. Coffin] was a congressman from Maine. Frank, in a talk with him one time in AID [Agency for International Development], I said to him. . . . We were talking about our

congressional relations and he said, "My god," he says, "when you think of it, I was up there for a couple of terms. I didn't even know what the function of a deputy assistant secretary was." He said, "I didn't understand the difference between a regulation policy statement, between an executive order and a statute, or any of that. Frankly," he said, "I don't think they know anything." And it was always amazing to me, because I spent many Saturday mornings with Mr. Rayburn and McCormack [John W. McCormack]. And when they would be dictating their correspondence, and you're just sitting there and correct it as they go along. Or they would be writing to the wrong level. Congressmen have a tendency to want to talk policy to people who are nuts-and-bolts people. And they want to talk nuts and bolts to a policy maker. So that they're much more interested in talking to the deskman than they are to the secretary. They think they're getting something. Actually, they're not. The deskman doesn't see the whole picture and he isn't supposed to. The secretary doesn't get into the nuts and bolts, either.

So at any rate, the possibilities of a Joe junior as a candidate I felt were good. The story that was going around in Cambridge at the time that he ran for Congress was that they had somebody else, and then he said that he would like to run, and then the group that were nominating said he didn't have anything special. The place was studded with war heroes. And as a matter of fact, one of them even made the ungracious assertion that he was a naval officer who had had his "T" crossed, which wasn't exactly received too well. But he said he would not draw salary as a congressman, that he would use it in some fashion to have students who were recommended by local high schools or something come to Washington and learn about congressional. . . .

MOSS: What were you doing in Boston at this time?

KENNEDY: In '46? Well, basically, I was just visiting, but when I came back from the service, why, Kelly [Edward J. Kelly], of course, had just gone out of office, '46.

MOSS: Right. This is the mayor of Chicago?

KENNEDY: Yeah, right.

MOSS: Right.

KENNEDY: And so had become the national committeeman. I came with him several times. And, of course, that opened a lot of doors.

MOSS: You were, what? His executive assistant or. . . .

KENNEDY: Well, I had been, but at this time I was operating. . . . It was an arrangement, like this. When I came back there was some suggestion I run for office, and I

wasn't too prone. . . . Chicago's a strange place of dinosaur characteristics. Everyone lives to be ninety, and it is looked on with considerable pain if anybody who is fifty would presume to run for office because the incumbents, some of them have never been off the payroll themselves since they were twenty-one, but how they got on there is always a mystery. And there is a lot of accommodations made--I mean, the congressional delegation is and was pretty much of a unit rule. If Jack Kennedy had gone to Chicago he would never have been heard of. He would have then ended up either one type or the other. He would have ended up Eddie Boland [Edward P. Boland], who just goes along. I mean, it's been on the record for that. On the other hand he might have ended up like someone around here that'd be more of an aggressive departer. He himself was the biggest rebel. I mean, he lost a lot of nostalgic support from a lot of old-time politicians when he refused to sign the Curley [James M. Curley] deal. Their attitude was expressed, I think, in a way that, "Well, it's not professional," when he didn't do it.

MOSS: What took you to Congress?

KENNEDY: Well, I was leading up to that. In 1948 and the 1948 election, why Kelly, of course, was spending more time down there. With the 1948 election. Truman [Harry S Truman], of course, had very little funds, and he was very simpatico with Ed Kelly. And Kelly had a lot of deals, and he also had enough standing with the delegation, that they were going to do pretty much what big Ed wanted. Why? Because Jack Arvey [Jack M. Arvey] and the boys had picked Martin Kennely [Martin H. Kennely], who was a mover--he was a moving executive. I don't think they'd believe that at home. He was an executive in the moving business, because they said that he. . . . The only thing that he ever learned in the moving business was not to lift the heavy end. And this he carried into his political life. So that there was the mayor's job and then a big, fat void. He couldn't even translate it into action. He was merely a facade. And behind this Kelly was running the show, and he had a congressional delegation.

With that Mr. McCormack was nominated to be the chairman of government operations, which was then called Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department [of the House], and Mr. McCormack also was the majority leader and he didn't have the time and he had followed this practice of always advancing up the table to the chairmanship and then stepping aside. Which, of course, made the ranking man succeed but also slightly beholden. See, because he could hold both jobs at once.

MOSS: Yeah, yeah.

KENNEDY: But there was a congressman, William Dawson [William L. Dawson], who was the executive--not at that time, but he was a member of the Democratic National Committee--and at that time he was what they called special assistant to the

chairman. Kelly had recruited him from the Republican party and had brought him in, and Val Washington [Val J. Washington] was the head of the same type office in the Republican party. But Val Washington had been Dawson's deputy. And you could see that the black vote in Chicago, the organization had just split that controlled both segments, you see. Well, Dawson then said that he would only take the job if he could get a counsel. So he mentioned to Kelly and Arvey, how about having me come down? So you asked, "Well, what were you doing in Boston?" as such. Well, when I came back Kelly said, "Look, you've been an administrative assistant here and that, we are having a little problem in connection with our county and city employees. They are going to be represented. I mean, organizations are recruiting them. . . ."

MOSS: This is union?

KENNEDY: Union. AF of L [American Federation of Labor], you know. He said, "Why don't you. . . . They're looking for a lawyer and an executive director." So I said, "Well, how many are involved?" He said, "Just, oh, about eight thousand." He said that it would be much more orderly if they hope to get pay increases, against a civic federation and other tax-paying types.

MOSS: Okay, go ahead.

KENNEDY: So, in that way there was roughly about fourteen small locals representing engineers, accountants, city employees, sanitary district, a nurses local, a doctors local. And of course, Chicago received a grant to President Roosevelt [Franklin D. Roosevelt] at Kelly's intercession to create what they called in those days, delicately, a contagious disease institute but was really a VD [venereal disease] center. And the other cities. . . .

MOSS: I knew a guy who interned there once. He said it was the most miserable experience in his life.

KENNEDY: Well, the doctors that were there felt that they were getting, you know, less than their best out of it and they wanted to be represented. The only way they could do it was organize. There were about twenty-five of them, so they organized. All you needed was ten to get a charter. So I represented all these. And then, of course, I would go and appeal to the city council and the county council and the county commissioners and the state legislature.

And, in that way, I met Douglas [Paul H. Douglas], who was an alderman in those days, alderman of the fifth ward. And, of course, he was very suspicious of me when I first came to Washington, because he knew that I had been close to Kelly and he didn't abide Kelly at all. But Senator Douglas became a pragmatist, a working idealist.

So you'd come to Boston or New York or other cities because of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, who had this national organization under Zander [Arnold S. Zander] which was domiciled in Madison, Wisconsin. So, in that way, you could also. . . .

When you talked to Jack Kennedy, he knew you had talked to the labor groups in the various cities. And that you were talking from the office in Chicago. And so it wasn't that you weren't also unappreciative of his problems. Because when he was a congressman there were a number of times that he asked me to come up to. . . . he never liked American Legion or VFW [Veteran of Foreign Wars] posts. He was not very hot for the so-called patriotic organizations. I was a member, and as I said to him, "Why turn them down as speeches?" I said, "When I'm up in the area, set it up and I'll go by. I can say good things about you. You don't have to show up. So if I get invited, then when I go back to Chicago I can use the Boston, Springfield, Westfield experience and translate. They don't want to listen to what happened to some post on the north side of Chicago. They could care less about that. They are interested in knowing if you come talk to the Medford post or Belmont post or something in Boston. They'll listen to you." Of course, you can attribute almost any experience on that shifting base, because you have to use the inner circuit. You have to use yesterday's story to start tomorrow's. At any rate, I went there . . .

MOSS: As Dawson's counsel?

KENNEDY: . . . as Dawson's counsel, and I stayed from '48 to '52, and then I went to GSA from there because I had helped draft the Federal Property [Federal Property and Administrative Services Act] Act.

MOSS: Right. Let me ask you to talk a little bit about Jack Kennedy as a congressman. Occasions when you were with him, met him socially on congressional business and so on, what kind of guy he was. Some anecdotes of the occasions, that kind of thing.

KENNEDY: Well, essentially, Jack Kennedy was a loner. I don't think he developed any real group of cronies until after Bob got out of law school. I think after Bobby came to Washington, and he brought some of the law school classmates he had, who were no factors in the years I'm talking about. Bobby was not, you know, in evidence very often. None of these that you hear of, like O'Brien [Lawrence F. O'Brien], or. . . .

As a matter of fact, O'Brien, if I recall correctly was Foster Furcolo's secretary at one time. And I knew Foster pretty well and I used to go to dinner with he and his wife. They were on the floor that had a hearing room that he used to use. His office was next door, so it was very convenient. But that was prior to Larry

O'Brien coming on to work.

Let's see, I'd say as a congressman he was more like a dilettante. He only was interested in the few things that interested him. There wasn't that, he wasn't rushing into print. He used to get pretty good publicity. He was very popular with the girls who worked on the Hill [Capitol Hill], as such. In that sense, he dated a lot of them and several of them, principally, as I mentioned, Mary Ellen Higgins was probably his most consistent girl friend over a period of, I'm talking about, say, four or five years. She was a rather interesting, a very attractive girl, successful, married afterwards, but she was. . . . I had met her one time in front of the White House, on the other side of the street. I said, "Well, Mary Ellen, if you played your cards right you'd be over behind that fence." She said, "Oh, I don't know. I think I did pretty well. So I couldn't help but agree with her.

MOSS: What sort of occasions would bring the two of you together? What common interests did you have, what common undertakings? That kind of thing.

KENNEDY: Well, a congressman. . . . This is the period now, I think, prior to Dave Powers [David F. Powers]. He had no sidekick. I can't think of this fellow's name, but Dave can supply it. He was. . . .

MOSS: The guy who didn't pan out?

KENNEDY: Yeah, right.

MOSS: Okay.

KENNEDY: And he was around and yet Jack used him more like, you know, I'll crank the organ and you be the monkey. You know, see. The guy was very two-dimensional and then he got into scrapes with different girls and all that. A lot of it was being attributed to Jack, you know, like that he was kind of girl crazy, sort of attitude. To a great extent it wasn't attributable to him at all. Many overtures were being made in his name by this clod whom he finally got rid of because I think there was some little shortage in the accounts or something of that nature.

But there, if he didn't come back to Boston on the weekend, what was he going to do? He lives over in Georgetown. At that time--I lived nearby--there wasn't much. You could go to church, you could go to the office. He had a couple of secretaries, they would come in on Saturday, but what was there to do Saturday evening? The next morning, you could go to church. He was a pretty good church member, in that sense. This bit about when he got to be president and, you know, every Sunday they'd have him in the paper. As a matter of fact, I think if he missed he'd be unnoticed. But in those days, there was no publicity and he was definitely quite regular about it. Of course, in those days, I myself went. You know, you just didn't feel like you started Sunday off. It never

occurred to you to stay home. But I would say that overseas, on trips, the two times that I spent with him, he got up and went with. . . . There was always generally one or two others, people who were going, so he always went on that basis.

MOSS: How did he enjoy himself? What were the things that he liked doing?

KENNEDY: Well, he would, like Mary Ellen, he played a rather indifferent game of tennis. If I recall correctly, because he was always very. . . . In those days he was skinny as a rail and he. . . . You've got to remember that during this period, here was a fellow who might change a tire and wipe it on his shirt, who rarely got a haircut until it was quite noticeable among a very tight clipped population. His suits always looked like they were slept in or he sprawled in them or something. There was none of this that he acquired as a senator. And one of the reasons, I believe, that he was chided by a number of people down there saying, "Hell, you got to look like a senator. You got to act like. . . ." Even if you're like Clyde Hoey [Clyde R. Hoey] and you wore a hammerclaw coat or you're like Clare Hoffman [Clare E. Hoffman] and you have no pockets in your suit, have something because you're going to deal with adult issues, you can't afford to look like a college freshman. At that time he was gawky. When he ran--you could see him--he kind of loped favoring his leg which I think he had some insert in his shin bone or something.

MOSS: I didn't know that.

KENNEDY: Yeah, I think there was some kind of, something in his leg. If I recall correctly, he had some. . . .

MOSS: We can check that out easy enough.

KENNEDY: There was something about one of his legs that he favored it. The thing that a lot of times you would do would be, you could go up on the Hill and, of course, he had his office. . . . He was a member of the, I believe, Education and Labor Committees [of the House of Representatives].

MOSS: Right.

KENNEDY: But he was not favored. He was a maverick on the committee. The chairman was Barden [Graham A. Barden] or someone, I believe Barden of North Carolina, who was an arch-conservative something like Goldwater [Barry M. Goldwater], and he couldn't abide Kennedy to start with.

Then, where could you go? I mean the restaurants were all closed down on the Hill. There was a greasy spoon row, they call it, which was up past Independence Avenue. There was a whole chain of dives, you know, like Mike Palm and his cafe, and all that. So that you could go to church--you had a choice--you could go in

Georgetown, you could go to the cathedral, or you could go to, I think, St. Peter's which was up about a block from the House office building.

Well, see, the chairman of the Banking and Currency Committee [House Banking and Currency Committee], Brent Spence, and the chairman of the government operations committee were friends, friends of mine naturally. And they also had quite a liquor cache, you know. So what we would do is go to church, and then pop by, and we could go in and it was in a . . . I must say he was not a drinker, but he liked one daiquiri, possibly two at the . . . But he also liked cigars which these guys had plenty of, and they were all free, and we could go in and lounge around and you had the . . .

Well, I had the keys to all the committee rooms, so we could do anything we wanted. If he wanted to write letters of something of that nature, why he used to do it. He has his own office, but he was in the old House office building, and if you've ever been in that old House office you'll recall that the ceilings are about forty feet high, and he had, it consisted of two rooms. He had his room on this side, and the girl sat out here. In the new House office building they're all modern, you know, and the john was private. The one they had there, they had a private john in some of them. But at the time I'm talking, they had a washbowl behind a portiere or folding screen, and then they had to go down the hall to the can. The other way, you could go over in the other building and it was up-to-date. And if he had some people, like I remember a guy--I can't remember his name, John--Boston Port [Boston Port Authority], for instance--John Callahan?

MOSS: You've got me, but somebody. It may be Callahan, yes.

KENNEDY: Some name like that anyhow.

MOSS: Maybe. We can get that filled in enough.

KENNEDY: And he wanted to talk to him about something or other, you know. If they were down on Sunday they'd come up from the Mayflower [Mayflower Hotel] or something. In those days we would walk sometimes from . . . I remember we walked one time from the Shoreham Hotel to the Hill, and I think that's the farthest he ever walked in his life.

MOSS: That's a good trek.

KENNEDY: That is. It's a good couple of hours' walk and puttering around. We even went into St. Matthew's to rest up. It was nice and cool. But the weekends, of course, that he went up to Boston, that was his own business. And then the weekends that I went to Chicago it was problems that didn't involve him at all.

My mother and father came down during this period, and I heard this for years afterwards. The chairman of the drafting committee

or legislative reorganization, executive reorganization, was Holifield [Chet Holifield]. He was in California. He could only go home once in a while, you know, because they had the limited number of trips. And he had the same amount of money as. . . . He was always grouching that the man who was elected--Howard Smith [Howard W. Smith], we'll say, from Virginia--could call everybody in his constituency, but he couldn't, because the phone bills would kill him. Same way with, he got a trip home, a trip at the beginning of the session, and I think one at the end maybe, and an occasional one, I forget exactly how many they were allowed. But it turned out, of course, that he liked to work on weekends. And my mother and father came down, and that weekend Jack Kennedy wasn't going home.

So it was Saturday evening, and they were staying at the Continental Hotel, so I invited him to dinner; and he suggested that he had his car and he wasn't doing anything, maybe they'd like to go sightseeing tomorrow. And so he drove them all over Washington, and when my father went home, he couldn't say a wrong word of Jack Kennedy for the rest of his life. That was his sole contact with him, as a young congressman. And when you consider as he said, "The meatheads we've had down here. . . ." The part I always got was this, "He had the time that you didn't have to show us around."

MOSS: Yeah, yeah.

KENNEDY: Okay. Well, of course, they stayed several days after that and I showed them around. But the weekend, there was no traffic much in those days and he had this old beaten up Cadillac with a dirty, tattered convertible top. And he was considerate enough, like he told my mother, "I won't put it down, even though it's summer and all that, because it might upset your hair," or something like that, and he didn't drive fast. It was a perfect day and they enjoyed it. And ever after that was their memory of him, though the other contacts they ever had were by watching him on TV or something. But you couldn't say a word against him after that, and it was a pleasant memory for them. And then, of course, when he got killed it was even worse, because they always felt that he never aged a day from the day they last saw him.

MOSS: You said you set up a little, sort of, constitutional law seminar at one point.

KENNEDY: Yes. It was suggested at that point by Vice President Barkley [Alben W. Barkley]. He lived across the street from me on Connecticut Avenue, and he. . . . I didn't know him too well when I came to Washington. But Brent Spence was the dean of the delegation, and he was blind and deaf, and he came there when he was about fifty and he died I think when he was eighty-eight or so. He volunteered, in a sense, to be redistricted out. And Barkley was a very good friend of his, and they'd like to.

. . . A man with no hobbies. Brent Spence was a fellow who had a lot of young ideas, but he was imprisoned behind a wall of darkness and silence.

I'll give you an idea. One time Vice President Barkley and I were watching this girl go down the hall and he was standing with us, and I went [wolf whistle]. Evidently he heard it, see, and he said, "What's she like? Help, help, I'm inside here. Let me in on her." Barkley said, "See, the old guy has got a lot in there." [Laughter]

So, at any rate, he suggested that one of the things that he had found most valuable when he came to Congress as a congressman himself, years before, was the need to have something, he said, better than what they had taught him in school under the boring label of civics. And he said that in order to gain the respect of your colleagues, a familiarity with the constitution, the principal cases, some grasp of the constitutional issues, the ability in a public forum to show an easy familiarity with this field and government generally couldn't help but push your career ahead.

So he suggested to me, because I had raised some constitutional points with him. . . . When I went to law school there was a dean I had in DePaul University which is the vincentian school out here which is, incidentally about ninety percent Jewish and ten percent Catholic--reverse discrimination in the thirties--was Dean Taft [Harry D. Taft]. He was President Taft's [William H. Taft] secretary, and then later his secretary when he was chief justice, and he taught constitutional law and was practically a walking library on the subject.

I had done pretty well with him in that field, so he said, "Why don't you take this up?" Particularly since being the new staff director I had been challenged on it practically my first day on that job by Henderson Lanham [Henderson L. Lanham] of Georgia who is affectionately referred to as the judge. And Judge Smith [] was on the committee although he was chairman of--not chairman then, he was ranking man--on the Rules [House Rules Committee].

I forget what the issue was, at this moment, but I always remembered affectionately afterwards that Mr. McCormack and Dawson said, "Well, we hired him, and we'll vote for him." There were 27 members, I think, something like that, on the committee and I had 25 vote against me, 'cause the judge introduced, something, that was not constitutional. Why do a useless thing? And I said it was. And so Mr. McCormack and Dawson said, "We hired him, we'll stand with him." Of course, that didn't constitute a very auspicious debut. So I also was a little irked, because he hadn't done any homework, Judge Lanham. So afterwards, I explained it to Mr. McCormack and to him. He said, "Listen, the judge is a fair old guy, and he is a nice fellow and he doesn't mean anything by it. You've explained it to us and I think you're right." I even showed him the Shepherd citator where it was the law in another related field, and it would come pretty well with this. They said, "The thing to do is to go around to his office," which was right near Jack Kennedy's in the old House office building, "and explain it to

him."

There's a lot of things. For instance, there's a lot of jealousy in those days between the people and how they got the suites in the new House office building. And one of the reasons Kennedy didn't move over right away was that he was playing hard to get on votes and not going along with the leadership, and they didn't reward him until they practically had to. Lanham they wanted to reward, but he didn't have all the seniority that he should to get it. And he was a little sensitive, and particularly when he had to come to a committee meeting, he came to the new House office building, which was brand new, from his old place. In those days, even when you went by the Johns the plumbing was bad, and also it was not air-conditioned.

That's one of the reasons the Sunday was so important for letter writing, now that I remember. It was not air-conditioned in the old House office building. They had fans, but they. . . . It was in the new House office building. So Washington, if you have ever been there in the middle of July, it was absolutely humid and soupy. So that if you had a nice refuge and you had a guy with all the keys, you know, it was something. So that I wasn't. . . .

It never occurred to me to look Jack Kennedy up as a means of advancing myself, because he meant nothing. I mean, what could he do? I could go home. I had been offered the seat in the third district three times, and I said, "For what? It's a topsy-turvy district. I'll get two years of glory and then I'll be thrown out." And then, as a matter of fact, it became a joke in Chicago that the two congressmen, the Democrat and the Republican bought a home, and they used to lease it from each other . . .

MOSS: [Laughter]

KENNEDY: . . . and then, you know that was. . . .

MOSS: Yeah.

KENNEDY: And they alternated until, well, they damn near died. Now of course, with the flux population and the black group moving into the third district it, in about, oh, I'd say 1960, '58 or something like that, it went completely Democratic. It has stayed that way since. But at the time I'm talking, it was about a twenty year of flipflop.

They had a rule which they have violated, which Jack Kennedy was strong for, that if you were a congressman you would not be again hired as a counsel or staff member or clerk of the House. You could run, but if you made it--if you got defeated, you could come back--I mean defeated before election. But, if you once got elected Mr. Rayburn and--what was his name, before him?--Bankhead [William B. Bankhead] and that crowd--they had always observed this rule, and that rule was only breached by Mr. McCormack when he appointed . . .

MOSS: Pat Jennings [William P. Jennings].

KENNEDY: . . . Pat Jennings.

MOSS: Right.

KENNEDY: Because there were a whole group of guys who at that time suggested that I be considered for clerk, which I wasn't particularly interested in at the time. But Pat Jennings was the breach in that group, and if I had done it, then I was out, you see.

MOSS: Yeah.

KENNEDY: And I said, "Well, for what? Then I've got to go back to Chicago." And at that point it had been down. . . . If you stay in Congress with a law practice, I'd say, over four years, you've got to run with your tongue hanging out after that, because you don't have any law practice. You can't possibly maintain one. Of course, they've used that as a reason for raising the annual salary, because it's an eleven-month job, basically.

MOSS: Unless you've got some very active partners who keep you floating.

KENNEDY: Well, or you have some partners who are a little unethical, I think. I just don't have too much respect for. . . . I go to you and you're a congressman, and you say, "Well, there isn't much I can do for you, but I'll tell you what. This is a congressional matter. I would rather not get involved. I'll send you to my partner." So then you go to his partner and then the partner says, "Drop the bill in." He drops the bill in for you and, why, they pocket ten grand or something, that's a deportation order or stay of execution of some nature.

We have--he's still alive yet so I won't mention the prime example of that, and I never did particularly care for it. And we had a lot of people out in Chicago who were interested in that if you might. . . . There are movies today that are quite popular on the subject so we won't go into it.

But the air-conditioning was a big factor that I mentioned, and I had. . . . But I've accepted that so much in recent years, that they forget it entirely.

There wasn't anything he could do for me, but there was a lot I could do for him. One, I knew any bill that affected his district that came to the government operations committee was going to come on my desk. We had an arrangement at that time with Senator McClellan [John L. McClellan] that we would not duplicate each other. And Walter Reynolds [Walter L. Reynolds] and Glenn Shriver [Glenn K. Shriver]. So we, Dawson, McCormack, Holifield sat down with McClellan, McCarthy [Joseph R. McCarthy], and Mundt [Karl E. Mundt], I think it was, and said, "Look, let's whack up the areas. If we're going to work on legislative reorganization, then you work on executive reorganization. You accept whatever we come up with, we'll accept whatever you come up with."

Now, if you go look at the federal property act, you're going to see that the Senate report is identical with the House report, because they've merely adopted ours. The federal records act, if you ever have occasion to look at it, you'll see that it's identical. Now, Walter Reynolds [Walter L. Reynolds] was kind of a little egocentric, so, once in a while he'd insert a sentence or something which we would buy simply 'cause he wanted to stake out a claim with GSA so that when he called them on the phone they'd know who he was or something. But, there was also the possibility that, if he wanted to go to Chicago and go before. . . .

We had a very tightly structured organization, and it was always incomprehensible to New York and Massachusetts congressmen that I could say this to them, which I did. I mean, I took John McGuire [John A. McGuire] out there from Connecticut. I took Foster Furcolo, Edna Kelly [Edna F. Kelly] from New York, giving you for example, Wayne Hays [Wayne L. Hays].

I remember particularly Edna Kelly's being flabbergasted at one thing. She met Mayor Kelly, I think at one o'clock, and she said she was going out to Chicago and that she had just been put on the Foreign Affairs Committee [House Foreign Affairs Committee] and she'd like to make some kind of a statement particularly affecting Israel or something. And he said, "That's no problem. How big a crowd do you want?" And she said, well, you know, the clubhouse, as they call them in New York. He said, "I don't think that'd have any effect. What you want," he said, "is the Jewish wards. Right? Well, how big a crowd do you want? Do you want two thousand, do you want five thousand? Just say. How important is this?" And she said, "Well, that would be splendid, I mean. . . ."

"It's no problem at all," he said, "I'll just put in a phone call. If it takes you two hours to get out there, I'll call here at lunch, up in the House office building and," he said, "they ought to have it by, oh, 7:45," or something like that. "They'll take you to the hall. So they'll meet you at the airport, take you to the hall." She said, "But you haven't even made the call, and you're talking about a rally," you know. And he says, "Look. . . ."

So he called, and what he did was he set in motion a deal. He had 50 wards. Every ward has an executive secretary, full-time, who sits there all day. Okay. He called the city hall where the coordinating secretary is. He called each of the. . . . They each had a minimum of six hundred jobs. Okay. The six hundred jobs were generally precinct captains, so he had about four thousand precinct captains at that time. Assume for the moment, now, that I'm a deputy sheriff in the sheriff's office. The sheriff's office gets what they call an alert. All the officers got an alert. It means that everybody who's on patronage, "Tonight there's a meeting in the twenty-fourth ward," which was basically the heart of the Jewish population at that time. And it was up to him. Each precinct captain, of course, had two lieutenants. And then, if six hundred were going--it was up to them to produce--each one of them would have to produce four more.

Now, who they were was their problem. They had six hundred and sixty people in their precinct. They had their wife to start

with, or their boy, So when they arrived at the door. . . . Oh, before they left the sheriff's office I would be given a red card, and then when I arrived at the ward door--the executive secretary knew everybody by his face--so then he gave me a blue card, and I gave him my red card. And if I couldn't show up because I was sick, then I sent my brother or somebody. Somebody, you had to send somebody with the red cards. The red card came, and it's not. . . . He doesn't recognize you. He says, "I'm Joe's brother," or something. He gives you the yellow card. Then the yellow card, when you go back to the sheriff's office, you hand the sheriff the yellow card. He says, "You better have a good excuse, 'cause you don't have a job here if you don't." They didn't take too much.

So that was how it was worked. The colors were the thing. You didn't even have to have anything written, because if you didn't bring the blue card or whatever it was at the rally. . . . Oh, they could guarantee you five thousand, they could guarantee you Soldiers' Field if you'd wanted it, you know. So, it was rather amusing 'cause they always think of themselves as being greatly organized, but that crowd out there, they took over in '31 and it's '72 and they're still in charge. They can't do it without an organization.

As I feel, you know, I think I mentioned yesterday about, I don't know whether it was to you or Dan [Dan C. Fenn, Jr.], I think it was maybe Dan. He said, "What do you think Daley's [Richard J. Daley] going to do in this upcoming election?" I said, "Well, he was trained in a school under the Kelly-Nash [?] organization, that if he's wearing Finnerty here, or we'll say McGovern [George S. McGovern], here. . . . They used to say, "You're wearing Finnerty's button, but you're saying, 'Vote for O'Halloran.'" and I said, "See? That comes from education. You're reading instead of listening." [Laughter] Sure, he has the button, but that doesn't mean anything.

MOSS: You took Jack Kennedy out to see Mayor Kelly, or was it in Washington?

KENNEDY: In Washington.

MOSS: In Washington? What was that meeting like?

KENNEDY: Well, I could see it was. . . .

MOSS: How did Kelly respond?

KENNEDY: Kelly is a very gracious, urbane individual. You know, Jack at one time suggested that I write a fictionalized novel on the city chieftain, as he called him, because he said that he knows that a great deal of humor and a great deal of human psychology practiced by these fellows. . . . Kelly was the type of guy who said, "Don't practice on me what I practice on my constituents. You know I have enough schmooze all day. Tell me what you want, you know." On the other hand, I think one of the things

that we discussed that day was how to be vague. Because Kelly said that anybody who deals with a politician must have a firm commitment and both understand it. With all other actions you must be cloudy and vague. You just can't put a glove on them.

I remember when we came away from the meeting. . . . Incidentally it was not a meeting that was easy to arrange. I'll tell you why. Congressman Tom O'Brien [Thomas J. O'Brien] of Illinois was a vicious bastard if there ever was one. He was an old guy and he particularly detested Kennedy. And he was a powerful member of the Ways and Means Committee [House Ways and Means Committee] and when Jack wanted to move from education and labor, at that time he was thinking that maybe he'd like to get a little exposure on foreign relations, or foreign affairs, rather. And he'd like to get into something that would give him more of a springboard. You see, in education and labor, at that time labor was a hot issue--it was the Taft-Hartley operation--add it would be a lot better to vote for the bill that someone else would construct than to be on it.

MOSS: Yeah. Yeah.

KENNEDY: Now, he had to get on that labor committee because he didn't have too much constituency.

MOSS: Let me turn this over.

KENNEDY: All right.

MOSS: Excuse me.

TAPE ONE, SIDE TWO

MOSS: Okay. Go on.

KENNEDY: Now, Tom O'Brien was a fellow who I always felt had some connections I'd rather not know too much about. He had been the sheriff, and the sheriff was a burner, as they call them out there; in other words you could only run for one term. And he was, I think he was some relative of Nash's, so he was the dean of the delegation, and he had about sixteen years when they couldn't find another candidate, so they put him up for sheriff. And of course, that broke his service, but he was back inside of four years. But he had just, I believe, if I recall correctly, he had just come back about the time Jack was trying for the Senate, or was going to try. He was very low on him. Of course, he was low on Estes also, for obvious reasons. But he felt that he was too outspoken and talking out of. . . . He didn't vote the chairman, which is the old rule, you know. He obviously wasn't going to vote Barden, and he didn't follow Lesinski [John Lesinski] of Michigan.

I'll tell you how bad it was on that committee. The Taft-Hartley bill was debated on the floor of the House, and Lesinski who would be nominally in charge was required to play handball, which was his only sport, while the bill was debated on the House floor. Because if he came out on the floor, they'd lose votes, and. . . He was from Michigan, he was an out-and-out labor type, but he represented a type of fellow in a floor debate, that they, everybody could mix them up. I remember once him saying one time, he started out with a reconstruction finance company, the reconstruction finance corporation, and ended up with the general refinance company at the end of it, so he had to, you know. . . . He had scrambled eggs for brains. His son is pretty bright, I understand. You know, average type. His father was something. . . . And this is the climate in which Jack Kennedy was. . . . He had offered some amendments in the committee, and O'Brien, you see, was in the position where he controlled because he was dean of delegation and invoked the unit rule, and he always got his word from the organization in Chicago. He got it. It never went to the others, which put him in a tremendous position. But on the other hand he was a fellow who was overbearing, autocratic, and all that, except when Kelly was around.

I went out to the airport and picked him up, and brought him in to the Mayflower . . .

MOSS: Picked up Kelly?

KENNEDY: Yeah. . . . and Jack was with me, see. And they talked on the way in, and he was saying that he was interested in city politics and he was trying to contrast. . . . But he approached it on a student basis, you know. "I'm studying city politics," and all that. . . . So then we walked in the Mayflower lobby, O'Brien saw him with Kelly, and he didn't know what the reasoning behind this was. And he saw me, instantly taking a violent dislike, that I had something to do with it. And he didn't talk to me for several years after that. However, he would do anything that McCormack told him. All I did was go tell Mr. McCormack what I wanted him to do, and then he would tell Tom O'Brien and O'Brien would go and do it. And as long as he said I was okay, he wouldn't bother you. Now he would have made a lot of trouble after Kelly was dead but for the fact that he would know that you were pretty well wired in--by this time I knew most of the Southern congressmen very well, and a Negro chairman needed their votes. So he used to say, you go around and get on your horse and go talk to him, 'cause he could do it. They would vote him as a chairman. That's how they rationalized it. They weren't going to vote him as an individual, you see. They followed the committee. That way you could get around a lot of friction.

While we went in there Kelly said to O'Brien, "Before we have this meeting," he said--there was a room away in the back, in the Mayflower, the Chinese room or something; that's where they used to have lunch and all that--"I wanted to talk to this young man here about a couple of points," and he says, "I'll be with you in twenty

minutes," or some such. And he was particularly interested at that time in asking him--because I was away in service, and so was he, at the time of the '40 war--"How did President Roosevelt introduce the name of Truman?" And Kelly said to him, "Well, we were all sitting up there and," he says, "you could check this out. Ed Flynn's still alive," so I assumed that he would, you know. He said that we were all sitting up there and we were trying to figure out who the city organizations could support for vice president, and that time he said they had a slogan, "Roosevelt or ruin," I think it was, or something like that. He said, "We can't stand ruin for vice president, you see." And the president called and said, "It's Douglas or Truman." And Kelly wouldn't answer that phone 'cause he was what they call the host of the convention. So he answered the phone and they were all staying around. And there was Hanrack, Hannigan, and Kelly, Flynn, Crump, Haig, a few other fellows that weren't crucial in those days. So when he hung up the phone they said, "Well, what did he say? Who is it?" He said, "It's Truman or Douglas." They said, "We can live with that. We'll take Truman. The other guy's a jerk.

So Truman then had the big city organization for him. Just as when there was an attempt at the accession of McCormack to be the speaker, people like O'Brien controlling their organizations, pledged their people to him. So when he walked out, you know, before they even had the caucus or anything, they were already calling him long distance and pledging. So with the city organization secure, the crucial bulk of the vote, he could afford to fool with the Richard Bollings and the rest of them, and not pay any attention, you see.

So I thought afterwards in connection with that meeting that had a Kennedy attempted the presidency, we'll say, by accident of birth--suppose he had been eligible ten years before--no way he would have ever got there. These old fellas had all died off, and their successors to this day have no dimension beyond their state or county, in some instances. As a consequence, the conventions were relatively wide open. Even the Kefauvers had. . . . Of course, there were some of them still alive. In the '52 you had, when Adlai came along, so. . . .

MOSS: You mentioned yesterday a trip to Japan that you went on with the committee. This was with the committee on government expenditures?

KENNEDY: Yeah. I believe they called it that, expenditures in the executive branch.

MOSS: In the executive branch, right. Okay, what was the purpose of that trip, first of all, just to document it?

KENNEDY: You see, it was popular as it is today to discuss the Korean war and its purposes, but it was more wholly supported because it was a collective nation effort. But the average congressman was interested in those days in strategies-

-still is, I guess--they're all armchair strategists--strategy and policy, but no one had ever taken any serious look at the cost factor which was then evidenced in the hardware and the supply management organization. So congressman Bonner [Herbert C. Bonner] of North Carolina and Porter Hardy [Porter Hardy, Jr.] began to pry into this, and they never conflicted because we made an agreement to start with. Porter Hardy would only look into the horrible examples and the individuals involved, whereas Bonner's studies would be on a loftier plane, never get into that, but would refer anything they stumble over to the Hardy Committee. So therefore they began to study supply management policy, logistical support, tried to upgrade--I think to a great extent they did--the studies of Somerville [Ralph H. Somerville] and Ludz [Peter E. Ludz] on World War II and update them with application to worldwide shifts. At that time there was a feeling that Stalin [Joseph V. Stalin] was a man who had a demonical plan to bleed us white, that this war was a feint, and that once you'd gotten your logistical support problems licked, he'd quit or go into a stalemate, and then activate Berlin, then go down to Iran, move it around, on a periphery, and then that way it'd cost you much more. Now they've been stuck down there in Vietnam for a period, and I think that this group in the Kremlin today I consider second-raters because the basic. . . . Mao Tse-tung's operation is, these guys are bush leaguers and I was one of the original twelve apostles, and they're trying to interpret the Bible, and I was there when the thing was created--that sort of attitude.

In the supply management field we went to a number of camps, warehouses, held hearings, and they're all, you know, pretty well established. As a matter of fact, the hearings are bound, and some of our. . . . As I say, in that Drew Pearson episode, you could extract some questions out of there that he asked. But he had flown over. . . . Oh, first of all, he came over to the office and he said, "I understand that you're. . . ." And, incidentally, he was not a guy in those days whose scent is people. I was not very privy to his staff at all. I mean, he had that lady who was his secretary--I don't know, she wrote a book there. . . .

MOSS: Lincoln [Evelyn N. Lincoln]?

KENNEDY: Yeah. But outside of just saying that, "He's in," or something like that, and you'd go into see him, that was the end of it. I mean, I never chatted with her or anything. He never sent her. . . . And then he had some fellow there that, I can't recall his name, tall. . . .

MOSS: I forget when Ted Reardon [Timothy J. Reardon, Jr.] came in, but it was fairly. . . .

KENNEDY: Ted Reardon came in about, I think, in around '50. He was an interesting guy, too. He--well, I'm digressing. . . . I had something. . . .

MOSS: Yeah, let's go on with Japan.

KENNEDY: Yeah, Japan. He came over and he said he heard that we were going over there, and what was the schedule? So I told him. And he said, "Are you stopping in Taipei or Taiwan?" I said that strangely enough the chairman, who didn't know anything much about that area, felt that we oughtn't to go there, Taiwan. I don't know why. I mean, absolutely. . . . But he asked so little, Dawson, that when the committee--and I was setting up the itinerary--and I asked him, you know, "How come?" He said, "Well, that's that nationalist crowd," you see, and the China lobby, and somehow that scared him. He didn't want it. He wasn't going anyhow, but he didn't want the committee to go there that he was going to be responsible for. So I said okay. Kennedy said that at that time he was going to go to Taiwan because that was an issue that was down the road somewhat.

You know, one of his penchants in those days was to interest himself in some movement that wasn't talked about. I mean, for instance, he was talking about Algiers when nobody else was talking about it, or. . . . Today, I'm trying to think of exactly what an issue. . . . Oh, maybe "Is the Gaspé Peninsula going to secede from Canada?" Well, nobody had heard. . . . "Where is it?" or "Who are they?" He'd issued a press release on it, and then everybody. . . . And then maybe five years later. . . . I will say this, usually a couple of years later everybody came rushing in, and I can well remember that he and Franklin Roosevelt were talking about Mao Tse-tung when no one else could pronounce it. And Wernher von Braun, you know. We brought Wernher von Braun, the whole group, up there, and they were going to talk about something or other, and that bunch of congressmen came by, including Jack, and he talked about a space platform--this was in '50--and how they were going to shoot up to it, and then from that launch to something else, and Clare Hoffman of Michigan came in and he said, "Who's this nut?" And one of the members said, "The last guy that said that was Hitler [Adolf Hitler]." Of course, he, Clare Hoffman was such a contrary man that I remember one congressman saying one time, he came rushing in the room and they were saying, "Vote, vote. How'd you vote, Clare?" He said, "Aye." He says, "Record my nay." "Wha, wha, what do you mean?" he says. "If you're for it, I'm against it. What is it?" That was his standard.

At any rate, he said that where we're going to see Ridgway [Matthew B. Ridgway], who was then the theater commander, and we had set up an appointment in Japan, and there was also the possibility of going to Korea. You'll recall at that time there was an injunction against the Korean War being interrupted with all these congressional visits, and the theater commander was van Fleet [James A. van Fleet], and he had to carry it out; he didn't particularly care one way or the other. He was a very cagey guy, and I knew him from the Greek war, and he made the troops over there in '48 and '49, and he was a military advisor there. Kennedy came over on his own, but he wanted to be associated with the committee; couldn't go on Education and Labor 'cause Barden

wouldn't give him the right time. He was paying his own way, and then he wanted to know. . . . He was going to stop in Saigon, he was going to stop in Taipei, I think, the Philippines, Saigon, somewhere else, say he was going to head back to, he'd end up in Paris. He'd join up with us again in Paris, and he was, I don't know what his other itinerary was. I can't recall that particular aspect. Then we met him again in Paris and London, or previously, in '49, we were going on to observe the Turkish, Greek aid bit, and Henry Grady [Henry F. Grady] was the ambassador in those days, Labouisse [Henry R. Labouisse, Jr.] was in charge of Paris, Averill Harriman [W. Averill Harriman] was the [copy ends]

But the studies that we made were of the Korean operation and the support, then we went on down to Hong Kong, of course, to shop, and then we went on down to the Philippines, and then from the Philippines. . . . Of course, these weren't American forces in the Philippines at the time. We went on down to Singapore, which was still British, and Malaysia, and stopped intermittently, oh, in Rangoon, Bombay, Calcutta, and Karachi, we hit 'em all. Then London, Paris; then we came up into Germany, and at that time they were pretty well concentrated, in Giessen and Koblenz, and places like that, the Americans. Then we went on to Berlin. Max Taylor [Maxwell D. Taylor] was the commandant, and he made a boo-boo with. . . . By that time we were joined by. . . . See, Porter Hardy was on the armed services [House Armed Services Committee] and our committee, and Hebert [F. Edward Hebert] had been serving on armed services--just got on--and then the South Carolina guy . . .

MOSS: Mendel Rivers [L. Mendel Rivers]?

KENNEDY: . . . Mendel Rivers, yes. Mendel Rivers was a buddy; he had Bryan Dorn [W. J. Bryan Dorn]. So we ended up with a joint committee by the time we got to Berlin. And Max Taylor made the mistake of saying that he was too busy to brief them that morning, and we all went out somewhere else, and when we did, we drove by and there he was teeing off. [Laughter] Oh boy, that was a dummy.

Because Bonner had a lot of blue chips in a strange quarter. Know what they were? He had been the secretary from 1919 to 1940 of Lindsay Warren [Lindsay C. Warren], and when the president. . . . You know, his son got killed, and then he was up to be the speaker, and he threw it all up, just went home. Then the president tried to get Karl Mundt, the president tried to get him to come up to Washington, and Bonner was running in the re-election, you know, the election in November, and he said. . . . So Lindsay Warren said to him, "Go on over and see what kind of a job that is, 'cause I don't think of Karl doing anything but looking at a very myopic aspect of GAO's [General Accounting Office] responsibilities, checking vouchers or something." So Bonner went over to the GAO and he spent about a month or two there, and then Lindsay Warren, he told him it was not a bad deal, so Lindsay Warren then, of course, came up and he took the thing. And of course Lindsay Warren, you know, when we were in the supply management, it was just what he

wanted. He loaned us his investigative staff, see, and of course all you had to do if there was any problem, Bonner'd get on the phone and call Warren. Warren would send out a whole mess of letters.

Well, of course Max Taylor got their cork out and they held a meeting, and he sent Warren a notice that if a guy could go playing golf in the middle of a cold war or something like that, they'd come all this way and he can't even meet 'em, blah, blah, blah, and the next thing you know he sent about ten auditors in. And Max Taylor was sweating for a couple of months after they left. But that was the group that we ended up with.

MOSS: What did Jack Kennedy seem to be interested in on this trip? What were the kinds of things he was doing? How did he conduct himself?

KENNEDY: He conducted himself very properly. I have had a working career where you've had to bail out a lot of people in kind of unsavory circumstances, but I can't say with any honesty at all that Jack was any problem. He never overindulged; he never patently ran around to that extent. He had a number of acquaintances in a lot of these places and was evidently invited out quite often because he would always. . . . We set up a program, as you know, for them, and the guys who had no great amount of local contacts, they generally tended to hang together. And then in those days, with all the counterpart, he was not excessive, and his requests for counterpart--he took whatever you gave him. Whereas a lot of the others were real bandits in the sense. But they called it funny money and really used it. But in no circumstances did he. . . . He wrote a letter to the chairman to compliment me at each trip, and he also wrote to the chairman, said it was a great privilege to. . . .

MOSS: What did his purpose seem to be in going along?

KENNEDY: Well, first of all we gave him insulation. See, he did have an official function. He wasn't trying to just cruise on his own. The second thing was that there might be something in what we were talking about

The strange thing about it was, though, that he. . . . When McNamara [Robert S. McNamara] was talking cost and hardware years afterwards, he was spouting a lot of the stuff that he had picked up on this trip. I remember one remark he made after we had had a meeting with Ridgway for four hours, and in which we told him that we weren't here to check his military policy, how his war was to be fought, but what were the dislocations, organizationally and operationally in getting the materials that he needed to prosecute a war from the contractors standpoint, the bids standpoint, from the procurement policy standpoint. He came back and he said, "Gee whiz, you guys must have wanted a trip awful bad." He was bored to death.

And we went to see Prime Minister . . .

MOSS: Yoshida [Shigeru Yoshida]?

KENNEDY: . . . Yoshida. They brought a whole bunch of old cars to the Imperial [Imperial Hotel] and they had running boards on them, and one of them broke down. I was sitting in the back seat when--they must have had eight of us in it--and the car he was in broke down. So then they all said, "Oh, the devil with it. We won't wait for the carpool to send them something else." So they all got on, and hung on the outside of the thing, and I'm sure that among--'cause I saw a picture of it later--was one of the congressmen, and I'm sure there's a picture of him on that side, hanging on. And I remember his remark to me, 'cause I was sitting in the back. He said, "What are you doing inside, and I'm outside? I said to him, "Well, I know why we're going there; you don't." [Laughter] So it was kind of amusing afterwards.

But we set up all the education and labor. He met the education attache and the labor attache and the cultural attache. He wasn't greatly interested in them. I must say, 'cause I attended those meetings, and sometimes I came there myself. He had a habit of oversleeping in the morning those days--I don't know whether he did it in later years--but at any rate at that time he would sleep in or something. He'd always claim he didn't get a call or. . . . But he was interested in the operations of the local government and the relationships, business.

I'll give you an example. We were invited in two circumstances, one, to the parliamentary union of the commonwealth of the British nations, [Commonwealth Parliamentary Association], or something. Is there such a thing?

MOSS: I know the organization.

KENNEDY: Well, we went there and it was in Westminster Hall--you know the big one? They executed somebody or other, maybe Charles I, or someone. And then he was interested because we were talking to Ernest Bevin. And I remember that joke that was told at that time, which was current--I had never heard it before--and it was repeated by Ernest Bevin, and it was about Aneurin Bevan, and it was typical of English humor. I always remembered it afterward: Did you know that at a recent party George VI, or King George, said, "Aneurin Bevan, our health minister, is a worthy individual. Possibly we could consider conferring an honor on him in the Christmas list. I have thought of him as possible Lord Thrombosis." So Aneurin Bevan rushed home. His wife said, "Oh, Lady Thrombosis. Gee, it has a good ring." So he said, "Well, I don't know. What does that mean? Where is it located, or what is it?" so they looked in the dictionary and in the British dictionary it said, "A thrombosis is a bloody clot which will destroy your constitution." [Laughter] So that was the type thing.

There was a Japanese parliamentary meeting which he attended with us and there they were inaugurating a new group called the Green Bowlers, which was a kind of young Turk movement in the

parliament, or Diet, and they were trying to give him the impression that it was a kind of a Japanese Camelot. I remember he asked them, "What do Green Bowlers mean?" This one fellow, Japanese deputy, said, "Fresh breeze, clean air, through the whole organization." And then they all--you know, it must have been about a hundred of them--heard that and they say, "Fresh breeze, clean air," you know, and I'm saying, "Geez, the ecology of politics." It wasn't even a word that we even knew in those days.

MOSS: How did he react to that?

KENNEDY: He was nonplussed. We all were. But I thought it was an interesting exchange, because they were trying to say, in effect, when they were talking, that the old families were controlling, like your old political machines and, "We are the Green Bowlers; we are the young people who are going to break through, bring this beautiful green vision to the world." And, of course, I don't know as they ever have--I think the old families are back in now.

What he would also do is this. He wanted to meet with the people who were at that time establishing franchises in Germany and in France. All the Detroit [Detroit, Michigan] people had come over, and they were trying to buy up a company--an automobile company, I mean--like Chrysler [Chrysler Corporation] I think it was, [?] was buying Simca [Simca Company], and the blah, blah, blah. . . . And I remember that he asked the question one time, which I thought was rather interesting 'cause it was a question. He said, "Well, you're going to make the cars here. Then what happens is, there are just so many people going to buy cars." "Well, if we have it. . . ." I remember this GM [General Motors Corporation] representative saying, "Well, if we got to have another depression, let it happen at Detroit."

Oh boy, that brought him right out of his chair. Because they were going international at that time, and he was particularly interested in Japan, in Ridgway's statements that German inspection standards were being introduced in Japan, and no longer would the prewar shoddy, stamped tin cans come out, that there would be precision instruments, and that Japan would be competitive with the entire world, and certainly would measure up. So I often thought of that afterwards, when you think of the fact that they have achieved German standards of inspection, and that's really why they have done as well as they have.

MOSS: Tell me a little bit about the second Hoover [Herbert Hoover] Commission and Robert Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy]. By this time--what?--you had not yet moved to GSA. . . .

KENNEDY: Yes, I had.

MOSS: You had moved to GSA? So this was. . . .

KENNEDY: This was about '56.

MOSS: Right. Okay.

KENNEDY: Well, the first Hoover Commission was a bipartisan commission, drawn equally from the Republicans and the Democrats, in contrast with the second commission. In both commissions the hardest working member was not Hoover nor Joe Kennedy, senior, and most of the productive work in the commission was done on the commissional level. Now, there was a staff under that, of course. But the policy determinations were made by--guess who?--our recently late secretary of state, Dean Acheson [Dean G. Acheson]. But he wanted a low visibility profile because, as you'll recall, in '52, he was probably about the most vilified American that ever stood in shoe leather. President Truman had stood by him. He had really taken a beating for the president, and this is a man who, as an assistant secretary, was the most popular congressional liaison relations officer that the State Department ever had. And I can't recall anyone being more successful and personally identified. Macomber [William B. Macomber], Bill, had been and is very effective, but he has no identity outside the department. This man had an international identity and still. . . . Yet that was completely shot out from under him by the attacks, so that he said there's no sense in jeopardizing the good work of a commission that's bipartisan by attributing so much of it to him, and there would be people on the Hill who would vote against it just . . .

MOSS: Sure.

KENNEDY: because his name was on it. At one time, one of the few times I ever appeared in the newspaper, I was labeled "a henchman of Kelly, a crony of Dawson and Trumanism," because, see, Dawson's committee was known as the last stronghold of Trumanism on the Hill, "and a friend of Acheson's." Which was a three-time kiss of death. And that was done by a guy who used to write things for Joe McCarthy, so that I got. . . . I had purposely avoided all reporters; I had no use for them; I didn't believe they ever told anything. First of all, I didn't think they were even educated enough to understand the issue; secondly, they were too lazy to even sit down and listen to the people who were doing the work--the congressmen, the senators, the staff--and they came in with a foregone conclusion, and they made unwarranted assumptions. So I was never impressed with them, and I didn't have any confidence in their integrity as such, 'cause they print anything.

I did run into one reporter--I was telling Dan that, and he said, "I never met him." I said, I ran into one reporter on the Hill who has a column, name is Scott [Paul Scott]. He and Colonel Allen [Robert S. Allen] had. . . . Now I guess he's by himself. He was the only guy that I ever heard congressmen and senators talk in front of, and then they'd say, "Don't mention it," and he never would. And as a result, he had a lot of stuff that was pretty good

when they gave it to him. But. . . .

MOSS: You said that Robert Kennedy was assigned to your . . .

KENNEDY: Yeah.

MOSS: . . . office in sort of a

KENNEDY: Here's how that. . . . I was just pointing out the contrast. Now the second Hoover Commission came into being, and this was a slanted commission. This was not bipartisan; it was weighted. I think Joe Kennedy and Holifield were labeled as Democrats, I think actually Joe, Joseph senior, voted with Hoover on most of the issues to some extent. He had a few dissents, I recall. But particularly in the budget areas, I think there was a feeling of the need for Congress developing more leadership and voice in the budget formulation. And then in the maritime arrangements.

We come now to '56. Bobby was out of law school, and he had passed the bar, and he was in Washington. He had been, I believe, for a few months on the Government Operations Committee. This is prior to the McCarthy deal. And then he went down with his father. His father didn't show up very much, so he kind of sat in and kept him abreast of it and worked with the staff. Well, then President Hoover had the feeling that the GSA contribution was their major thrust, and they had a citizens' committee for the Hoover reports and all that jazz, see. Now, the committee on the Hill that had handled all the original Hoover reports except one or two was the Government Operations Committee in '49. But then in the '56 deal, they parceled them out. At this time what's-his-name woke up, armed services chairman, the old guy.

MOSS: Rivers?

KENNEDY: No. The guy before him. From Georgia.

MOSS: Vinson [Carl Vinson].

KENNEDY: Carl, yeah. Vinson. Well, the National Security Act of '47 was written by the Government Operations Committee, or its predecessor. The amendments to it were written by the Armed Services Committee [House Committee on Armed Services]. And then when the military aspects of the Hoover Commission came up, he was awake by this time. He knew that he had almost been dealt out, you know. And he was mad at the Government Operations Committee because in '52, just before I left, we made it possible for McNamara to assert the leadership that he did, good or bad. Up to that time, when we got the legislation through that centralized in the secretary the authority over the military and abolished the national military establishment but the Munitions Board and all that, that gave them. . . . Bob Lovett [Robert A. Lovett] had it for about two months or something, and that was all,

you know. And then you had that Republican group coming in. But if I recall correctly, in '56 Bob was working at the Hoover Commission. President Hoover called up Mansure [Edmund F. Mansure], who was the administrator of GSA and was very close to the guys on the commission at that time, and Sherman Adams was Mansure's roommate at Dartmouth [Dartmouth College], and they were very buddy-buddy. As a matter of fact, when one left, the other was aced out. I mean, when Adams left, Mansure was aced out.

MOSS: Sure. Right, right.

KENNEDY: They wanted to see the GSA regions, the field offices, the warehousing aspects, the working out of the records center from--which was originally a WPA [Works Progress Administration] project. Wayne Grover [Wayne C. Grover] was just a grade 9 clerk, or something like that. And then they went from archival function in a sense to record management function. Then came the microfilming and retrieval, the whole bit, computer operation. So he thought it would be interesting if, particularly since they were going to look at some legal offices in the second Hoover Commission, they thought maybe there was too many lawyers. Oh, there was a wave of reform bit, and all.

I can remember Eisenhower put out a note to the administrators and secretaries and said that he wanted everyone at work on time; and he pointed out about two weeks later, I think, that they had some survey on the bridges, and the traffic peak had moved up from, say, eight-thirty to eight-fifteen, or something. This was remarkable. And I can remember telling Ed Mansure, "Yeah, but read the bottom part of it." 'Cause we made the survey, you see. 'Cause he was going to call me to tell the president. "Yeah, but look down at the bottom. It says that the go-home hour has moved up, too. So they're blowing the whistle on us."

Well, we didn't have to worry about it, because Brownell [Herbert Brownell, jr.] came thundering in to the president and said, "Look, if you're going to insist on this, my lawyers are going to have to be doubled." Bobby was very interested in this aspect because he said, "I can't give them regular hours. First of all they got to come to work. If they're going to court, they have to be there at nine-thirty. They got to come in at eight o'clock. But their work hours, they may go back to the office and be there till ten that night. Then if I tell them they gotta be in again the next morning, when they don't have to go to court, they're going to tell me, 'Stuff it,' in effect." And so there was the problem, because I knew at that time the administrative assistant attorney general, and it was, his name was--gee, I can't think of it. Office used to be called the office of legal advisor, or something like that, in the Justice Department, and I can't. . . . Rankin, Lee Rankin [J. Lee Rankin]. I think, really, that was the first exposure that Bobby Kennedy ever had to the Justice Department was that wrangle about the hours of coming in in the morning and that, and the rationale.

Maxwell Elliott [Maxwell H. Elliott] was the general counsel

of GSA, and he was known among the agencies affectionately as Maxie of Elliott, because Max had a mind like Lenin. He would rather make eighty-eight split-hair jackknife bends than to reach over and take it. He enjoyed the machination. And I remember at that time I was assigned to transportation--utilities, communications and administration--which, because it was a use agency, you had to know the other programs, and that was what appealed to Bob, because there's no. . . . GSA doesn't have much of a program of their own. It's like saying, "Well, GSA has a lot of records," but the records of GSA itself are very small. But they have the records of the rest of the government. Well, if you're going to move something for the civilian agencies, you've got to know what their program is. So you have to go over and learn it, and then you try to accommodate it. When the federal telecommunications system was in its embryonic state, you'd have to go talk to 'em about that. And then the utilities, we appeared before the regulatory bodies on behalf of all the agencies so that it gave us great access to the ICC [Interstate Commerce Commission], FTC [Federal Trade Commission], the FCC [Federal Communications Commission], and of course all utility cases are operated at the state level. So you had forty-eight states you could go to. I mean, we could intervene in a case we felt was a key case for the government, in Illinois, Massachusetts, Maine, Vermont, California, anywhere. You had to coordinate 'em because you couldn't attack Con Ed [Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.] in New York and be inconsistent on California Power and Light [sic] [California Pacific Gas and Electric Company]. And it was touchy about where you would do it.

Incidentally, a little after this time I got a call from Jack Kennedy's office, and he wanted me to come up and see him, and Bobby at this time was out of our office, back with the Hoover Commission, and was wind. . . .

MOSS: About how long was he with you?

KENNEDY: Oh, I'd say about eight or nine months. We had an office at 18th and F [Streets], and there used to be a group of buildings there that were little apartment houses or something--they're gone now--but the Girl Scouts of America owned one building. They had redone it in nice Georgetown style, but then these others were old. And in the basement of this, for a period of, strangely enough, about six months of the time he was there, they had a little snack bar or restaurant or something. Now we had a regular restaurant. We had an executive dining room and all that, but for some reason Max always wanted to go out for coffee. He had coffee in his office, he had an executive dining room on the next floor, but he'd go across the street. So we, three of us, would go over. He liked Bobby because, you see, Max was a legislative type creature. We used to tie the Pentagon up in. . . . They used to say, "How can those guys with their butt hanging out of their pants rip up the whole Department of Defense?"

I can remember this, Kyes [Roger M. Kyes], he was deputy secretary, Wilson [Charles E. Wilson] was secretary. Max, Bob and

myself, and a couple of others went over there on surplus property, on excess property; we only dealt with the secretary. You can't imagine. . . . I mean these guys were incredible people. I mean, they had no concept of what type of a department they were running. For instance, we spent two hours with Kyes one day--Ed Mansure was with us during this period--on recycling the surplus, excess property. Max was a lusty sort of guy that would tell. . . . Wilson said, "Your property act defines excess property, but I just don't understand it. I don't understand surplus, excess." Max says, "Listen, can I be just really down-to-earth with you? I'll tell you. You'll never forget it." He says, "Okay, that's what I need." He said, "Excess property is that portion of the breast you can't get in your mouth." And he said, "Well then, what's surplus property?" He said, "That's the other breast." [Laughter] That'll give you the idea why it was amusing to work with the guy.

Now, I have never seen this since, and whenever I saw Bob Kennedy I used to kid him about it in this sense. I never saw a general counsel of an agency of thirty-five thousand people with five commissioners, or one archivist, where the general counsel testified on operations. But he knew 'em better than the commissioners who were running 'em. And Jess Larson and Mansure wouldn't let Russell Forbes testify--he was the deputy. Besides, the committees didn't want him. And then Cliff Mack [Clifton E. Mack] was a. . . . Bob, we went out to, where was it, Dallas? Yeah, we went out to Dallas. We were waiting for. . . . And Mansure says, "Where's Cliff Mack?" the commissioner of federal supply. "Is he coming out here?" He'd always come some special way himself. So he says, "He probably will come out on a missile." And Bob says, "Unguided, I hope." [Laughter]

But Jack Kennedy called up and said, "I wanted to talk to you about something." So I went up to see him because that was right after that time that Max's kid wanted to go to Harvard, you know, in that episode I told you about yesterday. And he said, "Seeing you in connection with Max's boy reminded me of something, but I didn't want to bring it up in front of him." So I said okay. So then he said, "Say," when I got up there, "I was looking at the transportation report of the second Hoover Commission," and he said, "I was talking to my father a couple of nights ago, or days ago, and he asked me about it." And he said, "Judge Landis [James M. Landis] has read it, and since this is one that my father attended pretty well, and he's got some people in the shipping lines, and in trucks and in the rail who are interested, I'd like to hold some hearings on the, and kind of give an idea of effectuating these recommendations [?]. Who would we get? How would we go about it?"

Well, before we got it organized, Mansure was out; Floete [Franklin G. Floete] took over. He'd been the assistant secretary for property and installations over there in DOD [Department of Defense]. And of course he was new, and he came in with the idea that this was. . . . He aced Max out. Max went off with Harvey Aluminum out in California. And here he is; he's nailed. Senator Kennedy is on his back, see. So he's going to have hearings, like,

in two or three weeks. So I went up to see him after work, and I said, "You better get this guy before he's too ingrained in here. "Everybody's trying to capture him and he's new, he's cautious, he's afraid, and he's got a guy with him who's an s.o.b. named John Dillon [John H. Dillon]. He was a special assistant to the secretary of the navy, and he had a kind of a feeling that he knew the answers to everything. But he never got down and found out what was going on.

I mean, in other words, during this period, of course, transportation as a function was under the federal supply commissioner, and one of the things that didn't get nailed into the report as such, but the Hoover people like Holifield and Joe Kennedy junior had asserted the need for a separate service in GSA for this aspect, so that you could start talking about it. It was really the beginnings of the Department of Transportation.

Well, I told him that he ought to get a couple of people who would allay all the transportation policy people. In other words, possibly the editor or publisher of Traffic World, he'd get good coverage at all the of media of that field. Second, there was a fellow named Staley [John R. Staley] who was [vice] president of Quaker Oats [Quaker Oats Company] who had been the task force chairman of these particular series of studies, and some, a couple of other guys, I can't remember their names. It was Staley and somebody else. I said, "And then get Floete, and then bring in Earl Smith [Earl B. Smith] from the office of transportation at the Pentagon, and we'll speak for all the civilians, and he'll speak for the military. Then we can bring in possibly the assistant secretary of foreign commerce who has control of the trade zone areas and things like that, and you'll get out a cross section of. . . . And that'll give you the opportunity to discuss things."

So those hearings, of course, are printed. You can check those; you can read them yourself. Kennedy raised several. . . . I gave him a series of questions, but he raised a couple of them himself, and he couldn't. . . . He was, I thought, a little naive in. . . . But he asked a question, you know, like, "Well, if you're losing money, what are you hauling it for?" You know, that type of thing, see.

MOSS: What kind of guy was Bob Kennedy at this time?

KENNEDY: Well, you know, I was amused one time in that coffee shop, and I've thought about it since. Max Elliott wanted him to do something which involved something where he'd have to contact some people for him, for the agency but also would be beneficial to Max. And I said to him after Max was gone, I said, "He's our supervisor. You'd better be careful, Bob, because he's ruthless, and he'll take advantage of you any time he can." And afterwards I thought--not then, but I mean a couple of years after that--I thought to myself, "God, that was like telling a tiger that a lion was vicious." 'Cause Bob was. . . . I would say he was no different than his brother except that he didn't mask it as well. He had no finesse for that at all. He got mad. And I met him with

the deputy administrator of GSA over in the Metropolitan Club. Shortly after that he dropped out of the club because there was some problem about not having a Negro guest or something, and he capitalized on it to some extent by dropping, although he'd been in and out of it for years.

It renders you--if you're not a member of the Metropolitan Club--it renders you a little bit ineffective because I'll tell you why. You can't ever hope to go into a dining room where at least two former secretaries of state and maybe the incumbent are sitting there, and where you can approach 'em, plus all the rest of them. As Stettinius [Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.] once said when they were talking about having a dining room in the State Department, "Well what do we need it for? We all eat over at the Metropolitan Club."

So Bob's knowledge of government was to a great extent ladled through the Hoover Commission, and his exposure to an agency that had to learn the programs of others. Now it was limited to some extent. His concept of committee staff was entirely different than mine. I was counsel to the Government Operations Committee, full committee, which handles things that the subcommittees never handle, or they handle any legislation ultimately. But also the subcommittee on executive-legislative reorganization, international relations, public accounts, and intergovernmental relations, so that I had four subcommittees and a full committee. He had one.

But I always felt that it was my province to do a different type of work. One, I called in, say, the director or the bureau head, and I had been down in his office, I had been in his warehouses, I had been in his conferences, meetings, and all that. And I knew pretty much what they were doing. And then I evolved out of that possible policy areas for exploration, and then reduced that to a statement. In other words, "There is slippage here. There's a gap here. They need legislation here. Their efficiency is down here; it's up there," and all that. Really, what it is, is a master in chancery type of approach. And then I reduced that to writing, and then the chairman, you see, and the members would receive questions, and then the head of the department or secretary of the department would come, and then they talked policy. They said, "Well, wait a minute, we don't want to talk to your bureau head. We know what he's told us. This is the area. He admits it. Now, what are you going to do about it? You ought to draft up something, or we ought to draft it up, or something." And I always thought that it was much more productive, whereas. . . . Of course you don't in that way ever build a name for yourself very. . . . But among them you could do no wrong. I mean, you could write your own ticket, 'cause they would say, you know, "Go to France and look at ECA [Economic Cooperation Administration] and come back. We'll take it up with the head of ECA," you know. So that you had to have justification, but you could write your own ticket with the members.

And also, I found that most departments aren't engaged in any corruption or malfeasance to any great extent, and the Congress can't hope to run 'em, so the only thing they can do is shove 'em in the right direction, and when they lose their momentum, give 'em

another shove. That was your job, to develop the push.

So his approach was different. He wanted to go into some things like crime and corruption which he was interested in, but it was for the purposes of singling out, on a Porter Hardy basis, an individual rather than the broad sweep of. . . . And, as a consequence, well, he made, I think, a lot of people conscious, through airing it on TV. Had they been conducted without TV I don't think it would have amounted to anything.

MOSS: This tape's just about over. Let me cut this one off.

TAPE TWO, SIDE ONE

MOSS: Let me ask you a couple of questions at this point.

KENNEDY: I was just coming . . .

MOSS: Yeah. Go ahead. Go ahead.

KENNEDY: . . . I almost forgot this one thing. The reason why we held that hearing see. . . . And I said that to him at the time, I said, "You know, you can help me for the first time in a long time." And he said, "How? I don't see how you could do. . . . There's nothing I could do for you." He says, "It's a Republican administration and you're a Democrat." I said, "When you hold the hearings, you just follow my suggestion on one thing, and," I said, "it will help me immeasurably." So he says, "What is it?" I said, "When the administrator come up to the table to testify make sure I'm with him." And he said, "You'll be there, I suppose." "Yeah, I'll be there, but I mean I want to make sure that. . . ." I said, "This guy is new and he doesn't know what's what or who's who." And I said, "If you recognize me, he's got to live with you, so," I said, "I'll take it from there." He said, "Well, that isn't much." I said, "Let's see how it works out."

So we had the hearing. The administrator had this guy Dillon and another guy, and they sat next to each other up at the table, you know, in the committee room and, why, the senator looks down the first row. I'm sitting there with two other guys. So he said, "I see Tom Kennedy down there." He said, "Tom, come on up and join us." So I did and, of course, that wasn't lost on Floete, see. So at the hearing room after that, came to its conclusion--it was satisfactory for both sides, for Floete and for the senator, because he heartily endorsed the things and he was going to get them rolling, and so on. And that he would use this hearing as the aegis of sparking interest in agencies we serviced to do this, that, and the other thing. Out of this ultimately came the separate bureau.

On the way down, in the car, the administrator said, "Say, I'm going to ask you a question." He said, "Do you think you can keep that committee off my back?" And I said, "Gee, I don't know. They're pretty independent." And he said, "Well, I'll tell you what. You're a Democrat, so therefore I can't make you the

commissioner of this service but," he said, "I'll make you his deputy, and we'll combine it so that the general counsel's representative is also the deputy commissioner of the operating service." And I said, "Well you might have trouble with civil service," or something on that. And he said, "Well, let me worry about that." So he worried about it. It took about. . . . I asked within a week.

And so I called up the senator and I said, "What do you think?" I said, "See, you don't know your own power." He said, "What are you talking about?" I said, "I'm now the deputy commissioner." He said, "How did you pull it off? Come on up and tell me." So I went up. I said, "Well, your hearings here and Mr. McCormack having hearings over in the other place. . . . Now my problem is to keep you from getting too effective. And he said, "Well, we got so many other things, I don't think I'll ever get back to that field again." He said, "I think I've done all I'm going to do in that, and I'm glad for you."

He said, "Say, you're in the transportation policy end now, right?" I said, "Yeah." He said, "What can you do for Boston?" I said, "Well, I'll tell you what we can do for Boston. First of all we can make sure you get an eloquent share of the traffic, which before I came up I looked at, and I don't think you're getting it. The Boston port is behind times." I said, "It's about the fifth or sixth on the Atlantic tier." He said, "Anything you do."

So I went down and looked at it a little further. The attorney side of it, you could intervene in cases. And so I went up and sat down with the senator and I said, "You know, if you have a problem, first, you got one problem you got to take care of, and then we have a bigger problem and we'll help you take care of it if you'll work with us." He said, "Well, reasonable." He said, "How does J.W. [J. W. Flatley] feel about it?" I said, "He's going to feel the same way you feel, because he's for the state and for the benefit it will derive." He said, "Okay, what is it?" And I said, "Well, there's a little port up there I don't know some small little town, I can't even think of it now, and they've got a Captain Jones or something and this guy is down in Congress and demanding this that and the other thing, more tonnage and all that. And I said, "He's in a little place. He couldn't handle anything, and anything that he's going to handle is going to take it away from Boston and he won't mean a thing to you." I said, "That isn't the problem at all. Just get that guy to calm down. If we help Boston, ultimately he's going to go up, whatever he's going to get involved in. His little port will benefit. But if he's going to single shoot for himself we're going to have to ignore him because he's starting to call names and all that." So he said, "Well, what is the big problem?" I said, "The big problem is this, that since about 1800 there was an artificial determination made that if you were above the thirty-eight degree longitude, latitude, or something, shipping coming from Europe pays a certain rate. Below that it's considerably less, and Baltimore

MOSS: Virginia. It must have been a civil war thing.

KENNEDY: . . . Baltimore is the breaking point. So I said, "They have moved it back through some interpretation to Philadelphia so that Philadelphia, Baltimore are taking all the business. New York equalization, they can handle it, but the Boston tier is out completely."

So out of this we generated what became known as the equalization rates, eastern seaboard, and he became interested in that. Now, would we intervene?

Well he set up a meeting, Saltonstall [Leverett Saltonstall], and I think that was the first time I ever met Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen]. Kennedy didn't show at the meeting. Sorensen came. He only listened. There was nothing he knew about it anyhow. So Sorensen generated, what was said by a couple of the guys there, was that, "It's a shame when senators send their administrative assistant instead of coming themselves for an issue of personal importance." Why, one of the senators from the eastern area up here, not Massachusetts of course, but one of the other more yankeefied operations said, "Well sometimes when you send your assistant he understands the problem better than the original."

So Tip O'Neill [Thomas P. O'Neill], John McCormack, Donahue [Harold J. Donahue], Philbin [Philip J. Philbin], a couple others, they showed up. So they had quite. . . . It constituted the delegation meeting. We explained what we were going to do, and why, and that there would be a big blowup in the paper and they should be alerted to it, but it was for them, it was for their benefit, and Boston would get their share and that the Boston port people, John Callahan or O'Brien or whatever his name was, that was head of it and Mr. Gillette [sic] [Carl J. Gilbert] of the Gillette razor blades, was, I think, president of some authority up here. They were all for it. So we went on and there was a big amount of flak but we won the case, and so that today is why the equalization factor is no longer a problem as far as Boston is concerned. So you see, I pointed out to him, it was possible for people who come from Illinois to benefit from Boston acquaintances.

MOSS: How does that tie in with his St. Lawrence Seaway vote?
[Laughter]

KENNEDY: I don't know. It's very much like how he didn't get along too well with Rankin [John E. Rankin] and Teague [Olin E. Teague] because I think he was on the veterans' committee [House Committee on Veterans' Affairs] at one time, wasn't he?

MOSS: I believe so. I believe so.

KENNEDY: Yeah. I have a vague recollection that he was on the veterans' committee. He didn't want pensions. They'd brought up the Spanish-American war veterans, if I remember, and Barratt O'Hara was in it, and he was mad. He liked Jack Kennedy, but he said, "God damn him! He didn't have to vote that way. After all, I'm going to get this one."

MOSS: Let me back up a couple squares now and ask you, first of all, you told me a story yesterday about your going to Paris when you were looking at SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers (Europe)], right?

KENNEDY: Right.

MOSS: And you had a little vignette of Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower]. Would you tell that story for us?

KENNEDY: Well, let's see. Starting out with that, we had made a study of the effectiveness of SHAPE as a policy instrument, and the Bonner committee got into that. Then, I can't recall the name of the man who was. . . . He was in London. He was the head of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. His name was Bill Batt [William L. Batt]. Now Bill Batt was the big man. He was the man that the president looked to for the whole schmear, and yet somehow in the shuffle of history they've forgotten that.

It would be very much like you're named administrator GSA, and they appoint Eisenhower as regional director in Philadelphia, and everybody is going over to talk to him, and he didn't pull the whole thing together. He only had one aspect of it and he had a nonfunctional military planning group. And the joke in SHAPE at that time was expressed in a cartoon which appeared in one of the French magazines and it showed two German generals in full uniform going up and knocking on the NATO door and saying, "Ve're here with die Polizei." Something like that, see.

MOSS: Yeah.

KENNEDY: And they said they won't get going until the Germans come into NATO and start doing the planning.

MOSS: Yeah.

KENNEDY: We went over to see Bill Batt, and then Mr. Rayburn was trying. . . . See there was a little triumvirate part-- Rayburn, McCormack, Carl Vinson, the old fox as they called him. I got along with Mr. Vinson very well because I'd conducted a couple of investigations for him, and did it with a minimum of trouble. And then when we went on to bases, we operated like say, you tell us your problems, we can put the heat of the committee behind the people that are bothering you. Shape up your outfit, or else somebody else is going to come in here and make mincemeat of it. So do you want to do it inside or outside? They in main, I think, were very encouraged. First they dealt with you a little suspiciously. But if you checked with any of them in the years afterwards, Charlie Fox [Charles W. Fox], navy and Admiral Royar [M. L. Royar], bureau of supplies and accounts, they found that it was constructive approach. It benefitted, they thought. It gave them the leverage. They were able to say, "Look we gotta do it

or they'll be back." We became the amiable boogie man.

It was suggested by this group that. . . . And McCormack was going to be the chairman of the platform committee. Rayburn was going to be the chairman of the convention in '52. Mr. McCormack had asked me to help draft the platform and Charlie Murphy [Charles S. Murphy] was counsel. He told me, "You won't have to do. . . . Just an editing job." Out in Chicago, he called me up--I was at home--and he said, "Come down here." And I knew he was a little bit upset about something. Magnuson [Warren G. Magnuson] was there. Threw it on the table and he said, "That's Charlie's platform draft." So I read it over and I said, "Gee, that's terrible." I said, "It's left out a lot of things that are things that are momentous. For instance, where is the labor plank? Where is something about atomic energy, civilian use or something," you know. A few of these things. He said, "Here, go in there, in that other room, and draw up another one and do it. We'll hold the hearings." So I went in there and after a while the senator from Rhode Island, the old guy, Green [Theodore E. Green]

MOSS: Green.

KENNEDY: . . . he came in, and I was dashing off and he said, "Well, I'll provide the grammar." So he made me plural verbs and singular and all that. He was an amusing man. I always enjoy him. He loved to have a beer. In all the sessions he had about a case of it under there. You know, they'd have the thing for ten or twelve hours. He'd knock off six or seven cans of that stuff. He was droll and funny. But Eisenhower, of course, it was suggested to me after one of those Monday morning conferences, he said that the president is interested in knowing if Eisenhower is going to run. If he is going to run, is he going to be a Democrat or a Republican? He's never really expressed himself in any category up to now although he's flirting with the Republicans. And, of course, Taft [Robert A. Taft] at that time was quite a potent factor. As a matter of fact, I think Eisenhower was a minority candidate, wasn't in the party at that time. And I suggested at that time, I said, "Say it'd be great if he'd be a Democrat. He can get the endorsement of both sides and you'd have the first time since Washington [George Washington] and," I said, "It'd have the benefit of the blessings like they have in Chicago where the Democrats and the Republicans have working agreements. And, in that way, it would cement in a lot of the people that are about to get pushed out. You'd have the best people to draw from on both sides."

So I said to Mr. Rayburn at the time, "You know, one of the difficulties in the coming campaign is the fact that most of the people who are coming before our committee are Republican. They're assistant secretaries, but they're Republican. And we haven't spent enough time getting people who are Democrats." Evidently it was decided at one time in the department--I mean, the president level or such--that they would go out and get an assistant secretary who was a Republican. Then if the Republicans wanted to browbeat

somebody, you send that guy up there and they'll handle him a little softer. But then I think I ran a column one time in '52 just before the election, and I think there were something like thirty-two jobs that were assistant secretary, under secretary, or secretary, and I think there were something like twenty-one of them were Republicans. To me I could never see that rationale.

But it was suggested, "Well, why don't you go over there. You've conducted these military deals. Just coast over talk to Bill Batt in London, then go over see what shape SHAPE is in." Well, as I alluded to earlier, SHAPE was out of shape. SHAPE was like the *Allianza* [*Alianza para el Progreso* (Alliance for Progress)], it was largely on paper, and he was functioning as he had functioned before. I concluded in a report I gave Mr. Rayburn that he was a military ambassador. He was quite successful in that vein because he was predisposed to the British viewpoint, and he did not argue with anyone; he compromised to a great extent. He didn't want to make waves. He knew he didn't like Columbia [Columbia University], and he cited one thing to me when we were talking about it. He said that he didn't like college work because, he said, he made some opening statement to the faculty about what he would expect them to do this that or the other thing, and the college would do that, and some old guy in the back said, "Just a minute, general. As the faculty, we are the college." He said, he didn't like that kind of talk. He wanted to have them shape up and turn to, you know. So I talked to Mrs. Eisenhower [Mamie Dowd Eisenhower] and I came away with. . . . This part of my report was that although I was not able to detect what his political affiliation was or would be, there was no doubt in my mind that Mamie was running for first lady, and left it that way.

MOSS: You told me that you witnessed an example of the Eisenhower temper.

KENNEDY: Oh, yes. He was a terrible tempered man who had his flare-ups. Like I'm a stranger, you know, and we went out, to go to someplace, to have lunch and ended up by being passed by by the elevator. Geez, he hauled off and kicked on the door until the guy came back. Incomprehensible, a guy with five stars. Incidentally, in those days, Chip Bohlen [Charles E. Bohlen] was, he was the counselor then. He seemed to be a very nice fellow. The other one that later went on to be delegate to the U.N. was there, too. His name starts with an L, I think. I can't remember.

MOSS: An L?

KENNEDY: L, yeah.

MOSS: No.

KENNEDY: I thought it was L.

MOSS: What, delegate in the Kennedy administration?

KENNEDY: In ours.

MOSS: Yeah. Well the people up there were Plimpton [Francis T. Plimpton], Klutznick [Philip M. Klutznick], Yost [Charles W. Yost]. . . .

KENNEDY: Yeah. Wait a minute. That's right. L is wrong. Yost was his name. He made a very favorable impression on me, that I thought. . . . I always remembered Mr. Dulles [John Foster Dulles]. The secretary was amiable, one-faceted administrator, you know. There was a guy named Roderic O'Connor [Roderic L. O'Connor] ran the department and he was his assistant. And God knows what Dulles really wanted, but it used to be what Roderic O'Connor said Dulles wanted, because he was never there. And I remember he was up on the Hill, and at that time. . . . Incidentally co-extensively during this period there was a man named Kee [John Kee], K-e-e-, and he was the chairman of foreign affairs, and then after that came a fellow from South Carolina and I forget his name right now and he [James P. Richards]. . . .

MOSS: Collins? Owens?

KENNEDY: No.

MOSS: No.

KENNEDY: He went down to State when he retired, and he. . . . I used to do extra work for the members, and they always joined with their committees when we met overseas or something like that because we had a subcommittee, as I mentioned, on international organization. Some of them were on foreign affairs and our committee. I knew the chairman, Kee, and I never had particularly cared for this guy who is running it now for the last couple of, ten years, doctor of something or another from Pennsylvania. He never seemed to be with it at all.

MOSS: Oh, what is his name?

KENNEDY: I can't think of it, but the fellow from South Carolina, and I know him as well as I. . . .

MOSS: Yes, I can't get that past Don Fraser's [Donald M. Fraser] name on that committee now. That's his chairman. I think it's Miller, isn't it?

KENNEDY: Oh no, no. This is Doctor somebody-or-other. He's the chairman.

MOSS: It begins with an M.

KENNEDY: Yeah. That does sound like it.

MOSS: Do you remember whether it's Morgan [Thomas E. Morgan] or something?

KENNEDY: Morgan, Tom Morgan.

MOSS: Right.

KENNEDY: Yeah. Tom Morgan. I worked on that, on different problems with him, and I was interested in the Reichstag in Germany and General Handy's [Thomas T. Handy] occupation in Austria, you know, and then the ECA in France, and the foolishness of these people who in some instances talk about people-to-people, when you're talking about a cartel country or something. France, they did the right thing. They put the money in at the top where it came out the bottom. You could throw away all the money you wanted on the fellows that sit alongside the board of. . . . [Loud background noise] It's just a giant WPA. Well, that's a. . . .

But the Eisenhower period was. . . . Of course, I came back and I'd made this report, it wasn't exactly tiptop, and all that. And of course Carl Vinson called him in, you know, and Norstadt [Lauris Norstadt] and the whole gang. And then, of course, right in '52, after the election, I go down to GSA and there is Eisenhower, the president within a matter of months and. . . . Why Joe Dodge [Joseph M. Dodge] really helped. He was the director of the Bureau of the Budget at that time, and Joe Dodge had been over in Germany on a couple of trips, and he was working at the. . . . He was what they called the American kommerschadt with money and he made the German mark eventually so strong, as you know, that it's. . . . He was first director of the Bureau of the Budget. I got called over by the chairman of the national committee and they circulated a petition, why should I have a job for a Republican administration.

MOSS: I'm wondering about this time about how you survived?

KENNEDY: Yeah. I'll tell you I got investigated so often by the security people that my neighbors were positive I must be in on something, you know. It wasn't easy, but with the help of McCormack, Kennedy, Len Hall [Leonard W. Hall]--Floete himself came around--I survived. People have said, "Well, if you survived eight years under Eisenhower how come you can't go down there with Nixon [Richard M. Nixon]? You know, you must be able to get along somewhere." And I said, "Never again, not another eight years like that." I ended up with hives, you know boils from being nervous.

During that same period, I might add, there were eight years and I had five different commissioners, and I was the deputy. And I had four assistant general counsels, changes for getting booted or making boo-boos or something, and I had to survive. And then there were about twenty-five hundred people who were depending on you getting your appropriations.

Incidentally, one of the questions that Senator Kennedy asked

which was incredibly naive was . . .

MOSS: About public transportation?

KENNEDY: . . . yeah. "Well, why are you against Section 22 of the ICC act"--that's what he said--"and why are you mad at them?" Because they said, you know, blah, blah, blah. . . . " When I went in there to act they didn't have a commissioner, and I told Floete, I said, "Of course, we're not really doing the job." And, I said, "Senator Kennedy asked the question on Section 22, you heard it, and it really should be invoked." And he said, "Why? I don't understand enough about it." I said, "Well, here. You read up on this and this will tell you the whole thing." So I gave him the data, and he said, "Okay, now my predecessor (the guy who had been the director of that operation), he is now I think general counsel or the vice-president of one of the biggest railroads in the country." Of course, he was a patsy for 'em, you know. He didn't invoke it. And I can remember well Albert Thomas saying, "Gentlemen, here we have a man who earns more money than the government appropriates for his function. What are your savings this year Mr. So-and-so?" And he said, "\$518,000." Marvelous, marvelous, marvelous, and what is your request?" It was four hundred thousand or something. And Albert Thomas said, "You're going to have to do better than this man. Mighty big shoes to step in," blah, blah. So Floete signed the paper, we invoked Section 22 and of course it was years of controversy with the Boston port thing and all these others, you know. He said, "I don't know what you're getting me into with all this," you know. So I said, "Invoke it," so he did. First year I think our savings were twenty million, and it's still in force. I wouldn't, couldn't even want to guess what they are.

Here's how I explained it to Senator Kennedy. The rates are inflated, but maybe the railroads are in trouble, maybe the truck lines are in trouble, maybe they are but let's appropriate or let's legislate, and do it cleanly above board. If they can't make it let's give them a loan. They know then that they're beholden to you and you're going to get service out of them. But I said, "You know what's happening now? Obviously the one year it was \$518,000. The next year it was twenty million. Obviously the previous year it had also been twenty million. Where did that \$20,000,000 go?" It went this way. Across the country they have traffic clubs. All the people that work in these government agencies and in the trunk lines and airlines they belong to these traffic clubs. I belong myself. They get friendly with all these guys. When you make your negotiation there is no way of achieving anything except what they call equality or tonnage. So you come in and you complain loud enough, they give you an extra ten thousand. They say, "We'll make it up to you next month." I said, "We don't want to do that because that puts a Grade 9 in a position where he tells the representative of railroads, and his president comes to town, who do they take to lunch to find out about transportation policy? The Grade 9 or 7. And you are not in the act at all, see? In other words they're

auctioning off your tonnage. I said, "We've fired a couple of guys, and I can give you the cases." He said, "Well, like why?" I said, "Well, playing cards, they lose a little money and they say, 'Well, I'll make it up some other way.'" Of course, what they're doing is they give the guy another ten thousand ton or something like that. I said, "That stuff shouldn't go on. Secondly, I'm going to recommend," I said, "that, you know, that we put this all on a computer so that every railroad ? to spit out, there's no head-to-head stuff." We put the spit-out, we put it on a wall and everybody looks at it. If they're the Penn Central, and they only got two hundred, and some squeegee line down in New Mexico has got two thousand, their representatives can come in and growl, "Why, why?" you know.

So that was benefit that came from his hearings, and that I don't think has been emphasized enough. He stiffened the spine of some bureaucrats. Albeit, perhaps even unwittingly, to some extent, but it was a little bit like you felt like you were throwing the ball in and going in and hitting it, and then running out and catching it, you know. Which Max and I were very good at.

You know, one time I told. . . . Bobby was just new in the office, he said, "How's our legislator program going?" And I said, "Great." And Bobby said, "How could you say great? God," he says, "none of the agency bills have even got to final vote in the committees and there's none on the floor." Max said, "Bob, I said our program. I didn't say the agency's." We always had our own personal legislative program, you know. We even had one to make the whole department a cabinet post eventually. If they hadn't got chicken we would have pulled it off. [Laughter]

At any rate the other aspect of NATO got him back to that was that you never could get the organization into focus. To plot, you go in a directory of about 1950, '51, you'll see Bill Batt, and his relative proportion was never sold correctly, and Ike used that as a steppingstone from a. . . . A lot of people thought he had the whole of Europe marching in cadence, and he really only had a very small staff. They were uniformed and they walked around a lot. They had all kinds of problems, like an American sergeant was making more than an Italian lieutenant general, and the American corporals were stealing the French generals' girlfriends because they had more money, they had the wheels, the gasoline.

MOSS: Okay. I think maybe we ought to move on into the Kennedy administration itself. What were the circumstances under which you. . . . Well, let me ask you this first. When you saw the Kennedy administration come in, how did this affect GSA? How did it affect you and the GSA setup? Were there any substantial changes? What did you see happening?

KENNEDY: Well, of course Mr. Floete stayed right on till the end of the Eisenhower administration, and for the last. . . . it was evident that, of course, it was going to be a very close sort of thing, as it turned out. And it was, the deputy administrator at that time was very, a strong Nixon man. I can't

say that Floete was that interested in. . . . He's a pretty fair-minded guy and. . . . Eisenhower, I characterized his reign as what I call it--there was no rule about it--as the a-w-o-l type of government, it's administration without leadership. He left pretty much everyone of them pull their own strands, and then the strongest of them pulled the hardest and made it stick.

Of course, you see, General Motors had a great input there. Floete was the harvester man in a sense, the General Motors tractor operation. Summerfield [Arthur E. Summerfield], who was postmaster, who was big Chevrolet dealer and Kyes and Wilson, and you went through it. It was much more than you would expect, the impact of it. They thought in terms of business.

Now they made one tragic error, which I think was that you can hire a Charlie Wilson--he could be a great genius in Detroit--but when you bring him to Washington without his staff he's no genius. The last six months of the Eisenhower administration was a standstill operation. They didn't know which way. . . . It was going to be tough either way. Nixon, who had been shunted aside in the Eisenhower administration, the vice president's office wasn't included in that very much that I can recall. The famous statement made by Eisenhower to the effect that, "Yeah, the vice president made a few decisions. Come back next week and I'll think of one," or something like that, was devastating in its effect.

But what was going to happen to GSA, there was rumors, you know, that it would be not done away with but in a new slant. That the Hoover Commission would come in. And there would be a new Hoover Commission bit, and all that goes with it. And then there came that period in the Kennedy administration, when he was living down in Georgetown and he was trying to put together cabinets and all that stuff. And of course the only contact I had with him at that time was, you'll recall he'd gotten on the. . . . Then he went back up on the Hill to have a kind of a rump session, which was a little disastrous because I don't think it accomplished anything. I met him up there for a couple of minutes. He said something like, "I'll do what I can for you." You know, there wasn't that great urgency to do something for me. I was already an 18, you know, so what can they do? The thing I offered to him was this. I said, "I've had eight years, and no matter who you get he's a newcomer. I know where the bodies are buried." So he says, "Well, get in touch with Bobby." But I well realized what his problems were. Then GSA, moving into his administration, I don't know where he got the people he got. They were incredible. One was a guy, I can't think of his name right now, but he only lasted about six months. He was named administrator, and he was a vice president of business in some small college. I can't think of his name.

MOSS: (inaudible)

KENNEDY: John something-or-other.

MOSS: It'll come again.

KENNEDY: It doesn't matter. Then he brought in Bernie Boutin [Bernard J. Boutin]. Well, of course, Bernie was an ambitious guy who looked with suspicion. You know, my attitude was, I was there when the Republicans looked at me with suspicion. I took less tolerantly being looked at by somebody else, see. And then Boutin was a fellow who, he had called up Tip O'Neill, or one of the congressmen and told him that he was going to be the head of GSA, and then they announced this other guy. Then one of the fellows kidded the congressman, "You know, I thought your buddy was going to be the head of it," or something. And he said something of the equivalent of, "He'll be in it in a couple of months."

Of course, the fellow that headed it up was petrified. The job was too big for him. He was scared to death to go to the White House. And Bernie stepped amiably into that role. "I'll go over there," of course. Then he kind of played a buddy role, you know, like, the only people who are any good are, like, O'Donnell and Reardon and people like that who also just came in. And he would play with them only, and that any advice that he got from anybody in the agency was suspect. Well, of course, he made a number of "grievous" mistakes as a result, because after a while they just tossed it out and let him fall on his face. So he made a few accommodations then, with some of the guys inside.

I felt that I had stayed with GSA just about as long, too long. I had averaged in my life about four to five years in a place, and then go somewhere else. I felt this way. I had served at every level, and I had served in the military department. I had served in the civilian department, and I had worked for the House and the Senate, and I had been sent on detail in '49 for about two months by Rayburn and McCormack and Barkley to Chief Justice Vinson [Frederick M. Vinson] because he was having a bit of a problem over there with some of the justices. They weren't working together, and they had a small staff, and there was a lot of bickering, and he wanted some form of organization. And although he's not generally accredited with it he was the big, he was the man who began the thing called the administrative office of the court. So I felt that I had had a fairly representative cross-section, and since GSA as an agency dealt with every other agency, and you added on the park service program and the interior type, and I know agriculture pretty well.

As a matter of fact, when Freeman [Orville L. Freeman] set up his inspector general post I went over and helped the secretary to do that because Billie Sol [Billie Sol Estes] scared him to death. And I went down through his organization and showed where there were about eight separate investigations of Billie Sol, but they were all about half completed, but if they had all been completed he had never seen any of them. So he set up an inspector general operation. I think it's pretty general now throughout the government. More effective, I think, in the department like Agriculture and places like that than in State.

Then I took his word and I went down to see Bobby, and this fellow Seigmill or Seigheim or something who was with him--

Louisville . . .

MOSS: Seigenthaler [John Seigenthaler].

KENNEDY: . . . Seigenthaler, yeah, right. So he said, "Well, where do you think you could fit in?" So I said I was already in; the thing is that I thought I'd like to get into something different, but related. And I said I had really been doing program evaluation and general investigation for years. Why, I'd like to do that maybe in something like State or CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], something like that, different. So they said, well, the one that they knew least about was State and. . . . Of course, then there wasn't any post like that. They had gone up to Passman [Otto E. Passman] and they had. . . . Labouisse was acting--he was named by the president--and he took a bundle, the Congress, the Foreign Aid Act, and Passman threw it back in his lap saying, "Hell, there's nothing in here that says that anybody is going to check you guys. It's incomprehensible."

The old Johnny Murphy operation, which was an inspector general post had been abolished, and he said, "You've got to have a Johnny Murphy type of operation." So they were hastily putting it together like that. So then he told me to write to Dan Fenn. So I wrote to Dan, sent my vita sheet, and then he called me over and we sat down and talked, and then Coffin [Frank M. Coffin] and Labouisse. . . . Labouisse was leaving. He wanted out--I think they were going to give him an ambassadorship or something--and they had just interviewed Fowler Hamilton, and he had just taken over. So it was agreeable to Hamilton and Coffin and the. . . . Coffin had been on foreign affairs so I knew him and Edna Kelly and Zablocki [John C. Zablocki] and others, you see; Aime Forand [Aime J. Forand] of Rhode Island and those. . . . They all endorsed me very much, and of course I had Dawson and McCormack and the rest. So there wasn't any question about. . . .

So I went over to talk to Fowler Hamilton, and they had hired a. . . . As I was about to do this, Bobby Kennedy called up and said, "Say, we've got a problem on the Hill." And I said, "Like what?" And he said, "How about getting you a detail, but don't say that we had anything to do with it. But I understand that you're a friend of Brent Spence's. If you go up there, he has nobody, and we're trying to get a legislative history for the Bretton Woods Agreement amendments. We don't believe we can get them through but. . . ." This was a concordat type convention or something signed in Vienna the previous year on drawing rights of the International Monetary Fund. He said, "If you'll go up and contact Brent Spence and say that we'll release you, or I'll get you a release, or get somebody to release you, and you can go up and work on it." So I went up to see Brent Spence, and it's kind of difficult to tell him, you know. . . .

So this girl who was in his office, middle-aged gal, she told me in the hall, she said, "Oh boy, he's worse. You know, he's eighty-seven," or something like that, or eighty-six, "he's just not able to keep up with it, and he's going to retire. He has a

bunch of bills there that. . . . Nobody in places. . . . They're all working against him. They're all courting Patman [Wright Patman] and all that." So I said, "Why don't you suggest to him that he get me a detail, and I'll do that job and we'll whip it up and it'll be a monument." So he did.

I went in and talked to him, and of course you know you had to record it, and he held it up with a tremendous volume to his ear and he couldn't hear a thing. He said, "Okay, okay. Is it going to cost anything?" And I said, "No, it won't cost you anything." "Well, all right, good."

So then I went up there and I was up there about six months and through a strange set of circumstances there was supposed to be a legislative history, and I got in touch with Johnson's [Lyndon B. Johnson] office and then I got Mr. McCormack to back, and we got it passed.

And it was just about that time Boutin was jumping up and down. You see, he knew nothing about this. He was a bootlicker, and you know he was trying to get in with the Kennedys like, you know, Flynn. And, of course, on the other hand, he was carrying Walter on his shoulder because he had been a mayor of Laconia or something, and he was, "John W.," you know, and all that.

McCormack always said, "He's a nice fellow." He said, "You should be able to get along with him very well." I said, "Well, problem is he knows I know the agency. He doesn't know it, and he doesn't want to accept any assistance at all. So I just do my work and keep out of his way." He said, "Well, you shouldn't be in that position." I said, "Well, maybe I ought to get out. I think he'll feel better. Let him go." And so McCormack at that time said, "Well, you should have got the job yourself." And I said, "Well, I wasn't greatly interested. As a matter of fact, in the talk I had with Bobby, he said, 'You know, I can't very well do anything much more than that for you, 'cause we already got enough Kennedys. We got too many in, you see.'"

So that's how they ended up with this director of management inspection. They changed the title from inspector general because, he said, "Geez, you know, "attorney general, inspector general." He says, "You may only be shirttail, but by god, they'll make something out of it in every newspaper, and they'll have you with Sherlock Holmes hat and magnifying glass, and I'll be tarred and feathered, too." And I said, "Well, that's a rationale. I can understand that." So there wasn't any great. . . .

As a matter of fact the association with them was costly in a sense because, you see, had it been any other Democratic candidate I would have been in much better shape to go in and say, "Look I want to be an assistant secretary of this, that, or the other thing." 'Cause I saw fellows with no qualifications to any great extent pushed into jobs that were rather unrewarding as far as production was concerned.

But my mother and father, at that point I talked to them, you know, about it--getting out and going away, et cetera. And they said, "Well, he was nice to us, and after all you're doing all right. Why should you worry about it all. They may come and call

for you in a different position." So I went over.

I went up on the Hill and Boutin wanted release. He didn't know anything about Bobby Kennedy. He hadn't been in contact with him at all. And so I went over to State and Fowler was there and I got sworn in. I'll say this about him. I disagree with Dan on Fowler. I think he was what they needed at the time. I don't think he got the support from the White House he should have got. He was always worried that he was being undermined, particularly by one or two staff members over there and . . .

MOSS: Dungan [Ralph Dungan]?

KENNEDY: . . . yeah, Dungan. Dungan thought he ought to be the head of AID [Agency for International Development], I think, at some point or other. I don't know. I may be wrong in there, but I had the feeling that he did. He always loomed large in consideration. I told Fowler Hamilton, I said, "Listen, you've been worrying and worrying and worrying. See that park over there? Go on over there and sit on the bench, and then you say to yourself, 'I've been here about five months and I can't afford to stay more than about another six, so I'm going to quit. And now I'm giving them a deadline. They've been giving me deadlines. I'm going to give them one.'" I said, "Then you come back in and the first bastard that gets in your way I'd fire him, or put him off to Tanzania or someplace. Then you'll enjoy coming here in the morning. Right now you're creeping in and you feel like going to a movie instead of working."

He was the last AID administrator who delegated, operated on a global basis, who conducted his work in a serious vein but could see the humor of the situation. He'd get inundated with experts all the way. You know, everybody that came to the White House, they got shunted over on him. He was more accessible than Rusk, and he listened. Finally he went in a room, and I remember him saying, "Recommendations, opinions, policy formings. Enough, enough, I feel a decision coming on." [Laughter]

MOSS: That's beautiful.

KENNEDY: Yeah, I said to him, "Mayor Kelly had a statement that I have used in the past. 'When the issues are muddled let's rise above the facts.'" And in that case, it's about what you have to do.

So he accepted me over there, and I was on board about two weeks and I discovered that this great screening process before Dan got his assignment. They had transferred the two hatchet men of GSA over to State, two guys that were known laughingly in the agency as the Leopold and Loeb of GSA, the thrill slayers. They killed people--they killed their career--just for kicks. And here they were over there in. . . .

MOSS: Who was this?

KENNEDY: A guy named Vance [Harrell T. Vance] and another.

MOSS: Harrell Vance?

KENNEDY: Harrell Vance, yeah. I can't think of the. . . . A fellow I could blow for liberty when he dropped dead on a Jamaican golf course a couple of years after.

Incidentally, one of the big investigations I had to make afterwards was about a series of accusations against Vance made by his staff in Jamaica. Harrell Vance and there's another guy--I can't think of his name. He was a younger fellow. Well, let's call him the other guy. But you can imagine what they did to that organization in methods, office that was there.

So I was able to at least get on board. I get on board and there are these two guys sitting with a guy named Lingle [Walter L. Lingle, Jr.]. And Lingle was, of course, the name was not new to me. I was familiar with the Jake Lingle side of Chicago. But this guy was from Proctor-Gamble [Proctor and Gamble Company]. He called me in the office and Vance was sitting there with him. The other guy was in personnel. He later became the personnel director for a short time and then left. But he said, "What side are you on?" And I said, "What do you mean?" And he said, "Are you with Hamilton or against him?" I said, "You just swore me in about a week ago, I guess I have to be for him." I said, "I didn't have anything to do with his selection, but I understand the president selected him, and he's in charge, and until the president tells us somebody else is, he's our leader." He said, "Okay, you just done yourself in." He said, "We're getting rid of him. He'll be gone in about two weeks and I'm going to be running this agency and you're going to be out." So I said, "Okay."

So I figured I call up Dan, "Say, it's a great job you've got here." So he said, "Well, I don't. . . ." I said, "Well I think what I'll do is, I'll pass it on to Bobby." So when I went down to Joseph's I told him, "If you're for this guy, let's have the line. I don't understand Fowler Hamilton." He said, "What are you talking about?" I said, "I understand Hamilton's going to get the axe in two weeks." So I told him the story and he said, "Jesus, I don't know anything about that at all. I think I'd know it." I said, "Well that's one of the reasons I showed up." He said, "Well, okay your service is paying off already."

So I went over and sat in the office and about two or three weeks went by and the next thing I know Hamilton called me in the office and he says, "Say, Lingle's leaving." I said, "Oh, gee, that's too bad."

MOSS: Let me flip this tape. Just a minute.

TAPE TWO, SIDE TWO

MOSS: Okay. And Fowler Hamilton had just told you that Lingle was leaving.

KENNEDY: Yeah, and he said that. . . . I had told Fowler Hamilton, see. I had gone in there and I said, "You swore me in, I was told you're in charge, and I understand that I was presented with a choice, and I don't like choices like that. I couldn't feel that an agency that would be run by a guy who would talk like that would have much of a future, so I figured I'd better get out" And so he said, "Oh, I'll check into it. I appreciate it." So between the jigs of a reel, I told him I was going down to Justice to see Bobby, and he said, "Well, I'd appreciate it if you would." And when I came back I said, "Bobby said he didn't know anything about it." And I said, "He wasn't lying. I think I would know him well enough to know that he wouldn't, on that basis. But if he is, he's a master actor." I knew Bobby wasn't in on it, because he got mad, as if you had all the things carefully planned, and everything was there, and now, all of a sudden, some guy was upsetting the thing, and wasn't doing what he had agreed to do.

Hamilton said, "You know, we've got a problem. We can't kick this guy out." He said, "They've dumped it back in my lap. I've got to do something with him." And I said, "Yeah, he's going to cut your throat, and then you've got to worry about him." He said, "Well, when he left there, he was being touted for a higher post in his company. Well, he had newspaper interviews and he's pontificated on foreign aid, and all that, but if he goes back now, six weeks after he's departed, it'll be a black eye and every Republican'll grab it up." So he said, "Why don't you put on your thinking cap. Where could we get rid of him?" So I told him, "I think there's one place you could get him into and you could do it in a way that he couldn't be offended. Mr. McCormack was chairman of the space program, and Webb [James E. Webb], the former director of the Bureau of the Budget, is the head of it, so we know that you can. . . . I mean, I can tell, you can talk to Webb. What I would suggest is, you go to lunch, say that this is a problem, and that the NASA [National Aeronautic and Space Administration] people were created by the agency, this committee, and the committee is able to support you and all that; that his coming in isn't going to offend them or anything." And then lay it on the line with Webb, and say, "Look, we got a bastard here, and they've got a spot over there where we could take care of him."

So Webb came back a couple of days after that. I think there was a Hugh Dryden [Hugh L. Dryden], or something, secretary of the NASA something or other for years; he'd been in the space program, and he was leaving. And he said, "Say, we could slot him into something, but we, better give us the head room, that one job, but then I'm going to change it afterwards." So they slotted him in. He was going to be a special assistant to the NASA administrator. He ended up a deputy director of technical press relations, or something fake. He stayed here a year. And he was never heard of again.

About a month ago I was out in Chicago, and on my way back I had to take this flight which was a two-jumper--you know, two stops. The plane landed, and the stewardess announced that it was Memphis, or something like that. It was actually Cincinnati. Half

of us got off, you know, 'cause I was getting off in Memphis, and it was Cincinnati. And who do I see walking in the . . . I walked out into the area, you know, the airport area, and I saw Lingle. I said, "God, that's that guy from Cincinnati." And I thought, "Hey, is this Cincinnati?" you know. But the plane had taken off.

MOSS: Oh, boy.

KENNEDY: And, oh boy, there were about twenty-five of them stormed the counter. We ended up getting out; I think it was about a four-hour wait. That was the last I saw Lingle. I haven't relished looking forward to the next one, either.

MOSS: So what did your job shape up to be? What is it they were asking you to do? How did you organize it?

KENNEDY: Well, it was envisioned as the inspector general, but it was complicated in this regard. Passman and Morgan--Morgan particularly--decided that they would like to put in the act an inspector general of foreign assistance, who was Ken Mansfield [John Kenneth Mansfield], who was a personal friend of Morgan's. And Mansfield was to be nominated by the president, and confirmed by the Senate. Well, of course, that made him suspect in both camps. And he had a very novel approach. He didn't want to study anything except isolated cases, like this guy's taken a rug, and that fellow's doing this or that. He didn't get into. . . . As a matter of fact, all he did. . . . Well, he ended up getting a lot of those floaters, you know, that no one knows what to do with in the department, and they shunt them in there, Class 1 officers who have got up through the system, but could never be trusted to be an ambassador or a minister or a counselor, even. And they put them in, and they had about a dozen of these, and of course they were kind of gadflies.

I used to kid Ken--you know, I'd go to lunch with him--and say that I had the in-house capacity, and he had the outhouse. . . . He didn't always appreciate that type of humor. But his approach complicated the task, because it created confusion. I was there about a couple of weeks and then they told me to draw up a charter, and get the thing organized and all that. And Hamilton, et cetera. . . . One day he told me, "Say, listen, we just located a staff of forty-seven people who are engaged in investigations." So I said, "Yeah, you told me I was going to have a staff of seventy-five." He said, "Well, I guess you've got the first forty-seven slots filled."

MOSS: Where'd he find these?

KENNEDY: They'd been floating around doing fraud investigations, but they were under the administrative assistant secretary, or administrative assistant, assistant administrator. So I presented a plan where we would have an office of program evaluation. We would also have an investigative staff;

we would have the audit staff; and then the security; and that would be the range. And it has always been my private opinion in government that unless the head of the agency has control of the money, the security, the audit, and the audit must be separate from the control, the investigations and program evaluations, he's like a man on a stagecoach with eight horses and no reins, because he doesn't know which horse is running the best, and whether the others are pulling the wagon at all.

MOSS: He hasn't got a whip either.

KENNEDY: No. Oh, no, and there's nobody riding shotgun, right? So I formulated this so-called charter. Well, one of the crucial misappointments. . . .

Well, first of all, let's take State. Now I'm inside. I'm looking out. They don't like the guy that comes in from outside. I wasn't a member of the team. Now, the team had been laced with a number of people from the budget bureau who had sold their soul to get over there and had been patsies for the department, and that would explain the rapport sometimes in State people and their own

. . . . Then the department, of course, was a difficult one to do business with, even more difficult than when Eisenhower was there, and for this reason. Purposely, perhaps--I don't know--unwittingly the president selected an assistant secretary for obvious reasons. He took Soapy Williams [G. Mennen Williams]. He gave him Africa because he was very conversant with the black problems of (?) . Then he had Harriman; then he had Chester Bowles, who personally I felt was going down to defeat anyhow, and he decided to throw in with Kennedy; and said that he sacrificed the seat he wasn't going to be able to get anyhow. And he had a couple of henchmen who were trying to take over the department. Then he had Ball [George W. Ball], and he was affiliated with Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson]. Then he had Harlan Cleveland and he couldn't get a security clearance at that time, because Otepka [Otto F. Otepka] and the gang were involved. And then you had, well, a series of assistant secretaries who had been picked for some extra-departmental reason. And then, on top of it, they had placed Dean Rusk whose principal contribution would be that he would be able to sit on these people, not forcefully, but just as insulation, and that he would provide a certain blandness that would make the department less colorful for McCarthy type of action. And the president would obviously be the spokesman.

The problem also was that when Dean Rusk was the assistant secretary, evidently all these people that were still in the department, they hadn't been impressed with him then. As one guy told me one time, he said, "He could ingest chili and it would come out plain vanilla." So you had these people also, with their independent call on the president. Rusk would say, "Well, I don't really know what's going on in my department. I've got a Soapy Williams on the phone talking with the president; Harriman's talking to him out of another corner; somebody else, Chester Bowles

is in touch with him." He was like a civilian faculty member in a military organization, or a civilian in a nunnery. They were making policy while they're eating. So he could never catch up. And he really didn't get to be clout power until Johnson took over, and since I was there then, I saw the difference. Nobody raised their head, because Johnson didn't know that much about foreign policy as such, and he was very. . . .

MOSS: What made the difference then?

KENNEDY: That they couldn't approach the president; they had to go through the secretary. And the secretary was over with the president. All they had to do was pick up the paper to know that. They didn't dare contradict him because there was no way of their appealing to him. If Dean Rusk got mad at Soapy Williams, Soapy'd just call the president. There was no liaison between, let's say, Macomber and Johnson, or something like that. He couldn't move in. So that was the climate that you were working in. Now the president put it on Fowler Hamilton. . . .

MOSS: Excuse me for just a second. [Interruption]

KENNEDY: Evidently, it was the president's determination, according to people like Frank Coffin and Ed Dekellian and others who were on the committee up there, that

Fowler Hamilton would sell the foreign aid program, which would be a massive redoing of the foreign aid elements and collected in one area, recognized as a program and not an adjunct of something else.

I must say, as I said to Dan yesterday, I don't share your view on him at all. He was what they needed, and he carried it out very well. He contacted every member of Congress who was crucial to the program, and not crucial to the program in some instances, but instrumental. And he then said to them, "What about the program?" He organized it, and they sold it. And I think it was the biggest program that they ever had since. And not one single administrator after him ever was visible enough to be identified with the program in not only the public mind, but the press. And the president, whether he was Johnson or Kennedy, had to lay his head on the block in front of Passman to get his money. And so it was a little bit like the Acheson circumstance, to some extent, as far as I'm concerned. Of course these are my personal opinions. But I worked there every day from '62 to '66--or late in '66 or '67, I forget--and there's a lot that you can see and hear, and particularly if you. . . .

All we were supposed to do, and did, was investigate every other office there. And when I left, Gaud [William S. Gaud] said to me, "Well, you don't seem to be able to get along with your peers here." I said, "Well, I'll tell you what, Bill. Inasmuch as I suspect three of 'em of serious lapses in ethical and professional conduct, and I have been instrumental in getting rid of about seven of 'em, I doubt if the balance of them want to have much in the way of camaraderie with me."

MOSS: What were some of the things that you were running across that were instrumental in having people removed? Where were the failings of the program that you were uncovering and the failings of the people?

KENNEDY: Well, the problem in the country programs were, they developed in twenty years a professional mission director. He may have started in country X, and put in five or six years there, and then they transferred him, not even in the same area, but to another part of the world. And there he began again, with the experience he had, to try to apply the same solution. And quite often. . . .

Well, take for instance, I'll give you a good example. Now, although he was a pretty good fellow, let's see, Joe something-or-other, I forget his last name. He was mission director in Casablanca [Morocco], in Taiwan, and Saigon. I can't think of his last name, Joe something-or-other, nice guy.

MOSS: I know the Saigon one.

KENNEDY: Well, everybody's been to Saigon. There was one. . . .

MOSS: Was he during the Kennedy administration, or was it later?

KENNEDY: Yeah.

MOSS: Now, who was it? All I can think of is the USIA [United States Information Agency] guy, Mackland [Ray Mackland].

KENNEDY: No.

MOSS: USOM [United States Operations Mission]? Who was it? Well, I can fill it in.

KENNEDY: Joe something-or-other.

MOSS: I've got to get my. . . . Mendenhall [Joseph A. Mendenhall]. No, Mendenhall was. . . .

KENNEDY: No. That was Laos. No, I may be thinking of a different one.

MOSS: I think Mendenhall was USOM at one time. At any rate, I've got it in my notes and I can fill it in.

KENNEDY: Well, you know it's rather interesting that there is a tendency. . . . Well, first of all, in the department they didn't have the proper support because you have a whole group of people who were GS [Government Service] and were never going to serve overseas, didn't want to serve overseas, and set every bloc and judged everything by American concepts; frowned

on supporting supposedly corrupt administrations overseas, foreign administrations; would only be happy if you personally stamped the United States on every country in the world. Yet they felt they were going to do their thing by doing this. [Bangs the table here] And cumshaw was not recognized as this such. The life of the orient is cumshaw, therefore you cannot apply the standard in connection with that that is puritanical.

There was a tendency also to weave in a few CIA people, which caused foreign governments to look askance at almost anybody, you know, who came in. They were always suspect. Then there was little knowledge of some of the USOMs of the foreign ministries that. . . . By that, not just the foreign ministry, but any foreign ministry. They didn't know where the power was. We spend a lot of money trying to get to know where is the power in Congress? And yet then they turn around and they don't spend a dime to find out that in Greece it's maybe not the X department, but the Y department that's the real crucial one. You've got to know everybody there. And there is a tendency among Americans to always go to a cocktail party and stand around talking to each other. Also, there is a tendency in the foreign service initially to ignore the AID people. In Greece and Turkey, for instance, the ambassador was certainly not as important as the USOM director who had the money. And so to the foreign government, they don't accord to the guy with the money.

So then Kennedy brought the two together. He made the ambassador the money man and that. Well, that was good. Personally, I wouldn't have recommended it. I think that the ambassador should have had power of veto, but the normal operation would be run by AID rather than by the ambassador so that if any boo-boos were made, they could be disavowed. But then no deal will go through unless the ambassador concurs, but he won't run the program.

MOSS: How did you see the effort to combine the AID and the military assistance programs, and let me ask you to take a specific facet of that. The aid for internal defense, or internal security, the whole counterinsurgency thing that Robert Kennedy was really wrapped up in, how did you see this developing, in AID and coordinated with Defense, CIA, and so on?

KENNEDY: Well, it worked great, at the country level. There was no coordination in Washington to any great extent. They had a few meetings. Changing personnel and irregularity in meeting, the unevenness of the responsibilities of the delegates to the meeting, was against it. I mean, you're an ambassador, you're in Tanzania, you've got a country team, you've got the counterparts, and all these--they come to your office, they sit around a table, you meet once a week, you move ahead on a firm objective, and all that. But back in Washington there's also supposedly your counterpart of this--that's somebody from State, somebody from, we'll say, a Defense, somebody from CIA, USIA, and all that. Then these became meetings that were not, in my view, at all as productive as they were at the country level. It just couldn't work out.

MOSS: Were there ways in which this got out of hand?

KENNEDY: Yes, I think that there's a tendency depending on the country, taking the country level, for the dominant member to sometimes poke into areas that he didn't know too much about. The USOM man. . . . You take a guy like, he was in Korea, Killian []. Remember him, Killian?

MOSS: I don't know him.

KENNEDY: Well, he was USOM director in Korea, and a few other things. Well, he had a clique, a little team, moved them around with him. And you were in or you were out; you were on his team, or you were off. He was down in Saigon, he was in Korea, he was in Turkey. And he, I felt, like in the military he didn't know. . . . He was a labor attache, initially, or a labor counselor or something. He had been with some West Coast labor organization, and then he got into the thing early on the labor side. He didn't. . . . I'll tell you, he was totally unqualified in some fields that he was really pontificating on. And when you had a weak ambassador, he really had them go up the wall, you know? And so that was the bad feature of it. That was the breakdown. And I think in the Washington area, of course, the coordination just physically was difficult.

MOSS: I'm going to have to push this pretty quickly now, because it's getting on to five-thirty. Let me ask you one question. What differences did you see between the administrations of Fowler Hamilton and Dave Bell [David E. Bell]?

KENNEDY: Well, Dave Bell I consider in my opinion probably the worst administrator that AID had, and I consider Gaud the next. But Gaud had the saving grace, at least, of. . . . Although personally I dislike him, I mean, Dave Bell never had the experience of knowing even what a region might do, not that he would know what it was doing. And he had a tendency to listen to Gaud on almost anything, 'cause he was, as I say--all these are circumstances--mouthy, the most forceful. I mean, if you're going to take on Gaud, you might as well say, "It's going to be a tough fight." And why? Not because he's right or wrong. It's just because his personality is such. There was no rational approach to anything. It was either, you're fighting, you know. . . . He was feisty, Jimmy Cagney [James Cagney] type of personality.

Dave Bell came over with one girl from his budget office. I had no reason to like him, to start with, because when I presented the charter operations, Fowler happened to have it in his pocket when he went to lunch with Bell. But Bell said, "Oh, I think it would not be good to upset the comptroller's function by taking away his audit function. It violates every rule we can think of it." And of course he was a buddy of Hollis [Hollis B. Chenery], and he looked on my function as a thing that could upset Chenery, which of course wasn't true at all. 'Cause program evaluation is

not program analysis. But he didn't seem to be able to draw the distinction. I always got the impression that he was over his head. So then, I knew the general counsel of the Bureau of the Budget, who had been there. . . . There were only two general counsels of the Bureau of the Budget since Roosevelt, ? and Focke [Arthur B. Focke]. So I used to go to lunch with him a lot, and I said, "Geez, what kind of a guy was he? I know we had lunch in the past, and I know you mention different things, but I mean. . . . And I mentioned something about guys that I worked for, and you let them in one ear and out the other, and now this guy's dumped on us." He said, "Well, I'll tell you what. We've had. . . ." He just left Commerce [Department of Commerce]. . . .

MOSS: Stans [Maurice H. Stans]?

KENNEDY: Yeah. He said, "We had Maurice Stans. I think he was probably the worst in history. But," he said, "edging him would be Dave Bell." He said, "I don't know of anybody over there that. . . ." He said, "Hell, they didn't have to pass any ordinances about dancing in the halls when he left. He just sat in his office." And I can make you this statement, Dave Bell was asked by President Kennedy to contact me, because I was there. I know this to be a fact 'cause a member of the Board of Overseers [of Harvard University] said that Dave was the secretary or something; that's how he got to know Kennedy. And Dave Bell was a fellow who was also approached by McCormack, as the speaker, saying that, "I want you to know that the Kennedys and I have had some differences, but that you've got a good guy down there, and if you have anything that you want done, or helped or anything. . . ."

I knew Dave Bell because during that six months. . . . I knew Dave Bell myself, but not functionally as a. . . . During the hiatus, before Truman went out of office, he was working in the Bureau of the Budget, and he was about a 7 or a 9 or something, with Neustadt [Richard E. Neustadt] and they were looking around for a job. But contrary to them, they couldn't get one. I mean, I moved out of the Hill and came down in December of '51, wasn't it? Or '52. I forget. The election year, anyhow. And I got a 15. And they were trying to get in, and they, you know, got shunted off. Larson wouldn't hire them. So he came back up here, then, and took a master's or something. And Neustadt the same thing.

So I regard him as too opportunist, because when we were writing the Budget and Accounting Act, Lawton [Frederick J. Lawton], who had no guts at all, said, "I don't want to send anybody up on the Hill because, well, you know, when you open up an act you never know what's going to get into it." And I said, "Well, we're going to open up the act, and you're not going to have a thing to say about what goes in it?" He said, "Well, we'll leave it up to you." Well, Frank Weitzel [Frank H. Weitzel] from the GAO and myself, we sat down and we wrote it, and we didn't give the Budget Bureau too much headroom. So Lawton after that regretted he hadn't. . . . But these guys were sent up one day with some papers, and they tried to tell Weitzel something, and he just ordered them out

of the place. So it wasn't a pleasant thing, you see.

Of course, then there was a fellow who came in at this point who had a lot to say about how you'd organize, and that was John Macy [John W. Macy, Jr.]. Well, John Macy is a fellow that I knew when he was assistant to an assistant secretary, and you can look it up sometime, but our committee wrote a report that said that he, the assistant secretary, and Mr. Macy had "run the gamut from pique to petulance, from bluster to oblique." That'd give you an idea. He, John Macy, he'd walk on the other side of the street if he saw me coming. 'Cause he had somehow got his foot on the right and wrong, and he had done well, and I reminded him of a disaster that damn near finished him, and he didn't want to have anything to do with. . . .

In three and a half years I never was in Dave Bell's office but once. You know when that was? To tell him that I was retiring. So that was my rapport. I was his assistant, and there were only two people reported to him directly other than Gaud or Coffin, and that was the deputy; and then he had two assistants at that point, and one was congressional liaison and the other was supposedly inspection. He never. . . . I called him, oh, I'd say, for about six months, left my name to see him. He never did, so after that I just ignored him. Three and a half years later it was the first ntime I ever got in his office.

MOSS: Okay. I'm going to cut this off because we are getting late. I may want to try and get back to you sometime.

END OF TAPE TWO