

Dean Rusk Oral History Interview – JFK#5, 3/30/1970
Administrative Information

Creator: Dean Rusk

Interviewer: Dennis J. O'Brien

Date of Interview: March 30, 1970

Place of Interview: Washington D.C.

Length: 39 pages

Biographical Note

Dean Rusk (1909-1994) was the Secretary of State from 1961 to 1969. This interview focuses on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, the nuclear test ban treaty, and the United States' foreign policy towards China and Indonesia, among other topics.

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Dean Rusk, recorded interview by Dennis J. O'Brien, March 30, 1970 (page number),
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Fifth Oral History Interview

with

DEAN RUSK

March 30, 1970
Washington, D.C.


By Dennis J. O'Brien

For the John F. Kennedy Library

O'BRIEN: Well, I thought this morning that we could perhaps go back and try to attempt to reconstruct your view as well as the view of people in the Department, people in top-level policy-making positions, in 1961, and their views towards the Soviet Union, and not only their views towards the Soviet Union but perhaps if we can go back and reconstruct some of the assumptions at that point of how the Soviet Union viewed the United States. I do understand there were some rather high-level meetings in those first few months before the Bay of Pigs in which the Soviet Union was rather thoroughly discussed.

RUSK: Naturally, a new Administration would want to give a lot of attention to our relations with the Soviet Union. At the end of the Eisenhower Administration those relations had deteriorated rather considerably because of the U-2 incident and the collapse of the Paris summit and the rather bitter exchanges between the two sides. It appeared that Chairman Khrushchev was waiting for a new Administration to come into power in Washington before attempting any new developments of relations with the United States.

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We, therefore, spent a good deal of time trying to analyze Soviet policy and Soviet purpose. It seemed to us that we had to assume that the Soviet Union continued to support the world revolution, that they might use a diversity of tactics, and we clearly thought that they did not want a general war in support of the world revolution. But, nevertheless, we came to the conclusion that there was no reason to believe that they had departed from their ideological basis; namely, support for communist revolution wherever it was feasible to do so. On our side we thought that it was important to move away from an attitude of total hospitality and suspicion and try to find some approaches that would lead to agreement on one or another subject. We thought that it was getting pretty late in history to pursue an ideological pattern of hostility toward the Soviet Union, that we and they, as the two principal powers, ought to find some way to adjust our differences in the interest of peace.

I think we were very much aware of the impact of a total nuclear exchange upon our two countries. President Kennedy had detailed briefings on the effect of a total nuclear exchange, and it was very impressive information. So I think that President Kennedy was prepared to probe a bit with the Soviet Union to see what was possible. Now, that didn't mean that he was willing to give away crucial points to the Soviet Union, for example, points in Berlin or any of these other principal positions, but he did feel that there ought to be some interchange with the Soviet Union connected with a summit meeting.

I had already written an article back in 1960 in which I took a rather restrained view of summit meetings. I did not feel that negotiations should be carried on at that level, that it's better to leave the court of last resort free and to conduct negotiations at a lower level through ambassadors or through foreign ministers. But President Kennedy felt that he wanted to meet Khrushchev, and so that explained the meeting in Vienna in June of 1961.

O'BRIEN: In your view, was the Soviet Union in 1961 genuinely interested in disarmament at that point?

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RUSK: Well, that's a rather long and lugubrious story because on the one side the Soviet Union talked about general and complete disarmament as though we could reach utopia in short order if everybody would just lay down all of their arms, and on the other side, they seemed to resist the partial steps by which you get there. We felt that it was necessary to take this movement a step at a time and try to reduce arms and continue to reduce them until we go them down to manageable proportions. The Soviet Union was inclined to come in each year with a far-ranging total proposals for sharp reductions across the board that just were not practical and could not have been achieved. So the problem of moving on disarmament was to fit the rather broadside Soviet approach to the more cautious American approach of taking one step at a time.

There had been a good deal of disarmament talk during the Eisenhower Administration, but not much had been done about it. Both we and the Soviet Union were under pressure to do something about atmospheric testing because of the pollution of the atmosphere and the nervousness of people all over the world about that pollution, so we

decided to try to establish some sort of frank contact with the Soviet Union early in order to get on with some of these disarmament questions.

O'BRIEN: At this point, in 1961, those first few months of the Administration, was there an awareness of the growing split between China and Russia?

RUSK: We were aware that about 1960 and '61 the ideological split between the two had manifested itself in the different statements made by the two sides and that we also noted some acrimony between the two, but we did not know in 1961 how far that would go. I myself was inclined to believe that these two communist giants would find some way to patch up their troubles and not let them go too far. In the period since then I still haven't changed my mind. I think that they can reconcile their differences to some extent and get together at the expenses of the free world. But the Sino-Soviet difference did become apparent in 1961, yes.

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O'BRIEN: Well, let's take some of the other people in the State Department that are experienced Soviet diplomats with their background in, of course, U.S.-Soviet relations. Let's say Ambassador Thompson, Ambassador Kohler, and...

RUSK: Ambassador Bohlen.

O'BRIEN: ...and Bohlen, and Harriman as well. I've heard it suggested that there is a split between the pragmatists and the ideologists, in a sense, who look at the behavior of the Soviet Union in ideological terms or in more pragmatic terms. Is there much debate going on at this point on...

RUSK: I think the principal point of debate was on the question as to the extent of which the Soviet Union was proceeding on an ideological basis, the role of ideology and Soviet doctrine in action. There were some, such as Bohlen and Thompson, who felt that ideological character of many of the interchanges we had in that earlier period with the Soviet Union: the aid-memoire we got from them, the oral history transcript of communications between the two of us showed a very high ideological content on the Soviet side. When we had our exchanges about Berlin, the Soviet communications were filled with ideology, so that there was a good deal to support the view that the leadership of the Soviet Union still was highly ideological in its orientation.

There were some others who were watching the Soviet Union who felt that ideology was of less importance, that the Soviet Union faced some very practical problems in their foreign policy and in their economic system at home and in the management of their society and that they were becoming more pragmatic in character. Now this trend did not manifest itself until the fall of Khrushchev. After the departure of Khrushchev, the communications between the Soviet Union and the United States became very pragmatic and down-to-earth

and non-ideological in character and the atmosphere changed considerably, although there was still debate in these later years as to how much ideology influenced

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Soviet action. But there was a good lively debate that went on, but these debates didn't influence policy very much because what you decided to do was based more on Soviet action than it was on Soviet motivation.

O'BRIEN: What did you advise the President prior to the meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna as far as negotiating with the Soviet Union? Did you advise him to take a rather tough stand with them?

RUSK: No, my advice was to have a straightforward, across-the-board conversation about major issues to see whether or not there was any hint at points on which there could be some constructive development. We did want to talk about the test ban problem; we wanted to talk about Laos and Vietnam; we heard that Khrushchev was going to want to talk about Berlin. As far as I was concerned, that was a tour d'horizon between the two. I did not look upon it as a suitable place for systematic negotiation on the points that might be discussed. It was rather a get-acquainted meeting which might offer a good background for later exchanges between the two through diplomatic channels. It was to be a short meeting, so there was not an opportunity for a full thrashing out of any of the issues that were there, that were to come up.

As it turned out, the Vienna meeting was notable for two things: one, apparent agreement on Laos and the decision to get everybody out of Laos and leave the Laotians alone (that led to the Geneva agreement of 1962); and the other was the brutal pressure of Khrushchev on Kennedy about Berlin which opened up the Berlin crisis of '61 and '62. In retrospect, I still think that there are dangers to summit meetings. In any event, at that summit meeting Chairman Khrushchev tried to intimidate this new, young President of the United States, and it was rather a serious exchange.

O'BRIEN: What was the effect on the President?

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RUSK: I think he was sobered considerably and was rather set back by the thought that Khrushchev was trying to intimidate him. He had not expected that, I think, from Khrushchev. Khrushchev was very brutal in his language and in his pressure and threatened war if we didn't do what he wanted to do about Berlin. It was necessary for President Kennedy to be very tough and to point out to Khrushchev that we could not give away the vital interests of the United States in a world situation such as we then had, that we were present in Berlin, we could not be driven out, we could not accept that kind of action by the Soviet Union, and that this was a vital stake, a vital point in between us. I think President Kennedy was shaken a bit by the exchange in Vienna, not so much in terms

of being fearful about it but in terms of being startled by the strong effort made by Khrushchev simply to roll over the President of the United States.

O'BRIEN: Was he a little more cautious about summitry after that, the prospects of another meeting with Khrushchev?

RUSK: A little more cautious about another summit meeting with Khrushchev, but he did enjoy meeting VIP's from other countries whether in their own country, as he did on some of his visits, or in Washington, so that I would not think that the Vienna meeting changed his general view about summitry: It changed his view somewhat about Khrushchev.

O'BRIEN: At that time the Soviet Ambassador is Menshikov [Mikhail A. Menshikov] in Washington. I understand there is some criticism of Menshikov and some of his contacts with -- the point is that he's too friendly with government officials. Is there any justification in this? Is this...

RUSK: No, that was not my impression of him. My impression of him was that he was a rather harsh, unyielding, hard-bitten kind of man who saw our relationship in ideological terms and who did not go out of his way to try to understand the American political system.

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O'BRIEN: What leads to his removal?

RUSK: I just don't know. I think that with a change in Administration in Washington it might be natural for the Soviets to look for another man. The Soviets probably made an assessment of President Kennedy and probably came to the conclusion that a man with a temperament and style of Ambassador Dobrynin would be a more effective Ambassador in Washington than a man like Menshikov. Dobrynin was outgoing and social in his characteristics; he understood the United States, having served here for a number of years at the United Nations; he's a civilized man and well-read and thoughtful. And I think the Soviets just came to the conclusion that as a personality he would be better in Washington than a man like Menshikov.

O'BRIEN: Well, does the rhetoric of the campaign, particularly about things like the missile gap and the rather apparent interest that Secretary McNamara takes in the upping of full conventional and nuclear forces, do you see any reaction in the Soviet Union to this or any concern on the part of the Soviet Union to this buildup in both conventional and nuclear forces in those first months of the Administration?

RUSK: The historians would have to check the record of public statements by the Soviet Union on that. I don't recall any Soviet governmental communications

to us on the subject in which they were complaining. I'm sure there was Soviet propaganda aimed against some of the steps that Secretary McNamara was taking because Secretary McNamara was trying to build up both our nuclear and our conventional forces, but I don't recall that the Soviets ever took that up with us formally in negotiations.

O'BRIEN: Well, in terms of priorities on the part of the Soviet Union as you read them in 1961, what seems to concern them the most? Well, let's, you know, name a few things like, perhaps, the German question, Laos, disarmament, the Middle East, Cuba, and certainly other things as well. What seems to be the most important thing in determining their policy towards the United States at that point?

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RUSK: I have no doubt that at that time the German question loomed very large with them. That is the principal unresolved question between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviets have a passionate hatred for and fear of the Germans, and they are determined to see that the Germans do not revive militarily in any significant way that could threaten the Soviet Union. I think Germany was, by all odds, the number one item on their list.

Then, of course, they found themselves in this very intriguing position with regard to Cuba. Here Castro had come to power with a good deal of sympathy and interest from the rest of the hemisphere including sympathy from the United States, and yet he, by the middle of 1960, had clearly become Communist in his orientation and was prepared to and was setting up a Communist government in Cuba. Mikoyan said on an occasion later this meant a great deal to the old Bolsheviks because this was about the first time that a country had gone Communist peacefully. And this made a deep impression on the old Bolsheviks, and Cuba meant a great deal to them. This was also a bone in the throat of the United States and was a source of a good deal of hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union throughout the Kennedy years. But I didn't get much impression from the Soviets that they put disarmament very high on the agenda except as a propaganda matter. I didn't get the impression that they were ready for practical steps of disarmament any more than we were at the time.

O'BRIEN: Now, do you see any shift in those priorities by, let's say, 1963 or '64?

RUSK: No, I don't think so.

O'BRIEN: Basically the same, then?

RUSK: Right.

O'BRIEN: I guess, you know, we do discuss mainly the areas of conflict. How about some of the areas of agreement between the United States and the Soviet

Union in those years? Were you able to seek out any areas in which there could be cooperation and agreement on

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various problems?

RUSK: Well, we did achieve the partial test ban treaty, which was a fairly important step and has led to the cleaning up of the atmosphere to some extent, despite Chinese and French tests. I think that came about partly because Mr. Khrushchev came to the point where he was prepared to proceed on a ban in testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater, even though we could not find a formula by which we could ban testing underground. So that he finally came to the point where he was prepared to proceed on a partial basis, and so was the United States.

But then we also started other things during that period. We tried to expand our exchange program with the Soviet Union. We started negotiations on a consular agreement. We started negotiations on the civil air exchange between the two sides. Those things did not come to fruition until after President Kennedy's death, but a good many things were stirring during that period.

O'BRIEN: Was the Soviet Union at that point genuinely interested in some of the cultural and scientific cooperation that you were proposing?

RUSK: Those were difficult questions to negotiate with them because they were primarily interested in getting their people over here to see what we had in the scientific and technical side and they were very reluctant to an exchange on what might be called the humanities and social sciences or in the arts in which we were interested, so that it was hard to fit together the two interests or the two sides in the exchange program. And there was a good deal of suspicion on the Soviet side that we were trying somehow to penetrate their system, and so those negotiations were pretty difficult.

O'BRIEN: Did you have any reservations about the wheat agreement?

RUSK: No. No, I had none at all. I thought that it was appropriate for us to sell what to the Soviet Union and to finance part of it on credit

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if necessary at a time when they were short and we had substantial surpluses. I was all in favor of the wheat sale?

O'BRIEN: Did you have any reservations about the hot line?

RUSK: No, I didn't. I thought that the hot line as a standby was an important thing to

have. I hoped that the hot line would not come to be used for ordinary communications, and, in fact, the experience with the hot line has been that it has not been used for ordinary communications. It has been reserved for top-level communications of the most urgent sort, as during the 1967 war in the Middle East. So I think the hot line facility is a good thing to have standing by, even though it's seldom used.

O'BRIEN: Well, passing on to some questions about the test bans and, well, some specific questions, how does Arthur Dean's appointment come about?

RUSK: Well, Arthur Dean was a very distinguished Republican, and there was some advantage in having a Republican as a negotiator on a matter of that sort in the interest of bipartisanship. I had known Arthur Dean during the fifties -- as a matter of fact, during the forties -- and had a great regard for him. There was a time when I talked to the President about his becoming Under Secretary of State, but that didn't work out. He was a talented negotiator, had had a lot of experience in negotiating with the communists, and had an interest in the subject, so that it seemed to me to be a natural appointment.

O'BRIEN: In 1960-61, the Soviet Union apparently grows a little bit cold about the idea of a test ban or any kind of agreement on testing. Did you get any insight after becoming Secretary of State as to their motives at that point for this, as well as the decision a little later to resume testing?

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RUSK: No, I didn't have any special insight into what went on in the minds of people at the very top in the Kremlin. They probably had some military developments that they wanted to test out before any test ban was formulated. Looking at the development of their weapons system since then, they undoubtedly wanted to test in the largest megaton range and to see what could be done in that direction. They may have started some testing on the anti-ballistic missile weapons at that time, but I think it's true that there was a period when they showed relatively little interest in a test ban treaty. But we kept plugging away on it, and finally they came around.

O'BRIEN: Did you ever get any insight into internal pressures on Khrushchev within the Soviet government? Are there any, or does he have a relatively free hand at this point?

RUSK: I've always been very skeptical of discussion in the free world about what goes on among the leaders of the Kremlin, discussion of possible differences among them or of cabals within the group or pressures from the military aimed at the political leadership and things of that sort, because the truth is that we just do not have that kind of information on the Soviets. What goes on in the minds of the leadership is well concealed from the United States. We sometimes get a glimpse of it when the depose Khrushchev and make speeches about it, but I just don't know how we can ever find out with

such a closemouthed system what the conversations are that go on among the people at the top. But I'm very skeptical of rumors of differences within their system.

O'BRIEN: And you were then as well?

RUSK: That's right.

O'BRIEN: There are a good many technical problems that are involved with the test ban in detection and also, of course, with the nature of the bombs themselves. Does the State Department have a -- or do you have anyone in the State Department at this point that, for the State Department, does anything in the way of evaluation of these or advising on these, or do you leave this pretty much to the

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agencies involved?

RUSK: We had the Office of Political and Military Affairs under the Deputy Under Secretary's office, and we tried to equip them with specialists who knew how to read technical and scientific material and how to think about it, but we did not try to maintain our own stable of scientists to make independent judgments on issues affecting the test ban. When the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency came into being, they had some specialists to whom we listened. And then the President's scientific advisors also made comments, as well as in the Pentagon.

One of our problems was that we had a variety of scientific recommendations. The scientists were not all together on these issues, so that you almost had to pick and choose among your scientists. But that meant a good deal of hammering out and hard work and meetings and discussion. But we finally reached a point where we decided that we could ourselves, with our own means, sufficiently monitor atmospheric, outer space, and underwater testing as to be able to go into a test ban with reasonable assurance that it would be observed or that we would know of any violations. That was one of the principal scientific points we were concerned about.

O'BRIEN: Well, in terms of the scientific community, is there any one person or part of it that you come to rely on or (let's put it this way) may be a little more convincing to yourself as far as making up your own mind on these things?

RUSK: No, I think not. I think that my practice was to try to take a sampling of scientific opinion and work my way through it to try to find out on what basis a policy officer could safely proceed. I did not have any favorite scientist myself.

O'BRIEN: Well, at that point I understand there was some question or some disagreement as to where the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should be located.

How did you feel at that point about the location of it? Were you satisfied that it was given sort of semi-autonomous role...

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RUSK: Yes, I was generally satisfied with the way it was organized because it meant that ACDA operated generally under the supervision of the Secretary of State and the President. Certainly the relationship between ACDA and the State Department was always very close. When you came to the matter of actually conducting negotiations, there sometimes was a little tension because people in the State Department think that negotiations is their business and the statute actually gave ACDA the responsibility for conducting negotiations on disarmament, so that there were tensions at times between the two agencies as to who would actually conduct the negotiations. But those were usually resolved on an ad hoc basis. In general, I think the ACDA arrangement has worked out very well.

O'BRIEN: Were there any tensions between, particularly, the geographic area of European affairs? Were they concerned about the negotiation of the test ban, perhaps more than the others, and the tensions a little greater there?

RUSK: I think that not at the time of the test ban treaty. We did have some tensions at the time of the negotiation of the nonproliferation treaty, but I think our European friends were generally in favor of the partial test ban treaty and did not see that as impinging upon their special European interests, so that there was relatively little tension between the European office of the State Department and ACDA.

O'BRIEN: I myself felt that we could not go into an underground ban without on-site inspections. I felt that it was important for the United States to be able to assure its own people that a treaty of that sort was being observed and that we could not do that unless we had adequate means of checking to be able to assure ourselves that it was being observed. A treaty could soon be corroded by suspicion and doubts raised by people who would bring charges that violations were occurring on the other side, so that we had to be in a position

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to give assurance. That meant, it seemed to me, based on the technical information I had at the time, it meant onsite inspections, at least a reasonable number of them. The Soviets were adamantly opposed to on-site inspections.

You see, the Soviets and we are in a special relationship on this matter of inspection. When we ask them for inspection, we are asking for a unilateral concession because the Soviets don't need it as far as the United States is concerned: We're an open society; we have a government that doesn't know how to keep its mouth shut anyhow; and a little espionage thrown in gives the Soviet Union all the information they need about us. But they're a closed

society, and they do know how to keep their mouths shut, and espionage in the Soviet Union is extremely difficult. So we're asking them for something which they don't need as far as we're concerned. So this inspection issue has been a very serious obstacle to serious disarmament negotiations for a long time.

O'BRIEN: Did you recommend to the President that he go to the 16th General Assembly, 1961, and make the plea for a test ban the way that he did?

RUSK: Yes, I think I did. I was rather anxious that President Kennedy appear fairly regularly before the General Assembly of the United Nations. He had a sparkling personality, and he would make a deep impression up there, and so I did not look upon that as a harmful kind of summitry: I looked upon that as a very important appearance for the President before the world community.

O'BRIEN: And you yourself made several trips to the U.N. and, as I understand, carried on a good deal in the way of private and quiet negotiations with people.

RUSK: My practice was to go to the United Nations but not actually attend the General Assembly. My problem was that if I went over there and made the United States speech myself, other foreign ministers would feel that they had to be there to hear me, and then as a courtesy I would have to be there to hear them, and I would spend most of my time sitting in the General

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Assembly. Instead, I let Adlai Stevenson make the U.S. speech when the President didn't make it and spent my time meeting with foreign ministers. I would meet anywhere from seventy to ninety foreign ministers during each session of the General Assembly by simply seeing them right through the day and night. I thought it was a very worthwhile experience for me to get up to date on so many relationships that were discussed in those meetings.

O'BRIEN: In the timing that's developed on the President's announcement of the resumption of U.S. testing, did you have any reservations or recommendations to make to him on this? Were you satisfied in, in a sense, his schedule on this?

RUSK: Yes, I was satisfied with the resumption of U.S. testing. I thought we could not let the Soviet Union go ahead with its testing on a unilateral basis, that we had to take care of ourselves in a matter of that sort, but I also felt that we should press on and try to get a partial test ban treaty.

O'BRIEN: Well, at one stage Prime Minister Macmillan exercised a good deal of influence on President Kennedy in making another attempt to get the Soviet Union to stop their testing. How did you react to this? Are you, in a sense, agreeing with Macmillan here on this point? I was thinking mainly of the Bermuda meetings.

RUSK: Yes, I thought we ought to be able to go as far in holding up on testing as the Soviet Union would be willing to and that if we could get the Soviet Union to move that we could ourselves abandon testing. I was not impressed with the arguments made by some people on our side that come what may we had to do a lot of testing for our own purposes and that we should not have a test ban for that reason. I thought it was important to get this process brought to a halt if possible.

O'BRIEN: Did the British at all tie that, or did Macmillan tie his acquiescence and, in a sense, agreement with the President's announcement for testing, with the use of Christmas Island?

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RUSK: I don't recall. I don't recall the details of that.

O'BRIEN: One thing I was curious about: As I understand, coming out of the Defense Department at this time there's a good deal of conflicting evidence or conflicting views as to Soviet missile strength. Was this apparent to you and apparent to people in the Department, and if it was, did you ever make an attempt to evaluate the various armed services and intelligence agencies and their estimates?

RUSK: We had only partial information about Soviet missiles at that time. 

We got some information through publications and some through visitations and tourists and things of that sort, but not very much. I think this was a conflict over the assessment of inadequate information, and since the information itself was not conclusive, conflicts of interpretation were bound to occur.

O'BRIEN: There's been a good deal of speculation about Penkovsky's [Oleg V. Penkovsky] role and the value of some of the intelligence that he furnished the British. Was there anything of value there, or is this....

RUSK: 


O'BRIEN: Were most people cautious as to the -- well, the policymakers, most policymakers -- cautious of this information at that point?

RUSK: Yes, think so.

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O'BRIEN: Does State ever get involved in any of the internal debates in DOD about weapons systems? I'm thinking primarily about things like the B-70 and the Polaris system. I do suspect that you do get involved in the cancellation of the Skybolt, but how about some of the others as well?

RUSK: State gets involved in weapons systems primarily in working with the Pentagon on the posture statement made by the Secretary of Defense each year when he presents his budget, and that posture statement carries implications for weapons systems. Occasionally, there are specific weapons problems that involve the attitude of the Department of State. For example, Secretary McNamara at one time wanted to eliminate some carriers. As Secretary of State I felt that carriers were a very valuable and flexible instrument of diplomacy, and I made an effort to get McNamara to retain the carriers, and he eventually did. There was one case where the State Department moved directly on a particular weapons system. We were consulted each year, but in general we left the weapons systems problem to the Pentagon.

O'BRIEN: I was thinking, in terms of strategy, I understand there's debate over counter-city, counterforce strategy in terms of nuclear weapons. Do you get concerned with this at all?

RUSK: Not to any real extent. Some of the fellows on the staff were involved in some discussions on the subject, but that didn't come up for high-level decision. We didn't have to referee that discussion, but simply proceeded on the basis of alternatives.

O'BRIEN: In terms of some of the other people that are involved in both the White House and Defense and State in the question of disarmament, I wonder if you could, perhaps, give an assessment of their roles. I'm thinking of Jerome Wiesner, John McCone, the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a group and individually, Arthur Dean, Foster [William C. Foster], and Fisher [Adrian S. Fisher].

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RUSK: Jerome Wiesner was a very able man who had some strong political views about disarmament, and I sometimes had the impression that he let his political views overweigh his scientific judgment. In any event, he put forward on occasions points of view which were turned down by President Kenedy, particularly in such things as how many on-site inspections we needed for a complete ban on nuclear testing and issues of that sort. But he was a very useful counterweight to the technical and scientific people in the Pentagon who sometimes overbalanced the argument in the other direction, and his advisory group that he had around him was very valuable.

The Joint Chiefs, as one could expect, were conservative on disarmament matters. They were suspicious about our being able to verify Soviet compliance with disarmament agreements and were convinced that we ought to proceed on the basis that the Soviets would inevitably cheat. Secretary McNamara was himself strongly in favor of a reasonable kind of disarmament. He did a good deal of the work of the Department of State in the Pentagon with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, so the Department of State seldom had to argue directly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Secretary McNamara did that for them. And so we usually had a unified Department of Defense position with which to deal.

Mr. Foster was a very energetic, committed, and determined leader of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He took his mission seriously and tried his best to work out possibilities of limitations and reduction of armaments across the board. That brought him into occasional conflict with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and so relations at times between him and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were very touchy. This was affected by the fact that he himself had served as Deputy Secretary of Defense and felt that he knew a good deal about defense matters himself, and this caused resentment in the Joint Chiefs. But I'm quite sure myself that had it not been for Foster's determination and persistence that we would not have had the partial test ban treaty, would not have had the nonproliferation treaty, that those would have fallen through simply lack of nourishment without Foster's energetic support for them.

O'BRIEN: How do you see the Cuban Missile Crisis on the disarmament question in both Washington and Moscow? It's been suggested that it was a turning point in the Cold War.

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RUSK: I think the judgment that the Cuban Missile Crisis was the turning point in the Cold War was a very short-term judgment because I think the Soviets drew from the Cuban Missile Crisis the conclusion that they must enter a program of substantial expansion of their nuclear forces, which they, in fact, did. I think that the Cuban Missile Crisis produced an atmosphere of prudence both in Moscow and in Washington and that that atmosphere made it possible to probe points of possible agreement. We both rather stepped back from the Cuban Missile Crisis and said to ourselves on each side, "What have we done? How close have we come to disaster?" No one went through the Cuban Missile Crisis and emerged from it exactly the same person that he went into it as. So I think that the Cuban Missile Crisis had a tempering effect on the relation between the two and perhaps facilitated some of the later agreements, but it did not mean the end of the Cold War and it did not mean an end of competition and rivalry and tension between the United States and the Soviet Union.

O'BRIEN: Well, I've seen a number of references to individual meetings that you held with Andrei Gromyko. Now, was this on a regular basis that you met him or just sort of an ad hoc thing from time to time or did you have a series of discussions?

RUSK: Well, in the first place, I met Gromyko each year at the General Assembly of the United Nations, and that would usually mean two or three meetings, usually dinner meetings, and long discussion between the two of us on outstanding problems, so there was an occasion each year when the two of us got together. Then there were special occasions such as the Geneva Conference on Laos and the Geneva disarmament conference when we would get together. We also went to Vienna to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Vienna State Treaty, and he was there, and I had a chat with him then. Then I went to Moscow to sign the nuclear test ban treaty and we had long discussions there, and I went on the plane with him down to the Black Sea to visit Khrushchev down there. So we had many opportunities to talk with each other. We got to know each other rather well, on a first name basis.

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O'BRIEN: What were your impressions of him as a person and as a negotiator?

RUSK: He was very intelligent. He was always beautifully briefed; he never missed a point in terms of what the Soviet position was. He was tough, but when the signal had been developed in the Soviet hierarchy that agreement was desired, then he would be very helpful in trying to find a formula by which we could reach agreement. He's basically a technician rather than a political leader. He has survived the various changes in the Soviet Union partly because he is the foreign policy specialist and technician. And he does a very good job at it. He has become more mature and more mellow and more sophisticated over the years. He knows the United States quite well. He served at the United Nations and here in Washington. He's seen a lot of American leaders come and go. He's one of the senior foreign ministers in the world today, having served longer than almost anyone except Joseph Luns of the Netherlands, and he excludes the confidence which long service in that post would bring to him. I rather enjoyed my relations with him despite the fact that we had some extremely difficult times together. He came to speak English very well, so that often we would not use an interpreter, whereas at the beginning, during the Kennedy period, he would always speak Russian and we'd have interpretation. He changed that, and he learned English very well, but before I left office I never tried to learn Russian.

O'BRIEN: Did he have the capacity of being informal on occasions and sort of off the record?

RUSK: His humor was a little heavy. He didn't allow himself to become personal in any intimate sense. The last time I met with him he did speak personally and rather warmly about the relationship that we had had over the period during my service and referred to my retirement with regret and so forth. But while we were discussing business he was very businesslike indeed and didn't joke about it and didn't divert from the topic in order to engage in pleasantries and things of that sort. He was very much to the point. I would say he was a professional Bolshevik bureaucrat of considerable ability.

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O'BRIEN: In these discussions did you at any point, through your talks with him, see any major breakthroughs on questions like disarmament, or did they occur in your conversations with him?

RUSK: I'm just trying to think back over the various subjects we talked about. I'd have to check the record on that to see just what might have occurred. I think that there usually was preliminary exploration by other people before Gromyko and I actually buttoned anything up.

O'BRIEN: I was thinking of a memo that I saw in the microfilms pertaining to the '62 meeting in August -- I've forgotten the precise changes, but it was a change in their position. Well, it's in the record.

RUSK: Yes, well, I'd have to check the record on that.

O'BRIEN: Yes, it's in the record, so it's no problem. There are a number of other signals that occur in late 1962, as I understand, on this question of disarmament. I was thinking of Khrushchev's apparent conversation with Norman Cousins which is reported and some talks between...

RUSK: Kuznetsov [Vasili V. Kuznetsov.

O'BRIEN: ...Kuznetsov and Dean in Geneva. After the missile crisis do you sense that there is some change in the Soviet Union about this point?

RUSK: Yes, I think so. After the Cuban Missile Crisis I think the Soviet attitude relaxed a bit and they came to accept the partial test ban treaty concept.

O'BRIEN: Do you sense that there's any attempt on the part of interested group in the United States to sabotage the test ban talks, the opponents of the test ban, in a sense?

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RUSK: We had some skeptics in the Congress, but I'm not aware of any systematic effort to sabotage the test ban agreement. Some organizations, I'm sure, were not very enthusiastic about it, some groups of people, but in general it was well received by the American people.

O'BRIEN: The American University speech, of course, and the letter from Kennedy to Khrushchev in May of 1963, are you advising the President in this regard?

RUSK: Yes.

O'BRIEN: What are you telling him about that point? What's on his mind?

RUSK: I think President Kennedy was deeply concerned about the general direction of world affairs: the arms race between the two superpowers, the competition between the two, the failure to solve outstanding problems like the German question, growing tension and war in Southeast Asia, multiplication of nuclear weapons. President Kennedy brooded about the question as to whether it would be his fate to push the nuclear button; he thought about it a great deal. I think that he was trying to do was to begin to reverse direction of world affairs, try to turn them around so that we would be moving toward a period of consultation, negotiation, and agreement rather than a period of competition, hostility, and ideological opposition. Kennedy was himself not a strong ideological man and tended to be very pragmatic in his point of view. I think he was trying to find some basis on which we and the Soviet Union could move away from such a wide field of hostility and begin to get into some specifics of agreement.

O'BRIEN: I understand you're the one that suggests Harriman as a person to send to Moscow for the negotiations .Why Harriman?

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RUSK: Well, he was our most experienced diplomatin dealing with the Soviet Union. He knew the Russians pretty well. He had been one of the first to warn the FDR administration about the trends of Soviet policy, and he had had a lot of dealings with them during and after the war. And he was available; he was ready to serve. I think it was a good choice because he was a very careful negotiator, meticulous on detail and very persistent, so that he did a good job on the nuclear test ban negotiations.

O'BRIEN: How about the composure of the rest of the delegation. Let's put it this way: why not John McCloy and Kaysen [Carl Kaysen] Fisher, Tyler [William R. Tyler], McNaughton [John T. McNaughton? Was there any particular reason...

RUSK: Well, I think in negotiation of that sort sort there were clearly has to be one clear leader; there cannot be a delegation made up of a committee. So if you had Averell Harriman, you wouldn't want John McCloy sitting under him or alongside of him. So you normally would have one outstanding leader who had the full confidence of the President and whom exercised full authority over the delegation. Then you surrounded him with the people from the special points of view that need to be represented and whom he would need if he was to get his job done. So I would think the composition of the delegation was a fairly normal and natural one.

O'BRIEN: Did you have any reservations about the British delegation?

RUSK: I don't recall any at the present time.

O'BRIEN: Well, as I understand, a little later -- is it Quintin Hoag or Hogg?

RUSK: Hogg.

O'BRIEN: Hogg. Quintin Hogg becomes quite critical of Harriman.

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RUSK: Yes, I don't remember that particularly. I think Hogg was so anxious to get an agreement for his own purposes that he was inclined to give points away prematurely and was critical of Harriman for sticking firm on certain points until we got agreement.

O'BRIEN: Were you satisfied with Harriman's instructions in the matter, giving him as much latitude as he did to reach an accommodation on a comprehensive...

RUSK: Yes, I think so. I don't recall any discomfort on that account.

O'BRIEN: How about the language of the treaty when it's once negotiated? Did you have any reservation about it at...

RUSK: No, I think it accomplished its purpose with reasonable accuracy and effectiveness.

O'BRIEN: In terms of ratification of the treaty and the delegation that goes to Moscow, I've often been curious why Adlai Stevenson was not included. Was there any particular reason?

RUSK: Now that you mention it, I would have said that if you had asked me I would have said that he had gone. It would have been very natural for him to be included. But if he didn't go -- and I'd have to check this because I... If he didn't go, I just don't remember what the reason was.

O'BRIEN: I understand you had some discussions with Chancellor Adenauer and that particularly the Bonn relationship was a little sensitive after that. Do you recall any of those discussions?

RUSK: You mean about the nuclear test ban treaty?

O'BRIEN: Yes, on your return from Moscow.

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RUSK: Oh, the old Chancellor was pretty suspicious of anything that looked like an agreement with the Russians. He had some very strong views about the pressure of the Slavs against Western Europe, and he didn't trust the Russians worth a nickel. He didn't think that agreements with them would work, and he particularly felt a sort of resentment at any agreement with the Russians that didn't involve some improvement in the German question. He felt that all issues ought to be submerged in the German question so that if we got an agreement with the Russians we would extract concessions on Germany. And of course, we did not do that on the nuclear test ban treaty, so that he was a little grumpy about it, as I remember.

O'BRIEN: Did the President ever become irritated with him in their....

RUSK: Oh, in a mild sort of way. It was a little difficult to remain irritated with the old Chancellor. He was a great German figure who had successfully brought the Germans out of a terrible period onto a sound democratic base so that, in general, things usually worked out with the old Chancellor. He needed constant reassurance; he saw a lot of shadows. He was always fearful, and he needed constant reassurance about the loyalty of the Americans to NATO and to Germany, so Mr. Foster Dulles used to have to give him assurances about every few months, and I was expected to. The old Chancellor had a great affection for John Foster Dulles and used to remind me of it a great deal in a not very diplomatic fashion. But I think our relations with the old Chancellor worked out pretty well.

O'BRIEN: Well, passing on to another area completely, China and China policy in 1961. Now, what were your views of the existing state of relations with Taiwan and mainland China on assuming office?

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RUSK: My basic view was that there had emerged from China two Chinas, the Republic of China on Taiwan and mainland China with its capital in Peking. I felt that we were on an artificial base in recognizing the Republic of China on Taiwan as the government of China, but I also felt that we would be on an equally artificial base if we simply transferred that and recognized Peking as the government of China if Peking were unwilling to recognize the Republic of China on Taiwan. In other words, the realities of the situation were that there were two Chinas but neither Chinese government would accept the fact that there were two Chinas. Therefore, that left us little room for maneuver. We could not recognize Peking if Peking demanded that we break off relations with Taiwan. We could not surrender Taiwan to Peking as Peking demanded in our talks in Warsaw, so that Peking's adamant attitude on Taiwan effectively closed the door to any improvement of relations with mainland China, at least during the period when I was Secretary of State.

We proposed on a number of occasions exchanges of newsmen, scholars, scientists, technicians, weather information, plant materials on basic food crops, other types of exchanges. We always got back from the Chinese that there's nothing to discuss unless we're prepared to surrender Taiwan. Well, that just left things at an impasse. I thought it was useful to continue the talks, and we were disappointed when the Chinese broke them off in the latter part of the Johnson Administration. But we never made any serious progress.

O'BRIEN: Now let me switch the tape.

[BEGIN SIDE II TAPE I]

O'BRIEN: Well, how about the pressures on the other side against any change in China policy? Did you have any problems with the prior Administration?

RUSK: Not particularly, because there was no opportunity opening up for any change in the China policy. I once remember speculating a bit with President Kennedy about some of the alternatives in China policy which we might be able to examine, and I found him disinterested in any changes in China policy. I think he felt that he had

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enough on his plate from a domestic point of view and in Congress, and he just didn't want to take on a change in China policy that had so little promise to it. In any event, he was very clear about recognizing and supporting the Republic of China on Taiwan and never got to be particularly interested in going very far with the authorities in Peking.

O'BRIEN: Was he afraid of the possible political reaction within the United States to a change in China policy?

RUSK: Well, I think had there been some evidence that a change in China policy on our side would have produced some significant results internationally that he might have considered it. But for us to change without affecting anything, without improving the situation, would simply have taken on a lot of headaches here at home for nothing. President Kennedy used to say that if you're going to have a fight, have a fight about something, don't have a fight about nothing. And I think he felt that China policy was one of those things where there was no opportunity to get anywhere because of the attitude of Peking and, therefore, he'd prefer not to stir it up.

O'BRIEN: Well, how about the role of Stevenson in all of this? Is Stevenson a pressure on changing the China policy, irregardless of the lack of opportunities?

RUSK: I think Stevenson would have been ready to offer to recognize Peking even if Peking turned it down. That would have pleased some of the liberals in this

country and perhaps some in Western Europe; it would have caused some pain to some of our friends in Asia, people like the Japanese and Koreans and, of course, the Republic of China on Taiwan, Thailand, and other such countries. My own view was that there's no particular point in going through an empty gesture just to please a few people here in this country, particularly when at the same time it would have caused a good deal of pain in Asia. If there ever got to be a point where it would not be an empty gesture because of a changed attitude in Peking, then a change in China policy would be for very serious consideration.

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O'BRIEN: But the two China policy never really gets beyond the speculation stage?

RUSK: Not really, because President Kennedy just wasn't interested in tinkering with it.

O'BRIEN: I'm curious about the recognition of Outer Mongolia. Where does the idea originate?

RUSK: It came up in the Department of State [REDACTED] [REDACTED] There were a number of officers who felt that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] we ought to go ahead and recognize them and establish relations with them. I got into a special situation on that subject, however, because the question of admitting Outer Mongolia to the United Nations came up. That faced a Republic of China veto in the Security Council because the Republic of China was opposed to admission of Outer Mongolia to the United Nations. Well, in the process of discussing this matter with the Chinese on Taiwan, I made a commitment that if they would not veto the admission of Outer Mongolia to the United Nations, we would not take up the question of opening up bilateral relations with Outer Mongolia. So I had a personal commitment on that matter which rather blocked that subject, and I sacrificed the bilateral relationship for the admission of Outer Mongolia to the United Nations. Now, that the commitment on my part does not necessarily bind another Administration, but I was more or less paralyzed personally in moving on that point because of the commitment I had made in getting Outer Mongolia into the U.N.

O'BRIEN: Well, does the presence of Outer Mongolia and the status of Outer Mongolia, has this in any way, in your observation over the years, affected the Sino-Soviet relations?

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RUSK: I gather that the Chinese really think that Outer Mongolia ought to be a part of China, and as a matter of fact, I suspect that's the attitude of Chiang Kai-shek

and that that's one of the reasons why he doesn't want us to recognize Outer Mongolia. But in any event, there has been a struggle for influence inside Outer Mongolia between the Chinese and the Russians with the Russians gaining much the superior position, so that there's been a good deal of tension along the Outer Mongolian frontier with China and the movement of Russian troops into Outer Mongolia as a backup force.

O'BRIEN: Did you in 1963, through your talks with Gromyko or perhaps through the contacts of Harriman, attempt to arrive at any kind of an understanding or at least open for discussion on the relations of China and the Soviet Union?

RUSK: I always in my talks with Gromyko said something to open up the possibility of some discussion of China, but Gromyko never responded. The Soviets were never willing to discuss China directly with us. I gather in the most recent period there's been a little discussion of China, and in the negotiation of the nonproliferation treaty there was some discussion of China between us and the Soviet Union. But, in general, the Soviets were very reticent about discussing their China problems with us. I don't recall any profitable conversations with Gromyko over China at any stage.

O'BRIEN: Well, if we could, I'd like to pass on to a few questions about Indonesia and Malaysia, and that should pretty well finish it up for today. There is a relationship of the Ambassador in Indonesia in these years, Ambassador Jones [Howard P. Jones], sometimes described as the special relationship. Was it a special relationship? What is it?

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RUSK: Well, Ambassador Jones was one of Sukarno's [Achmed Sukarno] favorite ambassadors. Ambassador Jones reciprocated by trying to do everything that he could to create a friendly attitude toward Indonesia, toward Sukarno, in the United States, in the Department of State. He also was for a long time dean of the corps, the dean of the diplomatic corps in Djakarta, and Sukarno had a habit of bringing the diplomatic corps in on a lot of his public functions, and that included some of his political speeches, so that it tended to involve the dean of the corps with some of his more strident speeches. I personally felt this relationship between Jones and Sukarno was an embarrassment to us, and I regretted that he was, in fact, dean of the corps, and I was glad in due course we moved him away and put somebody else in his place. I thought that was not a good factor in straight-forward relations between our two governments.

O'BRIEN: The President takes a special interest in Indonesia. [Interruption] Well, the President took a special interest in Indonesia. Did you ever get any insight into why and how?

RUSK: President Kennedy was intrigued by the difficulties that we were having with some of the so-called progressive leaders -- Sukarno, Nkrumah [Kwame

Nkrumah] of Ghana, Ben Bella [Mohammed Ben Bella] of Algeria, Nasser [Gamal Abdel Nasser] of Egypt, Sekou Toure of Guinea -- and he went to some special pains to try to understand them and improve relations with them. He felt that Indonesia was an important country, that Sukarno had, after all, been the leader of the revolution that had won Indonesia's independence, he was a dynamic figure with some world influence at that time. Unfortunately, some of these progressive leaders just turned out to be crooks, and President Kennedy's effort fell to the ground because there was no basic integrity and no basic policy with which to work on the other side. But President Kennedy had President Sukarno here for a state visit, and he gave him a helicopter as a personal gift, tried his best to straighten things out with Sukarno, but Sukarno would just take that sort of effort and put it in his bag and keep going. He wouldn't modify his own attitude in any way.

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O'BRIEN: You have the problem of the Pope [Allen L. Pope] case here when you assume office. Are you getting any internal pressures, you know, to negotiate for the release of Pope and to get Pope out of there?

RUSK: No more than is normal in such a case. I think we might have had some pressure from family, friends, and one or two Congressmen, that sort of thing, but I don't remember anything unusual about the Pope case in that regard.

O'BRIEN: You didn't get any pressure [REDACTED] at that point?

RUSK: Oh, naturally they wanted him to get out.

O'BRIEN: Robert Kennedy becomes involved in not only the Pope case but in a number of other things in regard to Indonesia. Does he have much influence on his brother the President?

RUSK: No, it was the other way around. When Robert Kennedy took on various jobs, as he did, in foreign policy during the Kennedy Administration, he meticulously followed the instructions from his brother. He never freewheeled; he wanted to do exactly what the President wanted him to do. Now, he again made a major effort to improve our relations with Sukarno, visited Indonesia, but didn't get very far.

O'BRIEN: I understand that he had a rather serious diplomatic row with Sukarno on one occasion. Did it cause any complications in relations at all?

RUSK: I just don't remember that.

O'BRIEN: Did Sukarno's visit here in 1961 cause any embarrassment in any way?

RUSK: Not particularly, not particularly. He was a difficult guest; he was so filled with ideas of sex and things of that sort that he was not an

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easy man to be host to. But I don't recall any special difficulty that his visit caused us at that time.

O'BRIEN: I understand the White House played on his vanity somewhat in particularly that visit. Can you recall any of...

RUSK: Well, the charm that President Kennedy could extend to a visitor was really something. But I don't know anything special that was done except, perhaps, the gift of the helicopter to appeal to Sukarno's vanity.

O'BRIEN: Well, in terms of substantive issues, the West Irian or West New Guinea crisis is pretty important at this point. Does this cause any problem, let's say in relations between the United States and the Dutch and the U.S. and Australia...

RUSK: We had a few serious difficulties over the West Irian problem. We had to start with the fact that the Dutch had made a decision to get out of West Irian. The Cabinet, the Prime Minister, the Throne made it clear to us that the Dutch were determined to leave. Now, Joseph Luns, the foreign minister, for whom I had great respect (and still do), had some very special ideas of his own about how the Dutch were to leave, and these were not acceptable to Indonesia.

Well, at one stage the Dutch turned to us and said, "Now, we've put about seven or eight thousand men in West Irian. If Indonesia attacks, the rest is up to you Americans. You've got to help out." And I pointed out that the Dutch had not mobilized, the Cabinet had not asked the Parliament to call for mobilization -- as a matter of fact, everybody else in the government except Luns had told us that the Dutch were leaving anyhow -- and that I could not see the United States drafting boys off the farms of Kansas and the factories of Pittsburgh to do something in West Irian that the burghers of Amsterdam are not willing to do for themselves and that, therefore, we were not going to take on an underwriting of the Dutch position in West Irian. At the same time we tried to put pressure on Sukarno not to use military force but to work out some agreed arrangement by which the transfer could occur, and I threatened the

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Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio [Raden Subandrio] rather severely at one time trying to get them to hold their hand.

Well, eventually a formula was found by which the Indonesians would occupy West Irian, there would be consultation with the people under U.N. auspices in due course to give

the West Irians themselves some sort of choice about what their future was to be, and the Dutch left. But those were rather strenuous times because some of the Dutch felt that we were letting them down in a situation where we had no obligations or commitments and the Indonesians were made at us because we just didn't chase the Dutch out ourselves or didn't get out of the way while they did it. So that was a very disagreeable episode.

O'BRIEN: Did Bunker have a relatively free hand in working out some of the negotiations here?

RUSK: Within broad limits, he had a good deal of discretion. He did a beautiful job in working out the final solution. And I think today even Joseph Luns believes that was the right solution.

O'BRIEN: Well, in terms of this, and I was thinking also of Bunker's working out of the problem involving Yemen, what makes Bunker a good diplomat?

RUSK: He is completely honest with himself and with his superiors. He is tolerant; he is not shocked by any point of view; he is flexible in looking for the formula to bridge gaps in opposing points of view; he's patient; he's extremely honest and readily wins the confidence of those who are negotiating with him. I remember once attending an Organization of American States meeting, and a Latin American foreign minister suddenly said to me, "Oh, here comes the saint." And I looked around and there was Bunker. He was revered by the Latin Americans for his personal qualities. Bunker's also tough-minded. He could be tough in negotiations with a mild manner that was very concealing. But he's one of the finest negotiators we've had in this postwar period.

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O'BRIEN: Well, going back to some of the special correspondence and the special relationships with people like Sukarno and Nasser, there's a good deal of Presidential correspondence that goes out. How is that correspondence generated, and do you get a chance to take a look at it and put your personal approval on it?

RUSK: Typically it's prepared in the State Department and sent over by me, with some adjustments made in it in the White House by the President or by some of his personal staff working on it. But basically the message is prepared in the Department of State.

O'BRIEN: Were there any complications, particularly in the West Irian thing, were there any complications caused by the Russians' and the Chinese support of the Indonesian position as well as, of course, the United States working towards a similar kind of solution?

RUSK: I think not. I think their support might have made the Indonesians, Sukarno, a

little more insistent on occasion and shortened his patience, but that didn't seem to cause any particular complications, as far as I can remember.

O'BRIEN: Well, in terms of the so-called Maphilino [Malaya-Philippines-Indonesia] movement, is this something that is originated by the parties concerned? Do you happen to recall where the idea of Maphilindo...

RUSK: That came up in the area. That was not put forward as an American idea, although we were very much interested in and in favor of the drawing together of these nations of Southeast Asia. That was personal to me back in the Truman Administration days. But there are times when you have to stand aside in order to let something happen which could not happen if you had put your blessing on it. So Maphilindo was one of those ideas for drawing closer together that didn't work out, eventually, but nevertheless was something that we rather were pleased with.

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O'BRIEN: How do you see British policy in regard to, well, the formulation of Malaysia and generally in the area of Southeast Asia in the Kennedy years?

RUSK: I think in general Britain was getting ready to abandon Southeast Asia. They were trying to relieve themselves of their responsibilities, even during the Conservative government of Great Britain. They tried, I think, to put together a package in Malaysia that would be viable rather than leave Borneo and Sarawak and little nonviable states there on the island of Borneo. Singapore standing alone would have difficulty, and I think the British were wise in trying to incorporate it into Malaysia, even though it later burst out of Malaysia. But in general, I think they were getting ready to lay down the burdens of colonialism that they had been laying down everywhere else in the world.

O'BRIEN: In bilateral relations with the United States, are they attempting to encourage the United States to come into the area more during these years and hasten their own withdrawal or to take more of an active role?

RUSK: Not during the Kennedy years. As a matter of fact, not later during the Johnson years. They knew that it would be not well received if they were to urge us to do more out there while they were doing less. As a matter of fact, the tensions that developed between us and Britain had to do with the United States objections to their departure from that area and their willingness to keep their backs into the burdens of the area. But during the Kennedy years we had relatively little difficulty with Britain on these subjects.

O'BRIEN: Did the Department feel the U.S. should take advantage of the Malaysian settlement to put some pressure on the Indonesians to change some of their

internal, particularly some of their internal economic policies and political policies?

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RUSK: We tried through our aid program and through such instruments as the World Bank to get the Indonesians to make more sense about their internal economic problems and their attitudes towards foreign investment and things of that sort. Sukarno wasn't very much interested in economics. I think he was bored with economics and did not see that Indonesia's future turned upon their ability to mobilize their extraordinary resources and achieve a genuine and acceptable standard of living for their people. Indonesia is potentially one of the wealthiest countries in the world, but the wealth is wasted by mismanagement internally. Sukarno did very little to take charge of the economy and deal with economic questions. A good deal of corruption and graft developed out there, and it was just very hard to make sense out of that turbulent situation.

O'BRIEN: Well, in terms of the oil problems -- I was thinking mainly of Stanvac [Standard-Vacuum Oil Company] and Caltex [California-Texas Oil Company, Ltd.] here in their oil problems -- how does the meeting that takes place in Tokyo generate, the one in which, was it Wilson Wyatt and Chayes [Abram J. Chayes]...

RUSK: I don't remember the details of that except that it was a productive meeting. Wilson Wyatt was an able fellow and, I think, succeeded in getting the Indonesians to slow down some of their pressures on the oil companies, oil companies who were bringing Indonesia most of its foreign exchange at that time. But I'm afraid I just have forgotten the details of that.

O'BRIEN: Was there any great concern in those years of the oil possibly finding its way to China if the U.S. companies were excluded?

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RUSK: There were some problems under our domestic law if American oil companies operating in Indonesia sold oil to China, and that could have created a very touchy situation because Sukarno would not have admitted that American policy should prevail over companies operating in Indonesia. For some reason that didn't get to be a big issue, either because the Chinese weren't buying Indonesian oil in any great quantity or because some of the non-American companies in Indonesia were doing the selling to China. But I just don't remember that that got to be a real issue.

O'BRIEN: But the Broomfield [William S. Broomfield] amendment does, doesn't it, particularly at the time of change of Administration?

RUSK: That's right.

O'BRIEN: Just one final question in regard to policy towards Indonesia. Is there any decided change in policy towards Sukarno with the change of Administrations when President Johnson becomes President?

RUSK: No, I think that by that time our relations with Sukarno had gotten to be pretty bad and that we were just trying to keep them going on a day-to-day basis without really feeling that there was much chance of any serious improvement..

O'BRIEN: Did you see any evidence of any friction between President Johnson and Robert Kennedy in regard to Indonesia, particularly after he comes back in early '64?

RUSK: Not with regard to Indonesia, no. They had other difficulties, but not on that subject.

O'BRIEN: Were any of those difficulties concerned with problems of foreign policy?

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RUSK: I don't think so, although Robert Kennedy and President Johnson had a difference of view as to who should be Secretary of State. Robert Kennedy felt that I should long since have been gone.

O'BRIEN: Would you... [Interruption] It's on.

RUSK: But your question isn't on.

O'BRIEN: Oh, I see. I wonder if you'd make a final assessment on the impact of the test ban treaty on NATO and on, generally, our political relations with not only the Soviet Union but, let's say, some of the developing nations of the world and internally. I think perhaps would be of some interest, too, particularly the impact of the test ban on Congress and on American political opinion as you see it reflected.

RUSK: Well, I think the test ban treaty which was worked out under President Kennedy was a matter of very great importance. Just in terms of its effect on the pollution of the air, it was significant in bringing about a dramatic reduction in radiation in the atmosphere. In terms of slowing down the pace of the arms race, I have no doubt that had the United States and the Soviet Union continued atmospheric testing that the momentum of the arms race would have gathered considerably and that we would have seen even larger expenditures on both sides for arms than we have seen.

It was important after the Cuban Missile Crisis to demonstrate that the United States and the Soviet Union could still live in the same world with each other, and the partial test

ban treaty brought that about. We went to Moscow to sign it because we were interested in underlying that aspect of it. It had required extensive negotiation, careful negotiation, but at the end of the day the Soviet Union and the United States got together on a matter of major importance, this following the most horrendous crisis the world had ever seen.

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As far as the attitude in this country was concerned, I think most people were genuinely relieved to find that it was possible to find an agreement with the Soviet Union on some matter of mutual interest. There were some in the Congress, as well as in the country, who objected to the partial test ban treaty because they wanted to continue testing. But they proved to be in a minority.

The test ban treaty opened the door to other agreements with the Soviet Union that came along later -- the Civil Air agreement, the consular agreement, the non-proliferation treaty, the broadening of our exchange agreements and things of that sort, increase in American tourism of the Soviet Union, et cetera -- so that it was the beginning of an erosion of the Cold War. Now, the Cold War didn't finish under President Kennedy or President Johnson -- hasn't finished yet -- but at least the techniques for making dents in the Cold War are now pretty well established. President Johnson was able to go so far as to recommend to the Congress legislation to permit East-West trade on a most favored nations basis. The Congress hasn't acted on it, partly because of Vietnam and partly because of Czechoslovakia, but that would be a far-reaching step in cutting down on the impact of the Cold War.

But anyhow, the partial test ban treaty came at a good time. It accomplished an important purpose, and it was well received both in Europe and in this country.

O'BRIEN: Well, thank you, Secretary Rusk, for a very informative and interesting interview today.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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