

Richard K. Donahue Oral History Interview – JFK#3, 02/02/1977
Administrative Information

Creator: Richard K. Donahue
Interviewer: Bill Hartigan
Date of Interview: February 2, 1977
Place of Interview: Lowell, Massachusetts
Length: 46 pages

Biographical Note

Lawyer, assistant to President John F. Kennedy [JFK] (1960 – 1963) discusses work on JFK's 1952 campaign for Senate, Massachusetts politics in the 1950s, work on JFK's 1960 presidential campaign, and working in the Kennedy Administration, among other issues.

Access

Open

Usage Restrictions

According to the deed of gift signed March 1, 2000, copyright of these materials has been assigned to the United States Government. Users of these materials are advised to determine the copyright status of any document from which they wish to publish.

Copyright

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be "used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research." If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excesses of "fair use," that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law. The copyright law extends its protection to unpublished works from the moment of creation in a tangible form. Direct your questions concerning copyright to the reference staff.

Transcript of Oral History Interview

These electronic documents were created from transcripts available in the research room of the John F. Kennedy Library. The transcripts were scanned using optical character recognition and the resulting text files were proofread against the original transcripts. Some formatting changes were made. Page numbers are noted where they would have occurred at the bottoms of the pages of the original transcripts. If researchers have any concerns about accuracy, they are encouraged to visit the Library and consult the transcripts and the interview recordings.

Suggested Citation

Richard K. Donahue, recorded interview by Bill Hartigan, February 2, 1977, (page number), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION (NARA)
JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY

Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interviews of
RICHARD K. DONAHUE

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Richard K. Donahue, of Lowell, Massachusetts, do hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title, and interest in the tape recording and transcript of personal interviews conducted in November 1966, March 8, 1967, and February 2, 1977, and prepared for deposit in the John F. Kennedy Library. This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

(1) The transcript shall be made available for use by researchers as soon as it has been deposited in the John F. Kennedy Library.

(2) The tape recording shall be made available to those researchers who have access to the transcript.

(3) I hereby assign to the United States Government all copyright I may have in the interview transcript and tape.

(4) Copies of the transcript and the tape recording may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.

(5) Copies of the transcript and tape recording may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the John F. Kennedy Library.

Richard K. Donahue
Donor

10-12-99
Date

John W. Paul
Archivist of the United States

3-1-00
Date

Richard K. Donahue – JFK#3

Table of Contents

<u>Page</u>	<u>Topic</u>
1	Meeting John F. Kennedy [JFK] in 1951
2, 7	Working on JFK's 1952 Senate campaign
4, 8	Political climate in Massachusetts during 1952 Senate race
9	Working towards taking control of the Democratic State Committee in Massachusetts
12	Elections for Massachusetts state chairmen
16	Selection of vice-chairman on the State Committee
17	Activities during JFK's 1956 Senate campaign
17, 22	Campaign strategy
20, 31	Activities during JFK's 1960 presidential campaign
22	Campaigning in West Virginia
24	Impressions of the religious issue in West Virginia
25	Working with local campaign workers
28	Contact with Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr.
30	Activities after the 1960 Democratic Convention
32	Election day, 1960
34	Involvement in legislative activities during Kennedy Administration
36, 40	Conducting research on candidates for cabinet appointments
36	Issues with the Postmaster General position
41	General observations on years spent working for JFK
42	Activities on the day of the assassination
44	Effect assassination of JFK and Robert F. Kennedy on Donahue
45	Discussion of materials related to the West Virginia primary

Third Oral History Interview

With

Richard K. Donahue

February 2, 1977
Lowell, Massachusetts

By Bill Hartigan

For the John F. Kennedy Library

HARTIGAN: This is Bill Hartigan in the office of Richard K. Donahue, 21 George Street in Lowell, and the purpose of my visit is to interview Dick Donahue on behalf of the oral history department of the John F. Kennedy Library. For openers, Dick, under what circumstances did you first meet the late President Kennedy [John F. Kennedy]?

DONAHUE: I met him here in Lowell when he was a congressman in 1951. He was obviously at that time starting to move around the state and do some speeches statewide. I had just been elected on stickers to the school committee here, and he was making a speech, and some people thought that it would be well for us to get together, and I was introduced to him at that function. Thereafter, he asked if I would be willing to talk to him or some of his people about

[-1-]

running statewide, and I, like a lot of people, advised him that the one person he shouldn't run against was Henry Cabot Lodge.

HARTIGAN: Who were the people that introduced you to him?

DONAHUE: I think the specific person was Dan O'Dea [Daniel D. O'Dea]. The O'Deas were very close to the Kennedys and had been for a long time. The Gargan children had been raised with the O'Deas, and the Gargans

and my family have been very close anyway.

HARTIGAN: You hadn't at that point met the O'Donnells [Kenneth P. O'Donnell] or the O'Briens [Lawrence F. O'Brien] or Dave Powers [David F. Powers]?

DONAHUE: I never met them until several months later.

HARTIGAN: About that time, then, it was when they contacted you on behalf of the then Congressman Kennedy for his first campaign for the United States Senate.

DONAHUE: That's right.

HARTIGAN: Do you recall any events during that campaign?

DONAHUE: The first person, I think, that came out to see me was Tony Galluccio [Anthony Galluccio] who was a field man at that time. This would have been very early in the year, and he was asking about other people who might be interested. I started to contact people and set up some meetings, and then I started to work a little more actively as the summer

[-2-]

came on. That must have been in the winter of '51-'52. And then I started working in the spring, and I would be talking more or less directly to the senator or some other people whom I can't remember now.

HARTIGAN: At that point, then, you would have then met Bobby Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy] and Kenny O'Donnell?

DONAHUE: No, I didn't meet any of them really until later on in the summer and coming into the early fall. And I met them for the first time, I would think, in the summer of '52 when we were talking about one of the first receptions that was going to be done, one of the first teas. We first talked about setting up a phone bank, and we set up a phone bank, and I don't remember who I had that discussion with. But we rented some space downtown, or we got somebody to donate it, and we started to put the phones in. That time one of the people upon whom the senator was relying very greatly was James O'Dea [James L. O'Dea, Jr.] (he was the state representative), and James O'Dea was Dan O'Dea's nephew. And James O'Dea was the person that the senator expected—or that most people expected—was basically going to do the work here, and I was sort of an added starter. Then as we got involved into the summer, then there were lots of people who were coming around: Polly Fitzgerald, and there was a fellow who.... I guess the first function

[-3-]

that we really did was the tea. No, we did signatures before the tea. That wasn't very well done here. We started doing all those things, and then as things went on Jimmy O'Dea was running again for re-election, and so more of the stuff tended to come to me. And then that's when I started to meet Bobby and Kenny and Larry O'Brien.

HARTIGAN: You mentioned the fact that that was the one office that you felt that he should not run for—United States Senator against Lodge.

DONAHUE: Right.

HARTIGAN: Do you want to comment on that?

DONAHUE: Well, you know, I think I was like everybody else. I thought that Lodge was pretty close to unbeatable, and Lodge had strong support here in the French community, strong support from the newspaper. Almost all of us had great hopes that Kennedy would win statewide, but certainly Saltonstall [Leverett Saltonstall] looked less formidable in those days than Lodge, and it looked like a tough fight. As a matter of fact, I think among other things we suggested that it wouldn't be the worst thing to run against Dever [Paul A. Dever] for the nomination for governor or to force Dever to run against Lodge and Kennedy to run for governor.

[-4 -]

HARTIGAN: And you felt he could have beat Herter [Christian A. Herter] in that campaign?

DONAHUE: I think that clearly if he had the nomination, he would beat almost anyone. But I think also, selfishly, most people in politics at that time were much more interested in who was governor than who was senator. And so he wasn't at all, of course, interested in, I think, even being governor, never mind running for governor. And I think he took it, like a lot of advice, with a grain of salt.

HARTIGAN: Do you recall his response to your...?

DONAHUE: I think, you know, basically he would, instead of answering it directly, answer it obliquely that, you know, Dever had to make his choice, and if Dever chose to run for re-election, obviously it would be inappropriate for a young man to try to knock him off, and that he felt more comfortable with national politics than perhaps state politics. It would be that type of an answer. He never directly said he didn't want to be governor, but he never demonstrated enough interest in it to make me think he ever wanted it.

HARTIGAN: You were appointed secretary for Lowell, as I recall, personally.

[-5-]

DONAHUE: That was as a result of a series of things that did come. The first was the tea which.... Yes, the obligation just fell to me more and more regularly, and so we did it. We did a marvelous, I think as good a tea as was ever done in the state. I think it was about the second. I think the first one was in the Hotel Commander [Sheraton-Commander Hotel] in Cambridge, or something of that nature. We did a magnificent one here, and I never saw so many flowers and sterling silverware. We borrowed it all from everybody in the city, and we did all of the invitations and the ones in the paper and everything like that. It was, I think, five, six, seven thousand women.

HARTIGAN: At what point did you feel as though, or did you begin, to change your mind that he really could beat....

DONAHUE: I would say the first early demonstration—and I'm probably very inaccurate, but my memory is that this would have been about the Sunday after the primary in '52. The reason that I know is that at the time we were doing the phoning, trying to follow up to get people to the tea, some other people were trying to use the phones for primary activity, and so I know it was very close. But when we had a turnout that great and that enthusiastic,

[-6-]

and people, women particularly, were so carried away with him that he was just extremely formidable. He just had it all, almost.

HARTIGAN: And eventful situations in the campaign that would be of interest to....

DONAHUE: Yes, I suppose all campaigns. They start to fade after a while. I think one of the impressions I had quite clearly was that we were working very hard, we felt we were doing very well, and then we were called to Boston in one of the secretaries' meetings when Larry got up and, you know, told us how much we'd done and then all the things we had yet to do, including the tabloids, phones, and the election day, and you know. You almost felt you wished someone would say, "Thank you," but all he gave you was more to do, and no one ever did say, "Thank you." It was, you know, an awful lot of hard work. We were very lucky, of course, because we had just tremendously enthusiastic support.

We had particular local problems here. We had Father Morrissette [Armand Morrissette] who was a French priest who was a close friend of Henry Cabot Lodge, who campaigned openly in the French area, and luckily we had some of the girls come in here, and we had them do

[-7-]

house-to-house, and they could speak French. And we did stuff like that. It was a real hard campaign. This was one area where we sort of ran together with Dever, as opposed to most places ran away from him. We had a reasonably good relationship with the people who were interested in Dever, and rather than set out in total isolation we sort of worked together on a great many things. But it was clear that Kennedy wasn't running as a ticket candidate. He was running as an individual.

HARTIGAN: Did you notice Dever slipping up here in terms of....

DONAHUE: Well, he did. Interestingly enough, Dever was the first one to tell.... We had a rally. In those days, we had a Democratic rally at the auditorium in the last few days, and I was master of ceremonies at the rally. It was one of those typical things where the local candidates, and then the statewide candidates and the regional candidates would come around. As other people would be speaking, the candidates would sit next to you. Well clearly Dever and Kennedy would be the two major figures that would attract the most interest. I wouldn't say the crowd was particularly significant. There might have been four or five hundred people. That would be a lot. But

[-8-]

Kennedy came in after Dever, and Dever was waiting to speak, and as Kennedy came in there was quite a rumble and a roar, and Dever was sitting next to me, and he said, "You know, this kid's got it all," and he said, "I'm in trouble." It was the first time I had heard it. We had had them in town before when President Truman [Harry S. Truman] came to Lowell, but that was merely sort of a whistle-stop appearance. You could sense a little of the difference because Dever was introduced and Kennedy was introduced—we had tremendous crowds we were drawing—and the reaction to Kennedy was clearly superior to that of Dever. The reaction to Truman wasn't as great as you'd expect, at least I expected. But, no, Dever knew he was in trouble. I think that Kennedy—at least I thought—he was out further ahead than he was. But none of us underestimated properly Eisenhower's [Dwight D. Eisenhower] strength.

HARTIGAN: Moving on beyond the '52 campaign, after that was over, you were involved in the feeling amongst the staff that in order to be effective the committee had to be taken over, or at least the reins of the party.

DONAHUE: Yes, the Democratic State Committee.

HARTIGAN: The governor had lost. We had a Republican governor. At what point did you....

DONAHUE: Well, that was in '56. Between that time, in the '54

[-9-]

campaign—the question of Murphy [Robert F. Murphy] and we had the Furcolo [David Foster Furcolo] hassle and all of that—I had been in a lot of conversations with the then senator, just sort of collecting political intelligence, and swapping political folklore. The question came in '56 with the state committee. I was a candidate for the state committee. There was some suggestion that another fellow would run—a fellow by the name of Dick Flood [Richard Flood] who was a lawyer and whose brother had been a roommate of Joe's [Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr.]. And, I forget who it was who asked whether or not I thought he'd be a good candidate. And I said, "Well, he might be a candidate, but if he was I'd beat him because I intended to run." And I think that was the end of his candidacy. I ran and was elected.

And then immediately thereafter I got a call from the senator in the spring just before the election asking me if I would be his candidate for state chairman. And I told him at that time that I didn't know whether I had the time or the ability, and he told me he didn't worry about the ability; it was a question of whether I could have the time. I also told him at that time that I might run into some difficulties because of some votes I'd cast on the school committee, and that he should test out the feelings at

[-10-]

that time of James O'Dea as to what he would do. Well James O'Dea over this period of time developed as something of a protagonist, and so James O'Dea contacted people like Joe Cass [Joseph J. Cass] and Ed and established the fact that I would be an anti-labor candidate, which was a bunch of bunk, but it was indeed the fact. When I received this I talked back to the senator, and then he decided to look elsewhere. Then we started with all the preparations for the meeting.

I guess all of us remember Mother's Day at the Copley Plaza [Hotel, now Sheraton-Plaza Hotel] going through each of the candidates and shaking hands and counting heads and listening to the J. J. Lyons's [James J. Lyons] and all of those people. I remember Joe Cass' wife [Mary Walsh Cass], who was about the last person who came through that day, and he was listening—it was a lovely day, a warm day, why anybody was out Mother's Day politicking was kind of hard, but we were—and she put him to task, and she wanted to make sure that he was going to do what was right by the Democratic party. He didn't show any disturbance, but as she was ushered out of the room I happened to go in, and he was really mad. He took off his jacket, and he kind of threw it, sort of across the room almost against the wall, and he said to someone else who was in the

[-11-]

room—I forget whether it was Ted Reardon [Timothy J. Reardon, Jr.] or not, "Let's get Walter Reuther [Walter P. Reuther] on the phone, and we'll see who wants to do the right thing by the Democratic party." As you know, her husband worked at that point for the AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations].

HARTIGAN: On that chairmanship, Dick, if I recall—you've been over it so quickly—it was my understanding, coming from my district, that there was just the one name—yours was the one that was going to go—and then in the preliminaries of getting the organization going, something went askew.

DONAHUE: Yes, that's basically what it was. There were my own problems at home, and what they threatened to do was to take some votes I'd cast on the school committee and cast them as anti-labor votes, and as you remember there weren't that many votes to spare. I think—I may be absolutely wrong, but I think it was Kenny who came up with Pat Lynch [John M. Lynch].

HARTIGAN: Well, that's true, because he even relates that in his book.

DONAHUE: Yes, I think it was he. I'm not positive. Now at this time, of course, I was not talking to, because Kenny was in Boston.... I was talking to Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen], Ted Sorensen was the one who regularly communicated to me. If the senator didn't speak to me

[-12-]

himself, Sorensen did. I think you will remember, that vote—and I think it's kind of funny—meeting in Dick Maguire's [Richard Maguire] office with Sorensen a couple of nights before, and going over the parliamentary procedures of how the votes would be this and that, and whether a motion to move the previous question took priority, and it was kind of fun to think that anybody thought that we'd be going by parliamentary procedures because it was the Democratic State Committee of Massachusetts. Then, of course, we had the meeting which was a lot of fun. I don't think anyone will ever forget Bernie Cleary [Bernard F. Cleary] and Peter Cloherty [Peter J. Cloherty] who looked like two percheros trying to guard the door, and I'll never forget poor Agnes Lynch for moving. Agnes was sort of a reluctant dragon, and when they burst down the door Agnes got knocked down, and I picked her up, because I was supposed to bring her in anyway, and Agnes did the greatest fainting act since all time and told everybody how she'd been beaten and bruised by these plug-uglies from the other side. She made quite a scene. It was supposed to be, as you remember, a secret meeting which soon ended up into the whole hall.

[-13-]

HARTIGAN: At any time were you contacted by Eddie McLaughlin [Edward F. McLaughlin, Jr.] at all?

DONAHUE: No. He never bothered. I do remember Bernie Cleary's press conference beforehand accusing Kennedy of sending gifts and presents and pay-offs to all of the votes. This was in the lobby, I think, before we entered the hall, and all of us, I remember, joking about they couldn't wait to get home to see what they received under the tree. The funny part about the vote, which I'll never really forget, is that

we thought we had a pretty close count, and you remember that was the old ballroom, and as people went up to vote they had to write....

HARTIGAN: That was at the Bradford [Hotel].

DONAHUE: Yeah. It was a mirrored ballroom, and so as they went up, as they supposedly voted in secret, if you stood where I stood you could tell who wrote "Lynch" and who wrote "Burke" [William H. Burke, Jr.], and I never worried about who voted for whom because I could tell you at that time each one. That was kind of fun. I think everybody—or at least most of us—think that was the first time that anybody identified John Kennedy as a political figure. He had always been known as sort of a matinee idol, and I don't think that they thought that he could get involved in a struggle with

[-14-]

the speaker of the House and take control of the party machinery away from him. The fact that he did that, I think, started to, at least, raise the consciousness of those people who were active in party organizations throughout the country, that he could do that type of thing.

HARTIGAN: As a matter of fact, I think it was the first time that anybody really....

DONAHUE: Yes.

HARTIGAN: He took the chairmanship away from the sitting chairman.

DONAHUE: Right. And it was the first time that he had demonstrated that he cared at all about the party activities. But caring is, you know.... Then they had all the obligations of raising money, and I'm not sure that he guarded the job, though, jealously, but it did give him considerable more authority as he came national.

HARTIGAN: Well, I think as you proceeded through the subsequent campaigns, I think it showed there, outside the state, that he was in fact a ward politician in addition to being a diplomat.

DONAHUE: Well, you know, in my own experience since, I don't think there were very many United States senators who were the political leaders of their states, historically political leaders of the government. And I don't really remember

[-15-]

others except, of course, Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] had some leadership in Texas, but that would be of national delegates as opposed to party machinery. I don't think he ever controlled the party machinery. I think that was a singular effort. Obviously he knew that was

the purpose, otherwise he wouldn't have expended all the time and effort that he did. I think it worked out very well. Just the other day, knowing that Peter Cloherty is dead and Bernie Cleary's dead, you know, there's a whole era that's passed, and it's unfortunate.
[Interruption]

HARTIGAN: Before we get off the state committee activities, did you participate in the selections of the vice-chairman at that time? If you recall, they had five women and five men...

DONAHUE: Yes.

HARTIGAN: ...of which you were....

DONAHUE: Yes. I forget how we did it, but I'd be honest with you, I remember we did it. We always had trouble with the women. We never had trouble with the men.

HARTIGAN: But I recall we gave McCormack's father [Edward J. McCormack, Sr.] one of the vice-chairmanships.

DONAHUE: Well, actually, the funny thing, he turned out to be a pretty good guy.

HARTIGAN: He was always all right.

DONAHUE: He was a good... He was kind of wild at that thing, you know, when you put his belly with Cloherty's and Cleary,

[-16-]

you know, you have about a thousand pounds of dynamite. But he really was just a big growl, and he was a lovely guy, I thought. We got along very well.

HARTIGAN: Well, that was the suggestion of Pat Lynch, which turned out to be a wise thing, because they did participate, and I think if there was any functioning it was due to the fact there was a balance there.

DONAHUE: Oh, I think the only problems we ever had thereafter were with Peter, which you'd have problems with anyway, and J. J. and, you know, some of the others. But it was never very serious. As a matter of fact I never counted it or thought there was any opposition after that. If there was, it didn't really surface.

HARTIGAN: Dick, the next campaign was the 1958 against Celeste [Vincent J. Celeste]. You were active in that?

DONAHUE: Basically, I did most of the advance work in that. That was the first time we tried to really use a formal schedule. We started that very early. Kenny and Larry were both in Boston, and then I would go out and try to advance. And we tried to use a presidential-type campaign. By that I mean, historically in the past the president would go to the biggest dance or the biggest banquet in the neighborhood, and he'd hopscotch all over the state. Instead of that, what we did then was just plan him into a given area and

[-17-]

ask the local secretary to treat it as if he were sort of a presidential candidate and plan events. This was tough for the organization to get used to, but that meant that they had to cover him from the first thing in the morning, whether it was a radio station, to a school stop, to a shopping center, to a luncheon, to some sort of tour in the afternoon, plants and stuff like that, hopefully ending up with a tea, reception, rally-type thing at night. It was good training for all of us, because most of us in '52 had really reacted to events rather than planned events.

If you also remember—I forget the exact statistics—but in that campaign he was interested in achieving a lot of national recognition so he spent a lot of time outside of Massachusetts. I think his total campaign days were like seventeen or eighteen, or something like that.

HARTIGAN: For some reason, though, and maybe you've just already answered it, I know I got the feeling that we seemed to work harder on that one. Maybe it was because we had other thoughts in mind.

DONAHUE: Yes. I think everybody was concerned, and then we had him so little, and the time was so precious that if you might have had him two or three times in the '52 campaign, you might be told you were going to get him once and a

[-18-]

half or something like that, and you really had to make your shots count. I think also people felt more comfortable together.

HARTIGAN: You're hitting the point.

DONAHUE: Most of the people were working.... You know, we didn't work in a great number of new people in '58. We obviously did, but we still were working with a core that we developed in '52.

HARTIGAN: You got the feeling of a more serious situation even though the opponent.... This is, I think, what was misleading a lot of people: What are you working so hard for?

DONAHUE: Well, also remember that Symington [Stuart Symington, II] was running almost unopposed at the same time, and it was a question of who got the biggest vote. Every one of us had dreams that he would be national in '60. I think that for all of us it was still kind of a dream. I don't know. As convinced as I was, I didn't really know how he was going to do it, I just thought that he certainly could not be overlooked.

HARTIGAN: Did you participate in the convention in Chicago?

DONAHUE: No. I did not, in '56.

HARTIGAN: '56?

DONAHUE: No, I did not. I was not a delegate, and I didn't go there. I didn't even start the fire that Peter Cloherty put out.

HARTIGAN: I believe the 1958 campaign, and the next question with reference to the primaries pretty much are tied in, because it seemed no time at all before you bumped into individuals

[-19-]

from Massachusetts in different parts of the country.

DONAHUE: Right.

HARTIGAN: West Virginia, probably, is the best place to start. I know you were down there.

DONAHUE: Well, I first was in Wisconsin. I did New Hampshire first, and then I went to Wisconsin. I was, I guess, the first or second person in from out of state. I was out there in the early part of February up in Eau Claire. I didn't stay there all of the time, but I was up there—that's the Ninth District—for a couple or three weeks, and then Chuck Spalding [Charles Spalding] succeeded me. I had to come back to Massachusetts to do some work, and then after I was here a couple of weeks I returned and then I was in Milwaukee with Arthur Garrity [W. Arthur Garrity], and I guess he was the only other person from Massachusetts.

That was an interesting campaign for a lot of reasons. It was a disappointment. We thought we were going to do better than we did, although we did better than a lot of people thought. It was the first time that I was quite as conscious of the Catholic-Protestant issue, because it became very, very clear. It was also a time when we saw a very strong indication of the Midwest populist feeling, and the support

[-20-]

that Hubert Humphrey [Hubert H. Humphrey] had. It was quite an impressive thing. We were used to Kennedy's charisma, and we saw some of his, especially in districts like mine which bordered Minnesota.

But immediately after Wisconsin I left for West Virginia, and that's where we got the coldest bath of our lives, I guess. I think everybody knows the background now, that Lou Harris [Louis Harris] had conducted one of his vaunted polls which showed that Kennedy should beat Hubert, oh, 70-30, in West Virginia. The only thing he forgot to factor into his poll was whether or not anybody down there knew that Kennedy was a Catholic. Otherwise, of course, we would not have accepted the challenge to go to West Virginia. West Virginia was May 10, 1960, and I think that... [Interruption] Wisconsin was something like April 6. I know that West Virginia was May 10 because I always count that as the high point in my political life. And I was down there probably by the 10th or 12th of April, and it was the most discouraging time, I think, any of us had ever spent. I remember riding down from the airport in Charleston and talking to the cab driver and ask him about the presidential part of the election, and ask him how he was voting, and he said he was voting for the guy who was running against the Catholic.

[-21-]

And I had never heard such open discussion of religious affiliation in my life. And for most of that time we were just constantly beaten over the head by Catholics, Protestants, Catholics, Protestants, Fundamentalists—it was just unbelievable.

But it was an exciting campaign because we got very close to the people. The campaigns in those places... [Interruption] We did all the things that we'd usually done, but we had to get slated. The trick in West Virginia is getting slated. People down there care about two things. They care about who's sheriff and who is assessor. They really don't care about who's president or really who's candidate for governor, because the local politics is built around the sheriff who appoints deputies, and the assessor who keeps most of fees and everything that he collects. He can serve one term. They make large amounts of money. They're put together by political organizations. Traditionally different factions slate candidates. They'll slate someone for sheriff, someone for assessor, someone for everything else—governor, attorney general. And because this was a presidential election year they would slate people for president. We were meeting regularly around the state with political leaders hoping to get slated.

There was a lot

[-22-]

of talk about money. We used money, you know, in West Virginia; but we used money as every other candidate did, because they in West Virginia—like in Baltimore—nobody works on election day, or a lot of people won't work unless someone pays for the gasoline for their car or gives them five or eight or ten dollars for a campaign. I participated in the distribution of monies of that type, but they were organizational monies. There was no "box" money in the sense—you know, box money is two bucks a vote. We know there was some box money

used. It wasn't used by us. Box money was used in behalf of Johnson, or in behalf of Humphrey, but it was brought in through Johnson, and it was distributed by Senator Byrd [Robert C. Byrd]. We knew that that was in the Cabin Creek area, and I could identify the specific boxes that it was done.

Actually, we got to know and like the people in West Virginia very much. At that time we were very few. Ralph Dungan [Ralph A. Dungan] was doing an awful lot of work for the unions. Franklin Roosevelt [Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.] was there and released the Humphrey draft record and got the hell beaten out of him. Bobby, of course, was there, Larry and Kenny. Kenny was traveling with him, and Larry was trying to meet and make these deals if he could, where we could. The deals weren't based upon money. The deals were based upon whether or not either

[-23-]

candidate would lend strength to the slate. No county chairman gave a damn who won the preferential primary. If slating Kennedy was going to weaken his candidate for sheriff, there was no way in the world he would take him no matter how much money you put out. By the same token if he was inclined to slate him, and you could help him with his campaign expenses, he was delighted to do it.

We did everything we knew how. We did the teas and we did the tabloids, and we did everything. And we were behind. There's no question we were behind. The last poll the day before the election, Saturday or Sunday... I remember, I brought a fellow who was later, unfortunately, convicted—he was a road commissioner in West Virginia—Berl Sawyers—to see the president over at the Daniel Boone Hotel. Berl was considered a very important figure, and the question was whether or not he would throw his support to the senator. I remember meeting with him, and the senator showing him proudly Lou Harris' latest figures which showed us 45-45, and 10 undecided. So that's where we were just beforehand.

That, of course, is also the place where the president made that great speech that I just think turned it all around, and told everybody the fact that he was a born Catholic did not disqualify him that day from being elected

[-24-]

president, he did not think. It was a great, great compelling speech, and knowing the character of the people of West Virginia, where there are more Gold Stars than any other state in the country, and its own war record and all their background and their own really basic fairness, that's what really, I think, turned it around. As you know, that speech was not preserved on tape, and that was the speech that was destroyed. I remember watching it myself. I didn't go to the studio. I watched it in the hotel on TV. It was probably the most moving speech I ever heard him make.

The funny part about that was that a lot of the people who later became closely associated with us were convinced he was going to lose, so by the end of election day Ted Sorensen found it necessary to be back in Washington with Mike Feldman [Myer Feldman]. Pierre Salinger [Pierre E. G. Salinger] thought that it was very important that he be in Indiana

because Indiana was probably going to be a victory, and he wanted to be there to claim victory. So many people left that we had an awful lot of rooms in the Kanawha Hotel.

HARTIGAN: What about the local people, Dick, like Matt Reese [Matthew A. Reese, Jr.] and Bob McDonough [Robert P. McDonough]?

DONAHUE: They were super, just unbelievable. You know, in the basement of the Kanawha Hotel there's an old barber shop, and

[-25-]

it had all the tile of a barber shop but the barber shop was pulled out. We had Matt Reese in there. We had to put him in there because his voice was so doggone booming that if you put him next door to anybody else he would do it. And he started working and, you know, shouting and rootin' and tootin' and just did a superb job. And McDonough had the total intelligence of the politics of West Virginia. He could identify whose faction, or who was this, who was that, and he was just an indefatigable worker, just unbelievable. We just got to know and just really appreciate those people so much.

That's why, you know, as I said, that to me was the high point because we started so far behind. As the results started to come in during the night, you started to see the thing change. And the national press were there basically, as I remember, were basically for Humphrey. The liberal types always thought that Humphrey was the darling, and in that particular fight Kennedy was the conservative and was the underdog. And so he really was not given very much. And given all of that and then the results, it was just such a thrilling.... I don't know who slept. There was a place in the Kanawha Hotel called the Engineers Club. I didn't realize, quite frankly, after being there four weeks that drinking was illegal, in West Virginia, because you could go to the

[-26-]

press club or the Engineers Club, and you could buy a drink, but it was apparently all illegal. It was illegal; it's a bottle state. But we had a party in there that just went on—I don't know—I think about six o'clock in the morning, and then we were up at seven or eight, on the way in the *Caroline* to Washington.

To me, I thought that the election was over that day. I just thought that he clearly had licked the Catholic thing in my mind as far as the polls were concerned, as far as the convention was concerned. And I always thought that if he got on the ticket, he'd win.

HARTIGAN: Wisconsin-wise, would you rate Ivan Nestingen [Ivan A. Nestingen] and Pat Lucey [Patrick J. Lucey] and Jerry Bruno [Gerald J. Bruno]....

DONAHUE: Jerry Bruno, of course, was super. He was just marvelous. He just worked like the devil. And Ivan, of course, stuck his neck out. Pat, of course, for whom I've never had super regard, he was always busy being cute. He

could never reveal himself. Ivan, on the other hand, had his neck stuck out, you know, from here to Fort Hill Park, and stood to lose. I never really understood why Pat was given as much credit for anything, because he spent so doggone much time being careful not to be helpful.

[-27-]

HARTIGAN: After the West Virginia campaign, did you return....

DONAHUE: I was a delegate to the Massachusetts....

HARTIGAN: Right.

DONAHUE: I tried to scrape together a couple of bucks. I was back here for a couple of weeks, and then I went out to California early and started working on the delegates. I worked most especially with the Indiana delegation, which created a little problem, but then I worked on a whole bunch of other things with Larry. A lot with the California delegation, a lot of the foolishness with some of the others. It's hard to recall all of it then, there were crises a minute and everything was a crisis. We were always trying to solve a problem.

HARTIGAN: Up to date, from '51 up to the point we're at now, what contact, if any, did you have with the ambassador [Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr.]?

DONAHUE: I had very little. My contact with him came in a totally different way. As I suggested to you, the Gargans were relatives of his wife's, and the Gargans were very close friends of ours. Joe Gargan [Joseph F. Gargan, Sr.], the Gargans' father, died many, many years ago. He and my father were best friends. He had an uncle—I think it was Bill Gargan [William Gargan]—whose will I had drawn, and they owned a home here. Well, there was Joey [Joseph F. Gargan, Jr.], Ann [Ann Gargan], and Mary Lou [Mary Lou Gargan].... The uncle—whichever one—

[-28-]

died, and I was probating the estate, and for whatever the reason was, the ambassador would call me regularly about the estate. Now the estate consisted, I think, of a total of fifteen thousand dollars. That was the value of the house. The house is worth a lot more today, but I think that's what we sold it for. And he would use that as an.... And, of course, Ann was living with him, and this was before, of course, he was sick or anything else, but she was living with him and really very much a constant companion, and I would hear from him on a not irregular basis about the progress of the estate, but really I think also it was to find out something of what I'd heard or thought or knew about politics. He would exchange little anecdotes, and tell me what was going on and all of that stuff. That was, I think, the high point of my contact with him. Afterwards, at the convention, I had no contact with him, and

during the campaign I think I maybe spoke to him once or twice, and afterwards at the White House I remember talking to him, but never about anything.

HARTIGAN: Were you involved in the discussion of the picking of a vice president in the...

DONAHUE: No.

HARTIGAN: ...Los Angeles convention.

[-29-]

DONAHUE: I was very much on the edge, but I was not involved in that.

HARTIGAN: What about the period of time after the Los Angeles convention?

DONAHUE: I left immediately after Los Angeles. I came back here, and then I went right. ... Well, I was here about two weeks, and then I went to Washington, and I started to work for the Democratic National Committee. I moved into the Mayflower, and we were at 1001 Connecticut Avenue, and I stayed that way through the election.

HARTIGAN: Did you visit any of the hot areas of the country during this campaign?

DONAHUE: Basically, the first thing we did was try to put the coordinators out, which were no different than secretaries. We had all of the problems. I took the basic responsibility under Larry for the organization in the eastern part of the United States down through Florida—that would be out as far as Illinois! I set up a system whereby the coordinators would report, and I designed a form whereby they would report weekly as to their progress on things like registration, distribution of materials, Citizens for Kennedy organizations, things of that nature. When we got the first reports—I remember we were reported to out at Bobby's house—I was one who was the custodian of all the reports, because everybody was

[-30-]

reporting to me. As they started to run through the states I could tell what the status of registration was, and I had it all. He wanted to know where I got that information. I told him, the written reports, at which point he wanted all written reports to go to him. [Laughter] And then I did go out towards the end of the.... Well, the scheduling department, of course, was moving with the candidate, and I guess you could call us the organizational department. We were concerned about activities other than his actual presence. Really, in the last ten days of a campaign you can't initiate anything new from Washington that's going to have any affect in the field. I remember Bobby coming out and saying, "Hell, we can't get any votes here. Let's all get out." And to that end I had to do a bunch.... I did a lot of states—Wisconsin,

Illinois, Ohio, and a little of Michigan, and then down through North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. Most of it was trying to get ready for election day and see what the election day activity was.

HARTIGAN: Of course, the outcome we all know. He was successful, and then, of course, you moved into another experience in life, problems again—the setting up of the new administration, of transition.

[-31-]

DONAHUE: Well, before that we had set up the receipt of information at Bobby's house election night, and we had set up the banks, and I spent—oh, along with I guess eight or ten girls and Ralph Dungan and myself on the phones—we spent most of election day doing that work. And the president was around kind of checking on things. Every now and then he'd come and try out the phones, and we'd call people up to prove to him the damn things worked. It was a terrible day, because we never thought it would end, and we spent a very long and painful election night. We got ahead, doing great, and couldn't conclude it and couldn't win and couldn't do anything.

My most impressive feat that I remember was that about ten days before—or maybe it was earlier than that—before the election, I got a call at the 1001 hotel (whatever you call it) from the Secret Service. The Secret Service asked who was going to be at Hyannis Port, and who they were, and that's it. We weren't too sure, and I gave him a whole bunch of names, and we did a whole bunch of things, and I never had any sense that they followed.... I didn't know what they did with it. I do remember that after leaving the house at three o'clock and going to the motel where Nancy [Nancy Donahue] was, and then coming back, and then going to the armory, at the armory, the president said, "I'd like to see you back

[-32-]

at the house." The whole group of us—there was Larry and myself and Kenny and Sargent Shriver [R. Sargent Shriver, Jr.], and Bobby, and Lem Billings [K. LeMoyne Billings] was there, and some other people. As we came to Bobby's house and came up, I knew a secret service man stood out and said, "Good morning, Mr. Donahue," or "Good afternoon." I said, "How the blazes did he know my name?" They knew everybody.

That was the time he came into the room, the first time that, I guess, we all stood up. He had a big western hat on. It was kind of a messy day. He gave us all sort of assignments. He had Lem Billings get a hold of J. Edgar Hoover and Allen Dulles [Allen W. Dulles] and ask them to stay on. And then he told Sarge that he wanted to go out and seek out the best people. All Sarge could remember was, "Do you mean like Governor Hodges [Luther H. Hodges] for Secretary of Commerce?" because he had been one of Sarge's people under the Businessmen for Kennedy. And then he said, "Larry, I'd like you and Dick to work on making sure that we have proper control of the administration and we have the proper people.

We had made arrangements and had a "wish book" in print, and we received rough galleys of it that day. So I went from there to Washington, and I spent from there to inaugural day working with Adam Yarmolinsky,

[-33-]

Sarge, Ralph Dungan, Harris Wofford [Harris L. Wofford, Jr.], and Larry, basically on trying to put together people for various positions. We did that until we went to the White House.

HARTIGAN: I know that you were involved in many of the legislative activities. Do you recall any of the...?

DONAHUE: Well, of course, we first went over to the White House the first big fight we had was the rules fight. The rules fight.... You know, Larry had spent two years with Furcolo as sort of an assistant. I had been to Washington with my grandmother when I was in the fourth grade, and that was the combined and total experience of the legislative force, because Henry Wilson [Henry Hall Wilson] wasn't even hired, I think, until about inaugural day. Mike Manatos [Michael N. Manatos] had never been in the House [U.S. House of Representatives] side in his life. Claude Desaultels [Claude J. Desaultels] wasn't even there, and we were faced with this, you know, enormous fight. So we had to see what we could do to convince and persuade people.

We really got to know how to count the House in that fight. We got to know where the people are that had the courage, would really stand up for the president, and where those who were going to hide out were. And although every other

[-34-]

fight was built upon that, if we hadn't gotten control of some legislation, nothing would have happened. Most of the other fights were based in some part on our strength in that fight.

HARTIGAN: And from the legislative point of view, he really was not in any serious trouble through it or was....

DONAHUE: Well, he always had the problem that most of the people who were in Congress had run ahead of him. Most of them had gotten more votes in their district than he had. So most of them figured they knew better what was best for the country than he did, and there was no reason for them to risk re-election upon his determination of what was good for the country. So it was a long persuasion job. Really over the period of that time the amount of legislation that moved, and the amount of people who moved from a position of total opposition to the administration—more than fifty percent following to sixty or seventy percent—is a very impressive role. It's unfortunate that it has never been very well written, because most people never could understand the Congress. I mean, most reporters don't understand the Congress. And most of them didn't understand fully how effective he was as a legislative leader. Most people will continue to write that he was

[-35-]

a weak legislative leader but that he was a great idea and philosophical man. That just wasn't true.

HARTIGAN: Dick, were you involved in any specific research on any of the individuals who were appointed to the cabinet?

DONAHUE: Oh, yes. Cabinet, sub-cabinet. The three ones that I principally contributed was postmaster-general, the director of the Veterans' Administration, the head of GSA [General Services Administration], and then some of the independent regulatory agencies.

HARTIGAN: Well, the one I was familiar with was the postmaster-general. I knew you were deeply involved in that.

DONAHUE: I did all of the post office.

HARTIGAN: On that for the moment, that was the only cabinet position that eventually was threatened with a resignation. I know that you were involved in that, so would you care to comment on that?

DONAHUE: Well, it did develop that the president wasn't greatly involved in the Post Office Department, but the Congress desperately was. I had been involved in working with both Postmaster Day [J. Edward Day] and the Deputy Postmaster General.

HARTIGAN: That's Mr. Brawley [H. W. Brawley], now.

DONAHUE: Yes. That was Mr. Brawley. And it was a very regular thing for me to talk to the postmaster general, and it

[-36-]

would be regular if the postmaster general wanted to say something to the president that he would say it first to me. He might later say it to the president, or I might say it to the president on his behalf. It also was very common—and perhaps more common—that I and others in the White House would communicate with Mr. Brawley. We had a lot of things. The Republicans had done an amazing job of putting political operatives throughout the department, and we were very anxious to get rid of them—and that was in the regional directorships and, you know, all of the Schedule C and presidential appointee levels. And it was apparent, I guess, that everybody got to be talking to Mr. Brawley at least as much as they were talking to Mr. Day.

I wasn't actually present when the threatened resignation came because I happened to be in Massachusetts. It was one of the few times I'd come home on a weekend, or I'd come away on a weekend. I returned and I found that there had been a blowup. The postmaster general had threatened to resign, and that apparently Bobby had been called in to be the

intermediary. And the grounds of the intermediation were that Day would stay and that he would communicate to the White House, either to me or to the president and no one else, and that

[-37-]

no one else was to give an order to the postmaster general. I was just told that was the thing. As a matter of fact it never worked to be much more difficult.

HARTIGAN: Well, didn't he stipulate that Brawley go?

DONAHUE: Well, that was what he tried to trade. That was not a trade that he won.

HARTIGAN: But didn't it eventually come out that way? Who talked to Brawley and convinced him? Because he did agree to go to the national committee.

DONAHUE: Right. I think that nobody wanted to give him that much that fast, and so that was the next step. That was on towards the '62 election, and so Brawley was led that way out. But it ended up, therefore, that I used to have him regularly, you know, on my phone list, and I think that, you know, typically, Kennedy took the position that if that's his attitude, I'll never speak to him again. Now, if indeed the president spoke to him again, I don't know of it, because I know that I did more of the talking than anybody else.

HARTIGAN: Well, I know that Mr. O'Donnell didn't care to talk to him.

DONAHUE: No. Nobody did after that. It was really to get us through. We just didn't want to have an embarrassment with '62, or for later. And after the '62 election was over nobody

[-38-]

gave a damn. I mean, as a matter of fact, he was very welcome to leave.

HARTIGAN: And then, he did leave, and then did you know Mr. Gronouski [John A. Gronouski, Jr.] from your activities in the Wisconsin campaign?

DONAHUE: I knew Mr. Gronouski, who frightened me to death in the first instance, because he was first presented to me when we were doing the interregnum, and we were doing it as Paul Corbin's [Paul J. Corbin] candidate for head of the Internal Revenue Service. And I interviewed Mr. Gronouski for that position. But he sort of put his feet up on the desk and winked at me, and said, "I know we can get along," I got scared to death. [Laughter] I just said, "If there's one guy I don't want in the Internal Revenue Service it's a fellow who winks at me and tells me we can get along."

And I passed that information on to, I think, Bobby. At any event, he wasn't put into that, but he remained a viable figure. He was a well-qualified man, but, whew!

HARTIGAN: Were you aware of his activities in the Wisconsin primary?

DONAHUE: No.

HARTIGAN: With reference to the other appointments that you had a hand in, were there any eventful situations that took place?

[-39-]

DONAHUE: Oh, there's a whole bunch of them. It really is not easy to recall now as they once were.

HARTIGAN: The Veterans [Administration] one was....

DONAHUE: That was rather easy. Jack Gleason [John S. Gleason] who had been head of Veterans for Kennedy—he was vice president of the First National Bank of Chicago, and he had been the national commander of the American Legion—and it was rather an easy appointment to make. There was some fight—Tiger Teague [Olin E. Teague] and the members of the Senate who were anxious that Bill Driver [William J. Driver] who was the deputy be appointed. We had to battle that out, but we did. Bernie Boutin [Bernard Louis Boutin].... The fellow that was the head of GSA whose name I've now lost....

HARTIGAN: Moore [John L. Moore]?

DONAHUE: Moore, yes, was a fellow that I discovered, and, you know, appeared to be enormously capable guy with a good background of financial vice president of a university, and a CPA [Certified Public Accountant], and had all kinds of building experience, and we were quite pleased with him, and then it turned out that he could do everything but make decisions. And Bernie Boutin was put in as deputy there, and everyone was sort of apologetic that this former mayor of Laconia, New Hampshire, should be hired and holding such an exalted

[-40-]

job, and after he was there a very short time soon discovered that Bernie was the only administrator over there. He, of course, since has established himself as a super administrator. [Interruption]

HARTIGAN: Dick, I want you to excuse the interruption. We do have to change tapes. But are there any general observations you'd like to make with reference to the Kennedy years and your activities in them?

DONAHUE: Oh, yes. It was a very exciting time. I think that's about as thrilling an experience as you could ever have. The White House is the high point of power in the free world. I think in retrospect we did well. Obviously we could have done a lot better. I think in terms of operation, we ran a better operation than has been run since. I think the sense of unity among the members of the staff was as great as has ever been. I am aware that there were obvious disputes between various members over some authority, but nothing as divisive as has happened since. Clearly a lot of this is a reflection of the president, because I don't think that people are ever any better than their leader, and he was just super.

HARTIGAN: Do you feel as though we've left any category out that we should have....

[-41-]

DONAHUE: Oh, there's a lot of stuff.

HARTIGAN: We're always leaving out, huh?

DONAHUE: Just as well.

HARTIGAN: Dick, I suppose everybody remembers where they were on the ending of the war and when Jack Kennedy was assassinated. Do you care to relate to us....

DONAHUE: I was right here. I was in Lowell. I had resigned on November 15, so I was the only one who had left the White House of those of us who had gone down there from Massachusetts. I had left there, come back here to practice law. I was with Kenny O'Donnell's brother [Cleo O'Donnell, Jr.]. I was having lunch at a local private men's club, The Yorick Club. My other brother, Joe [Joseph Donahue], was in Dallas, had been practicing law in Dallas for ten years. Before I left the White House, Joe had called me and told me of the level of hatred in Dallas and to be very careful, and I had communicated that. But that was something that they all knew. I had spoken to Kenny specifically about it. But Joe was genuinely worried about the horrible antipathy to Kennedy. He was waiting at the Center [TradeMart] where he was to speak at the luncheon. I was here and a man came over to the table and said that the president's been shot. And I immediately went to a

[-42-]

room and saw a television. And the first quote I remember was from Congressman Albert Thomas. And Congressman Thomas was saying that, "Well, it's not all that serious, it's not too, too serious," and all that. And I knew at that point that he was dead. You just had to know Albert Thomas. He was the most optimistic and he was.... I knew he was overstating it dramatically. It's funny. I walked from there back to my office, and people on the street—I

was walking against the flow of traffic—were stopping to say, “Hey, Dick, you know the president’s been shot.” And I got to my office, and there was a reporter—it was funny—from the *Boston Herald*. The day I’d landed in town he had come, and he was doing a series, or he had done several interviews, with me on “How does it feel to leave Washington?” I mean, of course, he didn’t know anything about the president being shot. You know the guy just looked at me, and he had kind of tears in his eyes, and I had tears in my eyes, and that was the last time I ever spoke to the fellow.

I left there and went home, and that night we flew to Washington. (I guess that was the next night.) We stayed down through the funeral which, of course, has got to be one of the low points and high points. I mean, it was a terribly low

[-43-]

point in time. In retrospect now, some of the things I just can’t... I will never forget Jack McNally [John J. McNally] ordering de Gaulle [Charles A. de Gaulle] around. I will never forget Jack McNally with “Hey, Duke.” As sad as it is...

HARTIGAN: Hey, Ike?

DONAHUE: You cannot, you cannot take from your mind. Unbelievable. Yet, I tell you that when he was shot, just my whole interest in politics stopped dead, cold, totally. What I used to do enthusiastically, I have never been able to do since. I can’t get involved in it. I still know the things to do. I know how to do them. I know the way to do them, but I won’t do them. And then when Bobby got shot, it was unbelievable. It just destroyed any idea I’ve had. I almost have a feeling now that if I get closely associated with someone, they’re liable to get shot. An awful lot died that day. I guess it has for everybody.

HARTIGAN: Do you think we’ve just about covered the whole bit?

DONAHUE: Yes, sure.

HARTIGAN: Dick, the last question. As you know, they’re in the process of proceeding with the Library, and with putting on all full steam ahead in accumulating oral histories as we’re doing now, and also accumulating acquisitions rather in terms of memorabilia, papers that you might have had.

[-44-]

This is a standard question: Are you of a mind to donate those to the library?

DONAHUE: Oh, sure; oh, yes. No problem.

HARTIGAN: If so, the practice is that they usually will have somebody view the papers and the ones that will be determined will be good, they'll keep with your blessing. Would you want us to contact you at a later date, or do you want to ship them over to us?

DONAHUE: I don't know as I have many papers. I was one of the great ones.... You know, if I got a note from the president, I did what I was told and threw it away. I threw away everything. I have some rag-tag stuff around here, but it isn't even worth anyone taking a trip up for it.

HARTIGAN: Well, why don't you look it over, and when you get it together, maybe if you give me a call I'm not too far from here, and I can come up and pick them up.

DONAHUE: The only stuff I might have is some stuff from the West Virginia primary.

HARTIGAN: Well, that would be interesting.

DONAHUE: I do have some papers that I'm kind of pleased with.

HARTIGAN: What about anything from the Wisconsin?

DONAHUE: No. I don't believe so.

HARTIGAN: That West Virginia would be an interesting aspect. And as it happens, there are very few do have papers concerning that, as you can imagine.

[-45-]

DONAHUE: Yes, I have some papers that I... I'll look then up.

HARTIGAN: Be very happy to hear from you when you find them, Dick.

DONAHUE: Okay.

HARTIGAN: Thank you very much, Richard Donahue.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

[-46-]

Richard K. Donahue Oral History Transcript – JFK #3
Name List

B

Billings, K. LeMoyné, 33
Boutin, Bernard Louis, 40, 41
Brawley, H. W., 36, 37, 38
Bruno, Gerald J., 27
Burke, William H., Jr., 14
Byrd, Robert C., 23

C

Cass, Joseph J., 11, 12
Cass, Mary Walsh, 11, 12
Celeste, Vincent J., 17
Cleary, Bernard F., 13, 14, 16
Cloherty, Peter J., 13, 16, 17, 19
Corbin, Paul J., 39

D

Day, J. Edward, 36, 37
de Gaulle, Charles A., 44
Desaultels, Claude J., 34
Dever, Paul A., 4, 5, 8, 9
Donahue, Joseph, 42
Donahue, Nancy, 32
Driver, William J., 40
Dulles, Allen W., 33
Dungan, Ralph A., 23, 32, 34

E

Ed, 11
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 9

F

Feldman, Myer, 25
Fitzgerald, Polly, 3
Flood, Richard, 10
Furcolo, David Foster, 10, 34

G

Galluccio, Anthony, 2
Gargan, Ann
Gargan, Joseph F., Jr., 28
Gargan, Joseph F., Sr., 28
Gargan, Mary Lou, 28
Gargan, William, 28

Garrity, W. Arthur, 20
Gleason, John S., 40
Gronouski, John A., Jr., 39

H

Harris, Louis, 21, 24
Herter, Christian A., 5
Hodges, Luther H., 33
Hoover, J. Edgar, 33
Humphrey, Hubert H., 21, 23, 26

J

Johnson, Lyndon B., 16, 23

K

Kennedy, John F., 1-11, 14-19, 21, 23-27, 30-38,
40-45
Kennedy, Joseph P., Jr., 10
Kennedy, Joseph P., Sr., 28, 29
Kennedy, Robert F., 3, 4, 23, 30-33, 37, 39, 44

L

Lodge, Henry Cabot, 2, 4, 7
Lucey, Patrick J., 27
Lynch, John M., 12, 14, 17
Lynch, Agnes, 13
Lyons, James J., 11, 17

M

Maguire, Richard, 13
Manatos, Michael N., 34
McCormack, Edward J., Sr., 16, 17
McDonough, Robert P., 25, 26
McLaughlin, Edward F., Jr., 14
McNally, John J., 44
Moore, John L., 40
Morissette, Armand, 7
Murphy, Robert F., 10

N

Nestingen, Ivan A., 27

O

O'Brien, Lawrence F., 2, 4, 7, 17, 23, 28, 30, 33, 34
O'Dea, Daniel D., 2, 3
O'Dea, James L., Jr., 3, 4, 11
O'Donnell, Cleo, Jr., 42
O'Donnell, Kenneth P., 2, 3, 4, 12, 17, 23, 33, 38, 42

P

Powers, David F., 2

R

Reardon, Timothy J., Jr., 12
Reese, Matthew A., Jr., 25, 26
Reuther, Walter P., 12
Roosevelt, Franklin D., Jr., 23

S

Salinger, Pierre E. G., 25
Saltonstall, Leverett, 4
Sawyers, Berl, 24
Shriver, R. Sargent, Jr., 33, 34
Sorensen, Theodore C., 12, 13, 25
Spalding, Charles, 20
Symington, Stuart, II, 19

T

Teague, Olin E., 40
Thomas, Albert, 43
Truman, Harry S., 9

W

Wilson, Henry Hall, 34
Wofford, Harris L., Jr., 34

Y

Yarmolinsky, Adam, 33