

Dr. Peter V.V. Hamill Oral History Interview – JFK #5, 01/15/1970
Administrative Information

Creator: Dr. Peter V.V. Hamill
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Biographical Note

Dr. Hamill was an epidemiologist who worked as the medical coordinator to the Surgeon General's Advisory Committee on Smoking and Health (1962-1963). In this interview, he discusses the participation of various government agencies, the first press conference following the release of the report on smoking, and the ultimate consequences of the report, among other issues.

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Fifth Oral History Interview

with

DR. PETER V. V. HAMILL

January 15, 1970
Annapolis, Maryland

By William W. Moss

For the John F. Kennedy Library

MOSS: Okay. Let me talk a little bit about the roles of the other federal agencies. Well, let's start off with the Department of Commerce and the National Bureau of Standards.

HAMILL: Okay. The official we... I think we called them observers. I think that was the term we kept using there, interagency of observers. And the official observers ... Do you want to...

MOSS: No. Go ahead.

HAMILL: Do you want to check to...

MOSS: Go ahead. No. It's all right. I'm sure this is going all right.

HAMILL: The official observer from the...

MOSS: I just want to be able to see it from where I am.

HAMILL: ...Department of Commerce was Dr. M. B. Wallenstein [Merrill B. Wallenstein]. That's W-A-L-L-E-N-S-T-E-I-N, a physical chemist from the Bureau of Standards. He had kind of a dual representation. He was a technically able man as a physical chemist

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being able to understand something about some of the physical aspects of tobacco smoke itself. He also knew quite a bit about problems of [inaudible] and measurement of biologic fact and the development of instrumentation to measure things.

MOSS: Okay. Let me ask a couple of questions here. One is, who called them in and for what reason?

HAMILL: All these people?

MOSS: Yeah. How they decided that these people should...

HAMILL: Yeah. They were all at the famous July 24th meeting. So they were kind of already there before I was born, I mean I was there, too, but I didn't set up the 24th meeting. So let me try to search back a little bit.

MOSS: They were in a way a part of your given and not a part of your choice.

HAMILL: Precisely. Part of my given.

MOSS: Do you know of any...

HAMILL: My immediate response is, the previous, in the previous two actions of the Public Health Service—one was the kind of preliminary report of 1957, the other was Dr. Burney's [Leroy Burney] statement in 1959 on the special article in the Journal of the American Medical Association. Both of these were specifically Public Health Service. For the first time we weren't just the Public Health Service; we were kind of the whole federal government. We were kind of representing.... We were kind of the official.... We were the Public Health Service, but President Kennedy [John F. Kennedy] well, in a way, I guess we were speaking for President Kennedy if we go back to the...

MOSS: Yeah. The four associations that sent Kennedy a letter...

HAMILL: Yeah. That was originally to Kennedy. That was originally to Kennedy.

MOSS: Then he goes back to...

HAMILL: Went back through channels.

MOSS: Right. Through HEW [Department of Health, Education and Welfare] saying, "Do something." HEW tells PHS [Public Health Service] to do something.

HAMILL: Well, sure. And then it was starting to work back up again through channels and was becoming realized when the May 23rd press conference, the President's press conference, asked a specific question of "What are you doing about it, Mr. President?"

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MOSS: Well, as I recall...

HAMILL: And he used this further question of the reporter was, "Do you and your health advisers agree or disagree with these findings about causing different degrees?"

MOSS: Okay. And this comes on the tail, one, of the Italian government actions.

HAMILL: Right. Right. Which occurred that spring, I think.

MOSS: And on a lot of statements by Maurine Neuberger in the Congress.

HAMILL: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. She'd been making statements, I would say, for at least six months before this.

MOSS: Yeah. Right. So that the reporter's question doesn't entirely come out of the blue.

HAMILL: Oh, no. Not at all. We also worked...

MOSS: [inaudible] '62 press conference.

HAMILL: Yeah. We also were quite sure—at least it was almost assumed that he had some inside information.

MOSS: Yeah. Well, now...

HAMILL: He also was aware—that this reporter was aware also we think who—at least I was given to believe, everybody assumed that he was somewhat aware of our action that we had in process.

MOSS: Yeah. Okay. At least contemplating getting this committee together.

HAMILL: Yeah. There was some suggestion somewhere along the line that possibly even somebody in the Service set him up to this to ask the President this to greatly spur things up, to precipitate action and heavily endorse it. But this was suggested, but it's all very, very.... It was truly out of my ken. I didn't know for sure. All I was aware of was some suggestions about this.

MOSS: Yeah. Do you have any idea of who in Kennedy's immediate staff might have had responsibility for seeing that the memo was followed up and coordinated?

HAMILL: I think it was the Office of White House.... I think it was the White House Office of Science and Technology. That part I'm not sure, but I'm quite sure it was because when I came aboard, that was already—

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that was our definite channels to the White House, was the Office of Science and Technology. And then from then on I had a lot of connections with them, and they were always good. And in my connections, early connections with them, they were already more knowledgeable—you know, I could just tell the way they responded to things—much more knowledgeable than any other branches of the government.

MOSS: Okay. Now specifically...

HAMILL: Which means that they had prior dealings. I mean they weren't coming on this thing cold.

MOSS: And specifically this was Kenneth Clark.

HAMILL: Yeah. Yeah. But I had, even before Clark was the official observer, and if I'm not mistaken, the first time I met him was at the November, that first official November meeting. Then I had quite a few dealings with him after that, directly. And for a couple of reasons: First, he was—if he'd remember a gap in the structure of our committee, he was a behavioral scientist. And Clark was a professor of psychology. And I had some plans in the behavioral area, but they hadn't come to pass by November, the November meeting, so we kind of temporized and asked Clark to pinch hit, kind of play a dual role, both be the White House observer and kind of be—fill in this behavioral area. There was some complaint by the committee about this, definitely. They didn't like any of these observers at all. They never did. The very beginning, even two or three meetings later, even after six months or a year, they didn't—they called them the spies. [Laughter] And several times they, a couple of them—I think Seevers [Maurice H. Seevers] was quite outspoken.

MOSS: Seevers?

HAMILL: He was a pharmacologist from the University of Michigan. He was one of the committee members. And I can't recall somebody else were quite outspoken. Actually asked them to leave. You know, asked the chairman whether it was Hundley [James M. Hundley] or whoever it was at the time, to ask them to leave when we got into some what we considered rather confidential information. And by—I'll have to get the, if it's important, I'd have to get minutes out—and, I think, by the May meeting they were almost nonexistent anymore.

MOSS: Except for Clark.

HAMILL: Yeah. But he faded out, too. He and I had a little bit of a squabble.

MOSS: Okay. From...

HAMILL: But that was a personal thing, had nothing to do with.... It wasn't the agency, it was just a personal thing on.... He was trying to dictate a point of view to me and he didn't quite understand what he was...

MOSS: Well, was he dictating this point of view in an official sense?

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HAMILL: Not in an official.... Yeah. Not an official position.

MOSS: Rather than an official...

HAMILL: But it was about the conduct of the study.

MOSS: Okay. Okay. This is interesting.

HAMILL: Yeah. This was important because—and I really blew it.

MOSS: Okay. About when did this happen?

HAMILL: This happened in May.

MOSS: Of?

HAMILL: '63.

MOSS: Of '63.

HAMILL: Yeah. Yeah. We got along very well up to this point, very well. But this was one of my really pet areas, and I just couldn't get it going. I couldn't get the proper people involved. First I wanted Sandy Astin [Alexander W. Astin], who was the chief of research for the American Council of Education. He and I were friends at Lexington. At the time he was associate director of research for the National Merit Scholarship Corporation. His job was to follow up the different merit scholars, see how good their choices were and how bad they were and so forth. And that fell through. A Dr. Medalia [Nahum Z. Medalia], a social psychologist, fell through. And this was an area on exploring—I outlined this, I think, in the very first meeting—on really exploring any of the possible differences between smokers and nonsmokers besides the fact that they smoke, both genetic, constitutional, and physical differences, but as important, if not more important, were other possible behavioral differences.

MOSS: Yeah. You talked about this in an earlier thing, I think.

HAMILL: Yeah. Yeah. So this area was an area.... When I outlined the whole study area the year before, this was one of the areas I wanted to develop. This had been neglected by all other studies, too. This was the area that cried for more good, extensive and comprehensive work to be done in. Plus, in formulating different alternatives, I could see that from the year before, if there were any surprises in store, this is where they were going to come from.

MOSS: Okay, now. So what was Clark's position on this?

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HAMILL: Well, we'd gotten almost nowhere in this area even up till May, and most of the other subcommittees had been going well for four months or so. And in my time schedule, this area should have been almost one of the first ones done in the.... When I say time schedule, the "should" was in effect that in order to make other kinds of judgments, this was one of the first things that we should have been able to make up our mind about. And we were in May, trying to shore this up and formulate how we were going about it and who we might get, and Clark started getting quite dogmatic and saying, "Well, really all you want the study on the psychological area for is to figure out how to persuade smokers to stop smoking." Well, I was patient and I tried to explain to him the difference between phase one and phase two, that that was out of the purview of phase one. But that's not what I wanted anyway. We had these other far more, far prior questions to answer and he never understood where this fit in the whole epidemiologic picture.

MOSS: It's your old dependent and independent variables again.

HAMILL: Yeah. Yeah. And he kept—for an hour and a half or two hours—kept on this. I mean he was like a, almost like a rigid old professor. And finally—and there was a lot of pressure. Time was running short on us. This area just wasn't

getting covered. I got up and started shouting at him very definitely.

MOSS: Did he give you any indication...

HAMILL: And told him it was none of his goddamn business. It wasn't his study anyway because I was also under some dual pressure because one of the guys there was Seevers. Seevers was there. And Seevers was one of the real objections to having any of these advisers around anyway. And he objected to having anybody doubled as both an adviser and part of kind of the study group.

MOSS: Okay. Did Clark at any time indicate to you that he was reflecting a position of either the Council of Science Advisers or of the Office of Science and Technology?

HAMILL: No. He never tried to pull rank on me. That part I respected. He was stuffy. He was stuffy, but that's the way he was. But he never tried to pull rank or anything like that.

MOSS: Okay. In another way, did he ever communicate to you any attitudes that they were taking over at the White House in the Office towards the study?

HAMILL: I would say no. Except...Yeah, that magus [inaudible]—and now that you bring it out this way, I think, in resetting that night, yeah, part of the thing I blew off was not just his, well, failure to understand what we were talking about to keep almost [inaudible] on this other thing, but this [inaudible] was tying into a third thing, and that was a kind of impatience on his part that almost communicating, I think, and I don't know whether it was by, unconsciously or by

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design that, well, you're really wasting a lot of time on a lot of this. The real heart of the thing is how we solve the problem. That's what's really important is how do you get smokers to stop smoking, which I think represented two things, not just his own, you might say, I guess, failures to quite understand, but also let's get on with the show and get on to the real business at hand, which definitely could have, could very definitely represent an impatience from the Office of Science and Technology.

MOSS: Yeah. But this is speculative. He didn't communicate that the way...

HAMILL: Precisely. He did not. No. Definitely not. He did not specifically state that, but I really think he had more savvy if, you know....If, let's say, if in fact he was trying to achieve this, he had more savvy than to specifically state it, both with me—I think he knew me well enough—and even more so with Seevers there.

MOSS: And the committee as a whole.

HAMILL: Oh, Yeah. I mean that particular member of the committee, SeEVERS, that would have been a hell of a blunder had he done that. And he was dean of the University of Colorado, the school of arts and sciences, and then he went to [inaudible] and he was enough of an academic politician to not make big blunders like that.

MOSS: Okay. What other contacts with the Office of Science and Technology did you have?

HAMILL: There was, before Clark came on, a Dr. Peter something or other.... There were two different positions that I had contact with. I'd ask for the price on some things. If I recall the—a guy I'd mentioned before, whoever we—George [V.] Allen of the Tobacco Institute. One of them knew him and knew about him, gave me some pretty good advice on, about George Allen. As I say, one guy's name was Peter, but I don't remember his last name. The more senior men in medicine there, I don't recall what his name was. My relationships were both cordial and quite defective, but as soon as...

MOSS: Defective in what way?

HAMILL: In giving me advice and steering me to some.... turned out a piece of pretty good advice on people and resources they steered me to. But as soon as Clark came on, then he always handled everything from then on.

MOSS: The whole, you say, would be the chief contribution of the Science and Technology people?

HAMILL: As far as I was concerned, one of their chief contributions was not interfering. [Laughter] They were cordial and they didn't interfere.

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MOSS: I guess I haven't mentioned—but on the side almost at this point—in February of 1962, before you were involved, Endicott [Kenneth Endicott] testified before Congress, before the House Appropriations Committee, quote, "Public Health Service believes that the evidence regarding cigarette smoking as a major cause of lung cancer is sufficiently strong to justify an intensive educational campaign."

HAMILL: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. You say he used the term the Public Health Service, not just the Cancer Institute?

MOSS: Right. The Public Health Service.

HAMILL: Yeah. As I mentioned a lot earlier, Endicott was probably.... He was certainly one of the most powerful men in the Public Health Service, possibly even more powerful than the surgeon general. And he used to.... In some ways he had no right to make that statement.

MOSS: Well, that's what I wanted. It seems to me he's out of..

HAMILL: Yeah. Yeah. He used to make statements like.... he used to not just speak for himself, but he would kind of usurp—he used to speak for a lot of other people when he would speak. That was just kind of his way of doing things. For example, I mean specifically, I was in air pollution and we were involved vastly more heavily in possible effects in bronchitis and emphysema and in some ways some aspects of lung cancer. He wasn't speaking for us. And we were just as competent, if not more competent to speak about this than he was. He was not speaking for occupational health who was with Clark Cooper, and before that with Harold Magnuson almost as competent, on some areas more competent on a total thing almost as competent. So he wasn't.... I mean he really had no right to, scientifically he had no right to make that kind of a statement, possibly administratively or powerwise, he may have.

MOSS: Okay. Back to the other agencies. The Food and Drug Administration was involved.

HAMILL: Let's run down another interesting little point. When I go back over this chronology thing, in some ways, Terry [Luther L. Terry, Jr.], on April 16th....

MOSS: 1962?

HAMILL: 1962. In a proposal of the secretary for the formation of the adviser group and calling for a reevaluation of the Public Health Service position, I think, by Dr. Burney, he lists a number of significant developments since 1959 which emphasize the need for the [inaudible]. And the first one—number one was "new studies that seem to remove almost last doubt that smoking has major adverse health effects." Number six of these lists a request for technical guidance by the Public Health Service from the Federal Trade Commission on labeling and advertising of tobacco products, which is, I guess, more an

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administrative thing, and already presuming they are harmful. But number seven—evidence that medical opinion be shifted significantly against smoking—the point being and caused me to rethink some stuff a little bit, now that I come across this document, in some ways, personally, as it's always difficult to disentangle the administrator from the professional man, but probably Endicott and Terry both personally believed that there was no question but that smoking was harmful. Now, when he set up—I'm trying to think of a, trying to reevaluate

what I'm accusing him and still do of renegeing, but then kind of explaining and justifying a little bit, what he said in July 24th and from then on created kind of me and the study. He may have emphasized the objectiveness of the whole thing. I think he set in motion, perhaps, more than he had bargained for on true objectivity. In other words, maybe for effect, he wanted to be "objective," but he didn't really want it to be that objective. See what I'm talking about?

MOSS: Or he didn't think it was going to cost as much.

HAMILL: Both timewise and effortwise. Or maybe he didn't think you could get some really good men to carry it that far, too. He, at no time in—let's presume that. Let's presume he more or less kind of....The whole thing got, which it did, it got bigger than he or kind of anybody planned it. That no time in November meeting, January meeting, even March meeting did he try to, you might say, cut it back down to a size he had in mind as evidenced in April of 1962, which means (a) he either kind of more or less forgot about his position in '62 and maybe he had some new doubts, or else got kind of swept up in the vigor and enthusiasm and scope of the study once we got moving.

MOSS: Or perhaps hoped it would work out all right anyway.

HAMILL: Possibly the latter is what really happened. Now in some ways that's probably the.... I'm glad you put it that way because betting oddswise that's probably the most likely thing that happened, and it's also....The one guy that gets caught in the crunch that way, and that's me, but not by maliciousness or anything like that. But, and also possibly—and this is a speculation on motivation again—let's say by May or so of '63, because of pressures, he kind of went back to his original performance becoming really impatient, and was saying, "My God, what have I really launched here?" And the architect of his launch turned out to be me and there's some evidence that for some reason or another there was a little bit of, somewhere after May, May, June, July, some definite hostility towards me as an individual, definitely. Either as an individual or symbolic, but regardless of whichever it was, it sat with me. Because after the March meeting, for whatever reasons, he was never cordial with me again, ever. And this is a good possibility that, and that's the case, that he also.... It was probably spurred on by the fact that he must have been a little.... I mean the person who made the mistake was him, obviously. I mean if the thing kind of got bigger than he, his obligation, well, he was the one to hold, if it was to be held in check, it was his job. Right? Not mine. Oh, I took my sailing orders. My sailing orders were to make this thing completely pure and thorough, just, you know, and, by God, that's what I did. And it's interesting.

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Now I didn't mean it that way, but I used to make this statement back of the real early days, August, September, October in '62, that I was going to make this a better study than he even dreamed of or deserved. [Laughter] I was being a little prophetic and I didn't quite know what I was being prophetic about. Now that I'm seeing—because I really think now I'm

seeing another perspective of a kind of a sense of proportion and he lost a sense of proportion for a while. That's quite a.... that I didn't really until I had chance to go back through this chronology again. I haven't seen it for seven years now, and I see how he, as a professional, he wasn't anywhere nearly as skilled in this, professionally skilled in these areas, but he was still a professional. He, as a professional, had definitely made up his mind, there's no question about it. And it was not that, in looking in the back of my mind, that this will answer. He was also, by the time we started to recall, I stated that Schuman [Leonard M. Schuman] and Cochran [William G. Cochran] and I, who were the heavy cigarette smokers, had elected not to alter our habits for several reasons: First, we didn't want to tip off the reporters, and any of our habits from that, no matter what we thought during the course of the study until after the study, was published. Both Hundley and Terry were trying to quit, well, even by July and August because I remember a couple of meetings with Terry in which he bummed some cigarettes from me and then he would apologize both for borrowing the cigarettes and also for backsliding on his attempts to quit smoking. So primarily there were the....

MOSS: And here's a note, let's see, what's the year on this one? 1963, November 3rd.

HAMILL: Of '63?

MOSS: Yeah.

HAMILL: That's late in the day. Yeah.

MOSS: "The Surgeon General Terry gives up cigarettes in favor of a pipe."

HAMILL: What?!!

MOSS: "Denies link to forthcoming advisory commission committee report."

HAMILL: Good God! [Laughter] This is November of '63?

MOSS: Yeah. *New York Times* reporter.

HAMILL: Well, somebody's about a year and a half late on picking that up. I think I remember this now, but if he denied the link, then why did he quit, I wonder. They didn't supply any kind of an alternative reason. He was a confirmed smoker.

MOSS: Now let's go back to the agencies again, the Food and Drug Administration.

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HAMILL: Okay. Let me finish off with, about the Commerce Bureau of Standards.

MOSS: Okay. Bureau of Standards.

HAMILL: Wallenstein turned out to be fairly helpful. He got us data, some data on, well, let's see, no, I guess he never did produce. He was going to get data on.... No. I guess all he was was cordial and never really produced anything. Yeah. Okay. But that they would be interested in phase two, the economic and commercial implications, and that also that was the Department of Commerce and that specifically the Bureau of Standards would be possibly involved in undertaking tests of nicotine and tars in tobacco, which they'd been requested to from time to time by people to do. They hadn't done it up to this point officially. Okay. I guess I can let Bureau of Standards drop there.

MOSS: Okay. Now the FDA.

HAMILL: FDA was a Dr. [Howard I.] Weinstein. He states in this first meeting the way the draw.... He seemed to be one of these.... he never did anything for us, ever. I think he even resented being involved in this thing. He was officially—let me give you his official title—director, division of medical review, Food and Drug Administration. I think he was more interested in what they shouldn't do and he said in the minutes that tobacco is officially out of the category of drugs, but if there are health claims such as the cigarette entitled "Stay Trims" or cigarettes containing stromonium. Stromonium, they used to put that in a— it is an anti-asthmatic. It's a bronchial relaxant, and starting back in the `20s some cigarettes, I forget whether they were [inaudible] or who they were actually had stromonium in them for—to relieve asthma. Well, anything like that, either health claims or if they contained drugs, then they fall into the purview of drugs.

MOSS: That's all that qualify?

HAMILL: Not unless they're making any health claims from them. I think that this was mentioned. If they make any health claims, Yeah, then it would. So he stated specifically that any possible jurisdiction over the sell and use of tobacco, dealing with it by existing legislation could possibly form in two categories: one, under drug effects. And two, as a general marketable commodity. And that would be held to by any kind of a commodity that presumed to make health claims. And if I recall correctly, except for kind of pointing out to us what they did do and didn't do, that was the last of his contributions.

MOSS: Okay. Federal Trade Commission?

HAMILL: Federal Trade Commission was represented by Dr. George Dobbs, D-O-B-B-S, associate chief of division of scientific opinions.

MOSS: Sounds like a catchall, doesn't it, Federal Trade Commission.

HAMILL: Yeah. There is in the committee studies according to Dr. Dobbs because the FTC has jurisdiction over advertising and labeling of tobacco products. FTC would carefully study the committee's findings and conclusions from the standpoint of whether or not the current advertising reached the requirements of the FTC act. The FTC has the power to deal with affirmative representations in advertising and to require the disclosure of whatever information the scientific facts warrant. Likewise, he never did anything for us. When I say did anything for us, I mean got us useful information or produced a document, a useful document.

MOSS: Well, in a way, these were consumers of your report rather than contributors to it.

HAMILL: Yeah. Except that they all indicated that they would do things, but they never did.

MOSS: Oh. Okay.

HAMILL: Except one man. And that's Mr. Claude Turner, director of the tobacco division of the Department of Agriculture.

MOSS: Okay. What did the USDA do?

HAMILL: And people are always knocking him, but these people did a lot of work for us, and good work. They compiled several staff papers. One was on tobacco consumption and good objective data, tobacco consumption in America for over the past fifty or more years. But also a great deal of information on world-wide consumption and comparative consumption country to country, and as it changed over point of time. Now this was not just for us, not just for curiosity purposes, but in one of our epidemiologic associations, obviously, you look at the rising incidence of lung cancer with a total amount of tobacco consumed by the population. And you usually time it, look for about a ten to fifteen year lag in the sense of roughly our best guess is most of the lung cancers take anywhere from ten to twenty years to develop in a heavy smoker before it becomes manifest. So if a country—or women—who previously had smoked very little, all of a sudden had a great increase in intake of tobacco, cigarette smoking, and furthermore, if there is a definite relationship between cigarette smoking and lung cancer, then you would expect to see a rise in the lung cancer rate about ten to fifteen to twenty years after the expansion of this habit and also, differentially males and females because in a lot of our countries, highly industrialized countries, this is also an important piece of epidemiologic evidence. It was the differential between female smoking and male smoking. Females almost always lagged a generation behind the males in cigarette smoking. And the suggestive evidence is, or was at the time of the study, that the lung cancer rates in females would lag in just about that same generation and they, in fact, it looked like in the United States were starting to go up, too, but just starting because they were about a generation behind the males in the heavy smoking of

cigarettes.

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MOSS: Okay. Did this fellow from Agriculture indicate to you in any way that, say, Secretary Freeman [Orville L. Freeman] was taking a personal interest in this?

HAMILL: No.

MOSS: Or anybody else outside?

HAMILL: No. No, he was director of the tobacco division and he did a lot of work. He got us a lot of tax information, which was just kind of a peripheral background interest and he was the one who supplied us with the information that, well, it was that over three billion dollars annually in federal and local taxes are raised by, in America, are raised by cigarettes. And politicians being politicians, ain't nobody gonna want to give up that if they don't have to. So the vested interests were not just the tobacco companies, not by a long shot. As I indicated before, there were also, there were the politicians, their jobs, and there were also, as far as I was concerned, the biggest most important vested interest was the smokers, and perhaps the smoking scientists like me. In some ways that was the biggest of all the vested interest.

Of course, Turner I don't think was even.... He was completely free and apparently encouraged by his department to help all he could. He knew he was in this, of course, the Department of Agriculture being in this extraordinarily paradoxical situation as the Public Health Service, especially in later years trying to stop cigarette smoking and the Department of Agriculture subsidizing the growing of tobacco and not only subsidizing the growing of it, but helping tobacco farmers market their products and improve marketing techniques and everything else. It's always been that extraordinary paradox. It was almost as if he went out of his way to almost atone for his department's peculiar mission, and the quality of the staff papers he did for us was good, very good.

See, what I usually did, I'm always kind of a doubting person. In almost all circumstances, important staff papers, background papers, I'd independently try to get at least two separate ones. That was just almost a routine of mine unless I did it myself. Then it's a simple.... Any kind of a test is correspondence, and that is, if one closely corresponds with another, then you, and you're quite sure they are independent, then you rather relax and at least presume they're honest. There's a possibility that they could both be drawing on inadequate data. Then they'd come up with—they'd both come up with inadequate.... It doesn't necessarily say that it's really true, but at least, there's probably honesty involved in the production. So I had George Allen's tobacco institute produce almost the same kind of data all the way through. And this was a testimony to both of them and I know, unless they purposely...

MOSS: I was going to say, any evidence of collusion?

HAMILL: Well, I'm almost positive there was none because I kept looking for it. And they checked pretty darn well. The two different sources came up with pretty similar answers. They both did good work on, a kind of

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interesting thing on the historical use of tobacco, how it spread, where it spread, and by the countries. The different Indian groups used different kinds of tobacco, and they came up with rather similar kinds of statements and I think there was no collusion, at least I kept looking for it. I couldn't find any.

MOSS: Okay. Who else was involved [inaudible]?

HAMILL: And then it was going to be that Kenneth Clark from Science and Technology. That was our official, the official federal, other federal agencies.

MOSS: Okay. Let's move on then to the announcement itself on 12 January '64. There was a press conference, right?

HAMILL: In the new State Department—what do you call it?

MOSS: Auditorium?

HAMILL: Auditorium. Yeah.

MOSS: And you and Terry and Hundley...

HAMILL: And all the committee.

MOSS: ... the whole committee were there and representatives from the federal agencies.

HAMILL: No. I don't think they were there.

MOSS: They weren't there.

HAMILL: I don't think so. They weren't up with us, anyway. We were up on the stage.

MOSS: You were all up on the stage. Okay. What transpired roughly? I mean anybody could get the transcript of the press conference, but will you characterize...

HAMILL: Yeah. Yeah. I think, if I recall, it started at 9:00 or 9:30 in the morning, and at the same time the press conference and the passing out of the report coincided. And the doors to telephones were locked. I mean we physically had—the

reports were published, and we passed them out to the press at the same time. For me it was a very exciting time. I was quite impressed by the way, all the way through, the way Terry handled the interview. He started off with a presentation, and I can't recall always who did what, then he introduced all of us because it wasn't just.... The findings weren't just the book. The important thing was the people who did this because, you might say, the nonscientist was really relying on

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us. They weren't relying on our.... It wasn't our reasoning that was the important thing. It was, you know, relying on us.

MOSS: The recognition and prestige.

HAMILL: Yeah. Yeah. And integrity. Yeah. So, you might say, the report, the book was presented, but more important than the book being presented was the flesh and blood, the people who did the thing were presented to the press. And it was a bit of a, obviously a bit of a triumphant air, a little bit of jubilation. Even during the press conference because it was a very tough job, finally done. Everybody was pretty well satisfied. It was, as I had said before, it wasn't kind of what I'd kind of hoped it would, but it was still a darn good job. It was a really good workman-like job. In fact, as I had said before, it was better than the Public Health Service really paid for or deserved. Several of the reporters were very knowledgeable, had really steeped themselves in a lot of the actual controversy, scientific controversy, and several of them asked some pretty good, pretty searching, and pretty penetrating questions. And I presume, well, I don't know, I'm not a reporter, so I don't know really how they work. Part of them, I'm sure, part of which is to be able to show to other people that they could ask good questions. I'm sure of that operates to some extent.

MOSS: Yeah. I'd like some tea.

HAMILL: Yeah. I'd like some tea, too, please. Yeah. But also on a more legitimate level, the guys who were capable of asking good questions and then according to the answer they got right then and there was a way of judging us as men. And I got the impression that all the questions were handled very well by all of us at different times, and also I got the impression that the press corps, the large group were quite satisfied and quite pleased, really both with our performance and from probably the best they could gather from the probable quality of the report, the probable quality.

I remember particularly a guy named Carey, who is a science writer. He'd interviewed me way back in the early days before we finally put a complete embargo on any talking to reporters of any kind. And he is very skillful, very knowledgeable. And also a lot of people knew him and they were watching his questions. And he was also for us very friendly in a sense he was satisfied. He was quite satisfied it was a very good report. I'm quite sure his questions—at least I got almost the impression from my previous contact with him a year and a half before—I'm quite sure he was knowledgeable enough. A lot of his questions were to

make us look good in the sense that he would ask questions in such a way that he knew we could answer them well and he knew that this would.... His good question and our good answer would make everybody happy, which is, I don't know much about press interviews, but I guess completely legitimate. And it's a productive.... Because part of the.... It's productive in this sense in that if everybody presumes here's the tough question and we're—it's not a question of intrigue or battling and everybody's of good will, then kind of—then later on it becomes a question of selling to, persuading the public, or just persuading, persuasion of our findings, and if that's the case, then the productive newsmen can play a big role in that. And the clever newsman who wants to be a

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negative guy, no matter how brilliant the report could be, to his newspaper readers, by implanting doubt, could be very destructive.

MOSS: None of that.

HAMILL: Very little of that. Very little of that. Except I got trapped. I got trapped.

MOSS: Oh, yeah?

HAMILL: Yeah. It was embarrassing and one of the reporters found out—I don't know how—who of us were smokers. And Terry saw the question coming. He was going to try to shield it, try to.... I didn't see it coming. And Terry deflected it for a few minutes, but then the guy came back again and said specifically point blank, "Dr. Hamill, you are a smoker." I said, "Yeah," which was true. And he said, "What are you going to do about it?" And he just caught me flat-footed. And this was just, with my bare face hanging out all I could do was say, "I don't know. I haven't made up my mind yet," which in justification ... There was much laughter.

[BEGIN SIDE II TAPE I]

MOSS: Go ahead on the press conference on being trapped.

HAMILL: The whole thing was on national TV and radio. [inaudible] asked Cochran and Schuman the same thing. Cochran, bless his heart in his very dry matter-of-fact, Scotch way—I wasn't flustered at all—he just....I think right then he said he wasn't going to, at least for the time he wasn't going to change his habits, that he enjoyed smoking, that he was something like old enough that he wasn't going to live forever anyway. Schuman was always the grand-stander and he said he quit the night before. And he was a real grand-stander. He still is, but he was fun. But he was a grand-stander. I did resent it in some ways, though, because he probably, Schuman probably caused me more gray hairs than everybody else in the committee all put together, literally. Until a meeting we had in June of '63, a small subcommittee meeting, he hadn't done one damn thing until then and he had one

of the biggest roles. Even if you look over this....You ought to look at this, his document entitled "Committee Assignments" dated February 26th, '63. Give you an idea of the incredible scope and complexity of this thing, and Schuman was heavily involved. This was way back in February. And he hadn't, even though he'd promise you like a fool, and even in June all we had was this one three-day meeting. And from then on he didn't do anything more until, oh, I gather it was in September. He hadn't done any of his own real subcommittee work. A couple of the reporters...

MOSS: Yeah, you were talking about the press conference.

HAMILL: A couple of the reporters were, or in the press corps were—I don't remember his name—one of them was [Interruption]. He wrote a book on smoking. He was, I think, by trade a professional science writer, that

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kind of populizer, not.... I think he was a freelance science pop writer. He was a pretty bright guy. He asked us some tough questions. He wasn't trying to make us look good at all. He asked us some tough ones that he knew were tough ones. And we would handle those honestly and objectively, which I think made an impression. I was, when we got away from the thing, quite satisfied at the press as a whole—and then it was subsequently born out in the news accounts in the next numbers of days—was impressed with our integrity and also ability, but in fact the big news was not just what our findings were, but also that we were to be trusted and believed, and in fact, it was a good study.

It was just kind of news in itself because dear whatshisname? Pearson, Drew Pearson had thrown some mud at us and, I guess, October, November, two different times a couple months before the report came out. And in his apparently usual way, had a little bit of information, was wrong on seventy-five percent of the stuff. But it's really interesting because unless you were an insider and knew what he was wrong about and what he was right about, he used exactly the same tone whether he was right or wrong. I mean as an outsider you couldn't—if you were trying to guess if a man was either lying or didn't know his subject—you couldn't guess. You couldn't guess which he knew about and which he didn't know about because he talked about everything in the same tone, that is, he knew about everything. So it was quite interesting. So this kind of, I think, set things pretty straight. And then we had a luncheon that lasted for a few hours. I can't recall where. I guess it was at the Fort McNair Officer's Club. Yeah, that's where we had one of the private dining rooms at the Fort McNair Officer's Club. It was primarily a time of general jubilation except for me the sour notes was Terry's rather lack of cordiality to me.

MOSS: Any official communication from either Celebrezze [Anthony J. Celebrezze] or the White House on the completion of this, or to them?

HAMILL: To them, I'm quite sure we sent copies of the report a day or couple days directly to Celebrezze, the White House, I forget where else before we ever—before the press release.

MOSS: Well, it's a kind of thing that an alert, say, public information officer would be lapping up. Let's say a picture of you presenting a copy of this to the President a couple of days...

HAMILL: Yeah, but...

MOSS: Anything of that sort?

HAMILL: No. No. No. But you'll have to recall in this part that I was—had been in the hospital. I'd been out of the picture for the previous, officially for three months then, and that Guthrie [Eugene H. Guthrie] had taken part of my place, and so the official dealings, the official hard dealing for, except as I knew about, and most of them were out of my hands. I didn't know about.... I didn't pay too much attention to all the administrative relationships then.

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MOSS: Okay. Let's talk a little bit about what the consequences of the report were as far as the Public Health Service was concerned in subsequent action.

HAMILL: Okay. I'll start off by saying, very disappointing. I'm kind of summing up, kind of judge the whole thing to start with, very disappointing. They set up the National Clearing House on Tobacco and also, I think it was titled the Interagency Advisory Committee, which Terry stayed with. Those are the two official actions and this is six—what is it, six years later—yeah. Six years later...

MOSS: Almost to the day. This is the 15th of January.

HAMILL: I'd told—I guess I'd been kind of presumptuous—but I told Terry the year before that since Parran [Thomas Parran Jr.], when he was surgeon general, took on syphilis, that this was the thing almost directly analogous to it in our day and age. And I'm still convinced that that's the case, and equally convinced he completely missed the boat, probably due to lack of courage, frankly. I'll use that term.

MOSS: Courage or imagination?

HAMILL: Well, then I'll combine it—imaginative courage. That is absolutely from the quality of the work that we did in that study, absolutely appalling, the lack of consequences in that study. The way they pussy footed around even to today if the only justification for our work were these consequences, then we shouldn't have spent

more than five minutes on our study, frankly. They have done virtually no good research work, the whole area of switching the dependent variable to the independent variable, not at all, hasn't been explained by the Service at all. They got engaged in almost a semi-name calling contest with the AMA [American Medical Association], and the AMA got their ten million dollars to start their work and others claimed that they were holier than thou and yet most of the good research work that's been done since then has been through the AMA activity, not the holier-than-thou Public Health Service.

The thing...I don't know whether I'll end up editing how it is. I'll just have to think about that further as the Clearing House itself with Warren as director. As far as I say, I just don't know what I'll end up doing with that part of the tape, but I think the Service had plenty of warning that he was—both his competence and even possibly his integrity were definitely in question. I think it's been probably kind of well-born out on—all you have to do is look at the record of what they've accomplished. The interagency thing with Terry.... There's the thing that Emerson Foote, who is the big huge advertising man—I forget which company. It was one of the companies, one of the real big advertising companies, and he was president of it. And they had carried for quite a number of years one or two of the big tobacco accounts. He quit the advertising game altogether by saying it was dirty money and he wasn't going to be a part of persuading people to keep smoking. And he joined the interagency council. Terry was rather enamored of this whole thing, but for the life of me, I don't know what the hell they've ever achieved. The labeling on cigarette

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packages was almost exactly.... What ended up was almost exactly what the tobacco companies wanted. They could have written the script three years before. Or let me put it this way: I could have written the script for the tobacco companies three years before in almost the exact words because what it does in effect—I think this is working out in the potential law suits—it almost removes any blame from them. They've got their.... labeled. The danger is on the package, so it's kind of "Consumer, you've been warned." It's certainly, I don't think influences to much of a degree the.... Most people are going to continue smoking, don't pay attention to the label.

I think, finally, the most effective people, far more effective than the Public Health Service, has been the American Cancer Society and some of their spots on television and some of these posters they're putting out today—I've seen three of them they're extraordinarily clever because they get right at the heart of the image business. And that is a picture of two of the seediest bums you've ever seen in your life, you know, smoking. And one of them says, "Smoking is sophisticated." And the other one says, "Smoking is," let's see, "smart." The third one is a woman bum. I mean just one of the seediest old broads you ever saw and says, "Smoking is glamorous." And these are really clever. You know, they have cigarettes in their mouth and these are very—these are effective. There have been some further studies that have possibly clarified some stuff on our sociologic level, but I don't think much on a motivation level. But when I say sociologic in the sense of documenting and measuring a little better the relationship between do parents smoke and do the kids smoke, and if one parent smokes do they smoke. If a parent of the same sex or cross sex smoke....

They proliferated this kind of stuff, but I don't know that it's really added to effective insight. I don't know that—getting back to the switching over to the independent variable—that this tool has been used to gain much more psychological insight.

The area of....They possibly—they've done some more work, but not the Public Health Service. Most of this was being done by Dr. Bing [Richard J. Bing] at Wayne University. He was one of the AMA guys, very sophisticated, some more work on possible links on smoking and heart disease, blood clotting, and a whole lot of other things, but the area that was a beautiful study that had to be done on a big level—I mean it's far bigger than an individual thus here can do—either it's because of money, but also because it requires cooperation as the.... is a big cooperative study on.... to try to unravel emphysema in studying smokers and nonsmokers, doing pulmonary function tests on them, try to make a diagnosis when they're alive and then following as many as possible to autopsy doing special studies of the lung to get some very important further answers, and this area had just been dropped. And it was so promising.

I think if I had stayed in that field by 1965 or '66, I think I'd have had most of the best answers we could get in the relationship of smoking to emphysema. But I don't know if it'd be out because, see, one really well designed and properly executed big study is infinitely more valuable than ten or fifteen kind of half-baked studies. I mean two half-baked studies doesn't make a whole baked study, you know. And frequently doing things in kind of a desultory manner was worse than nothing at all in a lot of ways, I think. See, one of the things from the things that was totally lost was a momentum that was gathered, not just the information that was gathered, but there were a lot of us. There was a lot of real cross-fertilization that took place. And we got

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a lot of really good men throughout the country mobilized and interested in a lot of these issues, and this kind of a study I was talking about requires.... I mean I'm an epidemiologist and this requires work of knowledgeable, interested, probably it would require four or five different centers throughout the country, clinicians, the same number of really good pulmonary physiologists, and at the same institutions really good and really knowledgeable and guys who are willing to do some extra hard work, some pathologists.

And we had enough of them then, enough of all of these people to do this. And the interest was high. Imaginations were fired up and the questions were still kind of alive in the air. They were right there, plus specifically, I mean, I kind of dreamed this thing up and I actually went so far to sort a lot of them out and they were.... It's not just my guess that they were interested and eager to do something like that, but you know, specifically. And the fortunes of future events, I left this area altogether, the Service too, Public Health Service picked it up. Hundley is executive director of the American Heart Association now. He has been for a year or two. I don't know what they've done. I don't think they've done anything at all. They're one of the original voluntary [inaudible]. And I don't think they've done anything.

Eugene Guthrie, who took my place to finish the study, was director of the huge, huge division and later National Center for Chronic Diseases which heart disease control and cancer control and respiratory disease control, all three were part of his—were programs

within his area. And he never did a damn thing. I wrote him a memo and I called him in 19—late '64, early '65, shortly after.... about a year after the smoking study when I saw nobody was doing anything, and stated I could definitely be persuaded in getting involved in this big emphysema study. He had initiated nothing. They were doing virtually nothing. He said the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, who didn't even participate with us one single bit because they weren't interested at the time, and Dr. Vernon Knight who was the clinical director, couldn't be persuaded to—and we spent quite some time trying to persuade him because they had a particular confidence in the relationship of smoking to preexisting infection, or smoking as a condition to subsequent infection. I mean that whole.... And that's both bacterial and viral, which is one of the areas we pinpointed early we wanted to explore, and we never did this one very well. And Knight was in a very unique position to do something about this, and he just.... In fact, he had been a friend of Dr. LeMaistre [Charles A. LeMaistre] whose subcommittee this area was. We tried to persuade him, pressure him, everything. He just said no. Well, they're the ones who ended up showing more interest than anybody in about 1966. But they showed none at the time. Somebody diverted them. I don't know who it was gave them about three quarters of a million dollars in grants. That was about their interest. I don't know if they've ever done anything with it. I don't think they have.

I tried several times to suggest that—I also went out to the National Heart Institute—and suggesting that if anybody really wants to do some work, I'd be willing to change my existing plans and think about getting back involved. Nobody was particularly interested. Even when they had a flesh and blood and a competent person like me available, didn't nobody particularly want to pick it up. Those consequences have been pretty damn disappointing, and it really boils down the only, basically, the only satisfaction is more of the scientific satisfaction of having done a good job, not a great job, but a really good job.

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And I ended up, for my own self, I ended up solving my own problems and that persuaded me enough to really crank me up and motivate me and I quit smoking cigarettes in March, February of '65, a year, a year after the report. I haven't touched a cigarette since. I was a two to three pack a day smoker. I was not just a light smoker. I was a heavy smoker. And I haven't touched a cigarette since. And subsequently Bill Cochran did quit even though he wasn't going to start with, and even though he decided he was older and his kids were already through college and not dependent upon him, he ended up quitting. Len Schuman made a big deal of quitting, and to tell the truth, I don't know whether he stayed quit or not. He at least, in '65 or '66 he had still hadn't smoked. And I haven't checked with him since on that. There was one way of looking at it, personally, three of us benefited personally, but that's kind of the hard way of doing it.

And I still, just for the record, it's the toughest thing, most difficult thing I've ever done in my life was quitting cigarette smoking. It wasn't the quitting. It wasn't the early part. That wasn't the tough part. It was staying quit. The quitting was just kind of tough and unpleasant, but, you know, you can always live through that. You can live through pain. But staying quit is a kind of being bugged. To do something like exercise, that's doing something. You can discipline yourself and over the long haul and keep doing it. But to purposely not do

something is a totally different kind of a thing, to not do something. There's nothing to get your teeth into. It's, "What are you doing?" "I'm not smoking," you know. Well, that's not an action. And one way of looking at it as not an action, but.... I used to almost laughingly say it, but it was almost real. For almost a year or a year and a half my primary occupation, most important thing in my life was actually actively not smoking. But how do you perform not smoking? That's kind of a difficult thing to describe, isn't it? You know, how do you describe your behavior as not smoking? Maybe I'm not getting this....

And to find adequate substitutes—there just about aren't any because it's different than almost anything else. Then a thing that's a little frightening is one of the books I read early in the smoking game—and if we'd had time, I would definitely have wanted to get that kind of a—and this is still not exactly sorted out. This psychiatrist up in New York who wrote a book on—he called it Auto Arraputative Principle, real elaborate system of defenses in the body and the point being that the body, if it has a kind of a stress, it'll offer up as hostage part of itself. It can't really separate an arm very well like some of the arthropods can, I mean, a crayfish or something that can actually rip part of its arm out and get free and grow another. We don't do that very gracefully and very well, but this principle being that it might offer up its gastrointestinal tract, ulcerative colitis or peptic ulcer. It might offer up its tracheal-bronchial tree in chronic bronchitis, emphysema, possibly even lung cancer. That's just kind of wild, far-out thing, possible relationship. And having, kind of a hierarchy of things that it preserves that will last its stand [inaudible] and the very last thing it preserves is the central nervous system. And as it gets progressively threatened by the outside world, looking at it that way, it'll keep giving up a little more and a little more.

Now, suggesting, and he—I read his book and I had some contact with him. I talked to him, had a little bit of correspondence and talked to him on the phone. He would have been glad to have come down and testified and confounded all of us and let us try to settle that one. And his point was—and there'd been a lot of people of more or less set on the same kind of warning: Okay, smoking's bad for you. You give

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that up and you may, not just jokingly, you may be causing.... You make a thing go underground, you may be causing two or three other things much worse.

MOSS: This is from the point of view of giving up smoking. It doesn't pertain to the person who's never smoked before.

HAMILL: Oh, no, no, no. Wait. That's totally another story. I really believe even in the.... The odds are from overall causes of death, by quitting smoking when I did, I probably added about five or six years on to my life. That's about, in actuarial data, that's—we don't have enough data yet—but that's about the best bet. If it weren't for a thing called pride and I had to do it over again, I don't think I'd ever quit smoking. Really. I don't think that five or six years—it was just a question of gaining five or six years at the end, I don't think it was worth it. Hmm, that's quite a statement to make.

MOSS: And it's presumably at the least useful end of your life, too.

HAMILL: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, quite. Example: For over two years I didn't even attempt to write anything. I couldn't. I couldn't even sit down that long to write.

MOSS: So you lost two years.

HAMILL: In writing, I lost.... Yeah.

MOSS: In effect.

HAMILL: I lost more than that because even when I started to write, I still couldn't write effectively for another couple of years. I'm just getting now where I can really concentrate on writing. And part of it is a peculiar mechanism, I'm quite sure all of us have anxieties of various kinds, and some of them are what we call free-floating. The smoker, the heavy smoker, the good smoker, or the bad smoker, whichever way you want to put it, would handle, would both collect some of these anxieties and then handle them through the ritual of smoking. And I say specifically about writing. My ritual had always been—even when I was going to write a personal letter, even a short one—I'd usually have, I don't know why, one or two cigarettes even before I'd actually put the pen to the paper, just when I was kind of gathering my thoughts and kind of energizing, energizing yourself to discharge this energy onto paper. And then during the process almost smoked continuously, I mean, it was a long process and I smoked a lot, you know. And without that cigarette, literally, I couldn't collect the thoughts, and if I could, I couldn't have sat still long enough to have kind of like discharging an electric current through the pen onto paper.

MOSS: You know, it's funny, just thinking about this and comparing my own experience with a pipe. Invariably when I get interested in what I'm doing, whether it's writing or, say, painting, the pipe will go out and I'll never notice it.

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HAMILL: Once you get involved.

MOSS: Once I get involved. And I've discovered that the thing's been long out in the cold, minutes or an hour or so, after it's actually gone out on me. I'll have forgotten about the thing altogether.

HAMILL: Cigarettes are a funny thing, though. The cigarette is so mobile that it becomes almost a part of you. I mean you can take it almost anywhere.

MOSS: It requires no effort at all to keep lit.

HAMILL: Right. In fact you don't need to use your hands if you don't want to. I used to.... I played golf; I had a cigarette almost all the time and in a strange way—well, I mean another real specific way. I mean it affected me in hundreds of ways, but then another very specific way besides the writing was getting up in the morning, literally. I used to really enjoy smoking. I mean it didn't do any bad for me at all except the unseen things. It didn't make me feel bad. It tasted good. It was a pleasurable activity. And I used to, when I'd wake up in the morning, I was generally eager to get out of bed to get kind of through the toilet and eat quickly because I was always looking forward, not to the eating, because I didn't particularly like the taste of breakfast, but to get through the food to get at the cigarettes. I'd usually eat breakfast and then have two to three cigarettes immediately, one right after another, and usually when there was time with a cup of coffee, but I quit: coffee altogether. But more important was I didn't even want to get out of bed.

MOSS: After you quit.

HAMILL: I mean, really, for a couple to three years, I had a lot of difficulty. I didn't want any breakfast. It sounds kind of infantile and I guess it is infantile. I mean because these things feed into kind of infantile areas. But literally, and while I'm looking at it, it wasn't worth it to get out of bed. There was nothing to get out of bed for, you might say, which, of course, is preposterous, but it wasn't until I just, oh, a year that I started being able to get out of bed with the same kind of bounce and energy and get started moving and even though this carrot at the end of the rod wasn't there or the cigarette right at the end of breakfast wasn't there to lure me on. [inaudible] I almost never smoke a cigar during the day. I almost never smoke a cigar before dinner, and then my usual thing is one cigar sometime in the evening after dinner. That's my usual. Tonight, after long talking, I revert to using the cigar almost like a cigarette, and will almost chain-smoke cigars. I'm inhaling them, too. Chances are very good tomorrow night I won't even smoke a cigar or maybe even for the next couple nights I won't have any cigar at all because I know tomorrow morning my sinuses, nose and throat are going to be all clogged up with smoking because I'm not a regular smoker anymore and this is an unusual insult to the linings.

So different people use highly personal ways of quitting, but there are some of us—and I know I'm one of them—that know tricks. You finally reach a point—I mean I tried coming in the back door and kind of conning myself, tricking myself so many times into quitting. But it's just finally, when you finally have to

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reach a point that in a simple old-fashioned way, you'll be damned if you're going to continue smoking, or you're determined to quit smoking and it's just as simple as the old-fashioned thing called will power, whatever it means. And then it's a fight. There's no other way to describe it. And I think I've gotten maybe some satisfaction from achieving something this difficult, but I'm not sure.

But on the contrary, and in a way I had no choice because of the circumstances of my special knowledge and experiences, and I almost, with all the special knowledge and experiences.... It wasn't that I wanted to quit, but I just couldn't go on smoking in relationship to my kids. It wasn't so much the fact that whether they smoke or not because I don't believe it's directly linked as simply as that, but it's much more simple thing than to death, my premature death would be tough enough leaving four orphans, or I mean fatherless kids, and knowing it was kind of—as you were dying knowing it was somehow just because you couldn't do something as simple as quitting smoking cigarettes would make that almost intolerable. There's one, in some ways, if it's used properly, if you smoke it's actually a good technique for persuading your kids not to smoke and that is, if you could convince them that you're almost.... once you've started smoking, you're almost.... that you wish you could quit and how almost impossible it is once you've started smoking and that obviously that's an admission of defeat. But that in itself could be a strong deterrent again for the intelligent kid, you know, to smoking, not to ever get hooked.

MOSS: Let's talk for a few minutes about some of the people [inaudible]. How about Celebrezze as the secretary of HEW?

HAMILL: Didn't I...I told you that one story that you probably...

MOSS: You told it off tape.

HAMILL: Oh, was that off tape?

MOSS: Yeah.

HAMILL: I was just going to say because if it wasn't, I would edit it out. Okay. We'll just forget about that. He was kind of a funny.... He was a little, short little guy anyway. And we always had the feeling that he was uneducated, felt very uneasy around professionals, highly trained professionals. This may have been our imagination, but I don't think so. I think he didn't know how to cope with professionals, especially as, you might say, supposedly being some kind of a head over them. And I really don't think he's got enough sophistication to even deal with highly technical matters anyway, or to cope with—that was just my guess—to cope with people who were really intellectually sophisticated, highly sophisticated. I think he was basically a well-motivated guy. He really bungled the one thing, the press club around the first of the year, 1963, and unless I can find the paper somewhere, but he actually—it was a statement something about he didn't think the federal government should be in the business of telling people whether to smoke or not. My god, this was still right in the middle of the study. And to try to extricate him and us from that statement required some pretty fancy footwork, and I still don't think it was

at all a satisfactory job. It was one of those things you literally couldn't extricate, almost like Terry's statement if anybody really wanted to probe and be nasty, that his going from cigarettes to pipe wasn't really related to the study. All he'd have to do is just keep probing, "Well, what was it really related to then?" and try to get a satisfactory answer out of that.

MOSS: Okay. I've got the reference down, *New York Times* of December 3rd, 1962.

HAMILL: December 3rd? It was that long? Apparently.

MOSS: "Secretary Celebrezze says government has duty to determine if smoking is health hazard, but not to tell people to stop smoking." Now this is an interview. "A cease ban on smoking not feasible." This is just a brief characterization of the story, the index of the *New York Times*. It's not the full news article.

HAMILL: Yeah. Right. And a couple of clippings really ran away with this thing. I think we issued a press release a month or month and a half later somehow trying to straighten that out. I know we had to.... I was involved in—it was either that or just a formal memo to the White House. And then also, as I think I mentioned earlier, I had to rather placate and explain to not only the advisory committee. When they heard about this, several of the guys in it were not very pleased because it made them look kind of foolish. And we did have to assure them, then, and I think we were successful and also honest in the sense that in some ways, whether Celebrezze liked it or not, he wasn't going to interfere with the study and he couldn't, even if he wanted to. So I think we convinced him of that, that the committee itself....

MOSS: What role did Boisfeuillet Jones have?

HAMILL: He was kind of a go-between, which was his chief role, I guess, anyway, between the surgeon general and the secretary, very skillful guy, very skillful. And about the only.... One of the positive things he did for the study was he knew a lot of people in the health field, was [inaudible] very good advice, and important advice on the selection of one of the potential committee members, and it turned out to be a really good choice, and I think his advice was fairly important, but that was just my decision whether to accept his advice or not. And I had the luck or the wits to follow his advice in this particular case, and it turned out to be very good advice. And it wasn't just the fact he said the guy was a good guy, but also some of the things he told me about him—it was an accurate observation and it bore out quite accurately and how he helped in making a good choice, but also it stood me instead a couple of times in how to get along with him, too, which was one of my real chief jobs to get along as much as possible with all the committee members so I could serve their goals better that way, both direct demand serve them, and that was kind of a peculiar role.

I'm also quite sure he was, I always felt he was a very savvy guy, very savvy, and that if, let's say, somebody in the White House panicked or the secretary

panicked, that Jones could have been and would have been very instrumental in kind of warding off or helping us handle this in such a way that it wouldn't wreck our activity. I always felt a lot better getting to know him and also knowing he was there, definitely. Other than that, as far as specific, let's see, I think there was one other.... Probably, I would guess this, honestly, that probably his chief function was to keep the secretary away from us so that he didn't mess anything up and keep him off our back. I think that's probably a fair statement, too.

MOSS: Did under secretary Nestingen [Ivan A. Nestingen] have anything....

HAMILL: Yeah. I'm going to have to.... Somewhere I was looking through one of these notes and I also remember.... I never met Nestingen personally, but I think I'd talked to him on the phone once or twice. I recall him as being—having the reputation of being a very bright, capable guy, but I know—I saw in one of these documents and that recalls to my mind—he really pulled some kind of a real boner. And I think it was a slip up with the press. I'm not quite sure whether it was with the press or with the White House. It was something important anyway.

MOSS: Okay. Well, perhaps we can check on that and you can put a footnote right there.

HAMILL: One of the three could have been the press. It was in the category of real important and since it was the press, the White House, or a congressional, one of those—it was in that kind of a ballpark. And if I recall it was also something that was kind of irretrievable, too. I mean Celebrezze's foot in his mouth. We hadn't really recovered completely, but handled it pretty well, but as I recall the Nestingen thing was a total loss whatever it was.

MOSS: Okay. What...

HAMILL: Which seemed to be quite out of character with Nestingen.

MOSS: Here you were involved in this pretty much over the span of the Kennedy administration and here you are sitting in a usual point on an advisory committee. Now what was your recollection of the Kennedy administration as such from that perspective, talking about the President himself or the administration in general, whichever you choose?

HAMILL: Okay. Well, I'll qualify this by saying I'm a real, I'm a fourth generation Republican. Washington was an exciting place then, all of Washington, and our activity was no exception. And when I say exciting, I mean in a good way, in this sense that everybody or, well, I think I'd better not use the term everybody, we had a

sense and I think it was not just what we were doing.

MOSS: Let me put on a new tape. Just a moment.

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[BEGIN SIDE I TAPE II]

MOSS: Okay. You were talking about Washington being an exciting place.

HAMILL: You always had the feeling that what you did made a difference. And by that I mean it was almost like the bureaucracy at least for a while, no longer a real bureaucracy, and that things were really going to happen. It's kind of difficult to define whether it was a thing of hope or what, but it was a sense that a thing wasn't going to be just kind of lost in the wash of the big bureaucracy. The big nameless marshmallow just kind of either got totally lost or at least got so vitiated that you have a result, whether it was a good job or a bad job really didn't make much difference, the consequences being about the same if the thing could become so attenuated, which usually occurs in the big machinery of bureaucracy. By that I mean really brilliant ideas—I've seen this happen so many times just kind of get lost in the morass. Now, for me, whether it was my time of life, the specific activities, you know, hard to disentangle.

But I remember some of the older people in the Service—it made no difference whether Republicans or Democrats—saying that things were much more exciting and fun when Roosevelt [Franklin D. Roosevelt] was President, that there was a different feel to the air. Everybody had more of a spring to their step. I'm talking about government people. And I'll be damned if it didn't seem like this was occurring then, too. And possibly one of the things is.... As I say, I was a Republican. I didn't vote for him. I wouldn't vote for him today, but the guy was intelligent, and that really makes a difference. He not only was intelligent, but he surrounded himself with intelligence, which just that in itself gives hope in this sense that you presume—I mean one presumes—that he's pretty good. Well, obviously if what he does is good, if it's either beautiful or brilliant or wise, you know, that kind of good, and articulate, that if there's intelligence, that the intelligence will perceive it as such, that it makes a difference to intelligence, whether a thing is good or bad or not. In other words, I guess, another thing you're not casting your pearl before swine. And I'd had some personal experience. I'd come across some of my old writing just almost crying my heart out up on the Yukon River, and frankly, some of it was some pretty damn good, some pretty brilliant plans, and all there were, were bears and Eskimos amid twenty thousand miles between me and civilization to listen, nobody to comprehend that if I just uttered a grunt or was as brilliant as Hamlet, it didn't make any difference, it just didn't make any difference up on the Yukon River, but here it did.

And except for two times that I was really bugged severely either from the White House or somewhere by the politicians. And one was at the beginning when we were delayed on announcing the committee and being delayed in getting under way, which I knew better than anybody else how big a job we had. I also knew—I was hoping I could change the

impatience of the powers that be to get an answer. Those are two difficult things to reconcile. So I was anxious to get started. And I would say we were delayed a full month, a full month by, as far as I could see, just complete nonsensical hold-out before we could announce the committee and proceed with the.... From the time I'd gotten Terry to approve the selection of the committee, and the committee members all accepted, to the time that.... I think the speed knocked Terry off stride, too, either that or he wasn't quite straight. I think I've kind of gone

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through this before because it was indicated to me that it was only going to be a matter of a day or a couple of days and it went on for, I'm sure it was over a month.

And then the other, of course, was the monstrous change in the following May which still in the last couple of months, I've been, had a chance to recollect thoughts. I still don't know what all the sources were. I think further speculation would just be as to why Terry changed, I mean, who got to him; why he allowed it to get to him and so forth; why he reneged. And I really want to emphasize that term, why he reneged. I just don't know for sure. I know it was the politicians. I don't know whether it was Kennedy himself. I would suspect, knowing Kennedy was a pretty good politician, that he might well have had something to do with it. Yeah. And also, in retrospect now six, seven years later, whatever it is, I also appreciate, I'm quite sure that even—I mean everybody called Bobby [Robert F. Kennedy] ruthless, and I think that was probably correct. But I think if it came down to brass tacks, Jack wouldn't—President Kennedy would not have been somebody you would have crossed very easily in retrospect. I don't think that he gave that impression at the time, but I think my estimate of him now six years later it wouldn't have been that easy for Terry.

In other words, if he got an order and say if it was from the President, I think the President would have been rather impatient and not very gentle and wisely and kind if Terry said, you know, either tried to talk him out of it or said no, he's made various kinds of promises. I mean, knowing things a little better, I don't think that would have gone over very well, but I still won't excuse Terry for the whole thing. I still get it back either he was kind of unforgivably naive in the promises he made. Two, he was a dissembler throughout, which he may have been. I don't know, and just deceiving to gain an end, that is the committee to accept the job and then get them hooked. That's a possible alternative. Or three, which I think is kind of a combination and probably the most likely, is that he probably really almost meant it at the time, and then he wasn't willing to make the necessary sacrifice required to make good his word. And the sacrifice, probably, in knowing the Kennedys, would probably—probably been fired, you know. In a lot of cases you don't like to judge another man on a big decision like that, but in this I have had six and a half years to think it over. I will judge him, I think. I think he had the obligation. I think the way he said it, you have the notes, he said, "Gentlemen, this is the most important thing," not only in his term but the Public Health Service has ever done. Those are not light words.

MOSS: I think parenthetically just to get it on to the record, you might say where the minutes are deposited.

HAMILL: Yeah. Yeah. These are part of the National Clearing House for.... I guess it's officially entitled Smoking and Health, which.... With all of our reorganizations, well, Dr. Horn [Daniel Horn] is the chief and with all reorganization, I'm not quite sure where it sits in the Service now.

MOSS: At any rate it's in the custody of the Public Health Service.

HAMILL: Yeah. It's still in the custody of the Public Health Service. And it's officially in the files, and that's not only all the minutes but all the supporting documents. I don't know what they subsequently did. Some

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of our types of critiques were supposed to be confidential for all time because some of our reviewers.... I mean I promised that to them, and it would be embarrassing if some of the things they said, which was important to us that they were candid, not be made public at all. But this is almost always on a technical.... This is in relationship to technical colleagues, I mean technical matters in which some of them were colleagues. On administrative stuff, there's almost nothing that is that confidential. I think all that is available and should be available. It's only the personal stuff and personal stuff is only important in relationship to professional people. So it would have been kind of interesting, really, and now, this would have been interesting.

I mean I'm making another jump now, Kennedy's *Profiles in Courage*. He had the surgeon general then, and I mean without qualification, completely courageous, and stood up and said, and it really got across, "Look, Mr. President," and actually maybe even showed him the minutes. You know, "I've made this kind of promise and I'm not going to break it. I'm not going to. And you are going to have to remove me." This could have made Kennedy impatient, but I'd suspect—and this is obviously just pure speculation—this could definitely have ended up impressing him enough to, well, two things. Well, it's another level. For the President as an individual, plus how the hell will he explain it to the newspapers. That could have been far more explosive than anything else, which.... And a lot of things I knew gave me immunity from a lot of things. I was aware of that. And that was a comfort in the sense that all I had to do was holler and that gave me immunity from lots and lots of things. The subsequent kind of a fight between me on the one hand and Terry on the other was purely family. There was no possibility of that, I mean, I'm not that.... I mean family fights you don't bring out. That's got nothing to do with the public even though they renege and stuff like that. That was, that's family. But if...

MOSS: Why is it family if it jeopardizes the integrity of the study?

HAMILL: I guess that's what we mean by esprit de corps or really, there's some kinds of things, really, there are some kinds of things that, various kinds of loyalties and obligations, I guess, that as far as I was concerned took precedence over almost anything, well, over many, many, many things. Plus, I guess, I wasn't or I didn't,

maybe I didn't accept the fact that there being, but I think now both Terry and Hundley as dishonorable as they may have been, I don't think I formulated or really accepted that. It was more a personal thing then. And I reacted so violently personally that I was.... I can be pretty violent. And I was almost afraid—and this is a little bit of a handicap—that I might have been being too personal and this hampered some of my actions. I know this about myself. Viewing, as I say, back six years now, I would say he was dishonorable. And if I could have viewed that....I mean if they tried to mess with me the way I am now, tried to do the same thing.... Well, in the first place they wouldn't have, I'm quite sure. I think they were smart enough to know what they could get away with and what they couldn't do. I think I was kind of a good setup for the lamb in this whole thing, their holy promise. If you recall, some things had to give. And on all sides some things had to give. We found ourselves, all of us, honestly, in.... All you have to do is look at, really, the study lists in February and then I've got another document in about April, two months later, that is about three times as detailed and complicated as this, and see the magnitude of...

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MOSS: Of the committee assignments.

HAMILL: Yeah. And get a sense of magnitude of how much had to be done and the committee and everybody was just starting to realize the enormity of this thing. And the existing resources and probable times, not only the external thing like Hundley and Terry put it, but also one of the questions I raised on that very first days was, when I say some critical decisions are necessary here, how much time and effort can be devoted to this activity: a) by the committee members, b) by PHS staff, c) other PHS, and d) outside resources? To have carried the detail...

MOSS: Keep going, Pete. I'll be right back.

HAMILL: I'll look back objectively to carry the detail out, forgetting about my really great study, but to even carry out the detail really properly because we had it, as it was prone [inaudible], we'll say, in May, we couldn't possibly, with our existing resources and the way we were structured, couldn't possibly have finished the job before, I'll make an estimate of before December of '64, another year, and when we did finish, two things happened, two very critical things, well, three things: I kind of literally, figuratively, everything else got crutched physically and, I mean, my—ruptured the discs and just everything went to hell. So I had to pull out. Item two, the job was not carried out that well. There were many shortcuts taken, a lot of really gutty questions were never adequately answered, ever. They just avoided it or shortcut. And then c) from the PHS staff side with me out it was totally changed for two important—in two important ways, or maybe three: One, Guthrie replaced me was one way at once he was a much more skillful, efficient administrator, much more experienced. Two, he was not at all personally involved in the study. He wasn't even intellectually equipped to really get engaged in the study either by training background or even ability. So he always was kind of very much on the surface or on

the outside, whichever kind of imagery you want to use, which for administrative purposes makes it much more efficient, much more efficient, and as a couple of the committee guys said, he was "damn good at cracking the whip," damn good.

He didn't care. All he wanted to do was get a job done just like I was describing to you a couple of hours ago about [inaudible] involvement when you've got a job to do. And by hook or by crook he was going to get the job done. He had made no prior promises to anybody. That was important. He had no promises to keep. I did, but I was medically incapacitated. Terry and Hundley did, but I don't know what they did, but I don't know whether they swallowed.... I actually don't know how they handled those things, but that's their problem. He didn't, you know, obviously he had no prior promises. All he had to do was just finish a job by December. Whether it was fair or unfair, whether it was ignoring promises, and whether any committee members liked it or not, they didn't like it they could quit. They could grumble, they could complain, they could bitch, they could do anything they wanted to, but, you know, we've got to get a job done. And then the other dimension was, he was, as I was warned of this before, he was director of a huge staff and he was accustomed to bringing in huge resources, which he did, immediately to bear. I just don't know how many people directly full time and then indirectly many more, and people that he knew, people that

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he'd worked with for two or three or four years, plus he was already in control of them and he in other words—they were neither.... They were already his people, not only that he knew them, but also he was already accustomed and they were accustomed to work under his direction without questioning him or anything like that. And he brought great numbers of his resources to bear.

And I guess by this time Terry and Hundley had decided that they had to spend a little bit to get a job done. This was still in the Kennedy thing. So the effect of the White House directly.... I still have the faith with the intelligence there; that had the surgeon general been a different kind of a man, he would not have been steamrollered and that he could have, would have, and should have kept his promise. The more I think about it, the more convinced I am that once Kennedy was aware—even if it was somebody else trying to apply the pressure—he could have appealed to Kennedy on this thing. I mean, of course, in something like this Celebrezze would have been absolutely worthless. I guess I'm more convinced that he would have been successful.

MOSS: Can you think of anything else that you want to cover at this point?

HAMILL: Yeah. And just following up one little thing, and that is possibly some of the reasons or one kind of reason why maybe nothing ever happened in phase two and that's the incredible effect that Lyndon Johnson had on the Public Health Service. If you recall...

MOSS: Yeah. Can you spell that out a bit?

HAMILL: You know, Kennedy was, let's see, he was assassinated the month before, about a month ahead before the report came out. Right?

MOSS: Yeah. November 22nd, 1963.

HAMILL: Yeah. About a month and a half. I guess, now that I'm thinking about it, this.... Almost as soon as Johnson came in, the Service was never the same. Within some months even almost unashamedly he started announcing they weren't going to get and the Public Health Service was going to be more responsive to the political will. In other words, several other words would be—integrity was no longer, integrity and professional skill was no longer the prime criteria, but political mileage out of health events and health decisions were perhaps more important. I don't think Terry was a very good surgeon general. He wasn't bad, but if anybody thought he was bad, all they had to do was wait for his successor William Stewart if they wanted to see somebody really bad, really bad. And the combination of, well, I don't know. Boisfeuillet Jones had already gone by this time, whether that made much difference, I just don't know. He went down to Emory, I think it was, somewhere in Atlanta.

MOSS: Right.

HAMILL: But all the combinations of Johnson and Stewart and the ascendancy of Wilbur Cohen, who was an avowed, bitter, lifelong enemy of the Commission Corps of the Public Health Service, and even almost

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avowed enemy of most doctors in general. And then I can back this statement up. And I guess, now that's kind of funny, now, why I'm looking back, why I was fifteen minutes ago just singing the praises of Kennedy as much as I was, but rightly so because it was in contrast to what occurred the next three or four years. And as almost all the good things I said about Kennedy and still mean them, for the Kennedy time, it was just the opposite of what occurred, and I said the importance of intelligence and almost a belief that somehow, that action makes a difference, that intelligence can perceive this difference. And using the terms casting your pearl before swine, I'll continue with that. There's no point in enlarging on that imagery.

But I'll be damned if—and before I think about it now—that makes what I said almost kind of without thinking about the Kennedy time and bringing it out in this.... The step was somehow quicker, was the horrible contrast with the next three or four years to the step almost being dragged to the point of a death march, and that—I mean carried to an extreme of—it wasn't even a question of medium integrity anymore. But you somehow knew that the quality of brilliance of an idea was somehow rather independent of what would happen. And by that I mean independent in its outcome because of the incredible overlay of the importance of political consequences to whatever was done, so that the cheapest thing, if it was

politically expedient, now it was worth millions. It was worth the congressional medal of honor or anything like that, whatever kind of accolade you want to point to something, as long as it was measured in terms of its political mileage. These are pretty tough words, I guess, but I really mean them.

MOSS: Do you have an example you could use?

HAMILL: Well, the first shot that came to me was, I think, it was late '64 or early '65. When was Medicare pushed in?

MOSS: I believe it was '65, but I'm not too sure.

HAMILL: Well, this was just before Medicare. There was a pamphlet, a glossy pamphlet put out by the Public Health Service. And it's the first official document in my entire experience and looking over all the old ones of the Public Health Service putting out, these were blatantly fraudulent statements. And when I say fraudulent, I mean just like when we grew up, we considered propaganda, the word propaganda you automatically associated with Goebbels and the Hitler machine. And of course later on the distortions of Lysenkoism and various kinds of distortions of the rewriting of history of Soviet Russia. And this smacked of almost the same. This wasn't sloppy. These were purposeful distortions, and they occurred in several ways. I think the thing was entitled *Accomplishments of the Service*. It was either just under the Democrats or under Lyndon Johnson. By Democrats I mean since 1960. But one just had Lyndon Johnson, which would have been almost, say, two years by that. And the distortions were quite a few different kinds. I mean of all kinds. Some were what was accomplished, listed as accomplished. A couple were just plain lies. They hadn't been done. A couple had been accomplished some years before, I mean quite a number of years before. And quite a few, the most common and subtlest thing was a thing that had been initiated, well under way, and simply it just kind of

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came to pass at that period of time. But the whole suggestion in the writing of it was, this was almost from beginning, middle to end an accomplishment.

Hundley was one of the.... My eyeballs almost fell out, and that was just kind of a beginning. I was also sent out quite a bit about statistics. And I was able to sit by and watch a lot of the actions in the battle for Medicare. And there were both almost a never-ending parade of fraudulent data, which was known to be fraudulent data, presented to Congress. At the same time, there were illegal activities going on, I mean, frankly illegal activities that could be.... I don't know why anybody's never done anything about it, I mean, documented for departmental people, high ranking departmental people stumping all over the country for the passage of a specific political program, but the most vicious thing they did was the Kerr [Robert S. Kerr]—Mills [Wilbur D. Mills] Plan that was in for a couple of years before was purposely torpedoed. This was the kind of states type of health care was purposely torpedoed

all over the country by Wilbur Cohen directly, and by his orders, directly so that the situation would be as bad as possible, and the likelihood of passing Medicare have a greater likelihood.

Well, in this day I still can't quite figure out why nothing has been done, retrospectively, about that. And that at the same time was the disorganization, dissolution, and disillusion of the entire Public Health Service, which is still going on. And a couple of the more recent manifestation besides the just almost total exodus of all the good senior men retiring and retiring far sooner than they would have, kind of two other things: One was the really cheap action and this has been still going on, this is independent of Johnson, just last fall the Acting Surgeon General Dr. Cross [Edward B. Cross] who's a Negro and of people that knew him and have worked with him and several of whom were really great champions of the Negro cause still in reference here, that....I mean one way of putting it, if the man were white, he wouldn't have had a chance one in a million of being acting surgeon general. It was almost as if it were done to somehow further humiliate the Public Health Service. And the other was.... We had a thing that testifying before Congress on the—representing the commission corps of the Public Health Service. There was Dr. English [Joseph T. English] and Dr. Van Hoek [Robert Van Hoek] kind of representing the whole stand of the Public Health Service and the Commission Corps. Well, Dr. English has been a commission officer, I guess, for four or five years. He's got a....He was from the Office of Economic-OEO [Office of Economic Opportunity]—maybe not even that long. He's a hot rod from the Office of Economic Opportunity. And Dr. Van Hoek, who's a pretty good guy, is a refugee from the Navy, a Navy medical officer. I think he's been in the Public Health Service for, at the most, six or seven years. And these were the two men representing the entire cause of the Commission Corps of the Public Health Service before Congress. I mean you talk about a travesty....

I got a memo about three months ago from English's office. It was a long fifteen or twenty-page lamentation as to—searching as to causes as to why they couldn't recruit and retain competent medical officers. Well, it wouldn't have taken a great deal of imaginative genius five years ago when this whole thing was first started in initiation to have written the whole script. And then besides, to end his lamentation was kind of a semi-study as to causes and done by a couple of civil service laymen as to analyzing why they couldn't get them and then asking for suggestions.

Well, when they're analyzing—they were talking about pay and stuff like that in this almost twenty-page preliminary document. Nowhere in that document

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was there any suggestion of the words of excellence, of work level, performance, pride, esprit de corps, challenge, nowhere were those words even mentioned. They were talking about all externals, about pay and compare it to something else, working hours, changing personnel legislation for retirement and all these externals. So I wrote a short memo back pointing out to him that any half-wit could have written this script five years ago, and that also all these things were missing, and that contrary to what the laymen might derive from the popular press, doctors in fact were in general, by and large, motivated a little differently than clerks, and that contrary again to popular belief, that money was not the chief motivating factor and

that as long as they couldn't perceive these things, I was sorry, I couldn't help them. For god's sake, don't call me to participate in any kind of a committee to help remedy the situation. It would be very similar if you did that to ask me to a terminal cancer patient, to put some kind of ointment on him and cure him. I haven't heard anything with so little sense...

MOSS: Or give a starving man an enema and pretend to force feed him.

HAMILL: Right. [Laughter-Interruption]

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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