

Albert Gore Oral History Interview – JFK#1, 08/13/64 and 08/21/1964
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Biographical Note

(1907 - 1998) Senator from Tennessee (1953-1971), discusses personal relationship with John F. Kennedy, advising him during the presidency, and participation in committees in the Senate, among other issues.

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Albert Gore
Albert Gore

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Albert Gore – JFK#1

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Oral History Interview

With

Albert Gore

August 13 and 21, 1964

Unknown Location

By Seth Tillman

For the John F. Kennedy Library

TILLMAN: Senator, taking your experiences with President Kennedy [John F. Kennedy] in rough chronological order, what do you recall of President Kennedy's role when he was in the House of Representatives and when you were in the House of Representatives together. You came up here in early 1939 and he in 1947. You were not on the same committees, but I think you did tell me in a preliminary discussion that you did have a number of contacts with him both political and social.

GORE: Well, my first impressions, I distinctly recall, were of his physical appearance. He seemed slight, if not frail, quite slender, decidedly boyish in appearance. He was, indeed, as you know, a very young congressman. He wasn't there very long until it was well known among his colleagues that he had challenged the political predominance of the Massachusetts Democratic delegation in the House, of the then Democratic leader, John McCormack [John William McCormack], who, as you know, is now Speaker. This showed to some people a brashness on his part, to others a toughness of character and will. The latter interpretation, I believe, now must stand proven by history.

At first, he seemed to be quite provincial in his attitude, in the positions he took. I remember his references to TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority] in his early years in the Congress were not very kindly or favorable. This was couched, however, in the context of the competition which was not only in the TVA area, but other sections of the South were providing for the textile industry in New England. The movement of the textile industry out

of New England was something which was not prompted by the TVA, but Congressman Kennedy was concerned with jobs and prosperity and commerce and growth, economic well-being, for the district he represented, and he seemed to be looking for causes and ready to attack the causes. This is not an unusual position for a congressman to take. On the contrary, I think it is rather a par for the course.

As he gained in experience, he began to take, as I recall, more and more a national point of view. He was a jolly fellow, but did not frequent the cloak rooms very much where the humor was a little rocky at some times. He did not exactly keep to himself, and yet he seemed contemplative,

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reflective, and as I recall it, would come to the floor and listen to debates, vote, but seemed to be in his office or conferring with friends or associates someplace other than in the cloak room where many of us enjoyed the stories and the banter while some colleague was making an unusually heavy speech on the floor.

TILLMAN: What about this challenge of McCormack's in the Mass. delegation. Did you ever have a chance to talk about that with the then Congressman Kennedy?

GORE: No, I did not. We were aware of it, but I don't recall that I ever talked to him about it.

TILLMAN: You were personal friends during the House years, too, weren't you?

GORE: Yes, this was not a friendship that was formed early in his service. It was one that rather grew with the years. We were not on the same committees, and at first, we were not at all in the same social group. Later, we came to be friends through association, through growing contacts, multiplying contacts, and this through a close mutual friend had come to Washington as a young reporter, named Charles Bartlett.

TILLMAN: You recalled to me, I think, in our first discussion, in the evening at Charles Bartlett's house, where Jacqueline Bouvier [Jacqueline B. Kennedy Onassis] and John Kennedy came separately. I think, I don't recall if you said they knew each other at that time or not.

GORE: I don't think they did know each other at the time. She was the odd young lady and a beautiful one. He, the odd young man and surely a dashing one. It was a most enjoyable evening, I think, no more than ten people, perhaps eight. I believe ten. But Mr. Bartlett can give you more of the details about this.

TILLMAN: That was in about what year, the late forties?

GORE: It was.... I would have to...

TILLMAN: It was before either of you came to the Senate?

GORE: Yes, I think it was along about 1950. I think it was as late as that.

TILLMAN: Speaking of the Bartletts and the evening she spent there, another episode you had recalled to me was the night when you and Kennedy and Senator Cooper [John S. Cooper] had all met at the Bartletts and recall how you had organized your campaign and that you had all announced for the Senate simultaneously.

GORE: This was an enjoyable occasion. Congressman Kennedy, Ambassador Cooper and I, as you have said, had each announced for the U.S.

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Senate. We were personal friends and engaged in some banter and good fellowship, prophecy about the outcome. We compared notes as to the manner of our announcement. Each had a distinctly different method and apparently we had different campaign strategies in mind, but as we discussed it avidly for the evening, I think all of us plagiarized the other, and our campaigns were mutually enriched, and as you know, mutually successful.

TILLMAN: Did you have a chance to meet again or after your campaign?

GORE: Yes, we had a reunion and sort of a celebration, and of course, there was less tension after victory, less anxiety, a little more cause for hilarity, or more incidents which we could each recall to the amusement of the others. It was a joyous occasion.

TILLMAN: Were you all pretty confident you would win? How about Senator Kennedy? Was he confident he was going to win?

GORE: Well, I don't recall that he lacked any confidence. He didn't give any outward manifestation of it, but politicians are, by nature, optimistic, you know. Certainly I thought I was going to win, and I had no feeling that he lacked any confidence. Senator Cooper seemed more hesitant and uncertain than either Congressman Kennedy or I.

TILLMAN: During your senate years, when you served in the Senate together, 1952 until 1960, you continued to be warm personal friends.

GORE: Yes. As a matter of fact, we came to be warmer friends, because we served on committees together and our wives continued to be friends and our views on foreign policy, on economic matters, seemed to promote a

growing mutuality between Senator Kennedy and me.

TILLMAN: Did you see a good deal of the Kennedys socially during your senate years?

GORE: I don't know that I could describe it as a good deal, but, considerably. They were a most attractive couple, greatly in demand. Now and then we were together and always pleasantly so.

TILLMAN: Do you think that his outlook changed, evolved in this way that you referred to earlier, about his development in the House from a regional interest to a more national interest?

GORE: Yes, it went considerably beyond national. He began to think more of the position of our nation in the world of nations. This young man had a remarkable growth. You could almost see it. You could surely hear it.

TILLMAN: Senator, what do you think about his work on the Foreign Relations Committee? You were on the committee together for, well, two years, I guess, your having come on in 1959 and he having come on in 1957.

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GORE: Well, he was vigorous and his questions were incisive, not verbose. His observations were not quick and easy, but studied and pithy. I thought well of his work. The more I saw of it, the better I thought of it.

TILLMAN: Did he have a policy interest on the Foreign Relations Committee or any geographic interest in particular?

GORE: Yes, I thought his interest around the Mediterranean basin and European policy was a center of his concern in world affairs, other than perhaps the United Nations.

TILLMAN: Did you ever get a chance to talk with him about his celebrated Algeria Speech, which was in 1957, I think?

GORE: I don't recall that I had a serious conversation with him about it. I may have kidded him a time or two about his popularity with General de Gaulle [Charles A. de Gualle], with the French.

TILLMAN: He may have lived that down later. Another episode you had recalled in an earlier discussion was your work together on the select committee which investigated campaign contributions in 1956, I think it was. I think it

might be worth recording a little bit of the background of the matter, and reading up to your cooperation with Senator Kennedy, you recalled filing a joint dissenting report in the select committee.

GORE: Well, as you will recall, this investigation grew out of an episode in which the late Senator Case [Francis Higbee Case] of South Dakota charged that an oil man had tendered a campaign contribution under terms of commitment to some.... I don't recall the details of it, but Senator Case took the floor of the Senate and disclosed a situation which set off a demand for an investigation of campaign contributions—of this particular campaign contribution—and other facts involved. It was a disappointing investigation.

TILLMAN: I have a couple of notes I made on the background of that. It might be well to recall...

GORE: Yes, I'm having some difficulty recalling the exact purpose of the investigation. I remember it grew out of the Case incident.

TILLMAN: Bill Allen [William G. Allen] recalled it to me about like this: Senator Case of South Dakota said he had been offered a \$2,500 dollar bribe in the form of a campaign contribution to vote for builder-exempt natural gas from federal power regulations. Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] vetoed the bill, probably because of Case's declaration, and this led to a demand for an investigation of campaign expenses. The question then was whether you, as Chairman of the Privileges and Elections Subcommittee of the Rules Committee, would conduct this investigation or whether it should

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be done by a select committee. Lyndon Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] favored a select committee of four Republicans and four Democrats. The upshot of it was that a select committee was set up with you as chairman.

GORE: No, no...

TILLMAN: It was expected that you would be chairman.

GORE: Well, maybe expected, but it soon developed that not much investigation would be conducted and the usual prerogative of a chairman would not be accorded to me, so I stepped aside. The investigation, when ensued, was not very fruitful.

TILLMAN: Senator McClellan [John L. McClellan] became chairman of that select committee.

GORE: Yes. When the report was written, Senator Kennedy and I found we could not concur in all of the conclusions and recommendations, but specifically we wanted to go farther and recommend the passage of a law which would place strict regulations, which would bring under strict regulations campaign contributions and expenditures. This was the thrust, the principal thrust of our minority report.

TILLMAN: And was the rest of the subcommittee not in sympathy with this emphasis that you and Senator Kennedy made?

GORE: This I cannot say; at least this was not very strongly emphasized in the majority report. We felt it should be and ruled a minority report.

TILLMAN: Unless there is something else about that that should be recalled, I'd like to turn to politics, to the nominating conventions in 1956 and 1960. What was your role in the 1956 nominating convention, Senator, and of course the contest between Senator Kefauver [Estes Kefauver] and Senator Kennedy in the vice presidential nomination?

GORE: Well, throughout the pre-Convention [Democratic National Convention] period, there had been widespread speculation as there always is about possible vice presidential nominees, as well as presidential nominees. I think it is fair to say that my name was one of the three or most prominently mentioned at the time the late Senator Kefauver was a candidate for president. Like most candidates for president, he disavowed an interest in the vice presidency. Since Senator Kefauver was a candidate for president, I would not become a candidate for vice president, in fact I doubt if one can very effectively, at least in the normal sense, become a candidate for vice president, but at any rate throughout the period, I had—my lightning was up, my antennae was sensitive. It was difficult to be in this posture unless it hinder somehow Senator Kefauver's candidacy for president. Of course I knew that the ticket could not be made for the two Senators from one state. I did not, however, wish to hinder in any way

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his candidacy for the presidency, for the presidential nomination. You will recall that after Governor Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson] was nominated, that he suddenly, to my complete surprise, and so far as I know, to the surprise of most all other party leaders...

TILLMAN: The general public, too.

GORE: He announced he would have no choice for a running mate and threw it wide open. Well, it seemed to me that if it were wide open, that the water was fine, that since my colleagues ambition for the presidential nomination had been sided unfavorably to him, that perhaps I would then have a chance to make a go for the vice presidency, and I put out some feelers. Senator Monroney [Almer Stillwell "Mike" Monroney], some of the others, agreed to help me, and I finally decided to

do so. You may recall that I ran a rather strong third position; I believe, all told, I received 234 votes, so wide in geographic spread that one vote from Hawaii and one from Puerto Rico, some from the North, some from the border states, some from the Midwest, some from the South. I had widespread support, and frankly, I came very near to getting the nomination. Had the Texas delegation stayed with me through the second ballot, I think I would have been nominated, because new strength was coming to me.

When the Texas delegation let me know, or Senator Johnson let me know, that the delegation would not vote for me through the second ballot, I made my way to the Tennessee delegation, sought and obtained recognition, and withdrew—and threw my support to Senator Kefauver. There was no thought in my mind at any time that I would not favor my own colleague over someone outside the state, but it appeared to me that I had as much, almost as much support, as he for the vice presidency, and that everyone had an equal opportunity to seek it. This right I exercised. It was a most interesting experience, and I think turned out to be one of the dramatic episodes of any national convention.

TILLMAN: It sure was. I think a lot of you were very, very surprised when you went over to Senator Kefauver and not Senator Kennedy. A great many people thought you were going to and a great many people in the television audience thought you were going to do that.

GORE: Well, I don't know how that came about, except that there was a good deal of opposition to Senator Kefauver within the Tennessee delegation. I was not part of that opposition to Senator Kefauver. This is, there was a good deal of opposition to him for the presidential nomination. There was a good deal of opposition to him for the vice presidential nomination. My opposition was only to the extent that I, too, was a candidate. My opposition never at any time went beyond a preference between the two of us, a choice between the two of us. So it may have been that the commentators and the audience associated me with the all-out opposition against Senator Kefauver. I was a candidate for the vice presidency, for which I felt I had a right to be, and I had widespread support. I had reason to believe that—maybe I shouldn't say believe. I had reason to think that my own nomination would be preferred by Governor Stevenson to that of Senator

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Kefauver, and many other party leaders, as the vote showed.

However, there was never any thought in my mind that if I were unable to obtain the nomination that my support would then go to Senator Kefauver indeed. Within the Tennessee delegation we had an understanding that—I'm not sure I can state it exactly, but there was an understanding that I would be supported so long as I had a chance for the nomination and that then the state delegation would go to any other Tennessean who had a chance at the nomination. But it seemed to be left to me—the dramatic moment when I no longer had a chance for the nomination.

This dramatic moment came when Senator Johnson let me know that the Texas delegation was swinging to Senator Kennedy. Then it was my time to move, and I moved

quickly and dramatically, and threw my support to Senator Kefauver. This was not out of any lack of friendship for Senator Kennedy; we had been close friends. But so had Senator Kefauver and I been close friends. So it seemed to me that loyalty to my state and my own colleague took precedence. Senator Kennedy later thanked me for what I did, said it was the greatest favor ever done him, because as you know, had he been the vice presidential nominee in '56, he would have been a member of a losing ticket and may have never been nominated.

TILLMAN: Was it a great year for Democrats?

GORE: No, no, indeed it was not.

TILLMAN: Well, Senator, what are your recollections in the 1960 campaign, your assessment of Senator Kennedy's role in it? Did you support him, and in what way prior to the Convention and after the Convention?

GORE: I supported him, but not effectively. The Tennessee delegation had a unit rule. There were only a few of us in the Tennessee delegation who favored Senator Kennedy. I was one of that group. We never had a chance to take the delegation for him because the support was rather strongly for Senator Johnson, within the delegation. I recall that after Senator Kennedy's nomination, I grabbed the Tennessee banner and went to the rostrum, out in front of the rostrum, to hail the new chief, and as I recall, only two of the Tennessee delegation went with me. Maybe there were more, but very few. Most of them—as a matter of fact, I didn't see them very much after that on the Convention floor.

TILLMAN: In the campaign itself, you were head of a committee of advisors, weren't you, that...

GORE: Yes, Senator Kennedy came to me on the floor of the Senate and asked me if I would serve as chairman of sort of an unofficial strategy group or advisory group on issues and position on issues, and I told him I would be glad to do so. The other members of the group whom he suggested were Senator Fulbright [J. William Fulbright], Clark Clifford [Clark M. Clifford], Fred Dutton [Frederick G. Dutton] from California, Congressman Bolling [Richard W. Bolling] of Kansas City. We met fairly regularly, though Congressman Bolling didn't

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meet with us very much. Senator Fulbright, Fred Dutton, Clark Clifford and I met fairly regularly, mostly in my apartment at the Fairfax Hotel. We met a couple of times at the home of Senator Fulbright. We met more frequently as the campaign drew nearer. There was a message from the presidential plane thanking the group, and frequently we would be asked for a comment upon a development in the campaign upon an issue, upon a position with respect to an issue. We prepared positions, suggested position papers, on a number of issues.

For instance, you will find that all the copies could be located now, that President Kennedy's speech on nuclear weapons policy followed rather closely the recommended draft which our group submitted.

The existence of the group was never publicized. Very few people knew of it. We were careful to meet in our residences to avoid publicity. It was an enjoyable work. We would—we attempted to be a think group. We would try to detach ourselves from the headline of today, the pressure and emotion of the situation of today, and try to examine the campaign as it would be, likely be, three weeks from now or two months from now. Bobby Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy] met with us one time at my apartment. All in all it was a most enjoyable intellectual exercise to meet with this group, and I found it stimulating. We had very generous comments from Senator Kennedy about our work. Of course we were pleased very much.

TILLMAN: Senator, can you recall a bit more in detail the recommendations you made on nuclear weapons and how he used them and maybe even whether the contribution was made to his long-term policy and disarmament test ban treaty.

GORE: I recall that—well, to begin with, I dictated the first draft. It was natural, I suppose, that I would be the one who would do this, and with this particular issue, because I had been a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and had been a delegate to the Nuclear Weapons Test Conference in Geneva. President Kennedy and I had talked about it several times and we had found our views pretty close together on this subject. I don't think that I recall now the fine points of the memorandum, but I do recall that I felt some satisfaction when the President made his speech on the subject, that he followed fairly closely what we had submitted.

TILLMAN: This brings us pretty much into the presidential period—unless there's something we have overlooked on the campaign period or the senate period—to the presidential years.

GORE: I'm going to have to interrupt, I have got to go to committee.

[INTERVIEW RESUMED ON AUGUST 21, 1964]

TILLMAN: The date is August 21, the interview with Senator Gore is continuing. It is 9:30 a.m., the interviewer is Seth Tillman. We left off, Senator, our last discussion was the campaign of 1960 and the position you had taken in the campaign and the role you had played in the advisory committee which lent assistance to President Kennedy in his campaign. Turning now to the Kennedy administration itself, you gave me the idea in our preliminary discussion that there were a number of key issues that involved you in relationships of one sort or another with President Kennedy.

One of these was fiscal policy in general. I believe you indicated some doubts about the wisdom of Secretary Dillon's [C. Douglas Dillon] policies, and the first question I would like to ask is what was your feeling about Dillon's policies and what were your objections to his policies and to the administration's fiscal policies in general.

GORE: Well, the selection of Mr. Dillon as Secretary of the Treasury was clear notice to the country and to the world that President Kennedy would not inaugurate liberal economic fiscal policies, which I thought was inherent in the campaign which he had waged for the office and which was surely traditional with the Democratic Party. Secretary Dillon is an able man, an honorable gentleman, personally likeable, his views on monetary policy, tax policy, are on all fours with the views of Andrew Mellon [Andrew W. Mellon], Secretary of the Treasury, under Herbert Hoover. In fact, many of the statements that Secretary Dillon has made in advocating tax reduction as a means of balancing the budget are on all fours with many passages in the book and the speeches and the writings of the late Secretary Mellon. Instead of it being sound, either sound or liberal economic policy, it seemed to me nothing but ultra-conservative policy wrapped up with pseudonyms and labels to make it appear as liberal policy when in fact it was nothing but a nostrum insofar as progressive economics are concerned. So I vigorously opposed the selection of Mr. Dillon as Secretary of the Treasury.

His selection meant—and I said these things to President Kennedy before the selection was finally announced, but only after I had learned that Mr. Dillon was under consideration. I was astounded to learn that he was under consideration. I went to Mr. Kennedy at his home in Georgetown and we had an extended discussion. I felt that this would be a very unwise choice and that it would lead to economic policies which would set off a wave of a demand for, economy—and I so said to the President-elect—and that the first victim would be his foreign aid program and the second victim would be the very economic policies which would be necessary to provide either full employment policies, an adequate rate of economic growth, or adequate aid to uplift the quality of our education.

Well, I know that you wish to write this history not of what my views, what one Albert Gore said. This subject of history here is a great martyred president. President Kennedy was extremely interested in my views, because through the Eisenhower administration, I had been the most vigorous challenger of the conservative economic policies of the Eisenhower administration. Some had said mine was the most strident voice of criticism. In any event, President Kennedy drew liberally from the positions I had taken in the Senate and the issues I had forged in debate and by votes on the floor of the Senate for his own campaign. This, of course, pleased me, but made my disappointment the keener by the selection of Mr. Dillon and the adoption of the policies which his selection implied and made inevitable. At this particular time, Senator Kennedy indicated that it was necessary in his view to appoint one of Secretary Dillon's conservative leaning and financial acceptance. Acceptance in the financial community, both international and national, in order to bolster and preserve confidence in the dollar, confidence in the stability of economic policies. In other words, as I said,

notice to the world that you are going to follow the same policies that Eisenhower followed.

Well, I am not sure he liked this exactly, but he thought it would be possible to appoint Secretary Dillon for these purposes, which he had outlined, but still have an undersecretary or assistance secretary who would handle legislative matters and who would really be the voice of economic policy. I did not think this was possible and he later found that it was not possible. I thought also a part of his decision stemmed from the narrowness of his victory. Having been elected with less than 51 percent of the popular vote, he seemed to feel that he must consolidate his position, and I must say that I found this an appealing situation, sympathetic situation. I did not reach the same conclusion that he reached, but after all, he was the President-elect, and I was his close friend and supporter.

To race a little ahead, though, I sharply disagreed with the economic policies of which Mr. Dillon was the champion and which of course became the recommendations of President Kennedy, and opposed vigorously the tax proposals, the high interest rate policies that were continued, the undue concessions to business, such as big business, special privileged, such as the DuPont bill, Telstar, the Communications Satellite bill. Through it all, there lingered the hope that once the President was reelected that a true—at least more nearly true—progressive economic policies, liberal, economic, and social policies so traditional with the Democratic Party would come to fore and that this phase of John F. Kennedy, in the Presidency of John F. Kennedy, would come to fruition. Unhappily, we were not to realize this.

TILLMAN: Well, we might go ahead and talk about the tax cut at this point, Senator. What was the basis of your opposition—and I think we know the basis of your opposition, but how did you express your opposition. Did you deal directly with President Kennedy on any point?

GORE: Oh, yes, I dealt with economic policies with the President personally in many ways. I think I was the first Senator he called, for instance, after Roger Blough [Roger M. Blough] had dropped the bombshell of the steel prices. I went to the White House and together he and I worked out a course of action which had far-reaching effect. But this is not what you wish to talk about. I talked to the President several times at the White House and at other places.

For instance, the President called me aside at Hyde Park where we had gone for the funeral of Mrs. Roosevelt [Eleanor R. Roosevelt] and asked me what I thought he should do about the tax cut. I said nothing. Well, that didn't satisfy him, he always wanted to know why. Well, I said it would not solve any of the problems, pressing problems, that the country had, that it would make solution of them impossible and create more difficulties than the problems it would solve if any. That it would set off a wave of economy which would engulf his whole administration and put his economic administration in a straitjacket. Well, this likewise didn't satisfy him so he kept asking questions, one after another, and we were standing for a while and then he motioned to a couple of chairs and we sat down and he kept probing me

with questions and my reasons for the views I held.

I became conscious of a line more or less forming to shake hands with the President. This conversation occurred in the little cottage in which I believe John Roosevelt [John Aspinwall Roosevelt] lived. It was where the luncheon was held for about one hundred people who had come there for the funeral. The President seemed not to notice the waiting, the gathering line to shake the hands with him. I noticed that former President Eisenhower had come in and was standing nearby obviously to shake hands with the President. President Kennedy had not noticed this, so I just whispered to him, "Here is President Eisenhower," and I quickly vanished. Well, I was on a plane waiting to take off from the airfield at West Point. But the plane didn't take off, the motors revved up. I noticed out of the window a car coming across the field, and a General came aboard our plane and inquired if Senator Gore was on that plane. And I said yes, and he said President Kennedy wished me to ride back to Washington with him on his plane. I arose and asked my colleagues on the plane if they would excuse me. They gave me sort of a horselaugh and off I went and we rode back to Washington and talked some further.

I never knew just why the President was plying me with so many questions. He had his own purposes, I am sure, but he wanted to explore fully the views that I had. I suppose for one thing here was a friend and a supporter. I had become a voice of economic liberalism in the Senate. It may have been that he wanted to know fully my views, that he wanted to consider fully those views. At least, of course, it was flattering that the President of the United States would make such inquiry.

If he had in mind possible persuasion of me to points of view which he ultimately adopted, then he must have been disappointed, because I was unpersuasive. I might say I was unpersuasive because I did not think that we had any shortage of investment capital. Indeed it was running our heirs—I did not think the problem was more productive capacity for which Mr. Dillon said the tax cut would make provision, but rather idle productive capacity. I thought the real needs of our society lay in the inadequacy of health, education, transportation. These were largely in the public sector. Not in the private sector. I still clung to the hope and now cling to the belief that had John Kennedy been spared, his second administration would have seen economic social policies traditional with the Democratic Party.

TILLMAN: Senator, you took some initiative on the tax bill of 1962 which resulted in reducing tax savings abroad.

GORE: Oh, this was a phase on which he and I found ourselves in full agreement, and this was a source of great joy to me and the fight is still going on in that regard. But excuse me, I interrupted your question.

TILLMAN: No, that is the question, that is I would like to have that story. In our first discussion you recall having largely won President Kennedy over to support this kind of legislation in 1961, as a result of which he submitted a message to the Congress on it in April of 1961 that led ultimately to the tax bill in 1962. And the question is, what was

your role in this and what was President Kennedy's role and what was Secretary Dillon's role.

GORE: I'm trying to reconstruct quickly here. I have no notes before me. I remember one time President Kennedy saying to me, and I cannot recall for the moment—yes, this was in the White House, but I can't recall for the moment I couldn't remember whether it was in Georgetown or at the White House, but I do recall now, it was at the White House. But I do not recall the exact time of it, but it was very early in his administration. He said to me that deficit in our budget here at home bothered him not at all, because the deficit was in large part by way of investment in services, in national assets to our society and that this was something within our control. If the deficit became dangerous one way or the other, it was something which we could handle, but he was concerned deeply about the deficit in our balance of payments in international economics. And this statement was made during our discussion of the outflow of capital, of preferential tax treatment of income earned abroad, tax havens, the economic seriousness of export of jobs and capital.

This whole subject of course has many parts, and it was a subject which he came to understand in considerable detail. Without repeating the details of the conversation, he and I were in rather full agreement on the necessity or curbing or eliminating preferential tax treatment of income earned abroad, eliminating tax havens, foreign tax havens, and of reaching some, arriving at and installing some restraint on the export of capital should be handled. I favored regulations. His comments on this were generally in a main favorable to this though he seemed always aware of the political difficulties in bringing about enactment of these measures and the difficulty of avoiding a shock to the international financial community and the position of the United States in it. The details of this were not spelled out. We did reach rather detailed and firm agreement on taxation of income earned abroad and the elimination of foreign tax havens, and as you know, he submitted to the Congress a far-reaching proposal in this regard. More far-reaching than the Congress ultimately enacted. I was his champion in this cause.

TILLMAN: Were you satisfied, reasonably satisfied with the 1962 tax bill?

GORE: Well, I would say partially satisfied, if I could substitute partially instead of reasonably. It did I'd say about 50 percent of what we should have done and a little more than 50 percent of what the President had recommended, but it fell considerably short of the needs.

TILLMAN: Do you feel that the President backed it as strongly as he might have and that Secretary Dillon backed it as strongly as he might have?

GORE: Well, I suppose that must be a measured answer. I did not think that Secretary Dillon backed it as strongly as he should have and could have, and frankly, I did not think that the President did either. Though this must

be qualified, because politics being the art of the possible, there were certain priorities involved, and I realize that the late President could not place his whole administration in jeopardy by placing all priority

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on this one item.

TILLMAN: Well, I think this pretty much takes us to the end of our discussion of tax and fiscal policy unless there is something else that you had want to add.

GORE: Well, I think that perhaps there are additional matters relating to the preparation and the submission of the bill itself in 1963.

TILLMAN: Well, perhaps we can pick up with that next time. We are winding up at 10:35 a.m.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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