Hyman H. Bookbinder, Oral History Interview – 7/22/1964
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Biographical Note
Bookbinder, a labor leader, civil rights worker, and Special Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce from 1961-1962, discusses John F. Kennedy's (JFK) work on labor legislation during his time in Congress, the Kennedy administration's work on civil rights issues, and addresses various criticisms of JFK and his administration, among other issues.

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John F. Kennedy Library

with Hyman Bookbinder

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Signed: Hyman Bookbinder

Date: April 15, 1971

P.S. I now rescind the limitation re pages 27+28. All of the interview is now released.

H. B.

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By Hyman H. Bookbinder

to the

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Hyman H. Bookbinder

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Oral History Interview

with

Hyman H. Bookbinder

July 22, 1964
Washington, D.C.

By Dan B. Jacobs

For the John F. Kennedy Library

This is the first tape of an interview for the Kennedy Library Oral History done with Hyman H. Bookbinder, former Special Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce. The interview is being done by Mr. Dan B. Jacobs in Mr. Bookbinder's office in Washington on July 22, 1964.

JACOBS: Mr. Bookbinder, would you like to tell us when you first encountered Senator Kennedy [John F. Kennedy] and your work with him while you were with the AFL-CIO?

BOOKBINDER: Yes, I came to Washington from New York City in the latter part of 1950 and actually worked in Washington through the end of 1962. During all this period, of course, John Kennedy was in Washington as a Congressman, a Senator, and then as President. I read about him, I knew about him. In 1953, I started to work at the CIO, and then

in 1955 I worked with the AFL-CIO. In both of these assignments, I was involved in legislative work. In the CIO, I went by the title of Chief of Congressional Research, and in 1955 through 1960, for the AFL-CIO, I was Legislative Representative. In both these

connections, I worked closely with people on the Hill and, of course, as a lobbyist, which is what I was for these years, I contacted Senators and Congressman, and I did get to follow the work of Senator Kennedy pretty closely in those years before he ran for President.

JACOBS: Did you work with the Senator and his staff on pieces of legislation and assist them in preparation of legislation?

BOOKBINDER: Yes, I did, frequently. I went, first, to solicit support for legislation we were for and also to help to develop with them pieces of legislation they were interested in introducing, and also to help them to understand proposals that were before the Congress. I worked in that connection to some extent with the Senator himself, but as is always the

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case, you work a lot more with the assistants, and these included Ted Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen] for a number of years. In ‘58, I think it was, Mike Feldman [Myer Feldman] joined the staff, and I became rather close with Mike in the last years of the Senator’s career. I also got to know Ted Reardon [Timothy J. Reardon, Jr.] and Ralph Dungan [Ralph A. Dunagn] during that period. And, of course, in the last years, Senator Kennedy was very much interested in labor legislation—1959 was the famous year of the Landrum-Griffin Act in which Senator Kennedy played such a prominent role.

JACOBS: Did you want to say anything further about the Landrum-Griffin Act?

BOOKBINDER: Well, during these last years as Senator, I recall several special pieces of legislation in which the Senator was interested and with which his name is intimately associated. First, he was the original proponent and continued to be a principal sponsor of what has come to be know as trade adjustment legislation. This was a proposal to provide special government assistance

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for companies, employees, and communities adversely affected by imports to this country through the lowering of tariffs. This was a very progressive concept and especially for John Kennedy it was a really significant move, because coming as he did from an area of the country that was significantly affected by growing imports in textiles, the safest, the most convenient position for such a Senator would be merely to be for high tariffs. However, he wasn’t playing it safe. Kennedy was the principal sponsor of the concept that you just can’t use tariff walls to meet the special problems that we have; there just has to be an increase in trade; but the country has an obligation to recognize that if increased trade resulting from a lowering of tariffs does result in a dislocation of an industry or an area, then since this was done in the interest of tie country as a whole, the country as a whole has an obligation to provide some help for the community or industry or workers to adjust to the dislocation.

This concept was developed but it did not get adopted as national policy until he became president, when in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 there was finally incorporated a provision on trade adjustment. This, of course, was a major contribution of his.

The Senator was always interested in immigration reform. Unhappily, he never really lived to see any significant changes in our immigration law. He continued to propose it, although I must say that during his presidency he was subject to a good bit of criticism for not pushing immigration as much as he had pushed it then he had been a senator. His interest, I know, continued strong in immigration and as the country knows, in the months before he died, he was in fact backing some significant changes in immigration, including some revolutionary changes in the concept. So his interest in immigration was a continuing one.

He was a very active member of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee and was associated

with much of labor legislation. There is no need to recite here the obvious things like minimum wages and other pieces of legislation, education among them. He was very prominently and importantly associated with the Landrum-Griffin Labor Reform Act of 1959, and in this area I must say that for me personally his behavior during this piece of legislation stamped him in my mind as a real solid citizen because not only did he make important substantive contributions towards developing a sound piece of legislation, but he was engaged, for a politician, in a very, very, difficult, dangerous game. It was almost impossible to come out of this unscathed. No matter what position one took, unless it be that of no legislation, the labor movement was not likely to look kindly upon you and, as a matter of fact, large segments of the labor movement, even after the legislation was enacted, continued to feel very bitterly about Jack Kennedy. That includes a major and progressive union like the Machinists Union. Needless to say,

the Teamsters were most unhappy, but somehow this man managed, through his skill and his sensitivity and his knowledge of the labor movement, nevertheless to carry this thing through and get the support in the final analysis and the respect of George Meany, Walter Reuther [Walter P. Reuther], and the main elements of organized labor. Now there were doubts, there were criticisms, there was skepticism voiced about Kennedy's role, including suggestions made by some that we call it the Kennedy Labor Reform Act. This, of course, was a nasty suggestion; the final version was the best that Kennedy could get. By best, of course, I mean a combination of an act which really did impose some new requirements on labor to conduct honest trade unionism, but which also didn't operate in a punitive way, punishing honest unions, putting obstacles in the way of honest unions because some unions are dishonest. He carried it through well and successfully. That this man, after being largely responsible for a law which most labor bitterly resisted even with

the improvements made by him, for him to be able to get the enthusiastic endorsement a year later by the organized labor movement, this I would say is a major feat.

JACOBS: This was in 1959 when it was already quite clear to him that he had presidential ambitions?

BOOKBINDER: Oh, yes.

JACOBS: And it was clear to the public? Did you understand at that time that he was at all motivated by the fact that his brother, Robert [Robert F. Kennedy], was deeply involved in disclosing the Teamsters Union? What was his motivation in this particular struggle, since he was jeopardizing his chances of union support?

BOOKBINDER: Well, let's balance off that I have said. After all, labor was not John Kennedy's only constituency or only potential support. He, of course, had to weigh the cost of doing nothing in this area or just doing blindly what labor wanted. If he had done that, he would have lost other support. So again, he was a skillful, talented, balanced kind

of politician, but the tribute that I meant to pay to him a moment earlier is that after weighing all this, he managed to play what I consider to be a very wholesome and progressive role in getting a bill that was about as balanced as that tense period of labor hysteria made possible. You will recall that that was the height of the Hoffa [James Riddle Hoffa] investigations and if the Congress, at least large elements of the Congress, of the American people were permitted to write labor legislation without adequate hearings and safeguards, this would in fact have been what some people were calling a "slave labor act." like they had called the Taft-Hartley once before. So everything considered, I think the labor movement's final judgment was, and I think the American people's judgment was, that the Landrum-Griffin Act, despite the fact that it had some onerous provisions, with the contributions that Jack Kennedy made to it, and some others, of course, was a fairly responsible piece of legislation, everything considered. It

didn't have the worse features in it that had been feared.

JACOBS: I think that you wanted to comment here about the attitude of the liberal community in the United States toward Senator Kennedy, dating all the way back to the period of Senator McCarthy [Joseph R. McCarthy] and leading up to Kennedy's ambitions to run for the presidency.

BOOKBINDER: Yes, I would like to comment about that general question. I must preface it by saying that this won't be a very factual kind of commentary but rather an impression by one man who has been involved in the liberal, civil rights, and labor movement for some twenty-five years now. I think that it is accurate to say that, if I may give you my last line first, until the day of his death, Jack Kennedy was not really loved, at least consciously and knowingly loved, by the great bulk of what we have come to know as the labor and civil rights movement as well as the liberal and ADA [Americans for Democratic Action] movements.

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It is not accurate to say he was loved by them. They accepted him, and certainly as against Nixon [Richard Milhous Nixon], they had no difficulty in choosing whom to vote for, but there was an aloofness from him, a feeling that he was not quite good enough, or working strongly enough, or liberal enough, or courageous enough. There were all these reservations about him expressed, but it had to take this type of end to his career to shake people, to make them confess to themselves that over the three-year period of his presidency they had really come to love him; they had come to understand him and accept him; respect him and love him. It was difficult for them, before this (I'm talking about my friends) to concede that he was as good as he turned out to be. After his tragic death, and I guess it is because of his tragic death too, they went way out in their tributes to him. The ironic thing that happened for awhile was that I found it necessary and advisable to say to people with whom for years I had been debating, and in which debates

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I was always taking the pro-Kennedy side—I was saying, "Now wait a minute, he was not quite as good as you are now saying he was. Don't go overboard, maybe it's your guilt that is making you say that. Be a little bit more objective about your evaluation."

What was it that I found among many of my friends in the liberal movement, the ADA movement of which I am a member? I think it stems in large part from that first image they had of Jack Kennedy which flowed from a role which has yet to be made completely clear to me and to others—Jack Kennedy's role during the McCarthy days: a feeling that he was at best evading the issue and at worst really being pro-McCarthy, but he didn't dare say explicitly that he was pro-McCarthy; a feeling that his unfortunate illness in 1954 was just a great convenience for him; it was just a lovely opportunity for him to avoid the issue. I think that if it had been anything other than a back operation with x-rays to prove it, they would have said that he was

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feigning sickness. A large part of the liberal community never did forgive Kennedy for something less than all-out opposition to McCarthy and failure to make explicit attacks on him. I happen to think that history is going to have to judge Kennedy on this issue in terms of

everything else he has done in related matters. I must say, I don't want to sound so different from everybody, there were a number of years when I too was not the happiest guy in the world. I would have loved to have everybody shout "Down with McCarthy!"

In addition to this issue, in the middle and the end of the 50's too, the Kennedy posture was not the kind that appealed easily to the all-out liberals. He didn't make the Humphrey [Hubert H. Humphrey] kind of speeches. He didn't appeal to the liberals with the traditional phrases and clichés and slogans of liberalism, and so he didn't win their great fervor, which was necessary if he was going to make up for this McCarthy lapse. Also, I think, and this is a difficult thing, I am not

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sure that I am saying it right, or that I really understand just what it is that I am trying to say, but there was a period when the intellectuals, the ADA kind of intellectuals, almost resented way-out intellectualism. Kennedy was not enough the politician, was in his own way too much the intellectual, above the battle. There were personality factors to contribute to it, but the fact is, and this is the only thing that I can report—the other things are general impressions—that in the primary period of 1960 and in the election period, I could probably name on my fingers of one hand the number of associates I had who were for Kennedy in a positive way. They were accepting Kennedy but very few had really great things to say for Kennedy. They said, "Of course we'll vote for him against Nixon, but why do you have to be so all-out for him?" Even in the first couple of years in the Administration, while I was here in Washington, rarely did I hear volunteered statements of praise for Kennedy for things he had

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done, but always kept running into people who complained and asked, "Why isn't he doing more on minimum wages? Why isn't he doing more on civil rights? Why is he afraid to sign the housing order? Why doesn't he do something about the nuclear testing?" Well, I suppose there is nothing wrong with that but I can't help feel these complaints mirrored lingering doubts about the basic liberalism of this man. I don't remember the Roosevelt [Franklin Delano Roosevelt] days too well, but the liberals in the Roosevelt days, as I do remember them, the liberals' attitude was to explain Roosevelt, not to attack him. If he did less than the best they had a ready explanation for it, but very few liberals were ready to have explanations for Kennedy doing less than the best.

JACOBS: When you were working with him closely when he was a senator, did you yourself sense that he was somewhat more conservative than a Hubert Humphrey would have been, or did you share this feeling?

BOOKBINDER: Cautious is the word.

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JACOBS: Did you regard him perhaps in the realm of economics as more conservative?

BOOKBINDER: Somewhat, yes, but when it came down to the final test on issues that I was interested in, the ones that I was lobbying for, the ones that I was personally supporting, I never had any fault, or almost never had any fault, with his actual voting performance. I must add that if I have any criticism, it is that Kennedy wasn't the most active senator in that body. He was not around as much as a Humphrey would be around, or a Douglas [Paul H. Douglas] would be around. He seemed to have some other interests. He attended to the business that he had to, work that flowed from his committee legislation that he was personally sponsoring. Again, he didn't do these things that endear a senator to his principal constituents, and so that too contributed to something less than enthusiastic attitudes about him. Then there were personality factors that played a role, I am sure. He was not again, the kind of guy, like Douglas or Humphrey and others, who easily threw his arm around you and

embraced you. These are all factors that added up to a general image of a man who was cold, a man who really didn't care terribly much about the issues even though he voted right on them.

If I may now, Mr. Jacobs, offer this comment here about those years: the thing that impressed me most about those years, and the thing which sustained my interest in him and led to my support of him, was an evaluation of him that included the following factors:

First, he was an extremely intelligent person. You couldn't help but be impressed with his intelligence and educability. The ability of this man to get a briefing on something new, to use that briefing immediately in a most intelligent and comprehensive way, and bring to what you told him all of the things in his own experience that helped round out that picture, this was really a fascinating thing. In my own years of experience with people, I could name just two or three other people who have this ability. I think that Walter Reuther has this kind of ability, an ability to grasp and understand

and relate things; Hubert Humphrey has this ability; but there are just not very many who have this facility. I was convinced as '60 came around that here was a man who, whether he felt it in his heart—and some people doubted that he did—was making commitments to the liberal causes. He understood the liberal cause, had a commitment to it, and he had the intelligence to pursue the liberal cause, and those were important factors and qualities to me. The liberals, and I think I ought to round out this comment with observation, I think those liberals who had scoffed, who had been suspicious and so on, by the time of his death had become persuaded that this man had managed to behave in such a way during his presidency that maximized the progress that could be made on the important issues. He did it in a style that was different from others, but he did it nevertheless. I know that I was myself irritated at

some individual things he did or failed to do, but when one looked back at this period one had to have the kind of

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respect that became apparent after he died, that everybody shared.

Let me talk now briefly about a specific issue that documents what I have been trying to say here. I want to talk about John Kennedy and the White House generally and the Administration on executive action in the field of civil rights. I know of no better way to put this in perspective than to tell you about an initial meeting that I attended in April or May of 1961 of a group that came to be known as the Sub-Cabinet Group on Civil Rights. This was a body put together by the administration of people at the assistant secretary level in every agency of the government. This first meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House, as were almost all the subsequent meetings.

I will never forget the impact of that first meeting. The very fact that it was in the White House, that it was in the Cabinet Room, was itself symbolic of the importance attached to it. At that meeting no fewer than three presidential assistants were dispatched to run that meeting. The three

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were Fred Dutton [Frederick G. Dutton], who was a special assistant to the President and who since went on to do some other jobs in the administration, Harris Wofford [Harris L. Wofford, Jr.], who was presidential assistant, and Ted Reardon, who was at that time holding the title of Secretary to the Cabinet, and that post itself was very important for the purpose of this meeting.

Fred Dutton was the principal spokesman, and the others participated. In a businesslike, humorless fashion (I resented the fact that it was humorless at the time, but as I look back the importance of it is significant), we were told this: “In the judgment of this administration, we cannot look for significant legislative action. We have some laws on the books now; the courts have been magnificent by and large. Now the executive branch has got to start acting. Of the three branches of the federal government, the one that has been most deficient has been the executive branch, and in the judgment of the President and the judgment of the Attorney General, there is

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lots more that can be done through executive action.” We were told, “You are the fellows who are going to have to do it, and you are going to be accountable to us. We are going to meet regularly; we are going to get reports from you. This administration means to make progress in the field of civil rights.” I can assure you, Mr. Jacobs, that when we left that room, we knew they meant business. Now this continued to be the pattern. This was the pattern; this was the nature of the administration’s insistence upon executive action until the very, very last day.

Now, part of this picture is also a story of failure to do some things. The most significant instance of failure and the kind of failure which I am afraid misled lots of people into thinking that nothing, therefore, was being done. There was a long period of time, perhaps it was a year, I am not sure of the number of months now, when the administration was known to be considering an executive order on housing, discrimination in housing, and this, too, was a case of executive action. The administration was timid on this one, was careful, was cautious.

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It did take a long time before it was done and you may remember that we were needled very easily and successfully on this one because in one of the most famous of his speeches in 1960, Kennedy had said that discrimination in housing can be wiped out with the stroke of a pen—and people were now asking, "When is that stroke going to be made with that pen?" In case nobody else has jotted down this little footnote to history, let me jot it down right now. In the last months before the piece of paper was finally signed, there was a campaign by some Negro organizations that involved sending bottles of ink to the President, and thousands of bottles of ink were sent to him as a very dramatic gesture of insistence that he finally use some ink and sign that piece of paper.

Well, why was there this delay? Well, first, because there was some honest and very serious doubts about the legal rights of the White House to move in this field, how far and how fast it could move. In any case, there certainly were

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doubts about how far and fast it could move without dire consequences, legislative and political consequences, and here comes the key to much of the Kennedy Administration's behavior in civil rights and other areas—a constant awareness that the legislative situation was not a comfortable one for this administration. Always, the President would remind his listeners, and I was privileged to participate in some meetings in here this point was made—as he talked to advisory committees or he talked to his own Cabinet people—to remind people how thin is the support that he could muster at best in Congress for action, and how easily he could be punished if he did things that really stirred up the animals. It was this constant awareness of the difficulties to make legislative progress that was inhibiting not only his legislative proposals but some of his executive action.

JACOBS: Well, the charge was often made during that period that Senator John F. Kennedy had been very junior to the elders who ran the Senate and still felt

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deferential toward them. Do you feel that this was the case, that he was merely exercising prudence in regard to his legislative program and the difficulties of getting it through with senators in key positions who were predominantly from the South?

BOOKBINDER: Yes, I think it is a fact, but I not quite sure I understand the reference to deference. Let's see if I.... I'll say it in my own way. I think that there was something less of the traditional Presidential prerogative that Kennedy exercised in his relationship because they had been his seniors. I don't think that he felt particularly comfortable banging a table with Russell [Richard B. Russell, Jr.] present. Not that I was ever present, but from the reports that I got, I can understand that. If that is what you mean, I agree completely. I am certain that Lyndon Johnson [Lyndon Baines Johnson] finds it a lot easier and more comfortable to do that kind of table pounding than Jack Kennedy did. Mostly, I would rather use the word you used a moment ago, prudence. It was an evaluation that whether he pounded the table or

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not, he simply didn't have the votes, and while he respected, I know he did, and even desired frequently the criticism of outside groups who said that we should move faster, he felt that his responsibility as president was to get the best possible legislative progress he could and just to take a position for position's sake is something which he very rarely did.

JACOBS: Shall we go on to the civil rights discussion or shall we go back chronologically to the 1959-1960 period before President Kennedy had become President? Let's go back to the period before Senator Kennedy had started running in the primaries. What was your attitude then toward Senator Kennedy? Was he your preference for the presidency, or did you have other choices? This is relevant to your future relationships with the Kennedy Administration.

BOOKBINDER: Well, if you think it is relevant, I will comment here. What I am going to tell you now, I said pretty frankly to everybody that was interested then, so I am not revealing anything. I was very,

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very pro-Kennedy and at the same time very, very pro-Humphrey. If it had ever been my own problem to vote in a primary, I must say here that I would have voted for Humphrey against Kennedy if I had to make that choice. The position that I took with both the friends of Humphrey and Kennedy was that both of them constituted ideal candidates and would be ideal presidents; I therefore wished very much for a Humphrey-Kennedy or Kennedy-Humphrey ticket. These two men were my only two men for the candidacy for the presidency and the moment that Humphrey was out of the race after West Virginia, I, of course, had no problem whatsoever. I was now a one candidate man still hoping, of course, that Humphrey could be tapped for the vice presidency, but it soon became less feasible. I want to make reference to a letter I got from Hubert Humphrey on April 27, 1960, which I think—my judgment right now, and I might change it later on—is that this ought not to be part of the public record for at least 10 or 15 years, but let me note now that this letter is a letter

written to me by Hubert Humphrey during the final days of the West Virginia after a particularly disturbing attack on him. Let me read a few key sentences. After telling about some of the unfortunate developments, he says:

> "I don't like it—I consider the attack by FDR Jr. [Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.] irresponsible and one that I shall not forget—I am sorry this happened, because up until this moment I had felt that nothing could cause me to feel any sense of bitterness and therefore, I would be very free to switch support to Kennedy if my delegation were of that mind."

And then he adds:

> "I don't feel that way any longer. I consider this attack a low blow—one that is unforgivable and one that was undoubtedly sponsored by and cleared by Kennedy since he has been saying repeatedly that he was going to attack me on my war record."

Humphrey goes on to say that Kennedy knows all about this attack on his war record and that he is not going to get by with this kind of an attack. "He will pay for it dearly in the months ahead." Humphrey ends his letter to me by saying, "Sorry to have to say this but I resent what has happened very much." The point I want to make in reciting

this letter for the record is that this is a tribute, it seems to me not only to Kennedy, but to Humphrey, that despite this harsh feeling, this terrible blow, this terrible resentment that Hubert Humphrey felt, he did not find it difficult at, all, within months after this, first, to be a strong campaigner for Senator Kennedy and then, of course, to be the magnificent and loyal majority whip and friend of the President that we all know about. I also think, of course, that it is a tribute to the late President that he was able to command this kind of respect and friendship despite such a disagreeable incident in West Virginia and a disagreeable battle between the two men.

JACOBS: What role did you play during the 1960 Presidential campaign, Mr. Bookbinder?

BOOKBINDER: During the campaign, I took on a special assignment, a part time volunteer effort, working every evening, and sometimes through the night, to publish a document called "Correction, Please." It was usually a four-page document put out every two days to answer the principal charges and distortions that

the Nixon campaign had issued about the Democratic candidate and the campaign. This was sent out to a "hot list" of several thousand people responsible for the campaign. (A full set of it can be made available for the Library if one doesn't exist, and I invite that request. I have only one set left, but I would be glad to contribute it for the Library.) One of my proudest mementos of my of my association with the President is a letter he sent me after the campaign thanking me for this special effort on behalf of his candidacy. In addition to that, I did some speech-writing and generally assisted in anyway I could. I was working at the time for the AFL-CIO and did, of course, participate in labor's own efforts on behalf of the Democratic ticket.

JACOBS: It was in March of 1961 that you were asked to join the Kennedy Administration, is that right?

BOOKBINDER: That is right. I had had a couple of years of experience in the Commerce Department back in the early 1950's in connection with the Korean War. This probably is the principal reason why Arthur

Goldberg [Arthur J. Goldberg], who is an old friend and who had been tapped for the Secretary of Labor position, recommended to the administration and to the White House—I do not know whether he said anything to Jack Kennedy himself; I know he talked to the White House people—that I be invited to come in as a special assistant to Luther Hodges [Luther H. Hodges], who had been named Secretary of Commerce, to demonstrate the basic philosophy of the administration that it doesn't view labor and management as antagonists only but as possible allies in some of the important programs of the government. As Arthur Goldberg put it, he was naming a businessman to be Assistant Secretary of Labor, and he saw no reason why the Secretary of Commerce should not have somebody like me with a labor background on his staff. To the everlasting credit of Governor Hodges, who after all, had a background which was not a pro-labor, liberal background, he readily agreed; he thought this was a good concept, and he invited me to come over. After interviewing me, he decided that he did want me to be on his staff. The two principal

activities of mine in the years that I served as special assistant were the field of labor and the broad field of civil rights and human rights activities. I must say now that it is a tribute to the whole administration that a man like Luther Hodges—a man who came from a Southern state, and who himself had for many years been accused of being a vicious anti-union employer—could be the kind of loyal team-player that he was. In all of the years of my association—they are now three-and-a-half, for it continued after I left his Department—I always found him ready and prepared to do what the administration thought was wise and what he in time learned himself was right—to further desegregation and to work towards a cooperative relationship between labor and management.

JACOBS: What kind of activities did you work on in the Commerce Department?

BOOKBINDER: Well, of course, as a man with labor background, I was primarily a labor advisor to the Secretary. I participated most actively in the work of the President's Advisory Committee on Labor Management

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Policy. This was a tri-partite committee created by President Kennedy with rotating chairmanships between the Commerce and Labor Departments. This was another indication of the kind of labor-management common understanding that the administration tried to develop. During the first year it was Secretary Goldberg who chaired the committee, and then it went over to Secretary Hodges, and by the time it went back to the Labor Department, it was Secretary Wirtz [Willard Wirtz] and now, at this time, it is back in the Commerce Department for its fourth year of operation. This committee, by the way, has already achieved an enviable record, a historic record without precedent. While some would say, with some merit, that there were no supreme achievements that could be pointed to that flowed from this committee, the very fact of the continued existence of this committee into a fourth year of operation is itself a marvel of accomplishment.

There were a number of earlier attempts dating back twenty or thirty years to create such a tri-partite body, and every one of them collapsed

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after the first disagreement in the committee. Somehow, this one has persisted and has persisted first, I think, because Arthur Goldberg was such a very skillful organizer and helped to establish a tone, but in addition, and I guess primarily, it was a tone established by John Kennedy himself. Now this was not just a handpicked liberal businessman's committee—you can always put on four or five stooges and call them businessmen and take four or five labor people and call them labor people and say you have a labor-management committee. Included among the businessmen were Henry Ford, II, with whom there were many battles in the course of the work of this committee but who remained a very loyal and devoted friend of the committee. Then there was Joe Block [Joseph L. Block] of Inland Steel, who, while a liberal businessman, was a Republican and spoke out frankly; there was Dick Reynolds [Richard S. Reynolds, Jr.] of Reynolds Aluminum; there was General Franklin [John M. Franklin] of U.S. Lines; there was the editor of *Business Week*, Elliot Bell [Elliot V. Bell];

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there was Arthur Burns [Arthur F. Burns], the former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors. There was a feeling established in that committee that it must exist, it must continue, it must be a symbol of the potential of labor-management cooperation. Within the first year of its work the committee did in fact agree on what I believe is an historic

document. This first statement dealt with the important issue of automation and, while the problem is far from licked—as a matter of fact new presidential commissions on automation are being formed almost every day—I think the basic philosophy stated in that resolution continues to be the basic philosophy that must guide all thinking and all action in the field. It was a remarkable day when people like Walter Reuther and George Meany on the one hand, and these businessmen on the other, plus some in-between people (labor arbitrators like George Taylor [George William Taylor]) all agreed on this statement; that there are three principles to which we all ascribe, labor and management included. The first principle of that statement is that automation, like other

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technological changes, has been and can be and is a boon to mankind, that only from this will come a higher standard of living. Secondly, all of them agreed that advances in technology and automation must be pursued with due consideration for the human values involved. And thirdly, in order for this to happen (to take care of human values) both government and the private sector must develop and implement proper policies that will help people adjust to changes in technology.

Now, of course, these are aphorisms in a way. They are generalizations. But for a George Meany and a Walter Reuther, and the other labor leaders (like Al Hayes [Albert J. Hayes] to subscribe to a statement—this was back in 1961—that automation is a blessing, can be a blessing, is a boon, was itself a revolutionary bit of progress. I believe that the kind of things they heard Jack Kennedy say, the kind of attitude that he displayed, helped get that agreement.

I ought to add as a footnote that I do believe that it is accurate and fair to say that perhaps

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those very words, if they had been included in a resolution during an Eisenhower Administration [Dwight D. Eisenhower], might not have gotten the approval of the labor people. Saying this doesn't negate what I was saying earlier. In other words, this was done in the context of a Kennedy in the White House; therefore, there was the confidence that you can develop programs which will help workers, which will help industry, and will be good for the nation at large.

JACOBS: Do you want to comment in any other way on the relationship of President Kennedy to the labor leaders of the AFL-CIO during his administration? Did it change? Was it evolving? Have you any particular comments about that?

BOOKBINDER: No, I have no particular comments. I think that Kennedy always felt pretty comfortable with labor people. I think he had a higher regard for some than for others, but I think that is perfectly natural.

JACOBS: Do you have any other aspects of your work at Commerce or do you want to go on to civil rights?

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BOOKBINDER: Let me say a few more words on civil rights because I think I made the point that there was this determination to make progress in the field of civil rights. Now determination is important and, of course, was basic and it was helpful, but the administration, I believe even today, is still not satisfied with the amount of progress that has come from all of these efforts. I can document this with just a personal observation about the work that I tried, for example, to do in the Commerce Department. Under this general mandate and command from the White House and from Luther Hodges, in terms of our own employment practices for civil service workers in the Commerce Department, we got everybody saying the right things, everybody knew the right words, everybody said that we had to recruit and motivate and place and promote Negroes as much as possible. I believe that for the most part there was a desire to implement these words, but translating the words into concrete results was just another matter. Finding the Negroes to recruit, meeting the resistance of the

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old-line bureaucrats including many who were themselves prejudiced, developing ways of checking on whether there was in fact discrimination involved in failure to promote somebody, these are mighty difficult things to do and there were frustrations upon frustrations as we tried to do this type of thing. Perhaps the greatest frustration, the greatest difficulty, the greatest disappointment in the administration as a whole, which hopefully will now be corrected by the new legislation just passed, was the desire not to use federal money anywhere to further discrimination, to support discrimination; but one always had to make the difficult decisions of whether you permit a hospital to be built, whether you permit this kind of grant to be made even though you know discrimination will continue. How big a price are you ready to pay for a symbol of desegregation in a given situation: is it more important to win a battle on discrimination or is it more important to have the kids educated for another year? Or have more hospital beds built? These are not easy decisions to make, and, of course,

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during this period too, in the absence of clear, legislative authority moving across the board in this area, withholding funds from segregated facilities did raise questions about whether we could be sustained. It also, of course, stirred the Congress into resistance. Of course, in the field very few people challenged us as to propriety, in the field of government contracts, nobody would argue that we didn't have the right to write such a clause into the contract and there, I think, the record is very good. This committee was headed by the then-Vice President Johnson, and with the full power of the White House behind it, there was substantial progress made both in contract employment and general government employment.

One final word on civil rights. Perhaps the administration should have been more forthright in demanding civil rights legislation earlier than it was. We'll never know. There'll be no way of ever testing whether an earlier insistence on civil rights would have worked or not. My own personal,

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subjective evaluation is this: that even this year, in this past year, even with the "hot summer" of last year, and the threatening hot summer of 1964, I think it is one of those sad facts of life one has to recognize that Jack Kennedy, the assassinated President, was more successful than Jack Kennedy the living President. His death, first the fact of his death, and secondly, the succession of Lyndon Johnson at this time, made a successful legislative campaign easier for a number of reasons. In a way, it was a kind of tribute to Jack Kennedy; secondly, Lyndon Johnson was "emceeing" this legislative campaign at a time of his maximum acceptance and effectiveness. For him this was the first year of the administration. For Jack Kennedy, it would have been the fourth. Lyndon Johnson was a Southerner and that, while it also created some problems for him, also meant some help for him.

I've got to state for the record now that I was myself unhappy. While I was not as critical as some of my friends, certainly not publicly as critical, I would have liked a more positive posture

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for legislation. It is a fact that the record is already clear that even until his last days, Jack Kennedy did not think that fair employment provisions were possible in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but it turned out that it was possible; as you know, it was incorporated in the final legislation.

JACOBS: I believe that President Kennedy never took a strong stand on civil rights as a moral issue until June 1963 at the time of the Birmingham disorders. Is that true?

BOOKBINDER: I don't know; you get into semantics here. Certainly his June 1963 statements were all out, were as moral as you can make a statement, but it's not fair. I don't mean that you are not fair; I know that you are quoting. It's not fair to say that his earlier position was not a moral position. I think that the action I have already described, earlier statements, campaign statements of his, the statement he made at the beginning of the Centennial, the Emancipation Centennial, all of these were in the context of a moral position. These things are

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to be done because they are right. Of course, in June of 1963, by that time, everybody was making much more eloquent and moving and emotional statements about civil rights, and that includes Jack Kennedy.

I will never forget the speech he made near the end of the campaign in 1960 in New York at a special meeting called of the civil rights division of the campaign, and all one has to do is go back to that speech to know that the framework of Jack Kennedy's civil rights proposals were always in the context of a high, moral position.

JACOBS: Had you already departed from the government on a leave of absence at the time that the Civil Rights Act legislation which was finally passed in 1964 was being framed? Or did you participate in the development of the bill that was introduced in early 1963?

BOOKBINDER: I don't now have any calendar here with me so I can't be sure of this. I do know that by January 1963, which was when I left Washington, there were already discussions of the kinds of things that

the administration would be sponsoring. I don't believe that a bill had been prepared as yet. By the way, let me go back for a minute and round out the story of the Sub-Cabinet Group on Civil Rights. That body continues until this day, and, while it is not as active now and it hasn't been in recent months as it was at the beginning, it continues to be the basic entity, the basic vehicle for quickly getting information on a broad range of civil rights matters to all the departments through the assistant secretary level. At the present time, I represent the Office of Economic Opportunity.

There was one other thing that existed in the period when I was in Washington, and I was very privileged and very happy to be a part of, that I think the record ought to include. I was part of a very, very small group of persons who constituted what we then called the Ad Hoc Committee on Civil Rights. This was a group that never numbered more than eight—seven or eight—individuals who were there as individuals working with Presi-

dential assistants in an informal group to advise on civil rights. It wasn't a formal sub-committee of the Sub-Cabinet Group, just a number of people including one or two from outside the government.

JACOBS: Was it a changing membership?

BOOKBINDER: No, the participants at any given meeting changed somewhat, but the membership of the group consisted of Harris Wofford for the White House (he left sometime in 1962 to go to the Peace Corps—while I was there, he was the presiding man); Burke Marshall, assistant Attorney General; John Feild [John G. Feild] at the time Executive Director of the President's Equal Employment Opportunity Committee; Harold Fleming [Harold C. Fleming] from the Potomac Institute, who is today, by the way, Acting Deputy to LeRoy Collins in the Community Relations Service (he wasn't in government, but he was an advisor to government at all levels on the

whole question of civil rights); Berl Bernhard [Berl I. Bernhard], staff director of the Civil Rights Commission. I am trying to think whether there was anybody from the Labor Department—no, there wasn't—and I served. Now I didn't serve as a

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Commerce Department representative. I served because of my own long association in the civil rights movement and interest in it. There was also Louis Martin [Louis E. Martin], Deputy Chairman of the Democratic Committee. He didn't serve wearing that hat as much as he was also a part-time White House advisor on civil rights. He is a Negro. This group served informally, without records, without notes, but met quite regularly—for the most part once a week—in Harris Wofford's office to take a look at the whole civil rights picture, undisturbed by protocol, undisturbed by regulations or law, but just asking: what is it this administration ought to be doing in the field of civil rights? What *could* we do? While the President never participated in these meetings, through Burke Marshall, through Harris Wofford, the benefit of our thinking was always transmitted to him. I think this was a useful thing. I don't believe that there is anything comparable to that going on right now but, of course, there are a number of people in the White House itself who are today very actively involved in civil

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rights matters and, therefore, it makes the other kind of committee less necessary.

This group, by the way, started working and talking just days after the election of 1960, and provided some of the plans which later materialized for increased executive action.

JACOBS: Did you have any other particular roles or duties while you were in Commerce that you want to speak on before we go on to the fact that you left the Administration temporarily in 1962? Are there any other important functions in Commerce that should be brought out here?

BOOKBINDER: Yes, let me just list activities that I was involved in just as a checklist for others to go back to get the full story. I assume that they will be in the record. I did participate in the President's Commission on the Status of Women, the Commission chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt [Eleanor R. Roosevelt]. As a matter of fact, this was my key to Eleanor Roosevelt. I got to know her personally that way and this was one of the reasons, I suppose, that later I was asked if I would direct the Eleanor Roosevelt Foundation. This

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commission, as I hope the record will be filled in by others, did play a pioneering role in the whole field of equal opportunities for women. There were important civil service changes that resulted from the work of that commission. The Equal Pay Act was finally enacted as a result of the thrust that this commission gave that work and, in general, it contributed a lot to the acceptance of this hope of the administration that more women could be brought into

both government and the private sector. As you know, the present President, Lyndon Johnson, has made a great thing out of bringing more women into the federal government.

I also served on the special panel, appointed by the President, called the Panel of Consultants on Vocational Education. President Kennedy was keenly aware of the need to beef up every aspect of our education system that affected the employment potentials for our young people. A number of programs, of course, were enacted—Manpower Development Training [Act] (the MDTA), ARA [Area Redevelopment Administration], but as a result of the work

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of this particular panel, I am very pleased that federal assistance to vocational education was tripled, the extent of support was tripled through legislation that was passed a year ago, resulting in large part because of this panel.

There was also the President's Committee on Youth Employment, where I represented the Commerce Department and where again some recommendations have come out which in part support the present poverty program which has a major emphasis for youth employment. There are a few others like that, the President's Council on Aging, and other committees that I represented for the Department.

JACOBS: Did you want to make a comment about the way that President Kennedy dealt with the Commissions in his meetings with Advisory Committees, private citizens, *et cetera*?

BOOKBINDER: I would guess that there must be about a dozen occasions when I saw President Kennedy in action with citizens' committees, tri-partite committees. Half of this dozen times, I suppose, was in connection with the Labor-Management Committee, but

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also I saw him participating in these various committees I just listed for you. I can give you my personal evaluation. I never ceased being impressed with how adept he was, at how effective he was, in saying exactly the right things and immediately capturing the interest and at least the psychological support and the general personal support of participants at these meetings, even though they may have included people like the President of the National Association of Manufacturers or the Chamber of Commerce who never actually agreed with the program, but I always found a unanimous expression of admiration at the way this president dealt with them. It had a lot to do with setting the tone and obtaining a cooperative attitude towards the work of the particular committee. And, of course, in these meetings he displayed his now historic charm and poise, and he always had a witticism. But perhaps the most important thing of all that I noted, in at least several of these meetings, was the fact that he did more than come in to make an opening statement and leave.

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This he had to do sometimes, but when he could stay for an hour or two, he was a magnificent listener and knew how to draw out from his participants the things that he thought would be useful to him. For example, I would like to note the fact that at several meetings that he participated in with the Labor-Management Committee (he spent many hours with this committee) the one person to whom he turned most often and communicated at length was Arthur Burns, not Walter Reuther and the people he knew, whose concepts he understood. He wasn't going to waste any time on people with comments that he had already heard. He had Arthur Burns there who had been, after all, the chief economist for the Eisenhower Administration at one point, and he wanted to know what he thought—he asked him particular questions, challenged him, said, "Now, what do you think of this proposal? All right, Mr. Burns, tell me what you would do. I want to know what you would do." I think to some extent this offended other members of the committee. "Why the hell is he picking on a Republican? He is

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using up all his time talking to him." But this was the way John Kennedy learned. One of the things that I recall now as I am thinking of that association with that committee is that he showed great guts in some of the things that he said. He was not afraid of being quoted, and he never got quoted. For example, the day he met with the Committee on the unemployment problem. The Committee had just brought in a report to him, and we had been spending over an hour in his private quarters discussing it. At that time, we weren't really making much progress in reducing unemployment, and the President was challenging everybody with: "What shall we do? What can we do? What ought to be the policy?" Following this, there ensued a discussion about the debt. Somebody had made some comment like, "You can't just keep spending a lot of money, adding further to the national debt." And I couldn't believe my ears for a moment when I heard Jack Kennedy say to this group which included some Republicans, Arthur Burns included, "Tell me, what's wrong with something

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that I have been giving some thought to? If in order to reduce unemployment for the next few years, we should find it necessary to increase the national debt by 50 billion dollars, what's wrong with that? We're only at about 300 and something billion dollars now, which is only half of our total national product. There was a time recently when our national produce was just about equal to our national debt. Tell me, what's wrong, what if I followed policies that raised the debt by 50 billion dollars? I have had some pretty good advice that that is what we ought to do...." When I heard that, I thought the next morning the big headlines would be screaming, as a result of somebody leaking it, that the President is considering raising the debt by about 50 billion dollars. This, by the way, was at the time when he made a public speech at a national conference called by our Labor-Management Committee—the speech about myths. (It was at Yale that he had made the basic speech about myths and realities and had repeated some of these things to our own conference.) One of the myths

that he wanted discussed was the myth that our country can't afford a higher debt. We had good discussions at these meetings. Again, I was so impressed with his basic intelligence and ability to learn as well as advocate.

Let me tell you another incident I am anxious to record that is not directly in connection with the Labor-Management Committee, but is in connection with my labor work at the Commerce Department. I got involved in labor relations problems of the maritime industry. The Maritime Administration is part of the Commerce Department and, as I am afraid the country knows too well, the labor relations of the maritime industry is one of our really sore problems. One of the issues involved in the maritime industry relates to the so-called flags of convenience which, briefly, deals with the fact that a number of American companies own ships that fly under the flags of other countries. The result of flying under the flags of other countries is that they can employ foreign help and pay lower wages, *et cetera*. This has been a major bone of

contention by American seagoing unions who believe that these arrangements undercut our own standards, mean less employment for our people, and so on. Well, as a result of this dispute which has raged over a number of years, an NLRB [National Labor Relations Board] case developed a couple of years ago where the right of American unions to organize these ships became the issue, and there was a question as to the government's policy when the Solicitor General appeared before the Supreme Court. Within the government there were differences and, as must happen when agencies of government don't agree, this issue finally got kicked up to the President himself. A number of agencies were involved in this for weeks, in preparing a presentation to the President as to whether the position of the government should be in support of the NLRB or against the NLRB, and we finally had a meeting with the President. A half hour or so was assigned for this meeting, and the respective cases were laid out before the President. He listened to both and he said, "Now just a minute. Nobody has

made reference to a statement that I believe I made during the campaign of 1960, and I don't see how you can give me the whole case without reference to that. I've got a record that I have to live with also, and I have a recollection in 1960 of having described these ships—these flags of convenience ships—as run-away ships. And I remember that I said that a run-away ship is as bad as a run-away shop." Nobody had mentioned this, but I knew he was right. I was flabbergasted because in my researches I had come across a telegram that Joe Curran [Joseph Edwin Curran] (President of the Maritime Union) had received from Jack Kennedy as a campaign statement. It seems that the Senator couldn't attend a meeting sometime in 1960, and so a telegram went out to Joe Curran along the lines of: "Sorry can't attend, would like to be present. I know some of the problems facing your industry, and in my book a run-away ship is like a run-away shop, we have to end them both." This was in

the height of the campaign, and I can't believe that he himself ever dictated that telegram. It was probably

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one of the dozens that went out regularly, but he remembered it. First, I was impressed with his ability to recall that remote bit of information, but more importantly, he really put this whole discussion in what really had to be the right perspective. In addition to all the other perspectives for resolving this issue, here was a man who was sensitive to the fact that he had made a statement, that he had to take an action here that was consistent with, if not identical with, such a statement. He said, "I want that statement quickly." And we had to scurry around to look for it. We got it for him and sure enough it was almost precisely the words he recalled to us.

JACOBS: While you were in the Commerce Department, do you want to make any comments on what the relationship was between Commerce and the White House staff?

BOOKBINDER: Just a brief word. The Commerce Department's responsibilities were under the general care of Myer Feldman, and by and large, they were good relations. Myer Feldman and Luther Hodges developed a good relationship. I knew Myer Feldman well in

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the earlier years, so I helped a bit towards that positive relationship. I think I ought to say what probably others have said—and I guess it is true of any administration and any relationships with the executive departments: there were times when top officials of the Commerce Department resented the fact that they had to deal with some of the "young men" in the White House. Some of the young men who shall remain nameless, even for this record, certainly in those busy, harried, harassed early months, were a little less than delicate in the way they gave orders to the high officials in the executive branch, and I occasionally would hear references to this.

JACOBS: Now in 1962, after Eleanor Roosevelt died, you were asked to help develop the Eleanor Roosevelt Memorial Foundation. Would you want to go into the origins of that Foundation which is quite a unique memorial?

BOOKBINDER: Why don't I preface that by telling you a story about John Kennedy and Eleanor Roosevelt that I was associated with. In 1960, during the campaign, it will be recalled, of course, Eleanor Roosevelt was not one of the Senator's original backers. She

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was a backer of Adlai Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson] and was apparently (reportedly) very unhappy about the choice of John Kennedy. In the days following the convention, one of the important concerns of people concerned about the campaign was to effect a conciliation between the two. I was able to play a very small part in developing a meeting between the two. This is the way it happened: I was always very much interested in Social Security improvements. At that time one of the hot issues was—and still is a hot issue—hospital care for the aged under Social Security. It was then known as the Forand Bill, and Kennedy was a backer of this. There was the special session of the Senate after the Convention, and I noted the fact that the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Social Security Act was coming up on August 14, 1960. I was told that the Senior Citizens groups of New York were planning a pilgrimage to Hyde Park to pay tribute to FDR for having signed this act. I called this pilgrimage to the attention of Ted Sorensen. I couldn't reach

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Sorensen on the phone. I was desperate; it was getting late. I wired Sorensen and told him that this important gathering was taking place, and that I could probably arrange an invitation to Kennedy to be a principal speaker; and this would give him an opportunity to be at Hyde Park. Within hours after sending my telegram, I got a call from Ted saying "Yes, it's a great idea. The Senator would love to be invited." He was invited, of course. We made it clear all the way around that he would not accept an invitation just from the Senior Citizens, that if he were going to Hyde Park he wanted to make sure that Mrs. Roosevelt would be happy to have him come to Hyde Park. And she was. Not only that, but she said what we were hoping she would say, that she also wanted to have a meeting with him when he got to Hyde Park. It developed that the night before the August 11 he was scheduled to go, Mrs. Roosevelt's grandchild [Sara "Sally" Delano Roosevelt] was killed up at Hyde Park. It was a tragic accident, and we learned about this early in the morning. The Senator immediately got word to Mrs.

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Roosevelt, saying that he assumed that the meeting was off and that he did not want her to feel obligated in any way. But she got word back saying, "No, absolutely. I insist on seeing you." She said, "I will not myself attend the rally, but I want very much to welcome you and have you come to see me." That is the way it worked out. He participated in an enthusiastic rally of 5,000 senior citizens, laid out a whole program for all senior citizens, then went to see Mrs. Roosevelt. That meeting was widely reported, and that's when she said that, of course, she would be very happy to support him. She also told the press later that she was very pleased with the meeting and that she recognized that he was a very intelligent young man, *et cetera, et cetera*.

As far as the Foundation is concerned.... Mrs. Roosevelt died on November 7th, 1962. Within a few days after her death, there was a clamoring all over the country for memorials of all kinds—for tributes to her—and the President himself was interested in what could be done. The Presi-

dent, as you know, along with other former presidents, attended the funeral of Mrs. Roosevelt and invited Jimmy Roosevelt [James Roosevelt] and Frank Roosevelt [Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.] to come see him. Within a few days there was a meeting at the White House attended by Adlai Stevenson and a few others. Mike Feldman of the White House was there, and they talked about what could be done. There was a desire expressed by the President and others not to have a proliferation of all kinds of Eleanor Roosevelt memorials. Since she wasn't a government official (she wasn't even a First Lady at the time she died) it would have to be a private effort. The feeling was that if it had the stamp of interest of the White House, it would be helpful. Then and there the President decided to invite seventeen prominent citizens, headed by Adlai Stevenson, to form a committee for the formation of the suitable living memorial to Mrs. Roosevelt. They had a meeting soon of those seventeen (I think it was November 26) at the White House, and there the formal decision was made, with the approval of the

President (he even participated in part of the meeting) to form an Eleanor Roosevelt Foundation to be chartered by the Congress. This is an unusual honor for an individual. There have been other foundations chartered, like the American Red Cross. Some of the health foundations are chartered by the Congress. But this is the first foundation that we know of chartered as a memorial for an individual. It was chartered, and the bill was signed on April 23, 1963, at a White House ceremony. (The President's remarks are available.)

Immediately after that original White House meeting of the committee of seventeen, I was asked by Mike Feldman, on behalf, he said, of the White House (I don't know if the President personally asked about this) if I couldn't get some time off to help put this thing together. They needed a guy with a broad, general background like I had. And I had calls from a number of other people. I agreed to give them a few weeks. A few weeks turned out to be a year and two months. Then I came back to the administration in February of this

year.

The Foundation has made a determination to be principally devoted to the cause of human rights as a tribute to Eleanor Roosevelt's participation back in 1948 as the principal architect of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In this connection, it is working primarily towards the training of professional people in the field of intergroup relations.

JACOBS: I believe that you were planning that program for training people to work in the field of human relations, and President Kennedy learned of it just shortly before he died. Is that right?

BOOKBINDER: Yes, he knew about the particular program that we inaugurated in

October of 1963. We told him of this program to recruit young people, with an emphasis on Peace Corps returnees. We identified those especially as a wonderful source for the kind of people we were looking for, and he congratulated Adlai Stevenson on this project. While it was not a government project, the President was reflecting the need that the government itself has felt to get more people who are professionally trained to

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work in the day-to-day activities relating to civil rights, the concept being that picketing, demonstrations, legislation, and executive orders are going to bring down the legal barriers, but someone has to translate those legal victories into day-to-day meaningful progress in the field of employment, the field of housing, the field of public accommodations. This is a new skill. It isn't just enough to be for civil rights; you have to know how to implement civil rights. And that is why the President welcomed and congratulated the Foundation for this type of program.

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[END OF INTERVIEW]

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