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Biographical Note
Silas Horwitz (1910-1972) was a member of John F. Kennedy's presidential campaign staff and the Director of the Office of Organizational and Management Planning in the Department of Defense from 1961 to 1964. This interview focuses on the presidential campaign, the reorganization of the Department of Defense, and the controversy over the TFX contract, among other topics.

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Oral History Interview

with

SOLIS HORWITZ

March 18, 1966
Washington, D. C.

By Joseph E. O'Connor

For the John F. Kennedy Library

O'CONNOR: Mr. Horwitz, what were your initial contacts with John Kennedy?

HORWITZ: You want my very initial contact with John Kennedy?

O'CONNOR: Yes.

HORWITZ: My very initial contact with John Kennedy occurred while he was a young representative over on the House side. I happened to be in the barbershop one day, and he happened to be there. I didn't know who he was at all at the time. And we began to talk. This is the first time that I ever met him. This must have been sometime in 1949.

Then in 1957, I went to work for the Majority Leader in the Senate and, of course, got to know Senator Kennedy at that time. He wasn't on any of the committees that I worked with, but I did get to see him from time to time and particularly would discuss matters with him on things that he was interested in--for example, the Policy Committee scheduling in order to get matters on the floor.

O'CONNOR: I don't suppose you ever heard the Majority Leader

talk about the Senator, discuss his ability or his stature within the Senate?

HORWITZ: No. Of course, I was not with the Majority Leader in 1960 when the issues for the campaign were developing and the contest was developing. At that time I worked in the Senate and there was no issue at that point. I don't recall any specific discussion--except we did work very closely with him and Ralph Dungan, who was then working for him on the Labor Committee, in connection with some of the labor legislation that went through in '58 and '59.

O'CONNOR: You had specific contacts with Senator Kennedy then?

HORWITZ: I had some contact with the Senator but had more specific contact with Ralph Dungan, who was working for Senator Kennedy at that time and helping him with the bill.

O'CONNOR: Alright. What was your role in the 1960 campaign, if you care to move on to that, unless there's anything before that you'd like to mention?

HORWITZ: I can't think of anything specific before that. Well, the role in the 1960 campaign really grew out of. . . . Let me go back a little bit further. I left the Majority Leader at the end of '59 because of health. I became ill and I decided that I didn't want to work under the pressures that the Senate has all concentrated in a specific time period. I did some private work for a while and then went into private practice. In the meantime the campaign was coming on, and I was very interested.

I think it was [James H., Jr.] Jim Rowe who suggested my role. This was in July after the Convention, or the beginning of August. I said to Jim, "What role could I play here and help out?" because I was then, of course, interested tremendously in helping the ticket along if I could. And Jim made the suggestion that I go over and work with [Myer] Mike Feldman, who was setting up what was known as the research unit for the Party.

So I went over to work with Mike, and I think there were

just about three or four of us that principally directed the activities. Mike was, of course, in charge. Every once in a while we'd see [Theodore C.] Ted Sorensen when he'd be off the campaign for two minutes. [Richard N.] Goodwin used to come in every once in a while. Mike was fundamentally in charge of it. [William H.] Bill Brubeck was working there, and I was working there; I think most of the major stuff went through us, with one more added for the economic point of view. He's [Robert A.] Wallace, Bob Wallace, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.

And so we worked, I would guess pretty much from August until election day, on the various things that came up in connection with the campaign and issues, particularly on the issues side of the thing and particularly with respect to calls for information that we'd get. Ted Sorensen would call; Goodwin would call. They were doing most of the speech writing for President Kennedy, who was then a candidate. And we would do the same thing for people like George Reedy and people who were doing this for the Vice President.

Now my work, as I recall it--and this is rather difficult. . . . I did not have a chance to look through and get to any of the papers. As a matter of fact, I have a sneaking suspicion I'd have to go down to the cellar because I moved last year, and a lot of this stuff got packed away. I just haven't had a chance. My background had been, of course, that, while I was with the Majority Leader, I had done a lot of work in connection with defense work, and missiles, satellites, space activities, because he was chairman both of the Preparedness Committee and of the Space Committee. And the fact that I was with him in his role of policy making didn't mean you didn't help him out on his substantive stuff. If you know anything about the Senate, that's the way everybody is, a jack of all trades. And, of course, I had been in aspects of the defense business going back to '49 when I came back from Japan.

And so Mike, who knew about this and who had had some experience in defense activities because his original tour in the Senate before he went to work for Senator Kennedy. . . . He had been either on loan from SEC [Security and Exchange Commission] or on the payroll of the Senate Preparedness Investigation Subcommittee, and so Mike himself had some background in it. Mike pretty much asked me to take on various issues, getting up files and materials, analysis of questions

that had to do with defense matters. And, at the same time, I was working with Bill Brubeck on the question of our foreign relations and its relationship to defense. The materials are there. The work, of course, was not limited in anything. You just picked up what had to be done. You got a call. For a while, you know, you get people--Dick Goodwin wouldn't talk to anybody; he wanted one of the top men no matter what it was on. We were reading right out of the Statistical Abstract, but I had to read them to him. It was this sort of thing.

But, as I said, I worked closely with Bill Brubeck on foreign affairs issues. And I also did some work for Mike, principally, really pulling together the question of. . . . We thought maybe we were doing an exercise in arithmetic--what would a greater growth rate of the Gross National Produce produce by way of new revenues to meet new programs that Senator Kennedy had in mind to put into effect and to have as part of his program if he were elected. This was a very interesting thing because one was the question of what was the proper growth rate and where would it be, and, second, just what would it produce by way of revenue without adding taxes or anything else. It has been rather interesting to watch how well some of those prognostications that Bob Wallace and I played around with have come out over the last five year period.

O'CONNOR: Did you then have anything to do with the setting of wage-labor guidelines or guides?

HORWITZ: No. I will not say that this was not considered. I will say that I just wasn't involved in it, so I don't know. Let's say there must have been thirty, forty, fifty people in and out, some people only working part-time. This was pretty much a volunteer outfit, you'd call it. None of us got paid. I was supposed to get my parking fees, but I still haven't gotten those so. . . .

O'CONNOR: I thought maybe the greater part of your work during this period was on foreign and defense policy, and yet this particular item you mention as being considerably important was really as much domestic as anything else.

HORWITZ: Oh yes, this was. . . . As I say, there were no

clear working lines. I just didn't have a defense assignment and nothing else; Bill Brubeck didn't have a foreign relations assignment and nothing else. Everybody. . . . At least the four people I talked about, we did pretty much everything. Oh, I remember getting into--I can't remember his name at the moment--spending a couple of days with the guy who was working on agriculture problems. I knew nothing about agriculture, but he had some theories and he was testing them out, and I became the testing environment.

O'CONNOR: I just wondered, were there any other groups that were working on, for instance, foreign policy and defense problems during the 1960 campaign?

HORWITZ: Oh, I'm sure there were. I remember Senator Kennedy had asked Senator [Stuart] Symington to set up a study group.

O'CONNOR: You didn't have any relations with these other groups, though?

HORWITZ: We didn't have any relations with those. See, we were the actual campaigning body. This was a research group for the campaigning--the thing that had to be done fast. We weren't doing the long-range planning; we were doing the issues. Perhaps maybe some of the things we did were, because of the nature of campaigning, largely on the negative side, of pointing out where things were wrong. Oh, we got into some positive things. For instance, I think it was our group that really gave the positive push to the Peace Corps idea.

O'CONNOR: Can you elaborate on that at all?

HORWITZ: Oh, yes. Mike got a call one morning during the campaign--I believe a call from Ted Sorensen, probably--in which he said the Senator wanted us to take a look at [Hubert H.] Humphrey's old Peace Corps bill and see if we could do anything about. . . . I remember we took a look at it, and we sort of were intrigued with the idea. The thing that bothered us considerably was the effect of an endorsement from a campaigning point of view. We weren't thinking of it as part of a Presidential program.

We had to deal with this as a campaign issue. How do you handle the question that you're going to be accused--because any new idea coming from a campaign immediately from the other side produces arguments, particularly of the [Richard M.] Nixon type --that this wasn't to be a draft dodging device. This was the problem that we principally had to overcome, to show that this type of thing was genuinely workable. Some of the elements that were laid out as to the relationship of the Peace Corps and what it meant to public service were really laid out at that time. We had to deal with the problem in a way that, if the Senator desired to make it a prime campaign issue, that the Senator couldn't be attacked for it. This lay in the nature of the fact that we were conducting a campaign. You can behave entirely differently once he's elected President. Then you work your issue. But in a campaign you've got to make sure that your issue, which is designed to attract, may not be particularly vulnerable to be a trap rather than to be an attractive device. I mean, you have this in all kinds of things. But I think that was the genesis of what President Kennedy later pushed so strongly for and did such a good job with, namely the Peace Corps problem.

O'CONNOR: Okay, one other thing that was important during the campaign that you may well have worked on was the question of the missile gap. Did you do much on that?

HORWITZ: Oh, yes. Well, I had done a great deal on the missile gap before.

O'CONNOR: Well, can you tell us something about what you did, because it would seem that the missile gap became. . . . Well, it was a hot issue during the campaign, but it later appeared that the missile gap was kind of a myth. Now what were you thinking of during the campaign? What was your opinion of it?

HORWITZ: There was probably. . . . I want to get this into the right perspective. I was one of the few people who was in on the missile gap from the beginning. The missile gap was really an intelligence gap. The missile gap was really created by the intelligence community. It was not a deliberate thing. One of the things that must always be

remembered is that the Republicans believed there was a missile gap. This is one of the things that is overlooked today. But the Republicans believed--and the Democrats believed--there was a missile gap.

It was really started because nobody really knew what the Russians were doing. What did we know? We knew, one, that the Russians had exploded a missile of intercontinental proportions; they couldn't have Sputnik without doing this. So this was one fact that we knew. We also knew that the Russians had an industrial potential, so they could build missiles. This is all we knew. So the question came up: Having this capability, having actually produced a missile of tremendous importance, and, what is more, can reasonably be said to have produced several--because we know from our own experience in R and D [research and development] work that you have to produce several in order to get one good one at an early stage. The question came up: How many were the Russians producing? Well, we knew one other fact. We knew that the Russians had a nuclear capability. This we had known for some time.

Alright. Now, the problem then becomes--which is a problem of intelligence, of intelligence analysis. . . . These were the facts that you knew and the only facts that you knew. We may have known some others, but these were classified. But I don't think the classified material we had at the time really helped this matter any too much. And so everybody began to look at it in terms of this frame of reference. Now the Air Force said, based on this information, "If we were the Russians, this is how we would build. We would build so many missiles." And the Navy said that, "If we were the Russians, this is the way we would do it." And the Army had another position. Then poor Mr. [John Foster] Dulles and the State Department were left in the position, not being military experts at all, and so they said, "We really don't know how many they would produce, and therefore we could err. If we're going to err on any side, it's safer intelligence to err on the side that they would produce a sufficient number." Now the interesting feature was, whether you took the Air Force number, or Dulles' number and the State Department's number, and knowing our own program, then there would be a missile gap, a significant gap. Nobody really knew. But everybody, Republican and Democrat, said, "You've got to play this safe."

Now it was only after Mr. [Robert S.] McNamara got into office and he began to get the new information that was

flowing in which told us--well, from overflights and other things--where they were building and what they were putting out that it became apparent that the Russians had not made their determination at that time on the side of building more rather than less. And this was why there then turned out to be no missile gap. The missile gap was based solely upon an intelligence estimate of playing it safe because you just didn't know.

Now I would say that all during '58, '59 there was no question in anybody's mind that there was a missile gap because we were plagued with this intelligence gap. Now I believe if you go back and try to understand Mr. [Thomas S.] Gates' testimony in '60, without disclosing the new information, which was very dangerous to do, it would be understood he was trying to get across that maybe this calculation had been too heavy on the side of safety. But he was never clear about this. Mr. [Dwight D.] Eisenhower was never clear on this. As a matter of fact, Mr. Eisenhower left it clear in everybody's opinion that there was a missile gap.

And so we were talking about an issue which was framed on an intelligence estimate for which nobody had the information to say that the intelligence people were wrong. And I might say this, I believe that Mr. [Lyndon B.] Johnson, who headed the Preparedness Committee in its work on missiles and space, based upon the information that he had gotten from the intelligence community, really believed that there was a missile gap. I think that this was unanimous on the part of every member of the Preparedness Subcommittee. And I'm sure that Senator Kennedy relied on this background just as much as he possibly could.

O'CONNOR: You say that by 1960, though, Secretary Gates was at least aware that there was a possibility that intelligence . . .

HORWITZ: Well, I think if you go back and read his testimony. . . . I remember once during '60 there was some issue that came up in testifying in which Secretary Gates intimated or stated that it was not only the capability, but you also had to take into consideration Russian intentions. And well, he was never clear as to what this meant, or never brought this out clearly. Later, it turns out what it really meant was that the new evidence coming in was

that the Russians were not in fact doing all that they had the capability to do in this field. So you could begin to see that this is mostly. . . . It was never brought out, that I know of, up until the time that McNamara got more specific.

O'CONNOR: Well then, your research group in the 1960 campaign really did not know?

HORWITZ: We couldn't know. We only knew what we knew from. . . . Really, what I knew, what President Johnson then knew about the situation is what had been presented to us on the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. I am sure, for example, that [Cyrus R.] Cy Vance, who worked as counsel to the Preparedness Committee with [Edwin L.] Ed Weisl and myself--and he continued to work through '60--firmly believed at that point, based upon the evidence presented, that there was a gap. It was always in answer to the question if the Russians were doing what they had the capability of doing. We don't know in fact what they are doing. We must assume, to play it safe for our own side, that they are doing so and so.

O'CONNOR: Can you tell us what source of information it was that made McNamara change his mind, for example, in 1961?

HORWITZ: We're really in a very highly classified type of information. This stuff has got to be kept back. I think it was based on the new information, based on overflights . . .

O'CONNOR: Did [Oleg Y.] Penkovsky have anything to do with this?

HORWITZ: Not that I know of.

O'CONNOR: I wondered how much credence this puts on . . .

HORWITZ: This I don't know about. We didn't even know about Penkovsky. At least I didn't.

Frankly, as far as I can remember, we were called very little on this Cuba, Quemoy-Matsu thing at all. Bill Brubeck could have been called, but I don't recall being

brought into this at all. Of course, you will remember that Senator Kennedy had been on the Foreign Relations Committee, and a lot of this stuff about Quemoy and Matsu and Cuba represented his own knowledge. Sometimes he was talking from his own knowledge as distinct from something that we were looking up. The only thing that I recall that we did on Quemoy and Matsu was perhaps get up a series of events: this happened on this day, and this happened on this day, and this sort of thing. But I don't recall our working anything specific as to the merits of particular courses of action that should have been taken or could have been taken with respect to Quemoy and Matsu and Cuba.

O'CONNOR: Well, the reason I asked--and perhaps you still could shed a little bit of light on this--is because it has been stated that the controversial statement that President Kennedy made about the U.S. aiding Cuban exiles to retake Cuba. . . . It is stated that he never saw this statement, that this statement was issued without his knowledge. And I wondered if you had ever heard that or if you knew about that.

HORWITZ: No. As a matter of fact, our unit did not issue statements. We provided material to people who wrote speeches and wrote statements. We rarely wrote anything.

O'CONNOR: I understand this.

HORWITZ: Except specific pieces of stuff. "Here is the information." How the information was used was not our job. And so I don't recall that we ever got into this type of thing.

O'CONNOR: I knew that you did not issue statements, but I thought possibly you had heard some repercussions from this particular statement.

HORWITZ: No, we didn't hear any repercussions. As a matter of fact, the only time I recall this thing becoming of any importance was in the debates with Vice President Nixon when they got onto this. My impression was more that the statements that were made by Senator Kennedy at

that time were more likely based on his own fund of knowledge from being a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee than upon anything that anybody had done with them. If there were statements issued by other people, I really don't know about those. Now we may have furnished the information to them, but I don't recall this because we were furnishing information to all kinds of people. We'd get a call: "What can you tell me about this?" and "What can you tell us about this?" This sort of thing. And we'd go to our files and our archives, and if we had an expert on it, we'd get him in there and have him fill up a data sheet. But the conclusions that were drawn were not written in that group that I recall.

O'CONNOR: I wonder if the visit of Nikita Khrushchev to New York had any effect on the work you did at all. He was in New York at the time of the campaign. Was this taken into consideration at all by the people doing research here? Did it have any effect at all?

HORWITZ: Not that I recall. It could have been, but I'll be damned if I remember.

O'CONNOR: Unless there's anything you care to add about the campaign period and about the work and the role you played in it, we can move on from there.

HORWITZ: Okay. I can't think of anything else at the moment.

O'CONNOR: Alright, if you happen to think of something, we'd appreciate . . .

HORWITZ: Let me see what we've talked about. We've talked about the missile gap. There were some other things that we did. For instance, in the defense field we furnished a lot of information on Navy building programs and what had not been done, what had been requested and what had been granted, and what the Administration had been willing to do. This was part of a bigger thing which later became important in President Kennedy's defense activity--deemphasis on the nuclear side with more emphasis on a more flexible force. We were presenting evidence on the lack of flexibility, the lack of conventional armaments.

O'CONNOR: Where did the stimulus for working on this come from? Did this come from the Senator himself? Did he suggest that you work on the question of the lack of flexibility or did somebody else?

HORWITZ: Remember, part of the problem--and this is hard to say--was that I came in with a view, having worked in the area, of lack of flexibility. This was a view that was felt somewhat in the Preparedness Subcommittee about this and in the Armed Services Committee in the two Houses. So it's awfully hard to say where this sort of thing came from. For example, we were helping Senator [Claiborne] Pell in his campaign. [Tape recorder turned off--resumes.]

There was nothing unique about this idea. This was an idea that the Symington Committee had expressed in the work that they did for Senator Kennedy during the campaign. It was an idea that had been discussed by many people. As you know, this had been one of the reasons why General [Maxwell D.] Taylor had retired as Chief of Staff of the Army, because he didn't believe there was sufficient flexibility to meet the contingencies. So this was not particularly unique. There was pretty much a general feeling, which I did share, that we were putting all our eggs in one basket, that we'd be able to fight only a nuclear war; and it was becoming increasingly apparent, as the Soviet Union acquired an increasing nuclear capability, that the nuclear war was much the less likely thing to happen, and that you might get conflicts which did not involve nuclear weapons because each side had sufficient and would not resort to their use.

O'CONNOR: Well, it is indeed not unique, this idea of the need of flexibility, but there was a great deal of difference between the Eisenhower Administration's attitude toward it and Kennedy's. I was really interested in finding out where the impetus towards this came.

HORWITZ: I think there was a general feeling among many people that this was so. There wasn't much you could do during the Eisenhower Administration while Mr. Dulles was in charge of our foreign policy because of his peculiar and particular views that he held. I think at the end of the Eisenhower Administration a change was

beginning to shape up. I think Mr. [Christian A.] Herter had a broader grasp. I'm pretty sure Mr. Gates did. And I have a feeling that if Mr. Nixon had been elected, there would have been a more flexible policy enunciated from the Republican side as well. This has not been particularly a party problem. I think it can be more justly attributed to Mr. Dulles and his strong influence. There were two influences in Mr. Eisenhower's Administration: Mr. Dulles was strong on foreign policy and what flowed from it, and of course, Mr. [George M.] Humphrey and his views on the economy and finances. These tended to reinforce each other. Both of these influences, however, had largely disappeared from the scene at the conclusion of Mr. Eisenhower's Administration. And there was little doubt in my mind that there would have been some modification, maybe not to the degree that took place, but I think there would have been some.

O'CONNOR: Okay, the last time we discussed what work you did during the campaign in 1960. I wonder if you could talk just a little bit about your role after the campaign ended. Where did you go? What did you do?

HORWITZ: Well, right after the campaign ended, I went back to my law office and was practicing law privately. I did this until about the third week in January, when Mr. Vance, now the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who had agreed with Secretary McNamara to become the General Counsel of the Department, had dinner with me one night. He said that Mr. McNamara had assigned to him as General Counsel particular responsibility for the reorganization of the Department, and that he was setting up a new office, and that he, Cy Vance, had told Mr. McNamara that he would assume this responsibility if I would come with him for a while to do it. Otherwise, it would take him quite some time to find out who he ought to get, because Mr. McNamara felt that this could no longer be handled on an ad hoc basis, but should be handled with a small office which devoted full time to the restructuring of the Department of Defense in many of its aspects. And I originally agreed that I would come on for six months and I've been here ever since.

O'CONNOR: Well, when you came to the Department of Defense, did you notice any open hostility on the part of

military people toward the men that McNamara had brought in?

HORWITZ: I didn't notice any personal hostility. As a matter of fact, a good many of these people are people that I knew from my work on the Hill. There was, I think, a great deal of fear as to what would happen. The military organization is fundamentally, well, like any organization, fundamentally conservative. It doesn't like to change. In my area there hasn't been so much hostility as there were to certain other activities which I was not engaged in--particularly on the financial and the budgetary side--because in the areas where I'm working at there had developed a considerable body of opinion, even among certain of the military, that changes should be made, and what these changes were were rather dictated by events. And the real problem came to put it into proper focus. And once you got it into proper focus, you had hostility--you got opposition, shall I say, more than hostility--but once the decision was made, it was accepted. There was very little attempt to undo a decision or to balk it.

O'CONNOR: I had heard a lot of reports of hostility between the military and, particularly, people like Alain Enthoven that McNamara had brought in, and I was surprised to hear that you didn't find any in your area.

HORWITZ: Let me say this: There was a difference. I fundamentally have been searching, and my job has been to search, for better ways of doing established functions. The Alain Enthoven thing introduced an entire different way of life; and so there is a great difference in degree. Just to illustrate: It was my position that the intelligence function, which I regarded as being as important as the military did--and more so even--was being performed in the wrong way, and that there was a better way to perform it. The question was whether we would have a consolidated intelligence agency and thus have the opportunity of getting better intelligence because we didn't have to split our assets three ways or four ways. So, when you got done, in either event you were getting intelligence. The question is which was the better way to do it. Alain presented an entirely new problem. For the first time, the Air Force had to consider

its assets in terms of the Navy as well as the Air Force, and not as an internal fight within the Air Force. Now this is an entirely different order of magnitude, an entirely different type of problem. This is revolutionary. This knocks the hell out of prior thinking. And so there is this difference in the problem of what you were doing and what you were seeking to do. One wrenched you out of ordinary currents--you were doing the same thing but looking for a better way of doing it. The same is not true with what Alain was doing; it was so revolutionary in its concept for the Air Force to examine its budget not only in terms of the Air Force, but in terms of what the Army was doing, in terms of what the Navy was doing, and looking at the mission and saying, "When the Navy and Air Force are performing the same mission, then we've got to treat these assets as a unit." This is entirely a different type of thing. You get a degree of hostility which is entirely different than you get with the type of thing that I was doing. I don't want to say there was no hostility. There was hostility, but it never was the hostility to the extent of leading to a revolution, leading to complaints of a tremendous nature or whatnot. Plus the fact that my basic staff was always all military. Cy Vance and I were the only civilians in that element. But the basic working staff was always all military, who had entree to the military and could go discuss with them. There were men we had gotten from the military and whom they each regarded as the highest caliber of individual. Whereas Alain's thing was so new that it was an entirely civilian operation. You just didn't have any military who had been trained or qualified in doing this sort of thing. And this made a difference in approach.

O'CONNOR: I'm surprised that you could get fresh ideas, which would be required in organization . . .

HORWITZ: Oh, there's no question. There's loads of it around. Once you get them out of their old apparatus and bring them into your apparatus--because this is the remarkable thing about these men, they are loyal to the guy they are working for. This goes in another way. You learn by experience. I never have service representatives any more in any study. I tried to. But if you have them as service representatives, then they may tend to be governed by what the service says. On the other hand, if I borrow them as service experts to work for me, I get no problem.

O'CONNOR: It sounds like a problem in semantics, really.

HORWITZ: It really isn't. It's a problem of whom they're working for.

O'CONNOR: You said, in effect, then that you were brought here by Cyrus Vance for the job of reorganization, of organization. Well, from whom did the impetus for reorganization come? Did McNamara already know? Did he already have in mind what he wanted to do?

HORWITZ: No, he didn't have exactly the details. He knew there were hundreds of things that had to be looked at. He knew certain things had to be done. This was apparent in talking with Mr. Gates. Mr. Gates had started this. Now remember the Symington Committee had recommended a reorganization plan. Mr. [Roswell L.] Gilpatric, who was the deputy to Mr. McNamara had been on that Committee. And so there was this general knowledge that there were problems of organization. Anyone familiar with the events of 1957 and 1958 which led to the Reorganization Act of 1958 knew there were problems of organization. In 1958, Congress, in effect, put into law a bilinear organization for the Department of Defense, both lines terminating in the Secretary of Defense. In other words, there was one line of organization that ran from the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands. This was the operational line for the use of forces operationally, combat missions. On the other hand, there was another line of authority which ran from the Secretary of Defense to the secretaries of the military departments for the providing, training, and equipping of the forces that went into the combat units. The law had in fact taken the service secretaries and the military department apparatus out of the operational control. But nobody sorted out the functions right away of what had to be done in order to make your two lines fully compatible. As a matter of fact, operationally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Joint Chiefs didn't control two fundamental responsibilities which are indispensable to operational control: they were communications and intelligence. These were over with the military departments. Now Mr. Gates had started on the communications field and had created, in 1960, the Defense Communications Agency, but with certain rather limited powers.

It was not yet operational when we came aboard; it was still four or five months. It became operational in May. But it was in the process of being organized. Right at the end of Mr. Eisenhower's Administration there had been studies made of the intelligence field, and one of the things recommended in these studies was that this had to be done for the intelligence field. Mr. Eisenhower consulted with Mr. Kennedy because he wanted to know what to do with these recommendations, and he told Mr. Kennedy his views on them. Mr. Kennedy and he concurred. And so on January 18, President Eisenhower approved those recommendations. They were subsequently reaffirmed by Mr. Kennedy when he came on board. So there was no attempt to slip anything over Mr. Kennedy; he was kept fully informed. Mr. McNamara went over each one with Mr. Gates.

And so the first problem Mr. McNamara really gave us was bringing the intelligence over to the operational side of the house. This was the sorting out type of thing that had to be done. Now Mr. McNamara also had some views at the very beginning on how he wanted to organize his immediate staff. So we had problems of getting the expanded role of Comptroller, the new definition of ISA's [International Security Affairs] role, the new merged Installations and Logistics Office, and new Manpower Office, and this type of thing. Then, of course, he had a whole series of other problems that he asked us to look into. Then we turned to the problem of filling out the Communications Agency on a broader basis and increased its powers and its responsibilities. But basically our first task was to sort out the two sides of the house in those two basic fields.

O'CONNOR: Did you have much opposition in this respect?

HORWITZ: Oh yes, there was considerable opposition. Everybody was afraid.

O'CONNOR: Where did the opposition come from?

HORWITZ: Well, the opposition came, generally, from all over. The intelligence function had traditionally been in the military departments. Everybody yelled, "Oh, it's a function of command!" Well, you know it took us a long time to get it through to these people and really to get it clear in our own mind. "Well, gentlemen, we

agree with you. What you're overlooking is that command is not over in this side of the house; it's over here. And that's why we want to move it over here." Well, this is the type of opposition you got. I think, basically, they didn't want to change. By virtue of being in the intelligence business, the military departments were still in the operational business, and they wanted to continue to be in the operational business. Well, this opposition continued. Plus, in any kind of complex function, there is always the great fear that as you move from one type of organization to another, you will degrade your capability--at least on a temporary basis. And this, of course, is something you don't want to do. You don't want to degrade your capability while you're trying to improve it because, regardless of anything else, you've got to be able to use it at each and every movement wherever it is. So your real problem is to say, "Really, let's not fight the idea. Let's concentrate on the implementation of it so that we don't degrade." But there is this genuine fear that you would degrade the capability as you were moving from one form to another even on a temporary basis. And this is a legitimate concern, and it's something you've got to watch for all the time.

O'CONNOR: Okay, you called that your first problem. Did you have any other problems that we could talk about? I don't expect you to go into every detailed problem you had. I realize . . .

HORWITZ: No, I can't. You don't have that much time, and neither do I.

O'CONNOR: Can I have one of those? Thanks.

HORWITZ: The second and really major problem that we turned our attention to was the question of the purchase of common supplies. Is that running out?

O'CONNOR: It looks that way. Maybe you can do it better than I. I had thought that the problems of organization in defense and supply would be just about like a problem of organization in intelligence, and apparently that's because I didn't realize what the problem was in intelligence.

HORWITZ: Well, no. This is an entirely different problem because here we're talking about consolidating functions which we believe, under the Act, legitimately are service functions, as distinguished from Joint Chief functions, because they deal with the problem of procurement, which is fundamentally a service responsibility under the providing--furnishing clause, rather. Now this was also a matter that had not been without precedent in the Department because during the period '55 to '60, certain procurements had been brought under single management. For example, the Army had been charged with providing all food and all clothing for all services; the Navy was buying all petroleum and all medical supplies--this type of thing. In all, there were about eight of them, and other fields were being considered.

Well, one of the fields being considered was electronic spare parts, and the services were all agreed that there ought to be a single buyer. But they could not agree who that single buyer ought to be. Nobody trusted the other. And so they suggested a joint agency for buying the electronic spare parts. This immediately raised the question: if you had a joint agency for this, why not a joint agency for all these common functions. And so this was created, which is really a wholesale bank for common supplies in common areas. But this then was an area which was taken out from the military department and made to report directly to the Secretary of Defense. So this was the second or third major thing that we did.

Then one of the things that we rode herd on for Mr. McNamara was the total reorganization of the logistic side of the Army, which had had the technical services and were so firmly enbedded in Army tradition that Mr. [Robert A.] Lovett had stated that any attempt to get rid of them was like backing into a buzz saw. We were able to eliminate the technical services which were antiquated, which the Navy has just gotten around to doing too in its latest reorganization plan. So that these are the major type things.

Then, oh, there are all kinds, there are hosts of things; they run into the hundreds. We have a briefing that shows all the organizational changes that have been made. It's a fascinating set of charts.

O'CONNOR: I guess in this reorganization you ran into a lot of opposition, particularly in the last problem you mentioned, from the military itself. Did you?

HORWITZ: No, the more we did, the less opposition we got.

O'CONNOR: Oh, really?

HORWITZ: Yes. You don't get too much opposition now. As a matter of fact, oh, you get some, but it's not really very important.

O'CONNOR: There were a lot of complaints in the papers about McNamara centralizing the Defense establishment, and trying to make it a unified . . .

HORWITZ: Well, yes. You get these complaints any time, but they rather like what they've got right now. As a matter of fact, this is always one of the amusing things. Like all these things, as they work themselves out, little imperfections show up, and you want to make further changes to get rid of the imperfections, and you end up getting opposition to making those little changes. "This new thing is just perfect; we don't understand how we got along without it."

O'CONNOR: What we had hoped to do, aside from interviewing people who were doing the reorganization, is interviewing a few people who were opposed to the reorganization, and find out what their reasons were, and whether they still felt these reasons were legitimate, or whether they changed their mind. Do you have anybody you could recommend, anyone you would consider the center of the opposition, or anything like that?

HORWITZ: Well, guys like Arleigh Burke were opposed to some of these basic changes.

O'CONNOR: I guess Admiral [George W., Jr.] Anderson wasn't involved in this?

HORWITZ: No, he wasn't involved in this particular go-around. Arleigh Burke was here. [General Thomas D.] Tommy White is dead. Tommy was not too much opposed. Let's see. Who was the Army? [General George H.] Decker. Oh, well, they had positions--how intense they were I don't know. I think General [Lyman L.] Lemnitzer was in

those days quite opposed as Chairman.

O'CONNOR: Well, another complaint that was raised in the papers--and I wondered if you'd comment on this--was that the Department of Defense in its reorganization was ignoring the military. Do you feel that's justified or not: do you feel you were overriding the military?

HORWITZ: No. Let me say this. It depends what you mean by military. And second, were these kind of decisions military decisions? The answer to the second, first--most of these decisions were not military decisions because usually, from the point of view of military principle such as the intelligence and communication thing, the civilians were on far sounder military grounds than the military who wanted to stand pat. We were taking a very basic principle of military organization--that the commander must control his intelligence and communications. Sometimes they go further and say he has to control everything. But we do learn that these two things, because they're so essential to his decision, both the making of it and the communicating of it, that he must control it. And yet we were the ones who were saying--it was the civilians who were saying--"The military commander must control them, not somebody else, even though he's wearing a uniform." So very basically it so happened that on most of these arguments the civilians, even taking the military proposition, were on the sounder side militarily.

Second, there is a difference between what the Joint Chiefs of Staff tell you and what other people in the business tell you, even wearing uniforms. You've got to remember that the Joint Chiefs of Staff in those days was basically a bargaining organization. The triangle arrived not at a right result but something that kept everybody least unhappy. And so you really didn't get real military advice from them.

O'CONNOR: That's a funny comment.

HORWITZ: Well, this is right. You didn't get it from the Joint Chiefs because they had been encouraged not to have dissenting opinions. Now in an advisory body you don't need a unanimous opinion if each one as a military expert had given his own opinion. But what the Joint Chiefs were striving to do was get a unanimity, and the

only way you could get unanimity was by everybody giving up his strongest demand. It wasn't a question of what was the right course, but what was the course that caused the least dispute. Now you had plenty of military advisers who were not concerned with this process from whom you could get an honest, good judgment.

O'CONNOR: Okay. Can you comment at all on what President Kennedy's involvement in all this was? Or did he have much involvement? How close did he follow this?

HORWITZ: Well, I know this, that Mr. McNamara reported to him, all the time what he was doing.

O'CONNOR: You hear often of President Kennedy getting on the phone and calling a man, not the Secretary but somebody else. I wonder if he ever did that with you?

HORWITZ: Well, he did, but not in this organization, not in this type of thing. Oh, he'd get on the phone and call Arthur Sylvester when he was angry about some fool announcement that had been made. "Why did you let these bastards talk?" President Kennedy used to get excited partioularly. . . . He was very big on the peaceful uses of space, and the Air Force had a space program. And every time the Air Force put up a space shot and any publicity was given to it, he just went through the roof.

O'CONNOR: President Kennedy?

HORWITZ: Oh, yes. He went through the roof because this gave an impression to the world that we were militaristic. This is one thing John Kennedy and I did not agree on. I never did see this. I mean, I don't know who was selling him this bill of goods. And then we went through all kinds of things to hide the shots that the Air Force was putting out, although they could be observed by our press and the Russians. We knew the Russians were observing them and could observe them. And we'd come out with stories, and it would only become worse. As a net result, you got more publicity than you would have gotten if you had said

the Air Force had this shot because you didn't have to tell what was in the payload. But this was the sort of thing that he called on. But he never got into my area at all.

O'CONNOR: You felt he shouldn't have bothered this, he should have let the Air Force go ahead with the shots if they wanted to? I don't understand where your objection was.

HORWITZ: My objection was that in the effort to hide it, we were actually creating more publicity. The easier way would have been to say, "Yes, we're doing it. Everybody knows the Air Force has a space program, but the shot was for the purpose of measuring this weather condition and doing that." We were not fooling anybody except our own people. The Russians knew we had an Air Force program, and they knew we were not limiting it certainly just to the NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] type shots.

O'CONNOR: Before we get on to another question, I'd like to switch the tape.

BEGIN SIDE II TAPE I

O'CONNOR: I asked you about your involvement in the TFX business.

HORWITZ: My involvement in the TFX business is a strange involvement because I had nothing to do with the question of the procurement of the plane. But after the investigation had begun, I ran into Mr. [Eugene M.] Zuckert one day, and he said to me, "What are you doing with this? What role are you playing in light of your background with congressional investigations in this?" I said, "Nothing, thank goodness." I knew nothing about this matter other than what I had seen in the newspapers.

It seems that Mr. Zuckert went down to see Mr. Gilpatric and said that he thought it would be wise if they took advantage of my experience, in light of the fact that I had been in so many of the major investigations. Mr. Gilpatric must have thought that was a wonderful idea because about 8:30 that following morning I got called in by him and Mr. McNamara and told that I was going to head up our effort here to see that

we didn't go off in forty-nine different directions. We started to do this, and then the Committee got into the question of the characteristics of the plane and this sort of thing. They were making so much fuss about this sort of thing.

And Mr. McNamara, who had been playing around with war gaming, thought this would be a wonderful way to do this--to set up another team who would try to set up the counter case which we knew certain people on the Committee were trying to do. And so he said, "We'll have a red team. You be the blue team because you have the overall question anyway." Well, they did this for one day, and then I went back to him with Mr. Vance and Mr. Gilpatric, and I said, "Look, Mr. McNamara, we're all lawyers. You're not. We've got fundamentally a lawyer's job to do here. It does not, as lawyers. . . . All of us, we're pretty good lawyers. We have a cardinal principle in preparing our case: we spend more time preparing the other side's case than we do our own because this is what we've got to meet. And I don't like to turn over to somebody else the job of preparing that. I want to do that one myself."

He agreed that we could do it our way because Mr. Gilpatric and Mr. Vance agreed with me on that, that this was not the way to prepare what was fundamentally a lawyer's presentation. So the damn thing--the red team idea--just died. Well, they later got a hold of some disgruntled guy who had worked one day on the red team, and this is what this was all about. But I killed it after one day because I could see that I was not going to get from it what I could do for myself in trying to say, "Now, what is he going to present to me?" This is not a technique that is unfamiliar to lawyers at all. This is something that any good lawyer does, and if he doesn't do it, he's a damn fool. But my problem is, I cannot be satisfied that the case is properly prepared if somebody else is preparing it. See? This is something you've got to do as part of your own preparation.

You see, in preparing any lawyer's case, the preparation of your own case is the simplest part of it. It's trying to guess what the other guy is going to produce which is the difficult part of it. And I firmly believe that you can't have anybody do this for you but yourself. The red team died right then and there after I tried it for one day. See, this is not a war gaming thing where a series of events are happening. You've had a completed action so you've got all the information, and the question is its proper utilization.

O'CONNOR: You know, the complaint that was made--of course, perhaps this was made because of a misunderstanding--was that the red team wasn't given access to the information.

HORWITZ: The red team had all the same information. It didn't have any access because it only existed for one day. But it had every document and every case paper and every person that it wanted to see. There was no problem. They could go anywhere they wanted to.

O'CONNOR: Well, then did you continue the investigation as to pros and cons of . . .

HORWITZ: Of course, I did. I was able to guess what questions they were going to ask and what they were going to try to prove. I will say this, they were not very skillful about it. It was not the most difficult thing to imagine what they were trying to do at all.

O'CONNOR: Well, what do you think was the source of the military's opposition to the whole TFX? The military side didn't seem to support, for example, Secretary Zuckert or particularly Secretary [Fred] Korth.

HORWITZ: The answer there is that the military had done such a goddamn lousy job--pardon me for putting it this way--in carrying out their part of the job. You see, you go back and find out what happened, you find that the whole military system for making a decision is set up for the low man on the totem pole to make the decisions which gets rubber stamped on the way up. For example, General [Curtis E.] LeMay never even received a briefing. He hadn't attended the meeting of the Council. But when his deputy recommended it, he just signed on because his deputy did. We found out this went all along down the line.

Now, there's something about buying a plane that is very interesting, and why you have to be careful about the military role in it. The military will buy a plane that promises the most operational characteristics. Now if you're buying a plane that is in being--like when the Air Force bought the Navy's F-4--this is simple. You get a good flyer, you put him in the plane, and he flies it. And he says, "Yes, it

will travel five hundred and fifty miles an hour, and yes, it's got good turning capacity, and yes, it's got good visibility, and yes, you've got good control." A good operator of a plane can tell you whether it's a good plane. But when you're dealing with a plane that requires a lot of research and development that is pushing the art, and they say, "Yes, if all the R and D problems are solved, we'll get this," the military will go for that. They don't stop to consider, can you solve those R and D problems? Or even more important, can you solve them within the amount of money that you're going to spend, or within the time that you need the plane? And this was the problem.

There is no question Boeing said that if their plane got completed, it could do certain things better than the General Dynamics plane. There is only one trouble with it. They had three research and development problems which we had had plenty of experience with, and we knew we were going to have plenty of trouble. And we didn't know: one, whether they could solve them; and two, if they could solve them, when they would solve them; and three, how much it would cost to solve them. There are enough R and D problems in the General Dynamics plane which we knew about and then the Boeing plane without these additional ones. And this is where Mr. [Joseph V.] Charyk, who is one of the finest aeronautical engineers in the world, said to Mr. Zuckert, "Wait a second. They're talking about using titanium. Now you know and I know the trouble that Lockheed is having with the L2 (which was a reconnaissance plane) the interceptor, and you know what they have discovered about titanium. We know that you can't use it this way. Now do you buy that plane which says you're going to use it that way when you already have spent millions of dollars to find out that it doesn't work in this particular mode?"

Alright, now this is the type of problem that you had. The military paid no attention to this. [Bernard A.] Benny Schriever had concurred. Well, Benny said, "I knew these tough problems, but we were buying. . . . This is the way you buy airplanes." You buy airplanes on the basis of brochuresmanship. And one of the important things that came out of it is that we had to reform the whole process of how you do one of these R and D purchases.

O'CONNOR: Well, this being the case, why was it so difficult

and practically impossible to convince the McClellan Committee . . .

HORWITZ: Oh, there were a number of factors. First of all, you have a couple members of the Committee who have a personal interest. [Henry M.] Jackson got himself all involved with Boeing. Scoop's a good friend of mine, and he can yell all he wants to, but you know and I do he was making Boeing happy. McClellan got mad, I think, because of a couple of things the Secretary did. One is he'd agreed that he would have been better if he had gone first, and he tried to get in and give his testimony. The Secretary was not prepared to let these people go in and have their say for two or three weeks and then end it up. This was the real problem, I think. It was this, and then McClellan got mad that we were trying to stop him. Plus the fact that there were some factors about how the staff was behaving, and McClellan felt that his staff was being unfairly attacked. Frankly, he doesn't know how much they could have been attacked because they were going around asking questions like this--well, intimating that the whole hearings would be cut off if you gave half the contract to Boeing. This sort of thing was being intimated.

O'CONNOR: By members of McClellan's staff?

HORWITZ: Yes.

O'CONNOR: To people such as you, or . . .

HORWITZ: Not to me, but ~~to~~ the people, you know, in the decision-making process. So McClellan got the idea that his staff was being unfairly attacked.

O'CONNOR: You don't feel then that the charge that has often been made about conflict of interest . . .

HORWITZ: Oh, there was no conflict of interest here. Nobody had any conflict of interest.

O'CONNOR: Well, it's also been said that Mr. Gilpatric and others who were involved in the decision-making process didn't really know a great deal about it.

They hadn't seen cost studies on the plane, or something like this?

HORWITZ: It was perfectly apparent. There are certain things you do know. We knew that, one, both prices were way underpriced, and they didn't want it in the papers. We also knew from what Boeing was promising that it was going to cost a hell of a lot more to add on, even with their lower price to start with, than to the General Dynamics'. This is plain business sense. If you knew the R and D problems, you could estimate this. But then the factor--there's another factor--also comes into it. You say, "Didn't Boeing agree that they would do it at such a price?" The answer is yes. But the trouble is if they lost money on the R and D contract, then you'd pay for it in the production contract. So you were paying for it anyway. They just wouldn't sign a production contract that wouldn't cover that loss for them. And this is a loss that could have run into six hundred million to a billion dollars. This could become very expensive. Now these are judgments that you have to make. If Boeing could have gone ahead with it, they might have solved the problems in three days. On the other hand, from what we knew about the problems, they haven't solved them yet.

O'CONNOR: What was Admiral Anderson's role in this? He was very much opposed to . . .

HORWITZ: He wasn't very much opposed until he became a witness, and then he was dissatisfied with a number of other things.

O'CONNOR: You think it was the other things that he was dissatisfied with . . .

HORWITZ: Oh, there's no question bécause, well, there are pieces of paper that were put in the record where he himself signed the piece of paper that he didn't see what difference it made which of these you took. Either one would do the job.

O'CONNOR: Yes. I had known he had said that.

HORWITZ: He wrote it.

O'CONNOR: But I wondered if this was simply taken out of context.

HORWITZ: Oh no, it wasn't at all. This was the third report in which he said it didn't make any difference, and so, therefore, he was deferring to what the Air Force people wanted to do. And within the Air Force, I think, the Air Force just likes Boeing, that's all. There's no question about it. And this is strange because they have never produced a bomber. But the old SAC [Strategic Air Command] crowd just liked Boeing.

O'CONNOR: Okay, another man whose name was involved in a controversial way in this business was Albert W. Blackburn. Was he the man you were referring to?

HORWITZ: Yes, he's the red team.

O'CONNOR: Well, why is he called Mr. TFX, or is that so?

HORWITZ: I don't know why. Oh, I suppose this is the explanation: he called himself Mr. TFX because when Harold Brown was reviewing it he used him to do certain of the data material and backup material. And as a matter of fact, I may say--he doesn't want to admit this--it was his facts that gave the basis for the billion dollar figures.

O'CONNOR: What do you mean?

HORWITZ: That the GW, General Dynamics would be a billion dollars cheaper in the long run to produce than the Boeing.

O'CONNOR: These were Blackburn's facts?

HORWITZ: Yes, Blackburn's own analysis did this. But Blackburn is a strange guy anyway. We found out later that Blackburn is a real right-winger. He joins every right-wing organization there is, and by this time he was mad at John Kennedy.

O'CONNOR: Just for political reasons he was mad . . .

HORWITZ: He was mad. He resigned here--which had nothing to do with his work as far as I can remember--but I think this is where he'd gotten. . . . But it was Blackburn's own figures, and he was the guy who was the red team. Maybe he was insulted when I said I didn't want the red team, that I could do a better job myself, and the evidence was not hard if you knew what the right questions were to ask.

O'CONNOR: Okay, we can wind this up then. Do you have anything else you think you'd like to comment on concerning John Kennedy?

HORWITZ: One other thing I'd like to talk about because Jack Kennedy made a contribution following Cuba that was almost one of his last acts to our government which I've had a great deal to do with. And that is his establishment of the National Communications System whereby he directed the Secretary of Defense, as executive agent for our entire government, to join together all of our long-line communications facilities, no matter who owned them.

O'CONNOR: In case of emergency, you mean?

HORWITZ: No, so they could be, even in peacetime, mutually used and mutually compatible with each other; so you could talk from one to the other; and so that if the State Department needed extra lines to a specific country and we had extra lines against an emergency, the State Department could use our lines, without buying new ones, and this sort of thing. I regard this as probably one of his greatest contributions.

O'CONNOR: Where did you come into this?

HORWITZ: Well, I'm the Secretary's Deputy for the National Communications System, and I have handled this ever since John Kennedy set it up in 1962, or early '63.

O'CONNOR: I wasn't aware of that.

HORWITZ: Yes. And which I regard as one of his great

contributions to our government.

O'CONNOR: Well, okay.