Thomas H.E. Quimby Oral History Interview – JFK#2, 7/18/1968
Administrative Information

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Interviewer: Larry J. Hackman
Date of Interview: July 18, 1968
Place of Interview: Washington D.C.
Length: 30 pages

Biographical Note
Thomas H.E. Quimby (1918-1998) was a member of the Democratic National Committee from Michigan from 1957 to 1961, a delegate at the Democratic National Convention in 1960, and worked at the Peace Corps at Director of Public Affairs from 1961 to 1962, Director of Liberia from 1961 to 1968, and Director of Kenya from 1964 to 1965. This interview focuses on the development of the Peace Corps during the Kennedy administration, including creating policy and recruiting volunteers, among other topics.

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Thomas H.E. Quimby, recorded interview by Larry J. Hackman, July 18, 1968 (page number), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.

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Date: 10-27-71

Thomas H.E. Quimby– JFK #2
Table of Contents

Page	Topic
32	Interest in working for the Peace Corps
33	G. Mennen Williams' appointment as Assistant Secretary for Africa
35	Meeting with Sarge Shriver about the Peace Corps
36	Being appointment as a consultant to Agency for International Development [AID]
37	Shriver's management style
38	Applications for the Peace Corps
39	Concerns about the Peace Corps' independence from AID
40	Questions of requirements for volunteers
41	Political pressure over hiring
42	Determining the size of the Peace Corps operation
44	Handling of recruitment effort
45	Peace Corps' small staff
46	Work with the Advertising Council
47	Discussion of draft deferments
49	Contacts with labor organizations
50	Contacts with business groups
51	Recruitment of African Americans
52	Issues with programming staff
53	Harris Wofford's role in the Peace Corps
55	Federal Bureau of Investigation background checks on volunteers
56	Concerns that the Peace Corps would be infiltrated
58	Concern for quality in the early stages of the Peace Corps
59	Memo on regional arrangement of the Peace Corps

Second Oral History Interview

with

THOMAS H.E. QUIMBY

July 18, 1968
Washington, D.C.

By Larry J. Hackman

For the John F. Kennedy Library

HACKMAN: All right. Why don't you just take off then and give me what you have on this.

QUIMBY: In going through my records, I found a book that my secretary had made up of the Democratic Midwest Conference that was held in Detroit in February or March of 1960, and I will get this to you because it has some documents that may be interesting and appropriate to the political atmosphere at that time. Among other things, it reminded me of the fact that I claim credit for the name of the Kennedy Administration, "The New Frontier," because one of the speakers at this meeting, which was designed to frame a platform for the Midwest Democrats, was a speech assigned to Arthur Schlesinger. "New Frontiers in Political Liberalism." And I talked to Arthur sometime after that and suggested that that was where the name came from. And I don't remember our conversation specifically, but I think that he indicated that that was possible. The book does include Kennedy's speech, which was one, I think, of five or six given by the presidential contenders of that time. Each of them was limited to eight minutes at the dinner that concluded the Conference.

HACKMAN: Anything else in looking over that or your notes or anything else since last time that you can….

QUIMBY: No, I don't think of anything in particular on the Kennedy campaign.

HACKMAN: All right. What were you doing after the election then, in the period between the election and the inauguration?

QUIMBY: In the period between the election and the inauguration I worked for…. As a matter of fact, in the period between the election and February 28th, I worked temporarily in Senator Patrick McNamara's office, the senior senator from Michigan.

HACKMAN: Had you made any plans as far as what you were going to do or wanted to do?

QUIMBY: No, I hadn't. I was very interested in working with the new Administration, and I had some idea that I would be interested in foreign affairs. And I remember talking to Jim Grant [James P. Grant], and also Henry Labouisse, about the possibility of going with AID [Agency for International Development]. And then I think that the Peace Corps was a very appealing idea as it was starting to develop. And I had some conversation with Adam Yarmolinsky about that and, as a matter of fact, did you go work for Shriver [R. Sargent Shriver] as an employee of AID two days before the President announced the Peace Corps.

HACKMAN: Had you known Shriver previous to this?

QUIMBY: Yes, I'd met him in the course of the campaign. That was all. I'd flown with him. When I flew to Wisconsin and Minnesota on the *Caroline* after Williams came out for Kennedy in June, Shriver was also on the plane. I think that was pretty close to my first exposure to him.

HACKMAN: Can you remember anything about the reaction of Senator McNamara or Governor Williams in that period to some of the more important appointments that the President was making?

QUIMBY: Well, of course, Governor Williams was very much concerned with his own appointment. And I can remember when he was in the office in Michigan talking to Orville Freeman on the phone. They were wondering if Orville would get an appointment. Williams' appointment, I think, was the first one to be announced. And, incidentally, one of the things that was hoped for in that appointment was that the Azores would not be something that would inhibit the development of our relationships with Africa. And I think, as a matter of fact, that President Kennedy did assure Governor Williams that they would not be. Of course, that was more hopeful than proved to be the case. I remember when there was some discussion. As a matter of fact, I think it was Sarge asked me whether I felt that McNamara [Robert S. McNamara] would accept the appointment as Secretary of Defense. And I remember

talking to Neil Staebler about it, and we were all rather doubtful that he would leave the presidency of the Ford Motor Company.

HACKMAN: Had the two of you known him to any extent out there?

QUIMBY: He was a close friend of Staebler's in Ann Arbor. They had a reading club in Ann Arbor where five or six of them got together every Sunday morning to review, and each Sunday morning one of them would review a book about contemporary affairs that they had read. I had met McNamara at Staebler's house. I did not know him well.

HACKMAN: Can you remember what Governor Williams' reaction was to what he wound up with, the Assistant Secretary for Africa?

QUIMBY: I think that he wanted very much to be Secretary of HEW [Health, Education, and Welfare]. I think, also, that it was wise not to appoint him to that position, because his relationships with Congress would not have been good. He'd been identified, I think erroneously, as a rash liberal. He was a liberal, but I don't think he was rash. And I think it took a great deal of imagination on his part to accept an appointment at this level. And I think it took a great deal of imagination and guts on Kennedy's part to offer it because I think Williams did play a terribly significant role in the prior-Convention period, giving credibility to Kennedy's claim to be a liberal

[-33-]

when the rest of the -- not when the rest, but when a lot of -- Democrats were really working against him on the grounds that he'd been associated with McCarthy [Joseph R. McCarthy] and so on and that he had not identified with the civil rights movement and so on.

HACKMAN: Do you know if any other job suggestions or offers were made other than the African job for Governor Williams?

QUIMBY: No, this was the only one. And I think this…. I'm guessing that this is one that had given the Kennedy group…. What to do with Governor Williams, I'm sure, was something that concerned them. They liked him. They were very fond of the Governor. I think that Kennedy was personally, and I know Sorensen was. They had great respect for him ,and they were kind of wistful about the job that Williams had done in reforming the Democratic Party in Michigan. And they knew that we were critical of them for their failure to do anything in Massachusetts. And I think that the appointment reflects the great imagination and capability that existed in the Kennedy camp.

HACKMAN: Were there other people, Michigan people, that Governor Williams was pushing for other jobs in this period that you can recall? Any disappointments with Michigan people or with any of the other appointments that were made?

QUIMBY: I don't recall any. As a matter of fact, Michigan people ended up in rather reasonable positions. And a lot of them certainly came to Washington and have remained with the federal government since that time.

HACKMAN: What about Staebler? Was there any….

QUIMBY: Neil was not himself interested in a position. His prime interest is in motivating the average citizens to become politically active to preserve the democratic way of life. And he is one of the most selfless politicians I've ever known.

[-34-]

HACKMAN: I wondered if there were any attempts to talk to the President at this time about appointing John Bailey, because Bailey was appointed then at the end of the campaign after Jackson had been over there. Or had that decision been made much earlier as far as you people were concerned?

QUIMBY: I'm not sure when that decision was made. And I don't know that there were any conversations with us about it. I retained my position as National Committeeman until the day I went with the Peace Corps in February of '61. And I'm not…. When did Bailey go in?

HACKMAN: I think he went in right after the election.

QUIMBY: Right after the election. Oh.

HACKMAN: I don't know how much he was doing. I know he was sending over his own names for nominations in that period, many of which the Shriver-Yarmolinsky operation seemed to be able to come up with better names.

QUIMBY: Yes. Well, I think one of the things that pleased all of us was really the great talent search that went on and the great imagination that was displayed in the appointments. Of course, Margaret Price had become vice chairman at the time of the Convention.

HACKMAN: Well, let's move on to the Peace Corps then. What was the situation when you went over there as far as what your job was going to be?

QUIMBY: Well, golly, I went in to talk to Sarge. It was on the sixth floor of the Maiatico Building. I think he had one or two rooms there. And I guess I said I'd like to go with the Peace Corps. And he said, "What would you do?" I said I thought I could run the recruiting operation and perhaps selection. I had had some experience as an assistant dean at Harvard College working on the admission of veterans after the second war. And it was primarily in that context that I was thinking. And he was kind of noncommittal. Then, I think, I remember he called me back. And I guess…. I

don't know whether he gave me a copy of Millikan's [Max Millikan] paper or gave me some of Millikan's ideas -- Millikan at that time had done a paper, a very cautious paper, advocating a very limited, experimental operation -- and asked me if I subscribed to that. And I said I didn't see any reason for restricting it to that. At the same time that Millikan was on that line, I think Victor Reuther was talking about a hundred thousand going over. And I thought that we should operate to the extent of people available and interest in projects. And I guess shortly after that I got a call that I would come on as a consultant to AID, which was the formal employment position I held as director of recruitment at the beginning.

HACKMAN: Do you think Shriver was showing you the Millikan report just to get what your reaction was?

QUIMBY: Oh, yes.

HACKMAN: To see if you were a pusher or…

QUIMBY: Yes, I'm sure of it. Yeah. He didn't want anyone around who was going to be cautious.

HACKMAN: Were there any particular problems that you can recall in bringing in people like yourself and putting them in a consultant status in this early period? Was this a problem with AID?

QUIMBY: No. It appeared to me to be very easily and very well worked out. He was able to, of course with the support of the White House, he was able to organize a group and develop methods of paying them for their times, and I think, did a remarkable job of rounding people up.

HACKMAN: Were funds at all a problem, operating funds, in this early period, that you can recall?

QUIMBY: No, I think we operated on the President's contingency funds for the first six months or so. Well, it would have been longer than that because Congress didn't authorize the Peace Corps until September of '61. And at that point we had three groups in or going to the field.

HACKMAN: Right. I'd heard many people say that in a crisis Shriver's Merchandise Mart credit cards would come in handy.

QUIMBY: Well, that sounds a little glamorous, but it's entirely possible. It's entirely

possible.

HACKMAN: Did you work strictly, then, on recruitment or how did Shriver go about making the major decisions that had to be made? Did he consult the large staff group or did he hold this pretty much to himself?

QUIMBY: He had a…. We had staff meetings. My God, we were meeting three times a day. It seemed to me we were always in a meeting. He did some by meeting, he did some by individual consultation. And I think he liked to encourage debate and really hard infighting to develop good decisions.

HACKMAN: I know a lot of people have talked…. A lot of people have said that he had a rather unique way of administering. And I've heard any number of descriptions about how he went about it.

QUIMBY: Well, I think it was a matter of trying out ideas on various people and then coming to conclusions after he had gotten the reactions he felt he needed.

HACKMAN: Did he frequently assign people to things that were out of their normal responsibilities? For instance, did you stay mostly on recruitment or were there a lot of other things that you got off on?

QUIMBY: I worked pretty much on recruitment and selection. Initially, I was kind of the general employing officer for the Peace Corps. And a lot of the people that came on staff came through me. One of the very first jobs, of course, was that just after the thing was announced, we immediately got something like twenty thousand letters of interest and application, and sorting these out and getting them answered and setting up a structure for formalizing applications and receiving them and considering them, these were the jobs that occupied us the first few months. I can remember one night not getting home until 3 o'clock in the morning and being back at the office at 7 the next morning. It was a hard driving operation.

HACKMAN: Was this a problem for some of the people that came in in the early period? Were there people that simply couldn't keep up?

QUIMBY: I think there probably were, but they dropped by the wayside pretty fast so that I don't recall any specifically. But most people were delighted to be in a kind of a freewheeling operation where it looked as though it was possible to get something concrete done. And, of course, the public imagination was sufficiently excited by this so that this provided great stimulus.

HACKMAN: A lot of people have talked about…. A lot of people in other agencies have talked about Peace Corps' freewheeling operations in the earlier period. Can

you remember any problems coming up in relations with other departments, State or ICA [International Cooperation Administration] or anybody else, procedural things?

QUIMBY: No. Nothing specifically. I think it was tremendously important that it was the President's brother-in-law who headed the Peace Corps and that he had the kind of approach to life that he did have which I kind of think of as the Kennedy touch football approach. And I think the Peace Corps would not have been the success it was if he had not had the

[-38-]

leverage that resulted from his relationship with the President. For example, I know in the field…. I went out in the field in February of '62 as Director of the Peace Corps in Liberia. And in the early days there was a great deal of pressure to, for example, put us under AID, to give us other than an autonomous position. Well, this was staved off by Vice President Johnson. His help, initially, was enlisted on this. But then when we got in the field, there was also an indication to kind of regard us as junior assistants to AID. And we developed a very specific doctrine of separation and independence which was questioned by AID people and by ambassadors. We were able to sustain it. I think it took…. It was close to -- it was at least six months, and perhaps close to a year, before we had allayed the fears of State and AID that we weren't wild and before our position of independence was respected. And when I say allayed the fears of State and AID, of course Secretary Rusk [Dean Rusk] put out memoranda indicating our independence. And this was very helpful.

HACKMAN: Can you remember any specific meetings with people over here, or in what then was ICA, in that early period and what they were upset about?

QUIMBY: No, I was not involved in that aspect of the operation. That would have been more Warren Wiggins and program development and the development of financing. And I think that, of course, his background as an employee of AID and his knowledge of the way of the working federal government was invaluable and knowing what the pitfalls were and how to keep clear of them.

HACKMAN: In '62 when you went out to Monrovia, was this any problem in your specific case in getting this spelled out between the ambassador and between the AID man out there that you can recall?

QUIMBY: No, not really. I had a pretty good idea, having been with the Peace Corps for a year, what our strengths were and followed a rather independent line. It was not always appreciated by AID and the embassy, but it wasn't challenged. I did have a crisis after I'd been out in the field for about a year in which the ambassador indicated that he thought that the prohibition against political reporting by the volunteers

[-39-]

did not apply to the staff and that I should report after I'd made a trip. And I indicated that I thought this was contrary to policy. He then wrote me saying that he didn't think it was. And I wrote him back saying I thought it was and that I thought that it would be best to refer this to Washington for settlement and that I would send both of our copies of our letters in, which I did. And I have never heard any more about it.

HACKMAN: From the early period when you were still here in Washington, did this happen frequently? Is this…. Were most Peace Corps representatives in the field aware that this was the way to handle it because if it came back, it was likely not to create a problem?

QUIMBY: I think so. I think so. We earned for ourselves a kind of a reputation for being uncooperative because of this, but at the same time, I think it was very useful in establishing the difference in the nature of our operation.

HACKMAN: Is this something Shriver would have told people before they went out?

QUIMBY: Very, very definitely. Yes.

HACKMAN: At the point you came there, were there still…. Can you remember any of the debates on setting what the term of service or the age limitations on who would be accepted? Were these things still being talked about?

QUIMBY: Yeah. Of course, the matter of age limitation was a matter of eligibility, and that had to be resolved before we could get the application form out. And that was resolved in the first couple of weeks, as I recall. Eighteen is a minimum and no senior age. On the terms of service, I can't remember the reasoning that went into this. It was a compromise, I think, and also a matter of precedent. Most foreign service terms overseas have been two years. And this was

considered to be the longest period that a person jumping into the Peace Corps would be willing to remain away from home. It was recognized that anything less than two years would not produce productive people. It takes a long time to get oriented. And this has certainly proven true.

HACKMAN: What about on the legislation itself. Did you do any work at all on the Hill? I know Shriver was up there a lot.

QUIMBY: No. No, I didn't. Shriver, of course, did most of his own. Bill Moyers, of course…. Bill came in and did a beautiful job of working on the Hill and steering Sarge up there. I remember Senator Hart, who's a friend of mine once commenting to me that I had a great public relations boss because he had had a handwritten postcards from Sarge while he was on one of his surveys in Latin America, one of the early trips.

And he evidently made a point of doing this all the time. And he really did impress legislators. And also there was a drive from the outset, which I think both Moyers and Shriver subscribed to very much, to make the Peace Corps a nonpartisan entity, and also a recognition that every representative and every senator had a constituency that he was reflecting. And that if this was to be a movement of the American people, every one of them had to be satisfied. And they did a beautiful job of this.

HACKMAN: Can you remember any discussion at the Peace Corps in that early period about the possibility of taking political referrals for volunteers? Or was this discounted from the very first, any pressure for this?

QUIMBY: I think that Sarge did a good job of staving this off. I may have had a couple of calls from the National Committee. There may have been some congressional representation, but the only hard call I ever had was from Senator Humphrey who wanted us to hire his sister.

HACKMAN: As things developed then, you didn't run into problems then with congressmen on volunteers?

QUIMBY: No, we always did…. The importance of the congressional relation was spotlighted all the time, and every request was very carefully considered. But I don't think that political pressure had much, if anything, to do with early staffing. It would have been more on the matter of staff positions than volunteer applications that we would have gotten pressure.

HACKMAN: Can you remember anything about that case that came up when the legislation was in Congress with that fellow Charles Kamen -- does that ring a bell with you -- who was the fellow who gave the speech, or supposedly made some remarks at a Rotary Club meeting in Florida?

QUIMBY: Yes, this was…. I'm trying to remember how early this was. Was this in '?

HACKMAN: Yes. It was mentioned in the Committee debate in '61 and then erupted on the floor at one point, I believe.

QUIMBY: Yes, I remember he grabbed the microphone. And he had been in training as a volunteer, hadn't he?

HACKMAN: He was in Puerto Rico at this point, I believe, when it came up.

QUIMBY: Oh. I remember the incident, but I don't remember…. And I remember Sarge taking a solid stand on it. That's all.

HACKMAN: What can you recall about the discussion in the early period on what size program in terms of volunteers to go for in the first year and eventually? What was being discussed?

QUIMBY: Well, the first few years of the Peace Corps are characterized by, I think, over-optimistic projections of the number of volunteers we would be able to recruit, train and get in the field. Warren Wiggins was always very bullish, and I think, on the whole, this was good, but it did result in some anguish if certain programs overseas. For example, we went too far too fast in the Philippines, which was

[-42-]

an area that Warren knew and where he would be able to mount a spectacular program in a hurry.

HACKMAN: His first proposal was for five thousand in the Philippines.

QUIMBY: Yeah. And we had a similar problem five or six years later in India. So it was characteristic of the first administration to get into this kind of difficulty. But I think, on the whole, no great harm came from it. Nigeria was built up very fast. Ethiopia was built up tremendously fast. And I think, given the times, given the acceptance, it was probably a good thing. But I think that the programs today have benefited from these experiences, and there's a much greater understanding of political sensibilities, sensitivities, and an appreciation of the fact that the American presence is a very delicate thing, that it has to be watched very carefully.

HACKMAN: What were the factors as far as the size of the program that were taken into consideration in the early period? Was there any thought that Congress wouldn't buy a large program, or was it always governed by people who could be recruited and trained or budget bureau opposition or just…

QUIMBY: I think initially, one initial concept that was very strong was the idea of offering people an opportunity to serve, and nobody who wanted to serve and who was qualified should be turned down for lack of an opportunity. I think this was the key thing. And also it was felt that the need was tremendous and that sizable numbers were needed to make any kind of impact. Of course, one of the major considerations about where there was a tremendous amount of discussion was the ability of the young American to go over and live a very simple way. And this was emphasized over and over again. And, of course, the thesis was developed that staff should share some of this simplicity and not participate in any of the allowance that were available to other services for overseas duty. And it was felt that this approach to overseas living would permit more sizable inputs because the Americans would not be so conspicuous. It was a desire to be inconspicuous that had something to do with the size.

[-43-]

HACKMAN: Did this create any problems in recruiting field representatives or…

QUIMBY: Overseas staff?

HACKMAN: Yeah.

QUIMBY: No, I don't think so. As a matter of fact, and of course, this was one of the keys, I think, of Shriver's success was his ability to get outstanding, well-known people to go to the field and to approach life in this sort of way.

HACKMAN: How did the decision come about for you to go out in February?

QUIMBY: Well, there was a strong feeling that everybody on staff should get to the field. I had originally come in with the idea that I did want to go overseas. And I think the first possibility of assignment came up between Christmas and New Year's when Warren Wiggins asked me if I could be available to go out to I think it was either India or Pakistan on forty-eight hours' notice to do work out there. Well, that didn't work out. I was not anxious to go out on temporary assignment. As a matter of fact, it was a reservation I was glad I had maintained because people did go to the field on TDY [temporary duty] and stayed for as long as six months. And this was pretty tough. I wanted to take my family with me.

HACKMAN: Was there any disagreement on how this whole recruitment effort should be handled in the early period among the staff, or did Shriver have strong ideas on how you should go about setting this thing up?

QUIMBY: No, I wouldn't think so. Not as I remember. Of course, our first problem was simply to develop some kind of recruitment administration and some way to handle the great outpouring of people who wanted to apply and who wanted to serve. There was no problem in the first six or eight months. One of the remarkable things that we found out was that,

despite what we felt was a tremendous spate of publicity, there remained tremendous ignorance about the Peace Corps and a great concern on our part about how to overcome this.

I remember that in the fall of '61 we finally developed something like twelve regional conferences that we ran around the country, we set up. And this was a very hairy operation because I had a small, rather small staff, twelve or fifteen people, and a lot of them without much experience, going out and trying to organize citizens groups to sponsor these conferences. And a fair amount of my time, I think, was spent on the telephone soothing prominent citizens' feelings when they had been approached by a young person who had operated pretty brashly. We did have debates on the way this would have to be done. And I opted for a large staff operating out of Washington, and this is the way it has had to be done since then. We were strapped in the first year, I think, not having enough people, but at the same time it didn't hold us back too badly that year because of kind of the natural outpouring and interest.

HACKMAN: Was Shriver's reaction primarily that you don't want to take on a large staff? I've heard people say that staff was pretty scarce in that first period. Was this statutory or primarily Shriver's methods of operation?

QUIMBY: I think it was kind of Shriver's method of operation, staying within budget and wanting to avoid setting up too much of an administrative apparatus. American operations tend to get hidebound and muscle-bound and sclerotic with administrative apparatus. And, of course, this had been one of the great faults of AID and one of the things for which they were severely criticized and, I think, with good justification. So that there was always a desire to keep down the administrative apparatus.

HACKMAN: You were talking about publicity for this whole area. Who did you look to for help on this? I know Ed Bayley [Edwin R. Bayley] was the first press man, I believe.

[-45-]

QUIMBY: Yes. Bill Haddad [William F. Haddad] came in as a special assistant and got into this field a great deal. I think Bill and Bayley were probably the….

HACKMAN: Can you remember getting any particular help from the Advertising Council?

QUIMBY: I remember working with the Advertising Council. They were, of course, tremendously helpful, and I'm forgetting some names now. But also, by golly, there was one agency in New York.

HACKMAN: Young and Rebicam.

QUIMBY: Yes, Young and Rubicam was terribly helpful.

HACKMAN: I had wondered if that stood out in your mind. Someone else had said that. And some fellow named Ted Repprier or something like that at the Advertising Council.

QUIMBY: I think it was Repplier [Theodore S. Repplier].

HACKMAN: Repplier.

QUIMBY: And then there's someone else who has been on our national advisory council whose name I'm having trouble with now who I think was the retired president of Young and Rubicam.

HACKMAN: Did you have many contacts yourself with the TV network people on this?

QUIMBY: Yes, a good deal. And we had access to television an awful lot. There was tremendous interest.

HACKMAN: Did you get at all involved in the discussion of draft deferments and how to handle this in relation to volunteers?

[-46-]

QUIMBY: Yes, there was a good amount of discussion on it. And, as I recall, of course, it was resolved in the early years, and I think probably rightfully so, that it should be cause for deferment but not exemption. It was not an alternate service.

HACKMAN: I had wondered how seriously a possibility of exemption was discussed. I believe President Kennedy, when he was a candidate, had mentioned in some speeches that this might be the way to do it.

QUIMBY: Well, I think that we were always thinking in terms of universal service possibility. But as time went on, the demands of the Vietnam situation became such that this did not seem practical.

HACKMAN: You don't remember the contacts with General Hershey [Lewis B. Hershey] in '61?

QUIMBY: No, I did not participate in that area at all.

HACKMAN: Can you remember this subject being discussed in the context of how it would affect recruitment and whether this would have a big impact? Was this a factor?

QUIMBY: No. No, I don't think it was at that time. Of course, our draft calls were much lower then, and the problem of the draft was much less, and the agitation was much less. I'm remembering that one of the big debates of '61, and one really that was not resolved for a while, was whether the Peace Corps should be a very small bureaucracy which would contract out an awful lot of its operations to private agencies and universities and attempt to enlist the private sector in a massive way or whether it would develop its own capability and expertness. And Al Sims [Albert G. Sims], I think, as a matter of fact, left the Peace Corps' becoming more self-contained.

HACKMAN: He was arguing the other side of it.

[-47-]

QUIMBY: Yes. Yes. And of course, we had a lot of private agency people in Boyce [Gordon Boyce] of the experiment and Sims and Frank Williams [Franklin H. Williams] was head of that office for a while and argued that for the Peace Corps to be successful, it has to involve, directly involve, massively, private agency operation.

This has been evolved in favor of a government operation -- I think probably partly by decision and partly by just experiment and operation. The experience of the Peace Corps was unique, is unique. It's developed its own feedback. And we have come increasingly in the last few years to find that we even have better success when we have our own training programs rather than contracting them out.

HACKMAN: Can you remember this being anything of a political problem in the early period? Opposition from universities or university groups who wanted to handle more of the recruiting, training, and all this themselves?

QUIMBY: Well, I think down through the years it's been a source where there could be tenderness and conflict, that people on the Hill…. Of course, the Congress has been divided on this. Those with the university constituents want the universities better taken care of, and others are concerned that the universities get so many contracts that seem to be over priced.

HACKMAN: Was there any consideration to use some completely different method of recruitment, working through the Civil Service to a greater degree or using any of State or IJCA's facilities?

QUIMBY: No, it seemed to us that our job was so much bigger than any that they had handled. I remember it was a big step when we got agreement from the Post Office to put applications out in the post offices, make them more available. We did have a problem in the early days of availability of application forms.

HACKMAN: What can you recall about your contacts with other government agencies? I believe in the early period you were working with some of the voc ed [vocational education] people over at HEW and Labor.

QUIMBY: Yes. We realized in the early days…. Of course, anybody who went out to the field and started programming would come and ask me for farmers. And I think perhaps one of the most difficult problems I had was a.) to find farmers and b.) to convince the staff that there weren't the number of farm educated people that we thought we had and could get. I think now in the seventh or eighth year we're beginning to realize that this is a terribly limited supply.

But we did seek the help of HEW on this. We sought the help of Agriculture. I went out to a farm youth exchange conference in some place in Ohio, participated in their program. As a matter of fact, did a fair amount of traveling of this sort. We had contracts with the 4-H Club Foundation. As a matter of fact, we gave them a recruiting contract. And also we wanted people with mechanical skills, and we had arranged some arrangements with labor. But in all of these cases we kept coming back to the fact that we did a better job in house than when we tried to get another agency working for us.

HACKMAN: Can you remember anything else about your contacts with labor? A fellow named Pollock [William Pollock], I believe, was working for the AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations] in that early period for labor. Did you have any contacts with him?

QUIMBY: Gee, the name sounds familiar. I remember hiring Jules Pagano away from the Communications Workers to be our special contact with labor. And also we got Charlie Wood [Charles B. Wood] away from Communications Workers. I remember Victor Reuther was very interested in the operation. I can't remember anything specific about it.

HACKMAN: I thought maybe on…. I think there were some attempts to get apprenticeship credit for people who spent time with the Peace Corps.

QUIMBY: Yes. Yes, this is right. We were trying…. We tried to work something out like this. It never…. I don't recall that it ever came to fruition. I'm sure it didn't. But I can remember specifically trying to work on that.

HACKMAN: Was there any resistance on the part of some of the Peace Corps staff people to taking people without college degrees or some of these labor type people?

QUIMBY: I think one of the biggest debates that we've had in the Peace Corps…. I think now it may be resolved. This is one that Frank Mankiewicz could sound forth on at the drop of a hat. I remember long discussions about, well, if you had a nineteen year old guy whose only job had been as an elevator operator, could you make him into an effective worker overseas? There were all kinds of elements that came into this. Number one, in the initial years, we did not spend the time on language that we needed to, and it's become increasingly apparent that the ability to learn a language and the necessity to use a language is pretty concrete. And this indicated that language aptitude, a verbal aptitude, that is more prevalent among college trained than other people. So this points toward the college person. Another thing is that the level of maturity has a lot to do with it. And achievement of a college degree is an indication, a fuzzy one, but an indication of this. I think a lot of us felt and still feel that a person who has completed his apprenticeship and has a journeyman's card is in many, if not all, ways able to meet the requirements. I always considered the guys who thought we could take a group that didn't have any skills and make them useful as incurable romantics. We also found that we had a higher rate of return among people who did not have college educations. There's something about an ability to sustain yourself in the cross-cultural experience that is helped by a college education, particularly a liberal arts as opposed to a technical education.

HACKMAN: Can you remember anything particular about your contacts with business groups and trying to get them to help out on recruitment or leaves of absence for their employees?

QUIMBY: Yes, and as a matter of fact we were looking for an agreement with labor to get seniority rights for people who came with us. And I remember going out

[-50-]

and speaking to business groups and also I can remember going, again some place in Ohio, to talk to an all Negro Kiwanis, I think, or Lions Club or Rotary. Maybe it was Rotary. We didn't…. We tried to work out the special kinds of recruiting problems for groups. We had a particularly good girl, little girl, who was a Mexican-American that we sent out to the Southwest to make contact, who did a very nice job. We were working constantly on all kinds of special contact developments.

HACKMAN: Was the recruitment of Negroes in this early period a real problem?

QUIMBY: Yeah, I think it's always been a problem.

HACKMAN: Is this something Shriver pushed particularly hard or what?

QUIMBY: He pushed it hard. Frank Williams worked on it. And we were always looking for good answers on this.

HACKMAN: Any problems in relationship with religious groups? That whole role seemed to be pretty fuzzy for a while and how you were going to, particularly on…

QUIMBY: Well, I think probably there were two problems. One, of course, the first amendment, separation of church and state, and how we would maintain this. And we got Bill Josephson [WIlliam Josephson], I guess, did some excellent work for us on that as our General Counsel. And then we had, of course, all kinds of interest on the part of religious groups in overseas operations. And we welcomed this and welcome them. And they did help us out in recruiting.

HACKMAN: You got involved in handling some of the requests for very specific kinds of talent from foreign governments as though you specialized in types of talent, at least this is the way a memo I've seen from the Peace Corps files reads. Can you remember any projects that had to be turned down because you just couldn't find the type of volunteers?

[-51-]

QUIMBY: Oh, yes. Yes. And I used to get pretty frustrated with some of our programming guys who apparently had no idea what the society of the United States was made up of. Someone was out exploring a program in Burma and came in with a request for two hundred people who would be doctors and nurses and heavy equipment operators and repair men. And, I had a terribly difficult time explaining to him why we couldn't mount this. As a matter of fact, we worked for five years, tried to develop a good doctors,

volunteer doctors program. And, I think, might have made a go of it. It was starting to get off the ground and then again Vietnam interfered. Charlie [Charles S. Houston] did, I think, a superb job, but he got clobbered in the end by the Vietnam situation.

HACKMAN: Was this problem with the program people just a problem with their lack of awareness or was there something of a disagreement among the staff members as far as this concept of middle level manpower went and what type of people you should send?

QUIMBY: Well, it took awhile for the concept of middle level manpower to gain some meaning. And also the Peace Corps is still experimenting and there's still an area of ignorance in programming. One of the research projects that I was thinking about doing when I left the Peace Corps was an analysis of the kinds of programs you could have for the kind of infra-structure you had in the government that you were assisting. And in some countries you can get pretty complicated. In other countries…. And with a resultant lessening of the degree of expertness on the part of people working. I think a good illustration of this is the land settlement program in Kenya which I think is probably one of the best programs we've ever had. But it was a good program because there was a tremendous amount of money in it on the Kenyan side, and also there was a good Kenya Department of Agriculture, a good agricultural extension service. And the missing element was a guy to live in the village to prod and to organize and to demonstrate techniques. And this is where the Peace Corps can shine. Now if you tried to put this same project into a country that did not have a good Department of Agriculture, did not have good services, did not have good extension agents, and did not have money, it would fall on its face. You would have to have a higher level going

in. And I think this is pretty well understood in the Peace Corps now.

HACKMAN: How well did Shriver understand these things? He spent quite a bit of time in the field. Did he have a good grasp for project problems like this?

QUIMBY: No, I don't think he did. Wiggins better, but Warren had no real…. Neither of them had any real field experience in the Peace Corps. Sarge had an eye out for the thing that would be attractive domestically, and he was terribly good on this. But I think the only people in the Peace Corps that are good on it finally are those who have batted their heads against the realities of field operation and lived in the field for a couple of years.

HACKMAN: What exactly was Harris Wofford's role in the Peace Corps? He had some responsibility at the White House level, but…

QUIMBY: Well, Harris started out…. Of course, he was a White House consultant or advisor on race relations, civil rights. And then he went to Ethiopia as the

director of the Peace Corps in Ethiopia. He was given a…. Or he was called the Peace Corps representative for Ethiopia. He was given an additional title, because he had come out of the White House, primarily, which was kind of Africa regional representative. This, in effect, meant, for example, that if there were any United Nations meetings on foreign assistance which would involve the Peace Corps that he would represent Africa. He did not have the administrative responsibility of a Washington regional director for an area. There was a great deal of confusion about this.

HACKMAN: Did he play any significant role in the early period, in the period, let's say, up to the time you went out to Liberia in '62?

[-53-]

QUIMBY: Yes. He did. Of course, he developed this very large project for Ethiopia, and I would think initially that he probably worked with Sarge on staffing, looking for people, and suggesting people. And he also had a number of ideas on the development of the nature of the Peace Corps. He participated in a lot of our staff meetings.

HACKMAN: What about Haddad? You'd mentioned him earlier. Was his responsibility ever clearly spelled out or exactly what he was doing in this early period? He was a special assistant to Shriver.

QUIMBY: Special assistant. He got into all kinds of things, and he did a lot of work on public relations. He was the prime liaison, for example, with Advertising Council.

HACKMAN: Did people ever have the feeling that Haddad was Shriver's spy who was…. Do you remember this being at all a factor?

QUIMBY: Ultimately, Haddad became the director of evaluation and developed the evaluation system in the Peace Corps, which is a very brutal system. But I think really…. It made me madder than hell when I was overseas. But I think ultimately it was a good operation, and it was part of the character and nature of the Peace Corps. I think maybe he probably massacred some reputations in the process, but it was a good thing to get going.

HACKMAN: Were there problems among the top people -- Moyers and Wiggins and Haddad, particularly -- in getting along in that early period?

QUIMBY: Oh, yes, I think there were. I think Haddad was probably the most controversial person. And I would think that Moyers and Wiggins and Josephson all got along pretty well. I would think Josephson probably wielded as much power as anyone. He did a very careful job of cable reading, and he knew everything that was going on and had a profound influence on Shriver.

HACKMAN: I didn't realize that.

QUIMBY: It would be hard to distinguish who was the…. I would say the three most influential would be Wiggins, Josephson, and Moyers. And if you asked me which one had the most, probably Moyers. After all, Moyers was the one who became the Deputy Director.

HACKMAN: There was a fellow over in the early period named Bradley Patterson as the Executive Secretary.

QUIMBY: Yes.

HACKMAN: Can you remember Patterson having any particular problem since this was such a freewheeling operation in the early days in getting any sort of coordination set up or just…

QUIMBY: I remember marveling at the way that Brad kept things going and did the exec sec function because those of us coming in from outside of the government didn't have any ideas what an exec sec was and what he did and why he did it. And, of course, his…. Maybe I still don't understand the function, but my idea of it is he is someone who makes awfully sure that the boss knows everything that's going on and that papers are properly cleared and clearances and agreements and so on are properly made. And Brad was one of these nice, gentle guys who did not impose his own personality on anybody, was always very affable and cooperative and free of guile and any backstabbing.

HACKMAN: Can you recall…

[BEGIN SIDE II TAPE I]

HACKMAN: Can you recall getting involved in any discussions about the whole security clearance process on volunteers, cooperation with the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] and with Civil Service on doing these field investigations and everything?

QUIMBY: I remember discussions, but nothing very, very deep on it.

HACKMAN: You don't remember there ever being any particular concern that investigations in depth by the FBI might scare volunteers off or anything like that?

QUIMBY: Yes. Yes. And, of course, this was one of the…. I think initially maybe the FBI did all of them, and then we switched to the Civil Service, I think sort of to try

to take some of the taint of the FBI off of it. BUt I was not involved on this side to any great extent.

HACKMAN: I know there were…. I've seen expressions of concern in the early period that undesirable groups would attempt to infiltrate the Peace Corps. Was this anything that you were particularly concerned about on the recruiting side or any steps that…

QUIMBY: No. Very early in the game recruiting and selection were separated. And this would have been a selection concern. And I remember I was always interested in whether the FBI would tell us if the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] tried to penetrate us.

HACKMAN: Did that ever come up that you can recall?

QUIMBY: No. Very early we had the President's sincere assurances and also the presidential orders to CIA that it was hands off, and we had been satisfied. This has been observed very carefully. Anybody who's ever had anything to do with intelligence is just -- regardless of how good he is, and we've had to turn down some excellent people who had reserve commissions in intelligence, naval intelligence, for example. This has always been very carefully guarded.

HACKMAN: Was there any feeling on your part as this developed that recruitment and selection should be kept together rather than separated?

[-56-]

QUIMBY: Well, initially I felt that, of course, they should be done under the same person. I thought that -- and somewhat naively, I think -- that I could operate selection, too. Actually recruitment, selection and training…. Jack Young [John D. Young] was kind of the genius, governmental genius, who put the first organization chart together. I've always said that Shriver never believed in organization charts, that he believed in a centrifuge. Got everybody whirling around, and the person that went out the farthest got the decision. But as I remember the early structure, recruitment, selection, training -- as a matter of fact, there was some thought at one time that medical would be included -- were set up under the office of Peace Corps volunteers. I think Larry Dennis [Lawrence E. Dennis] was the first head of this, and Nick Hobbs [Nicholas Hobbs], who is one of the most wonderful guys we had on the staff, came in very early in the game to work on selection. And this seemed to be a very logical organization.

And I can remember trying to resist when Shriver decided, and I think it was at Moyers' suggestion, that recruitment should come under the Office of Public Affairs which Moyers was director of. And there was some thought that Moyers would come in as congressional relations, and Sarge was just simply trying to build up the office by putting recruitment under him. Well, of course, after…. I then went over as Bill Moyers' deputy. I remember resisting the change, but after the change was made, it seemed to me to be the most logical thing in the world. Of course,

it did provide for an argument which I think has only been resolved in this last year, a continuing argument of how many applicants do we have, and recruitment saying we've got so many and selection saying we've only got so many. We always had the battle of numbers on this. But it certainly made sense under the Office of Public Affairs, and, of course, I was delighted to work with Bill Moyers. He was a great guy to work with.

HACKMAN: Were there any major changes in that first year in the number of applications that you realized were needed per applicant chosen, per volunteer?

[-57-]

QUIMBY: Well, again this has taken years to get settled down. And it is refined now to a point where they really know what's going on. But initially we didn't. I think at one point we had a figure of maybe one in seven; it takes seven applications to produce one guy in the field.

HACKMAN: Were there any periods during that first year, major crisis periods, on your side of the operation when it just looked like you might not be able to meet the things that…

QUIMBY: No. I think the heat was not on to the extent that it was later on in producing applicants. I don't remember our inability to mount projects in the first year for lack of applicants. We weren't able to mount…. I suppose we weren't able to answer certain requests because we didn't have the right kinds of skills.

HACKMAN: More of a concern for quality in the first period to get the program off to a good start?

QUIMBY: Well, it wasn't so much quality as over-specification. Quality I think of as the innate ability of the individual to withstand the rigors of overseas service, while specification would be heavy equipment operators or geologists. I remember slightly…. Joe Colman [Joseph G. Colman] and I together got the first Tanzania project selected, and we called in a retired Navy captain who had been in the civil engineering side of the Navy, the engineering side, to select these engineers. He kind of disposed of our entire group saying, "Oh, these people aren't qualified." And then after he left, Joe and I reinstated them all.

HACKMAN: Can you remember any serious disagreement by State or ICA to any of that first group of projects that was so important?

QUIMBY: No, I can't. But that's an area that I would know nothing about. That was over on Wiggins' side.

[-58-]

HACKMAN: I saw in a memo that in the early period you were working on a paper on trying to decide on how to set up the regional arrangement of the Peace Corps, whether to organize it on regional lines. Do you remember anything about that?

QUIMBY: You mean for recruiting purposes?

HACKMAN: Well, I didn't think it was recruiting. I took it to mean regional geographic in terms of the world.

QUIMBY: That would have been on the…. I think that would have been on the program side, and I would have been surprised if I'd gotten into that side of it.

HACKMAN: Didn't seem to fit?

QUIMBY: No, I think it might be a matter of setting up recruiting regions in the United States, which was a matter of continuing debate. And as a matter of fact, Dennis did hire someone on the West Coast to be a recruiter who turned out to be not properly checked out before we hired him, and there was a problem getting rid of him.

HACKMAN: Was there anyone on the White House staff that you can recall that took a particular interest in Peace Corps operations? Was Goodwin [Richard N. Goodwin] at all involved in that early period?

QUIMBY: Goodwin came over .He didn't operate…. I think he…. I'm sure he was. He, at one point, headed up the International Secretariat for Peace Corps Operations or some such name. I did not have any contact myself, and I don't know who on the White House side we would have worked with on this.

HACKMAN: That's really all I've got, unless you can think of something else on the Peace Corps that you would put down.

QUIMBY: No, you really had a remarkable set of questions, Larry. You've done a lot of research.

[END OF INTERVIEW]