

Arthur H. Dean Oral History Interview – JFK#1, 01/20/1965
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Dean, United States Representative, Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests (1961), Chairman (1962); Presidential Advisor on Disarmament, discusses attempts to negotiate a nuclear test ban treaty and the early stages of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, among other issues.

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Oral History Interview

Of

Arthur H. Dean

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Arthur H. Dean – JFK #1

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Oral History Interview

with

Arthur H. Dean

January 20, 1965
Washington, D.C.

By George Bunn


For the John F. Kennedy Library

The classification of this tape is Secret. The interviewee is Ambassador Arthur H. Dean. The interview is George Bunn. The interview takes place on 20 January 1965, Inauguration Day, in Room 5725, State Department Building.

BUNN: Mr. Ambassador, when did you first meet President Kennedy [John F. Kennedy]?

DEAN: I first met him at a conference held at a seminar in California on problems in relation to Communist China sometime, I believe, in either '58 or '59. He and I were to speak at this conference and after the afternoon conference, he asked me if I would like to take a walk and we both walked down to the beach and I think we walked much further than either of us intended to. So we sort of had to extend ourselves to get back in time for the evening conference. So we were together, I would say—walking down the beach and back again—a period of several hours in which we were discussing for the most part problems in relation to the Far East.

BUNN: Do you remember what he felt about those problems or what he said at that time?



DEAN: Well, he was very much interested as to whether in the long run we could continue to ignore the 650 million of 700 million—whatever the correct population figure is on the mainland of China—whether our policy of non-recognition was correct, whether our policy of attempting to keep them out of the United Nations was correct, whether it wouldn't be better if we faced the fact that sooner or later as more Asian and African countries became members of the United Nations and as the ability of the Chinese Communists to cope with their problems or their ability to prove their economy had expanded—he was just wondering out loud, he in no sense

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committed himself—as to how far we could continue to maintain the fact that Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan were entitled to the seat for China in the Security Council of the United Nations and how far we could maintain our position against the expanding number of nations in the United Nations that the Chinese Communists were either entitled to admission or, if admitted, entitled to the Security Council seat. He was also very much interested in the problems of Japan, the problems of India, the problems of Burma, and the aftermath of the French defeat in Dien Bien Phu [Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam] in 1954 and the Geneva Accords of 1954 which had been worked out at the time that _____ France was _____ of that country.

BUNN: Did you see him again in '59 or '60 before he was elected?

DEAN: We met once or twice socially but we never again had any conversation of any substance.

BUNN: How did you happen to be selected, insofar as you know, to be the US representative to the Conference [Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests] on the cessation of nuclear tests?

DEAN: Well, I had assisted President Roosevelt [Franklin D. Roosevelt] in the drafting of the Security Pact in 1933 and I was appointed by President Roosevelt on the so-called inter-departmental committee known as the Dickinson Committee which recommended the creation of the Securities Exchange Commission instead of allowing the securities regulation to stay in the Federal Trade Commission and setting up a new Commission and the regulation of both securities trading on the stock exchanges and over the counter. After that act had been passed, President Roosevelt and I had some discussions about the makeup

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of the Commission and I recommended to President Roosevelt that he get a man of great experience in the stock exchange field and a man who would have not only ability but ability to sell the two pieces of legislation to the country because we had just been through a great depression, we had separated commercial banking from investment banking, there hadn't

been any new security issues for four or five years and it was quite a problem to sell both industry and the investment banking community on the merits of the new legislation. One of the men we discussed, among others, was Joseph P. Kennedy [Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr.]. After he was nominated by President Roosevelt to be the first chairman, Mr. Kennedy asked me to come down and help him set up the Securities and Exchange Commission and to outline the form and so forth. So I, over a period of years, while the President's father was chairman worked with him off and on over a period of several years. And then I was a very close friend of Jack McCloy's [John Jay McCloy]—Jack and I had worked on a great many matters together in the Council on Foreign Relations—and when President Kennedy asked Mr. McCloy to be his Disarmament Advisor, Mr. McCloy and I were discussing whether we shouldn't—whether a separate agency shouldn't be set up, and why you would not have to start on a test ban before you could get on to the whole subject of comprehensive disarmament. Mr. McCloy and I had spent several days together on this matter in New York and had met at dinner and weekends and one day Mr. McCloy telephoned me and said that President Kennedy had asked him if I would be willing to undertake the negotiations for a test ban treaty with the Soviet Union and Great Britain, Canada and Italy and the other countries—Eastern

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satellite countries of the Soviet Union—Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I said I would like to come to Washington to discuss the matter with President Kennedy and I believe that I came to Washington and met Mr. McCloy and Secretary Rusk [Dean Rusk] and President Kennedy on Saturday, March 4, 1961, and I said I would be willing to do it. I worked that weekend on the outline of a proposed test ban treaty with Mr. McCloy and on Tuesday, March 7, President Kennedy gave a luncheon at the White House to which he invited the members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations [United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations] and the House Committee on Foreign Relations [United States House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Relations]. And I believe, although I am not sure about this, but I think he also had at that luncheon the members of the House and Senate Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

BUNN: Do you remember whether Senator Pastore [John O. Pastore] or Congressman Holifield [Chester E. Holifield] were there?

DEAN: My recollection is the Senator Pastore and Representative Hollifield were there. I remember that Senator Fulbright [J. William Fulbright] was there, and a Dr. Morgan [Thomas E. Morgan] who was Chairman of a House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The President outlined—and Vice President Johnson [Lydon B. Johnson] was there—President Kennedy outlined at this luncheon the problems with respect to the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons, the problem of radioactive debris in the atmosphere, the fact that non-nuclear nations were becoming more and more concerned about the possibility of this causing leukemia in growing children or a lung disease or death in the case of people who had long exposure to it, and the fact that he thought that it was in our best interests to have nuclear weapons

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brought under control by putting a ban on further testing.

BUNN: There was a March 2 Committee Principal meeting which came just before this in which a number of the issues then before—then to be decided were discussed. I have four issues that were discussed particularly that might—just to refresh your recollection. The first was safeguards for the seismic research program. The main issues there was whether we were going to show the device to the Soviets, remember? And the second was the peaceful uses provision—really the same issue, whether we would be prepared to show that kind of device. And the third was the hottest—that was the number of on-site inspections. And the fourth was the high altitude test. And at that Principals' meeting all those were pretty well resolved except for the numbers of on-site inspections and, according to my notes, it was at the 4 March meeting with the President that was the—the number of on-site inspections was the main issue and Mr. McCloy was recommending that we have a sliding scale with ten on the territories of each of the parties plus one on-site inspection for each five eligible events over 50 with a ceiling of 20. In other words, a sliding scale of 10 to 20—the number in between depending on the number of unidentified events that were eligible for inspection. And at the 4 March meeting, the President finally decided to retain 20—retain the present position of 20 on-site inspections, at least for the moment, but to have a fallback of 10 plus one for five over 50 up to the 20 ceiling, the formula the Mr. McCloy had recommended. But that was to be fallback—it wasn't to authorize—for the meeting. Do you remember the discussion with President Kennedy about that?

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DEAN: I remember the discussions with the—we were having intensive discussions at that time, some informally, with the members of the Atomic Energy Commission—Commissioners Seaborg [Glenn T. Seaborg] and Hayward [John T. Hayward]—we were having informal discussions with some of the joint members of the House and Senate Committee on Atomic Energy, and we were having—at that time there was a—I don't know the precise name of it—but there was a committee of scientists with whom I spent several days with Mr. McCloy prior to the time that we met with President Kennedy.

BUNN: They were probably the ones who wrote the Fisk Report—the Fisk Panel.

DEAN: Dr. James Fisk [James B. Fisk] was there and the man who seemed to do the most of the briefing was Dr. Herbert York [Herbert F. York] who had been the science advisor in the Department of Defense [United States Department of Defense] under President Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower]. And there was also on that committee at that time Thomas Baty, Dr. Kinowski of Stanford

[Stanford University], and Dr. Brown [Harold Brown] who is currently the scientific advisor to the Department of Defense, and Dr. Kiscitowski [George B. Kistiakowsky] who has been a scientific advisor to President Eisenhower, a professor of chemistry at Harvard [Harvard University], and Jerry Wiesner [Jerome B. Wiesner] who was the new scientific to President Kennedy. There was also a good deal of discussion in those few days before I met with President Kennedy on the Fourth of March '61 as to whether we were going to continue the unpoliced moratorium that had been entered into between President Eisenhower and Marshal Bulganin [Nikolay Aleksandrovich Bulganin] in the summer of 1958, because at that time, or at least until then, the state of both seismic and nuclear science knowledge—we didn't believe that even if we adopted the rather elaborate system of identification stations together with 20 on-site inspections per annum that we would be able both to detect and to identify—that is to distinguish from actual explosions such as, _____, explosions which

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might have a yield in so-called _____ range of 19 to 20 kilotons, about the yield of the Nagasaki [Nagasaki, Japan] and Hiroshima [Hiroshima, Japan] explosions in '45, _____

BUNN: 4.25.

DEAN: 4.25 on the seismic scale of _____. There had been one explosion underground in the so-called soft-dome, which had been camped so that—and it is believed that as a result of that one explosion of a nuclear explosion in the soft-dome that it was possible to reduce the yield that would be recorded on seismographic devices, something in the ratio of—which could go up to 250 or 300 kilotons and by camping it in a soft-dome, it might not register more than 19 or 20 kilotons on the seismograph. At that time we didn't have enough data about the character of sound waves in alluvia or in granite or in so-called Nevada toughs, or we didn't know about the sound waves disappearing after the first 1000 or 1200 kilometers—there were a great many things that we knew about subsequently but we had not yet gotten very much on Project Valla and—

BUNN: Do you remember, Sir, how much of this detail President Kennedy had in his mind? Did he—had he read the papers on this—the Fisk Report—and grasp some of these details, do you think?

DEAN: There isn't any question that President Kennedy had read all of the reports of the House and Senate Committee on Atomic Energy. He had read a great many papers in this field, that he had examined these papers with a great deal of care and that he was tremendously interested in getting on

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with Project Valla or with any other research that would make it possible to reduce the number of identification stations and, if possible, without sacrificing the results, reduce the number of on-site inspections.

BUNN: Did you get the feeling from him that he really wanted the test ban?

DEAN: Well, there wasn't any question that he—I think the test ban was very close to his heart, it was something which he was taking a tremendous amount of interest in, something which he very definitely wanted to put through. He followed all proceedings in Geneva [Geneva, Switzerland] and all scientific papers that were written and all negotiations with the utmost personal interest.

BUNN: Do you remember when he had this meeting with the House and Senate members, the pertinent committee, how he handled the situation—was he in a sense already looking toward the ratification of the treaty and how he would persuade these men to support the negotiations, or was he looking just for the moment of how he'd get congressional support for your trip over to Geneva and the proposal you were going to make? Could you see what he was trying to do when you watched him in action?

DEAN: He was obviously trying to persuade these people that a nuclear test ban treaty was a good thing from the standpoint of defense of the United States, and secondly, from the standpoint of health, and three, from the standpoint of moral considerations. He more or less informally said to them that day that he was not going to attempt to work this thing out by presidential agreement or presidential accord—Executive Agreement—

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There was at that time a tremendous fear on the part of Senator Bricker [John William Bricker] and some others who had joined with Senator Bricker, that these so-called Executive Agreements which did not have to be submitted to the Senate for ratification or to the House and the Senate for joint resolution, were the means of sort of by-passing the Congress and also by-passing the Constitution. I don't know whether it helped me with the members of the Congress that were present at that luncheon but I had been a leader of the American Bar Association against the adoption of the Bricker Amendment and had written extensively against it and had worked a good deal on the treaties and making power of the President. In an event, he was quite sure that in order to sell the American people on the necessity of a test ban treaty that he had to sell the Congress and he was quite open and frank with them that he didn't intend to go forward and put anything into effect without going through the constitutional procedures with respect to ratification of the treaty in the Senate.

BUNN: On 4 March when the question of the number of on-site inspections was discussed, I assume from reading the minutes of the Committee Principals earlier that there may have been some objection to the

sliding scale proposal that Mr. McCloy had put in by the—Secretary McNamara [Robert S. McNamara] or by the Joint Chiefs [Joint Chiefs of Staff]. I wonder in watching President Kennedy act in that meeting if you sort of sensed how he was trying to bring the differences of views together—did he have in the back of the mind “I will certainly need the Chiefs with me in order to get a treaty through the Senate” or those kinds of considerations—

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was he, in a sense, a politician mobilizing forces?

DEAN: Well, in all my discussions with him he always seemed to me to have great respect for the views of the Joint Chiefs, and the views of the various Cabinet officers involved, the members of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the views of the members of the House and the Senate who were working on this. He knew and he realized that the joint Atomic Energy Committee had been working on the question of atomic energy for a long time and that some of them, at least, more or less considered nuclear weapons or atomic energy as—I don't say invidiously but as a sort of property of that committee and this was something which many of them had spent a great deal of time on. Some of them had become tremendously well-informed on—and some of them were very familiar with the scientific writings on it and had followed all of the discussions that had been had—the Baruch proposals of '45 and '46 and the various disarmament negotiations which, I believe, our Ambassador Wadsworth [James J. Wadsworth] had carried on starting in Geneva, I believe, in October of 1958. I was in Geneva about six months of the year in '58 _____ Conference and five or six months in 1960, so I used to talk a good deal with Ambassador Wadsworth about his problems in connection with this matter at that time. So I was generally aware of some of the problems about the number of identification stations, the number of on-site inspections, the conditions precedent to being used to get an on-site inspection and the problems about what we could or couldn't do in identification of events yielding below 4.25. There were some other scientists, I believe Dr. Edward Kellerher who was involved with the hydrogen bomb, and Dr. Elberbyer who had drawn a great many conclusions from this one experiment in Nevada Tops

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which some other scientists thought might not necessarily be true if you carried out the experiment in granite or carried it out in dirt or carried it out in dirt or carried it out in other forms of earth. They also thought that some of your tests might not be the same if the experiments were carried out in swampy land or carried out under different conditions. Some of the members of panel were quite convinced that additional research would pay real dividends in the ability to reduce the number of identification stations and in the ability to increase in whatever systems we set up—the ability to both detect and identify. I think especially as a result of the great amount of research that has been done on Project Valla that many of the theories of the Fisk Panel have, I believe, been proven to be correct.

BUNN: Do you remember why—did President Kennedy say why he decided to retain the 20 on-site inspections rather than adopt immediately the sliding scale—10 to 20—proposal?

DEAN: Well, I believe that when the experts drew their report up in 1958 as to the type of identification stations you'd have to have, the equipment of those stations, the number of ships at sea, the amount of submarine installations that we would have to have, and in addition to being scientists, they were also asked as to how many on-site inspections the international agency supervising the treaty would have to have all over the world in an effort to make sure that no one was cheating on the treaty and on the assumption that you were still going to have the treaty only apply to tests yielding 4.25 and above on the same scale of magnitude. It's my understanding, subject to correction, when this matter first came up,

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Dr. Kiscitowski, who was then science advisor to President Eisenhower, felt that since these on-site inspections especially if they're underground might require a great deal of mining in desolated parts of the world where there might not be electricity or power or you might run into rather difficult geological conditions, that in all probability the fact of the matter is that you might not be able to mount more than ten or twelve per annum but he thought that since the Russians were such poker players that we probably ought to start out asking for twenty, but in the course of presentation of this matter to the Congress and to the country in the discussion of the question especially by those who were opposed to the adoption of a test ban treaty, the number 'twenty' became somewhat like the law of _____. There were some people that, I believe the President felt would be almost immediately antagonized by the whole idea of a nuclear test ban treaty if until he had all the scientific data on approvable basis, he should start out and say to them well, we will both consider a test ban treaty and also consider reducing the number of on-site inspections below twenty. I think he thought that that would be an insuperable argument and instead getting down to the merits of the treaty and really arguing it, many people would be antagonized by the idea of going below 20 so you would never get down to the real merits of the treaty.

BUNN: To refresh your recollection, you went to Geneva on 21 March and the new proposals were then set forth by you at the Conference on that day and thereafter. Then, you remember that on 18 April a draft treaty containing the new proposals was cabled to Geneva and on 1 May, according to my notes,

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you were back again here in Washington and there was an NSC [National Security Council] meeting at which you were present. I don't know what was discussed at that meeting but based on the events which had happened before and those that happened afterward, I think that at least two subjects were discussed. One is the sliding scale proposal because that was made at Geneva on 12 May thereafter. And the other was the possibility of resuming testing.

There were two NSC meetings—one on 1 May and one on 2 May—then on 4 May you met with the President again. I suspect that was probably just before you took the plane and went back to Geneva. I think he issued a statement at that time. Could you tell us what you remember about those meetings?

DEAN: There had been about eight or ten rather basic issues that the Soviets had said they would not accept a comprehensive test ban treaty including higher altitude, atmospheric, on and under water, and underground unless we agreed to certain things in the treaty. And we had spent a great deal of time between the time I first came down around the second of March with Mr. McCloy and Mr. Fischer [Adrian S. Fisher] and yourself and various scientific advisors to the President and Dr. Wiesner on this whole question. The Russians, for example, had always insisted that the United States and the United Kingdom should not each have a single vote on the Control Commission to be set up with the Soviets having one vote because then the Soviets felt that since we were allies in NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and allies generally that there always would be a 2 to 1 vote. So we in effect agreed on a procedure that the UK and the US together would have one vote as against the Soviet Union's one vote. We agreed upon a ten point _____ in which a nuclear explosion

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underground was supposed to have taken place before you had the right to make an inspection. We agreed upon certain procedures in the international control organization, the Soviets had been asking for. And we agreed upon certain additional requirements that had to be met before you had the right to make an on-site inspection. There was also the question of costs. We were trying to get the Russians and ourselves to assume the major burden of the _____ costs and the UK assume the lesser burden of the costs. We were working at that time on the outline of a draft treaty which we were submitting to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Committees and the Joint Chiefs. And there was also a question raised, which was always raised, in discussions with the Russians, as to whether along our negotiations we should try to find out whether if we put these forward they would accept them or whether we would be better putting them forward. Because the very first day we met Ambassador Churapkin on behalf of the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] brought up the question of the French tests in the Sahara—

BUNN: Also he raised the Troika—

DEAN: Yes—and insisted that since France was a member of NATO that we in effect through our agent, France, in NATO had violated the Bulganin-Eisenhower moratorium. He also enunciated the theory that he had previously stated in the United Nations that all of the world was now divided up into what they are pleased to call Socialist or rather, always peace-loving Socialist countries who believe in the Communist system and the imperialist war-mongering countries which, in their language, includes

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the United States and the United Kingdom and so forth down the line were peace _____ and he therefore insisted that the administration of this control organization be set up on this basis of a Troika. He further insisted that the Soviets have a veto over any action of this control commission. So that if you were able to meet under the treaty the criteria of an unidentified event, either seismic underground or in the atmosphere or outer space or on or under water, you still wouldn't be able, although you met all conditions necessary, actually to carry out inspection if the Soviet Union exercised their veto power. We were also trying to get these inspection teams made up of trained scientists, trained geologists, or geo-physicists or people acquainted with dirt-moving machinery, or tasks—we were trying to get these teams set up ahead of time so that they would be immediately available in the event you had an unidentified event because unless you can send airplanes around to pick up the debris or unless you can do certain things within a fairly immediate time after the event goes off, you might not be able to get the evidence that there had been any violation. Whereas the Soviets were always insisting that these teams would only be made up on an ad hoc basis after the event. There was also the question of the routes that would take the teams to the site of the unidentified event—there was the question of who was going to pilot the plane—there was the question of what kind of equipment should be on those planes, what kind of controls the host country (by host country I meant the country in whose territory the alleged unidentified event had taken place—the country therefore that would have to invite the—or facilitate the work of the control commission)

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and there was the question of whether—as the Russians insisted—there, in effect, should be self-inspection so that each side would inspect itself; whereas we were insisting that we and the UK would inspect for unidentified events on Soviet territory and they would have the right to make up the teams that inspected on our territory.

BUNN: Do you remember, sir, when you were in Geneva during this period, ever calling President Kennedy on the telephone to report or his calling you? I know there were cables—dispatches—back and forth.

DEAN: I never called him but there were three times, I believe, when either he alone or he and the Secretary of State called me at Geneva to discuss questions. There was this panel that Dr. Fisk was working on with the other scientists—they were revising, I believe, their idea as to the number of earthquakes that were actually occurring on Soviet territory in any one year and the parts on Soviet territory where these were occurring and whether we wouldn't be safe in saying that if you had as many as 50 unidentified events then you'd always had a minimum of 10 and then for every additional unidentified event going to five you'd have one more right of inspection up to the maximum of 20. So if you never did have more than 50 unidentified events, well, then you wouldn't be entitled to more than 10 on-site inspections. But if you went up to—if there were as much as 20 unidentified events, well, then you'd have on the basis of one in five, you'd

have another 10 or up to a maximum of 20. The—I believe the question of—my recollection is that I came back to discuss this whole

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question with the Joint Chiefs and the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Committee prior to the time that we actually put up this minimum of 10 and then one in five up to 20. And we had also when we actually tabled our draft of the treaty on the 18th of April '61 we had also put in as a schedule a very detailed schedule of what we planned to do in the way of launching solar satellites and _____ earth satellites because under the system of a very large number of identification stations—under the system recommended by the scientists in '58, these had to be placed not more 600 kilometers apart in seismic areas and 1000 kilometers apart in non-seismic areas and the—since there was a possibility that the Soviets wanted to wait for the time that they could launch one of these experiments and set it out in outer space and then wait a period of several months until they got the information back or possibly, they might be able to mount leaden wings on it which would absorb the initial gamma rays so that they wouldn't be recorded by these instruments. You had to have a large number of installations on the earth between these stations in an effort to pick up possible nuclear explosions in outer space and in the atmosphere. There was a lot of worry at that time as to whether they might not be able to launch one on the far side of the moon, or the far side of Mars, and we might not be able to pick it up. This panel I think was resolving a good many of these rather difficult nuclear science and astronomical scientific questions during this period. And my recollection is that the Joint Chiefs wanted to be heard again on this question before we went forward in earnest with the nuclear test ban

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treaty that we had actually tabled on the 18th of April. I don't know whether your minutes show it, but I know we had meetings with General LeMay [Curtis E. LeMay], we had meetings with General Lemnitzer [Lyman L. Lemnitzer] and Admiral Burke [Arleigh Albert Burke] and with members of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense and the Joint Committee at this time.

BUNN: Do you remember the meeting in early May?—whether the possibility—whether the President talked about the possibility of resuming tests and how he felt about it—how he reacted to that possibility?

DEAN: This question of the plowshare came up at that time—as to whether or not we shouldn't try to—invite the Russians over to some plowshare experiment, and two, precisely what it was that we were going to allow them to see. The Joint Committee at that time, as I recall it, was very much opposed to our allowing them to see only certain types of nuclear warheads. There was a question of what we were going to use and what kind of observers they could have, and what we were going to allow them to see. The President was very anxious to try to convince the Soviets of our

peaceful intentions and of our desire to advance the peaceful uses of atomic energy so that we could improve our identification system and our ability to both to detect and to identify. Shortly after I got into this, I began sending a series of cables asking the President and the Secretary of State and Mr. McCloy to look into this whole system of identification stations because the more I read about it and the more I studied it, it seemed to me that it was going to cost several billions of dollars to set it up and it was going to cost about a hundred million dollars to administer it.

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It might also—although we were talking at that time that as a result of President Eisenhower's statement December 31, 1959 in which he said not that we were going to resume but that we reserved the right to resume because the Russians hadn't agreed to certain things on the test ban treaty, there was a good deal of question as to whether or how far we wanted to carry the moratorium on underground tests below 4.25 and most people didn't seem to realize that—the thing that bothered me a great deal, the thing that I kept cabling about was that if we got this treaty through it was going to take a period of, even with luck, three or four years to get the system set up and working and during that period of time we had, in effect, agreed not to test without any ability to detect or identify whether the other side was cheating during the period of time that we were going to set this whole system up. I kept talking to scientists who had been sent over there from AEC [Atomic Energy Commission] and from _____. I just thought that this thing that the scientist had recommended in 1958, and I say this without any criticism because everybody has to do these things on the basis of state of knowledge that existed at the time that they made the recommendation and there had been practically no basic research in this field of seismic research, but I just thought we were sort of advocating a _____ that we might never get off the ground even though we got the treaty or never get the appropriation, never get the trained personnel, never get the stations set up, or never get the thing working.

BUNN: Do you remember when you came back and saw the President and whether you got the impression that he had read the important cables from Geneva on a fairly regular basis, that he saw them—

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DEAN: Every time I ever talked to the President he showed the utmost familiarity not only with all my cables and my weekly reports and summaries, but the reports of the scientists. I remember well the President—that after the Russians started to test on August 30, 1961, and I was recalled from Geneva, President Kennedy setup the Kinowski Panel in an effort to ascertain by _____ of scientific reasoning and knowledge of what the Russians would gain by this type of testing. The Kinowski Panel finally came up with a report—my recollection is that it was several hundred pages long with a good many formulas in it. As a non-scientist I studied it every night until 2 or 3 o'clock in the morning for about ten days until I thought I was sufficiently familiar with it and submitted a two or three page summary of it to the President.

The President told me he wanted to read it. I advised him strongly that I didn't think that he should but he said to me jokingly that if it took ten days for Cornell [Cornell University] to absorb it he was sure that a Harvard man could do it in two days. He told me one day two or three weeks later that he wished that he had taken my advice and never started in on the report but he read it and he studied it and he understood it.

BUNN: That's amazing. There was a meeting that you had with him on May 24 of '61. The records show that there was the day before that a Committee Principals meeting in which McNamara strongly urged resumption of nuclear testing and Secretary Rusk stated four questions—he asked you if whether there was any prospect of a treaty, you said they were pretty dim, and he said is there a need for testing, and McNamara said yes,

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and he said can we accept an uncontrolled ban on tests, that is a moratorium, and Mr. McCloy agreed that it weakened our position on control, and then he asked about political considerations involved—the impact on the world and Mr. Murrow [Edward R. Murrow] said he'd heard nothing at the meeting that would be very convincing to the rest of the world to its own national interest. So those were the sorts of issues that were discussed the day before and I assume those were the sorts of issues that were discussed with the President on the 24th. Do you have any recollection of what he said?

DEAN: I remember that the President was very impressed with Mr. McNamara's presentation on the need to resume testing. We had had some unconfirmed reports—intelligence reports—that it looked as though the Russians might be going to resume testing but nothing very definitive. And some of our scientists thought that if the Russians tested, and especially if they tested in the atmosphere and especially if they tested in the megaton range, that they might get certain advantages over us that would be very difficult for us to overcome. President Kennedy, of course, was getting ready for his meeting with the then Premier Khrushchev [Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev] in Vienna [Vienna, Austria].

BUNN: Right—that took place on June 4—

DEAN: Which was to take place on June 4 and unless there was an urgent national necessity for it President Kennedy was extremely reluctant to say we were going to resume testing prior to the time that he had this conference with Premier Khrushchev at which, among other things, the nuclear

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test ban treaty was going to be discussed. After President Kennedy saw Premier Khrushchev in Vienna in June—I think it was Mac Bundy [McGeorge Bundy] that telephoned me at Geneva from Vienna and asked me to meet the President in Paris [Paris, France] on his way

back. And I did meet with the President and Ambassador Thomas and Ambassador Gavin [James M. Gavin], then the American Ambassador to France, and Mr. Bundy and Mr. Wiesner and—

BUNN: I remember the sombre atmosphere that came through on the television broadcast that the President gave right afterward. Did he convey that same feeling to you in Paris?

DEAN: The President was very much discouraged with his interview with Premier Khrushchev. He apparently had been very rough and tough and had not indicated any desire whatsoever to meet any of our points on the test ban. He still insisted there was no need for on-site inspections—that Mr. Macmillan [M. Harold, Macmillan] in his visit to the Soviet Union in '59, according to Premier Khrushchev, had said that the British conceded that there was no need for on-site inspections but that this was merely a political bogey for the Americans and Khrushchev continued to insist that the Russians on a scientific basis, on national instrumentation alone, could both detect and identify. There was a good deal of confusion at this time because the Director of the Royal Swedish Mathematical Institute at _____, Sweden, used to announce to the world that he could both detect and identify. We discovered subsequently when I asked one of our nuclear scientists, Warren

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Heckroe, to go up and spend ten days up there, that due to their lack of good scientific dictionaries or good scientific translations, the Swedes were using the words “detect” and “identify” as though they were synonyms, rather than the recording of an event and then the ability to differentiate between whether it was man-made or nuclear or whether it was natural such as an earthquake. So, some of their announcements at that time were somewhat confusing to the world and to the Russians and to ourselves. But the President was terribly upset by his—at least in my judgment he was—interview with Premier Khrushchev and he rather seemed to feel that there was no possibility of working anything out with him on a peaceful basis. I was with the President from about half-past three, I would say, until seven o'clock and then he had dinner—Mrs. Kennedy [Jacqueline B. Kennedy Onassis] was there—with Ambassador Gavin and his wife [Jean Gavin] and then we spent two hours or so after dinner discussing the situation. And then I was asked to see President Kennedy again the next morning and we had a meeting in the room reserved for the presidents at the Orley Airport the next morning, before he left.

BUNN: Had he made up his mind, do you think, at that point to order a resumption of testing?

DEAN: No—he definitely had not.

BUNN: Was he still determined to push on with the treaty?

DEAN: He still was determined to push on with the treaty and see whether there wasn't some way that we could improve our scientific knowledge and improve our means of detection and identification and whether there wasn't some way that we could meet some of the Soviet's points. I've forgotten the

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exact date but there was—one of the principal points of the Soviets were arguing about was the fact that if we appointed a director of the international control organization, that this man couldn't be removed and we put in language that he could be removed for cause.

BUNN: Yes—I remember that. And that—I think that was on August 30—the new proposal on the expulsion of the administrator by the control commission for cause—and there was some new proposal on staffing of teams. But there were a couple of things before that—we might run through. There was on 8 August '61 an NSC meeting and on August 10 the President made the statement about the Kinowski Panel on detecting underground tests and then it came out that he had the report that indicated that inspections still were essential and that he was prepared to go with negotiations. He said you were going to return on August 24.

DEAN: I had come back—my recollection is—I'd have to check my own diaries on this but my recollection is that when President Kennedy first talked to me about this he also asked me if I would be willing to carry on the negotiations with the Russians about trying to agree on a number of non-aligned people that we were to add to the old ten nations disarmament conference, to see if I wouldn't carry on the negotiations with the Russians to attempt to get them to resume negotiations. They had walked out on Ambassador Eaton [Frederick M. Eaton] in June 1960 a few days after the U-2 incident—when he called off his meeting with President Eisenhower in Paris. And I said that I would and the—you may recall that Ambassador Zorin [Valerian Zorin] had come here to

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start working on joint statement of agreed principals in the summer of '61—sometime either in the latter part of June or in the early part of July 1961—

BUNN: Yes—but there was a Principals Meeting on 5 July at which you were present and at which there was a discussion of the draft which became what President Kennedy ultimately tabled at the UN [United Nations] on September 25, 1961.

DEAN: I began working with Mr. McCloy and Secretary Rusk on the whole theory of setting up the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and I spent a great deal of time on the question as to whether it was to be set

up as a completely new and separate agency, completely different—independent from the Department of State [United States Department of State]. And that was the theory on which some of the strong advocates on disarmament had wanted to see it set up. But I spent a good deal of time studying the cables and came to the conclusion that we in effect would have to have a—to set it up as an independent agency you'd have to have an additional man handling disarmament at each embassy, you'd have to have a separate cable system or else use the State Department system, you'd have to use the State Department code. It seemed to me rather expensive and cumbersome to have to put a man at all of the embassies on disarmament. It seemed to me that it would be difficult for the Secretary of State in the Cabinet advising the President or the Secretary of Defense when the workings of the whole place was peace and treaties and to have somebody else working in the general field of disarmament who would be completely independent of the Secretary of State. And we finally after long travail hit upon this device of making the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament

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Agency an Under Secretary who would have his own budget and would have the right to report directly to the Secretary and would have his own staff so that he wouldn't go through what I'd gone through and lots of other people had gone through on _____ Conference in 1958—where the whole staff is delegated to you from other agencies so that the last ten days of the _____ Conference in 1958 I lost 90% of my staff the last ten days of the Conference because they had been recalled by other departments. And then when we set up the second _____ Conference everybody had been dissipated to some other agency.

BUNN: And you had to start all over again—

DEAN: And you had to start all over again. And when I studied on what had happened from time to time on disarmament after '45, I found that at one time there wasn't anybody working on disarmament here in the Department, I believe, except Thomas Farley, was it?

BUNN: His first name wasn't Thomas but his last name was Farley. I've forgotten his first name. He's in Paris now.

DEAN: Well, Mr. Farley and one or two secretaries perhaps.

BUNN: _____ and Miss Baker—

DEAN: And maybe two officers whose primary duties were in other fields. So that—

BUNN: Phil Farley [Philip Judson Farley].

DEAN: We also found that when people were loaned to you by the Air Force or by the Department of Defense that people were often loaned to you on the condition that they reported first to their superior officers and they weren't

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permitted to really give you their best judgment but they were sort of loaned to Disarmament on the general theory that they couldn't do anything that would interfere with the budgets or the work of the departments from which they came. So that I was working with Mr. McCloy on this whole theory of setting up the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and also meeting from time to time—I worked with Mr. McCloy on the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles—meeting with Mr. Zorin from time to time. In that summer of '61 before I went back to Geneva, I believe, on—was it August 24?

BUNN: 24—and then it was delayed after you got there. I think Churapkin had to go back to Moscow for a couple of days and it didn't actually start until the 28th but the plan was the 24th. There was a meeting on August 17th with the President at which the test ban and announcement of preparations for nuclear testing was discussed. And then there was a 22 August meeting with the President—

DEAN: Just prior to that August 17, '61, I think I had sent some cables in which I said that I noticed a rather stiffening in Churapkin's attitude, a sort of disinterest in new proposals and that we were beginning to query each other—I was beginning to send a series of cables in August of '61 without anything to go on—without any knowledge of evidence of anything—but just beginning to wonder whether they were really interested in a test ban or whether they weren't getting ready to test. And then we had told them that I was coming back with some new statements and the fact that Churapkin was recalled to Moscow which generally presaged some new

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announcement on the part of the Soviets, led us to think that perhaps something was coming towards the end of August.

BUNN: You remember the 22 August meeting—I believe it was the 22 August meeting—that there was a decision about the threshold—the 4.75 threshold—on the 28th, when you returned, you were authorized and did propose the—reducing or eliminating the threshold immediately. Do you remember that one? And the—it must have been at the 22 August meeting that you talked with the President about that—

DEAN: We did—we talked at great length about that.

BUNN: To this day the Chiefs don't know where the threshold went. They were at the meeting but apparently you must have discussed it with the President at the end of the meeting when they—apparently after they thought the meeting was over.

DEAN: Oh—really?

BUNN: Yes. Do you have any recollection of some of the people thinking the meeting was over and getting up or anything—or perhaps you talked out in the garden with the President or went to another room or to his desk and maybe you and Mr. McCloy talked to him about the threshold?

DEAN: Very often after we were at one of these big National Security Council meetings the President would ask Mr. McCloy or myself to stay—we sometimes walked around the garden with him—I can't say whether this August 24th meeting—well, he had a State Dinner or some dinner for which he had to get dressed and he invited me into his—oh, what do you call it—

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sitting room—but it's a room just off the large oval room where the Cabinet meets—and he and I had a long discussion on this elimination of the threshold. I thought the whole thing had been—I thought it was merely a pursuing of the earlier discussion on the elimination of the threshold. I had pointed out that one disadvantage of the threshold was that if Dr. Kellerher and Dr. Latimore were correct that you could reduce meaningful nuclear _____ by carrying on underground tests of a yield below 19 or 20 _____ range, perhaps the Russians could do all kinds of things _____ the larger weapons than if we were going on—proposing to go for quite some time, that we were going to sign a test ban treaty, assuming that we get some right of verification and inspection at or above 4.25 but that we were giving the Russians carte blanche to do what they pleased other than this so-called unpoliced gentleman's moratorium not to explode any yield below 4.25. And it seemed to me that if we could extend our inspection that we could and perhaps reduce our number of stations and reduce our number of on-site inspections, that we were really getting more out of it than before because the seismic reports that were coming in at that time indicated that we could go on materially below depending on the type of earth or gravel or geological formation that the seismic event took place in that we could go way below what we were doing. And then, of course, we had this whole series of tests in other nations about which we never had made any public statement, about which we never could say anything in Geneva, or never say anything publicly at the congressional hearings where the

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transcript was to be made public but with these other stations on countries, the general geographic locations of the Soviet Union, plus the ordinary means of intelligence, we were picking up things that according to the scientific theory were not supposed to be able to pick

up. And there were scientists at that time, remember, who were studying this theory of a deep hole to overcome background noises, they were studying the theory of a larger ray of seismograph lowered into a deep hole, they were studying the effect of—if you could fly an airplane over it, you might be able to photograph or pick up the impressions in the earth where there was a nuclear explosion in alluvia. And the scientists were beginning to change their theories about the number of earthquakes there were in the Soviet Union and also whether alluvia wasn't a better medium in which to cut down seismic emanations so as to be able to get out a larger yield on your instruments to record a smaller yield than a so-called soft-dome. The Russians had made a statement that they—they wouldn't sign a test ban treaty if we continued—we were talking that summer about the fact that we had the right if we wanted to at any time to stop the moratorium with respect to tests yielding below 4.25 and the Russians were arguing that we didn't. So we thought that perhaps—we weren't very sure of it—but we thought that perhaps if we met the Russians on this point, at least that would be one point on which they wouldn't be able to use as the reason they were refusing to sign.

BUNN: I'm just trying to recapture the mood then. We didn't know the Russians were about to resume testing but the President may have had some

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inkling of it. We were ourselves making preparations to resume testing and the negotiations were—

DEAN: We actually weren't making preparations to resume testing—

BUNN: Well, not overt—

DEAN: Well, we—apparently the AEC hadn't understood the instructions because you remember when the—

BUNN: After it happened—it took a long time—

DEAN: After it happened, I think it was six or seven months before the—

BUNN: Before the atmospheric tests began but they—what they were making preparations to resume at that point was underground tests.

DEAN: But even the underground tests—

BUNN: They started almost right away.

DEAN: Well, they didn't do anything very meaningful right away.

BUNN: No—I think that's right—they were mostly proof tests.

DEAN: They were pretty much proof tests—I remember Hayward or someone telling me that these things—getting ready to test—cost a tremendous amount of money. They really couldn't do anything meaningful until—really getting ready to do these underground tests—word had gone out after the Russians had.

BUNN: Do you remember—in late August what the President's attitude was here—on the one hand, he indicated to the AEC that they ought to get ready or, I assume he had, at least there had been a lot of talk about

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getting ready to resume. And the Soviets were being very obstructionist in Geneva and yet he was authorizing you to make several very significant test ban proposals, steps in the Soviet direction at Geneva.

DEAN: Well, he—as I said earlier—he was always exceptionally careful and checked everything with his panels, the AEC scientists, Dr. Wiesner, and the Air Force and everybody, but he sensed, which subsequently turned out to be true, that some of the scientists having taken a position, didn't want to see Project Valla ____ succeed if it was going to thereby disprove some of their theories and statements. And you may remember at that time that the director of Project Valla was not very much in sympathy with it.

BUNN: Yes—it was George Bain, at that point.

DEAN: Yes—he was convinced in his own mind that no matter how much money he had, or what kind of a staff he had, or no matter what kind of experiments he had, that he just never was going to be able to improve anything. In fact, he would say so. He testified before the Joint Committee and when he came and spent time with me, I spent hours and hours with him trying to argue with him that if we did this that or the other thing that we must get some kind of an improvement. And George was—George always made me think of—seemed to me living proof of what my father used to say quoting an old Yankee philosopher “It ain't ignorance that causes so much trouble as it is the things people know that ain't so.” George knew more damn things that were not so and he wasn't willing to—really do this type of scientific worked that changed it. Which has since been done. I think the President sensed that.

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BUNN: And he was going to walk that last mile—

DEAN: He was going to walk that last mile and he was not going to give the order to resume testing if there was any possible way of working the thing out with the Soviets.

BUNN: You went then to Geneva, were in Geneva making a proposal on August 28 and another one on the 30th which was then the same day, later in the day when the Soviets announced their resumption—

DEAN: It was about 6:30 that night when we got the word that they announced the resumption of tests.

BUNN: And do you remember—you don't remember whether you had a telephone call from the President?

DEAN: I had a telephone call from Secretary Rusk.

BUNN: Did you? I wondered what his attitude—

DEAN: Well, Rusk was furious and said that I was to come home immediately.

BUNN: Did he indicate that he had talked with the President?

DEAN: Yes—

BUNN: On September 1 then there was a NSC meeting on Soviet testing. It met three times that day and then you will remember on September 3—

DEAN: Well, what we were considering at this September 1 meeting was could we offer to the Soviets that we would expect to extend the moratorium on underground testing until we could work out the treaty on that thing and in the meantime we each would agree without inspection not to test further in outer space, in the atmosphere or on or under water. And we were examining

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that with the scientists and the Atomic Energy Commission. We had long meeting with Glenn Seaborg in the President's study and then my recollection is that the President left for Hyannis [Hyannis, Massachusetts] either Friday or Saturday before Labor Day, and we had several meetings that day. And I stayed here over that weekend and met several times with Mr. McCloy and Mr. Rusk and then Prime Minister MacMillan, you remember, got in touch with the President at Hyannis and I got a call from Hyannis the President wanted our advice—Secretary Rusk, Mr. McCloy and myself—as to whether he should join in with MacMillan's proposal and we advised him that we thought that he should.

BUNN: That was for an atmospheric treaty?

DEAN: That was for an atmospheric treaty. Atmospheric, outer space, and on and under water. And then he and MacMillan sent their message to Khrushchev and then there was so much hubbub in Congress and in the Joint Committee and in papers and everything that before Khrushchev replied President Kennedy gave the order to resume testing.

BUNN: Well, actually there was a limit, as I recall, in the letter—we needed to know by the 6th of September.

DEAN: My recollection is the President gave the order on the 4th of September—

BUNN: September 5th—he said we are compelled to resume testing. But you had a meeting with him then again on September 8 and on September 9 Geneva was adjourned without date. Charlie Stell [Charles Stell] was over there doing the talking for you because you had come back. But I suppose that the meeting

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on September 8th was to talk with you as to whether Geneva should be adjourned.

DEAN: Well, he wanted me to become a member of the United States delegation at the 16th General Assembly and he wanted to know whether I'd handle the disarmament and test ban and he wanted to know when we should present our treat again to the United Nations at that session and he wanted to know whether we should amend our treaty in any way or whether we should go ahead with this so-called Kennedy-MacMillan Declaration, whether I should go back to Geneva and whether it was better to adjourn while the session was on or—there were all sorts of meetings at that time with the Kinowski Panel. There was a letter that was written—that I worked on for three or four days—as to—a long letter that they worked on as to precisely what they thought the Russians could find and the President and I went over that letter several times.

BUNN: Do you remember what his attitude was at that point—he must have been pretty discouraged about the test ban negotiations?

DEAN: My recollection is that the President never really in that sense of the word got discouraged. He disliked intensely that the Russians had started to test—he thought that presaged difficulties with the Soviet Union and he had more or less prided himself on the fact that he was going to be able to work something out on disarmament and the test ban. He was wondering whether we should do something more on our identification stations or our number of on-site inspections. The

British came over here at that time. We met with the British and we were meeting with the British scientists and there was a meeting at that time of the so-called non-aligned nations of the

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world at Belgrade. And that meeting was going on at the 30th of August when the Russians announced that they were going to resume testing. And Nehru [Jawaharlal Nehru] was present at that meeting. And the President was terribly shocked that although Premier Nehru at least claimed to be or perhaps was the first man to suggest a treaty stopping testing, the first man to talk about the horrors of nuclear testing, that Nehru didn't do anything. He just—hardly a murmur of protest at the Russians resuming testing, although you remember that Khrushchev had stated back in '60 that the first man that resumed testing would have crime on his hands and he would be denounced throughout the world—and this Conference didn't do anything and Nehru issued a very mild statement and then we were having all kinds of meetings as to what we were going to submit at the United Nations.

BUNN: Yes—you were sworn in as the U.S. representative on September 12 and then in September—and on October 10 there was a Committee Principals meeting on UN resolutions where you described the proposed US/UK joint resolution that the test ban negotiations be immediately resumed and you mentioned that Indian resolution we were concerned about—

DEAN: Well—the Indians—they were trying to find a resolution that would not condemn the Soviets and you remember, the Soviets were also talking about exploding a 60 to 100 million megaton thing and they were trying to get a resolution through on that and Krishna Menon [Vengalil Krishnan Krishna Menon] was doing everything in his power to see to it that the Indian resolution would come ahead of our resolution and that there was no condemnation of the Soviet Union and that there be no real request to the Soviets to stop the 60-megaton

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testing until after it had actually taken place.

BUNN: I think I've got to stop the tape and turn it over at this point. Now, on November 2, you had a meeting in New York at the Carlyle Hotel with President Kennedy and after the meeting you went to the airport with him.

DEAN: I went to the airport with him in an open car.

BUNN: Oh—really? Do you remember what you were discussing then?

DEAN: Well, he wanted me to bring him up to date on the nuclear test ban treaty and on the general discussion of disarmament.

BUNN: Why was he riding in an open car that day—had he been through a parade or something—or he just liked open cars?

DEAN: Well, I think he liked open cars and he—

BUNN: One might say that he was _____

DEAN: Going back a little bit in September—the next time I come down I will bring it with him—Mr. McCloy and I, you remember all that time, we were all working through lunch, and working on drafting, and working on the legislation and testifying up on the Hill [Capitol Hill] and seeing senators and everybody—and I—when I'd see him, he would ask me about disarmament generally and I would tell him I was for it. Somewhere around the—when did I see him before his speech on September 25, 1961?

BUNN: 21 September—oh, no—wait—that was with the Business Council. You probably didn't—you were sworn in on September 12 as the U.S. representative and you also saw him for about an hour that day.

DEAN: Yes.

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BUNN: I guess maybe that was when you talked to him about the speech on September 25.

DEAN: Well, I talked to him generally about disarmament and the speech and the outline of the speech. I didn't see him again between September and—

BUNN: And through November. Not according to what I've been able to find from your records and our records and Mrs. Lincoln's [Evelyn N. Lincoln] records.

DEAN: Well, he must have called me on the telephone. At his request, I had seen some senators and representatives in Congress on disarmament and I had seen Fulbright and I had seen Hickenlooper [Bourke B. Hickenlooper] and Humphrey [Hubert H. Humphrey] and I had talked to Lovitt [Robert A. Lovett]. Jack and I had been talked to Mr. Foster [William C. Foster].

BUNN: Jack meaning Mr. McCloy?

DEAN: Yes—yes—as to whether I'd be willing to become the director if the bill went through. And my recollection is that Friday afternoon prior to September 25th, which I think was a Tuesday, we had all his speech on which I had been working all done and we had our draft of—our statement of Disarmament and a Peaceful World and he called me on the telephone and said—I've got to go up to Hyannis Port this afternoon and I may want you to come to Hyannis over the weekend. I'm not sure yet but I may want you to come to Hyannis or I may want you to come up and ride down with me. He said there are a number of people in the Administration that think that it doesn't make good sense for me to come out in favor of disarmament at this time. Some of the leaders in the Party are quite strong

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against it. You ought to know that as of this moment, it's not entirely certain that I'll appear before the United Nations and make this speech about disarmament on—next Tuesday or not. And I was shocked and said so and said, of course, I was ready to come to Hyannis. And I thought about it most of the next day and that night I went out to Oyster Bay [Oyster Bay, New York] and wrote out in longhand a telegram to the President and I didn't have with me at Oyster Bay his proper code number to get him at Hyannis so I couldn't get through. So I called Mrs. Lincoln at the White House on Sunday morning and she put somebody on the telephone and I dictated to him a long telegram saying that—I'll give you the exact text of it—the substance of it was that the hopes of the world were centered on him in trying to bring something out on disarmament, that he had been elected by the Democratic ticket by a very narrow margin and he had to do something to convince the world that he was something more than a parochial President, that disarmament was a subject that was dear to the hearts of the American people and everybody like Hughes, and Theodore Roosevelt, Taft [William H. Taft], and you had worked on it—the world is waiting for this and if you disappoint them it would be a tragedy. I said in the middle of the Civil War everybody came to Lincoln [Abraham Lincoln] and told him that he must not under any circumstances or in the middle of the Civil War issue his Emancipation Proclamation but Lincoln finally on New Year's Day, January 1, 1963, issued the Emancipation Proclamation and said there's a time to talk about things and there's a time comes when you've got to do something about it and he did it. And I said I think the time has come when you've got to move on disarmament and you can't just continue

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to talk about it and not do anything about it. And if you don't make the speech, in my opinion, you missed the greatest opportunity you will ever have and the people will say that you're a great speech maker but you're sure not much on promises. So he called me from Hyannis and said—Whee, that's quite a message I got from you. You really feel that strongly about this subject? And I said—Yes, I do, Mr. President. I think you will be making a great mistake if you don't go forward with it. Well, he said, there are lots of people who disagree with you, including people in my Party. And he said, if my recollection is correct, you're not a member of my Party. I said, you are quite correct. I am not a Democrat and I have always

been a Republican. So he laughed and said—well, are you going to be in Washington in the morning. And I said—yes. And he said, Well, I may not come to Washington. I may go to the Carlyle. And my recollection is that he asked me to come to see him at the Carlyle and I had to hang around for four or five hours. There were—oh, I don't know how many—politicians there seeing him. And finally I saw him for a very few minutes about 9:30 Monday evening, September the 24th—

BUNN: About the speech—

DEAN: Yes. And he said, “You still think I ought to make that speech?” I said—yes, I do. He said, Well, all these other people have been in here telling me that I'm nuts to make this speech. I said, Well, Mr. President, the tough thing about the presidency, as you well know, is that everyone can give you advice but there comes a cold moment when you and you alone has

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got to make the decision. And I said, the whole world is waiting for you to make this decision. It's all scheduled. It's a sellout at the United Nations and everybody all over the world is waiting for it and if you now decide that you are not going to come out and make this speech, which I think will be terribly popular both throughout the country and throughout the world, I just think it will be a tragedy. He said, Well, I haven't made up my mind yet and I want you to understand that I'm not promising you anything. It was only just a—

BUNN: The day before or so—yes.

DEAN: So, he asked me to come to the Carlyle Hotel the next morning. And I went to the Carlyle Hotel the next morning but I didn't see him but Mrs. Lincoln or Ken O'Donnell [Kenneth P. O'Donnell] or O'Brien [Lawrence F. O'Brien] or somebody came out and said the President can't see but he said for you to not worry—it's O.K. And then I went over as a delegate and he came in at 12:00 and made the speech and, as you remember—

BUNN: It was a great speech—

DEAN: It was a great speech and there was a tremendous ovation. And so he called me up that night and he said, Well, I hope your advice is good. How many votes do you think it's going to get me come next election?

BUNN: I tell you the thing that was tabled by the delegation at the time he made the speech lost us ten million dollars in authorization bill in the House of Representatives a year later—1962. It was just after the

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hearings of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the bill was on floor and the opponents of the bill—H.R. Gross [Harold Royce Gross] and some others—got a whole bunch of that Freedom from War pamphlet—do you remember?

DEAN: Yes—I remember.

BUNN: They got the thing printed up and they spread it all over and the people who were in doubt about us—and underlined the stuff about the Peace Force and everything and that—based on the people who were on the floor at the time working for us—we were told, was what killed us. We lost ten million dollars on the authorization Bill. The Foreign Affairs Committee had voted \$30 million and the House changed it and cut it back to \$20 million. But it was a great speech and I'm glad he made it. Well, that's a good anecdote to end on. Do you want to go on to other obligations?

DEAN: Well, let me see when I can do this again. I've got to stay down—

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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