

Pedro A. Sanjuan Oral History Interview – JFK#2, 8/09/1969
Administrative Information

Creator: Pedro A. Sanjuan
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Biographical Note

Pedro A. Sanjuan (1930-2012) was a staff member of the Nationalities Division of the Democratic National Committee and the Assistant Chief of Protocol for the Department of State from 1961 to 1963. This interview focuses on equal employment efforts in the Department of State and issues with diplomats' abuse of diplomatic immunity in Washington D.C., among other topics.

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By PEDRO A. SANJUAN

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
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
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
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April 19, 1971

Pedro A. Sanjuan– JFK #2
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Second Oral History Interview

with

PEDRO A. SANJUAN

August 9, 1969
Washington, D.C.

By Dennis O'Brien

For the John F. Kennedy Library

O'BRIEN: We were briefly touching the last time on the functioning of this sub-Cabinet on civil rights in the Kennedy Administration. I was wondering whether you might go into how that related to what you were doing in the State Department, not only with the African diplomats but also a little later with the desegregation that was, well, going on in the Department.

SANJUAN: The sub-Cabinet group on civil rights I'm a little hazy right now as to the chronology. I'm a little hazy as to who started being the head of it. I believe it was Harris Wofford who had the idea and who won acceptance for it. And each department sent a man or two over to the White House to be the representative of that department at the sub-Cabinet group for civil rights. Occasionally, President Kennedy would sit in on a session. And the results of the meetings were reported to him on a periodic basis -- by that I mean regularly -- by whoever was the chairman of it. I remember that Harris then left (he joined the Peace Corps,) and that for a while Berl Berhnhard took over, and then after that Lee White took over and Lee White became the head of the sub-Cabinet group on civil rights. By far the two most effective heads of it, or at least when it was making most sense, were Harris and Berl.

I had the feeling that after that things got a little bit more political and less motivated. But, anyway, the idea was very good.

Some departments sent people who had no particular mission to -- as you know, some departments weren't particularly concerned with civil rights. Others had people like Adam Yarmolinsky, for example, who represented Defense. Adam was a very aggressive champion of civil rights. Others had people like Adam Yarmolinsky, for example, who represented Defense. Adam was a very aggressive champion of civil rights and had some damn good ideas. He was very blunt and outspoken.

John Macy was one of the most important figures there because he was the head of the Civil Service Commission. John minced no words and appeared to be very much of an action man and sensed, I think, in the Kennedys the support for civil rights that agreed with his disposition to do something about it. Just as much as I think later on when Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] came in and gave Macy a much more exalted position as his top talent scout, as well as being the head of the Civil Service Commission, John, who was much more honored by Johnson, realized that there was less room to freewheel and therefore became less involved in civil rights matters that were meaningful. After all, he was a professional bureaucrat and knew the definition of the freedom for a bureaucrat to do things, which is not much.

State sent two people. I went there more or less because I was making a lot of noise. And then they had a Negro named Fox, Richard Fox, who was supposedly in charge of equal employment at the Department of State. He and I never saw eye to eye together on anything.

They had also some sociologist types from the Equal Employment Commission, the Commission on Equal Employment, whom I took great exception to because they were always trying to produce statistics either to justify their contention that things hadn't ever looked rosier, couldn't have looked better, or to justify their contention that things didn't look very good because equal employment was an insurmountable problem. They always had some excellent excuse for failure.

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Louis Martin was also a member. Louis Martin was very outspoken in these things, and Louis Martin could be very outspoken where he wished. He was a very good politician and knew also when not to be. And that was the composition of the sub-Cabinet group.

What was contemplated in the beginning -- perhaps the most interesting period -- was to do such things as to, for example, give an order to all the commanding officers of all the military bases in the United States, particularly in areas of the South where there was considerable segregation, that unless that particular community accepted all of the servicemen on that base on equal terms and did not deny them access to any place of public or private accommodation that the commanding officer would be ordered to declare that particular town or city off limits to members of the base. Well, that would have been, if indeed it had been done, a tremendous weapon against segregation because many places like Pensacola, Florida, and, other towns that depended entirely on a Naval base or an Army base or an Air Force base would have been faced with the dilemma of starving to death or integrating. And my opinion is that, after raising a hell of a ruckus and complaining and

creating some problems in the U.S. Congress, they would have integrated because nobody wants to starve to death.

And it would have also shown the real power of the President in certain situations -- the power of the President especially vis a vis the Congress. I mean, the President can do tremendous things to Congressmen in their own districts by using his control of the military establishment. And if it comes down to a showdown, the President has the last word there. I think they can deny him legislation, but he can destroy their constituencies. Of course, this is not a game of destruction, but in those days the situation was so incredibly bad and we had advanced so far in time -- it was 1962 and yet we were still living in the nineteenth century -- something drastic was needed.

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Now, as far as I was concerned this group was a very useful forum for me, because they supported anything that I wanted to do with regards to the effort we were making in the Department of State -- basically to push civil rights under the door in the guise of foreign policy. I don't deny the accusations leveled at me by many people in the Department of State that this was not foreign policy, that what I was doing was actually mixing civil rights with foreign policy for the benefit of civil rights, and that I was actually hurting the Department of State. Well, I don't deny any of this except for the latter contention, which I don't think was true -- I don't think I was hurting anything. On the contrary, I was teaching the Department of State a few things that the Department of State needed to know, among other things that the Department of State was not a law and an institution and a society unto itself but belonged to the world and that the world was changing and the Department of State might as well leave the eighteenth century and say good-bye to Metternich and join the twentieth here on this side of the Atlantic and stop worrying about inconsequential things and start worrying about the important things.

I think I had a claim to a fairly indisputable theory, more than theory an indisputable belief that the single most significant issue in the United States, in internal politics in the United States, or in the United States internally, that affected our foreign policy throughout the world, the single most important issue was the question of civil rights. The French image is hampered or enhanced by a number of things. You can say that their wines help their image or that the French mission of "civilizing the world" aids their foreign policy. In other words, that there are certain cultural and commercial interests inside France that push France a certain direction, and you can isolate the most important factor that has shaped their foreign policy over the years or has affected the success of their foreign policy. You can also do this with England or any other country. And I think in the United States it's quite obvious that the one big mark, the bar sinister in the escutcheon of the United States has been civil rights, unfortunately. And I figure that if we fought aggressively against discrimination, we'd make very palpable gains and would suffer very few losses.

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And if we did nothing we would make some terrible mistakes and very few friends. It was difficult for anybody to argue against this line of reasoning in those days, or when they did, it was very difficult for them not to appear foolish.

In any case, as far as the sub-Cabinet group on civil rights was concerned, everything I wanted to do, I used to write in a memorandum ahead of time and direct it to the different members of the sub-Cabinet group in the different departments announcing my next move and then talk it over during the meetings. Finally what I did was to bring the news back to the Department of State and launch it. By the time that anybody had any reason to complain, it was already a policy. It was a policy that had been presented to the President somehow, that had been discussed, and Ted Sorensen knew all about it as well as Fred Dutton. It was very difficult to say that I was doing something on my own, independently. Of course, as far as the Department of State was concerned, I was definitely doing something on my own. There was great consternation there. But they could never really say that I was doing things to the detriment of the Administration. And, of course, that was the real issue. The sub-Cabinet group was very useful in this respect.

That's how I got involved in equal employment first. I heard the statistics that were brought forth at those meetings by the Department of State and contrasted those with my knowledge of what was going on in the Department. I came to the conclusion that a colossal fraud was being perpetrated. The Department, for one reason or another, was presenting a picture to the White House that was not at all in accordance with the facts.

This was in large part due to the Secretary of State -- not because the Secretary of State really was an enemy of civil rights, because you can say a lot of things about Dean Rusk, but he had a very peculiar attitude towards civil rights. One had to realize what he really was. He was a Georgia cracker originally, a Southerner with a disguised Southern accent. He had been raised in a Southern culture, but at the same time he believed in egalitarianism, and he believed that the Negro should have his rights, as many Southerners do, and quite honestly. Of course, his point of view was dated. It was a little bit arcane because what he thought was very courageous on his part was already very

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passee. But one has to be fair in judging people. For the Secretary of State, for Dean Rusk back in Georgia, his attitude was probably quite, quite courageous, quite advanced. And he thought it was quite courageous, quite advanced. And he thought it was quite courageous in 1961. But the thing that hurt in the Department wasn't Dean Rusk's attitude one way or another. What hurt was the fact that Dean Rusk never wanted to mess with administration in the Department of State.

Dean Rusk basically had his great success as Secretary as a result of the fact that he was able to keep the Department and Dean Rusk separate. Congressmen could have the greatest destination for Foreign Service cookie-pushing types and for the Department of State itself -- but they had the greatest admiration for Dean Rusk, who came to many hearings on behalf of the Department and came out smelling like a rose. Rusk did very well, whether consciously or otherwise, in separating the two images, and the administrative problems of the Department of State didn't concern him one bit. As a matter of fact, he had a very distinct

patrician attitude, since he has not been born patrician. No one could have said that of Dean Acheson. He was more of a real patrician, but I gather Dean Acheson used to mix in all Department matters and ran that Department from the top to bottom including specifying the type of soap that had to be used in the men's room or the toilet paper they should use. Dean Rusk never. First, he had very few friends in the Department. He only consorted with a small number of people. Secondly, he didn't care a hoot about administration.

So the administration was handled by the Deputy Under-secretary for Administration. Ball [George W. Ball] also didn't quite care too much about administrative matters because his main war within the Department, of course, was a veiled war with Dean Rusk to see who could witness the other one's neck slit from ear to ear. They were both bucking for -- one for staying on as and the other one for becoming Secretary of State. Administrative matters were very important to me because they had to do with equal employment and civil rights in the Department. These things were left up to the Deputy Undersecretary. In every case this was a man who didn't really have the answer. Then they set up a stooge there, a sort of white man's Negro, to be polite, named Fox, who was a GS-15. Because of Carl Rowan's departure from the Department, Fox had been left as the top-ranking

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Negro! His main problem was, "How do I stay the top ranking Negro? I don't want any other black man to outrank me, no other Negro to become top man." Fox had quite a problem. He solved it by creating statistics of doom. He would say that there weren't enough qualified Negroes to draw from, and consequently you couldn't get any black people in the Department. Well, this was complete and utter nonsense. There were obviously not enough qualified Negroes in the United States then nor are there now to fill all the professional positions that should be available to them on the basis of equality, but to say that there weren't enough qualified Negroes to even be able to get us one Assistant Secretary or one Deputy Assistant Secretary was foolishness.

Richard Fox had an agreement with all the Negro colleges of the South, which is where he did most of his recruiting. Fox was a very cagey, a "foxy" fellow, because he knew that if he went to northern colleges and got his Negro recruits there, they could pass the Foreign Service exam because they were bright fellows and had a good education. Instead, he got the Ford Foundation, I think, to give a grant, to the Department, a very ill-advised grant, to get all the people from all the Southern colleges to be trained so that they could pass the Foreign Service entrance exam. In other words, the Negro would already get started in the Foreign Service as a pariah -- as a charity case. It would appear that he was too stupid to pass, and instead of treating him like an equal, like anybody else -- who would be told, "you can't pass, you flunked" -- because he was Negro and because he was decreed to be stupid or ignorant or something inferior, he had to be helped. Well, that was very bad psychologically.

Fox actually publicized statistics of doom. He got two hundred black students to take the test and only one passed. Fox used to give this stuff to the papers. It got me so goddamn furious because the last thing in the world we needed at that time was any information -- particularly such devious statistics of such doubtful value -- to prove that the Negro was inferior and indeed didn't belong with the rest of us. And Mr. Fox, a black man, made these

statements. I used to challenge him. That used to make Mr. Fox very mad. Of course, the madder he got, the happier I was. I used to really harass him.

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There was a chap named Sawyer in the sub-Cabinet group from Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, who used to defend Mr. Fox. Those boys were also concerned with creating statistics of doom because the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or Committee wasn't doing a damn thing about equal employment. They weren't really succeeding: They had to say why they weren't succeeding, so they used to create some form of apology for themselves. The apology didn't hurt them. It helped them because it perpetuated their roles as middlemen, but it hurt the Negroes, you see, and I would challenge them.

If it hadn't been for the assassination, that fellow Fox would have bit the dust. What happened was that I finally got fed up. I tried to see Ralph Dungan. I knew Ralph from the campaign and Ralph was always very friendly at social events, but it was almost impossible to crash through that almost impregnable Siegfried line that he had in the White House of secretaries and assistants to get an appointment with him. I called up one day to get an appointment with Ralph Dungan to talk to him about the Department of State being a white man's club, and I was told that Mr. Dungan could see me a month and a week later, five weeks later. They gave me a date in the middle of the next month. I said, "Well, you can tell Mr. Dungan that at that rate, by then we may all be dead, so I'm not interested."

And then I saw Averell Harriman about this equal employment issue. I knew Averell from way back in '56. I had a very unsuccessful session with Harriman. He didn't have his hearing aid on that day or something happened, and everything I said, he misunderstood. I don't know what he thought, I wasn't going to quarrel with Averell.

And then finally I said, you know, "This is foolish. You've got the power and you don't want to use it because of some compunction about proper channels. Send a memo to Bobby Kennedy. Send him a memo right now." So I wrote a very direct memorandum, and I said in it that there was Uncle Tom in the Department of State and that we were short on blacks because of him, and I said, "Mr. Kennedy, I don't think at this time the Administration can afford more criticism concerning insincere efforts to bring about equal employment. Don't forget that you just had pickets outside

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the Department of Justice a week ago saying that you weren't doing very well there and you *are* trying." I sent the memo. The memo got to Bobby and he read it and he got furious -- not of me. And he made a copy of it, put a memo of his own on top of it and sent it to Dean Rusk demanding action. Here was this memorandum from one of the people in the Department of State under Dean Rusk, sitting on Dean Rusk's desk with a covering memo from Bobby that said, "Do something about this." Well, I would have thought maybe that Bobby -- I would have hoped Bobby would have called up and said, "Do something about this." Well, I would have thought maybe that Bobby -- I would have hoped Bobby would have called up and said,

“What do you want me to do,” rather than take such radical action. But anyway, I knew Bobby well enough and I guess I should have realized what was going to happen. It caught me by surprise, though, I must say.

The first thing that happened is that I got a call from Ralph Dungan’s office, and Mr. Dungan wanted to see me that afternoon, so could I possibly come? That was most amazing. I got the appointment very fast. And there in Dungan’s office it wasn’t a question of what’s all this about; it was a question of what can we do about it. Well, I needed that starting signal, “Well, this is what you can do about it.” We had a meeting next with Averell Harriman (Averell had his hearing aid on this time, tuned up to the highest frequency) and Mr. Fox was there.

Fox was quite belligerent, and he said that there weren’t any qualified Negroes.

Now, as I told you before, there had been a question of how to get Negroes into State dinners in the Department of State. In the early Kennedy days they used to invite the same people over and over again: Andy Hatcher and George Weaver and Bob Weaver and Andy Hatcher and Bob Weaver and George Weaver and Andy Hatcher.... I was put in charge of developing a huge list of Negroes throughout the country who could be invited in large numbers, ten or fifteen or eight or seven, something like that, to these State dinners. And I had over a period of months developed about six or seven hundred names: college presidents, professors, lawyers, whatever. I carried this thing with me as the atomic bomb. I remember it was a very black, very large case with four by five cards -- no, what are the big size cards? Ten by eleven, ten by twelve.

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O’BRIEN: Eight by ten?

SANJUAN: Eight by ten? Yes. It was a large -- it was this size. And I carried it up there.

Mr. Fox made the statement that there weren’t enough qualified Negroes. I said, “Well, don’t you have some lists of Negroes throughout the country, and can’t you get some people interested in coming to the Department of State and taking a job here if they’re qualified?” He says, “I don’t have any lists.” And I remember Averell Harriman sat on the couch and I sat on a chair and there was sort of a coffee table, a large coffee table, between us. There was Fox on the other end, and I just simply took this file and I pitched it to Fox. I flung it up in the air and I said, “Here, catch.” He caught it, and I said, “There are five hundred names for you to start with. Work on those.” Well, Harriman, who was hearing then, said, “Yes, yes. Why don’t you start on those? Go ahead.” And Fox could do nothing except say, “Yes, sir.”

And then that evening Mr. Fox came and visited me and told me that he knew that I had sent a memorandum to the Attorney General saying that he was an Uncle Tom. I said that I had sent a memorandum to the Attorney General saying whatever I chose to say and that I didn’t have to tell him what was in the memorandum, but if he wanted to know whether I thought he was an Uncle Tom, I said that was a very simple question that I could answer immediately: yes, I did think he was an Uncle Tom, a hanky-head and everything else, and if he didn’t want to be called that he could start doing something about it and I would back him

a hundred percent, but that so far my experience with him had been very bad. Well, we had a number of interesting exchanges!

The question was how to get Negroes into the Department of State in areas where Negroes were never permitted to go before. The Bureau of African Affairs was no problem. In the first place, Soapy Williams was looking for Negroes, and in the second place, any Negro that got a job in the Department of State was sent to the Bureau of African Affairs, the contention being that Negroes belong there. After all, they were Africans originally, they were blacks originally, so they were going to be in African Affairs! There was a counter theory, however, that if you sent a

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black to Africa, the Africans wouldn't like it, which was a lot of baloney. The Africans didn't care whom you sent to Africa, black, white or purple. And, indeed, neither did most Europeans care whom you sent to Europe, black, white or purple. There wasn't any issue like that except in the apartheid countries, including ours. But most of the professional Negroes in the Department of State went to the Bureau of African Affairs. We had always had an all black motor pool, though. In other areas, like the Bureau of European Affairs, well, in the first place, there were very few Jews in the Bureau of European Affairs. They've had a problem bringing in any ethnic types except for Anglo-Saxon or Germanic types in the Bureau of European Affairs. Negroes, zero.

There was a fellow who came to the Department of State who had been with the Ford Foundation in North Africa, spoke very good French, was very well trained, very bright guy, had been to Yale. His name was Ulrie Haynes. I thought he was just a dandy for the Bureau of European Affairs and I would have put him there as a Desk Officer. But, no, he went to the Bureau of African Affairs, and I must say not without the full approval of Mr. Haynes, who left me pretty crestfallen because I thought he would have fought with me to put him in the right place. He wanted to succeed in the Foreign Service, so he went where he was told.

The other area that was pretty bad, was the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. It so happened that my father-in-law, Ed Martin, was Assistant Secretary at the time, and I thought that here was a chance to break this barrier. The Bureau of Inter-American affairs was not only lily white but it was lily Anglo-Saxon white almost. Fox one day told me that Fred Dutton, who was then congressional liaison, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Affairs in the Department of State, a bureau that is known by the interesting initial "H" -- I don't know what "H" can possibly have to do with congressional affairs; I suppose maybe it's for Hill or something like that. Mr. Fox told me that Mr. Dutton hated Negroes. I had a hard time understanding that because when he was in the White House Fred Dutton had been one of my strongest supporters and Fred Dutton had hired a Deputy Assistant Secretary who was Negro and Fred Dutton was a great civil libertarian. That was the stupidest thing

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I'd ever heard, in fact, I told him so. I said, "I think you're nuts. This is ridiculous."

And then I said, "Well, who else is bad?" And he said, "Well, Inter-American Affairs. Ed Martin hates Negroes." I said, "Is that so?" I said, "Well, that could be." I wasn't aware of that, but you never know. "I'll tell you what, I'll go talk to Ed, and I'll find out why. Are there any openings there?" He said, "Yes, I think there is an opening, but you'll never get that for a Negro. Nobody'll ever get it." I said, "I'll go talk to Ed." Fox said, "I've already talked to him, and he said no." I said, "Well, I'll talk to him." "No, no, you better not. I don't want you to go." I said, "Well, look, he's my father-in-law, and I'll talk to him whenever I want to, wherever I wish, in the garage, in the kitchen, in the house, in his office, anywhere. And I'll tell you what happened afterwards. I don't care whether you want me to talk to him or not."

I did get an official appointment to see Ed Martin. I told the secretary to tell him that Pedro A. Sanjuan, the Director of the Office of Special Representational Services, wanted to see him, not as his son-in-law, not in that capacity. And he gave me an appointment the next day.

I brought in a series of possible candidates for the job of Deputy Assistant Secretary, and I said, "Ed, Mr. Fox tells me you don't like Negroes and you are refusing to allow them to come in." And he said, "I don't know who Mr. Fox is." I said, "Well, you've got to. You've seen him." He said, "I have not." And after awhile it was quite clear he had never seen Mr. Fox. Mr. Fox had never dared to see the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, or for that matter any other Assistant Secretary of State. Fox dealt with what are called the executive directors, that's the administrative directors of each bureau. Of course, they're the wrong people to see. They have no authority, no power. And they don't want Negroes anywhere; that was quite true. I said to Ed, "Well, do you have any objection to getting a Negro here as Deputy Secretary?" He said, "No." I said, "Okay, in that case, I'll try to get you an additional number of names." I went back to Mr. Fox and I challenged him, and it turned out that he had never really seen Ed Martin, this Fox himself admitted.

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All these things led us to decide that we were going to get rid of this fellow and put somebody else in. By us I mean Fred Dutton, Harriman and I. But then the assassination took care of that pretty well. Equal employment in State went by the board. I don't think to date the Department of State has had an equal employment program that is really worth its salt, and I don't think they will for a long time. I think they'll maintain the situation as it is, even after the rest of the government has fallen in line.

O'BRIEN: What was Bobby's role in all this? Did you have contacts with him regarding the sub-Cabinet?

SANJUAN: Oh, yes, I saw him in the equal employment thing.

O'BRIEN: Yes. In the equal employment thing in State.

SANJUAN: Oh, yes. I saw him about four or five times after the memorandum and told

him what was going on and what we were doing and so forth. He pretty well had determined that we were going to have a strong civil rights or equal employment program in the Department of State. I said, you know, "It makes no sense to have me making all this noise about equal accommodations and about diplomats and foreign policy and civil rights and the whole thing, involving the Department in such a way; whereas, on the other hand, you've got this lily white organization here that doesn't take in any Negroes. You've got to do something about it." And he agreed. This got to a climax almost around November 10th, 1963, and after the 22nd there was no possibility of doing anything about it. About twice a month I would go to see Bobby to tell him what the progress was.

What we did was to coordinate with his office. I used to talk to Seigenthaler [John Seigenthaler] at first and then always to somebody in his office so what we were doing would not conflict with what Justice was doing in civil rights.

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We needed to have the cooperation, in some cases, of the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], and Bobby made sure that we did. But I must say that in some cases the FBI did a fantastic job, you know. I don't know whether J. Edgar [J. Edgar Hoover] was in on it or who was in on it, but as far as getting people out of jails, foreign diplomats -- in a few cases we had diplomats in jail -- and preventing a situation from really becoming impossible and quickly sanitizing things and so on, they did a very good job. When they wanted to, they did an excellent job. In each case that I was involved in, they did a very good job. We had no problems with getting assistance quickly from the FBI.

I used to see Robert Kennedy about twice a month, when the situation in State for me got impossible. There was some group or somebody who was trying to see what they could do to circumscribe my operation. I would be about to lose my staff or we would be told we were to be moved to the Annex, for example. During that period of two and a half years, I was threatened something like ten times with a complete move. My office was on the first floor facing C Street, a very central location because one came in through the diplomatic entrance and right away one could get to my office, after passing another office. And it was very convenient to have that because we were a trouble office and the sooner you could get to us the better. The project was to move us to the seventh floor behind the map room somewhere in an area that was totally undesirable or maybe in the Annex someplace. And then, after that, when I got into safer political areas in the Department, nobody ever tried to do that to me again.

I had a number of people on my staff, and they were always being threatened with transferring or with some problem or other so that they couldn't stay with me and then I could find no substitute. These harassments also involved wanting to send me away on trips, to advance trips for the President in Latin America, which was none of my business. They had fifty thousand people who spoke Spanish. Why take me? The idea of being that if the head was removed the rest of the tape worm would die. And then, well, I came in at a certain level, at a certain salary. It was not

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the level I might have bargained for if I'd been clever, but I didn't, I came into the Department because the Attorney General told me, or Bobby, who wasn't Attorney General then, told me to come in. When I realized I needed a promotion, the answer was no. And so I had to go to him.

Every two or three months I would go to Bobby with a problem or two, and he would pick up the phone and solve it. When things got very difficult, and I saw, for example, that they were taking my program out of the budget and they were not going to budget it for the next year, I called him and he straightened it out with one call. Simply he'd call Dean Rusk and say, "Dean...." And I must say that in each one of those cases Dean Rusk didn't know what was going on, and he found out that this was being done, and he straightened it out. I have no reason to believe that he was behind any of the efforts to castrate my shop. The Department of State was not that well controlled from above, and also moves like that could be made on many levels.

O'BRIEN: Well, in regard to some of these issues, like housing and the barber shops in Washington D.C., particularly the housing problem, you started with the diplomats and the relations you have with the people in the sub-Cabinet. Are these people, in a sense, looking at the diplomats as the opening wedge to....

SANJUAN: Yes. In some respects that was true. For example, Yarmolinsky. The housing thing for the sub-Cabinet group was brought up for air fairly frequently with my problems, I think. Maybe I'm biased. I'm looking at it from an egocentric point of view, but I think that all I did was to say, "It's a really lousy situation in Washington. For example, we know that there is no apartment building anywhere in the Northwest where you can come in if you're a Negro. I can tell you this because I've been looking in every apartment building to get African diplomats in and I can't get them in. And they're certainly not biased against diplomats; they're biased against blacks, you see." Yarmolinsky was very keen on following good ideas and had many of them himself. He had the added advantage that he was not particularly zealous about their being his own; he'd follow anybody's good idea. Adam got the Department of Defense to issue -- got McNamara to

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to approve the issue of regulations concerning the fact that no billeting could be approved around the Department of Defense if it was segregated. By George, that did a hell of a lot to get that part of Virginia sort of semi-integrated.

What we wanted to do was to do the same thing with the Department of State, but we had a real problem with Department of State officials renting their houses on a segregated basis, and what I wanted to do was to have Dean Rusk say, "You cannot rent your house on a segregated basis."

At one point I said to this guy Frank Luchs I told you about, who was chairman of the Real Estate Board, that he wasn't doing enough and after one of these meetings, which was quite tempestuous, Luchs immediately beat me to the draw by calling a press conference and

lying about what had happened at the meeting; that it was a very productive meeting and that the Department of State was very happy with what was going on. Well, he was no spokesman.

And I sort of laughed. I said, "If you think you can do that and that's going to get you what you want, you've got another thought coming, pal." So I called another press conference, and I said, "The truth of the matter is that the Department of State is very unsatisfied with what is going on and doesn't think that the realtors in Washington are doing anything significant. And we're coming to the point where we're beginning to believe that they're using this association within the Department of State to protect themselves rather than to do anything meaningful."

Well, this made Luchs furious, and in his anger he started flailing about to see what he could do to hurt either me or somebody in the Department. So he said, "Who in the Department of State can talk about this when they all live in segregated houses? They all live in the segregated part of Washington. They live on Foxhall Road. The Chief of Protocol lives on Foxhall Road. The Secretary of State lives in Spring Valley. And this fellow, Sanjuan himself lives on Foxhall Road." I lived in a rented house on the other side of the tracks of Foxhall Road, you know, the little houses there, that I got from Roger Tubby. Roger Tubby used to live there, and he rented it out to us. He had gone to Switzerland.

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It was a bit of a challenge, and I gave a press conference the next day. I said, "In the first place, I want to make something very clear" -- not to paraphrase Mr. Nixon but -- "I want to make something perfectly clear, and that is that I'm renting this house, I'm not buying here, and therefore I haven't signed any covenant that may go with this house. I don't know if there is any racial covenant. As far as I'm concerned this house could be rented to a Negro, but perhaps Mr. Luchs is right: nowhere in Northwest Washington can Negroes really live in the desirable residential areas. And I would put it to Mr. Luchs that we don't solve these problems by all of us going to live in Northeast. We can solve these problems by bringing Negroes into the Northwest. So my living here makes no difference. However, I'll challenge Mr. Luchs. I will challenge him to find me a decent, desirable, well-located house in any residential area in the Northwest, close within the range of the Department of State -- that is not in an area that is fully covenanted and therefore restricted." Well, you know, then the weapon was in my hands. Anything that Luchs turned up I could say, "This isn't suitable" and leave him there. And then I moved. I challenged him, and I moved to Maryland to a little place.

But the point was that at that time, my God, the Secretary of State did get very nervous because not only did he live in Spring Valley, but he had bought a house and he had signed a covenant. I mean, he hadn't signed one of those covenant that said, "You will not sell to Negroes, Semites, Jews, Arabs," and so on, which is one of the most redundant things in the world. If you read one of those covenants; they have everybody defined five different ways. But he had signed one of those agreements that said, "I agree to sell my house to W.C. & A.N. Miller," which were the developers of that area. And, of course, W.C. & A.N. Miller didn't sell it to anybody who was Negro, and everybody knowst hat, so he, in a sense, Rusk

had signed something like an agreement to keep the area lily white. And that bothered him. And it also bothered Angie Duke a little because he lived on Foxhall Road on the right side of the tracks. I was told by both Mrs. Rusk and by Duke, "You're putting us in a difficult situation." My desire was to say, "Well, make the best of it. This is what it's all about," you know.

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But at that time I began to notice that I was beginning to upset the apple cart a little too frequently. But as long as Bobby was behind me there was no problem. I think I could have gone up and I could have even thrown rocks at the Secretary of State and I would have been okay, had I done it for the right reasons. That was a very good thing; it was the feeling of support that made me successful if I was at all successful.

O'BRIEN: You also got into it with Fulbright [J. William Fulbright] and Senator Morse [Wayne Morse] over, I believe it was, Fulbright's attempt to get some kind of law which would...

SANJUAN: Well, yes, this was a little bit different. I'll tell you what that was about. I'll go into it very briefly because I don't think it's terribly interesting for you.

Basically, the diplomats are pretty bad neighbors. There's no question about that. All diplomats are bad neighbors, you know: the British, the French, the Italians, the Libyans, the Nigerians, they're all diplomats. Diplomats usually are people who take advantage of their immunity to put their cars in the middle of the street and to put their garbage in the wrong place and to give wild parties to the wee hours, and they are fairly obnoxious. And there were many, many new diplomats coming into Washington, in the early 60's. The situation was getting to the point where residential areas were being taken over by chanceries. You couldn't really get your car through certain streets in the middle of the day because diplomats were blocking streets illegally; abandoning their cars right in the middle of the street. Senator Morse was very upset about that because Morse has always been an advocate of seeing that the District develops properly. [Interruption]

O'BRIEN: Okay, we were on the Morse and...

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SANJUAN: Yes, anyway, that's the background. Now, in some residential areas, or most white residential areas, they didn't want to see black faces, you see. That was mixed in with it, but it was a very mixed issue because, on the one hand, people didn't want Negroes around or blacks of any sort; on the other hand, one knew damn well that there were some very legitimate complaints about diplomats in general. Many of the complaints were directed against European diplomats. It was very difficult to make a real racial issue out of it.

Fulbright lived on Belmont Road. His real quarrel with diplomats was with the French Embassy, which was next door to him. The French had been for many years threatening to do something like put up a new chancery there that was going to go three stories underground and four stories above. Of course, such a tremendous office building didn't belong in a residential area. Moreover, the French Ambassador, Herve Alphand, had the habit of parking his car on the Senator's recently seeded lawn, leaving ruts of about five or six inches. It was the stupidest thing to do, and Fulbright had a good point. Nobody near Belmont Road was an African, and I don't think that the problem with Fulbright was Africans. The problem with Fulbright was how to get chanceries out of these very exclusive residential areas; they don't belong there. And so it was with Morse.

Well, I had an understanding with Fulbright that we would draw up a law that would ban chanceries from residential areas reserved for single-family residence occupancy, you see, which means R-1A, R-2B, R-2, and parts of R-3, I think. But below that, R-4, R-5, all these areas would permit chanceries. There was a lot of R-4 and R-5 zoning in Washington in the Northwest, and it would have been very easy to live with that type of restriction.

We had a hearing. I had an understanding with Fulbright that this was going to be the law. But old Morse went off the deep end, as Morse has been wont to do at times, and Morse misunderstood what we were saying. The whole thing had not been cleared to him. The Congressional liaison team in the Department of State had done a bad job of apprising him as to what the testimony was going to be. Morse got into one of these tantrums, and he said that he wanted chanceries thrown out of Washington altogether, why did they have to be in Washington. Of course, that was

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silly. You have to have chanceries in Washington because the practice has always been that the country is going to keep its offices within the Capital of the host country, the receiving country, and otherwise the Russians could put -- you know, just to harass us or to make it difficult -- their chancery in Denver, Colorado. We wanted them and all other diplomats in Washington, D.C.

So basically Morse was completely off, and I had to say, "Senator, you just can't do that because it violates, as you well know, an international understanding." That annoyed him -- that this young punk should be telling him, the senior Senator from Oregon, about an international understanding which he obviously didn't seem to remember. I tried to be as polite as I could with Morse because I thought Morse was going to be on my side. He was a liberal. But he went off the deep end at another point and said that I was a tiger out of leash and a petty dictator and he wanted the Secretary of State to put me in a dark room with a sheaf of papers to cut out paper dolls.

Well, that got me mad damn it. It was uncalled for. As I went out of the hearing room a reporter got hold of me and said, "What do you think of Senator Morse?" I said, "Well, I was very surprised to see that Senator Morse was so upset about having blacks in his neighborhood." Frankly, it was a blow below the belt, but I thought if there's one thing that Morse would have a hard time dealing with, it was any admission of racial prejudice on his part. And I said, "It's strange that Senator Morse feels that way while Senator Fulbright's

willing to accept diplomats in his neighborhood. Senator Fulbright comes from Arkansas, and Senator Morse comes from Oregon. I don't understand; it seems to be a real reversal of roles."

Well, I got back to State, and Fred Dutton said, "Don't pick that type of a fight because you haven't got a chance of a snowball in hell of winning it." And I said, "Well, what do you want me to do?" He says, "Just lay low for a while and do nothing because if you start picking a fight with Morse, he'll beat you." I said, "How's he going to do that?" Well, he'll say, "Until Sanjuan's thrown out of the Department of State, I will not vote for any legislation that the Department wants." I said, "Oh, I see. Well, in that case, if he's going to make it that much of a

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point, I'll just drop it." And I disappeared.

Then, there was an OAS [Organization of American States] dance or something, a banquet, a week later. We were invited to go. I sat at my father-in-law's table, and there was Morse. I looked at Morse and I thought he was going to eat me alive. I said, "Senator, I'm very sorry about the other day." He said, "Oh, you did a fine job, a fine job. I was very proud of you, young man." And I said, "Well, you said I should be put in a dark room with a sheaf of papers...." He said, "Well, I say things like that very frequently. Don't let it bother you. No hard feelings?" I said, "Well, certainly not. I'm delighted. Thank you very much."

I think frankly he'd forgotten all about it, he didn't remember who I was or what happened. But that was the Morse thing. So, you see, it had nothing to do with.... It was a mixed issue, a very confused issue, and it had really nothing that you could really directly attribute to the question of racial prejudice.

O'BRIEN: But at the same time you were shifted around the State Department about that time?

SANJUAN: No.

O'BRIEN: Weren't you? Didn't you become, the old Office of Protocol go and...

SANJUAN: No, no, no. At that time -- I don't know whether it was at that time or not -- there was a rumor that was spread by an article in "Periscope" in *Newsweek* that I was being demoted and sent to Timbuktu or something because of this fight, and then an article came out again in "Periscope" a little while later saying that I was being promoted. The truth of the matter was neither. I was neither demoted or promoted. Nothing happened to me.

I don't know, maybe it coincides with my becoming the Director of the Office for Special Representational Services. That was a small gain for me. All of Protocol was divided in half, and I was given one half of it. But I don't think it had anything to do with Morse. It had to do with something else that had been going on internally, that we just couldn't function anymore the way we had been before

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because things were terrible within the Office of Protocol at that time. I was charged with half of the Office of Protocol basically. I mean, all those things that had to do with trouble and blacks: with the types of, you know, visas that maids were given; and with questions of trouble with police; and a whole bunch of things like that too numerous to mention; the consular problems, relations with consulates in the United States; questions of security involving embassies; and certain other matters that are classified information that I think I'd still be wrong to mention here. And I had charge of all that mess. But basically there was no possibility of getting along with the Chief of Protocol because he was always too busy figuring out whose table cloth had to be green and who was going to be on what receiving line and I don't know what else, or on a trip with the President or something like that, it was decided the best thing was to do was to chop the office in half and give me responsibility for one half of it and put it directly under the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Administration.

Well, I was promoted at that time. I think I got -- I became an FSR-2 then, from a GS-15 or something like that that I had been before. Consequently, I gained a promotion, but it had nothing to do with Morse to my knowledge.

O'BRIEN: You got involved in this traffic ticket problem, the parking problem of diplomats, too. I think you got some of the diplomatic corps a bit upset at you.

SANJUAN: Oh, terribly upset. I had the theory that this was the twentieth century and not the eighteenth, that diplomats had absolutely no right to go around pretending that they needed to violate all the laws in the United States just because they were diplomats, and neither did our diplomats overseas have the right to do that. The thing got to be, and still is probably, a real problem. But anyway, the proportions were pretty epic proportions.

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For example, there were five thousand diplomats, all told, in Washington at the time, and the average debt, outstanding debt unpaid and uncollectable, at any one time involving the diplomatic corps was close to \$800,000. Involved were Sears and Roebuck, Woodward & Lothrop, all the big stores. The gimmick usually was as follows: certain members of the diplomatic corps, when they learned they were going to be transferred, just before being transferred, would run up a colossal bill where they had a charge account, like Sears or Hechinger's or Woodward & Lothrop or Hecth's or some other large store, and then they would leave Washington. They'd take all their loot with them and not pay. There was nothing you could do about it. You see, the embassy could not be sued. They couldn't be hurt. And prestigious diplomats were gone.

They used to rent apartments, and absolutely destroy them, just leave them completely ruined. You know, wreck the walls and wreck the furnace, wreck the kitchen, in some cases urinate on the furniture. It was one of the most fantastic abuses in the world.

Therefore, it became very difficult for diplomats in general, and even harder for Africans, to get apartments, not only because of the color question but because diplomats were just plain bad tenants. You couldn't sue them. You couldn't take them to court. They had immunity, you see.

To solve the situation like that, you redefine diplomatic immunity. You say, "Diplomatic immunity does not apply to any civil suits in which there is a legitimate case against a diplomat in our.... We won't demand such immunity for our people, and we won't recognize such immunity for theirs here in Washington."

As far as diplomatic traffic tickets were concerned, the diplomats were in the habit of just, as I said before, leaving their cars usually wherever they chose, in the middle of the street.... Particularly during times when there were receptions, Connecticut Avenue used to be just full of long, black, DPL, Cadillac limousines that were parked right in the middle of the street. They would sometimes leave the doors open in the summer. You couldn't get through Connecticut Avenue towards Dupont Circle, past the Indonesian Embassy, for example, to save your life. Well, now there was no excuse for it. In many cases the violations were

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committed by the chauffeurs of the diplomats, of the ambassadors, who are Americans. But they were covered by the embassy, who tore up all the tickets.

I finally devised a scheme whereby, without violating diplomatic immunity, you could prevent this. And what you did was say that you were given a ticket; a ticket was put on a diplomat's car, which is basically like issuing a summons. Of course the diplomat could pay voluntarily whatever the ticket required as a fine, just send it in voluntarily. If the diplomat did this voluntarily and without there being coercion on the part of the U.S. government, why we would check that thing off and not consider that there had been any delinquencies. However, if the diplomat did not pay these tickets, there was nothing we could do about making, coercing him to pay. That's where the immunity rests. But there was a little question here of diplomatic license plates. We gave out license plates as a privilege to diplomats. We didn't have to give them license plates, and we're not abrogating their immunity in any way by saying, "No license plates." "Now, we're going to take those unpaid tickets, and if we see that there are two or more at the end of the year, we're not going to give you any tags until you voluntarily pay them. Now you don't have to pay them, you don't go to jail, as an American would, but you are not going to get any license plates either, or with the old license plates, we will bring this to the attention of the ambassador. And if you continue to do this, it will be so obvious that you are here apparently to violate the laws of the United States, that we'll be forced to consider you *persona non grata* and send you home, because a diplomat is not here to violate the laws of the United States flagrantly." That's part of the Vienna Convention of the early nineteenth century, and it's part of the reiterated Vienna Convention of 1961 -- whenever that second one was -- and consequently, there was no problem there.

Of course, the Secretary of State had to have some guts, and there's a point at which the Secretary had to say, "Go home." There are very few embassies that wanted to really stir

up things to the point where they would refuse to do something. By the second or third time such violations were brought to their attention, we wouldn't have had any real *persona non grata* problems.

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Well, the diplomatic corps really got furious about this. Betty Beale wrote some articles denouncing me. Yet, we really had won the day, because we stood firm and we said, "There you are." And by George, Morse was behind me, you know. But apparently some diplomats did visit the Secretary and the Secretary backed off. After having agreed to do it my way, he backed off, and he was to get into serious trouble with Senator Morse on this same problem a year or two later. The problem didn't die, and I can bet you dollars to nickels it'll come up again.

The thing that was a very funny sort of side issues here was that in Manila at that time they decided they would crack down on American diplomats, and they did. They zeroed in on some lady, the wife of some Foreign Service officer, and caught her doing something wrong and deprived her of her license. She had gone through three red lights. Normally, they'd have let her just do that. Well why shouldn't they arrest her if she'd gone through three red lights? And they caught another fellow who had been driving without a license for a year, and they told him he couldn't drive any more. And this was brought out as a case of retaliation, something that was going to hurt the United States. The U.S. diplomats in Manila certainly should be driving in accordance with the local regulations and if they don't, they get in trouble.

One young, Foreign Service, cookie-pushing, chap who was going to be stationed in the Congo came up to me very excited. He said, "You know what you've just done to me?" And I said, "No, I have no idea what I've just done to you. What have I done?" You know I'm going to the Congo." I said, "Well, I didn't send you there. You've got the wrong man." He said, "No, no. But you know I'm going to go to the Congo." I said, "Well, I just learned about it. You just told me. Yes. Are you happy or unhappy?" He said, "I'm neither happy nor unhappy, but you've just abrogated diplomatic immunity." I said, "Oh, no, no, no, no. We haven't done anything of the sort. On the contrary, we've unfortunately left it intact." I think you've abrogated diplomatic immunity, and I know what's going to happen to me when we get to the Congo: my wife is going to get raped when I get to the Congo." I said, "Well, my dear fellow, I

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don't think you've got the right man. Your problem is with your wife. If I were you, if you're so sure she's going to get raped, I would just watch out because there's something about your wife there that you've got to watch out for if she's that prone to being raped. But I really don't know how you can connect that with diplomatic immunity and parking tickets. However, I'll think about it. Maybe there is a connection. But I put it to you, in all honesty, that I would check on my wife. There's something there about your wife if she gets raped awfully easily."

I think that the foreign service of every country feels that they have certain privileges and prerogatives -- they call them "privileges and immunities" -- and this makes them a sort of an aristocracy. They're sort of born to the purple, so to speak, and they have a right to do certain things. They have a right to be considered an aristocracy, a nobility, but *noblesse* in those cases does not *oblige*, you know. Strangely enough, they in turn, as a result of all the prestige they've got, go around cheating and stealing and robbing and parking their cars wherever they choose because they are better than everybody else. Well, hell, if you're better than everybody else, you'd better prove it.

This is the twentieth century and all that stuff... That applies to a time when they harassed diplomats to make points in foreign policy. In the eighteenth century the ambassador in a country had to keep up his appearances pretty carefully or, my God, he was cooked. They could even kill him. He had to show that if they touched his head, his country would go to war, so they'd better not touch him, and also, if they touched his head, the other fellow, his counterpart in his country, was going to be put in chains. Well, in today's world, we don't function that way. Most countries have a perfectly decent legal system that can be lived under, except in Yemen, where they lop off your hand -- yet, I really don't think they do that in Yemen, but there's some parts of, I think...

O'BRIEN: Saudi Arabia.

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SANJUAN: Saudi Arabia. And they lop of your hand if you're a thief. In those cases, individual cases, you could have some understanding with some immunities granted. I would put it in a rather cynical way: In those cases what we would do is -- because after all, diplomatic immunity in international law still is based on the hostage system very basically, when they lop off one of our Foreign Service officer's hand, we just take one of the fellows in the Saudi Arabian Embassy and take him onto Connecticut Avenue and lop off his hand, you see. And that'll stop it. But still there is no....

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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