

**William Barry, Oral History Interview – RFK#1, 3/19/1969**  
Administrative Information

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**Biographical Note**

Barry (1927-2018), Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, security expert, and personal bodyguard to Robert F. Kennedy [RFK] in the 1968 Presidential campaign. In this interview Barry discusses the 1968 Presidential campaign in terms of security, advance men, campaign stops, and RFK's attitude towards security and police among other issues.

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Oral History Interview

Of

**William Barry**

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William Barry – RFK #1

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Oral History Interview

with

WILLIAM BARRY

March 19, 1969  
New York, New York

By Roberta W. Greene

For the Robert F. Kennedy Oral History Project  
of the John F. Kennedy Library

GREENE: How did you first learn that Robert Kennedy was considering running for the presidency?

BARRY: It was in Ambassador Kennedy's [Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr.] office at 200 Park Avenue. I just happened to be there by accident when Joe Dolan [Joseph F. Dolan] came in and called me into an office and asked me about my availability, in case. This was, I guess, approximately a week before the announcement. I told him that my availability would be difficult, but that, of course, I would.... He just said, "Well, be available," and that was it. I heard nothing more from him until after the announcement.

I received a call and was asked to make a trip to the South -- I think the Senator was going to Alabama -- and I couldn't do it due to the pressure of business. And the next call I received was from Steve Smith [Stephen E. Smith] who asked me very brusquely, "Well, I'd like to do it." What he was talking about, of course, was traveling with the Senator and supplying him the personal security as well as an overall look at the security of the campaign. I replied that the bank obviously would have to be consulted, and I would need their permission to leave Bankers Trust for however long this would take. Steve said, "Well, who do we talk to?" I said, "Well, I imagine you should talk to the chairman of the board." "Great. Pack your bags."

So the next thing, I was asked to appear at the Saint Patrick's Day Parade with the Senator, and again for business reasons I couldn't do that. The following Monday Steve talked to the bank, and then the bank talked to me. The bank took the position that it would be all right for me to go, but that my job wouldn't be here when I came back, and they would obviously have to make other arrangements to fill in the hole left by my departure for an unknown amount of time. So I thought that was rather a negative way to

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deal with the question. I had two calls from the Senator's office that day to find out what the answer was. I talked to Tom Johnston [Thomas M.C. Johnston] and told him, "Tom, I don't really understand how important it is to the Senator that Bill Barry himself go, or is it just that he wants just anybody to go? If it's Bill Barry, I'll quit this job and go, but if it's just anybody, you know, I can recommend other people because it looks as though my job won't be here when I come back." Tom talked to the Senator and the Senator said, "Well, I'll call the chairman of the board myself." And that was part of my conversation with Tom. I said, "If it is important to the Senator that Bill Barry go, well, then I think he'd better call himself." So he called. The bank said, "Go with my blessing and everything will be fine when you come back." The original position that the bank took was a misunderstanding. It's not what the chairman wanted at all, so the bank in sum, was really terrific about my going off on this campaign. I was gone for a rather long time, and when I came back they immediately sent me away on vacation, so they've been very good about the whole thing. So it's a long way of telling you how I learned about it. But I was not consulted or anything, just told to be on standby.

GREENE: Did Mr. Johnston indicate that Senator Kennedy wanted you personally?

BARRY: Yes, he did, as a matter of fact. He then called the chairman of the board himself, and that was during the meetings that he was having to decide the campaign strategy, so that was quite an intrusion at an important time. So he really did want the person of Bill Barry rather than any advice, which I meant quite sincerely. I just wanted to know what he was thinking. Sometimes what you're thinking and what someone else is thinking is entirely different. So that was established. He did want me to go.

GREENE: Were you in on any of these meetings?

BARRY: No.

GREENE: Do you know of anything that took place at them? Did you hear any conversations?

BARRY: No. You mean about whether he should go or whether he shouldn't go? No.

GREENE: He never consulted you at all, asked what you thought of the whole thing?

BARRY: Well, later on in the campaign, he asked me a few times what I thought. But, you see, my job kept me away from Washington, and our relationship. Our relationship was such that I felt he was really quite overburdened with people he had to give attention to. My relationship was if I could help Senator Kennedy, I'd do it. So when we had contact it was usually for business.

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GREENE: How frequently would you say that was between '67 and '68?

BARRY: Oh, I'd say a dozen times.

GREENE: When you speak of business, what do you mean?

BARRY: Well, if the Senator needed some information, or if due to my association with him and being part of the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] I would get information that I thought he should have, well, I wouldn't go through an intermediary with some of that; I'd call him directly. Or if he came to New York and just wanted to see me, I'd go and see him. If for some reason he needed somebody he trusted, well, then he'd call me and I'd come down and meet him. Sometimes for the children, sometimes for Mrs. Kennedy [Ethel Skakel Kennedy].

GREENE: Could you give some examples of what you mean?

BARRY: Yeah. Of...?

GREENE: Of the types of occasions when he would call on you, what situations would be involved?

BARRY: I said two types. You mean the family situations?

GREENE: Yes. Would it be to act as a guard for the children?

BARRY: Well, I think also to facilitate their getting around and also.... Well, a family day, for instance, would be the day he visited the Giants on a Saturday and took all the children and Ethel and the nurse, and they all went up to Yankee Stadium. The Senator had learned that there were some children that appeared from underprivileged homes in Yankee Stadium to see the Giants, and he went up and took part in that. Well, that day I brought two of my boys down, and we all went out together. That kind of thing. No, not basically for protection. Not in those things.

GREENE: Would you talk about his political activities on occasions like this?

BARRY: Not really. Senator Kennedy would talk about political activities in this way, "What do you think?", if there was something he was deciding. For instance, possibly the rumors that he's going to do -- he'd say, "What do you think?" But that's not a discussion. You just say what you think and then he says, "That's fine." [Laughter] And then he tucks your answer away with other people's. I, of course, always thought he'd make a great President from the first day I met him, so my opinion was always, "Go." So that would be the answer I would have given him.

GREENE: Were you in contact at all with the other people that he was speaking to, in New York particularly?

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BARRY: No. No, I think that was pretty closely guarded. I don't think there were any valid rumors. I knew a lot of people that he knew him and didn't know anything about this decision until it came over the television.

GREENE: Did you sense, in any of these meetings, particularly in late 1967, that he was seriously considering this?

BARRY: No.

GREENE: He didn't really let on.

BARRY: No. I think he was seriously concerned about what was going on in the country and in Vietnam, but translating that to challenging an incumbent President -- I never got that impression. He never indicated to me that he was....

GREENE: Could you explain exactly what your job was?

BARRY: Which job?

GREENE: Excuse me. Now we're skipping ahead to the campaign, once you got involved.

BARRY: It was a little confused. It was never -- my activity and participation was never formally discussed with me by anybody. After the bank said, "Go," I received a call from the Kennedy office, "Could I go to the South?" I think the Senator went to Alabama. But I needed a few days here obviously to wrap up my work and get my assistant clued in on what we were trying to do. So the first date I would be available would be March 23rd, and that was the trip to California. So I was just told, "Well, be at the plane at such and such a time." That's the only conversation I had. I got to Kennedy Airport in time to



catch the plane. The Senator came over to me and said, "So you're with us, good," slapped me on the back, and that's the last word I had from him until we hit California.

At no time was my role ever outlined for me. It wasn't a bodyguard in the true sense of being a bodyguard in that a bodyguard is constantly with the individual. The Senator wanted his privacy, and I respected that. So it was really only for public occasions that I would be there. Initially, I felt that it was a bodyguard, but after the first trip -- I think it was a ten or twelve day trip -- it became apparent that it would be impossible to serve in that capacity.

The basic job was to get him through crowds. I'd have to say that if I did anything, that was it. You have days of twelve and fifteen rallies a day, and when the day was over there wasn't really much opportunity to stay with the candidate, he was tired and I was tired. So what I tried to do was set up security to take over when I obviously couldn't be with him. And the Senator, on three separate occasions, canceled that security. He didn't want it at all. By that I mean local police in the corridors or the hall to keep the curious from coming up and also to provide physical security, obviously. But those were canceled. So it distilled down to the fact

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that when the Senator was campaigning, I was with him; but at night and before the campaign hit the trail in the morning, I was not with him. So basically the job was to get him through crowds and onto platforms and, in general, try to protect him.

GREENE: Did he give you any reasons for canceling the security, or did he even discuss it with you?

BARRY: That would be a fragmented answer. I think you've got to look at the overall problem of the campaign. Naturally, one man could not handle the security for this campaign. Really a lot depended on the attitude of the man to be protected, in any event, no matter how many people you have. Senator Kennedy's attitude was that he was going to live his life and not be constantly fearful of what might happen. And the basic security measures are naturally in contradiction to that philosophy. If you put two people outside a man's hotel door, you're limiting his freedom of movement. And the Senator wanted his independence, not only in, let's say, that limited example, but almost in every situation.

And I think we got along so well because from the beginning I realized that the Senator was, one, a very courageous and fearless man; and, two, I felt he was entitled to his privacy -- and I'm going back to when he was an Attorney General. On this campaign, however, I was very concerned about the overall security problem, but I could get nowhere with the Senator. He didn't want more people. He just wanted the protection that I could afford him, however limited, and he didn't want large squads of policemen. Many times he canceled escorts rather than have the sirens going. If it was a question of sirens or no escort, we didn't have an escort. Getting through a crowd -- he didn't want big policemen with clubs

pushing people back. He just wanted one man, me, to make the path, and he could walk through because he wanted to see and touch the people and give them access to him.

There were many occasions of police complaints about this particular attitude. They felt he didn't appreciate their efforts, but he did. We never had an escort that he didn't thank personally and shake their hands. This became an issue. I've been asked about it a number of times, why Senator Kennedy didn't like police. It wasn't that he didn't like police. He just didn't like his freedom limited in any way. So the security thing depended on his attitude, and he just didn't want to be surrounded by people protecting him. He didn't admit the threat. If he did, he felt that he could deal with it.

GREENE: Was this something that he actually said to you or you just knew it?

BARRY: No. No. He said it to me. I think it was the second trip, on April 11th in Lansing, Michigan. The Senator made a midday talk to assembled Democrats. He scheduled meetings in his hotel room

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for three hours with the important Democrats in Michigan. While these meetings were going on, a police lieutenant came to me with what I thought was a serious threat. This wasn't the first. I asked them, "How sure are you that this threat is a bona fide threat?" And he said, "Well, a policeman witnessed the man going into the building across the street with a rifle, and we're concerned about it. We have the block cordoned off."

Now, the Senator was almost through with his talks. We had a half an hour to go. I closed the blinds in the room, without being directed, and had the open convertibles brought into the basement of the hotel instead of where they were parked by the front entrance. There were very few people gathered around. I thought that any campaign purpose of being observed leaving the hotel was minimal, and so that the security pressures were overriding to put him under the thing, and that the political question wasn't serious because there were only a few people.

So we left. And the police brass who were with us went right down to the basement, and the Senator started to get into his *closed* car. And he noticed it, and then he called me over and said, "Bill, why are we doing this? Why have you got me in the basement?" So I said, "Well, Senator, I didn't think it was a problem. There aren't any people out front, but there was a serious threat and a man was witnessed going into the building again. Don't ever change whatever we're doing until you talk to me, and I don't ever want to change it because I'm not afraid of anybody. If things happen, they're going to happen." He was really furious. He made it quite plain that he didn't ever want to duck anything that came. The statement was, "I'm not afraid of anything or anybody and I'm not going to let people make me hide in a basement."

Now this was in a basement garage, and there must have been fifty policemen within hearing distance of this. He was that serious that he didn't save it for later when we were alone. This was in full hearing of many, many people. That was the first of those occasions

that he made that statement. The second time was in Cleveland after Martin Luther King was assassinated.

GREENE: April 4th?

BARRY: April 4th?

GREENE: Or April 5th, it would be the next day.

BARRY: The next day, I believe it was the next day, yes, the next day we went to Cleveland for another speech, and inside speech, and we were met at the airport by the usual motorcade. I was sitting on the back of the Kennedy convertible, and a car pulled alongside and asked whether I'd join that second car. It was a communications car, and the person in the car had just received a call from Washington that there was a sniper in a church steeple, and that if the Senator spoke he was going to be assassinated as a retaliation for the death of Martin Luther King.

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They stopped the motorcade so I'd get that message. The message, of course, was from Washington who had received it from the Cleveland police. The Senator said, "Why are we stopped?" I said, "Well Senator, there's quite a serious complaint." I outlined it to him and I said, "Would you let me go ahead and locate the police who have this information and give it some kind of a judgment?" He said, "Absolutely not. Get in the car. We're going on. Whatever happens is going to happen." We refused all safeguards and protections that day. Even for crowd control, for crowd reasons....

There was one time in South Dakota, a large city in South Dakota. It was a nighttime rally; it had been a long day. There were about ten thousand people out front. The stand was right in front of a hotel entrance that afforded a side entrance access to the motorcade, which is where we put the motorcade. After the Senator finished the speech, we took him right through that door and out the side and, we felt, saved him a lot of bruising contact with the crowd. I was concerned about this particular thing always. And I thought physically it was helpful. And again he stopped us and said, "I don't ever want to be taken out a side door. We'll go out through the crowd. We're not afraid of anybody. We're not going to duck anybody."

So that was the attitude. Those are just a few examples. We had others, other serious threats in other cities, and we were never really able to effectively deal with them. It was of such a concern that a meeting was planned, when we finished the California primary, in which I was going to make all of these things apparent and ask for a change in the security setup so that we could properly protect him. Of course that meeting was never held. The problem of security was never *really* faced, and it was never really afforded the Senator.

GREENE: What would his reaction, do you think, have been if you had held that meeting?

BARRY: I really feel, well, I would not have continued the campaign, and I don't think he would want that. I think he would have accepted some change, and I think that people that he respected were every bit as concerned as I was about the mounting problem of security.

GREENE: Who particularly do you have in mind?

BARRY: Well, Steve Smith, Kenny O'Donnell [Kenneth P. O'Donnell], John Reilly. Oh, I spoke to Fred Dutton [Frederick G. Dutton], Adam Walinsky. I was concerned because I was physically very, very tired. Doing the crowd work was very difficult; you're just too tired to really give a 100 percent assurance that you're the best guy. You need help. You've got to have a professional help. Just anybody can't do this kind of work; you've got to have a professional who is aware of what the problems are and how to react to them.

GREENE: In California, did Rosie Grier [Roosevelt Grier] and Rafer Johnson offer assistance in this way? Was that part of their job?

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BARRY: Not really. Rosie's first appearance on the campaign was in Indiana with the athletes. I think he kind of liked getting through the crowd, and it was kind of fun to have him do it. And he's such a great personality. As a matter of fact, Rosie had nothing to do with the campaign in California. He appeared twice as a singer but never as part of the campaign group that traveled from city to city. He would be invited, for instance, as a personality -- and not very often. Not that he wasn't wanted; it was just that the occasions that his entertainment was called for wasn't that often. People think that he traveled with us. He didn't. So he was not any help in security; he was really there as an entertainer. Once in a while he would help through a crowd, but it was really accidental. Not what I'd say an applied security man could have brought to the....

Rafer was a little different. He did travel with us a little more, not constantly, just when he was available or wanted to go. He was quite a close personal friend and became very friendly with me and, of course, would help me when I asked for it. Rafer's real entry onto the security scene came the day after the Oregon election when we appeared in California. The crowds were very, very receptive. They seemed to want to make up to Senator Kennedy for the loss. The California people were great. There were signs, "Just Don't Worry, Bobby. We'll Make It Up to You" and things like that -- people actually saying that.

The California crowds were much more exuberant and rough and bruising than any other crowds that we hit. During this long motorcade through the center of the city, the Senator's hand -- he was standing on the back of the convertible, and I was kneeling on the back of the convertible holding him on with one arm around his waist and the other arm holding Fred Dutton's hand. But three men grabbed his arm and kept pulling him. I knew I

was losing this battle of holding him on. At this juncture -- this happened often -- Dutton would let go of my hand, then I'd, keeping pressure against the Senator, jump to the ground, catch him, break the hands and put him back on the convertible. This had been done a number of times. But this time Dutton wasn't paying attention or whatever because he didn't let go, and I wasn't able to jump down and the Senator was falling. So I went with him. Dutton let go. And I went with him as far as I could to make sure he got his feet under him so he didn't fall, but then I realized that I was going to hit face down on the pavement. The car was doing about twenty miles an hour. So I rolled -- to take it on my back -- and my leg stayed in one position and I ripped my hamstring. I jumped to my feet to see how he was doing and fell down again. We needed somebody to hold him on the car because I was in such pain that I just couldn't walk, let alone kneel and take the pain. So we called Rafer from the press bus, and Rafer took my spot, and I stayed in the car and held Rafer on instead of Fred Dutton. He knelt on the convertible and held the Senator on through this motorcade.

The next event was a noontime speech in Beverly Hills, and they had a doctor there for me who told me that I'd have to go to the hospital for three weeks. So I had him tape the leg and got an injection of novocaine. It was hemorrhaging. I knew that there wasn't any chance of staying in the hospital. The Senator finished his speech and came to the room. He said, "Are you ready to go yet?" I jumped up and went to the elevator.

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He looked at me and said, "If you're not big enough to play the game, get out of it." That was his joke. That was his way of showing his concern, but I thought it was rather funny.

I got through that afternoon all right. Then we got to Riverside, California that night, and I packed it in ice through his speech and all the way back to Los Angeles. I think that really saved it. It was all red and black and blue. I got through it, but that's where Rafer really helped, when I was hurt. He took over the responsibility of holding the Senator.

GREENE: How did you feel about his attitude toward security?

BARRY: Well, you see, as a professional security man, if I had been brought in and not known Senator Kennedy, I would not have accepted the responsibility. But I knew Senator Kennedy since 1960, and I was always aware of the demands on his personal life. And I felt that he, more than any man I ever met, was dedicated to the United States and that his public life was really a service, and in the true sense, and that many times the public life spilled into his private life. And I always regretted when I, in any way, was responsible for an intrusion of that sort, not screening a man or anything like that.

Initially, he was a very young Attorney General and I was a young FBI agent, and it was a free and easy association. However, as his responsibilities grew, and after November 1963, the security problem became more acute. I was always concerned about that. But he deserved a private life of some sort, and I think that nature of the man was that he only accepted as much protection as he got because he like me. I don't think he would have accepted as much from anyone else. And he wouldn't have had anybody if really left to his

own choice. I tried not to play up the security role with the Senator. I really tried to protect him in spite of himself. Is that the answer to that question?

GREENE: It certainly is. Actually, I also wondered if you felt his risks were unnecessary?

BARRY: Yes, absolutely, absolutely.

GREENE: But you could understand the reasoning?

BARRY: Well, I can understand the man, not the reasoning. I could never understand the reasoning. But I knew who he was, and he's just a fearless guy, one of the truly fearless men. And I think he felt he could deal with any problem he had, and that in the risk of an attack he could take care of anybody who ever attacked him. And I think he could have, really. But what he didn't realize, and what of course my concern was, was that attackers rarely give you the chance. And the reason to have someone around is to look out for that possibility when you're unguarded. So that's the difference.

GREENE: How did Mrs. Kennedy feel about all this, do you know?

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BARRY: About all the protection angle?

GREENE: About the problem of security.

BARRY: Well, she was concerned, and she was glad that I was with him. I feel sure she was. She told me she was. She asked me many times to take care of him; whenever we left, Mrs. Kennedy, she'd always say, "Please watch him." She knew what his attitude was. There wasn't much anyone could do to change it. It was admirable in a way, sort of like a test pilot who knew there were risks, but he wanted to take them. Mrs. Kennedy would have taken any projection, would have okayed any protection that we could have provided. It's just a shame that the later Secret Service protection wasn't available to him.

GREENE: Did she ever, to your knowledge, try to convince him to accept more security?

BARRY: No. I never heard that. You know, she could have. I don't know.

GREENE: What about the rest of the staff? Did they see eye to eye with you or with him?

BARRY: I think they admired his attitude. I think they were concerned about it, but I think for the most part the staff felt it was a great adventure. You see, you had

different interests in the staff. You had the purely political interest which, in a catch-up ball game -- the Senator was challenging an incumbent President -- his obvious strategy was to go to the people and get support. Well, a fellow like Jerry Bruno [Gerald J. Bruno], for instance, would be interested in exposing the Senator to everybody in the United States. Well, exposing him to everybody in the United States brings with it security risks, so that his would naturally be in conflict with my interests, which would be to limit the exposure to sensible type risks -- not plunge through a twenty thousand crowd, for instance, and do it time after time, twelve times a day, go through open crowds without any protection at all, just one man. But I could understand that, and I could understand that politically it was an overriding pressure that he does take these risks, and that was why he was in the primary, to win it. The security he got was what I could afford him out of my love for him, and that was really the size of it.

The political people wouldn't want a large police force staff at the airport although I felt they were tremendously needed and always very useful. But politically it didn't look good to have five hundred policemen -- well, that's an exaggeration -- but to have a strong police force on the scene between the Senator and his people, because the people were very emotional about Senator Kennedy. They would get excited and surge against the police, the police would push them back, and there were many unfortunate incidents in a way which distressed the Senator. He had a great love of humanity, a truly great love of humanity, and it pained him to

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see anyone pushed or in any way hurt. There's no way for police to control a crowd but to be aggressive, and if they're passive, they will never control a crowd. So the two strains conflicted.

Then you had the speechwriters who were concerned with the Senator as a person but also concerned politically, and I don't think had a real judgment on the risks involved. I don't really think they understood the potential. I don't think they got the idea that in almost every city we went to there were serious, bona fide threats that something was going to happen. Dutton would be the only person that was privy to the pressures involved, but again, he was politically oriented in that he was interested in the winning of the primary, where I wasn't politically oriented at all. So you had the different insights into the problem.

GREENE: Did it make your job pretty frustrating from time to time?

BARRY: Yes, very frustrating, very frustrating especially the first trip. It was almost incredible. I never expected anything like it. We arrived in California and I, again, had not been told what was expected. We walked through a relative calm from the airplane to the terminal. The doors opened and this blast of sound reached us. Every hippie in San Francisco was at that airport and, of course, I hope many serious voters, but it seemed like the hippies were making the most noise with signs and the noise was just deafening. The Senator tried to speak, and there were "We Want Kennedy" chants, and he said a few words and they got even more excited. The emotional pitch was -- you could feel

it. The floor was marble -- my shoes had leather soles, which I changed at the next stop -- and I couldn't get traction through the crowd. The crowd was, of course -- you have four or five thousand people in a small area pressing against you. We got through that all right. People were falling, pushing each other. It was incredible. It never let up from then until the California election. The emotions that Senator Kennedy -- that was the big surprise, the emotions and the physical pounding. He could have used a flying squad of ten men to get him through those crowds, but he wanted to be in the crowds. Although, it distressed him at times to see people all around. So that was a big surprise, I'll tell you. The crowds were fantastic!

GREENE: You say there were a lot of hippies. That's kind of surprising.

BARRY: Why?

GREENE: Well, because there was a bit of dissension about the way Kennedy came in, and many of the more radical students were in disagreement with him.

BARRY: Yeah. I really don't know what brand of hippies they were. Maybe I'm betraying my conservative bent. The dress was certainly not conservative. [Laughter] So I assumed that they're hippies. I don't know how radical their politics were, but they were wild, wild kids.

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GREENE: Did you work much with local people, even on a small level?

BARRY: We, I tried to. You mean...

GREENE: Local law enforcement.

BARRY: Local police? Well, at each stop the advance man, of course -- and I tried to organize that as much as I could, we got it pretty well organized as time went on. An advance man would run on the plane and see me right away, and then would tell me what the conditions are, and how we get out, and who the police were, and whether the police had anything to say. So, in essence, the advance man was responsible for the security, setting it up, and then advising me what was happening, and then he'd just turn that over to me when the plane landed. This was not an organized thing. It's one that we just developed as we went along and as the advance men got to recognize and know me. That developed very well. That worked quite well.

GREENE: Who was doing most of the advance?

BARRY: Well, different groups in different states. I don't know what you mean. There were repeats.



GREENE: That's what I meant really. Who was traveling as an advance man wherever you went? Was there anyone like that?

BARRY: Oh, no. You mean in the plane, in the party.

GREENE: Well, ahead of you. Was there anybody that went to each place before you did, or to each state to make arrangements?

BARRY: Well, the advance men would do that.

GREENE: But it wasn't always the same person.

BARRY: No, no, no. You see, in one day we might be in three states, or within one state we'd be in ten different cities. Well, each city would have an advance man. Now these were coordinated by, I think Joe Gargan [Joseph F. Gargan] initially. And then Joe Dolan did some scheduling, but it was all done from a central location. These people were dispatched from a headquarters that Kennedy would have. They'd set that up and then I'd meet them. Now, when you kept meeting different ones, they became well known to you as a matter of fact.

GREENE: What was Jerry Bruno's job in all of this?

BARRY: Jerry Bruno was, I guess, kind of a coordinator or supervisor of advance men. And then if there was a really important day involved,

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he would take personal charge of that day and do his thing, which was advancing -- the "king of the advance men." He's really good and a fine, fine fellow. He's a great organizer and a good driver of men.

GREENE: Who took care of the personal arrangements -- luggage, hotels and things like that?

BARRY: In the campaign plane itself there was a baggage man. The first one was Floyd Boring, a former Secret Service agent, who didn't like the menial type -- and it was many service things. He quit, and they got a man named Bill Mantiss from Continental Airlines -- I believe from Continental Airlines -- and he handled baggage, luggage, getting the things that you needed from the plane to your hotel room.

GREENE: What kind of physical arrangements did the Senator usually like? What kind of places did he want to stay in and eat in?

BARRY: I don't think it really made a great deal of difference. I really don't think he was concerned with creature comforts. What he really wanted was quiet. He wanted a window that could open so that he'd have fresh air rather than the air conditioning. He wanted a meal when he got there. As far as eating goes, he rarely would go to a restaurant. Usually at the end of a day -- which would be anywhere from 11 to 12 to 1 o'clock in the morning the day would end -- well, if we hadn't had a chance to eat, and often even if he had just had a snack, he would have steak at that time brought to his room and quietly sit down and eat that and call Mrs. Kennedy and then go to bed. So his life was pretty spartan on the campaign trail and, of necessity, mine was because you couldn't really take the punishment that he was taking, and I also, in the crowds all day and traveling. So, really, it wasn't a question of places to eat.

GREENE: What happened along the way to make.... Did you do anything to make your job more bearable. Was there any way of accommodating for some of the problems? Someone said that you had gotten knee pads.

BARRY: Yeah, that's right. Well, you see, that was in Indiana when, gosh, there were so many rallies a day that, kneeling on the back of the convertible, my knees were taking an awful pounding. I really don't know how, frankly -- I look back in amazement -- I was able to do it. I don't mean that as a plug. It just was incredible physical punishment.

There was one particular day in Hammond, Indiana. It was the last day of the campaign, and we were in a motorcade for two hours. I was in that position for two hours. Of course, the Senator was taking a real pounding; people were shaking his hand and pulling him, et cetera. And then we stopped at a hospital to make a phone call. My knees were so bad that I couldn't walk when I got off the convertible. I got in there all right, and I bought these very light knee braces they call them. There's

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no pad to it; it's just kind of a bandage. I put those on, and they were worse because they were just taking the scabs off and the blood was going down my knees. And then we were in a motorcade for the next five hours, and it was just getting unbearable. So then Mrs. Kennedy took some foam rubber; the last hour and a half, she saw this, then then put this foam rubber under my knees. That helped quite a bit.

The press, of course, were terrific fellows. They got me the knee pads to put on, and they helped quite a bit. But then even so, you see, you'd have the knee pads on, and then you'd have to go through a crowd rather quickly, and the knee pads weren't commensurate with the activity so that, really, I couldn't use them. It was a problem that we could never really solve. Mrs. Kennedy would try to throw something under my knees whenever she noticed it. But really, you know, it just was -- but we did get the knee pads.

And then another thing that happened was in Columbus, Ohio. I had a thin belt like this on, about three-quarters of an inch wide. And the pressure in Columbus going through the ghetto was just fantastic, and I was holding him on. As I said, Dutton would hold one

arm, and then the Senator would actually lean out over my arm so that he's really putting a lot of trust in the arm, and sometimes your sockets start to pain after an hour or so of this so that Stanley Tretick, the photographer, was taking pictures, and he was holding onto this belt, and it was really hurting me, but at least it was holding us on. And at the next lull, he took his belt off and gave it to me, and it was a nice thick one. And then after that if I ever needed it, that belt really was a great thing.

GREENE: Did you find in general that local officials, both political and local law enforcement officers, were cooperative?

BARRY: Yeah, I think they were. You mean in the matter of security.

GREENE: Yes. Were they concerned and cooperative as far as protecting him?

BARRY: Yes, they sure were in every instance except, I would think, possibly in Los Angeles. And I'm not really conversant with that dispute. Every other city really was overly cooperative.

There was a problem in Fresno. And that gets back to what I was saying about the Senator and crowds. It was a rather late stop in Fresno, but the people waited. We were late, and they waited, and there were two thousand of them. The Senator's routine upon arriving at an airport -- if there were people there, he went to see them. Between the Senator and the people was a line of officers, motorcycle officers, and they were placed about six feet apart. You see, it looked as though the Senator had these men there to keep the crowd back, whereas just a few officers might have done the trick. It just seemed to be a little overdone. Well, I didn't object to it. We went around the officers and did the crowd. At this occasion, I would be in front of the Senator, and I would back into the crowd and just walk through that way trying to force my way through whatever pressure I got. And he would try to stay reasonably close to me and keep moving along. The advance man in this case, Carmine Parisi -- and I think it was Dick Tuck [Richard G. Tuck] who was involved in this. But

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They talked to the chief of police to get his policemen out of there -- that would handle this, and that the security was in good hands. The police chief really, I think, misunderstood. Carmine was rather excitable and from New York and the police chief from Fresno didn't like his attitude, I think, whereas Carmine didn't mean it the way the chief interpreted it. And then the chief said, "All right, if you don't like the way we work we'll all leave," and took all of his men and left. So we didn't have an escort going into Fresno, which wasn't as bad as -- the escorts were really to get you through the traffic, and many times you don't really need them. But the police chief made a complaint to the newspapers that the Kennedy people were anti-police, and this is still alive today in California, this rumor. Parisi was quoted in the Fresno newspaper as reflecting the Senator's attitude toward the police, and it wasn't the Senator's attitude toward the police. He appreciated everything they did. Whenever we went to an airport, he'd stop and shake hands with every officer. He had good relationships and

respected them. It was just -- the police job was to control the crowd. They were concerned for his safety. His job was to get elected and get to see the people. It was just a conflict of interest which, in a way, epitomized what my problems were. His job was to get elected, my job was to keep security pretty tight, and of course that wasn't possible.

GREENE: What was his attitude toward the police, do you think?

BARRY: Oh, very good, always was. When he was Attorney General he respected them. And he loved the FBI agent, he really liked them. He did many things that no Attorney General ever did to improve the lot of both the police and the FBI, and any law enforcement. He supported law enforcement in general. Some things happened probably in the heat of the campaign he didn't even know about -- for instance, the Parisi incident he wasn't aware of at all.

GREENE: What was that?

BARRY: Well, in Fresno.

GREENE: Oh.

BARRY: The Fresno incident. He didn't even know about that. And if he had, he would have talked to the chief of police. On the other hand, he couldn't abide a bully policeman in these crowds. He just couldn't stand to see a policeman pushing people with a large club in his hands, and this happened. When it did, he'd tell *me* to talk to the policeman and tell him to stop. And, of course, then that policeman would come away with the idea the Senator didn't appreciate him. Well, it wasn't that at all. It was just that the policeman had his way of doing the job that wasn't in accord with what the Senator wanted.

GREENE: Were there any times when you got the impression the crowd might have resented you and the fact that you were sort of between them and the Senator?

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BARRY: Not really. I don't think so. Initially, I used a lot of muscle and bulled my way through the crowds. And the Senator told me, "You have to be gentle. Don't hurt these people." Once you lost momentum a crowd, it was very hard to get started again. Where you lost momentum was if the people grabbed his arm and shook his hand and held him. They wouldn't let go. So then he stopped, and the crowd that you'd made some impression on catches up to you, and then you start all over again. So I would push these hands away, and if I pushed too roughly he'd say, "Don't be so rough on them." These people were hurting him, but he didn't want me to be rough and to hurt them. It's a hard thing to explain, this love of humanity which he had. It just got to you after a while so that my approach then became more gentle, and instead of the bruising, muscle-type of thing, it was more stubble and more of a technique of getting through a crowd rather than pushing

through. Actually, the technique was a great improvement. We got through crowds you wouldn't believe just by walking through saying, "Excuse me. Pardon me" with a smile. People just would make way, whereas before when you pushed, it got to be a game. And in many colleges I lost because the linemen were bigger than me. Really. [Laughter]

His attitude, I think helped a lot. He had a really deep appreciation for people and the fact that they were there to see him. One time we were going through a crowd, and I was getting rather upset because they were really rough, and I was just really angry. And he said, "Don't be angry. They came to see us." It was just an entirely different approach -- which I accepted, it helped me a lot.

GREENE: How much of a problem were people who were not there because they appreciated him but were there to heckle or just be antagonistic?

BARRY: Not really. No problem physically, if that's what you mean. Rather good-natured. In West Virginia there's many Wallace [George C. Wallace] people. In Oregon there were people who were against gun control; it's great hunting country up in Oregon. I think that was one of the factors in the election: these people resented the gun control law. The McCarthy kids -- I think they were basically good-natured, and the Senator really had a great affection for them. You know, they were saying, "Where were you in New Hampshire?" things like that. And the signs.... There were only a few people that were rather mean that I can remember.

One in Gray, Indiana. He had a very mean face, and he held out his hand, and I just happened to spot him. He wanted to shake the Senator's hand. I said, "Geez, don't shake that guy's hand." And the Senator waved to him and avoided him and made a joke out of the man's attitude which was very upsetting. He had a very mean face and was rather husky, probably a steelworker, dressed rather roughly. Two blocks later in the motorcade, the man did get the Senator's hand, and he really squeezed it. And I was going to do something about it, and the Senator just held on and squeezed back and then the man gave up. But it was really a very mean encounter. And then there was another one in California where I did get off the car and throw this fellow out of the way. He was shouting mean things about the Senator and President Kennedy so that I just got upset and did what I wanted to do and threw him out of the way.

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GREENE: What did Senator Kennedy say to that?

BARRY: Well, I think he rather liked that. [Laughter] He didn't want me to ever hurt anybody, but that fellow was really way out of line and very nasty and was following the car. I think one or two remarks in a block aren't -- but this fellow just kept running alongside screaming these things. So, finally, I couldn't stand it anymore and jumped off the car and threw him back into the crowd.

GREENE: What is the response of the rest of the crowd to someone like that?

BARRY: Like that? Dangerous, I think, in many cases. I think those people could get hurt. Although, the thing that was amazing about the Senator's crowds was that they were very festive -- I think in many cases celebrity crowds -- people that wanted to see a really good-looking man who was one of the leading celebrities in the world at that time. I don't think crowds were as polarized initially as later on they became, in California, for instance. In Oregon, they were bland crowds; in Nebraska, they were pro-Kennedy mostly; and in Indiana, bland again. I couldn't believe how unresponsive some of the crowds in Indiana were, unless you went into the black ghettos, and then, of course, the exuberance was overwhelming.

GREENE: Let's just backtrack to Los Angeles. I thought of something I wanted to ask you about that. What happened in Los Angeles with the police and the local officials? Do you remember?

BARRY: I don't. I don't know what the arrangements were. As I mentioned before, I did not handle (this) or obvious reasons; I was always in the plane or traveling. I couldn't handle the advance work with the police department. The advance men did. We never were afforded an official escort in Los Angeles. We hired our own escort, a private group that supplied motorcycle escorts that were excellent. They were really great. We never had police protection. They would probably respond locally to a crowd situation in an auditorium or something like that, but we never got police protection in Los Angeles.

And the day we arrived from Oregon after the Oregon election we received, oh, I forget, thirty-two summons at the end of the motorcade for obstructing traffic and passing red lights. It was just an indication that all wasn't well between.... I felt, and again I don't know what it was.... I think probably it was Mayor Yorty [Samuel W. Yorty] didn't appreciate Senator Kennedy. I really am not informed on it though, but we never did get any protection or support from the L.A. police. I think the police themselves would have given us anything we wanted.

GREENE: Which type of a travel was the greatest problem for you as a security man?

BARRY: Well, travel in itself was never a problem. The plane, of course, was a place for me to rest, and I did rest constantly on the planes. Car travel between cities was no problem. The travel that was a

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a constant problem was travel in motorcades with open convertibles from the airport, all the way back to the airport. That was a problem. But other travel was not a problem.

GREENE: How did you feel about traveling by train, the whistle stopping?

BARRY: Oh, the whistlestops. Yes, that's right. There really wasn't much of a problem there in security. The problems would develop when the train would be pulling out of the station and the crowds, many children, would want to surge after the train. The railroad police would have a cordon of policemen under the speaker's platform in the rear of the observation...

[BEGIN SIDE II, TAPE I]

GREENE: You were talking about the San Joaquin Valley.

BARRY: The Senator was speaking, and again there was a large crowd. A woman fell in the middle of the crowd, and people were falling on top of her. This is just an example of what happened at these stops. I charged into the crowd and got her out. It was rather funny. I was quite concerned. She was about eight-years-old, and she had ripped her stockings, and her shoes were gone. We got the shoes, and I carried her out of this tremendous crowd and stood her on her feet. And she said, "God bless you, Sonny. I love Bobby and will you tell him that." She didn't care what had happened to her; she was excited that Senator Kennedy was there. So I gave her the PT boat pin that I had, and she was very excited about that.

Those were some of the things. The crowds were really -- that was a holiday thing for those small whistlestop towns, just a holiday atmosphere and a lot of fun. Even the whistlestop in Nebraska, you know, was all Nixon [Richard M. Nixon] country, and you'd see many Nixon signs, but they were there and they were having a good time. They liked Senator Kennedy as a person, and he had a good time with them. It was really a great experience and great American people involved. The faces were great.

GREENE: What are some of the faces that come back to you? What kind of people are the most memorable?

BARRY: Gee, there were so many. The Mexicans were just so exuberant, and then Watts, the ghetto in Watts, was a fantastic experience. And then the faces in places like Hartington, Nebraska were all hearth-land types. They're great. The small towns in Indiana, just great.

GREENE: How did Senator Kennedy respond to this type of homey crowd like you found...

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BARRY: Loved it. He loved the small towns better than anything. He loved Hartington, Nebraska. In fact, he mentioned to me.... I really felt.... We had a whole day of small towns where the whole crowd would be a thousand or two thousand and that would be the whole town; and I remarked that I felt that this was an awful effort to put out for the return that would happen. And he felt that this was the time he enjoyed most

during the campaign getting back to the small towns and kind of becoming -- I can't think of the word but rejuvenated or getting a charge from these people. And it kind of picked you up a little bit and sent you out feeling a little better for having seen that there are people that will come out to hear a political speech and ask serious questions and are concerned with what is going on in the world even though they are in Norfolk, Nebraska or someplace like that.

GREENE: How about with children? Can you remember any examples of his behavior with kids?

BARRY: Well, there's never a child that didn't get a special smile or a "hello" or a pat on the head or a conversation. One incident that I feel was the greatest example of this was in Gary, Indiana. Children would run along for miles alongside the car which wasn't a good thing security wise and really wasn't good politically because it kept voters from getting up close to the car and seeing the candidate. But there'd be a convoy of children constantly, and dogs and bicycles, and it was dangerous because of the motorcade behind us. If one of them fell, you know, the guy couldn't stop. So that was a problem, how to space the cars. Do you space them up tight so that the kids can't get between you? If you do that, there's no.... So that was something that we had to contend with.

I noticed this little boy running along; he had a broken arm, and he was dragging his sister. He was about ten years old and his sister was about three or four, a pretty little blonde. And for two blocks she ran rather well, but the third block he was dragging her, and then the fourth block he carried her. And he was saying, "Look at the Senator. Look at the Senator." So I told the Senator what had happened, he stopped the car and stopped the motorcade and reached down and picked Michael -- we found out his name was Michael -- up. The Senator was sitting on the back of the rear seat of the convertible, and he put Michael next to him and his little sister was on the outside. Michael was in the middle. Michael didn't look at the Senator. He turned to his sister and put his hand under her chin and pointed her towards the Senator and said, "Look at the Senator, honey." He was so concerned that she would miss or be too shy. He was, obviously, the Senator's devotee, but he was more concerned with his sister. I just thought that his love and relationship with his sister was tremendous, and the Senator did too. He kept the kids in the car for about three miles, and they went right along with the motorcade, waving at the people. I pointed out to the Senator that we were getting rather far from their neighborhood and that I felt we should make some arrangements. He said, "We will." And he told the motorcade just to stay there, and we pulled our car out of the motorcade. And the Senator took these

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kids home and brought them into their mother, who was in her housecoat, and gave her a bouquet of flowers that he had just received, so she was really quite excited. And they had a picture of this in the newspaper -- of Michael. But that was an accident. It was not done for any publicity or any campaign purposes; he just loved children. There was never a time that he.... This was a great occasion but it wasn't the only occasion. He loved them.



GREENE: Are there any others that come to mind with children?

BARRY: Oh, yes. Many motorcades, we'd get into a city late at night. We'd be late because of the demands of the day, maybe two or three hours late, and you'd see a family.... Again in Indiana, a family of children had fallen asleep on top of their station wagon, and the Senator stopped the motorcade and went over and shook hands with the mother and father, and the children were all passed to him one by one. There were quite a few of those occasions where children would be asleep and he'd stop and say hello. Of course, if he saw an old lady who was in a wheelchair or anybody like that, he'd stop the motorcade and get out. This was rather tiring on him, but he never failed. If there was a sixty or seventy-year old lady that was unable to come out, he stopped and went through the crowd to see them and shook their hands and talked to them.

GREENE: Is there anything else you can think of about the advance preparations for these trips that would be interesting or useful?

BARRY: Well, I think the type of people who were doing the advance is a story all in itself. They were all, I think, above-average men. The ones that I remember, frankly, were mostly from New York, from the 1964 campaign. They were young attorneys who were married and had children, and they left their careers and their families and traveled into the small towns and wherever they were asked to go and advanced these trips. They'd sometimes go to a town where there weren't any Kennedy people. Don't forget, they were challenging the Democratic Party at this point, and they'd get no cooperation locally sometimes, and they had to set everything up from scratch: make signs and check the police, get motorcades lined up -- volunteer motorcades -- get the hotel and motel space for their crowds. So I thought they had a rather tough job.

GREENE: Are there any outstanding names besides the ones you've mentioned, Joe Gargan and Jerry Bruno?

BARRY: Oh sure. There were people that the Senator really loved: Jim Tolan [James Tolan] in New York, well, Carmine Parisi was excellent, Tim Hannan; Chris McGrath. There's one fellow that was the eternal pessimist. He'd show up in Nebraska; it hadn't rained in eighteen years in Nebraska and he'd have on a raincoat and carry an umbrella. He was from Boston, Bill Foley [William F. Foley] was his name. Don Dell [Donald L. Dell] was another advance man and was excellent. There's another one from Washington, that was great for morale purposes, a happy extrovert, Lee Fentress [Arthur Fentress] was his name. He's down in Washington now, as a matter of fact. He advanced quite a few trips, especially in Indiana.

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GREENE: These men were generally divide geographically? They'd take a state or two.

BARRY: It seemed to me that many times they worked in teams. For instance, Don Dell, Lee Fentress, and Frank Craighill [Francis H. Craighill, III]; they were three roommates from Washington, all young attorneys, and they volunteered for this. They'd more or less be sent out to -- if we were going into West Virginia, they might take three segments of the West Virginia trip. The West Virginia trip was a motor trip through the state so that they could actually set up five cities -- one man handle five cities, and then the next five cities on the route the next fellow would handle. The third and last would be Charleston where a major speech was, and the third fellow would handle the advance for that, letting the local politicians know who was coming, advising the mayor, things like that.

GREENE: You've mentioned how strenuous this all was. Was there anything done to try to prevent wearing out the candidate?

BARRY: Yes, but you know what. One thing I forgot to tell you about advance men was that they would come on the plane and brief me on any problems that I might expect -- security -- but they would also tell the candidate about local conditions. That was part of their assignment to find out, you know, if it was in Nebraska and the price of cattle was a problem, or Oregon and the export of lumber, that kind of thing. Well, they were responsible for a lot of that *hot* information. The local mayor was an anti-Kennedy man or whatever he was, they were responsible to verify that kind of information so the Senator would have it.

GREENE: Did they speak to him personally or to some of the aides?

BARRY: No. Most advance men would go right to the Senator with that kind of thing because it was only a minute or two. The plane door would open; they'd get on, and of course then the crowd was expecting.... So between the time the press emptied the plane and got down on the runway, that would be the only time allotted to this briefing. Sometimes it was important; many times it wasn't.

GREENE: Did your own briefings on security take place within earshot of the Senator?

BARRY: No.

GREENE: Deliberately, do you think?

BARRY: I think probably deliberately, but it was my feeling that I was never really.... On that plane I let the Senator have his privacy and kept away from him. I felt that the abrasion of everyday living and being together from dawn to bedtime could be alleviated

somewhat if I kept away from him whenever I could. Of course, the plane was the obvious spot to stay away from him, and I did. So on the plane I wouldn't be near the Senator anyway, through my choice.

GREENE: What examples can you recall of reports that you got upon landing in towns, besides the ones that you've mentioned, of possible problems that might arise security?

BARRY: Well, first thing they'd tell me is what the police escort situation was; whether we had them or didn't have them; whether they were going with us all the way; was the town set up to handle the crowd; were there enough police on hand there. Also, where the cars were located; how they were pointed on the airport runway; could we get out easily; did we anticipate a problem with the crowd. And then, of course, they'd tell me of any threats: in Gary, Indiana a sniper on an overpass was a concern; Monterey, California, a man called the FBI office and said he was going to kill the Senator. These kinds of things would be gotten to me as quickly as possible. Many times Washington couldn't contact the plane, but they'd get the advance man so that that would be my contact with any threats that would be reported to Washington by the FBI in Washington.

GREENE: Most of these reports from the police would go directly to the FBI in Washington and then be relayed to you?

BARRY: Yes. Or the police would tell the advance man too, normally, and then I'd get it. But the FBI, Washington, back to me was the usual route on the three or four really important ones.

GREENE: What did the FBI do on these?

BARRY: Nothing. There's really no federal jurisdiction, as far as they're concerned, on these threats.

GREENE: Then what would be the purpose of notifying them? Just to keep them informed?

BARRY: Well, there is a basic jurisdiction in the states called the extortion statute. And I'm sure there were some investigations in the rally flagrant cases. However, a sniper in a steeple -- and that was not true, by the way; the steeple was empty when we got there (that's not to say that somebody wasn't there or couldn't have gotten there) -- that would be the type of thing the FBI would pick up and immediately give to the campaign staff. That certainly isn't a federal offense. But if a phone call or a letter is received with a threatening nature, that's an extortion problem, and they probably would investigate that.

GREENE: How did you decide which of these call, threats, letters, and other such

incidents were serious and which were just pranks?

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BARRY: Well, when I was in the FBI, and I was in the FBI fourteen years, the last ten years I spent on the major case squad in New York handling kidnappings, bank robberies, and extortions. I learned in those investigations or extortions that you can't dismiss any letter however innocent, or even vile, on the other hand, it may be. So I felt they were all serious and they were all worthy of some protective measures. However, as I explained before, we couldn't take protective measures; the Senator wouldn't let us, so then it became a matter of living with the bomb, so to speak. You did the best you could personally, and that was all he'd accept in the way of protection. So, really, it didn't matter how serious the threat was; we weren't going to do anything about it anyway. This was going to be my theme in the conversation after California because we didn't do anything about it.

There's one occasion in a small town in California on June third or fourth. The Senator was going through the small town, and he stopped at a Mexican church and jumped up on the stairs to shake hands with the padre, then got back in his car. An advance man came running but, screaming at the Senator, "Get down, get down," screaming at me, "Get him down, get him down. Somebody's going to shoot him," and actually pulling the Senator. So, naturally, the driver is in a panic, and I told him to drive on. The Senator leaned to me and said, "Tell that fellow never to yell at me again. What difference would it make if somebody was there, I wouldn't get down." This is the type of attitude we were dealing with, just completely courageous, completely unmindful of any personal risk.

GREENE: Would you agree with those who said he was "foolhardy" as much as courageous?

BARRY: You see I don't know whether that's a correct word "foolhardy." He just didn't want to live in fear. So I think he was making a personal judgment of his own, based on his own life force. And I'd never judge him; I think he was far beyond any judgment that I would give. He's too good a man to be judged like that -- "foolhardy" certainly was not. . . . Whatever reason he had for living that way, it certainly was a conclusion he had reached and not a foolhardy one.

GREENE: Were you ever able to make any arrangements without his knowledge to try to alleviate possibly dangerous situations?

BARRY: Yes, we did. We did as much as we could.

GREENE: Like what can you think of?

BARRY: Well, we would keep police around as much as we could. Many occasions I'd hire off-duty policemen to stay in the lobby of the hotel, not in the corridor of

his room where I'd prefer to have them, but at least they were in the hotel. I had some friends that assisted me in various cities that would come out and give me a hand, but no really serious effort ever was possible. These were mostly stopgap measures.

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GREENE: I think I asked you this, but I'm not sure we answered it. What was done to prevent wearing him, and yourself and the rest of the group, out completely?

BARRY: I don't know how often, but every once in a while we'd get shots of B12, and that really helped. It *really* did. I was really at low ebb when I'd get them, and it just seemed to give you the courage to go on, not the courage, but the stamina.

GREENE: Would this be for almost everybody traveling in the group?

BARRY: No, just the three of us: Dutton, the Senator and myself.

GREEN: How did Dutton fit into this?

BARRY: Dutton was more a personal assistant type of thing. He'd make sure the Senator had a clean shirt, or that his bag of personal effects carrying his razor and things were always there, that the speech got to him on time, that the Senator was briefed on local conditions, and that the cards of briefing were given to him. A personal assistant, I guess, would be more like it. I couldn't do both jobs, obviously, and Dutton added another dimension to that job by being an expert in politics and a very brilliant guy and a nice personality to have, very low-key type of fellow.

GREENE: What about side trips in the course of a campaign? One that comes to mind is to the Haskel Institute for the Indians, the trade school in Kansas? Kansas, is that correct?

BARRY: I don't know. Those Indian trips kind of blur for me. A side trip, for instance, was up to South Dakota to see the Sioux. That took most of the day from Chadron, Nebraska all the way up into the reservation, and we would wound up at Wounded Knee. That was an interesting trip.

GREEN: Tell about it.

BARRY: Well, we landed at Chadron and again the Senator, as was his custom, was walking along the fence, and the pressure of these people was so much that the fence gave in. And he leaped back, and I grabbed the fence and tried to hold it up and couldn't. Of course, there were a thousand people falling on it. And one of the photographers, Bill Epperidge, was pinned under the fence; no harm was done to him. It was

a close call for Senator Kennedy. That would have been a serious thing because it had these wires at the top, it was a wire mesh fence. It could have ripped him up pretty badly, but he was noble and he jumped back. So we started out our trip in that fashion.

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Everyone got into buses, and there was an Indian on the bus that sang a song, "This land is my land; this land ain't your land." And he was rather amusing. We had box lunches, and it seemed to take three hours to get up to the reservation. The Senator walked around with Senator McGovern [George S. McGovern] and a Senator from North Dakota; I can't remember his name.

The one thing that sticks out in my mind in that trip was that on Indian reservations there are lot of abandoned cars. There was one right outside the house in which the Senator was talking to the mother and father who owned this house. He was conversing, and I was wandering in the back of the crowd and looked in this car, and there was a little boy in there. All the windows were up, and he looked funny. The door was jammed and I forced it open, and he was close to death. He was suffocating. We got him back and we gave him mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and brought him up to his mother and father. I explained to them what had happened -- that their son had almost died in this abandoned car, that they ought to break the windows or do something with it. They didn't seem concerned about it all. But it was really a pretty harrowing experience.

GREENE: Was the Senator aware of this?

BARRY: Yeah.

GREENE: What was his reaction?

BARRY: Well, he picked the boy up and comforted him. He was concerned about him. He later spoke to me about the Indians and how much they needed help. And he really had a genuine love of the Indians and appreciated how hopeless their plight was: they had hope until they were about ten, and then from there on they were wiped out; there wasn't anything they could do. And he was concerned with the inhumanity of taking these Indian children from their parents at an early age and sending them down into Arizona for schooling. That had to hurt the family structure; if there was any to begin with, that certainly destroyed it.

GREENE: What would he do on a trip to a reservation like you're speaking of? Would there be formal talks or just....

BARRY: Many times there'd be -- of course, I think, they were all tied in with the Commission on Indian Affairs [Senate Subcommittee on Indian Education] that he was a member of. And many times, other Senators who were on the Commission would meet him wherever the reservation happened to be. It was all part of this

study they were doing. And it just coincided with the campaign, and actually was a sacrifice for the Senator to make when every minute counted. He would take a day out and go to the Indian reservation in connection with -- one day it was in Arizona -- all day hearings, hear the tribes twitch their complaints and things like that. It was rather interesting but very tough for a man on the run as Senator Kennedy was; but he did it, and did it willingly.

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GREENE: Do you have any recollection of just about when that might have been, the meeting in Arizona with the Indians?

BARRY: It's probably in this.

GREENE: Well, maybe we can attach a memo later. I hadn't heard about that. Were you present at that meeting?

BARRY: Yes, I was. All day, as a matter of fact.

GREENE: What do you remember about it?

BARRY: Oh, just the colorful surroundings of it. The Indians came in their clothes and blankets. These were the Navajos. They were proud people. I got to understand the Indians a lot better through it, and they had a lot of problems, problems I never thought about in New York City. The Senator knew about them, and he asked very good questions, I thought. Of course there were a lot of hearings like that. He went to an Indian school in Phoenix. And he went to schools in Flagstaff and again back up in South Dakota. He visited those kinds of schools whenever he could.

GREENE: You weren't with him in Kansas, were you?

BARRY: No.

GREENE: That was where the Haskell Institute that I mentioned was, so you wouldn't know about that. How were the arrangements made for these trips? Were they on the schedule, these side trips to reservations or any others he may have made, or did he simply say, "Today we're going..."

BARRY: Oh no. They'd be scheduled in. There would be a release in the morning for the press on what the day's activities would be, and they were always in there. It was never haphazard. They were planned in because of the Commission hearings. They'd have to be planned into the campaign schedule: this day he would not campaign; he would be on this problem.

GREENE: Were there any unscheduled stops at all? Spontaneous detours that you can

remember?

BARRY: Once in Nebraska he went through a hospital for retarded children. It was quite an experience. It was heartbreaking to see those children. And gosh! He had tremendous courage. You know, you'd see a child be completely deformed, and I must admit that I felt repelled by it, you know, just completely. But the Senator would go over and hold his hand and maybe pick him up and fondle him. And, again, this was a private moment, not when he was a candidate. And, God, it was just fantastic, the love he had for those children.

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GREENE: How did he affect your own way of looking at things?

BARRY: You mean now?

GREENE: Well, in retrospect, how do you see his effect on your own thinking?

BARRY: He's always had an effect on my thinking, from the moment I met him. He was very aggressive as an Attorney General, personally as well as officially. He was, I think, the finest Attorney General the country has ever had. But he had a "go-go" spirit in those days -- that I looked at my own career and said, "Well, gee, what are you doing compared to what this fellow's doing?" And that kind of changed my attitude toward myself, a little introspection. But later, after November, and then after he recovered from his brother's death, there was a deeper quality to him that affected me, and a great tolerance for people that I... I don't know; I don't think I have it, but I'd like to have it. At least I admire it. He was just very tolerant with people. I think he just became a very deep man. He affected me a lot in that -- you know, when I was growing up, well, we were a very religious family.... I guess the one catchall phrase, I would say, of the qualities he got later on were very "Christ-like," a love for humanity that he had his desire to do something about problems. So if anything affected me, that would be the thing.

GREENE: When do you think this came? After President Kennedy's assassination?

BARRY: Well, I think.... Yes. And I think his exposure to problems that came after he was elected to the Senate. I just think he applied his.... I never thought of it, frankly, so it's difficult for me to.... I just think he came out of that period and looked at problems in a different way and became aware of problems that the country was facing and applied this tremendous philosophy of his to them.

GREENE: Were you conscious of disorganization in the early days of the campaign?

BARRY: Yes. There was a certain amount of disorganization. It was rather hastily thrown together, the first trip, but I think in sum total it wasn't bad. It was



rather well done. Summing it all up, I think they did a marvelous job.

GREENE: When do you think things started to shape up?

BARRY: Jell? I don't think they really did in the sense of being a smooth functioning thing. I think they had the problems that any organization has: over-scheduling the candidate, under-scheduling him; getting him maximum exposure; getting the type of events that would get good copy in the national media or whatever; getting the exposure for

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television early enough on the West Coast so that it could be shown in the evening; what kind of events would lend themselves to a visual type of thing; how about the stories. So those kinds of things lend themselves to a disarray. Personalities that were brought into the campaign, some didn't work out; some did. It didn't function, maybe, as a smooth team, but I don't think that's unique to this effort. I think it's unique to almost any endeavor.

GREENE: What were some of those conflicts among personalities?

BARRY: Well, basically it would be the different interests of the individual involved. Jerry Bruno's interest was to expose his candidate constantly, forever, to as many people as possible, and he did a masterful job. My interest, for instance, would be to protect the candidate a little bit. So those two things would be a conflict of application but not of personality. A personality conflict would be Dick Tuck and Jerry Bruno. Jerry Bruno didn't think that Dick Tuck was adding anything to the campaign; that he was just an extra seat on the press bus; that he didn't have a function that was defined, that was adding anything to the overall goal, which would be winning the election. Fred Dutton thought that Tuck was performing a morale service to the press. And actually, that was a definite conflict between Dutton and Bruno about Tuck. Then, of course, there were certain conflicts in scheduling and in organization that I don't know about. I just heard about it.

GREENE: What about the conflict like between Tuck and Bruno; how is that resolved?

BARRY: Well, it really wasn't. It was still current. Bruno threatened to quit the campaign on one occasion if Tuck stayed, not seriously. It was in the heat of a moment, and I'm sure he would never have quit the campaign. I mean that just dramatizes how.... And Jerry, of course, was tremendously overworked, twenty hours a day. I'm sure his nerves were frayed, but that was the extent of the conflict with Dutton. Dutton insisted that Tuck stay, and I thought rightfully so. I thought Tuck added a lot to the kind of fun atmosphere that the press bus had, and I think it was a serious contribution.

GREENE: How did Robert Kennedy get involved in this type of conflict?

BARRY: Not at all. Not at all. I would never let him hear that. And I advised everyone else not to bring that kind of stuff to him. He just didn't have time for it, and it upset him. That would upset him.

GREENE: What about the rumored conflict between the young Senate staff and the older '60 people?

BARRY: I can understand how there would be a conflict. I didn't see it. I don't think anybody really saw it. They traveled with us. I think you mean Jeff Greenfield and Adam Walinsky would epitomize

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the young speechwriters. Well, they traveled with us, and I think they did an excellent job, very bright, brilliant, not always tolerant, a little abrasive on occasions, but they worked awfully hard too. I think they felt they weren't appreciated for the amount of sacrifice they were making and the contribution they were making. Then, of course, the old guard -- is that what you mean, the old guard? Who would you mean?

GREENE: The people that worked with President Kennedy, primarily in the 1960 campaign?

BARRY: You mean Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen] and Kenny O'Donnell and those people?

GREENE: O'Brien [Lawrence F. O'Brien.]

BARRY: Well, I don't know of any real conflict that I could... I could understand that there might be a conflict, but I didn't see it, and I don't really have any basic knowledge of it.

GREENE: On the debate question in Oregon?

BARRY: I didn't know about that. I was asked for my opinion, and I felt that the Senator shouldn't debate him.

GREENE: Why was that?

BARRY: I didn't know what purpose it would serve. Either he was going to win in Oregon or he wasn't. The crowds in the last week were picking up a little bit, and I think their attitude had changed. I didn't really think, and I don't think anyone else did, that McCarthy was going to win in Oregon. So the purpose would be not to win an election but just to debate him, at least in my opinion. McCarthy hadn't really campaigned that vigorously in Oregon. Of course, what I didn't take into consideration is that

they were tremendously better organized than we were and that that gun control issue was more important than I realized. So I felt that he shouldn't debate. And he asked Larry O'Brien. Dutton was against the debate and O'Brien was. It seemed as though all of those people were against the debate whereas Walinsky and Edelman [Peter B. Edelman], and Greenfield were for the debate. They wanted him to debate. As I remembered it, we had campaigned that day and came in and the decision had been made, and the Senator was ready to retire, take a nap before the evening event, try to rest up a little bit. And they insisted on opening this matter again. He told them that he had already decided that, and that he didn't want to discuss it unless they had something new. I think vanden Heuvel [William vanden Heuvel] favored the debate too. They continued the discussion in the hall -- and it started to get loud -- and actually, I think, told a couple of jokes and started to laugh. And he came out in the hall and said, "I would think you'd have something better to do. If this is all you're adding to the campaign, go out and ring doorbells and lick envelopes or go back to New York." So they were rather hurt, and I think there were some threats

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of quitting later -- not to him; they took it and left. They were out of line obviously. They shouldn't have been making noise outside his room. They should have understood that he was under pressure and needed his rest. But he, of course, was tired or he wouldn't have blown up like he did. It wasn't a major incident, except that it was the only incident, so naturally it's remembered. But it wasn't that serious. It wasn't a question that they were, "I'm going to quit," and then he went to them; he didn't at all. They just decided that they would just have to work a little harder.

GREENE: You say that vanden Heuvel, you think, was in favor of the debate?

BARRY: I think he was. Well, at least he was part of the crowd that was outside the door. I don't really know how he opted for that. It was my impression that he did.

GREENE: Was there any discussion, formal discussion, that you know of about the debate question, or was it just a question of consulting?

BARRY: I didn't think so. I think the Senator consulted. There could have been. As I said, when I wasn't needed in security, I left.

GREENE: How was his mood, in general, from the beginning to the end? Could you give us an idea of how things look from....?

BARRY: I think initially, on the first trip to California and the Western States, he was a little tight, under tension. And I think he was tremendously buoyed by the crowd reception he got. I think by the time we finished that trip, it looked very, very good. And then later on when the President decided not to run for re-election, he

realized he had a very good opportunity to get the nomination and the atmosphere became one of not a quixotic challenge, but one you could actually win. You'd have to work a little harder, and if it took hard work, we'd do it. I think the attitude in Indiana and Nebraska was very bullish. We were going to win bigger in Indiana than we thought and, of course, in Nebraska it was a big victory. And then Oregon was rather a dash of cold water. But I think probably it would have done a lot of good. It kind of changed his image to the people. It made him a little more vulnerable. You can love somebody that's vulnerable, but it's hard, I think, to identify with a machine that does these things and out comes a winner. Well, he wasn't; he was vulnerable. And the attitude in California was just fantastic after the Oregon loss. And I think it would have helped him in the East. But the attitude in Oregon was one of disappointment, that they didn't accept him for what he really was. And I think that the problem with Bob Kennedy was that his public image was so far different from what he was in person. But I think that was his salvation. And I always felt that once people knew him, or were exposed to his thinking, that these myths would be blown away, and they had to love him. There's just no way about it, they had to love him.

GREENE: Where do you think the greatest misunderstanding of his reality as opposed to...

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BARRY: Well, I think it probably existed anywhere you went. But just thinking of my own friends and my own background, I don't think there's anyone that I know that liked Bob Kennedy, except for some FBI agents that admired his Attorney General tenure. And that is a universal thing; FBI agents universally think he's the best Attorney General we ever had. But politically none of them were oriented toward his Vietnam situation, and I wasn't either initially. And then many of his theories on solving the racial tension.... In other words, I'm from a conservative background, although I'm personally not considered conservative. That's the kind of thing I meant -- my own personal knowledge of the way these people thought of him. I knew that they didn't understand him at all. They felt that he was a complete fire-eating liberal. I think that he arrived at his positions because they were the positions that could save the country. And after I traveled with him for two weeks, I realized that he was right about Vietnam and the draft and thing that I didn't agree with initially. I became.... So I felt that if I could be convinced politically -- that's what I meant -- I felt that a lot of my friends.... And if my friends could be convinced, he couldn't lose.

GREENE: When do you think he got the feeling in Oregon that it was not going to be a victory?

BARRY: He knew it. He knew it right away.

GREENE: From the earliest trips in, in the beginning of the campaign?

BARRY: Well, the earliest trip were so -- I don't mean them. They certainly weren't overwhelming, but they had Barrett Prettyman up there and later vanden Heuvel. And he felt they were pretty much under control. I can't remember the exact date. We had been in and out of Oregon a few times and California and then back to Nebraska and then back to California. And there was a *Newsweek* story by someone saying that we were in trouble in Oregon, the Kennedy campaign was in trouble in Oregon. And the Senator asked for some opinions on that, and it was universally agreed that we were in trouble in Oregon. It was the first he knew about it. And he said, "Well, I felt that, but why didn't anybody tell me? Why do I have to read about it or hear about it from a news magazine?" So that's when the response was to get Steve Smith to go in and take a look at it, and Joe Dolan was sent up. But he was rather angry that -- he was depending on people to give him unvarnished estimates. I think frankly that if action had been taken earlier, he could have swung Oregon around because, really, the crowds change their attitude; on any exposure, they change their attitude. In Indiana it was quite apparent that the first swing through was very noncommittal, but by the end, the crowds in almost the same town or the same kind of area were very pro-Kennedy. So if he was exposed to people, they changed, they liked him. So that's what it was with Oregon.

GREENE: Who did he hold accountable in Oregon, primarily?

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BARRY: Gee, I don't think he -- if you mean personally, I don't think he did that. I remember Herb Schmertz who was an advance man in Oregon.... Let's see, I don't remember exactly what the Senator said. I know what it was. I told the Senator that Herb was very upset and that the reason that he was upset was that he felt that he had contributed to the loss and didn't really help the Senator. And he told me to tell Herb that that couldn't be further from the truth, that he can't take the credit for all the victories and not take the responsibility for the losses, that he realized that he lost Oregon and not the people who he sent up there. The organization as a whole might have been improved, but he didn't hold anyone accountable. And I used the Schmertz example as a specific statement he made that he accepted that responsibility.

GREENE: What about Mrs. Green's [Edith Green] organization in Oregon?

BARRY: Well, again I would be traveling so that I didn't have any face-to-face experience with the Green organization except in the fact that we were traveling. I found Mrs. Green to be a delightful woman and a really fine person. And I think she was genuinely upset at the defeat, and I think she made a genuine effort on the behalf of Bob Kennedy. I have no judgment on whether that effort was, in someone else's judgment, what was needed. It was enough for me that in her judgment she was doing everything.

GREENE: You don't remember any discussions among the staff or Senator Kennedy

himself about this?

BARRY: Oh, I think Senator Kennedy liked Mrs. Green; in fact, I know he did. I think that was his attitude -- that she was doing her best. It was up to us to improve what we were doing. The abrasions I think you're talking about are the Easterners coming into Oregon. They're a very conservative state, initially pretty insulated, and beyond that, I really don't know.

GREENE: Did you discuss at all what they might have done to...

BARRY: Yes. I think the problem in Oregon, at least this is what Barrett Prettyman told me, is that they really didn't have enough people there initially. The McCarthy clubs were organized long before the Kennedy clubs. He was in the state much longer than the Kennedy effort was. He had many, many more McCarthy clubs than we had. He had many more organizers there. His campaign staff was four or five times larger than the effort we made. I think that was the criticism; Prettyman and the vanden Heuvel didn't really have enough arms and legs to do the job.

GREENE: Was there any change once Steve Smith came it?

BARRY: Oh yes. There was an influx of people, and there was quite a great effort made and more stops were added; we went more places. Oh yes. Steve organized the thing and got it going.

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GREENE: What was the big problem there? What made it so difficult that they just couldn't pull it through?

BARRY: I think it was a different electorate. I don't think those people voted so much *for* McCarthy as they voted *against* Kennedy. The people who didn't vote for Bobby really voted against his ideals rather than for Gene McCarthy. I think that, for instance, Oregon people weren't voting for McCarthy because of his Vietnam stand. They were voting against Senator Kennedy because of *his* Vietnam stand, which was the same as.... I think if Senator Kennedy had lost in Indiana and Nebraska, he would have won in Oregon because those people weren't choosing between two doves, they were choosing between a dove that stood a chance to win and a dove that couldn't win. That's my own personal opinion, and I'm not an expert on any of this.

GREENE: Were they more issue oriented, do you think?

BARRY: The Oregonians? I think the biggest issue was the gun control, I really do. Senator Kennedy was for the gun control bill, and they were really against it. They're very outdoors people out there.

GREENE: What was McCarthy's position on the gun control?

BARRY: I don't think there was a position. I don't remember that he had a position, if he did.

GREENE: Avoided the question?

BARRY: I don't know. I just don't remember that he took a stand on it.

GREENE: How did Kennedy feel about those conservation trips he took up in the northern part and along the coast in Oregon?

BARRY: Oh, I think he loved them. Whether it was politically smart to spend all that time, I question that myself, but I think he enjoyed them -- up to the logging camp and then out to Astoria and along the seacoast. He really enjoyed those things.

GREENE: What was his explanation for doing it, if there weren't many things to be gained politically?

BARRY: Well, you see, that would be part of the planning of the Oregon campaign, which, of course, is under question. Should he have spent a major part of a day going to a logging camp? Was the attendant publicity in a logging state commensurate with the loss of contact with various people in the population centers? That's a political judgment I couldn't make. I don't know whether it was considered worthwhile or not. I guess when you lose it isn't.

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GREENE: Hindsight. I have a couple things that we didn't go over in the earlier part. Do you know anything about the commission story, the whole controversy with the suggestion of the Vietnam review commission? It came to the surface in the early part of the campaign.

BARRY: No, I don't. I remember it, but I don't recall anything pertinent.

GREENE: Well, let's backtrack a bit to your first trip to California and that whole swing. You had spoken at one point about the interplay with the Senator and his audience. What do you remember most about that, especially during that trip in California, his reaction to the crowd and theirs to him? I'm thinking particularly of the speech that seemed to bring it all to the head, which was the Greek Theater speech.

BARRY: Oh, yes. That was really fantastic. Of course there were a series of frenetic

appearances, one in Stockton in a shopping center. The crowd there was just fantastic. And then Sacramento, in a Mexican community, and then in San Jose, and then we stayed overnight. And then the next day we stopped in Monterey, which was fantastic experience. We stopped in an airport and four levels of that airport were choked with people. You just couldn't see how another person could arrive, about twenty thousand people. It was just an incredible sight. We landed here, and there's a cliff on which the airport is itself, the terminal is located, and that's where all these people were. Just quite a sight, a sunshiny day. We landed from the Pacific, and it was quite a thing. Those crowds were just fantastic. He got better and better as he went along, but he started to have certain jokes with them.

You asked about the Greek Amphitheater. That was preceded by a stop at Olivera Street where the Mexicans had a fiesta going. He talked to them with his fluent Spanish, which only comprised of "Ole" and just a couple of other words. [Laughter] I forgot what the other words were, but they loved anything he said in Spanish. We left Olivera Street, with ripped jackets, fighting our way through just incredible enthusiasm, and drove to the Greek Amphitheater. There were about five thousand people *outside* the Greek Amphitheater. We couldn't get the cars as near as I wanted to. We fought through that crowd, got through the door, and he got up and he talked in the most incredibly beautiful surroundings that we saw. It was about 5 of 6 o'clock at night and they had a lot of flowers there, not honeysuckle but some kind of a flower that abounds in a vine in California.

GREENE: Bougainvillea?

BARRY: Yes. And gee, the scent of that was fantastic. And all these people were spread out in ascending rows all away from us in these California clothes, no jackets. Coming from the East, it was quite a sight. He made a terrific speech there and got his jokes across

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about Teddy [Edward M. Kennedy] and his buttons. You asked about interplay though. Do you mean verbal interplay?

GREENE: No. What was his response to the crowds? Did he really love this kind of enthusiasm?

BARRY: Well, he loved the enthusiasm, but what followed he didn't. He didn't love physical contact as far as people grabbing him and touching him. I think that was really a thing he had to force himself to do, to shake hands and... He loved the people, but he didn't like people ripping his shirt, and I don't know who would. And the press of excited people is something that you have to experience before you can understand it. At first, until you get used to it, it actually frightens you because you don't know whether you're going to come out of this. And then you find that you do come out of it. But the Greek Amphitheater had a fence outside -- oh, I guess, about twenty feet high -- and



it went right across the Greek Amphitheater, and they had fifteen-foot doors that swung in. And we headed for those doors, this crowd just.... Everyone funneled towards the doors, and people were getting crushed, we were getting crushed, and I didn't know whether we'd.... The outside crowd of five thousand was trying to get in to see the Senator, the inside crowd wanted to see him, and they were all pressing towards these gates. We somehow popped through there and got up on the car. I really couldn't tell you how we got out of there. I actually phoned for some police when I saw what was going to happen. The traffic was at a standstill. I didn't know.... But we did; we got out of there. It was just incredible, but it was frightening too that the Senator could have been seriously hurt. And this scene was repeated many times through the campaign, but it was the most intense and vivid scene that I remember.

GREENE: What do you remember about the nature of the speech he gave that night? On Vietnam?

BARRY: I don't remember it. I could give almost his...

GREENE: Do you recall any criticism from the press or other people that were along the nature of the speech or the reaction of the crowd?

BARRY: Well, I think they criticized his initial speeches for being demagogic, that he was trying to arouse these people to an anti-Johnson feeling. Now, many times during his speech, for instance, specifically during his speech, I was concerned on how we were going to get out. So I spent time -- we had Mrs. Lawford [Patricia Kennedy Lawford] and Mrs. Smith [Jean Kennedy Smith], his sisters, with us too so they were an added responsibility for me. So I went outside to check to see where our cards were, had they been brought up, were they in an accessible spot so that all of this time.... And I also phoned for the police. This was all part of my responsibility so that many times I didn't hear the speech. And I didn't hear it that night.

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One funny thing. When I was out to check the motorcade, there were five or six flower people prone on the sidewalk listening to the speech. So remembering Olivera Street where we were literally stampeded, I mentioned to them that this would not be a good spot to be when the Senator left the amphitheater because the crowd would become excited and start running toward where he was, and they would be right in the spot. They said, "Well, man, if that's the thing, that's the thing." So I don't know whatever happened to them, but I hope they got up because it was wild.

GREENE: But you don't remember offhand any criticism of this speech or what his reaction, rather, was to the criticism?

BARRY: Well, just the fact that they criticized him in general in that first swing for

demagoguery, and he accepted that as a legitimate criticism, and dropped it.

GREENE: Was there any meeting, that you know, to discuss this?

BARRY: No. I don't think there was a meeting. There could have been a meeting. I don't know. I don't know.

GREENE: Were there any obvious changes at that point that you were aware of?

BARRY: No. You mean in his speech matter?

GREENE: Well, in the organization, the reviewing of speeches or anything like that. Were there any major changes made at that point to try to eliminate the problem?

BARRY: No, I don't think so. From the time I knew him as an Attorney General, he was the one that made his own review on his speeches. He never said anything he didn't want to say. He read every speech before he gave it and crossed out what he didn't like. Now, I think maybe Dutton got involved here a little more than he had heretofore. He might have done some editing. I'm not sure of that, but it's possible.

GREENE: Do you remember any discussion about who wrote that speech, the one at the Greek Theater?

BARRY: No.

[END OF INTERVIEW]