

Bradley H. Patterson Oral History Interview – JFK#1, 8/01/1968
Administrative Information

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Biographical Note

Bradley H. Patterson was the Assistant Cabinet Secretary for President Eisenhower from 1955 to 1961, Executive Secretary of the Peace Corps from 1961 to 1962, and a National Security Affairs Adviser for the Department of the Treasury from 1962 to 1964. This interview focuses on the transition between the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, the founding of the Peace Corps, and the Peace Corps' relations with the White House, among other topics.

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Oral History Interview

with

BRADLEY PATTERSON

August 1, 1968
Washington, D.C.

By Larry J. Hackman

For the John F. Kennedy Library

HACKMAN: Why don't we just start off, Mr. Patterson, with you commenting a little bit about the things you did get involved in in 1960, as the campaign developed, in anticipation of the transition.

PATTERSON: My role in the White House at the time was the Assistant Cabinet Secretary on President [Dwight D.] Eisenhower's staff--the Cabinet Secretary was [Robert K.] Bob Gray. As with many items of this sort, the problem of transition--or getting ready for a new administration--was an Administration-wide question. So, like questions like that, this question came up in the Cabinet several times, and in that sense we got involved in it and did some follow-up on it.

President Eisenhower stressed two things, as I remember, in getting ready for Mr. Kennedy's accession: One was that there wasn't any such thing as a "transition" in the sense of a gradual change. He stressed several times to his Cabinet and White House staff that the change took place suddenly, with dramatic suddenness, at noon on the 20th of January, and there wasn't going to be any slow, gradual change of power from one to the other; that wasn't what happened constitutionally and legally, and not to let people get themselves fooled into thinking that there was a slow giving up of the reins by Eisenhower before it was time.

On the other side of the coin, however, I think typically in his concern for good administration in government, he was really personally and vitally concerned that the change, when it took place, would be a smooth one, and he issued instructions to all the Cabinet members and the sub-Cabinet members, that is, the under secretaries and the assistant secretaries in every department, each of them to make provision for briefing his successor or leaving behind briefing materials.

Now of course, in departments like Defense this had been de rigueur for a long time, even with changes within an administration, and so the preparation of big black briefing books was nothing new and it stayed the same. But in some agencies this was a new idea. General [Andrew J.] Goodpaster, as part of our Cabinet follow-up on this particular instruction, asked me to go around and interview people in each of the departments and review their transition plans, in the sense of these preparations for briefing. I did this and gave Andy the report. These plans varied, as I said, from Defense, which was, of course, ready, willing, and able, and experienced in preparing briefing papers, briefing books and so forth, and had reams of them in preparation, to, I remember, one department, the Labor Department, where, in effect, [James P.] Jim Mitchell's attitude was: "Well, if Arthur Goldberg comes into the Labor Department as my successor, he'll hardly need any briefing at all." In effect, he just didn't do it. But most of the departments were taking it very seriously and were preparing, each assistant secretary for his successor, briefing papers and so forth and personal interviews as soon as the new appointee was announced by the President.

HACKMAN: Do you remember any other reactions like Mitchell's or any who found it a problem to. . . .

PATTERSON: No, I think by this--what I'm talking about is December 1960. By then, of course, most of them had swallowed their disappointment that Mr. [Richard M.] Nixon hadn't been elected and were pitching in with the utmost good faith in making sure that for the benefit of the nation this change took place effectively.

HACKMAN: Did you work very closely with the Bureau of the Budget on this, or what was the difference between what you were doing and what they were

trying to do in cooperating with the departments?

PATTERSON: They, I believe, had been compiling papers on issues of public administration that the different candidates had talked about. You're familiar with the encyclopedia that they kept, the "Jacklopedia" and "Dicklopedia" and so forth. I do remember participating in one Bureau of the Budget session held up at Camp Ritchie one weekend for the senior career people in different departments trying to anticipate and go over from the Jacklopedia the proposals that Mr. Kennedy had been making and that would presumably be part of his legislative program in 1961. There was a slide presentation with [Philip S.] Sam Hughes and, I think, Roger Jones going over these items with the senior career people trying to say, "Well, here's what Mr. Kennedy has said about this. Here's what you should anticipate in your department, being ready to do." I remember when we came to the Peace Corps, Sam Hughes threw up his hands and said, "We haven't the faintest idea what this one's going to be about. This is an immeasurable to us."

HACKMAN: As the campaign developed, had you been involved at all in preparing materials for Mr. Nixon? Was this any part of the Cabinet?

PATTERSON: No, my role in the White House was as a career guy. Now this seems an anomaly to say this but there were about three of us--[William J.] Bill Hopkins, [Albert R.] Al Toner and myself, and I guess you could say General Goodpaster, too, only he was on a very senior level--who were hired and considered and treated as career professional. My boss, Bob Gray, was, of course, non-career and took an active role in the campaign, but my role was with trying to anticipate the problems of government that ought to be brought before the Cabinet and to go after them, make sure papers would be prepared, draw up the agenda and so forth, keep the Cabinet records afterwards, do the follow-up and write down the decisions based on the discussion in the Cabinet meetings. So it was a professional job.

I absented myself from those Cabinet meetings which on rare occasions would be held to discuss Party matters like the platform. I just left the room because I felt that a career guy's presence there might be a limitation of the discussion of this. In the Eisenhower years, I think it only happened about twice in all those meetings. But we also knew, however, except for Bill Hopkins, that there was no tenure on the White House staff as such.

There was one other aspect of the transition I guess you've probably looked at. This was the role of Brookings Institution. Have you looked into this activity? Have you talked to people who've been involved in it?

HACKMAN: Well, several people I've talked to have commented on it, but I haven't talked to any of the people who were involved in. . . .

PATTERSON: I was involved--this is quite interesting--of course, Clark Clifford was involved for Mr. Kennedy. But here was an attempt by an outside group such as Brookings, with a great deal of reputation and facilities for this kind of scholarship, to look at the problems of the presidency and say what kinds of options and choices is the new President going to have to make, and what have other Presidents before him done in like circumstances, the organization of his White House staff, the organization of the Bureau of the Budget, the use of the National Security Council, the use of the Cabinet, the use of the press conferences and so forth.

About ten different subjects were outlined, and Brookings got together a distinguished group of people from several previous administrations--[Charles S.] Charlie Murphy from the [Harry S.] Truman Administration, [Robert F.] Bob Murphy, of course, from the State Department many years back, [James E.] Jim Webb from the Truman Administration, Marion Folsom, as I remember, and I think [Robert M.] Bobby Cutler from the Eisenhower Administration--in other words, a group of officers who had been involved in planning the switch in administrations, and then they examined these ten questions. Brookings had papers written on each of the questions. I wrote one of them on the Cabinet, on the alternatives and about the use of the Cabinet--how [Franklin D.] Roosevelt used his Cabinet, how

Truman used his, how Eisenhower used his, and, thus, the choices Mr. Kennedy might have.

These were very fruitful sessions, and Brookings then. . . . They were held on "neutral ground" in Brookings. They felt free to invite a representative of Mr. Nixon, who was then Colonel, now General, [Robert W., Jr.] Cushman of the Marine Corps and was Mr. Nixon's personal aide; a representative from Mr. Kennedy's staff, who was Clark Clifford; and a representative of the White House, who was [David W.] Dave Kendall, and Dave actually asked me to go to represent him. We met about five times, I guess, four or five times, going over these papers and discussing the options and choices the new President would have to make, and then the papers were distributed equally to Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kennedy.

My memory is that Mr. Nixon didn't consider this particular enterprise of any great weight, but Mr. Kennedy considered it of great weight, and Mr. Clifford participated actively, and the papers were useful to Mr. Kennedy, although I can't say exactly what happened in those two camps because I wasn't in either of them.

HACKMAN: Did you ever get any reaction on your paper on the use of the Cabinet from anybody connected with the Kennedys?

PATTERSON: I do remember that when Mr. Kennedy took office, [Frederick G.] Fred Dutton, who was in charge of the Cabinet affairs at the beginning, did a paper for the President and the Cabinet, on the uses of the Cabinet. I think he drew on the paper I had done and drew on the speech I had written that [Maxwell M.] Max Rabb gave down in Florida some years back and had collected material from [Richard F., Jr.] Dick Fenno's book and others and had a series of quotes and theses about the use of Cabinet and circulated them, it was my impression, to the President and the Cabinet, really to elicit some ideas, of which maybe he wasn't sure yet, to see what that Cabinet and that President really wanted to do. It turned out, of course, that they didn't organize in any formal way, but that's a choice open to each President that I very vigorously defend. But it was

interesting to see Fred reaching back into recent history and, in effect, doing the same kind of thing.

HACKMAN: Can you recall anything that Mr. Clifford was particularly interested in, in the Brookings thing, or was this. . . .

PATTERSON: I can't. In other words, the precise debates and discussions then are a little foggy in my memory.

HACKMAN: I had wondered if you could remember anything particular about staffing because I know Clifford had someone do for him a study, which the Kennedys then later used in this talent search, in the key positions to be filled. Was this something that was being considered by the Brookings study?

PATTERSON: Well, it was one of the matters studied. I'd have to review my notes from the Brookings meetings. I took some informal notes of my own. I think the meetings themselves were not recorded in any minutes, rather to keep them kind of informal. Clifford's role was mainly, of course, as an observer. The participants themselves, like Webb and Cutler and others, did most of the talking, and Clifford and particularly Cushman didn't do so much of it.

HACKMAN: Who was coordinating it for Brookings, can you recall?

PATTERSON: George Graham.

HACKMAN: And had this come completely from Brookings or had there been. . . .

PATTERSON: Yes. This was an initiative, as far as I understand, from Brookings. And only an institution like Brookings could do this, you see; neither one party could do it by itself; the White House couldn't do it, and so forth. Brookings later paid some of the people involved. I remember turning my check back to them because

I figured it was part of my duties in the White House, so I gave the money back.

HACKMAN: As the meetings between the Kennedy appointees and the Eisenhower Cabinet people developed, can you remember any problems coming up in this period, in physical arrangements or access to records?

PATTERSON: No, because they were pretty well limited, as far as the White House was concerned, to the rather formal occasions where Kennedy came in twice to see General Eisenhower. And of course Clark Clifford was named to deal with General [Wilton B.] Persons, and the two of them kept in touch quite often. I can't say I remember any problems. I do remember the question in the White House at the time of access to records or what records should stay in the White House. This turned out to be a very interesting problem.

There was a staff meeting one morning, I guess presided over by Persons, but Andy Goodpaster took the lead in the discussion of the question of the preparation for the disposition of the President's papers. And he emphasized the basic thesis that the President leaves an empty White House; he leaves the file cabinets bare. And this has always been true of each President; the papers get either burned up or taken to Abilene or Gettysburg. Well now, this was raised at the staff meeting and the general instructions given to go through the papers and anything that looked interesting or of historical significance, anything that was a record and so forth was to be kept, of course, in either Abilene or Gettysburg, and the rest destroyed.

Well, then Clarence Randall got up--he was the chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy and as such is a senior White House coordinator and was chairman of a major interdepartmental committee--and he said, "Well, look, what about all the records of my committee? I can recall them from the departments, I suppose, but what do I do with the files up here in my office? Are all these deliberations and these decisions on foreign economic policy, in effect, to be considered as if they had evaporated, and all the papers sent off to Gettysburg or Abilene?"

[George B.] Kistiakowsky got up--he was the Science Advisor and at that time this was not part of the Executive

Offices. He was there as a personal member of the White House staff. It had not been made the Office of Science and Technology yet, which would make a difference. And he said, "Well, now, look, I've got all the papers of the President's Science Advisory Committee--all the panels and all the plenary meetings and the minutes and the documents and all the decisions of the Science Advisory Committee." He said, "I realize, of course, we'll give copies to Gettysburg and Abilene, but do these then evaporate, too, as if the Committee never existed?"

And we didn't get on our feet but we were about to, Bob Gray and I, about the Cabinet because here, you see, was a particular area. Of course, the NSC [National Security Council] was another example. Now the NSC, everybody said, well, that's in the statutes, so all of their papers, (of course with copies to Gettysburg and Abilene) will stay because they're "statutory."

Then the Cabinet--now this is the first time in American history that we have had a set of papers for the Cabinet--of course copies to Gettysburg and Abilene, naturally; we could recall the papers from the departments if necessary, but do you burn them all up? There were a group of the Cabinet papers, the decisions about which were not reflected in press conferences, White House releases, Messages to Congress, legislation or agency directives. In other words, the decisions about these matters were incorporated only in the Cabinet papers themselves, and if you sent them all off to Gettysburg and Abilene and burned the rest, you again were performing an evaporation process on decisions which were binding in the Administration until, presumably, changed by a new President. So we raised the question with Andy, "What about the Cabinet papers?"

So at this point General Goodpaster said, "Well, I shall discuss this with the President and come back to you." He hadn't anticipated it. So we had another staff meeting, or at least the decision was made later that, yes, there could be certain papers left behind, reflecting, and I'm not quoting Andy here, but reflecting the fact that there is an institutionalization, just a little bit, that has crept into the White House--papers that are there because of office of the Presidency, not just because of a particular President.

So Kistiakowsky was allowed to keep what was called a "technical archive," which obviously was a record of the Science Advisory Committee, and Randall the same for the Foreign Economic Policy Committee. As for the Cabinet papers, we made a detailed paper-by-paper analysis of all the Cabinet papers of those eight years, seven years really--(I think the system started in the fall of '54)--and identified about twenty-two Cabinet papers, the decisions about which were to be found in no other government document or release or Message. So these Mr. Eisenhower gave to Mr. Kennedy. I wish I knew what happened to them. I don't know if Mr. Kennedy did anything about them, but in any case the issue of principle was met, considered, and resolved in this way.

HACKMAN: What happened to the rest of them then? The rest of them were burned or they were. . .

PATTERSON: The rest of them were sent--the files were very carefully made, two duplicate sets--one to Abilene and one to Gettysburg. The departments were asked to return them. I have no idea whether they kept their Xerox machines busy and made their own private copies, but they did return large bundles of them, and needless to say, we were so overwhelmed with papers we didn't bother to check each document, although we did have records of them, and we simply put them in big paper bags and burned them. But in the Eisenhower collections in Abilene and Gettysburg are the most complete two duplicate collections of Cabinet documents, and these will, of course, be for history.

HACKMAN: Maybe you could just discuss in general to what extent there was a problem in the late Eisenhower period, as it was realized that a new administration was coming in, for you to get action from the people you were dealing with in the departments and agencies. Was it a period when it was difficult to get things done, papers to come out or positions, actions?

PATTERSON: I don't think so, so much. The President for six years had been in a minority situation vis-a-vis the Congress, and what action he could

get out of the Congress was, of course, very difficult. And of course everybody realized that after the election there would be a new legislative program. The Bureau of the Budget was getting ready for that, working with, I believe, Mr. [Theodore C.] Sorensen on an informal basis, naturally. But Eisenhower had a prestige among his own Cabinet members that was still very high, and I can't say I could put my finger on any examples of requests of his that were not paid any attention to.

I remember a very poignant time was the closing Cabinet meeting when, in effect, Eisenhower expressed the hope that his other Cabinet members would get into politics the way Fred Seaton was doing. But none of them succeeded very well; Seaton was defeated. So was Mitchell.

HACKMAN: Was this actually the day of the Inauguration, that meeting, or was this one the last one before that?

PATTERSON: No, it was just a few days before. I forget the exact date.

HACKMAN: Can you remember any comments made by people about their opinions of President Kennedy at that point and the incoming administration?

PATTERSON: No, I don't. I don't. Mr. Kennedy conducted himself, of course, with a great deal of courtesy to President Eisenhower. The relations between the two men, you know, seemed to me were quite good. It wasn't anything like the Eisenhower-Truman bad feeling. All these preparations, the thorough preparations in the Executive branch, I'm sure Mr. Kennedy knew about. I don't remember any snide remarks or any malicious kind of comment at all.

HACKMAN: Did you get personally involved in this period with any of President Kennedy's people, any of his staff people, before the Inauguration?

PATTERSON: No, I didn't. We were, of course, very much interested in knowing what was going to happen about the Cabinet, but we just simply read the newspapers out of Palm Beach and were interested in the appointments and so forth, such as Mr. Dutton's. Now I did stay in the White House for a couple of days after the 20th and was helping write a few notes and memos for Fred Dutton about Cabinet--the typical opening agenda and this kind of thing--and then went over to the Bureau of the Budget.

HACKMAN: What were you doing then in February before you went to the Peace Corps?

PATTERSON: I was in the Bureau of the Budget for two months, working with [Thomas D.] Tom Morris' staff--of course, Tom by that time had gone over to Defense--but on the problems of organizing secretariats and on the problems of committee management. One of the little projects we had in our Cabinet Secretariat that I began in 1955 was an accounting system for interdepartmental committees. This began by a sub-Cabinet paper. At the time we had the sub-Cabinet--the Under Secretaries--meet. I drafted the sub-Cabinet paper and drafted this little system which was approved, keeping track of all the interdepartmental committees of the United States Government. We classified them into three groups: committees of major interest to the President (there were about forty-five such committees that reported, in effect, to him or whose policy matters would obviously come to him) and then committees which are policy committees but which would not come to him directly; and then technical committees.

And, as I remember, there were about 350 to 380 committees in all in the executive branch, the interdepartmental committees. Every department reported its own, the ones that it chaired. But then in a duplicate series of card-- in another card file, we classified them by subject matter, so all of a sudden we had, for the first time in American history, a card file of committees by subject. And then we could see the overlaps because several departments might chair different committees in the same field. And then we would put pressure on the departments to try to cut out some of the committees that were duplicating. We had this procedure: About every year the departments reported to us on what was happening to their committees.

Well, Dutton took a big interest in this. I took the file with me over to the Bureau of the Budget and helped on it over there and wrote him several memos about what was happening to these forty-five committees. I think Kennedy issued a press release saying that he had reduced that number. Well, of course, one would expect him to reduce their number because many of them were Cabinet committees appointed under Eisenhower. Unlike Eisenhower--[James C.] Hagerty, who didn't see very much public relations in what happened to the departments' committees, Kennedy and Dutton saw a great public relations plus in being able to say they had whittled away in large numbers, so they did

Now this procedure has been kept up, and in 1964 or so, or '65, it was taken over by the Bureau of the Budget and is now a regular part of the Bureau of the Budget's monitoring of departments; they report to the Bureau on their committees. This is something we began in the Cabinet Secretariat in 1955, and I'm glad to say it's kept up. I hope it will be extended to the public advisory committees one of these days. We were thinking of doing this ourselves, but we never quite got to that.

HACKMAN: Anything else you can recall about that February--or the two months you were over at the Budget Bureau?

PATTERSON: No, not very much. This was a small management advisory staff, providing advisory management services for the departments, and I was just there about two months.

HACKMAN: You don't recall any reaction from any of the new Kennedy appointees to any suggestions coming out of that office, do you?

PATTERSON: No.

HACKMAN: How did you get over to the Peace Corps then?

PATTERSON: Well, somebody had whispered my name in Sarge's [R. Sargent Shriver, Jr.] ear, I guess, as somebody who knew something about how to run a

secretariat service. I went up for an interview, and that was it. And then began really a great adventure.

Sarge, as everybody I'm sure says, was a good example of a charismatic administrator. And the Peace Corps, of course, was a very exciting place and time because it was a new idea, it was one of Mr. Kennedy's best and brightest, I think, and had a great deal of promise and a great deal of focus in the public interest. I remember very well on March fourth, 1961, the White House came out with an announcement that we were going to have it, and it had started, and who some of the people were

And then that afternoon I came back from lunch, I remember, and there were the television cameras all over our office.. So the poor cameramen obviously were trying to make news out of the Peace Corps, when all there were, were people working at desks, which everybody does in Washington, and there were cables running all over the place. Sally Bowles was there (she was Chester Bowles' daughter) and Nancy Gore (she's Senator [Albert A.] Gore's daughter): these were the two glamour girls of the Peace Corps. All the cameras could do was take pictures of them working at their desks. But it was a very frothy and exhilarating time.

HACKMAN: What were the problems that you encountered in setting up your side of the operation?

PATTERSON: I was the Executive Secretary of the Peace Corps, and this job was simply a job of serving the Director, namely Sarge, and the Deputy Director--vacant until later on--in keeping their business orderly, what went to them; the papers that went to them, making sure that any of those matters were ready for them and ready for their action; and the papers that came back, the decisions they made, making sure they were distributed the right way and followed up: In other words, making an agency-wide systematization of the business of the Peace Corps.

Of course, this was interesting and fun and challenging because Sarge is not a very systematic person; he's a charismatic administrator, a guy who leaps into the breach and gets things done, crossing channels or speeding things up or taking short cuts or cutting corners and so forth in any manner that he feels is necessary, which often is true to get something

going. But the result is that anybody who's trying to follow up to straighten out the business and make sure that things go in an orderly fashion really has to keep hopping. It was a great deal of fun.

I remember one incident that exemplified what I meant by all this. A cable had gone out to some African nation--it may have been Ghana or may have been Nigeria--to prepare the Embassy over there for the advent of the Peace Corps volunteers and the advent of the Peace Corps staff. And it was a perfectly routine cable, and it said that the Peace Corps would need maybe a car and office space in the Embassy and a chauffeur and access to the crypto-facilities--a very routine administration-type cable. Shriver took one look at that message and that word "chauffeur" caught his eye, and you could pick him off the ceiling. He was so outraged. He called the drafter of that message up to his office, who was some little guy who had done his job, and said the Peace Corps wasn't going to have any chauffeurs, by God. And that message had to be rewritten; the whole message was cancelled and had to be redone.

This, of course, looked like very unbureaucratic procedure, but it was Sarge's way of projecting himself and the important ideas of the Peace Corps onto his staff and onto everybody who worked for him and everybody in the State Department who read, of course, the first message and then the second message. Obviously everybody over there in that Embassy got that second message. And to me this was good. But, as I say, it was an exhilarating time. The poor guy went out of Sarge's office with his tail between his legs.

And, of course, the net result of Shriver's reviewing and rewriting a few cables like that was that everybody sent everything up to him for approval ahead of time before it got sent out. This is the normal bureaucratic response. So this tended to center everything in him. This is exactly what he wanted, in a way, and was the secret, really, of his being able to project the Peace Corps and Shriver as really the same thing; the Shriver idea of the Peace Corps was the Peace Corps because he ran it out of the palm of his hand. But slowly, you see--well, not so slowly either, right from the first, really--there came evidences of this what I call antagonism, well, that's a bad word, the transition from the Peace Corps as being pure charisma to a bureaucracy. Let me give

you some examples. At the beginning, it was charisma. It was just Sarge and a few guys. There was Louis. . . .

HACKMAN: Martin?

PATTERSON: Louis Martin from the Democratic National Committee and Warren Wiggins and, you know, six or seven people. And that was the Peace Corps.

When we had a staff meeting, we'd all get around the little tiny table in the little tiny corner office on the sixth floor of the Maiatico Building, and that was the staff meeting, which we had a lot of, and they were very useful. But then, as it grew, of course, you couldn't get them all around one table, so you had to have some representatives come to staff meetings and so forth. But one of the first things, you see, you had to get was what was the policy guidance, what projects would Peace Corps be in and not in.

In the days when Peace Corps was three or four guys, one fellow, in effect, could say it would be this. When the Peace Corps began to grow and you began to have relations with foreign nations and so forth, all of a sudden you needed what the anti-bureaucrats might call directives. This, of course, chills the blood of people who don't want directives and read tape and so forth and bureaucracy, but we had to have them. You had to have some guidance as to who the hell would be a Peace Corps volunteer, what their procedures for selection would be, what their standards would be, what the standards for projects would be, would we work with religious projects or not, and so forth.

So the first few months of the Peace Corps was, on the one hand, a tremendous charismatic experience of public relations and of what this was going to be and how this was going to change the nature of American diplomacy and so forth, as it did in part. But at the same time it was also a feverish time of writing directives and guidelines and doing the things that bureaucracies do. And there was a friendly, and sometimes not always friendly, dialogue between the directive writers and the public relations guys, so to speak, one hoping that the other would not totally overrun him.

I guess one of the most vivid examples of this particular dialogue process that I had never seen came up once in the Peace Corps, which illustrates this point about that an agency grows from a charismatic beginning to a bureaucratic organization--I am using bureaucracy not in the pejorative sense here--was the problem of letters. Now when the Peace Corps volunteers began to go overseas, the staff was just dying to know what would be their first experiences. When they wrote home, when they wrote back to the staff, when they wrote to anybody, the Peace Corps would like to get their hands on the letters because they wanted to know what did they think of their training? What did they think of their selection? Were they frustrated? What did they think of their treatment by the host country? What did they think of their treatment by the Peace Corps staff abroad? Were their jobs paying off? What was going to happen? How were they dealing with the poor people abroad? How were they dealing with the government abroad? What were the anecdotes of humor and of accomplishment? You know. We needed them for congressional relations; we needed them for budget presentation; we needed them for public relations. Every newspaper in the nation was saying, "What's happening to the volunteers?" We needed them for evaluation of training, for evaluation of selection, for evaluation of program management, for evaluation of program continuation or expansion. We needed them for a million reasons. So everybody was thirsty to get his hand on the mail.

Well, in some cases there were members of the Peace Corps staff--I remember in this case [William F.] Bill Haddad was one of them--who made it a personal crusade to go around and meet a lot of Peace Corps volunteers in training. He could do this in his official capacity as inspector general, so to speak, for Sarge. And many of the volunteers began to form a personal relationship with individual staff members, and particularly Bill. So they would write letters, "Dear Bill," from overseas.

I remember we had a staff meeting once at which Bill, in effect, was saying--I'm not trying to be in any way critical of him--he was just saying, "Look, these are letters, 'Dear Bill,' you know. They're my letters." And the rest of us on the staff were saying, "They're not 'your' letters. They're letters for the whole staff to see. They need to be copied and reproduced and sent around and treated as an organizational, not as a personal charismatic adventure here." I remember Sarge in this

case came down on the side of bureaucracy in saying, "Look, Bill, the Peace Corps volunteers write you not because you're Haddad, but because you're a member of an organization. So we need to behave organizationally."

But this is what I meant, as I say, in a perfectly friendly aspect of this dialogue of men with people like Bill. There are many like him who bring into government that freshness and that innovative sense and the enthusiasm but probably, maybe, with a little bit of contempt for the importance of dealing organizationally. This is simply a little friendly example of the problem and how you really have to use both. The Peace Corps to me was the marvelous combination of both in those early years, of the energy, enthusiasm, innovation--everything was innovation, of course--of people from outside who were fresh, and the necessity also, which I guess I personified, of dealing and thinking and working organizationally even in the very beginning. With Sarge presiding over all of this, it was a very stimulating time. We're very proud of those years.

HACKMAN: Where did Mr. Shriver usually come down on these directive things? Was he interested in getting these out or did. . . .

PATTERSON: Actually, as it turns out--I don't really mean to categorize him wrongly because, as I say, he realized he had to have an organization; he realized he had to have directives and guidelines. He usually railed against it, but, nonetheless, he had them. He had a whole bookful within a few weeks or so of policy directives. I forget what--we had a name and an alphabetical system and an acronym and number for them, and so forth. And he approved many of them personally.

For instance, one of them he had was on marriage and pregnancy, what happened in these cases. That was one of the more interesting policy directives of the Peace Corps. Marriage, for instance, not only of volunteers to each other, but of volunteers to members of a host country and to aliens and so forth, the children, etc., etc. Working with religious groups was another one. On this one Shriver and I went over to see Sorensen and had some discussion about the problem of working in religious schools.

I might add, which you're probably interested in particularly, a little bit of the Peace Corps' contacts with the White House and with Kennedy at the time. Number one, it was a formal contact in the sense that there was a reporting system, which had been established, I might add, by a recommendation that Carter Burgess and I had made to Eisenhower back in the summer of 1954 that there be a reporting system to the President from all his Cabinet departments. He let this lie fallow until 1956 when the recommendation was made again, and he instituted a reporting system which was called Staff Notes. It was done under Goodpaster's jurisdiction with a young gentleman, who was a friend of mine whom Goodpaster hired in his office, named Al Toner. And every day, several times a day, the departments would come to him with paragraphs or memos or something of information the President ought to have at any given time. Toner would put these into the Staff Notes, which would go in either at the end of the day or at any time during the day, or a special note. And he was an excellent master of English and would brief these down so that just the guts went in. And in all something like 7,500 submissions were made in four years to Staff Notes, and about five thousand of them were used. Al and Goodpaster never knew when a Staff Note would produce the ringing of the bells and the whistles would go off and the sirens, and the President would say, "Hold everything. I want to know more about this," which is, of course, exactly the purpose of the system.

Kennedy changed this to a weekly, Tuesday at 2 o'clock memo, not to exceed two pages, from each department, which went, I think it went first to Dutton and later to [Timothy J., Jr.] Ted Reardon. I'm told that they didn't edit them at all; they just rammed a staple through them and sent the package to Kennedy, and he used it particularly for his press conference reading. He was a great reader and liked to do this.

When I went over to the Peace Corps, having been on the receiving side, now I was on the sending side. I carried with me into the Peace Corps a determination to make sure these reports were candid because over in the White House, in the Eisenhower White House, we had the Lord's most agonizing time in trying to convince the departments to be anticipatory and candid in these reports because we would want to tell the President what was about to happen, the problems that were just around the corner that they knew about and he didn't. Until the end, one

of the departments still was sending us press releases. So I was very much attuned to the problem of reporting to the President, anticipatory reporting.

Well, in the Peace Corps, of course, here I was in charge of drafting this thing for Shriver's initials every Tuesday at 2 o'clock to Dutton or Reardon. And I remember in many cases pouring into this draft some of the same candor that when I was in the White House before, I would expect would be coming into the White House anyway. And I remember Shriver's reaction was often pretty interesting. He would say, "Hey, wait a minute. I don't want to bother Jack with all those problems. I can take care of them. I don't want to wash my dirty linen in front of him." He says, "I can take care of that kind of a problem. Scratch that problem paragraph out and put in some lists of accomplishments: of the people we've recruited for our overseas staff, or the number of volunteers that have done this and have done that."

So Shriver would often, even to his own brother-in-law, tend to make the document into more of a statement of accomplishments than a statement of problems. But to be fair to Sarge, though, this only happened a few times, and in general this report was a very candid, ultra-candid, two-page discussion of all the Peace Corps' problems that were just around the corner as well as what we had done in that last week. And this was sent over to Dutton or Reardon.

HACKMAN: Well, did you get much of a reaction from Dutton or Reardon, or did anybody else in the White House . . .

PATTERSON: I guess you might say that was one disappointing thing. I never got any reaction at all. I don't know that Sarge ever did either. But nobody ever called up and said this was good, or we want more about this. You know, you sent it in to a blank wall, so to speak. But I still thought it was a very good system, and our reports were hard-hitting, very candid reports.

I remember one other little contact we had with the White House, which showed--it's not so much of any interest to anybody else but me, I guess, who'd been in the other White House--the difference in style of Mr. Kennedy's White House. In the very, very first days of the Peace Corps, one of the things we wanted was a letter to each Peace Corps volunteer who had signed up. Of course, the big thing was how many volunteers were going to sign up; who's going to be interested in this doggone thing; how many recruits are you going to have, because if there weren't any recruits, there wasn't going to be any Peace Corps. The staff immediately caught on the idea of having the President send a little greetings, or letter, or a thank you, or "I'm glad you signed up, fella," you know, good luck kind of a letter, to each volunteer from the President. And Shriver was with us, of course, and we drafted it and so forth.

And then the question was, now how can we get the President to approve it? It's got to be reproduced with his signature on it. I remember there was a girl; I believe she was Harris Wofford's secretary. Now, Harris was in the White House, one leg in the White House and one leg in the Peace Corps. But this girl, Deirdre Henderson, I think her name was, was one leg in the White House and one leg in the Peace Corps, too, and she said, I remember her offering at this drafting session, "Well, I'll take it over and get Jack to sign it." And she did; she did just that, which was, of course, very useful to us enthusiasts in the Peace Corps. But I remember reflecting back on the Eisenhower White House--the difference of having any, you know, in effect, clerk be able to go in to the President and say, "Mr. President, sign this." Eisenhower didn't operate that way, but Deirdre sure did. I have a suspicion Mr. Kennedy didn't operate that way very much longer either. But it was an amusing side-light of the time in early 1961.

HACKMAN: Speaking of Harris Wofford, what exactly was his role in the Peace Corps? How would he get involved in things?

PATTERSON: Well, of course, he was, as I said, both a Kennedy assistant and a Shriver assistant, and this was a very useful dual role. He was particularly a good writer. He gave a couple of marvelous speeches--or maybe they were articles that he had written, or maybe they were both--about

the Peace Corps and about what it meant to the future. They were really--his rhetoric was very moving, and he was good advice to Sarge. As I remember, he particularly was advising us on programs with respect to the United Nations. Later on, of course, he became one of the African directors. But it was very useful to have his thinking and his experience there.

HACKMAN: Would he come in on his own or was he always asked to come over by Shriver or somebody else?

PATTERSON: One of the major methods of communication in the Peace Corps was staff meetings. The Peace Corps has always been rife with staff meetings. In the early days it would just be these six or seven, and it always included Harris, who would sit around the table, so he always came to staff meetings and gave his advice at this time. And that was the way it continued until he moved over to the Peace Corps.

HACKMAN: Do you remember anything about Richard Goodwin's role in the early days in the Peace Corps? Did he take any interest that you can recall while you were there?

PATTERSON: I'm sure he took an interest, but I think he stayed in the White House. He was very close to Sarge, I'm sure, but Dick's role in the Peace Corps that I remember, where he, in effect, played a personal, continuing role, was during the conference the Peace Corps held of the other nations of the world that they were trying to get to organize peace corps themselves. This was a Peace Corps Conference in Dorado Beach hotel in Puerto Rico in the fall of 1962. And I had just left then and gone to the Treasury, and Sarge asked me to come back to help with them down there as sort of a conference secretariat. And I remember Dick Goodwin was down there as well as Walt Rostow. I remember helping Dick Goodwin and Walt Rostow write the communique or the resolutions of the Conference in the session we had. So he did take a personal role there, in other words, and I was quite impressed with his intellectual power.

HACKMAN: Can you recall anything about Shriver's relationship with the White House people--with [Kenneth P.] O'Donnell and Sorensen and [Ralph A.] Dungan and these people?

PATTERSON: Not so much personally. Of course, he was in touch with all of them. Our reporting requirement went directly to Dutton and Reardon, and of course

Sarge would see his brother-in-law not only informally but occasionally on business, too. I remember one day--that was the day when Margery dropped her postcard, Margery Michelmore, a volunteer in Nigeria. It looked like the Peace Corps' first goof. Shriver went over to see the President, I think on that, or I guess it was really another piece of business, or the President caught sight of him or something. And I remember his coming out of the White House; we walked back, and Shriver almost was shaking his head; he said there were many other crises in the world at the time and so forth, and Shriver saying, "Good night," he said, "he's got the whole ball of wax in his hands, and the first thing he asked me is, 'What about Margery?'"

I do remember one important, very important issue that went to the White House early about the Peace Corps, and that was the Peace Corps' organizational location. The big debate was this: Was the Peace Corps going to be a part of the Foreign Assistance Act and, in effect, a part of AID [Agency for International Development], or was it going to be a part of the State Department separate from AID? There was never any proposal the Peace Corps should be separate from State. But the question was, was it going to be under AID, in effect, or separate.

At that time there was new legislation that we were just drafting which was a sort of international resources kind of a bill which would put in one package the availability of American resources to developing nations abroad. Obviously, one of these resources was manpower resources--highly professional manpower like AID, tax advisers and water systems advisers and police advisers and so forth, and then going down the line of skills, and then Peace Corps volunteers. This is all part of sort of a "manpower resources."

The people over at the Bureau of the Budget were sort of assuming that you'd have all the resources assistance groups together. Well, they underestimated the Peace Corps because the Peace Corps was, in effect, saying, and from their point of

view it made good sense, "We've got to be a new, fresh agency at State not under AID." How would it seem, the Peace Corps people asked themselves and posed the rhetorical question to others, "If you went to the nation with the slogan, 'Come to Washington and work for AID for nothing,' how many recruits would you get with that kind of a recruiting slogan? But," says the Peace Corps, "if you can say, 'Come to Washington and be a part of a Peace Corps'" which obviously had the implications of being an agency in a corporate sense of being by itself, "then you'd get something."

So this turned out to be quite a bruising fight as to where the Peace Corps should be located. Now it's interesting, Sarge was out of the country at the time; he was on a world tour. And this fight was led by Warren Wiggins, simply as the guy in charge, in writing. Now Warren, I don't think, knew Mr. Kennedy particularly well, and so the issue had to be solved in the White House, there was no question about that.

So, I remember, I personally took over the envelope to Kennedy's office and gave it to Mrs. [Evelyn N.] Lincoln; I remember seeing Mr. Kennedy--he had just stepped out of his office, and he was reading something at the time. But this was the Peace Corps' memo, you know, reclamation, on this question. And with Shriver still out of the country the question was how would it be solved, what kind of a meeting would be held, what kind of a confrontation.

It turned out, it's interesting, our friend in court was the Vice President, Mr. [Lyndon B.] Johnson, because in a meeting that was about to be called or was called for the purpose, he latched onto this, and I'm told that what happened was he just said, "There's just no question about this. The Peace Corps has got to be a fresh independent group here, part of State but not buried under anything else. There's just no question at all." And his word carried with the President, and with Sarge out of the country and not even participating in the discussion, the issue was solved much to the favor of the Peace Corps and I think, as a public administrator now looking at the whole thing much to the credit of the whole Administration because the Peace Corps did have to have a new kind of a separate appeal in order to be successful.

HACKMAN: You had mentioned the Bureau of the Budget's viewpoint that this should probably go under AID. Can you remember anybody else? I had heard that Ralph Dungan had done a study on this at the White House. Can you remember this coming in at all favoring it going into AID?

PATTERSON: No, I can't. I don't remember that. I remember, I think it was [Richard W.] Dick Barrett, who was the fellow in the Bureau of the Budget who quite properly and professionally had prepared this, you know, combined resources kind of legislation. I know Dick had worked very hard for several months, going back even into the pre-Kennedy period, on the new shape of an AID bill. I can recognize the arguments on both sides. But in terms of being able to go to the country and get young men and young women to step forward, I don't think there's any question that we came out right in it. It was interesting to us, as I say, to see the issue solved with Mr. Johnson's help and Mr. Shriver absent. In other words, he didn't have to appeal to his brother-in-law on any kind of a family basis or anything. The issue got solved on its merits, with Sarge out of the country.

HACKMAN: How did Vice President Johnson happen to be involved at this point? Did he usually take an interest, or was it something [Bill D.] Moyers brought him in on, or how did this all happen?

PATTERSON: Of course, Moyers and Sarge were very close for a long time, and Moyers was over there in the Vice President's office--then, of course, later came to the Peace Corps. And we sent the Vice President a copy of our weekly report to the President. So he was kept involved. As I remember, the Vice President chaired the Peace Corps Advisory Council right from the beginning. So there was a vivid interest back and forth here, and I think Moyers was obviously the thing that kept it warm. But Mr. Johnson quite clearly was interested personally.

HACKMAN: Can you remember anything on the same subject about a story being leaked to the New York Times which Peter Braestrup wrote on this whole dispute?

Did you get involved in this to any extent?

PATTERSON: I remember the story and the leak, and I'm trying to think, was it on this dispute? I guess it was. Sure, sure, that's right. I remember Sarge being unhappy about that when he got back, but, of course, the Peace Corps, like any agency fighting for some very, very important matter, will--as any agency in any administration, Eisenhower, Truman, or Roosevelt Administration, or whatever, Johnson Administration and Kennedy--will use every method. And I guess some of the folks on the staff used this method to try to get their case to the public.

HACKMAN: Do you know, was Braestrup a regular person that the Peace Corps would use, do you know, or were there any particular people?

PATTERSON: Well, he was very friendly with several of the Peace Corps staff members and vice versa, so we were pretty sure where the leak came. Stepping way back now as a scholar in this business, agencies will use the press, involving the press in their own battles whenever they consider the battle is that important.

HACKMAN: Did your operation have any lines into the aid task force that was operating with George Ball and [George F.] Gant and [Theodore, Jr.] Tannenwald and a whole bunch of people like that?

PATTERSON: Yes, as I remember, we did. I think Gant came over to see Shriver, and it was in that task force, I guess, that they were really pulling together that bill, the new AID bill. And I guess it was in that task force that the interim decision was made that the Peace Corps should be part of the new AID. And it was that, the findings and work of that task force, as far as the Peace Corps was concerned, that we appealed to the White House. I believe Wiggins sat with that task force for a while.

HACKMAN: Was Wiggins helpful to your operation, since he had been around the government, in trying to get the procedural things ironed out to any degree?

PATTERSON: Yes, indeed. Warren was one of the government's finest administrators, in my book. He had that combination that many of us did, but he had it in particularly "x" degree, combination of enthusiasm for the idea and very capable administration as a government servant. And his office was a great help to our executive secretariat in keeping track of what was going on.

When Shriver made phone calls to his subordinates or overseas or something, Warren and I would make sure that he, Warren, found out about it. I helped Warren, and he helped me on this, and we tried to keep everybody informed. This was the point. With Sarge galloping so quickly, this was a job sometimes, and we joined forces to do this. Warren handled his office in a very systematic way.

HACKMAN: Shriver's attitude of keeping his fingers on a lot of the details and bringing everything up to his level must have created quite a problem for you in keeping up with everything.

PATTERSON: It was a problem, but I recognized it for what it was. It was a man who was determined to create something new in the image he wanted to create it in. And in my book--and this may sound very strange--Shriver was almost the ideal administrator because of this demand that the agency be run sort of in his image. And there'll be no piece of policy in that agency which he doesn't have a hand in, either big or small, like the little chauffeur problem.

Now many administrators will debate this by saying, "You can't do that. A good administrator has to delegate." Well, okay, when the organization gets so big that the time and energy of the one guy gets exhausted, then you have to delegate. But the point is, Shriver's time and energy didn't get exhausted; he was almost inexhaustible. His family and his kids and his wife didn't see much of him, but he kept on top of it, and he kept on top of it in all these minute details. And he'd write handwritten letters to ambassadors, and he'd be right in up there in a very personal sense. But, as I say, it didn't mean that the staff was always scrambling to try to figure out what he was doing or to keep up with him.

But for that period of time and that new agency at the beginning, when it was still small enough, his tactic, I think, was successful. He made the Peace Corps into the very image of what he and, presumably, Jack Kennedy wanted it to be, and it was a very successful one.

Now in a bigger agency, when Shriver was in OEO [Office of Economic Opportunity], that was a different experience. In a great big outfit where you have hundreds or thousands of people, then obviously you can't run everything personally. But in terms of the challenges facing the Peace Corps, in a certain sense it could be argued, in that way, that Shriver was an ideal administrator.

HACKMAN: There seemed to be a great turnover in personnel in that early period. Were there a lot of people who simply couldn't keep up with the pace, who dropped out?

PATTERSON: No, it was just they were hooked in quickly. Louis Martin was hooked in for a few weeks and then, of course, dropped off to his other responsibilities, and Harris Wofford had White House responsibilities as well as Sarge's. You had people who were fast-moving people, who were on the go in their own careers in other directions, and they came for a while, helped out, and went back. Rafer Johnson was a consultant. Sarge had this ability, and the whole Kennedy Administration in those years had the excitement and the ability to grab on to somebody--he may be very important, very busy--even for a brief amount of time, use his services, pick his brains, and then he'd go on. So the turnover wasn't anybody getting sour or tired. The turnover was simply a measure of the very brilliant and busy people that they were able to latch on to even for a temporary period.

HACKMAN: By the point when you came over to the Peace Corps, the Executive order had already been issued, is that right?

PATTERSON: No, I think it was issued about a day or so after I came, March fourth.

HACKMAN: Well, my question was, can you remember any opposition to using the Executive order as a vehicle for setting this up rather than going to Congress in the initial period?

PATTERSON: Oh, I remember that there was some language in the existing AID legislation which permitted the Peace Corps to be formed. Otherwise you would have had to go to Congress. But for the summer of 1961 the Peace Corps functioned under legislation in the AID Act. And, for instance, we were all appointed as Foreign Service Reserve Officers; everybody who was on the staff. But this was a legitimate use of temporary authority (I forget the exact language), and the lawyers looked at it quite carefully, and the Congress was satisfied with it. And then we told the Congress, "We'll go right to Congress and prepare legislation and prepare proposals and a budget and so forth." And then that fall we did. So there wasn't any pussyfooting around; we were quite candid about it and went to Congress with the legislation, and that was passed in the fall.

HACKMAN: Can you remember any problem in working out the arrangement to get funds or finding a source of funds in that very early period?

PATTERSON: The problem was a little bit of one at a time. Of course, Sarge wanted everything at once, and high grades for his Peace Corps representatives abroad, and the equivalent of supergrades for some of his staff, and so forth. There was some abrasion in the sense that Sarge wanted a lot and he wanted it fast. But AID came through, AID and, particularly, State, and John Macy at the Civil Service Commission was a real help. And Sarge many times spoke of how much he owed a debt to him of arranging these personnel matters quickly.

HACKMAN: I'd heard that in your early period, before they could get funds, that Sarge's Merchandise Mart credit cards came in handy for some people. Can you remember this being used at all?

PATTERSON: It could have been, but I don't remember personally. Maybe in travel or in. . . . I just don't know. The answer is I don't know.

HACKMAN: You mentioned the frequent staff meetings. Now what would your role be in a staff meeting? Did you get in the substantive discussions, or were you strictly a decision . . .

PATTERSON: As an initial member of the senior staff, I felt quite free and was welcome to contribute to the substantive discussion. My major role, of course, was, what were the issues to be considered in the staff meeting, and Sarge always hollered for me about ten minutes before the staff meetings, "All right, what's the meeting going to be about?" Of course, he knew he was going to have a meeting--he always wanted the meeting--but what's it going to be about? What's the issue? So we'd have an agenda of two or three or four things and that was fine. He paid staff meetings a great deal of heed. He gave them a lot of personal time. It was an excellent communications device. Later on when the Peace Corps had gotten so large, we had two staff meetings, a little one and a big one.

HACKMAN: Yes, I had wondered about the difference. The Tuesday-Thursday meeting, I believe, involved representatives of all the different units, and then the Monday-Wednesday-Friday one was select people. What exactly was the difference?

PATTERSON: Well, that was about it. Each Monday-Wednesday I guess, the small one was held up in his office, as I remember, near his office in the small conference room. It was just plain smaller. It was ten or fifteen people. The other one, in effect, was open to any officer of the Peace Corps. And you'd have people sitting on the coat racks and sitting on the floor. It was, in effect, a sort of mass meeting.

"I remember one thing again involving the President about the Peace Corps. Mr. Kennedy had done what I think was a very, very admirable thing on one, if not two, occasions. He went over to the State Department, and they called the senior officers

of State together, put them in the State Department Auditorium on 23rd Street, locked the doors, put the White House police at the gates, and, on a classified basis, Kennedy had an exchange with the officers of the State Department.

Well now, you know, very few Presidents come over to the departments and close the doors and, on a classified basis, talk about the problems that the senior bureaucracy's handling. It's a wonderful communications device between the President and the senior bureaucracy because they're only just a couple of levels removed from the papers that move from them to the President. I remember he did a brilliant job. He showed that he knew just as much about what was on their desks as they did. I was invited, and a couple of Peace Corps staff members were invited because, in effect, we were part of the State Department.

So several of us said, "Gee, wouldn't it be great if Mr. President would come over and talk to the Peace Corps staff that way." And so it was arranged, only in this case a great big mistake occurred. They invited--I don't know who, I guess it was Sarge, anyway--and made it a press thing, with all the employees and the press. And, of course, this totally changed the character of the meeting that was held in the Chamber of Commerce auditorium. With the press there, and the klieg lights and the TV and so forth, it just became a nice little pep talk. But what we had hoped it would be would be Kennedy coming over and talking to the officers and, if you will, employees of the Peace Corps, but behind closed doors, about the problems of the Peace Corps. As I say, it turned out to be a totally different kind of meeting.

It was nice to have a pep talk, but it wasn't the kind of thing that he did in State. And I guess he did it in Defense, and he may have done it in others. I often thought, Eisenhower never did anything like that. This is a very useful communications device between the President and the bureaucracy. Other Presidents should take note of that and have them.

HACKMAN: Can you remember anything in more detail about the meeting over at State, the particular questions that were raised?

PATTERSON: Yes, I remember one of them very well. An old friend, Carlton Savage, on the Policy Planning staff--I don't know if he's still there or not

now--I remember his asking the President a question that was on a lot of State Department minds, in fact has been on the State Department minds for a quarter of a century. "Mr. President," he said, "we in the State Department are supposed to be the prime department among all the other departments, but in foreign affairs it's a great big mix-up. Defense is in the business, Commerce is in the business, Atomic Energy, even Public Health, Treasury--all these other agencies have a piece of foreign affairs. Well now, Mr. President, how do we keep the leadership here? How do we make sure that State Department really is the prime agency?" I'm not quoting him exactly, but that was the import of his question.

I'll never forget the answer. It was, "Well," said the President, "the State Department will be prime as long as you guys come forward fastest with the best answers. And if you come forward to me with the best answers the fastest, then you don't have to worry about your primacy. But if you can't produce the best answers the fastest, then you'd better be worried about your primacy." It was a great answer.

HACKMAN: I've seen in a Peace Corps memo that one of the things you were involved in in the very early days was setting up meetings with Shriver with desk officers and people over in State. Were there any problems? Can you just recall what the reactions of the desk officers and American ambassadors coming back were in that early period to the Peace Corps idea?

PATTERSON: It wasn't so much the desk officers, but we did have American ambassadors when they were in town come over to see Shriver. Everywhere in the government at the very beginning there was a skepticism about the Peace Corps--was it going to work? I guess it was very strong in State; it was certainly very strong in AID; you might even say it was strong in the Peace Corps--was it going to work? What was going to happen with these young kids--what could they accomplish in foreign affairs? wouldn't they just cause more trouble than they're worth? and so forth. The ambassadors always who came were very polite, and they knew damn well to whom they were speaking; they were speaking to the President's

brother-in-law, so there wasn't any fuss raised about that.

But the real time, I believe, the turning point came when Shriver went to the Foreign Service Association luncheon. Now here were the blue blood of the Foreign Service Association, all the old-line ambassadors, retired ambassadors, and so forth. The Foreign Service Association is the union of FSO [Foreign Service Officers], so a lot of the middle grade and younger people come and so forth. I didn't go myself, but he went and gave a speech. And he, I am told, really had them eating out of the palm of his hand at the end.

One of the points he made, as I remember, was, "Look, you fellows in the State Department, you've never had a domestic U.S. constituency before. Do you realize that in the Peace Corps you're going to have ten thousand young people and for each young person a mother and a father and a couple of sisters and a couple of brothers and aunts and uncles and relatives who are just dying of interest to know what that young person is doing abroad, the problems of developing nations, what that young person is accomplishing, the successes and failures and so forth of that young person, and, furthermore, his community and his high school teachers and his college teachers. He opened their eyes!

We get letters in the Peace Corps. I will never forget one we got from Massachusetts, a resolution by the Town Council in a little town in Massachusetts, about a girl who was in the Philippines. Selectmen of the town had by formal resolution said, "'We're in back of Mary. Mary's out there in the Philippines, and she's doing her bit for the nation and to improve the lot of the peoples of the world. And we, the Selectmen of (the town of whatever it was in Massachusetts) want you to know that we're in back of Mary.'" Now, in effect, Shriver told the Foreign Service Association, "How many of you guys ever got a resolution like that? The State Department can use this kind of grass roots constituency." Well, as I say, at the end of the meeting he told me he had them eating out of his hand. They really gave him applause because he did show that what we had here was a new component in American diplomacy. It was a great occasion.

HACKMAN: Do you remember anything turning up on dealing with foreign embassies here in Washington? Was State at all upset with Shriver and the Peace Corps staff going around?

PATTERSON: No. We didn't deal very much with foreign embassies. You see, we had policy proposals, let's say, for a Peace Corps program in a given country. This was a formal piece of paper, and under an NSC [National Security Council] instruction, this had to be cleared by AID and State and the White House. This was in a formal way. So AID and State had their fingers in on every proposal that was made, and we didn't go ahead with it, to open negotiations with a foreign government. That was what it was about. The negotiations, of course, were conducted abroad, not here.

We did have some problem. The only real problem we had was we had some eager guys on the staff who were sniping at AID in the beginning, talking about the "golden ghettos" of privilege and so forth. And, of course, Shriver did insist that the Peace Corps staff, not to mention the volunteers, but the Peace Corps staff, would live austerely and would not have the allowances--the rather fancy allowances, he thought--that some State Department officers had. Particularly, they wouldn't have any hardship post allowance. So he issued a directive which literally made a definite distinction between Peace Corps staff in an embassy and the rest of the embassy.

And I remember Roger Jones, who was at that time the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration of State, saying, "Sarge, you may be storing up trouble for yourself by making these distinctions." And of course State in itself, I guess, some of them over there were pretty shocked at this, you know, here he is turning down these allowances. But Shriver was adamant about that. When he said austerity, he meant austerity.

This led to some little sniping with the AID people and so forth. For instance, one question was access to the PX. Actually, looking at it from the longer view, I think, it's been the military more than AID and State who have lived in the "golden ghettos," and it was they, if anybody, who deserved the sniping. I remember Sarge felt very strongly about this. There was a guy in the Philippines, a Peace Corps staff member, who bought a house or rented a house with a swimming pool, and Shriver made him move out because of the swimming pool. And although the staffer said he used it for Peace Corps volunteers who came to Manila for a little rest,

and gave them a swim, he had to move out. This kind of thing has kept the Peace Corps on its toes.

HACKMAN: Do you recall anybody over at State being particularly helpful on Peace Corps matters?

PATTERSON: Well, the Secretary. The Secretary was behind Shriver every step of the way, every step of the way. And I think Ball. Oh, I can't remember. But I remember [Dean] Rusk particularly was very. . . . [Lucius D.] Luke Battle, who was his special assistant and head of the secretariat over there, was very cordial to me. Of course, we were old friends from way back in the State Department, going back to the late forties.

HACKMAN: I had seen [John O.] Jack Bell's name mentioned in a . . .

PATTERSON: Yes. Yes, I believe that. He helped on some of the drafting. But our legal boys, of course, worked with their legal staff.

HACKMAN: Do you recall any State Department reaction or AID reaction to any of the early projects proposed, any that they particularly were upset about?

PATTERSON: No, I can't right now, right offhand. I think Warren Wiggins would be the one you'd want to talk to about that because he worked with the problems of policy clearance and these kind of things.

I remember a couple of other little Peace Corps problems that you might be interested in. One is the problem of communications. This turned up in the Cuban crisis and has since been a major problem. But I shall never forget Shriver trying to reach Ambassador [William P.] Snow, I think it was, in Burma, on the question of whether we were going to have a Peace Corps project going in Burma. U Nu apparently didn't want it. But just sitting there with Sarge trying to get Snow, you know, and it was in the broad daylight in Washington--I guess it was 2 a.m. in Burma--and having the operator saying, "I'm sorry, all the circuits are out now." You know, they

just shut down for the night. And I'll never forget saying to myself, since I was reasonably well acquainted with the National Security Committee and how SAC [Strategic Air Command] conducts its communications out of Omaha and so forth, that the State Department was just crippled by terribly inadequate communications. I've always felt that senior State Department officers ought to have at least the same ability that the senior SAC officers have in just pressing a button and talking to whoever they damn please in their own system. They still don't, I think. They use military facilities now, but they're still very poor. Boy, that incident in Burma.

The other little story I remember about the Peace Corps very well was the problem with Mr. [John E.] Moss and the problem which came up in the papers at the time of the extension of the classification authority in the Peace Corps. As you know, Eisenhower issued an Executive order, I think it was 10501, which specified that only certain agencies could use the classification authority, the Top Secret, Secret and Confidential stamps, so to speak. And he tried to limit the abuse of this authority by listing in an appendix to the Executive order the agencies that were qualified to use it. Well, this meant that any agency that was new or wanted the authority de novo had to get a new Executive order.

In Kennedy's time, in 1961 or so, there were two new agencies. One was the Office of Emergency Planning a newly designated agency, and then there was the Peace Corps. We needed to use classified information to the extent of Confidential telegrams, confidential because they use the State Department's cryptographic facilities. We didn't have any really highly classified information in the Peace Corps at all. I don't think we even had a Secret paper, and there were certainly no Top Secret except the State Department's policy summary which Shriver was allowed to see, and I was allowed to show him. That went back every day to State. In terms of originating information or traffic, it was only Confidential. That was really all we needed for staff purposes.

But Moss saw that the President issued an Executive order, and the Peace Corps was named. Well now, Mr. Moss' committee had a little procedure they went through every time this Executive order was issued. A letter would be composed to the agency head so designated in effect saying to him,

"What internal procedures are you developing to make sure that you're not going to misuse this classification authority?"

Well, what must have happened up on Moss' committee: The letter was prepared and addressed to Mr. Shriver, you know, "Dear Mr. Shriver, Please tell us what internal procedures you have so the Peace Corps won't misuse the classification authority?" And somebody must have stopped short and said, "That's interesting. The Peace Corps wants the classification authority."

Now the classification authority meant Top Secret as well as Secret and Confidential: it didn't do us, but it did to them. And it did legally, of course. So somebody must have said, "That's interesting. The Peace Corps wants to be able to classify things Top Secret." Now, of course, "Peace Corps" in a generic sense to the ordinary American meant the volunteers, not the staff. So sure enough, the letter appeared in the newspaper either at the same time as or before Shriver even received it. And then it was out: The Peace Corps wants the classification authority. That meant the volunteers want to be able to use the Top Secret stamp.

Well, this caused a furor because the wire service story carried all over the country and all the front pages, and then from the front pages it went to the editorial pages, and from the editorial pages it went to letters to the editor, and the letters to the editor got sent to Congress, and it was months before that thing died down. Why should the Peace Corps volunteers want to use the Top Secret authority? And we issued a statement and so forth, but it never caught up with the story.

The real trouble was this--it almost had certain tragic overtones--that it was just at this time that the Communists were trying to figure out, the whole Russian world was trying to figure out, what to say about this American Peace Corps, what would be the Communist line on the Peace Corps. And the best they could figure out was that it was a "corps of spies;" they were "CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] agents in sheep's clothing." So this was the line: The Peace Corps was a corps of spies. This may have sounded silly in America, but over there in Ghana or India or Burma or Malaysia this wasn't any laughing matter because a lot of young Americans charging all up and around in the bush sections and the back roads and no

roads and so forth of their country. If they could be proved or in any way shown up as agents of CIA or as spies, the whole Peace Corps would be wrecked from the beginning.

So that was the Communist line, and of course we laughed at it and derided it and so forth. And then, lo and behold, out of Washington comes this story that each Peace Corps volunteer is going to be authorized to classify documents Top Secret. And that played right into the hands of the Communist propaganda. I'm not accusing Mr. Moss or his committee of playing into the hands of Communist propaganda, but it just shows how things can happen in government in juxtaposition. You see, Moss' committee could have called up Shriver and said, "What's this all about? Why this?" and so forth. In a telephone conversation of forty-five seconds, it could have been straightened out. That story probably did us some damage abroad.

HACKMAN: Were there any problems in working out a relationship with the State Department on this, on access to any State Department records that were needed?

PATTERSON: No, not really. We did ask for State Department cable traffic. And, of course, when anybody wants State Department cable traffic, what they want is the most significant traffic, that is, foreign policy problems traffic. And the State Department always was of the mind to say, "Foreign policy problems traffic is our own traffic, and we're not about to share it with any agency. If the agency wants guidance on foreign policy problems, come to our desk officers and get it." And from a long distance point of view, it is probably correct. They don't want to distribute their very sensitive traffic around very many places. Of course, it does go to Defense and the White House and the National Security Council staff, but to peripheral agencies like Peace Corps and Commerce and Atomic Energy Commission and so forth on some of these things, the State Department officers say, "You have foreign policy questions? Come to us. We're informed." So we did have some small snarls, but I don't think they really amounted to very much, and Shriver did get the Top Secret daily summary, but it was sent to me for Shriver. So we were alerted to major questions like that.

HACKMAN: Was there ever any way devised to communicate with Peace Corps people in the field without going through the regular routes so that State

people would not. . . .

PATTERSON: Well, Peace Corps volunteers, of course, had no business in Embassy affairs, but Peace Corps staff were members of the Mission. And they could use mission facilities and the State Department. . . .

HACKMAN: I was wondering in cases where disagreements might have come up between a Peace Corps representative at the embassy level and the ambassador, whether there were. . . .

PATTERSON: I don't recall any examples of any problems between the Peace Corps reps and ambassadors of any major kind that had big reverberations in Washington in that, the first year and a half. There may have been a few smaller ones. Of course, I am sure they all had their setting-in problems, but I don't recall any. Some ambassadors were outstandingly helpful to the Peace Corps like Joe Palmer.

HACKMAN: Were there any agencies that you had connections with in that period where problems came up? I know you were dealing to some extent with [Stephen N.] Shulman over at Labor and someone at HEW [Health, Education, and Welfare] on the domestic Peace Corps idea.

PATTERSON: That came a little later, on the domestic Peace Corps; that came a little later. One of the big problems we had was Mr. Eisenhower. He either was tired or cross or operating off the cuff, but he made a statement that the Peace Corps was, well, not a "kiddie korps," but he made a very derogatory statement about the Peace Corps. This disappointed us; it disappointed Shriver a lot. And it disappointed me because I knew that Eisenhower always had an interest in young people and in young people interested in foreign affairs. You had the Eisenhower Fellowships, for instance, sponsored by the Scott Paper Company, I think it was. He used to give this a great deal of attention.

Eisenhower was very much interested in the educational exchange program in the State Department. I remember he once said in Cabinet, "My God," he said, "in the B-36 bombers we put six billion dollars down the drain. We can't get another ten

million dollars for educational exchange," one year when the budget was short. He banged the Cabinet table so much that he scared everybody. So he was really interested in young people and in educational-cultural work. But why he let loose with that blast on the Peace Corps, I really don't know.

And years later, when I was at the War College, I remember interviewing him on my War College thesis, which was a thesis about the presidency and the problems of the tactical command of the presidency in national security crises. I spent an hour with him at Gettysburg, and when I told him I had been associated with the Peace Corps, he repeated it, the statement, again, that he never thought very much of the Peace Corps. So I guess it wasn't anything off the cuff; it really grew out of a conviction. But I still feel that it was not consistent with Eisenhower's basic interest in educational-cultural affairs and young people. I'm sorry that he's never amended that. Shriver always felt bad about it and wished that I could have gotten it changed.

HACKMAN: Again with the Peace Corps-State relationship: What was Shriver's attitude on providing information to State on what was going on? Was this criticized, or was it keep it close to the Peace Corps?

PATTERSON: I don't think there was ever any problem about that. Any official problems the Peace Corps had were all in the State Department traffic and in the State Department cables. And they'd come to us, and they'd obviously be in State. There were no "eyes only" Peace Corps traffic, I don't think. It would all go to the Secretary and his people. Now there were letters, of course, and if there were problems here, they'd be handled in letters. But I can't say I remember any problems of that sort really.

HACKMAN: I can remember seeing in one Peace Corps memo, or maybe minutes of a staff meeting, that you wrote that a problem of security leaks was discussed, security leaks apparently at the Peace Corps side. It said that this was getting to be a problem to some extent. Can you remember what exactly this. . . .

PATTERSON: No, I don't. Do you mean security in the sense of texts of cables?

HACKMAN: I'm not sure to what it was referring.

PATTERSON: I don't remember either.

HACKMAN: I think Haddad made the point at that meeting that one of the problems was things at the Peace Corps side were possibly being over-classified, and if you didn't classify so much, it wouldn't be a problem. Now I don't know specifically what was . . .

PATTERSON: I know Sarge, of course, felt, not only after the Braestrup story but others, Sarge felt that the Peace Corps was a leaky place in terms of relations with newsmen, and that there were problems in the Peace Corps. We had a problem, what was that guy? Charles Kamen, the fellow that was--and what we were going to do with him and so forth. There were a lot of newsmen around the Peace Corps, and a lot of the Peace Corps staff were former newsmen. Shriver felt that there were some parts of the Peace Corps that were leaky offices. He several times admonished the Peace Corps in their staff meetings to watch their damn security. This was, after all, his organization, and there was certain privileged business that was privileged until he was going to release it. And sometimes the admonitions got a little icy at the edges I remember.

HACKMAN: Can you remember anything in particular about this Kamen problem and how this was resolved eventually?

PATTERSON: I think Sarge finally ruled that he was ineligible.

HACKMAN: He was taken out of training or left shortly after completing training. I wondered how that arrangement was worked out?

PATTERSON: I think Sarge probably was a little conscious of his congressional relations here. He had excellent congressional relations, and he was probably concerned with that.

HACKMAN: Were there any particular problems that came up in the relationship with the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] and then with Civil Service on doing investigations of the volunteers themselves?

PATTERSON: Yes. I remember [J. Edgar] Hoover came forward and volunteered, offered, to do several hundred investigations free for us at the beginning. And we took him up on this, of course, and he did them. But then it was switched to Civil Service because they were doing it normally for government employees. They would charge for it, of course. Any information developed as a result of Civil Service findings which bore on national security--and this is true of any of their investigations for any agency--had to be reported to the Bureau. I think most of the investigations, if they ever reported anything derogatory, it was usually of a guy running away from bad debts or maybe a marriage or something, this kind of thing.

HACKMAN: Do you remember any staff discussion of how this should be handled, or whether these should be done at all, to this extent, in the very early period?

PATTERSON: I remember staff discussions on it, on how the reports should be handled in the office. The legal boys wanted these almost exclusively because they were sensitive. Shriver was quite circumspect about how they were handled, too. But I don't remember there was ever any doubt--I'm trying to think back--I don't believe there was ever any question that the investigations should not be made because everybody realized that these were young people who were going to be the vanguard of representing this new idea abroad, and we sure as heck wanted the very, very best. The Vice President told Shriver, in effect, "You get a good clean Americans going abroad. Don't get yourself involved in

any off-color Americans in the sense of security or perversion or anything like that. That would really wreck the Peace Corps." And all of us were conscious of this. [The actual LBJ language was much more colorful].

HACKMAN: No particular problems came up out of this though?

PATTERSON: No, I don't think so. There may have been some that were turned down, but rather small, as I say. And most of the cases were problems of debts.

HACKMAN: You had talked a little bit previously about Shriver's desire to cut out the red tape and cut corners. What kind of problems did this create in relationships with other agencies, with the Budget Bureau or. . . . Were there problems when the. . . .

PATTERSON: Well, I remember one day when the Budget Bureau came over, and they said, "Mr. Shriver, what's your five-year plan?" Now this was a perfectly legitimate inquiry from the Bureau of the Budget's point of view and from the President's point of view. The President wanted to have some feeling for what his agencies were planning and where they were heading five years from now. And if you were President, you would want to have this kind of a feeling as to where things were going. So this was a presidential control mechanism. Here the Peace Corps was in one of these early years when we hardly knew where the next day was coming from, how many volunteers, and what kind of a success or failure, and the Bureau of the Budget says, "Where are you going to be in five years?"

I remember Shriver almost started laughing at him. He said, "Look, it's a very legitimate question, but how the hell do I know where we're going to be in five years? I have some hopes; there's some projections." And we did give him some, of course, with Wiggins' help. But just the very posing of the question was almost humorous in the Peace Corps at the time. But we had excellent cooperation with the Bureau of the Budget. [Christopher] Chris Weeks was the young officer, actually, who came and asked the question and who was our contact, and Shriver liked him so much I believe he later hired him, a very competent fellow. The Bureau gave us good support.

HACKMAN: Can you remember discussions of the eventual size of the Peace Corps and where you were going? Was there much going back and forth among the staff on this? I know Wiggins had in the initial period proposed the "Towering Task," the big thing, the Philippines and all this.

PATTERSON: He pointed out the need for concentration. These were discussions which were carefully held. I don't remember any major debate about them. The whole question was how many countries would buy in, and how many volunteers would we get. And if the countries would refuse or the volunteers would slack off, these would be the big problems. And in those years neither happened to us; all increase, increase, increase.

HACKMAN: I had heard someone say that Shriver was always playing the numbers game, throwing a big number out, and then everybody had to work like heck to catch up to it.

PATTERSON: Yes, he was anxious, of course, to have that program expand; he was proud of it. But this was no problem at that time; it did indeed. I remember one issue we had in the beginning about the very first group of volunteers--this question about how long they were going to be in training. I think it was to Ghana. Somebody wanted them over there a little faster. And the training people said, "Now wait a minute. We've got to do careful training." The issue there was, get them there quickly or train them carefully. As I remember, Sarge came down on the latter side; he wanted to be sure they were trained carefully because this was the first group.

HACKMAN: As the legislation was being proposed in '61, there was a special legislative presentation group operating. Can you remember who was on that? I just haven't been able to find that out.

PATTERSON: I guess it was mostly Warren. I remember--was it the first--I guess it was really the second legislative presentation. I remember that because

it was the first full year budget to be submitted to Congress in the spring of '62, and just at that time a letter came in from a Peace Corps volunteer in Chile. Tom Scanlon, yes, I think, was the name of the volunteer. And it said: "Hello, everybody. . . ." It was written to his home, I guess. Maybe it was written to Shriver, but I think it was written to his family, and they sent it to us. "Hello, everybody," it said. And it told about what he was doing, and about how the Communists had said, "You won't be able to come up here. You won't come to our village; you won't dare." And he says, "I'm saving up my time. I'm going there." And it was a wonderful story, both anecdotal and about all his challenges, frustrations, experiences. And it was so candid, so straightforward, that we printed it right on top as the first few pages of the Peace Corps budget presentation to Congress. So the Peace Corps document, which usually, of course, in most agencies is a very formal document . . . [Interruption] began with this letter, "Hello everybody."

BEGIN SIDE II TAPE I

PATTERSON: I'll never forget sitting in the galleries-- speaking of Congress--sitting in the galleries and hearing I think it was this old guy [John W.] Davis from Georgia, a very conservative Southerner, saying, "Well, I'm for the Peace Corps. I think we ought to give our young people a try." This was really an amazing turnabout in the conservative Congress to see the early acceptability of the Peace Corps. And it has really remained so since. Shriver, however, did a great deal behind the scenes. He went personally to see just hundreds of Congressmen and I guess every member of the Senate. He just spent hours in congressional relations. It was very effective.

HACKMAN: How was Moyers on congressional mail? Do you think he handled it very effectively?

PATTERSON: Yes, well, very effective. We tried to hook up with him on this and make sure that it got handled quickly. That's the gripe, of course, of any

congressional assistant in any agency: how the mail is handled. We had some problems, too, in the Peace Corps. A lot of guys would sit on their mail. Shriver would pay a lot of personal attention to mail. Often at staff meetings I would keep a tally of outstanding pieces of mail, and he would read them off, those who were delinquent.

HACKMAN: How did you go about making assignments? Was it on a fairly logical basis, or was it a very irregular process?

PATTERSON: Well, it was really on a very personal basis. If he thought of a guy on his staff who could do a certain thing, no matter where he was in the hierarchy or what level he was at or what his current responsibilities were, he'd ask him to do it. It was on a whom he trusted and liked personally to do it. So that was all right, but it was a sort of an inhibitor now and then, and there'd be some surprises.

HACKMAN: I had wondered particularly, I know [Edwin R.] Ed Bayley worked the press office over there . . .

PATTERSON: Yes, that's right.

HACKMAN: And Haddad seemed to get involved a lot on the press side of things. I had wondered if this relationship was any problem.

PATTERSON: Oh, yes. As I remember, it was; I remember it was. But Haddad used to be--I guess he used to be, he was in the newspaper business. Yes, he was; he was on the Post, the New York Post. And you had a lot of ex-newsmen on the Peace Corps, and Haddad's staff had a lot of ex-newsmen on it. So yes, there was some problems back and forth here, a little bit of extra enthusiasm maybe. But Shriver kept all these tigers in check because he was a bigger tiger than any of them.

HACKMAN: Now Haddad was operating something that he called a Special Projects Operation. Can you recall this?

PATTERSON: Yes, yes. This was sort of an idea group, as I remember. I think there was one idea he had of getting generators out to some of the villages and so forth. Bill was, as I say, I guess my favorite example of a guy from outside government who comes in and shakes up the place, and he enjoyed doing this. And in many cases his ideas were wonderful and the shaking up was very useful; in other ideas, in other cases, it was sort of screwy and everything out of channels, of course. But as I say, Shriver was big enough to control this. If Shriver hadn't been there, there would have been a real problem. This letters example was one, as I mentioned.

There was one problem with Bill. He was the inspector general. And as an inspector general, he did this by personal interview, as a newsman. And he hired newsmen on his staff, and they used newsmen's techniques to do this. Well now, if there was a problem somewhere--let's say that the volunteers were griping about something: Maybe they were griping about the guy who was running their training program; maybe they were griping about the guy Wiggins had hired to be their Peace Corps staff member abroad; well, no matter--Bill's investigators would go out and they'd interview. Maybe they'd interview the guy, but more likely they'd interview the volunteers, and they'd compile quite a dossier of all the gripes. But it was just interviewing. So then they'd come back with an "eyes only" memo to Shriver about the problem.

Well, I remember Warren and the others, the training people, felt that this was a very unscientific way of finding out what was wrong. It was maybe talking to one side of the issue, or sympathizing rather with the little guy rather than with the organization. We had some rather bitter exchanges in the staff meetings on occasion about the unscientific method of investigations. But again I say Shriver was a big enough tiger to manage all the little tigers because he realized when he got a memo from Haddad that he'd put a couple of grains of salt on it, maybe pour a whole bucket of salt on it. But he was glad to have it simply because it showed where the smoke was. If it didn't analyze the causes of the fire in any scientific way, it told him where the smoke was, and that's all really he wanted to know.

HACKMAN: I've heard that often in disagreements between Haddad and Wiggins or whoever, that Moyers acted as sort of a mediator. Do you remember . . .

PATTERSON: Yes, I believe that was right. I believe that was right.

HACKMAN: Can you recall why it took so long to get a deputy Director? Was it Paul Geren who came for a while but didn't stay long?

PATTERSON: That's right. Paul Geren came and then went, and then you had, I guess, Moyers for a while. The real problem, I guess, to be perfectly candid about it, was who would ever be a deputy for Shriver? who'd ever be a deputy for Shriver? because he ran the Peace Corps out of the palm of his hand. He made it perfectly clear that anything important was going to be run that way; any important decisions when he was out of town or out of the city or out of the country would be postponed until he got back. There really wasn't anything that a deputy could do other than sort of be a general manager to make sure that the organization clicked along and sort of the kind of thing that I was doing anyway, making sure the mail got answered and this kind of thing happened.

So I wouldn't envy anyone who tried to be a deputy to Sarge because he'd, in effect, turn out to be an office manager and not a policy deputy, just like sort of a deputy to the President--there isn't any. It's both a reflection of Sarge and a tribute to him because he put himself so thoroughly over the organization that there wasn't any division of labor that really could be effective.

HACKMAN: You just mentioned that Wofford gave some help on the relationship with the U.N. Can you remember anything about the relationship between [Adlai E.] Stevenson and the U.N. staff and the Peace Corps? Stevenson's first position had been that we're going to try to internationalize it, and then this was dropped.

PATTERSON: Yes, that's right. [Franklin H.] Frank Williams was helping on this, too. There was a feeling, I believe, in the U.N. that they--this really takes me back, but it's hard and fuzzy without the documents.

HACKMAN: This was going to be a resolution proposed at the Economic and Social Council meeting that fall to internationalize it to some degree. And then this was withdrawn. The resolution was then just to volunteers. . . .

PATTERSON: To encourage other countries to do this. Yes, that's right. I guess there was a final feeling in the Peace Corps that they wanted to give the American experiment a fair chance all by itself. They didn't want to just give it away with the problems of clearance and negotiation with lots of other countries. Maybe there could be an international Peace Corps, but they didn't want to put the American Peace Corps in other hands. And Shriver felt he'd lose control of it, Congress would lose control of it. And it was too new; we hadn't proved anything ourselves yet.

HACKMAN: What can you recall about problems with the CIA? Do you remember this ever coming up, the CIA wanting access to things?

PATTERSON: Well now, if I give you a very candid answer, I'd have to classify this.

HACKMAN: I'd rather do it that way.

PATTERSON: The first information I have is that President Kennedy specifically ordered CIA to stay away from the Peace Corps. And they really did. That was point one. Point two, of course, I did tell you the story about the Peace Corps and Top Secret and the damage that did.

The only contact we had with the CIA was on one occasion where Sarge had become concerned, and I had become concerned, about the possibilities of subverting volunteers by trying, once they got abroad, playing on their frustrations or their loneliness and so forth, to try to catch them, and literally to blackmail them. This came up, actually, after a funny little incident--I don't know that the two are connected necessarily--where you had some press stories, one of them out of Malaysia and I think there was another one maybe out of Latin America, about the Peace Corps being a failure. And it turned out they were stringers. That is, they were reporters who were operating on a stringer basis--on the basis that you get paid for how many words finally get printed. So they wrote rather bizarre stories about the Peace Corps, hoping they'd get printed and thus hoping they'd get paid. And I'll never forget Shriver saying, "My God, who are our enemies? The American press is our enemy," because there was a story after. . . .

In discussing it in that staff meeting, somebody came in and said, "Well, in Latin America I heard a story that one of these stringers tried to get a Peace Corps volunteer drunk and make a story out of his misbehavior." And at that point Shriver said, "My God, who are our enemies, and who are our friends?"

Well, anyway, this led some of us to be a little concerned about possibly--the Soviets were calling us spies, and it seemed to us that the Russians could if they wanted to, if they really wanted to embarrass us and make us look silly and destroy the Peace Corps, would be to manufacture some incidents, and really get some Peace Corps volunteers blackmailed and then trapped. Entrapments and blackmail are the things we were concerned about. So Shriver authorized me very specifically to go over to CIA and ask them if they had any materials on the problems of entrapment--how they teach their agents to avoid it--and, if they had any materials, to let us see the materials and then let us see whether we could issue any kind of a guidance or instruction or incorporate them into our training program.

Believe me now, in telling you this, I want to emphasize that this was in absolutely no contravention of the President's instructions. The CIA was to keep away from us in terms of any use of any volunteers. We just wanted to know about this problem of entrapment. I remember going over there and talking to my friend over there whom I knew well, Jack Earnian, and we had lunch and so forth, and I told him of my interest and what I was concerned about. He said he'd have some stuff sent to me. So, sure enough, a guy showed up with the stuff and it was wide of the mark. I should say that it was unclassified material. It was something about the history of the OGPU and something else. Either they didn't understand my query, or they didn't have anything, or they didn't want to respond, or something. It was wide of the mark. So we never did anything else about it.

But that was the only contact that I knew we ever had. I think CIA did respect this and never got anywhere close to the volunteers because that would have wrecked us. And I might add that in all the exposes of CIA since, you've never seen anything about the Peace Corps, so I think the instruction has been adhered to.

HACKMAN: I have one question on the relationship between the Peace Corps and the AID people. Do you remember this changing any when ICA [International Cooperation Administration] was reorganized into AID and when Fowler Hamilton came in to replace Henry Labouisse?

PATTERSON: There was always this tension between AID and the Peace Corps. As I say, it began in those days when Peace Corps fought that battle-- successfully--to become independent and stay independent, and it was not helped by remarks--I guess they were Haddad's remarks--referring to AID people as in the "golden ghettos" of privilege and so forth. In fact, did he publish something in the Saturday Evening Post? I forget now whether there was some published remarks of his, whether he had written a piece about it. And Loy Henderson was the one who took very bitter exception to this and said this wasn't fair. And I

guess he was really directing it not only at AID but at some State Department people. As I say, I think on balance this wasn't fair. It was probably the military who were the chief users of the PX and the exporters and living within their American culture abroad. But anyway this was a little bit of bitterness in there.

But there was a lot of attempt to distinguish what the Peace Corps volunteer would do and what the AID people would do. And the general policy we operated under was that they were very senior kinds of advisers about how to establish a tax system, how to establish a system of dams and bridges and water purification: this was AID stuff. But if you wanted the people to go up in the back country and test the water, all right, this turned out to be Peace Corps volunteers. You don't use a Ph.D. in sanitary engineering to go test water. And there were many projects where AID and Peace Corps dovetailed, literally dovetailed. For instance, AID, I believe, supplied road-building equipment to Tunisia. The Peace Corps volunteers supplied repairmen, and they were trained in Peoria in the Caterpillar plant. My memory is that the damn road equipment in Tunisia was immobilized because they didn't have any repairmen. AID had supplied the stuff but the Peace Corps supplied the guys who knew how to take it apart. And Shriver made a lot of the fact that Caterpillar trained these people, and they could take it apart, and they could speak Arabic, French, fix a bulldozer, and play basketball.

HACKMAN: Can you remember anything about State's reaction to sending Jews to the Arab countries or Negroes to Africa and this being a problem at all?

PATTERSON: Well, I don't think we had any disagreements with State on this. Sargent Shriver refused to be limited, and if the Arab countries wouldn't play on that basis, if they would not take any volunteer that qualified, they were not eligible for any. And, of course, they did not, so we did not.

I guess one of the most sensitive subjects, if you're getting into some policy issues here, on a legal and constitutional basis was the problem of Peace Corps volunteers serving in religious schools. The example came up with respect to Nigeria. And I remember Sarge and the rest of us went over to the White House and sat in Ted Sorensen's office and talked with him about this. It was an interesting question.

In Nigeria, of course, you had many mission schools--many, many of them which had gone back for years. And then the country became independent, and the school system incorporated these mission schools as part of the public schools of Nigeria because they needed all the schools they could get. So the volunteers were assigned to the Nigerian Ministry of Education, and the Nigerian Ministry of Education would then reassign them to whatever schools needed them, and some of these schools were the mission schools.

Well, this obviously had some possibilities of a Protestant volunteer being assigned to the Nigerian Ministry of Education and reassigned to a Catholic mission school or vice versa. And the question was, did this violate the constitutional prohibition against separation of church and state? And we went over to Sorensen's office and, as I remember, there were two points which convinced us that this was not so, that no such violation would occur. And point one was that the volunteers were assigned initially to the Nigerian Ministry of Education. And that was enough for us, as an official act, to assign them there, and nobody in America assigned them to mission schools. The second thing was that the American Constitution didn't apply to Nigeria, and that it wouldn't be fair to judge the Nigerian education system according to the American Constitution. So if they did not have separation of church and state, that wasn't for us to say they should. And the third point was that volunteers would not be given religious duties. They would be teaching math or teaching English or teaching history and so forth, and they would not be expected to perform religious duties or any kind of proselytization. And on that basis we went ahead with it.

HACKMAN: It seemed to me, from looking at some of the Peace Corps papers, that it took a while to get this ironed out, and I had wondered if there

was a delay at the White House end in taking a position, or if the problem of getting the Peace Corps legislation through Congress, and possible opposition from religious groups, had led to a stalling on taking a position here.

PATTERSON: Well, it was a difficult issue, presented in rather a new way, you see, and it just took awhile to get all the views available, all the Peace Corps views. Bill Moyers, I remember, kept warning us about how the Protestants and other Americans United [for the Separation of Church and State] would react if we made a misstep on this, and Shriver wanting to be careful and do the right thing here, under the American Constitution, and also not wanting to anger any legislators. But it really was, as I saw it, a rather new issue in the constitutional procedure, and I'd say we straightened it out, with Sorensen's help, to our satisfaction. And I don't remember anybody blasting us on it.

The only problem on a religious side was the question was whether Peace Corps volunteers could participate in denominational projects. Not the Nigerian schools, but in Latin America there were some denominational charitable projects. And many different churches had denominational projects of different kinds, aiding little settlements for missionary work, not schools, but other kinds. And these were church affiliations, not through the government, but it would be directly to a church. And the Catholics had many, and the Lutherans and so forth. There were quite a few of them. Shriver finally decided, instead of against any particular ones, in trying to screen them individually, he just said, "We won't have any." The Catholics were the ones who were hurt the most by this because they had several in Latin America they were very anxious to have volunteers go to. And I believe they criticized Sarge on this. And this was an unusual thing to have a prominent Catholic layman get this kind of heat from his own Church. . . .

HACKMAN: I remember a fellow I believe named--maybe a bishop--[Edward E.] Swanstrom.

PATTERSON: Yes. Shriver felt he had to do this--say no to all of them rather than yes to a few.

HACKMAN: That's about all the specifics I have on the Peace Corps unless you. . . . Oh, one other thing. Can you remember any problems coming up--in late '61 or '62 the General Accounting Office began to do some audits. Were there any things that came out of that that created any problems?

PATTERSON: Of course, any new agency like the Peace Corps that got organized quickly took short cuts and so forth. Everybody always said to himself, "Wait till the GAO finds out about this kind of thing." So, on that great day when the GAO decided they would do an audit and they came over, we all sat around that little table in the room next to Shriver's office, and we wondered what they were going to say. And they said, first of all, that they considered themselves responsible for looking at the accomplishment of program, not just where the pennies go. So they were going to do a program as well as a monetary audit.

But the other thing they said, it seemed to me, that finally set everybody at ease was they recognized that when a new agency got started, there were a lot of short cuts everybody had to take, and they weren't really interested in that first year and a half in terms of the short cuts necessary to get things going. It was a very statesman-like attitude. Shriver's attitude was, "Look at everything; I want you to tell me anything you find. Everything's open to you." So it really worked out fine. I don't remember what happened with the Corps at the time, whether it worried them or not.

There was one other--I want to conclude this--very poignant occasion in the Peace Corps that I remember when--who was our ambassador to Bonn, now back in the State Department?

HACKMAN: [George C.] McGhee?

PATTERSON: McGhee. George McGhee came over and talked to the senior staff about how he viewed the Peace Corps. In fact, I just saw him yesterday at a swearing-in ceremony over there, and I told him

about this and about what he said. And he said, "Gee, I haven't said that since. I'm glad you thought of it." He said that, as he saw it, the entire objective of American foreign policy--economic, political, military, and cultural--was slowly to build, behind the defensive shields that may be necessary, was slowly to build around the world little threads of contact and friendship. One little Mary from Massachusetts going to one little place in the Philippines. builds halfway around the world a little thread, and another one is another thread. And any of these threads, of course, are fragile, and maybe some of them are only short-lived and so forth, but if, over the long period of time and the long development of American foreign policy, there are enough threads built and built and rebuilt and twisted together around the world, like the threads that held down the giant of the Lilliputians, there will come a day someday when the threads of trade, of commerce, of culture, of films, of movies, of books, and of person-to-person visits like the Peace Corps, when finally the world can't blow apart--it'll be held together. I always thought of that as a very beautiful metaphor, not only in describing the fundamental long-range objectives of foreign policy, but in particularly showing how the Peace Corps fits into things.

HACKMAN: What were your own reasons for leaving the Peace Corps then, and going over to Treasury in '62?

PATTERSON: I had been in national security affairs a good deal, and this was a chance to get back into that, and I was interested in doing that. And Shriver, of course, at the time was talking about nobody should stay around very long. And I got an attractive offer over there with this guy whom I knew and had worked with before. And later on, of course, I went to the War College which I enjoyed.

HACKMAN: What were you primarily involved in while you were over at Treasury?

PATTERSON: We were involved in assisting the Defense Department in military sales, particularly in military sales to those countries in which our

balance of payments was way out of whack because of American troops abroad. Germany is the best example. If we didn't have a military sales program with Germany, our balance of payments would be off by a billion dollars, or something like that--eight hundred--nine hundred million dollars. My own speciality was in Japan, where our balance of payments was out of whack by three hundred and fifty million dollars because of a large number of Air Force and some Navy stationed in Japan on our bases there. The Japanese enjoyed the benefits and got the balance of payments drain. We were trying to say, "All right, on a military account, let's try to square it. You buy some of our stuff, anti-submarine warfare and other equipment that you really need--we all agree you need--and even up the account." The Japanese, of course, like to build their own stuff, and this is very frustrating.

HACKMAN: What kind of relationship did you have with the people on the Department of Defense side?

PATTERSON: Oh, very close, very close.

HACKMAN: No problems?

PATTERSON: Oh, no. State was the one we had a problem with. State didn't like to see too much pressure being put on some of these other nations.

But subsequently the Germans have backed out a little bit, and the Japanese have come forward on this on the military side.

HACKMAN: That's all I have unless you can think of something else.

PATTERSON: No. As I say, that Peace Corps experience was, looking back as an aspect of the Kennedy Administration, a very exciting day. It was a feeling that, in the Peace Corps perhaps more than any other agency of Government, personified the whole Kennedy philosophy of "Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country." And all of us believed it--and I still do--and lived it and felt we were part of an enterprise which was the personification of that philosophy.

Okay. It was a pleasure.