

**Walter Pozen Oral History Interview – JFK#3, 12/7/1967**  
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**Biographical Note**

Pozen (1933-2016) was the Assistant to Secretary of Interior (1961 - 1967), editor of the book *Strategy for the '60's: Policy Research Centers for the United States Senate*, and lead partner at Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP. In this interview, Pozen discusses the White House Conference on Conservation, President John F. Kennedy's [JFK] 1963 conservation trip through western states, the Cape Cod National Seashore, and JFK's 1962 conservation message, among other issues.

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Third Oral History Interview

with

WALTER POZEN

December 7, 1967  
Washington, D.C.

By John Stewart

For the John F. Kennedy Library

STEWART: The White House Conference on Conservation, May, 1962. The obvious thing to me is why a conference like this? What real political advantage, if any, does it have to the layman looking at conservation, a conference like this at which very little seems to really be accomplished except evoking the memories of different pictures of Teddy Roosevelt? It doesn't seem to have that much real political appeal. Did it? What was the real reason for the conference?

POZEN: Yes. John, you know, the further you get away from it you get some kind of perspective

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on it. Now I don't know if I've ever touched on this before, but in 1960 the Department of the Interior was a western department, the vocabulary of conservation was something which was unique to people who specialized in what Stewart calls the birds and the bees, you know, the Sierra Club, the wildlife groups and so on. So it certainly didn't have any broader currency, any broader popularity or understanding. As I say, looking back seven years you realize the sort of revolution in a small sense that's gone on...

STEWART: Yes, this must be the part.

POZEN: ...in this whole field. I mean, frankly think -- but then that's because I'm just very biased, I don't pretend this as an objective judgment -- that Stewart's responsible for this, of introducing a new language that now even eastern congressmen, I don't mean even eastern congressmen, but even congressmen are aware of. They

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talk about ecology, they talk about the quality issues, the problem of air and water pollution. In 1960 these were issues that were very esoteric in the political sense. I mean, you would hesitate writing a speech and mentioning these things. In fact -- and I'm going to get to the conference -- I recently in preparation for the series of interviews was looking back at some of the campaign speeches -- I was digging out books to come over here -- that Kennedy made, conservation speeches, and they're the usual kind of old line, irrigation, water power, revisiting the public versus private power fights. If you compare a Kennedy campaign speech of 1960 with a Johnson typical conversation speech of 1967 they're just like night and day. They're as if they were fifty years apart. Now with that as a background, as I told you at one stage we sent over a sort of a program of what we expected to accomplish

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in the first two years of the Administration, parks that we had hoped to create and so on. It was Stewart's view any my view that we should really bring the President into all the sort of a great mix that was going on, this whole bubbling up of a new set of issues, of identifying the Administration with this concern for the land and really, as I say, surfacing a whole different set of issues. I think this conference with all the attention that was focused on it -- I don't mean to say it was earth shattering but at least it identified John Kennedy with some of the things that Stewart had been talking about and working on. And Orville Freeman was there, and as I remember Gardner Ackley. It wasn't as much of a success as I had hoped it would be, but at least the President was there, said the right things and showed some of the skeptics who thought that he knew nothing about it that at least he was

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a part of it. So I think it had some success.

STEWART: Was the thinking at the time along this broader scope that you mentioned or was this primarily aimed at convincing people who were already knowledgeable about conservation problems that the President was with them? Or was it aimed to a much wider audience than that?

POZEN: That's a very good question. I think on the first level it was just identifying President Kennedy with conservation or something, backing up Stewart in

some way and showing that he really was for Stewart. Hopefully, I think we did succeed here. We tried to broaden the interest in conservation and make other people aware of it. I don't think that was achieved, but it was certainly hoped.

STEWART: To what extent were people in the White House involved setting up this whole thing? Were there any problems at all?

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POZEN: Oh, yes. Sure. Again going through my files as I indicated previously, there was a singular lack of interest on the part of the White House staff in this whole function, in this whole facet. I mean, this was the beginning of the period when Ted and others were really getting much more interested in foreign policy, and the President was absorbed by it, and this was just.... In other words they sort of said, "All right." Sorensen in essence said, "Okay, Pozen, it's an idea. We'll do it, but do it for us." We turned a chap named Dan [Daniel M. Ogden], who's still in the Department of the Interior, loose on this thing and set up a staff. I've got a whole big file. We had all kinds of problems in getting up a mailing list and setting up the physical details, and we received very little help out of the White House.

STEWART: But no opposition evidently? It was a....

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POZEN: No. Oh, no. And let me just say, I think that's probably the right way to do it. I mean, they shouldn't have to worry about it.

STEWART: Yes. Did you see any indication that it helped legislative-wise or that there were any tangible benefits?

POZEN: It was May, 1962. Yes....

STEWART: Or was this a part of the....

POZEN: The intention of it?

STEWART: The whole purpose?

POZEN: Yes. I'm sure it had an effect. For instance, just on a very practical level, John, we invited Wayne Aspinall and Clinton P. Anderson, who was then Chairman of our Senate Interior Committee, to participate. And Aspinall wasn't on very good terms with Johnson at this stage, but it helped in that stage. Well, we did very well in that Congress but the one after that was an extremely good

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Congress. The House and the Senate passed more conservation bills over these last seven years than they've ever passed in the nation's history and created more parks too. I just can't help but think that that was part of it and that it gave it a big boost. Even though, let me just make it very candid, in terms of substance I can't say it made a major contribution to the true understanding of conservation or even understanding of the government's relationship to what should be done, and so forth. I mean, the more profound questions certainly were furthered or answered.

STEWART: In September, 1963, of course the President made a trip throughout a number of western states. You mentioned that you were quite heavily involved in the planning of this trip and in writing some of the speeches. First, do you know precisely how this trip originated, or where the idea came from?

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POZEN: Yes, I do. Stewart was concerned.... Let me just go back. He's fundamentally a political person and having been a House member he still thinks somewhat in Hill terms, electing so and so, and this guy's in trouble. And he viewed himself in some ways, and still does, as one of the most political members of the Cabinet; presently Larry O'Brien and Stewart and I suppose Orville Freeman. He would give the President reports on it. He was also, I suppose, the expert on the West in an eastern oriented operation as it was. So Stewart had been giving reports on how Scoop Jackson was doing in Washington and how "x" was doing in Colorado and so on in the form of personal notes to the President. Stewart thought that on two levels it would be very helpful to have a conservation trip, three levels; a) there hadn't been one in a long, long time since Franklin Roosevelt sort of

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set this pattern; b) it would be extremely helpful in terms of some of the political situations which weren't very good at that stage. One had a tendency to idealize it all but the President hadn't done extremely well in that bi-election, the 62 elections. And there were some defections in the West. And three, this is the thing, I don't remember if Stewart put it in words but I know he felt, is that the President should have -- this is sort of a subcategory -- the President, just the same as Johnson and I suppose every president, should get out of Washington because things have a very different view here than they do other places. The McNamara story is a perfect example of where here, you know, everybody's looking for the true analysis and if you go -- Tom Wicker had a piece -- when you go to Alabama or to Montana or something, people just don't worry about it. So the

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President should get out of Washington and more important is the sub-two under that category, he should see more of what the country's all about. As it turned out, that's exactly what happened. He sort of opened up like a flower. He had been really very tight, he didn't look very well either at that stage. That's how it came about in my recollection.

STEWART: The actual proposal and the timing came from Interior?

POZEN: Yes. I think O'Brien had a lot to do with it later. As I recall we talked to Larry and to Claude Desautels and some other people, I mean, you know, we had sent over. We sent it to the President and Stewart had mentioned it I guess to Larry of something and that's how it came about. It was a curious trip. Go on, why don't you ask some questions about it?

STEWART: As far as the scheduling, the determination

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of which cities, which states you would go to, who did this?

POZEN: Kenny O'Donnell [Kenneth P. O'Donnell] and Larry were the.... Sure, they told us. I mean, Stewart made recommendations. Of course, you know, John, these things are amazing. As soon as it got out, even in a very guarded way that he was going to make this kind of trip, every senator of course starts knocking on the door, "You've got to go here, you've got to go to Utah, you've got to...." and so on. So as a result, when you look at it on a map, as I think somebody in the future probably will, it looks like an absurd trip in terms of miles traveled and zigzags and so on. The signs were very often dictated by the Congressman "x" and the zag by Senator "y". So it really was sort of a mixture of O'Brien, O'Donnell, a series of senators, plus Stewart.

STEWART: Gaylord Nelson had a role presumably in planning this thing or at least in putting

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in some definite recommendations. There's a story which probably you've heard that they had intended to skip Wisconsin but....

POZEN: Right.

STEWART: They put it back because Nelson was angry at the appointment of Gronouski [John A. Gronouski] and this was to pacify him.

POZEN: Absolutely; that's exactly true.

STEWART: This is the truth?

POZEN: That's my recollection of it. I don't know, I'm mixing up trips, but it was either this trip or another Maggie [Warren Magnuson] had a great fit too and a number of people.... It's amazing how petty -- it's not really petty it's just a definition of self-interest I suppose -- you know, how important they thought this trip was. The trip was more interesting on a lot of other levels. Why don't you ask your questions before I volunteer?

STEWART: As far as the speeches were concerned, again there was a certain amount of criticism that

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he didn't speak enough about conservation and that too much focus was given to either political affairs or especially the test ban treaty which I think he picked up as it went along.

POZEN: Let me talk about that. Yes, that's a fascinating thing. There are three points to be made. One -- and it goes back to this vocabulary point -- the first point is on the White House Press Corps. I had many friends in this regard, you know, over there and you do and so on, but they're so used to writing for the big black and whites that they just.... The first point is that they didn't believe that this was truly a conservation trip. They just thought that it was a salvage operation, a political thing and so on. So they just didn't understand what he was up to at all and didn't want to report it that way. That's really true. They were

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lazy and I was very unimpressed with their operation. They'd get a handout and they'd say, "Oh this is a lot of nonsense. I don't believe it. You know, what's he really have in mind; what's Ted Moss's big problem?" They just didn't believe the speeches, and I worked very hard on a lot of the speeches and I'm not saying they all were first rate; some of them were good and some weren't. That's the first point. Second, the President wasn't -- in fact Mary McGrory reported and other people did -- that he wasn't at home saying some of these things. He didn't understand it, he never truly understood some of the very complex reclamation matters which frankly I didn't understand myself that well, and he wasn't at home with the speeches. Thirdly, as he relaxed and opened up and he saw the enormous expanse of the country and began thinking in the broader terms which is really his true contribution and our great loss, he started

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thinking about the world situation, fitting the country into the test ban and started making speeches which came much more out of him than the Walter Pozen-Stewart Udall efforts. John, I don't think this meant that the trip was a failure. I think just the opposite. There's a film that's quite a beautiful film, and I hope it's in the Kennedy Library, that the signal corps people took. Did you ever see it?

STEWART: No.

POZEN: It's a very beautiful film *The President's Conservation Trip*.

STEWART: Yes, I think I've heard of it.

POZEN: You just watched him. It's very curious to watch him because he became much more relaxed, he related, he saw. I've gone across this country man, many times and you just can't help but be impressed by the magnitude of it all, the differences, the things' that we've

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done and built. You know, you'd see him at a dam site or you'd see him in some place in Montana or something and you knew that he was truly understanding the nature of the country and the true essence of conservation. In other words, he was rejecting the sort of classical or old fashioned dogmas in relation to conservation, and unfortunately some of our speeches were forced to be couched in these terms because Senator "x" would say, "You've got to mention Hungry Horse, you've got to mention this dam and so on, and you've got to mention that project." So there it would be in the speech. It was a laundry list very often, and he wouldn't want to do it, and in a lot of ways I think he shouldn't have done it. But in terms of the broader understanding of what Stewart has been trying to do and what the Administration's been doing in conservation, a recognition of the land,

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the fact that you've got to save it, you know, this is our true heritage and so on, that the President began to understand and relax and so on. The Press Corps did a real disservice to all. They didn't understand what was going on, they didn't report it that way. They were looking for a gimmick, you know, for the catchy story.

STEWART: This is very interesting. Of course naturally, the President had himself been in these areas so many times before, and it's interesting for you to say that on this particular trip so many of these things started to come to light or, you know, you could actually see a difference in his attitude because of this one trip.

POZEN: I really believe that's true.

STEWART: Whereas he had of course been through these areas so many times before.

POZEN: Yes, but he had been through them in a political sense. For instance, he spent

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the night in Grand Teton as I recall. He had never been there at all. Then he went to another one of these.... You know, these parks are so, I mean one had a tendency when you're working everyday to forget the magnitude of them and the grandeur. I mean, they are just quite spectacular. He was in Yellowstone -- was it Yellowstone or -- yes, he was in Yellowstone and we landed a helicopter there and the conservation people went wild. They thought it was terrible, it's a sacrilege to land a helicopter.

STEWART: Oh, really?

POZEN: There's a picture Stewart had of getting out of the helicopter. Not since he was a kid -- you know, he had spent a summer I guess in Arizona when he was seventeen or eighteen -- had he really been a park setting and a western setting which wasn't truly just

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totally political. It was my feeling that it was a real shot in the arm in terms of seeing the country anew. He always was best when he was campaigning. Let's assume for a moment that he didn't see the things that I'm saying he saw. Just getting out of Washington and walking in Missoula, Montana and seeing Mike Mansfield's father, which was a part of the trip. He was a marvelous old man, and they went to Mike's family home, which was just a very, very modest house. Seeing Kennedy with this old man and Mansfield; it was just a very moving business.

STEWART: You were on the trip then, I assume, all the way?

POZEN: Yes. All the way with LBJ. Go now to somebody else.

STEWART: They had a big problem in Oregon, the Tongue Point controversy. Were you at all

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involved in this?

POZEN: Yes. I just don't remember so many of the details, frankly.

STEWART: Well, Wayne Morse wanted the government to keep it as a school for Indians

and for other things and the state of Oregon wanted to get hold of the rocks for use on roads, and then Morse threatened to investigate GSA [General Services Administration] which was going to turn the thing over to the state of Oregon. Had this been pretty well worked out before?

POZEN: Yes, it was. Senator Morse, in his typical way, really had a fit about it and indicated that we should totally cut Oregon out of the trip until this kind of thing was resolved or he'd blow the whistle and so on. But, it was resolved as I remember. I remember talking to Bernie Boutin [Bernard L. Boutin], who was then the Administrator of GSA, about

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it and so on. I think we did resolve it. I talked to Bill Berg [William Berg, Jr.] who is a Senator Morse's assistant, about it. He came down and saw us; the Senator came down and saw Stewart and so on. It was a big tempest in a teapot. This was the king of thing, John, curiously that militates against this kind of a trip. It's such a chore and it's all... One should never, in understanding contemporary history, underestimate the political motivations of a man like John Kennedy. I mean, people talk about how Johnson is just a great wheeler dealer and always thinking about the politics of a particular situation. But I think I have alluded earlier in some of these meetings that both Kennedy and Johnson were just part of the same spectrum and grew up on the Hill as I did and I still... My first reaction is always to see the political

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ramifications and I'm not embarrassed or ashamed of this. In planning this trip, sure, it had a great deal to do with it. I think that's probably ninety percent of it.

STEWART: You mentioned the way the press unfairly treated this whole thing. Did Pierre Salinger and his office do anything or attempt to do anything to give a different impression of...

POZEN: No.

STEWART: Were they aware of the impression that you were trying to get out of it?

POZEN: No. You know, that's quite a... Pierre is a very attractive, marvelous person, I mean, in terms of being a marvel, and he ran an effective operation it seems to me, but he played their game. He certainly wasn't a reformer in any sense. I don't think he believed it in either. I mean, in other words, I think they just, Kenny O'Donnell and all these people, I'm sure, thought of it as a political operation with a lot of pluses and some minuses,

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the Wayne Morse kind of minus, the Gaylord Nelson kind of minus. I'm just saying watching the President perform and having seen this film a few times, it just reinforced my view that is opened his eyes to a lot of things that he hadn't seen really. I mean, he'd seen, but he hadn't really perceived. It was a tight period for him and he was all tight and getting out of Washington was a great thing. It's like Johnson going back to the ranch. There's the man, when you see him there.

STEWART: Can you remember any anecdotes or anything that the President may have said informally that would serve as an example of his attitude during this trip?

POZEN: Yes. Let me just think.

STEWART: Well, let me go to.... For example, I looked over these speeches and he was, in practically all of them he made some humorous

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was very interesting because when he really didn't understand something he read it very quickly. You know, you could see he just didn't understand it. In one state, I think it was this Utah thing, he read two pages of this material which, as I said, was important locally and important in traditional conversation terms but he didn't understand a damn word of it. He just threw it away. You know, I just watched him carefully. He just took the papers and he just pushed them aside, and then he started talking about what he wanted to talk about. He slowed down and he became animated, and he made his points. That was the turning point in the trip; he didn't give another Pozen speech for quite a while after that until the end of the trip. Then he began thinking about other things like the test ban treaty. There's not so much I can say really about it. I don't remember it in specific detail. Maybe

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I will.

STEWART: Is there anything else about the trip that....

POZEN: No. I think that kicking the press people around a little bit is something that I just felt that.... I never saw anybody say this: I think the White House Press Corps leaves a lot to be desired in the present context and even then, I think that John Kennedy in many ways captured them and they performed a disservice perhaps to the country. I think they are also performing a disservice in reference to Lyndon Johnson. I just think these are very able people as a rule, but it's aplomb and it's something that you're your own boss over there, you pick up your own constituency and you become perhaps....

The paper loses control of you and you report things.... It's very easy to report things as you're told and not to really perform the service that you should perform

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in terms of being a newspaper man. I think this was a perfect example. They didn't understand what the trip was all about and they reported it that way. They looked for the kind of things that you pointed out, that he really didn't understand it all, but I think it was a success. That's as much as I can say.

STEWART: Okay. The Cape Cod National Seashore. This had reached the stage, I assume by the time you got involved in it where it was fairly well through but still there were some problems to be resolved. Let me just ask a general question. How did you originally get involved in the bill?

POZEN: Me personally, or the Department?

STEWART: Well, start with the Department and then personally.

POZEN: We saw President Kennedy shortly after.... Stewart saw him really the first time in terms of policy and program. I don't remember

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the date at all, Sorensen sort of set it up. It again demonstrated the fact that he didn't know a hell of a lot about what the Department was all about, but he sure knew a lot about seashores and about Cape Cod. He knew about this bill which had been kicking around in Congress for at least four or five years. Hastings Keith, the Republican member from Massachusetts who turned out to be one of the sponsors of the bill which passed, was deadly against it. The local pols just didn't know how to play it. Again I don't think they realized the pluses, the political pluses of conservation. And Kennedy, as a Senator, was straddled with that somewhat, but finally came out in favor of the bill. He knew about it and he said -- it sounds corny but it's true -- he said, "I told Stewart I want some parks where the people are. It's great to have those places out there -- meaning I suppose Yellowstone, Yosemite and so on -- "but

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let's get some parks where the people are." He said, "What do you think about Cape Cod?" Stewart said he thought that that was possible, and Kennedy said, "Let's get that done." We did get it done, on his birthday as I recall, it passed on his birthday. It was about ready to go. He did show a real interest in it. He was interested in looking at the maps on what the boundaries looked like because there were differences of opinion on how large it would be and so on. He wanted to know what was included and what wasn't. He had a strong feeling in

terms of these seashore parks, and there had only been one up until Cape Cod and that was Cape Hatteras, which is quite a beautiful place in North Carolina. This was a real personal sort of contribution he made in terms of reinforcing what Stewart already believed. But in the last few years they have created Cape Cod National

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Seashore and Fire Island National Seashore right next to New York, in New York City practically, Assateague National Seashore right here in Maryland. I won't go through them all, but where previously there had been only one, now there's something like eight of them in the United States. Now this was something he specifically was interested in.

STEWART: Didn't this whole bill establish the precedent in that the government was buying land and people were staying on the land for what, twenty five, thirty years?

POZEN: Sometimes a life was taken up there. They lived there for their lifetime. That's very unusual. The problem, John, is that ninety -- I memorized the statistic -- ninety seven percent of the eastern coast is privately owned, and less than three percent, as I recall, is in public ownership, which is just an

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it in essence, so we bought their right to develop it. In other words the title still remains in the people, but they have no right to build a high rise or whatever the case may be.

STEWART: Was there any real criticism that this was being pushed as the first seashore project because it was Cape Cod?

POZEN: Yes, which is perfectly understandable. But sure, oh sure. The H.R. Grosses of Congress just said that Kennedy was buying a playground or something. You know, we were getting Kennedy's own little playground. In fact, I raised this point after this meeting. I said, "Well, Stewart, it seems to me that it would be most helpful if our first park were in Los Angeles." I mean there were the Padre Islands which is a lovely little area, big area near Texas, or Point Reyes which is near San Francisco, another national park that

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we bought. He said no. I thought actually it was sort of a foolish thing politically.

STEWART: Really?

POZEN: Yes.



STEWART: Who at the White House was handling this primarily?

POZEN: O'Brien. You know, it was a legislative thing. As I explained, Henry Wilson and Mike Mantos and Larry didn't help us an awful lot, but this was when that was just about ready to go anyway. It didn't take any great effort or innovation from us to get it through.

STEWART: Okay, unless there's anything else on that....

POZEN: No. I'm glad it did come up.

STEWART: The President's 1962 Conservation Message, which was a big one. Very briefly, or very generally, could you just run over some of the mechanics from your point of view of putting this whole thing together and getting it wrapped up to go into the annual program.?

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POZEN: I had a conversation just the other day in reference to that. That was the first one, so I don't know if I was repeating what I told you before when I was telling the story to one of President Johnson's key aides. Did we talk about this, because it's an interesting story in a sense.

STEWART: No.

POZEN: I had lunch at Paul Young's the other day with someone who I work very closely with since Johnson's been president in the preparation of messages and in preparation of a legislative program. Under, Johnson, strangely enough, it has become a rather organized technique. They have a regular way to do it; they have these task force businesses and so on. Speeches are done; you submit a draft, and so on and so forth. It's really highly systematized. I was saying to this guy, "Well, you know the first conservation message was very

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different" and he wanted to know how it was done. My recollection was something like this. We got the green light on this because there wasn't.... Getting up messages, you know, the State of the Union and these things and so on, this wasn't ever included because this wasn't an annual event. The last one was many years before, and so we had made a suggestion and included in it was this White House Conference, that we have a conservation message as such. We got the word from Sorensen that this would be included in the messages that were going to go up. They were worried about too many messages, because you can flood people with ideas and so on. So we were told to do it so that on the first one, it's very curious

because it was a highly personal kind of thing on Udall's part. We asked various bureaus in the Department to give suggestions.

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John, they were so prosaic and so unattractive and so couched in as I say this sort of classical, traditional kind of cost benefit ratios and commercial fisheries. You know, the kind of thing that you could just erase whether it was Stewart Udall or Secretary Douglas McKay who did the same thing. So the two of us, and I believe John Carver who was then Assistant Secretary and Frank Church's administrative assistant -- later even Under Secretary of the Department of the Interior and he's now a member of the Federal Power Commission, a Commissioner of the Federal Power Commission -- sat there and wrote the damn thing; I mean literally just sat and wrote it. I remember the first line, "I come to talk to you about the American land," which I just did and I thought to myself, "That's so corny that'll never stay," even though I think it has a great meaning to me.

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The way we handled this was after the Udall draft was finished -- I mean literally Stewart's secretary typed the thing out -- we worked until eight or nine o'clock at night -- we sent it over, didn't hear anything about it. And then -- I don't remember the time, maybe a week later, whenever it was -- Ted sent it back with a short fuse, "Please review this in six hours." They sent copies of it to, they circulated to the various agencies because the other agencies had matters entered in the Bureau of the Budget and so on. But there it was, I mean, at least two thirds of it was our language, and Ted had polished it up and so on, but it was our, "I come to talk to you about the American land." It was the kind of thing that people just don't believe really happens. I mean, this was Stewart's speech, and the President had made some changes. He literally made some changes in

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it, I saw it. But this was the first and last time that ever happened. After that it was again much more routinized; the quality of the stuff that we got from the Department was better.

STEWART: Was there much paring down of the number or the scope of the...

POZEN: Recommendations?

STEWART: ...recommendations that were in it?

POZEN: Yes. A lot of red pencil now and then, I suppose. It was money. It seems to me money's always the problem. Where are you going to get the money for this? This was the Bureau of the Budget's great contribution. Their role in government is something, at least in the years when I was working for Udall, was one that

could use a little more exploring. The Sorensen operation used BOB very much, and I would like somebody to really dig and and find out what their contribution had

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been. It's been enormous, I just know. I don't agree with many of the things they did, and they were very antagonistic towards Stewart for being unusual and unorthodox.

STEWART: But there were no real controversies that you can recall over the substance of things as far as the image of the Administration, for example, being too aggressive or going too far in trying to do things that people politically thought should be left either to states or to private enterprise?

POZEN: No, not on that level, John. I think that we never really, I think everyone just assumed that the answers were there. There were arguments on specific proposals, whether this park should be included or that park. Either in this message or the next, for instance, Congressman Henry Reuss had a bill for an area in Wisconsin, and there was great fighting about whether this should be mentioned

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in the message. Henry finally called the President about it, and damn it, you know, we had carefully decided that Pictured Rocks or something in Michigan which is a rather superb area which still hasn't passed yet, we'd leave that out, but we'd thought of that for some time. The list that was included was a very good list, the parks, most of which are areas which have now become national parks and national facilities. We gave a lot of time to them. When the thing finally came out, this Reuss business, which was just an inconsequential thing, was there because at the last minute the politics indicated to do it. Henry called the President and so on.

STEWART: The Water Conservation Fund proposal and the Land and Water Conservation Fund Bill was a part of the 1962 program.

POZEN: That's correct.

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STEWART: What was the basic reasoning for this? Was it purely an attempt to get around the Bureau of the Budget and congressional approval of appropriations for capital investments in parks and monuments and recreational areas?

POZEN: I suppose that's one way of looking at it. We didn't think of it that way. This was again a very personal kind of contribution on the part of the Secretary. I

know how it came about in his mind. He just wanted a financing mechanism to make certain, in almost an automatic way, that if the BOB and the President and the Secretary of the Interior agree that a particular area really made sense, and the Congress obviously had to authorize that there be money available for it, because we always were nickel and dimed to death. "Oh, you know, we don't have a million dollars for that," or "We couldn't."

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He just thought if we had a fund like the Highway Trust Fund which Stewart knew a lot about it because he voted for it in 1956 when it was created and he was a congressman, and like an old dog you learn these lessons and they stick with you. He just thought a highway trust fund for conservation would be a very important contribution that he could make in terms of really getting this thing off the ground. We didn't think of it in terms of getting around BOB, or, you know, back door financing or something, even though that's how it was viewed curiously.

STEWART: Had this idea been kicking around for some time or....

POZEN: No.

STEWART: Was there some other financing arrangement?

POZEN: I've discovered there are very few new ideas in anything and, John, perhaps.... Let me just cover myself by saying that Resources

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for the Future, which is a first rate group, had done a study which appeared about the time of the change in administrations, and I read it carefully. I don't recall, maybe they had ideas about reorganizing the Department of the Interior and having a part of the natural resources and so on. I don't think that this was in there, maybe, I don't know. Like déjà vu, I'm not sure where I got the ideas and so on. But I thought this was a very personal thing that he thought up. We covered this before, but it was very hard sledding where the two of us, with very little help from anybody else it seemed to me, just did the damn thing. I never before or after drafted documents that normally could come up through the regular channels in the Department. I have innumerable -- I dug them out the other day -- memoranda explaining this to the President, explaining this -- you know, one pagers.

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Do a one pager bill explaining it all to everybody. We had so many head knocking sessions with Elmer Staats and with Lee White and we had the session of the Treasury people and

Stan Surrey [Stanley S. Surrey]. It was just heavy going all the way, and we just did something unusual and we didn't get much help of anybody I realize now.

STEWART: This didn't pass until 1964 I don't think.

POZEN: That's right, that's right.

STEWART: It was bogged down all the time.

POZEN: Yes. It was just.... We had to worry about the Ways and Means Committee. We got a great friend of ours, Ed Edmondson, who Stewart knew very well in the House and was a first rate guy, just decided he was going to beat the damn thing because he was very close to the corps of engineers, and the corps of engineers just doesn't like to be part of anything, and felt that some of the inland shipping people felt this

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would be a burden on them because there are tolls collected for the use of certain water areas constructed with federal funds by the corps of engineers. Some of the impalements and a lot of the large reservoirs behind the dams are not run by the Department of the Interior but are run by the corps. You know how the fund works, but the fees the people use for the use of these facilities goes into the fund. A lot of people were worried about.... In other words, the corps was using its own constituency to beat us.

STEWART: The Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission had made this...

POZEN: Oh, I guess that's right.

STEWART: ... a recommendation on this in 1962.

POZEN: I guess that's right.

STEWART: Did you have anything to do with the functioning of this commission, and if so was it....

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activity of America is driving. Fantastic, I mean, in other words, when people were asked what do you do for relaxation, they go for a ride. To me it's rather unattractive but that's true. So out of this came Stewart's thought, which ahs still not born fruit but perhaps it will, is that we're spending all this money on this enormous interstate program to go as fast as hell from one place to another. Why shouldn't we have a system of scenic roads and scenic parkways where you don't go as fast as you can from one place to another? In fact, we've had a proposal kicking around for a while to take on percent of the highway trust fund and use it

for this purpose. Or, I think suggested that, and it's something Stewart is very much interested in, except there's just no money for it.

STEWART: Look, do you....

POZEN: Yes, I think I've got to go.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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