

Edward C. Crafts Oral History Interview—JFK #2, 12/16/1969
Administrative Information

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Biographical Note

Crafts, Director of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation in the Department of the Interior (1962-1969), discusses Julius Duscha's 1962 article on Forest Service and Park Service's problematic relationship, Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall, and the establishment of various national recreation areas, among other issues.

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Second of Two Oral History Interviews

with

Edward C. Crafts

December 16, 1969
Washington, D.C.

By William W. Moss

For the John F. Kennedy Library

MOSS: All right. Dr. Crafts, I'd like to start out from the first item on the outline and some comment on the Julius Duscha article. You said that you might have some general comments first of all, then I'll ask particular things.

CRAFTS: Well, this article came out when I was still in the Forest Service, in April 1962. This is actually the month that I transferred from Agriculture [Department of Agriculture] to Interior [Department of Interior]. The article is a mixture of accurate and inaccurate statements; it's sort of a patchwork device. It's sort of an attempt, it seems to me, to stimulate controversy between two agencies which have had enough controversy in the past, but that's sometimes characteristic of the press. Some of the things that the author talks about I was deeply involved in, in fact, some of them are directed right at some of my activities because these were my assignments in the Forest Service.

First of all, he's right, I think, that the Forest Service has good and powerful relationships on the Hill [Capitol Hill]. And so does the National Park Service. I think he's right, too, in the general inference that relationships between the two agencies were at a low ebb in 1962. They've had their ups and downs ever since Gifford Pinchot, and during the tenure of McArdle [Richard E. McArdle] and Conrad Wirth [Conrad L. Wirth] as heads of the two agencies, the relationships progressively deteriorated.

Looking at it from the Forest Service standpoint, this situation arose because Wirth was so aggressive in trying to get national forest lands transferred to the National Parks

Service. Because of his manner of operations, we just finally came to feel that you couldn't trust him.

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This was quite different from relationships that existed in earlier days when Lyle Watts [Lyle F. Watts] and Horace Albright and some of the other chiefs and directors were in the saddle. But April 1962 was about the low point of interagency relationships that had deteriorated for eight to ten years.

The Park Service did have a Mission '66 in which it had certain objectives over a period of years to develop a national park system. I remember that when I was still in the Forest Service we had objected to this very strongly to Secretary Benson [Ezra Taft Benson], then Secretary Freeman [Orville L. Freeman]. I had attended a meeting in Udall's [Stewart L. Udall] office, at which the Park Service on our request laid out the specifics. It became apparent that there were millions of acres in the West that, in order to fulfill their program, would have to be transferred from the Forest Service to the Park Service, although they tended to downplay this. Udall hadn't fully realized this until we nailed the Park Service in his presence. And this bothered him a little bit, because, after all, he did have the job of getting along with his fellow cabinet officer.

The Park Service at about that same time had a meeting in Williamsburg [Williamsburg, Virginia] of its top people. We received some of the internal papers that were developed at that meeting, and some of them had such headings as, "War with the Forest Service" and this sort of thing. I mean they were very indiscreet. And this didn't help.

So, the Forest Service decided it was going to fight. The "Operation Outdoors" of the Forest Service, which was the Forest Service recreation program as it existed, and which in effect was a companion piece to Mission '66, is what the author refers to in his reference to the Forest Service report on recreation. But there was this difference. "Operation Outdoors" was largely oriented toward explaining and developing—explaining the Forest Service ongoing recreation program, developing the recreation potential of the national forests as they existed. It did not have in it any significant acquisition program for new areas to enlarge the Forest Service empire. It was intensified management of the recreation facilities and resources that already existed on the national forests. There was this fundamental difference between the two. But there was no secret about "Operation Outdoors." It was published, printed and issued as a government document, just like Mission '66 was.

MOSS: You're not aware, for instance, of Duscha's contention that Udall suggested that the program not be announced until it could be presented to Congress as part of a national recreation plan?

CRAFTS: I'm not aware of that. That might have happened. I don't know, but I'm not aware of it. The inference here is that relationships were going to get worse, there was going to be a big squabble, and the Forest Service would torpedo the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation. Well, it didn't work that way. The Forest Service, as I think I said at the last interview, became one of the strongest supporters of

the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, because it—well frankly, because it trusted me, and also because it could see that if it had the Bureau on its side it would get further than trying to torpedo something that it believed Congress was for.

There were more problems that the BOR [Bureau of Outdoor Recreation] had with the National Park Service than it ever had with the Forest Service. So Duscha misread the future, in that respect, completely. Now, if they had picked a Park Service man to head the new bureau, his reading of the future might have been quite right. I think largely the reason it didn't work that way was because of the Treaty of the Potomac that we talked about last time, because an Agriculture man was selected to head it up, and because both Freeman and Udall agreed on the selection. This was the moderating influence.

Now, on the wilderness bill, his comment, and inference is there was a fight over wilderness between the two agencies. Wilderness was the wrong term if he's using wilderness in the context of the wilderness areas as set up by the Forest Service. I might just say on that, the Forest Service had administratively declared some thirty-six to forty wilderness and primitive areas and placed roughly 10 percent of the national forest system in wilderness and primitive areas. The Park Service had never followed a wilderness designation procedure at all within the national parks per se. So the Forest Service pioneered this system. The Forest Service worked with the wilderness people, with Howard Zahniser for years, in talking about and eventually preparing and drafting a wilderness bill. Maybe I'm getting ahead of myself, but I'd like to go into that wilderness bill a little bit.

MOSS: All right, we can do this. We don't have to follow the outline exactly. Let me interject here. It seems to me the logic that Duscha sets up is that there is, one, collusion between the Forest Service and lumber companies...

CRAFTS: Well, that's wrong.

MOSS: ... therefore, the Forest Service opposes the wilderness approach.

CRAFTS: This is wrong. The lumber companies, for the most part, the organized timber industry, have had a running conflict with the Forest Service for years over: one, its management of the national forests; two, its proposal to regulate cutting practices on private lands; and three, any proposals to acquire more national forest land. The Forest Service probably has more continuing difficulties with the timber industry and the grazing industry than with any other groups that I know of.

It had no collusion with the lumber industry. On the wilderness bill particularly, it did not. The lumber industry sort of stood on the sidelines on that. The mining industry was deeply affected and was involved. I'll talk about that when the time comes. But he's wrong on the lumber industry. If there was collusion anywhere—and of course that's a bad word—

but the Forest Service often had cooperation, or mutuality of management objectives, with the conservation groups like the Wildlife Federation [National Wildlife Federation], the International Association of Fish and Game Commissioners, the American Forestry Association, and the Wilderness Society, and this type of group. The timber industry put an awful lot of pressure on the Forest Service, and sometimes it succeeded in getting its way...

MOSS: What kind of pressure would they...

CRAFTS: Pressure with respect to technical things, with respect to methods of appraising timber for sale, with respect to the allocation of bids, with respect to whether it would be oral bidding or sealed bidding, with respect to amount of money held aside for construction of forest roads.

MOSS: Okay, these are the areas. Now, in what way did this pressure manifest itself?

CRAFTS: Through the Congress, through the Secretary's office, and through just continual harassment by the timber industry.

MOSS: Letters, phone calls, this kind of thing?

CRAFTS: Letters, phone calls, conferences. For the timber trade associations here in town this was their principal mission. They had a whole section on government relations; they still do. It was then the National Lumber Manufacturers Association. I think it's now the National Forest Products Association. Their principal mission was to keep the Forest Service in line. So the author is just as wrong as he can be on that.

MOSS: Now the way they attempt to keep the Forest Service in line...

CRAFTS: Is to get their way on things that are favorable to them from an economic standpoint.

MOSS: Okay. Now, what are the tactics that they use? Is it simply argument on an issue, or you say that you mentioned....

CRAFTS: Arguments. When they don't win with us, they go over your head to the assistant secretary and you start all over. Then they go over his head to the Secretary, perhaps utilizing the Forest

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Service appeals procedure.

We had a very clear-cut appeals procedure. They would appeal case after case, which uses up a great deal of time and money, until they're finally settled. They go through the congressional route for pressure. They get bills introduced, have congressional hearings or

investigations. They'd have congressional subcommittees hold hearings around the country, this sort of thing. It's standard operating procedure.

Now, the grazing industry, which he doesn't even mention, did the same thing. They worked very similarly, as most trade associations' work. They had Congressman Barrett [Frank A. Barrett] of Wyoming once hold what they called, "The Barrett Wild West Show;" which was held all around the West, where the forest officers on the ground were brought in and ridiculed, subjected to sarcasm, and it was a very, very rough deal. They would even resort, in some of the smaller communities where the rangers and assistant rangers live, the family ostracism, where the children of stockmen wouldn't play with the children of Forest Service officers in the public schools, or where the wives of Forest Service officials would not be invited to lunch groups, this sort of thing. It got right down to the grassroots.

MOSS: What about the mining people?

CRAFTS: The mining people—you mean in connection with the wilderness legislation?

MOSS: Yes.

CRAFTS: Let me tell you how the wilderness legislation got off dead center, because it had been considered for quite a few years. Zahniser was a fine gentleman, but a little bit of a dreamer and not very pragmatic about getting things done. The American Forestry Association had as executive secretary at that time an independent guy by the name of Lowell Besley, who subsequently got himself in trouble with his board of directors who were associated with the lumber industry and they got rid of him.

MOSS: Could you spell the name for the benefit of...

CRAFTS: B-e-s-l-e-y. He was a forester. He finally left the United States and went to Canada, ended up in Montreal. The American Forestry Association had been a great help many years ago to the Forest Service. Then in more recent years it hadn't had any real torch to carry, and he decided it was about time to carry one. So he talked it over with some of us in the Forest Service, and we decided we'd better get these wilderness areas protected by statute, not just by

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administrative regulation. A.F.A. [American Forestry Association] said it would see what it could do. There were two bills that came along about the same time. One was called the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of about 1960, and the wilderness bill; and they were very closely related.

The American Mining Congress, which is the lobbying arm of the mining industry here in town, just thumbed its nose at the Forest Service. It had good relations with the western members of Congress on the Interior committees and so forth. You see, mining was permitted in wilderness areas under the law, and the mines didn't want to lose any of their privileges. Also, there were mining claims all over the other national forest lands, which

could be used as a device to steal timber or rock, or build a summer home, and this sort of thing. Both those things needed cleaning up.

The American Forestry Association—how they did it I never really fully knew; and I was a little surprised they were able to—they took on the American Mining Congress and forced them to sit down to some very real brass-tack negotiating sessions. The A.F.A. got to the mining leaders. I remember one meeting in particular was held in the offices of the American Forestry Association. Out of that meeting came an agreement that the American Mining Congress would not fight all out, but would cooperate with the Forest Service on a Multiple-Use Mining Act. This meant that miners would lose the surface rights on mining claims that went to patent. Also they worked out a special procedure to clear out invalid claims. That Act passed in 1955 is operative, and has been a great boon. Also, miners wished to have their mining privileges continue on the wilderness areas for some time, until they had a chance to explore and find out whether existing claims were valuable or not. If so agreed then the mining lobby wouldn't object to legislative creation of the wilderness areas.

The outcome of this wasn't very good really, there were too many compromises—but the miners got a continuation of the mining laws in the wilderness areas for twenty-five years from the time of the establishment of wilderness areas. After that they were through. So they get twenty-five years to explore the area and operate, and any existing patents were not affected. But the lumbermen and the miners joined forces in one major compromise which the Forest Service didn't like. About half the Forest Service areas were wilderness areas, which meant they'd gone through a special evaluation procedure and had secretarial designation. About half of them were primitive areas. The distinction was a difference in degree of designation, not in management. They were managed and handled identically by the Forest Service, but the primitive areas did not have the secretarial blessing that the wilderness areas did.

The wilderness people and the Forest Service wanted both the

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wilderness and primitive areas given the protection of the Wilderness Act. About half the areas were designated and half were primitive. The big loss that the wilderness people and the Forest Service people sustained was that the upshot of the Act was that the wilderness areas were endorsed by the passage of the Act, but that each primitive area had to have certain examinations made of it, and then be recommended individually and set up by individual act of Congress.

This is now going on, the Forest Service is pretty much on schedule, and the Congress has largely gone along and set these up. But it's created an awful lot of work, and a lot of delay. In summary, while the mining and lumber industry didn't want any wilderness bill, and the Forest Service and the Wilderness Society wanted much more than they got, Congress compromised about halfway down the line.

Now, as to why I say this article is wrong about the Forest Service on wilderness: I remember the first time any Administration took a favorable position on a wilderness bill. We were called for hearings on the Senate side. I think it was on Senator Humphrey's [Hubert H. Humphrey] bill. The Interior Department was opposing the bill, and the Park Service didn't want wilderness areas created inside the national parks.

MOSS: When was this?

CRAFTS: It was about 1958 or '60, roughly in there. We couldn't get an administration position, and here we were. Finally we had a meeting in the Bureau of the Budget the night before we testified the next morning. Sam Hughes [Philip Samuel Hughes] presided, whom I mentioned in our last interview, and who never received the recognition he deserved. My recollection is the Park Service was represented by Bob Ludden [Robert Ludden], although I could be wrong on that. But the upshot of it was that at about seven o'clock at night, McArdle and I got approval to testify favorably for the wilderness bill—and we got it over the Interior Department's objections.

A lot of people have thought the Interior Department was the great wilderness advocate, and this is the furthest from the truth. McArdle and I handled the testimony together: we testified three times on various wilderness bills after that time. Not on the bill as it finally passed, because by that time McArdle was gone and I'd moved over to Interior. But the early history, and first time any Administration favored legislative action, should be credited largely to the Forest Service. I wanted to make that point.

MOSS: Okay. Is there anything more you want to say on the wilderness bill, I think, while we're at it? Now, what changes occurred in the drafted legislation over time? You say there were three separate...

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CRAFTS: The major changes were the ones I've just mentioned. One I conceived including only the wilderness areas, and not the primitive areas; and the other leaving the mining laws to apply. The third one, I guess, was the extension of wilderness to include the national parks. I have mixed feelings on wilderness areas in national parks because the National Park Service, and system, is under a great conflict, it goes back to their basic 1916 Act [National Park Service Organic Act, 1916] which says they should preserve the national parks in their natural condition—which is wilderness preservation—and then the act says, to make them available for the enjoyment of the American people, a basic conflict. So what does the Park Service do?

They've been wrestling with this conflict ever since the beginning, and the crunch is over now, with throngs of people coming into the national parks. But under the Act, the Park Service is required to examine for wilderness category all areas of five thousand acres or more that don't have roads, and there is a lot of that in the national parks. The wilderness people want everything included in wilderness that could possibly qualify and the Park Service doesn't, because it can see the need for use and enjoyment of the national parks by people who don't want wilderness experience. So it's trying to look ahead and propose a balance between pure wilderness and keeping the parks preserved as best they can, but with easy access to people.

If the Park Service set aside as wilderness all of the national park areas that would be suitable, about 95 percent of the national parks system would be converted into a wilderness system; and this shouldn't happen. So the Park Service has now got itself a running fight

with the wilderness people on this. And my sympathies here are with the National Park Service. They're trying to get a balance, but they're being pressured very hard in the other direction. So that's about all I want to say.

MOSS: Okay. Well, let's move to the next item on the outline. And that's the Outdoor Recreation Advisory Council. First of all, who were the people who composed the council?

CRAFTS: I don't know as I can remember them all, and they were changed a little from time to time. There were the Secretaries of Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and H.U.D. [Housing and Urban Development]. When D.O.T. [Department of Transportation] was set up, it was added. There were some independent agencies that were added like G.S.A. [General Services Administration], Federal Power Commission, and Tennessee Valley Authority. They were the main ones. That's not all of them.

MOSS: Engineers [U.S. Army Corps of Engineers]?

CRAFTS: No, Secretary of Defense, not the Engineers.

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MOSS: Secretary of the Army, or Defense?

CRAFTS: No, Defense.

MOSS: Of Defense!

CRAFTS: Defense.

MOSS: For heaven's sake! Why did they go that far? Do you know?

CRAFTS: They were dealing with cabinet officers.

MOSS: Yes.

CRAFTS: Well, he's a cabinet officer.

MOSS: Right. But I remember in the business of reevaluating the old Budget Circular A-47 on the water projects, the lash-up was Interior, Agriculture, and Army.

CRAFTS: It wasn't here; this was Defense. We dealt with Defense on it.

MOSS: Okay. And did McNamara [Robert S. McNamara] sit on the meetings, or did he send somebody else?

CRAFTS: He was a member, but he sent somebody else. He would usually send an under secretary of Defense.

MOSS: And was the same thing true of the other secretaries?

CRAFTS: This varied a great deal. Initially—Freeman and Udall would nearly always come. Secretary Connor [John T. Connor] frequently came; Secretary Weaver [Robert C. Weaver] frequently came. It varied. The first four years you had rotating chairmanship with Udall chairman the first two years, then Freeman the next two years. The first four years the council was quite active. It met maybe four to six times a year. And usually some of the cabinet officers would come. You would rarely get them all there.

MOSS: Okay. Any problem when you had, say, one department represented by a cabinet officer, and another one represented by somebody of junior rank?

CRAFTS: No, because it wasn't junior rank. You would usually have the under Secretary there if you didn't have the secretary. They sent their top people. Then it sort of began to fritter out. When Connor became chairman, the thing began to go downhill. But there were other problems.

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MOSS: All right. How often did the Council meet?

CRAFTS: I said about four to six times a year, initially. And then during the last years, it would meet maybe twice a year.

MOSS: Okay. What sort of problems came before the Council?

CRAFTS: The Council was proposed to be the coordinating arm or mechanism for the coordination recommended by the Rockefeller [Laurance S. Rockefeller] Recreation Resources Commission [Outdoor Recreation Resources Commission]. And these were almost without exception interdepartmental recreation problems. Sometimes they were very specific problems, like which agency was going to operate a particular area where there was a conflict in interest, as between the Forest Service and the Corps of Engineers regarding the Kinzua Reservoir in Pennsylvania. Or sometimes even within a department they'd seek advice, as between two agencies as B.L.M. [Bureau of Land Management] and the Park Service within Interior. Not too frequently for that. But the members attempted to enunciate a number of major government-wide outdoor recreation policies.

One of the things they did was establish the concept and criteria for national recreation areas, which have become very popular, including who was going to administer them, what guidelines they would have to meet, and so forth. Sometimes there would be problems involving an independent agency—like G.S.A.—in the matter of the disposal of property and what preferential treatment should be given for recreation or park purposes

from surplus G.S.A. property. This could cover several agencies. And there were problems at times between the Land and Water Conservation Fund program of Interior and the recreation grant program of H.U.D. These were the types of things that would come up. Then the Council got into the Hudson River matter, because this was interagency, involving any number of federal agencies and the states. The Council commissioned the Interior Department and the Bureau to make the first federal study of the Hudson River. These are examples.

MOSS: Okay. Now let me ask you about the mechanics of how a thing was brought to the Council and what the Council did about it. In what form was it brought?

CRAFTS: The Council had a staff initially. The initial agreement was that each department would designate and make available a full-time top-level man, at its own expense, to work as the Council's staff. These people would be housed in Interior, and would work under my direction as executive director of the Council. Each man, having access to his own department, could surface issues for us, could get material from his department, could help work on the coordination.

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That didn't work at all well. A number of the departments appointed individuals, but it turned out they were appointing incompetents or surplus individuals they didn't want much; they weren't appointing the right kind of people. We housed these people, and they were active, but they weren't very effective. But they were the Council staff; and gradually over time, we built up a backstopping staff to the Council staff, within the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, of people who would really get down and work. These other departmental men, for one thing, weren't made available full-time; they'd be subject to call by their parent departments.

The way things were brought up, an agency would take it up with its own representative on the Council staff. We would have rather frequent meetings of the Council staff. And out of the Council staff you developed the agenda for the next meeting, and you would also develop position papers, recommendations of the Council staff, and minority views. Before the meeting you would circulate a rough draft of the proposed agenda to all of the principals, and get back their comments. Finally, I would sit down with the Chairman, and out of this procedure would come the agenda and what we were going to talk about. Udall ran a very relaxed type of meeting, and sometimes they'd take several hours. Freeman watched the clock very closely and banged the meetings through. They would never last more than an hour under Freeman and sometimes quality and accomplishment were sacrificed in the interest of time. But anyway, this was the way he did it.

MOSS: Do you feel there was full participation by all?

CRAFTS: No, the trouble was when you would really get into something.... Well, let me say this; Freeman and Udall would really be willing to surface things. And

they wanted this Council to be effective and to be a coordinating device, an effective one. Of course, it was advisory only. The other members held off a little, and when you would get something that was really controversial, frequently the issue would fall between two departments or three departments. The members involved would discuss it vigorously, but the others would largely be silent; and particularly when it came to a vote, they would abstain. And so, over time, the Council began to be less and less effective.

Now, the basic trouble with any device of this sort is that if coordinating is interpreted to mean the power to put decisions into effect, then this Council, if it was going to be coordinating, shouldn't have been advisory. You see, the members were advisory to each other; the council wasn't advisory to the President, initially. And if they were going to have the power to impose their collective view, on Agriculture for example, then that Council was more powerful than the Secretary of Agriculture. Who was going to run the department in recreation, Freeman or the Council? And the same thing with Interior. This is

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the basic conflict and weakness of this type of interdepartmental advisory mechanism. I think it performs a useful function, but its function is somewhat limited: the procedure gets people together; it gets them thinking; it gets them talking; and some good comes out of it.

MOSS: But as far as implementation of recommendations it has a...

CRAFTS: This varied a great deal with the individual departments. Some of them would take these recommendations very seriously, some of these policy enunciations which they all signed—and they're printed and on record. Some departments would adhere and follow these, while others wouldn't; and there wasn't anything you could do about it. They weren't directives of the President, and there was no policeman involved, nobody with police power authority. But usually the settlement of jurisdictional disputes were implemented because there were only two parties involved. These were settled. They couldn't very well ignore those. But the unilateral application within a department of a general policy that was enunciated, lots of times wouldn't be followed.

MOSS: Okay, do you think in what you've said you've covered strengths and weaknesses as well, or do you have something to add to that?

CRAFTS: The chairman should have been the Vice President from the start; the rotating chairmanship was very bad. The chairman always should have been the Vice President, and this was accomplished, not during Kennedy [John F. Kennedy], but in the last nine months of the Johnson Administration [Lyndon B. Johnson]. Humphrey had the authority, and the thing just picked up immediately when he became chairman. He would tell these Cabinet officers what to do. He'd say, "Well now, you do this," and, "You do that," and they'd do it.

MOSS: This might be the answer to the age-old problem of what to do with the Vice President.

CRAFTS: No. Humphrey was chairman of about fifteen such commissions at the time. But he took this on because of his interest, and because Laurance Rockefeller persuaded him to. But the Vice President is the one.

The other possible thing is that participation by principals is difficult to obtain at cabinet level. In a sense this Council was at too high a level. They had over half the Cabinet on it. It was just like having a rump cabinet meeting. And really, why have cabinet advisory groups when you've got a cabinet? So I think it might have been more effective in actual work accomplished if it had been at the Under Secretary level. Then let the Secretaries see that it got

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implemented within their departments. I think it was too high upstairs. And the other thing, they needed to make available a competent staff. Those were the three weaknesses.

MOSS: Okay. Let's move on to the next topic, which is Mr. Udall as Secretary of the Interior. What were his major interests as Secretary?

CRAFTS: His major interests were in the resource field and, more specifically, in the parks, recreation, and beautification fields. There isn't any question about that. His interests in Indians, in grazing, and timber management were relatively minor. He had considerable interest in water resource development too—I should add that—parks, recreation, water, and natural beauty.

MOSS: On the areas he wasn't interested in, did he just sort of leave it up to the Assistant Secretary concerned and more or less forget about it?

CRAFTS: The Under Secretary, or the Assistant Secretary for the most part, but not entirely. When some crisis would come up, like in the Bureau of the Mines, he'd get into it, or in fisheries. But otherwise not, as for the Geological Survey—I don't think they hardly ever saw him.

MOSS: Okay. This is getting into style of operations. What did he do when he had an interest?

CRAFTS: He hounded the death out of it. The phone was ringing all the time. Now Udall, for my money, was a wonderful Secretary of the Interior. I guess maybe I'm prejudiced. He was the kind of fellow I could work with. He had ideas. He was creative and imaginative. He wanted to move. And he would throw off jobs on you one after another, things he'd dream up at night, or at home, or on an airplane, or somewhere else—"Take a look at this island," or, "Somebody told me about this; let's look into this." And then he'd leave you alone and let you do it, but he'd never forget. Pretty soon, he'd ask you how you were coming, The national island inventory was his idea, so were the

wild and scenic rivers, and the national trails. Many of these that have come to pass through legislative action came out of Udall's head.

He didn't monkey much with administration, and he didn't tell you how to run your show. He would leave you alone and let you run it, but he'd expect results. He didn't keep a day-to-day track, and he didn't get into details. A lot of his ideas weren't any good, and you could tell him so. You could tell him to back off, or tell him that this is a hare-brained idea.

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He was very informal—some people criticize him on that. He was informal with his staff that he knew well. He would sit at his desk in his shirtsleeves with his feet up and his shoes off, and you could get some of your best work done that way. You could tell him flat to his face he's just as wrong as he could be, or he'll get himself in trouble doing that and he shouldn't do it, and he would take it. So this was his style.

He was a very loose administrator, but he surrounded himself with competent men. He thought—and I think I agreed with him based on my forty years experience—he had the most competent group of people assembled in top positions in Interior that they'd ever had. And by that I'm talking about the agency head level and up. He didn't concern himself below that. Then, as I say, he would give these people their head. And he was good at inserting himself in issues in such a way as to get publicity. And he was fearless; he wasn't afraid. He'd take the criticism with the plaudits. And he never ran out of new ideas, or new missions, or this sort of thing. I think this is what you need in a person at that level.

MOSS: This may be the opportunity for you to contrast Udall's work with Freeman's.

CRAFTS: Freeman was a very different man. Freeman was a very good administrator. I sort of hate to say this, but I never heard Freeman come up with an idea. I really never did. Now, that doesn't say he didn't surface ideas, but he didn't when I was around him. He was a very tight administrator. He would delve into details much more than Udall, and he was rough on his people. Udall was never rough on you. If Udall felt he had your loyalty and you were working along the same avenue, he would never be rough on you, even though you pulled a boner or what was done was not good enough. He'd let you know in a nice way.

In contrast, I've had friends of mine tell me this who are in the Department of Agriculture that Freeman would at times act like a drill sergeant in the Marines with men at high level in responsible positions. I think, as a result, probably the morale was a little better, and certainly the rapport was better, between Udall and his top people than between Freeman and his top aides. But the principal difference was that Udall was the idea man and not the executor, whereas with Freeman, the ideas would have to come up to him, from below, and then he'd pick and choose. He was more of the administrative type.

MOSS: Did you ever find with Udall that he was doing end runs around you?

CRAFTS: No, never, never.

MOSS: Or that there were areas that he more or less took to himself to handle, out of your hands?

CRAFTS: Not in my field. He may have done this in some areas. Of course, you must remember now, I may not be typical. He picked me, I was his appointee. I had helped him a lot on the Hill, and he knew that, and we had the same basic objectives and goals; so we worked together as a team very well. I never felt that he ran around me. I know one time when the question arose about publishing the North Cascades report. Freeman was trying to block that. Of course, he'd drug his feet on that the whole time, and he was trying to block the report. And Udall first decided he wanted to delay it and see if he could finally get Freeman's approval of it.

In the meantime, I'd gone ahead and gotten it printed, had it there, but didn't release any of it. I told Udall when we got it from G.P.O. [Government Printing Office] that we had it; he didn't know it ahead of time because I just went ahead and did it. There was so much at stake. "Well, Ed," he said, "That's complete insubordination." And I said, "Maybe so, but you've got a report now. You've got to decide whether you're going to put it out or not, or just let it sit in a locked-up room." I pushed him a little by the fact that it was already there. He didn't resent it, but I think he was a little bit surprised. But he never ran around me. I think, if anything, I ran around him. But he knew that in general, too; sometimes he liked that—especially on the Hill—as I could do things on the Hill he couldn't because he was a cabinet officer. He gave me my complete freedom on the Hill.

MOSS: What about the other way, to the White House?

CRAFTS: Yes, same thing. He never blocked me anyplace in the White House, never. I never got any instruction, "Well, don't deal with this man, let me deal with him." Never.

MOSS: Okay, how about the relationship between Udall and President Kennedy and Mrs. Kennedy [Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy]?

CRAFTS: Actually, I didn't know too much about that. I was new in the department then. To the best of my knowledge, his relationships with President Kennedy were good. I know nothing about his relations with Mrs. Kennedy, nothing at all. She didn't have the interest in these natural resources, recreation, and natural beauty matters that Udall had, and my guess would be that probably he didn't have the rapport with her that he later developed with Mrs. Johnson [Claudia Alta "Lady Bird" Johnson].

However President Kennedy did have this special interest. He was a man of a great many interests. I remember the signing ceremony for the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation Organic Act, which President Kennedy signed,

and he of course gave the blessing to creation of the Bureau by Udall. But at that signing ceremony—and I have some pictures of that—Kennedy made a few remarks. I think they were off the cuff. There weren't too many people there. There might have been twenty, mostly members of Congress. And he talked a little bit about his interest in this new bureau, and his hope that Udall and Freeman could work out some of the problems between the two departments that they would be able to move in the parks and recreation field, and that it was a coming field. Then he referred to the fact that he himself did have a great deal of interest and belief in the value of our natural resources and developing our outdoor recreation facilities. And he said, "I got this from my days on Cape Cod and my love of sailing." And he referred to that as the basis for his interest in the outdoors and especially the Massachusetts islands.

MOSS: I've heard some comments that there was a change following the President's conservation tour in '62, I believe it was. People said that prior to that he really did not have a close feeling for natural resources, and that somehow in the course of that tour, he began to become very enthusiastic and to perceive that...

CRAFTS: This could have been, I don't know. I can't comment on that. When I heard him, it was after '62, and he was interested. He didn't have a great knowledge of the subject but he gave Udall his head, just like Udall gave me mine. Same sort of thing. They knew of the President's interest in the White House; the staff knew it, so they were responsive. And that's really about all I can say.

MOSS: How about Udall and President and Mrs. Johnson?

CRAFTS: I know a little more about that. Mrs. Johnson and Udall had a very close relationship on this national beautification program. Udall had a time getting himself established with Johnson, but finally he did. Johnson had a very real interest in these things, going back to his boyhood, but a different background of course.

Kennedy had urged the Congress to move on the Land and Water Conservation Fund bill, by writing a special letter, which I've got; and one of Johnson's first acts was to reinforce it with another letter of his own. Johnson just loved it when we'd get these bills through, and we'd have these signing ceremonies around the country. He knew Padre Island, and he knew a lot of the areas personally. He knew the country, I think, better than President Kennedy did.

One of the highlights that he had was the signing ceremony in October '68 when, at one time, he signed the North Cascades Park bill, the Redwoods [Redwoods National Park] bill, the Wild and Scenic Rivers bill, and the National Trails bill all at one time. This was a real production,

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and called the "grand slam." These matters had attracted national attention. This was the peak of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation.

Both presidents sent up special congressional messages on conservation and national heritage, natural beauty. Johnson sent up two or three, and Kennedy sent up at least one. The only sad part was that, right at the very end, Udall's relations with President Johnson went a little sour. Udall was anxious, as one of the last great conservation acts of the administration—and I think I've mentioned this before....

MOSS: I think you did off tape.

CRAFTS: Udall was anxious for the President to utilize the Antiquities Act and establish as national monuments very substantial acreages of land in Alaska and the Western states. This was of borderline legality, but the Interior lawyers said it was all right. This was really taking away the prerogative of Congress to create national parks, by utilizing this other procedure and calling them national monuments and then hoping Congress would ultimately endorse them. This same procedure had been followed years and years ago. Udall was trying in a way to get Johnson to emulate Theodore Roosevelt, who had signed the national forest executive orders in 1905 the night before he signed the Act taking away his authority to do it. This is where Udall got the idea.

Interior worked for six to eight months on preparing all the details, had dry runs and everything. And I went to the session with President Johnson at which Udall took over his people to present this. Johnson had Charlie Murphy [Charles S. Murphy] there, and he also had Clark Clifford [Clark M. Clifford], who was then Secretary of Defense, as well as some of his staff people.

Udall put all this presentation before the President; he'd done a beautiful job. Johnson slouched back in his chair and listened to it all with his eyes half-closed, but he didn't miss any of it. Mrs. Johnson came in about a third through and sat down, and she was just enraptured by it. Udall got through, and Johnson asked Clifford for his comments. Apparently this was his procedure; he'd have another one of his advisors present who was not closely tied to the subject and whose purpose was to pick flaws. Clifford asked some very searching legal questions. Otherwise that was about all he had. Charlie Murphy's only question was, "What impact would this have on the national forests?" And it didn't have any: Interior had learned its lesson; they'd stayed away from the national forests. Well, Murphy says, "No more questions."

Johnson said, "Have you taken this up with Aspinall [Wayne N. Aspinall], or with the Hill?" And Udall dodged him. We'd asked Udall the same thing in Interior and ducked a straight answer, and told him he was going to run into trouble. So Johnson then turned to his staff man who was there—and said, "Do some checking on this on the Hill, but also work it up

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for me. Let me have it by tomorrow night."

That was the last of my personal participation, but I know that Aspinall raised strong objections. Then Udall and Johnson had further discussions, and I'm told that Udall offered his resignation, right in the last days of the Administration, over this issue. Johnson felt that Udall was pressing for too much. The upshot of it was that Johnson did sign some orders

taking some of these actions, but nowhere near as much as Udall wanted. And I don't know whether this soured relationships between the two men or not, but I know that it didn't help them.

MOSS: All right. You mentioned Aspinall just now. What about Udall's relationship with particular congressmen, and Congress in general?

CRAFTS: Particular congressmen? You have to name the congressmen. There were so many.

MOSS: Aspinall....

CRAFTS: Udall served as a junior member on the committee that Wayne was chairman of, and I think, but don't know, that Wayne sort of resented having a junior member of his committee elevated to Cabinet rank. I think he would like to have had the job, but this is only my guess.

MOSS: I've heard this somewhere else, or read it somewhere else.

CRAFTS: Udall's surface relations with Aspinall were very good, and at times they got along splendidly. They had constant interchange. They were always on the phone with each other, this sort of thing. At times they worked very well together; and at other times, when Aspinall would feel that Udall was going too far, the homework hadn't been done, or something like that, he would be very rough on Udall.

Udall would frequently use me or Bob McConnell [Robert C. McConnell] as a foil on some of those situations. There were numerous times when he would say to me, "Ed, you go talk to Wayne. You can do this one better than I can." And not just me. There was McConnell, myself, and Carver [John A. Carver, Jr.], and different ones of us for different purposes, and for different situations. So in general I would say the relationships were good; they had to be for as much to have been accomplished. I think they became strained along toward the end because Aspinall felt that Udall's demands, or desires, were insatiable.

MOSS: What about Mike Kirwan [Michael J. Kirwan]?

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CRAFTS: He didn't have too good relations with Mike, but nobody had real good relations with Mike. They were all right, but Mike sort of went his own sweet way. And of course, Mike wasn't chairman of the Interior committee.

MOSS: No, he was over in Appropriations then.

CRAFTS: No, I mean of the Appropriations subcommittee for very much if any of the time that Udall was Secretary. He took over the chairmanship of the Public

Works subcommittee, and then Julia Hansen [Julia Butler Hansen] became chairman. His relationships with Julia were excellent. So he didn't have too much to do with Mike.

MOSS: There was an instance, wasn't there, where Kirwan was brought down to the Interior Department for a big pat on the back?

CRAFTS: That was for the aquarium out on Hains Point.

MOSS: Oh, I see.

CRAFTS: You see, he'd keep blocking everything until he could get his money for that aquarium. Well, he finally got it, and Udall put on a big show for him.

MOSS: Oh, I see. Okay. How about Jackson [Henry M. Jackson] in the Senate?

CRAFTS: The relationships with Senator Jackson were very good. They were on good terms, Jackson was much less conservative than Aspinall and willing to do things, willing to lead out. Jackson is a superb politician, both within the Senate and with the executive branch. The more you see of Scoop, the more you admire him. I do. And I would say relations were absolutely fine. A lot of times we would get things started with Jackson as a way to push Wayne. The relationships between Jackson and Aspinall were not good though, at all. There was a lot of difficulty there. They had an awful time getting together in conferences, and deciding who was going to take the lead, and even trouble over communications. It's amazing you'd get that, but it was true.

MOSS: Who gave you the most trouble on the Hill?

CRAFTS: You mean me, personally, or the department?

MOSS: You and the department, two separate questions. Let me hold that a minute. Why don't you think about that a second while I flip this tape over because we're getting near the end.

[BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 2]

MOSS: I asked who gave you trouble on the Hill. Two questions, you

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and the department.

CRAFTS: As far as individuals went, individual members of Congress, I never considered I had trouble with any of them. The one whom I guess you might

identify in that category—there's only one—would be Ed Edmondson [Edmond A. Edmondson] of Oklahoma. I want to make clear that Ed and I were good friends. We got along splendidly, and he was for our programs and so forth, but he had this fixation against user fees in connection with the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act, and as a consequence thereof he gave us a lot of trouble in trying to get enactment of the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act.

MOSS: He's from a Corps of Engineers area, anyway.

CRAFTS: Yes, he's from eastern Oklahoma. But this never affected our personal relationship at all. It was simply a difference of opinion on this particular item, and he was the one who gave me and the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation the most trouble. I can't answer your question on Udall because I don't know the full scope of his operations with other agencies. I just wouldn't know.

MOSS: Okay, fair enough. What were John Carver's major interests?

CRAFTS: Well, John grew up in either a small town or on a ranch in southeastern Idaho. He was a country boy, and he sort of picked himself up by his bootstraps. His interests when he was assistant secretary, and later as under secretary, were in public land management, mining, grazing, timbering, parks, recreation, water—not so much in saline water research or commercial fisheries or the geological survey. His interests were mostly the ones that I have listed.

He had more interest and knowledge in problems related to grazing, the utilization of timber resources and the problems that the Bureau of Land Management faced than Udall did by far, both more interest and knowledge. He had been exposed to those where he came from in Idaho, and then he was administrative assistant to Senator Church [Frank Church], and he learned them there. So he'd had that exposure. And he was much more sympathetic, as well as interested in those grazing and timber matters. He was much more sympathetic to the problems of the commercial users of the public lands, I think, than Udall was. He's a very capable man, very imaginative man.

He had one problem of getting confirmed. This was Senator Anderson [Clinton P. Anderson] of New Mexico. Why Senator Anderson didn't want him I don't know, but he didn't. And I think I've mentioned this before too. That's the only problem he had, that I know of, when he got confirmed. I thought he was a good assistant secretary of Interior.

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All of the under secretaries—including Carver who was under secretary for a while, and Jim Carr [James K. Carr]—had the same problems with the exception of Chuck Luce [Charles F. Luce]. The problem was roughly comparable to the problem of the vice president, namely just what were his duties and responsibilities. In Agriculture, Freeman and Charlie Murphy sort of divided the department into two parts. Udall didn't do that, and Udall would deal directly with his assistant secretaries and his bureau chiefs. He would bypass his assistant secretaries to his bureau chiefs a great deal. One of our jobs as a bureau chief was to keep the

assistant secretaries informed, particularly if he had an assistant secretary in whom he didn't have too much confidence. I'm diverting here, but you know, Udall didn't pick his assistant secretaries. That's an ironic and a wrong way to do things, but the Cabinet officers don't pick the under secretary and the assistant secretaries; the President picks them. The Cabinet officers pick the bureau heads. So Udall had his under secretaries and his assistant secretaries in some cases imposed upon him.

MOSS: Can you think of specific instances?

CRAFTS: I can; I don't know if I want to name them.

MOSS: Okay.

CRAFTS: One of them was Harry Anderson [Harry R. Anderson] of California, who turned out pretty well, but he wasn't Udall's choice as assistant secretary for Public Land Management. Harry's a real nice fellow. But this was purely a political deal, and it was handled in the White House.

MOSS: This was in the Johnson Administration.

CRAFTS: Right. It wasn't in the Kennedy time.

MOSS: What about the initial appointments? Do you know of any instances?

CRAFTS: No, they were all made before I came, and I know a great many of them were Udall's choices; Frank Barry [Frank J. Barry, Jr.] the solicitor was a close friend of his from Arizona. I don't know about Jim Carr. They got along beautifully, but what was there for Jim to do? I don't know whether Carver was one of Udall's choices or not. There again they worked together beautifully.

MOSS: What about John Kelly [John M. Kelly]?

CRAFTS: Kelly, I'm pretty sure was a Clint Anderson choice. How Udall got involved I don't know. He was from New Mexico.

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MOSS: How did John Carver operate? What was his way of doing things?

CRAFTS: This job as assistant secretary was his first job of administration, really. He'd been in a staff capacity heretofore. John sort of left the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation alone. He spent most of his time on the trouble spots with the Bureaus under his jurisdiction, as you would expect. This is right. Most of his problems were in the Bureau of Land Management and the Park Service. He had the Bureau of Indian Affairs, too, and there was a lot of trouble there.

He was so preoccupied with those matters that as long as he felt that things were going all right in the Bureau [Bureau of Outdoor Recreation], he didn't bother us too much. It was up to us to take things to him. He supported us with the Secretary. He didn't hesitate to disagree with us when he did. He held weekly staff meetings, which were informative, but no decisions were made at those meetings, and that was a good idea. He got his bureau chiefs together once a week for an hour, Monday morning. He'd tell you a little bit about department-wide things, and each bureau chief would bring you up to date on matters within his bureau. You learned things that you wouldn't otherwise have. It was an information exchange.

So I would say that by and large John operated about as an assistant secretary should, and he did a good job of it. He had a fine mind. He had just one weakness, though. Sometimes he'd get his back bowed on something, and then if you pressed him and it was proved that he was wrong, it was real hard for John to admit it. He would tend to resort to bombast, I call it, loud talking and table pounding and this sort of thing, to overcome the awkward position in which he found himself, rather than saying, "Well, I goofed. Everybody goofs. Let's go on from here." This I think was a weakness, but it was about the only one that I knew of. John was a fairly good speaker, but the subject content of his talks was usually better than the presentation.

I hate to get personal. John had a little handicap, which he fully recognized, with his appearance. He looked to be much more youthful than he was, and he used to talk about how he could grow old faster, somewhat facetiously, but somewhat seriously. That's about it.

MOSS: Do you recall his role in the Wirth resignation?

CRAFTS: Yes.

MOSS: Would you care to make comments on that?

CRAFTS: He was the hatchet man. I was not involved in the decision to let Connie go. It had been talked about, and it wasn't surprising. I don't know who made the decision; I guess Udall did. But certainly Udall, Carver, and Jim Carr, with none of whom

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did Connie get along well, were involved. John, because the Park Service was under his jurisdiction, was the logical one to do it. He was given the job of making a speech at Yosemite, where Wirth's dismissal was announced. He did it, and it was a shocker to the Park Service, but I think it did some good. It was a hard thing for John to do, but he had plenty of courage, and he did it. But as far as Carver planning it, or him being the instigator, I know nothing about this. I wasn't privy to this.

MOSS: Okay. Let's move on then to the next topic. I think we'd better take the appropriations and the budgeting business first, sort of out of the context of

legislation, put in the executive area. What were the mechanics of your drawing up your annual appropriations request? Well, relatively briefly, at any rate.

CRAFTS: The mechanics are well known. You start over a year ahead, and you go through all this standard procedure. You had to do it, and it was a very exhausting, time consuming and expensive job, no different than the mechanics for any other agency. You would have then a top-level review session. Udall would appoint a review committee within the department, consisting of assistant secretaries, the under secretary, maybe one or two agency heads, to sit and listen to the budget presentations of each bureau. This would be sort of a formal full-dress affair in the Secretary's conference room, and you would present your case there. They wouldn't get into the mechanics and details. This was largely the bureau chief's job to present his policy arguments, philosophy and his other justifications, more than the specific dollars involved.

These were quite helpful. And out of them, the Committee would finally cut and fit between the agencies, and within the departmental ceiling. You might have another final go-around with Udall in a big session with all the bureau heads. You had a chance to file an appeal, either a formal appeal and an informal appeal. This was about the way it worked. Later, they got into what they called the P.P.B. system—Programs, Planning, and something else.

MOSS: Programs, Planning, and Budgeting system.

CRAFTS: I think, as far as applying it to Interior was concerned, it was a great misconception, and great boondoggle. McNamara's whiz kids sold it to the White House and then it was forced down the throats of the other departments. It never surfaced to the Hill. You never went that way when you got to the Hill. It all was just mechanistic within the executive branch. The budget office of each department had to do this. It was an empire-building opportunity for them, and they took advantage of it.

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P.P.B. was a tremendous strain on the agencies. I never even bothered to read the material, or study it, or know what was in it, or even know what our people had said. We would develop internally our own budget with our line items and sub-items, and that was as far as I got involved on details until I got to the write-ups that were prepared and went to the Appropriations Committee. I would look those over pretty carefully. Then I'd make my own notations to supplement those formal write-ups. The policy role of the budget officer in the Interior Department was negligible, as far as my operations went. He might have had a policy input with some agencies but in my operations Udall had a special interest. This is where we were sort of privileged.

So Sid Larson [Sidney D. Larson] first who was the departmental budget officer, and later Dan Ogden [Daniel M. Ogden, Jr.], who came out of BOR [Bureau of Outdoor Recreation] to the job, really didn't have too much to say, other than handling the mechanics and getting things worked up. Once in a while they'd tip us off on something. We had good relations with them. Sid just accepted the fact of life. So did Dan, and so it didn't affect our

relations. Otis Beasley [D. Otis Beasley] had been around a long time, and he helped us a great deal when we started. We had good relations with Otis. Otis had been around long enough to know the payoff came on how well you did on the Hill. When he saw that we were getting along all right on the Hill, then he didn't fret. So the main people we dealt with were the Assistant Secretary, the Under Secretary, and the Secretary on budget matters.

As for the Budget Bureau, I would frequently deal with the Bureau of the Budget directly. I think here I was probably stepping out of line, and Interior's budget office didn't like that too well. But the Bureau of Budget would call me, and I wasn't going to tell them no. If I needed to, I'd call them. Of course we had hearings before them and all that. That's standard procedure. Also the Bureau of the Budget knew these were programs that were desired from the president on down, so they gave us a break. They never gave us all we wanted, but they gave us a break compared to some of the other departments. We got along pretty well, budget-wise.

MOSS: Did you get much support from the White House staff when you went before the Appropriations committees?

CRAFTS: No, you wouldn't get any. They just ignored it. That was your job.

MOSS: Yes, okay. That's good. Now you said that you were instrumental in the Land and Water Conservation Fund drafting.

CRAFTS: I don't know who actually first thought of the idea of something like the Land and Water Fund. I do know when I was still in the Forest Service, Carver was chairman of a committee Udall had

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set up within Interior to try to work out something like this. He delegated this to Chuck Stoddard [Charles H. Stoddard], which was bad because Chuck was alienating the other departments and agencies involved, and it looked like an Interior empire-building deal. Shortly after I transferred, Interior sent up a bill to give this so-called organic authority to the BOR. They had included in it the state planning aspects that were subsequently in the Land and Water Conservation Fund. Congress didn't pass the bill that session.

Then I started checking on how they felt on the Hill. I remember Wayne telling me, he said, "Ed, take that planning grant stuff out of there and just limit your first bill to the organic authority." He said, "If you can get along with Udall and we see you're going to last for a few months, we'll pass the bill for you next spring. Then put the federal grants to acquire land and the grants to the states, to acquire land, the grants to the states for planning all together in one bill." He said, "That's where they all belong." Wayne told me this, so that's exactly what we did. And when the Bureau was created, he kept his word. In the first session of the next Congress they passed the Organic Act within two or three months.

By then we'd had a year to work on a Land and Water Conservation Fund Act, after I'd talked to Jackson and Anderson and Wayne. We drafted something and sent it up that was quite different from what the Department had worked up pretty much based solely on

executive branch thinking without checking with the Hill. Finally the bill went up with a whole package, and it was pretty much along the lines that we had discussed with members of Congress. The basic recommendations of the Fund Act were in the Rockefeller report. But if you will go back far enough, twenty-five years, there is an earlier report put out by the Federal Security Agency, and many of the recommendations in the O.R.R.R.C. [Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission] report that are credited as being original are traceable back to that report of the Federal Security Agency, including the creation of a Bureau of Recreation, grants to states to acquire lands, and planning grants to the states to make recreation plans. All of those things are in that report of some twenty-five or thirty years ago. Anyway, Udall picked it up within the Department and gave the go-ahead sign. That's how the drafting took place.

MOSS: Okay. Let's move to the recreation areas then, the individual ones.

CRAFTS: What, the national recreation areas?

MOSS: Yes.

CRAFTS: All right.

MOSS: Let me ask how you feel about time at this point; I've got about forty minutes of tape left.

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CRAFTS: Well, I have to leave here not later than 12:15 because I have a 12:30 date up at Dupont Circle.

MOSS: Well, let's run until 12:15 then, and see...

CRAFTS: By then I have to get out of here in a hurry, and I hope I can get a cab.

MOSS: See if I can get you out of here by 12:10.

CRAFTS: That would help.

MOSS: All right. The first one I have listed down here is the Tocks Island area. This failed the first time, why?

CRAFTS: I don't know. That happened before I got involved in it.

MOSS: Oh, I see. Yes.

CRAFTS: And when I got involved in it, the problem was one of implementing acquisition authority with money and the problem of preventing development

on private in-holdings inside. We were involved in those aspects, and were fairly successful. But the actual legislative act was handled before I got involved.

MOSS: All right. Assateague is another one.

CRAFTS: Assateague is one that we handled from start to finish. Assateague, of course, is a beautiful undeveloped barrier reef. It had a lot of private owners with small lots but with no houses on them—about four thousand of them. There was a lot of opposition from local counties over there, but it was a natural. Going from the Cape [Cape Cod] down the Atlantic coast there: Cape Cod, Fire Island, Assateague, Hatteras [Cape Hatteras], the Core Islands, then hopefully Cumberland [Cumberland Island], then Florida.

One of the things we did was to hire Joe Kaylor [Joseph F. Kaylor], who had been director of Parks and Forests in Maryland and knew Maryland politics backwards and forwards for years. He worked as one of my legislative liaison to [inaudible]. Joe's job was to get Assateague through. He knew all the people involved. He knew the county people; he knew the state and congressional people. And I really think without this knowledge we couldn't have done it.

The other factor was we got Rogers Morton [Rogers C.B. Morton] behind us. It's in his district. And this was hard for Rogers because his local people around Snow Hill were against it. Downing [Thomas N. Downing] in Virginia went along, and it was partly in his district too.

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So we finally built the congressional support. And the only opposition we really had was the local county and the landowners, who were headed by a fellow named Phil King [Philip F. King], who was a former assistant director of the National Park Service. He fought it tooth and nail. Some of the landowners were staff people on the Hill, and the Budget Director of the Department of the Interior [Larson] had some property down there. You met yourself coming back on Assateague.

But it went through after a good deal of work and is now accepted and popular. It is interstate extending into Virginia. I'm condensing an awful lot here, but Assateague is one of the best national seashores if they don't overdevelop it. We had to compromise. People have wondered why there is a big state park concession and development right on the island. This is one of the compromises that the congressional and state people insisted on in order to support the bill. I'm proud of Assateague.

Let me just say a word about Fire Island. Or did we cover that the last time?

MOSS: We covered some; but go ahead.

CRAFTS: The main thing was there was a lot of local opposition to Fire Island; there is to all of these. But the way we got around that one was we proposed to take in a lot more...

MOSS: Right. Yes, you mentioned this.

CRAFTS: I've covered that?

MOSS: Yes, you mentioned this.

CRAFTS: All right.

MOSS: All right. Let's take the Dunes next, I guess, Oregon Dunes.

CRAFTS: Oregon Dunes has never been acted on legislatively. And this is an odd thing, because this is under the Forest Service. It's protected; it isn't subject to danger. The Forest Service and the Park Service reached agreement when I was in the Forest Service that this is one the Forest Service would relinquish. Initially the Forest Service opposed it, and the bill was defeated several times, but then we finally reached agreement. The Oregon Dunes was indicated for study in the Treaty of the Potomac by President Kennedy. It was never studied because there was no more study needed; it had been studied to death. But there was agreement on the part of the Forest Service that it could go to Interior. I mean they weren't objecting. The problem by then was Senator Morse [Wayne L. Morse], and we never changed his position. And that's why that one didn't happen; otherwise it would have. And it should have; it

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still should and will some day.

MOSS: Any indication as to why Morse opposed it?

CRAFTS: I can't recall. I knew at one time, and I've talked to him about it, but I don't remember.

MOSS: There was a rationale about the question of condemnation of private homes and this sort of thing.

CRAFTS: Oh, yes. It was something about the inland lakes. It was condemnation around the inland lakes, and it involved some of the large timber owners as well as small property owners. That's it; that's what it was. I'd forgotten. We never could work out a formula for compensation that was suitable to him.

MOSS: I have also heard it said that it's not so much that he really had a rational argument; he was rather piqued that he hadn't been consulted beforehand on this.

CRAFTS: Oh, I don't believe that, because he had been consulted. His man, Berg [William Berg, Jr.] —I think he's now dead—and I had talked frequently

about Oregon Dunes and I worked closely with him.

MOSS: Okay. How about Indiana Dunes, the Burns Ditch [Burns Waterway Harbor] business?

CRAFTS: The Indiana Dunes. We and the Park Service worked together on that, and the Park Service did most of it. We had one man, Perkins [E. Winton Perkins], who knew it intimately, and we made him available to the Park Service. I don't know there's much point in going into the details; it's finally happened. I have my own serious reservations whether it should have happened. I think probably that one went beyond the point of being worthwhile. It's so surrounded by industrial development, so polluted and so on. And you can go rather a short distance up the shoreline into the state of Michigan and find dunes that are far superior to the Indiana dunes that are much more available, that are not befouled by the steel mills and all the other stuff that you've got in Indiana. And it was so expensive. Really I think it shouldn't have happened.

MOSS: Do you think there's any substance to the charge that Paul Douglas [Paul H. Douglas] and the Chicago people simply didn't want a competitor over there on the Indiana shore, as far as a deepwater port was concerned?

CRAFTS: Didn't want a competitor?

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MOSS: Right, as a deepwater port. One of the accusations was that Douglas...

CRAFTS: You mean this prevented a deepwater port?

MOSS: That the dunes preservation would prevent the Burns Ditch...

CRAFTS: I don't know. Who'd you say, Douglas and who else?

MOSS: Douglas and the Chicago people.

CRAFTS: It could have been true of the Chicago people, but I don't think it was true of Paul Douglas. No sir, I don't think so.

MOSS: Okay. Okay, how about Sleeping Bear Dunes?

CRAFTS: That one hasn't happened, and that one should happen. Phil Hart [Philip A. Hart] wants it. But it isn't going to happen until they get some more money into the Land and Water Fund. None of the pending proposals that haven't happened are going to come to pass, under the present Administration, until they begin to appropriate and make available the moneys that are in the Land and Water Fund and the logjam is broken. But it should happen. The rich people around Sleeping Bear have been

instrumental in preventing it, and I think Senator Griffin [Robert P. Griffin], who used to be a congressman, from that area, has been opposed to it right along. In his position now as assistant minority leader; it hasn't got a chance.

MOSS: There's no way of getting one of these things through, is there, if the local congressman is against it?

CRAFTS: It's very difficult, very difficult. I wouldn't say there isn't any way to do it; I can't think of any that's happened that way though. What usually happens is that the local congressman sort of starts out being against it, and then finally changes his mind. That's what happened at Fire Island.

MOSS: Right. Pike [Otis G. Pike] was against it at first, and then came around.

CRAFTS: Pike. That's right.

MOSS: Okay, the Flaming Gorge.

CRAFTS: That was a different deal, and the Whiskeytown-Shasta-Trinity's another one. I don't know whether you are familiar with Flaming Gorge. The scenic part of what's now the lake is inside the Ashley National Forest. The supervisors headquarters are in Vernal, Utah. The Green River cuts through the Uintas on its way southward to

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join the Colorado and that's what makes the Gorge. This is an interesting phenomenon. Here you have a river running downstream and the mountains rising. Usually the river slides away from the mountain: here you have a river heading into the mountains. The Green River rises in the Wind River mountains of Wyoming, runs south across the red desert and then hits the Uinta mountain barrier. It cuts through and makes the canyon. All the scenic part of Flaming Gorge was the Forest Service land. The Bureau of Reclamation came in and built the dam, and that created the lake. Then the Park Service wanted to control the area. They had some real set-tos. You had the Park Service and Forest Service offices side-by-side, the Park Service planning recreation developments on the Bureau of Reclamation land, which was not very much, and the Forest Service doing the same thing right around it on the Forest Service land. Then the question arose, "How about all of the rest of the lake that was north on public domain land for the most part, in Wyoming and which is on the Sagebrush Desert?"

This issue was worked out by two groups, by the President's Council on Recreation and Natural Beauty and by the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation. This is one where finally Hartzog [George B. Hartzog, Jr.], against the wishes of many of his people, agreed that he wouldn't object to it going to the Forest Service.

You had to do one of three things: you either had to have divided jurisdiction, which wasn't a good deal—or you had to invade the forest with a national recreation area administered by the Park Service. The policy is if the recreation areas are inside the national

forest, the Forest Service administers them. Or you had to extend the national forest way out around the lake in the desert where there wasn't a tree within fifty miles. So, either way of unifying administration meant violating the normal pattern.

Since the scenic part was in the national forest, since the Forest Service establishment was there, since most of the local people knew the Forest Service and preferred the Forest Service, including the congressional delegations, I recommended that's the way it go; and George agreed. Congress passed the act, and it's established. The Park Service either is pulling out or has pulled out.

We had a somewhat similar situation on another one in California—the Whiskeytown-Shasta Trinity. This is divided: the Forest Service administers two noncontiguous units of it inside the national forest; the Park Service administers one unit outside the national forest. All three of them involve Bureau of Reclamation dams.

MOSS: Pictured Rocks.

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CRAFTS: Pictured Rocks is one in which there was conflict between the Park Service and the Forest Service over the amount of land to be taken. The Park Service wanted, as usual, a lot. This has happened now—and the Cleveland Cliffs Iron Company was deeply involved in that one, too. The upshot of that one is that the Park Service is administering it. We've got that one resolved.

MOSS: The Allagash River is rather interesting one.

CRAFTS: That's a unique one. The Park Service wanted a national park, monument, recreation area or something up in there. They'd prepared their studies and their report, and this of course was Connie Wirth's position, and it still is. The state of Maine wasn't about to have any more federal invasion. And so Muskie [Edmund S. Muskie] became involved. Udall took a look at the river, and I took a look at the river. Finally we came up with the idea—I say “we,” I don't know who it was, really it was one of the three of us. Why not make this a state wild river and fund it out of the contingency fund of the Land and Water Conservation Fund, with half the money coming from the federal government, but let the state run it. This was a wholly new concept. The Maine people thought that was wonderful, and the Park Service thought it was awful, but Udall said, “This is the way we'll go.”

Then the problem was that there are four or five big timber landowners in there—the area is in the unorganized towns of Maine—and they fought this thing. Oh boy, how they fought it. Regardless of who was going to run it, they didn't want people in there with an injury liability problem, observing how they cut the timber, consequent fire problems, and all this. This was the companies' domain. There were no roads. There's nothing in there, no schools, no county governments, no nothing.

They had to get two bills through the Maine legislature. One was an authorization for the state of Maine to acquire the land and to condemn it, and another was to float a state bond issue to raise the money. They finally got it, both of them. And the man principally

responsible, other than the governor [John H. Reed] and Senator Muskie, was a state senator, Senator Violette [Elmer H. Violette], who was a very courageous man, and who ran as a sacrificial lamb against Margaret Chase Smith this last time and, of course, lost. But if it hadn't been for Senator Violette—most people don't know that—I don't think this would have happened, and he's never gotten the credit he should. But it's there, and it's operating.

They've gotten practically all the land needed. They decided to use condemnation. With the state's advance knowledge and concurrence Udall threatened publicly that if the state didn't get cracking he was going to withdraw the contingency money. That gave the governor a handle, saying, "We got to go, so we're going to condemn." When the

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companies knew the governor was serious, then they decided they'd donate.

MOSS: Okay. Let me hit you with one more, the North Cascades.

CRAFTS: That is a very complex one, as is the Redwoods. That study was commissioned in the Treaty of the Potomac by President Kennedy. I was chairman of an interdepartmental task force; we studied it upwards and downwards and held hearings out there and finally came out with the North Cascades Study Report, which was divided as to recommendations; the two Interior people and myself recommended a national park; the Agriculture people recommended a couple of recreation areas administered by Agriculture.

Jackson picked it up—and this is where Freeman and Ed Cliff [Edward P. Cliff] misread the signs. They didn't think that Senator Jackson was serious, but he was. Finally, President Johnson ordered Udall and Freeman to go out there and look at it on the ground. There was a look-see by helicopter and so on. We had Udall and Freeman, the three agency heads—Ed Cliff, Hartzog, and myself—various staff aides, and Sam Hughes of the Budget Bureau. In one night session at Newhalen we finally thrashed it out.

Freeman never did agree, but we worked out some compromise. Finally Freeman agreed to that study report coming out, but with a disclaimer sheet in the front, which is there. Later, after it got past the first squabble within the executive branch, Sam Hughes carried the issue back to the President. I mean something had to be decided; they were either going to recommend a national park, or they weren't. And since Jackson was pressing the President, and since Sam Hughes became convinced that there should be a national park on its merits, he went back and persuaded the President to overrule Freeman.

This was the key decision, right there. Then it didn't have much trouble in Congress because Jackson as chairman of the Interior committee could get it, and it didn't cost anything because it was federal land. So it sailed through. This was the end result of about forty years of squabbling over the North Cascades. They've now got a beautiful national park out there, two new national recreation areas, and a new wilderness area.

MOSS: Okay, one last question before I let you go, and that is to ask for a comment on the usefulness of such things as the White House Conference on Conservation, and the national conferences on outdoor recreation.

CRAFTS: The conferences on outdoor recreation were technical conferences, one on education, one on research, and one on policy issues. They have utilitarian value to the professional workers in the field.

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White House conferences are at quite a different level, quite a different thing. They have the big names, they get a lot of publicity, they get principals to make speeches and they usually come out with a report which is published, and that's about it.

I think these technical working conferences, if there aren't too many of them, provide a useful service for research people to get to know each other, an exchange of ideas, and this sort of thing. The others probably do too, but of quite different sort. Their impact is more on the general public, to awaken the public to the urgency of this or that domestic issue. As far as accomplishing much, you can't easily put your finger on tangible things stemming from these. I think a White House conference right now on our domestic environment might be in order, because there's so much public attention devoted to that.

I think the conferences on conservation and the conferences on natural beauty serve a useful purpose, but there are always those who want to have another one. And you shouldn't have them too frequently because they are expensive, and time consuming, and there's an awful lot of wasted effort involved. But as far as focusing public attention on something the President is interested in, if that's what you're trying to do, why, that's all right. But if you're trying to actually get something through Congress, get more money out of Congress, contributing new knowledge to a field, no.

MOSS: Okay, we're about five minutes from the deadline. Is there anything else you want to add to...

CRAFTS: No. I appreciate it very much.

MOSS: All right. Well, thank you very much indeed, Dr. Crafts.

[END OF INTERVIEW #2]

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