

**Thomas Winship Oral History Interview –JFK #1, 7/8/1964**  
Administrative Information

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**Biographical Note**

Winship, Thomas; Journalist. Washington correspondent (1945-1956), editor (1965-1985), Boston Globe. Winship discusses his coverage of John F. Kennedy [JFK] throughout his senatorial years, briefly touching upon JFK's time as president. In addition, Winship discusses JFK's interests in running for vice president, senator, and president, and JFK's thoughts regarding Senator Joseph McCarthy and McCarthyism, among other issues.

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Oral History Interview

with

THOMAS WINSHIP

July 8, 1964  
New York City

By Fred Holborn

For the John F. Kennedy Library

HOLBORN: Tom, just by way of starting, why don't you tell us a little bit about when you first came to know Kennedy, what periods you saw him most closely, and over what stretch of time.

WINSHIP: Fred, I think my first meeting with Kennedy is very fuzzy, and that was in the late forties, around 1946 or '47, when I was a young reporter on the Washington Post. I was covering local affairs at Capitol Hill, and at that time John Kennedy was one of the younger members of the House District Committee. The Post, as you know from your time in Washington, was then and still is a devoted fighter for home rule for Washington. I used to bump into Kennedy, and I must say there were very pleasant but flighting brushes with him during that period, when he expressed some interest in the home rule effort. I used to get him to give occasional statements in this campaign. He was always for home rule, and I must say he was about as disinterested in District affairs and the home rule

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struggle as a lot of us were. It was such a hopeless kind of thing at the time, and he was just one of the younger freshman House members who was doing his time on the District

Committee. He was never a very forceful member of this home-rule effort, even though he was thoroughly committed on it.

Then I don't think I saw John Kennedy until about 1954, when I -- it must have been the year 1955 -- went from the Washington Post to become Washington correspondent of the Boston Globe. As such, he was certainly one of my prime beats, covering the new Senator from Massachusetts, and I had a glorious and a most fruitful association with him from 1955 through his campaign for vice presidency the following year and continuing into 1959 during this build-up for the presidency.

HOLBORN: Well, this would have been roughly from the point when he returned to the Senate after his operation?

WINSHIP: That's right. That's right. So the only place where I have any real contribution to make is during certain phases of his Senate career, and his build up for the presidency. I did not go through the 1960 campaign as a reporter with him; I was back in Boston by then. The only other association I have had with the Kennedys is through Edward M. Kennedy. Again, it's a professional relationship of a Massachusetts senator with a newspaperman in Boston.

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HOLBORN: Had you ever known any of the Kennedy's in Boston, at Harvard, or in any other way?

WINSHIP: No, I never did. Jack Kennedy was two years ahead of me at Harvard. He, again, was a name and a well-known name, but we went different ways and I don't think I ever actually met him at Harvard. Nor did I know him growing up in Cambridge or in Boston. Neither one of us spent much time there.

HOLBORN: When you first met him, did he associate you with Boston, or were you....

WINSHIP: Oh, very much so. Very much so. I think we did hit it off well when we saw a great deal of each other in the mid-fifties because we had this mutual experience of having a lot of time in Washington and in Boston. So we had a certain amount in common with this combined experience of Boston and Washington.

HOLBORN: Well, concentrating now for the first part of this interview in the three years or so that you covered him rather intensively as a Senator was he an accessible news source? Did you go to him directly? Did you deal with members of his staff? How was it to cover him?

WINSHIP: Well, he was a wonderful person to deal with as a news source because his door was always open. The door of his staff people was always open. You

know yourself, Fred -- you were in his office most of the years that I was poking in and out of his office -- but if he was in his own private office, I never remember his door

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ever being closed unless he was doing a recording or something special. You always just walked in when he was there. He had then, as he always had had, a terribly keen sense of what's a story. I used to get all kinds of good stories from him, either in his office or walking with him over to the Senate floor. He never stood in the way of your talking to staff people, and I used to barge in on Ted Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen] and Ralph Dungan. You always sort of became a party to what they were doing, and I always had great luck in getting stories out of them; both him and his staff. It was an open book. There was so much going on then during that build-up period that you never came out of there empty-handed.

HOLBORN: Well there were really two build-up periods: one for the vice presidency; it then became a bridge to the other one. At what point did you first have a sense that he was interested in the Vice Presidency, was it many months before?

WINSHIP: No, I think it was -- I guess I was stupid. It was about five months before he ran in 1956.

HOLBORN: And was this from something which he said to you or just the atmosphere....

WINSHIP: It was the atmosphere and the fact that he was traveling around the country a great deal and, of course, the clincher was when I saw the meticulously prepared, famous memo on how a Catholic Vice President could help a Democrat win.

HOLBORN: And how did you see that memo?

WINSHIP: I saw it in Ted Sorensen's office. I knew Ted had

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prepared it and written it and....

HOLBORN: Did he ask you to come in?

WINSHIP: I think it was just one of those things. I had spent so much time walking in and out of Kennedy's office I don't remember the exact circumstances, but I'm sure I just walked in and sat down and saw Ted working on it, and he showed it to me. He was not -- as Ted often does -- saying that he had not prepared it. With a big smile he told me it was the John Bailey memorandum. Nobody took him very seriously.

But the memo was a most powerful one, as you know. And again in typical Kennedy fashion, the Bailey-Sorensen memorandum wound up in various columns. Arthur Krock devoted at least one of his columns to it at an appropriate time just before the convention.

And then I remember taking a walk with Ted Sorensen just before they went to Chicago during which he indicated what a sense of urgency both he and the President had on getting ahead, that they didn't see any point in not making a try for the White House this time rather than waiting four years, as apparently his father and many close advisers had urged.

HOLBORN: And did you have the sense that they expected to win at that time, or was it....

WINSHIP: No, I really had the feeling that they felt it was an up-hill fight. But they were grasping at every kind of assist they could get, grasping at every straw. And they displayed, as you look back on it, a certain amount of inexperience. Just continuing on this vice-presidential effort, one thing that impressed me more

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than anything else about the efficiency of the Kennedy organization, how they do business, is -- I can't remember the name of the so-called headquarters room at the Conrad Hilton in Chicago in 1956 for the Kennedy vice-presidential effort. It was --. What was it?

HOLBORN: I can't remember.

WINSHIP: It was the Ranch Room, or something like that. It was done in a Western motif. Well, I remember walking in there several times in the course of that week, and there was always this fellow sitting in a chair next to a telephone, and he was a very pleasant fellow. And I finally inquired who he was, and, if my memory is correct, it was Kirk Johnson.

HOLBORN: Was that....

WINSHIP: He worked in the Merchandise Mart in Chicago. I may have his name wrong, but I... And I inquired further as to what his role was, and Ted Sorensen, I believe it was, told me that his job is to make sure that we keep our appointments and that if Jack Kennedy has made a commitment to meet the Missouri delegation at 7:30 in the morning, that he's there. If he's made a commitment to go on a TV station at a certain time, he'd be there. He was sitting there as a businessman, making sure that the pieces were picked up. And this always impressed me a great deal, the idea of bringing an administrator into a campaign operation. And I believe he came back and did the same kind of chore briefly during the 1958 campaign for re-election in Massachusetts. I'm not sure, but I believe he did. But this impressed me.

It was a lot of fun for me that week in Chicago. I was still covering

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for the *Boston Globe* and my story obviously was Jack Kennedy. He was getting an immense amount of exposure. He was the narrator for the convention opening night, which was his first role, giving a televised story of the Democratic Party. Then, of course, his next break was being picked to nominate Adlai Stevenson. He was an exciting person to be around.

I remember the morning that he was going out to nominate Adlai Stevelson. I had been looking everywhere for him, as it was important to my job always to keep in touch with him. I couldn't find him in the hotel, and I decided that if I didn't get out to Convention Hall I would miss hearing him do the nomination speech. So I walked out to the curb outside the Hilton and tried to hail a cab. Presently a cab came along, and it was the President sitting in the front seat and Sorensen in the back seat. He picked me up. He was in a highly nervous state. He wasn't satisfied with the speech. He was rewriting it, as he always did, and by the time we got out to the Convention hall the last two pages were pretty well messed up. They were all written out in longhand, and he was worried he couldn't read them very well, so he asked Ted to see if he couldn't read them very well, so he asked Ted to see if he couldn't get the last two pages typed. Ted didn't have a typewriter. I had my portable, and I helped Ted type the last two pages of it.

HOLBORN: Did he have any inkling on that day or was he at all confident that the vice presidency would be thrown open?

WINSHIP: No, I don't think he was at all. I don't think he had any idea. I think it came as horrible shock to him just

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the way it did to Kefauver [Estes Kefauver] and Hubert Humphrey. No, I think that was a bombshell to everyone.

HOLBORN: Well now, you were with him the following day when this vice-presidential thing did come to its climax. I believe you were with him in the Stock Yard Inn.

WINSHIP: Yes, I was, and it was one of those special things. I attribute that little experience to some advice my father gave me years ago. My father had always been a bright newspaperman and he said, "Whenever you're on a big story, go in the opposite direction from everyone else." They were just starting the balloting for the vice presidency, and every single newspaperman in Chicago was sitting in the Convention hall keeping tally on the balloting. I suddenly remembered my father's advice and left my seat in the Press Box and went out looking for Kennedy. And I headed, just instinctively, over to the Stock Yard Inn, which is the only nearby inn, assuming that the President probably was holed up in one of the rooms there. As I approached the Stock Yard Inn, Torby MacDonald [Torbert MacDonald] came scooting out in the Inn, and I said "Where's Jack?" He said, "He's up in Room 180."

So I went up to Room 108 -- the balloting had just begun -- and rapped on the door. Ted Sorensen was there and opened it a crack, and I said, "Any chance of coming in to watch the balloting on TV?" The President overheard me and said, "Sure, come on in." So I sat on the floor watching the balloting with Ted and the President.

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A Chicago plainclothesman, who had been assigned to guard Kennedy, was also in the room. The President was a wreck after four or five days of no sleep and campaigning, and he was doing what he always did when he was tired: he was getting ready to take a bath. I sat in on the john and chatted with him while he bathed.

HOLBORN: Was the TV in sight or out of sight?

WINSHIP: No, it wasn't. This was really just before the balloting got going, and it was interesting reminiscing about the people, who had suddenly become so helpful to him in the last couple of days and why they were. We talked about Governor Battle's [John S. Battle] son. I forget his name.

HOLBORN: Bill Battle [William C. Battle].

WINSHIP: Bill Battle. He said this goes back to a World War II friendship. I think they were in PT's together -- I'm not sure -- but some place they met in World War II.

HOLBORN: Same squadron.

WINSHIP: Yes. And then Representative Smith from Mississippi.

HOLBORN: Frank Smith.

WINSHIP: Frank Smith from Mississippi was another one of the Southern troopers who were fighting hard for Jack for the vice presidency. I think that was an early House friendship.

HOLBORN: Yes. He later appointed him to the TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority] when he was defeated in Mississippi.

WINSHIP: Oh, that's right. Yes, that's right too. So he came back and put on some shorts and lay on the bed. The balloting had just begun. My memory isn't as good now on his conversation as

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is a story that I wrote at the time. I would suggest, if you want to, inserting it in this transcript at this point. I must say there are some typos in it, and I hope maybe you can correct them.

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HOLBORN: Okay.

WINSHIP: But I remember that Sarge Shriver [R. Sargent Shriver] and Ted Sorensen were much more hopeful and excited towards the end when he teetered on the edge of victory.

HOLBORN: Sarge was in the room throughout?

WINSHIP: No, Sarge came busting in at one point and said, "Jack you've got it," but the President wasn't anywhere near as bullish about his chances as his brother-in-law. It was a great thrill for me just watching this fellow come so close to a big prize as this and watch the businesslike way he went about facing defeat, getting dressed and going over and doing his stint of throwing his support to Kefauver.

HOLBORN: Did he talk to Ted or to anybody about what he should say or was that quite spontaneous?

WINSHIP: No. I didn't say a word to him, at least in the room. Now I should say that just before he went over to concede he was pulled out of Room 108 into another room by Sarge Shriver at the request of the local gendarmes because by this time crowds were gathering in the hallway. On this second floor of this little inn, was a great mob of reporters and photographers. They were there now because they discovered that was the place to be. They banged on the door. Kennedy was about to be inundated, so he adjourned to another room, and I am sure he and Ted did some talking about his impending speech. No, I withdraw that. I just don't know whether they did or not. It sounded like it was a spontaneous effort.

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It had to be because he didn't have much time to think about it.

HOLBORN: Did he then or subsequently ever say anything to you or did you overhear anything regarding the role of John McCormack and that whole thing which became a subsequent dispute?

WINSHIP: I know it became a great dispute. He never did say anything to me about that dispute. He seemed to have left that to his friends. The one thing I do remember -- which is rather typical of the President -- in regard to his relationship to John McCormack was that he was much more relaxed about this so-called bad

blood between John McCormack and himself than his friends were or than John McCormack's friends were. I think he had a great respect for John McCormack.

HOLBORN: The same was probably true of Lyndon Johnson later.

WINSHP: Yes, I think so too. But he made it perfectly clear that he and John McCormack weren't the kind of fellows who liked to sit up all night in their living room chewing the fat. They never would be close personal friends, but he respected political relationships, where sometimes things went smoothly and sometimes they didn't, depending on their political fortunes. I never felt that he was ever very bitter personally towards John.

HOLBORN: Do you remember any comments which he made about his competitors at that time about Kefauver or Humphrey?

WINSHP: No, I don't, to be honest with you. This has nothing to do with his vice-presidential effort, but I remember right after the vice presidency -- oh, no, it was in '58 or '59 -- I remember

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talking to him about various candidates and whether he should run in '60, and he made it perfectly clear that he thought if he was ever going to run in 1960, because he had very strong feelings about how long a figure can stay at the top without eroding. I remember his talking about how fast erosion sets in on people who are so thoroughly exposed as a candidate for the presidency, and he said "I got a great deal of exposure in '56, and if I sit out in '60, by the time '64 comes around that's eight years." He didn't think that you could last much longer. He thought eight years was stretching things a little. In this conversation back in about 1957 he said, "Look at Estes Kefauver. I hope I never have hands like his." He was referring to how terribly tired and beaten up and shopworn Estes looked after '52 and '56 efforts.

HOLBORN: Well now, in keeping with this, do you think that in his own mind it was pretty clear to him that he would make a try for '60 as of the moment he was defeated for vice president, or did this grow out of the campaigning that he did that fall on behalf of the Democratic ticket, or was he keeping an open mind?

WINSHP: I am convinced that ten minutes, maybe twenty-four hours after he was defeated for the vice presidency -- his first defeat in his life, with the exception of struggles with his own health -- that he had made up his mind to run for the presidency. You had to have the presidential bug to do what he did that summer and fall of 1956. He, you know, did a terribly skillful job of turning this defeat into a plus for him. He ostensibly was campaigning in 1956 for

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his friends who were running for congressional offices, his contemporaries, and for Adlai Stevenson. He campaigned vigorously for both his friends and Adlai Stevenson, but there couldn't have been a more useful thing for a fellow to do who was getting ready to run for the presidency four years later. He had a lot of work to do around the country.

And the other little thing that convinces me that he had his eye on the White House in '56 was, I think I was flying from New Jersey to Washington with him, and it was late one night after he had been campaigning for Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey. He pulled out of his briefcase some polls. They were polls of how John Kennedy would do against Nixon [Richard M. Nixon] and how he would do against a couple of other Democratic possibilities -- Humphrey, Symington [Stuart Symington] -- if he were running for president. They were not polls of the entire country, but a test on how he would do in Philadelphia. Whether he had polls done of his strength and weaknesses in other cities, I don't know, but I was impressed with the depth of his research and the depth of his friends' concerns that they were already doing polls of Kennedy strength versus possible rivals four years before he was going to run for office.

HOLBORN: Well, in these earlier years, '55 and '56, you already have a keen sense then of the Sorensen-Kennedy teamwork?

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WINSHIP: Oh, heavens, yes. I think one of the most skillful team plays was the other great memo that came out of the Sorensen office: the memo -- I think it was 1958; when he was trying to get on the Foreign Relations Committee.

HOLBORN: No that would have been December of '56, January of '57, right after the election.

WINSHIP: That's right, it was right afterwards when again Sorensen prepared a memo which was sent to Lyndon Johnson and, I believe, to all the Democratic members of the Senate stating the case on why John F. Kennedy should be on the Foreign Relations Committee.

HOLBORN: Which was another race against Kefauver.

WINSHIP: Yes, that's right. Kefauver had the seniority rights, but he marshaled all the arguments why, in spite of Kefauver's edge on him on longevity, John Kennedy should be on the committee.

HOLBORN: And Ted Sorensen freely showed this to you again?

WINSHIP: Yes, he showed this to me again, and again stories were written about this.

This time John Kennedy won out over Kefauver. And, of course, it's an old story on how Ted and John Kennedy barnstormed the country, and incidentally it did quite a job on both of their backs.

HOLBORN: Now to turn to some things that happened more on the legislative scene during those years, I suppose probably from a newsman's point of view perhaps as important a thing during those years was Kennedy and McCarthyism. What contact did you have with this as a newspaperman, reactions....

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WINSHIP: Well, obviously, being a Massachusetts newspaperman, this is a very big and raw story. I have two thoughts on this subject, and they both relate to the President's handling of the issue after the fact. The first one was his appearance in June of 1956 on a Face the Nation panel. It was just before the Democratic Convention, and Arthur Sylvester of the Newark News and I were on this panel. And in the course of the interview with our guest, John Kennedy, we asked him about his position on McCarthy. If my memory is correct he hadn't publicly states his position on McCarthyism, certainly not in the '56 campaign year. And I will have inserted for you for what it's worth at this point in the transcript of that interview, because I think it would be interesting.

**[INSERT FIRST APPENDIX IN PDF]**

I remember Sylvester and I had quite a job getting the President to state how he would have voted if he had been in the Senate on the censure matter. He finally said, in response, I believe, to Sylvester's question, that his judgment probably would have been against McCarthy, that he would have voted to censure him. I remember him saying it in a rather formal way, and I know he was somewhat peeved that we pressed him quite so hard on the program.

HOLBORN: Did he seem to have anticipated his question?

WINSHIP: No, I don't think he had at all. I think the transcript indicates that he hadn't anticipated it at all. My other....

HOLBORN: Well, let's go on with this one, was it extremely tense, or was it just sort of....

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WINSHIP: The interview? No, I don't think any of these tenseness came through on the program, but after the program broke up the President twitted us for bearing down on him quite so hard on the issue. He was very decent about it, but he made it rather clear that he didn't find it the most comfortable half hour he ever had. The other thought I have on this McCarthy issue is -- well, let me rephrase that. The only other

background I have on it is I do have a copy of the speech that he had written or he had written himself, I think it was in late July 1954. It was a speech in which he declares himself against McCarthy. He winds up the speech by saying: "I would vote to censure Senator McCarthy." It reads like a good Sorensen-Kennedy effort. It is a very thoughtful speech. It was never delivered, and of course the President was never recorded on the censure vote which took place on December 2, 1954. I learned of this speech and obtained a copy given by a friend of mine and a good friend of the President's. I learned about it during the campaign year of 1960. I suppose Ted Sorensen is the only one that can answer why it wasn't delivered, but I would like to just read a few thoughts and give a little background on this speech and on the President's posture during this very difficult period.

Kennedy was not the only Massachusetts politician who failed to be heard on McCarthy. During the Truman [Harry S. Truman] period Maurice Tobin, then the Secretary of Labor, had a lively anti-McCarthy speech for the Veterans of Foreign Wars, but when he stepped up to the microphone he took on another topic. No one can factually say why the McCarthy

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speech never left Tobin's pocket. He may have had some second thoughts about McCarthy's strength in Massachusetts or he may have felt he could put it off, but here is some background. If you remember, debate on the original resolution to censure began on July 30, 1954. It was a simple six-line resolution calling for the condemnation of the Wisconsin Senator for actions which brought the Senate into disrepute. It was brought to the floor by Senator Flanders [Ralph E. Flanders.] That same afternoon there was a meeting in the office of Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Democrat of New York. There a group of liberal Senators....

HOLBORN: Humphrey or Lehman [Hebert H. Lehman]?

WINSHIP: I'm sorry, Lehman -- there a group of liberal Senators discussed censure tactics. Kennedy attended this meeting. In the Senate Chamber the debate was bitter and was carried on until after 10 that Friday night. Few spoke. Those who did, spoke at length. The leadership on both sides of the aisle promised that all would be heard before the vote was taken. None of the current crop of Presidential candidates -- Kennedy, Senator Hubert Humphrey, Stuart Symington, or Lyndon Johnson -- entered the debate. Shortly before adjournment the liberal strategy was splintered. Senator Wayne Morse attacked the Flanders resolution. He asked that a Committee be set up to bring forth a bill of particulars on charges against McCarthy.

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Debate for the next two Senate days, Saturday, July 31, and Monday, August 2, was just for the Congressional Record. In the wings the establishment of a select committee was agreed to by Senate leader William F. Knowland and Johnson. During this period Humphrey has

asked a question about the Knowland amendment. Kennedy said he believed that there was “no adequate grounds” for the censure of McCarthy because of his (McCarthy’s) questions in the Annie Lee Moss case. As you remember, she was a Pentagon kitchen worker accused of being a Communist. Johnson and Symington did not say a word. On the vote to establish the select committee Humphrey went along with Lehman and Flanders and nine others who wanted to vote the censure measure immediately. Kennedy voted for the study by the select committee. So did Johnson and Symington. The Knowland amendment carried seventy-five to twelve, and the Flanders resolution was shelved.

The select committee held hearings and brought forth its report on November 8, 1954. By this time Kennedy was in a New York hospital for his back operation. He had been on crutches since August. Kennedy did not leave the hospital until just before Christmas and did not return to his Senate office until the following June. Ted Sorensen, as you know, has gone out of his way to take whatever blame he could for not having his boss recorded on that vote. Sorensen has always claimed that while the Senator was in the hospital during the censure proceedings he received no phone calls or mail. Sorensen says Kennedy did not have a chance to read the Record, and he could not take a position in the Senator’s

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absence.

Now I’ve got here the text of that speech which the President never gave. As I said, it’s beautifully written, and it winds up, as I said, saying that “I shall vote to censure the Junior Senator from Wisconsin.” It is because, as Senator Norris [George W. Norris] stated in the final words delivered concerning the Bingham [Hiram Bingham] resolution -- these are Norris’ quotes -- “When the Senate takes this action it seems to me it will have accomplished great good for the welfare of the country, for the practice of drafting of laws, and for the honor and dignity of the United States Senate.” Kennedy made very clear in this speech that he condemned McCarthy or he was voting to condemn McCarthy not on grounds of Communism and the various people that McCarthy had attacked but on the grounds of how McCarthy conducted the investigation as a Senator, on how McCarthy permitted Roy Cohn to use the Senator’s name in going after people, how the Senator permitted Roy Cohn to protect David Schine in his dealings with the Army in getting him preferential treatment during Schine’s Army period. It was a most legalistic and a sound speech. Now, I must say that...

HOLBORN: If I may just interrupt here for a moment. Did you, as a newspaperman, on December 2nd press Ted Sorensen as to the non-recording of Senator Kennedy, or was this something that all came out of....

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WINSHIP: No. Well, I didn’t but the reason I didn’t is that I was still at the Washington Post and I wasn’t covering the story and I wasn’t close to the story. But I will



say that through the fifties and through the President's build-up for the White House I was always very critical and unhappy that he hadn't taken a stand on McCarthy. I still believe he displayed a lapse in courage by failing to record himself on this historic moral issue.

The six years I've spent in Boston as a newspaper editor have given me a better understanding of how people vote in Boston. I also have a little more perspective on those harried McCarthy days than I did have. Kennedy may well have been right from a strictly political viewpoint, in not taking a public stand on McCarthy was a wise one. I think he either would have lost or come so close to losing if he had taken a stand in '54 that it would have....

HOLBORN: You think it was largely a political judgment in Massachusetts terms on his part or do you think it was a family role that Bobby [Robert F. Kennedy] had played in the committee room.

WINSHIP: I think so. Well, I just don't know. I don't quite get your question, Fred.

HOLBORN: Well, some people believe that his primary consideration was really out of respect or out of protection to Bobby, who had been one of the counsels to the Committee and active subsequently to the minority but originally a member....

WINSHIP: And that's why he was taking it easy on McCarthy?

HOLBORN: Perhaps, and also his father's past friendship with

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McCarthy.

WINSHIP: Well, I really think it was hard-boiled political judgment in Massachusetts terms. He had so much pressure on him from the liberals to take a strong stand on McCarthy and he withstood that pressure. I think, as you look back on it, it was probably the most uncomfortable period he ever had. I'm sure he was convinced that politically he probably did the only thing he could do. It wasn't easy back in '51 and '52 taking on Cabot Lodge [Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.] who looked absolutely invincible. In short, I have become a little more tolerant of this McCarthy chapter in Kennedy's life than I used to be, and I am suggesting that you print at this point the text of this speech that reportedly was written by the President or written for him because I do think it shows the Kennedy political logic at its best. I think it provides some historic hints that down deep he wasn't a McCarthy adherent. This speech is an interesting piece of history and I wish somebody who is in a position to know to provide some of the facts about why it was written, why it was not given, etc.

[INSERT SECOND APPENDIX IN PDF]

HOLBORN: Well, perhaps the next most controversial episode in the years that you were covering him in the Senate was summer of 1957, the first of the three civil rights bill, the civil rights bill of '57, and the dispute over the votes which Senator Kennedy cast: first, on having the bill sent back to the Judiciary Committee for a limited period of time under the Morse amendment and perhaps secondly, and perhaps more important, Kennedy's vote on the Jury Trial Amendment, so-called. What reflections or recollections do you

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have of that?

WINSHIP: Well, I do remember the civil rights debate, and I do remember reeling that this was another bit of hard evidence that President Kennedy had his eyes on the White House. That may have been a cynical point of view, but I think certainly the Southern papers and the Southern attitude sort of agreed with this. If my memory is correct, it boiled down in political terms to his voting twice with the Southern side and twice with the Northern side. I wish somebody in going over the development of President Kennedy's view on civil rights would do a good analysis of how these four votes on the 1957 Civil Rights Bill jibe with his subsequent views and how consistent they were. I'm not saying that he was inconsistent then. I remember he was terribly troubled by the jury trial vote. I think he cast his view by the late Mark de Wolf Howe of Harvard Law School.

HOLBORN: Yes, and I think a conversation too with Freund [Paul A. Freund] wasn't it? I think both of them.

WINSHIP: That's right. And as, incidentally, a good example of his making great use of the academic community in Cambridge to help buttress his views and help form his position. I think he felt very much more comfortable having those two card-carrying liberals fellows in his corner.

HOLBORN: But your feeling was that he was disposed to vote that way on the jury trial and that these really supported the position that he wanted to take?

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WINSHIP: Oh, I think so. That certainly was my feeling at the time. I twitted him a little bit on it at the time in stories, but again I'm not sure of my own ground on the logic of this thing; whether these are intellectually motivated votes or whether he did have his eye on the South. It must be said that during that period he was certainly getting a lot of favorable support from the Southerners, and I think this helped in that

build-up period to give the idea to the responsible Southern leaders that he was not an impulsive way-out person on civil rights and that he would be a safe, reasonable man in the White House dealing with the race issue. Again, I may be only cynical, but I remember feeling that way at the time.

HOLBORN: Your mention of the Howe-Freund memoranda or conversations -- did he increasingly, during the years that you covered him as a Senator sort of have recourse to his academic constituency, I guess, like he did at the very beginning with Seymour Harris and his programs for New England, or do you think he derived an advantage from this and made good use of it?

WINSHIP: Oh, I think he did. I think I wrote the first story on the development of his quite expansive brain trust. It might be worthwhile maybe inserting this story in the transcript at this point.

[INSERT THIRD APPENDIX IN PDF]

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It lists all the Cambridge crowd that he got together in those informal sessions back in -- I'm trying to think -- was it '54 or '55 that he really organized a large group of Cambridge academics?

HOLBORN: Well, I think it started as a very small group. Of course, he gets Arthur Holcombe and Seymour Harris and a few others at the beginning. I guess the real sort of formal organization began after his Senate campaign in '58.

WINSHIP: Yes, I think it was right after '58 when he really tried to get these people organized, and my, how they helped him! He used to get, I think, a great stimulation out of bumping himself up against those undisciplined minds in Cambridge. I remember on more than one occasion he would prepare himself for a difficult session by locking himself up in a room with Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. bouncing questions off him, letting Arthur bounce ideas off him. I think he made great use of them and the proof of it is that about 90 percent of them were rewarded with pretty good jobs in the New Frontier.

HOLBORN: Well, now as you left Washington roughly at the time that Kennedy was running for re-election for the Senate in Massachusetts, why don't you sum up the impressions you had of him at the end of '58. Do you think he was reaching too high? Did you personally have a sense that he might get the nomination or would get the nomination in 1960? Had he grown substantially as a public figure in terms of his impact over those years? What sort of -- what was in your mind

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at the time?

WINSHIP: Fred, when I left Washington in '58 I was pretty thoroughly convinced that he was going to be President. I remember going through, in '58 and a little bit in '57, long arguments with my colleagues in Washington, who couldn't for the life of them see a fellow who spent two years on the committee investigating labor leaders, a person who was a Catholic, a person whose only experience was running an office of fifteen people in the United States Senate, a person who seemed to enjoy getting in rows with Truman and other party regulars, a person with several other unusual votes in his kit, could be nominate on the Democratic ticket. I had become convinced because if you spend much time watching Kennedy and watching the intensity of his effort from 1956 to 1958, when you think of the ceaseless travel that he did and just the raw determination that he had during those two years, I was convinced that Kennedys usually get what they want. I think this is one of the things that probably the Boston reporters, through their assignment of having to cover this fellow in depth from 1952 on, probably got on to him quicker than the people who didn't get to really know him or get a smell of his thrust and drive until about '57 and '58. I did think he had grown a lot, and had become better organized. He had built a strong staff. He had learned to use the thinkers of the country a lot better, and I was convinced that he was off to the races and that he would make it.

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The campaign in '58 in Massachusetts was by traditional standards a joke. He spent a total of about thirty days in the state. He blocked out that year to give himself thirty days -- I think it was the month of August; I'm sure -- in Massachusetts.

HOLBORN: No, I think it was late September and October.

WINSHIP: Was that it?

HOLBORN: The Senate went late that year.

WINSHIP: That was it. That was it. Yes, that's right. It was last month.

HOLBORN: And then he went briefly to Europe and then he came back, the day after the primary.

WINSHIP: That's right. But up to the end of the campaign every chance he had would scoot out to California or Illinois or any place but Boston. He was teased a little bit by the Massachusetts press for not paying enough attention to his re-election.

HOLBORN: Even in the middle of October, you remember, they went out to the

corn-picking contest in Iowa.

WINSHIP: And posed for a picture with Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower]. Yes, I remember that. But he still had that fine organization O'Brien [Lawrence F. O'Brien] and O'Donnell [Kenneth P. O'Donnell], driving to make sure that he won a record high vote in Massachusetts. They did.

HOLBORN: Well, since we're on this campaign of '58 and you've been back in Boston, looking cumulatively, do you think that from a lot of criticism of Kennedy that he never really concerned himself

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sufficiently with the organization of the Democratic Party up and down across the state in the way its dominant figure ought to? What sense did you have of his relations with the average Democratic politician, average member of the legislature? Was there a deficiency here? Was it purely a personal organization or did it have some lasting effect?

WINSHIP: Well, I can speak with vehemence and strong feelings on this subject. I think his assertion of leadership or lack of leadership in Massachusetts Democratic politics was thoroughly satisfactory to the Democratic regulars. It was thoroughly unsatisfactory to the *Boston Globe*, which had wholeheartedly dedicated itself in 1958 to trying to clean up political corruption in the state, and we were convinced in this effort that we needed the help of the dominant Party in this effort because most of those indicated or caught with their hands in the cookie jar were Democrat. We repeatedly appealed to Kennedy for support to our anti-corruption drive through our paper, and I remember we wrote a full-page open birthday letter to the President in 1961 on his birthday. It was his first birthday that he celebrated in Boston.

HOLBORN: 1961?

WINSHIP: It was 1961, just before he left for his Vienna summit meeting with Khrushchev. That day we printed a full-page report on "What's been happening in Massachusetts," and we appealed to the President in this open editorial to give us a hand, that things are going terribly in his own state, and there was too much corruption and

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that it's his responsibility to do something about it. But again this is... And maybe when you are on a campaign such as this you have to be dissatisfied and a little impulsive. Today, three or four years later, as I look back on it, things have greatly improved. The Kennedys do run the state. They have cleaned up the party. They have created some real party responsibility. They have some decent people in the state committee. They have all kinds of good young

candidates running for office, and the whole thing was a Kennedy effort. It was done in a rather typical Kennedy family way. The President, I never felt, took a personal interest in it, but they had carved out this preserve of Massachusetts for Ted, and they left it to Ted to do, and he obviously had the backing of the White House and the Attorney General's office. The Globe kept needling Ted to strengthen the state committee, and we worked with Ted's two or three professor friends Beer [Samuel H. Beer] and Bob Wood [Robert C. Wood]. We put a lot of pressure on him, which he took very nicely. And I think this feeling of leaving this to Ted to clean up the state was reflected in Bob Kennedy's remarks two weeks ago which were printed in *Newsweek*, that one of the reasons why he's not thinking about running for governor now is that this is Ted's state. Ted had done all the work up there and why should he come barging in. Ted has done an immense amount of work and set a fine example of decency and excellence in party politics. He's made the Republican party look badly when it comes to party responsibility and party ethics, and that's going some, if you know the Massachusetts story.

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HOLBORN: So you think that the much publicized fight between McCormack and Kennedy for control of the State Committee in 1956 was in this respect a fairly barren victory, it had no consequences for the state?

WINSHIP: Not as such. Of course, what it obviously did do was it asserted for the first time and in a lasting way that the Kennedys were in charge, not the McCormacks, but as you say, it was a rather barren victory. He won the battle and then went away for four years to become President and people in Massachusetts who were struggling to scrub up the state's image. Two years later Kennedy is elected, and four years later we have an entirely different situation. I am bullish about what the Kennedy family has done in Massachusetts in party politics.

HOLBORN: In 1958 in that very abbreviated campaign that Kennedy did run, did you find him much improved as a campaigner, at the top of his form? Had he doped it all out well in advance, or was he just coasting?

WINSHIP: I don't remember one speech that had any particular impact. He had established himself by '58 as an extremely powerful and extremely popular man. He had won over the liberal doubters by this time. He had won over the conservative Democrats by this time, and as we said earlier he spent less than a month cruising through the state. It was a beautifully organized thing by O'Donnell, O'Brien, Sorensen, and company, and it was an easy milk

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run for him. A symbol of the President's complete domination of the Massachusetts scene, I always thought, was him winning the *Boston Herald's* endorsement and the ADA's

[American for Democratic Action] in a twenty-four hour period. The *Boston Herald*, more so than it is today, had always been a strong Republican paper, never supported anybody but a Republican with a few minor exceptions in the dim, dark ages, and the ADA, which in the years past was loaded with Kennedy dissidents who still hadn't recovered from Kennedy's handling of the McCarthy issue, by this time he had taken ADA completely into the camp.

Speaking of '58, it reminds me of how the President quietly and very nicely set up his younger brother, Ted, for his future. In about 1955 I first became conscious of Ted. I still hadn't met him, but occasionally the President would mention him in a very casual way, and I think I was the first person to whom he said that Ted was, after all, the best politician in the family. His assessment has proven accurate, I think. So he started talking about him to, particularly, Massachusetts reports in '55-'56. Then he gave him the managership of his 1958 campaign for re-election in Massachusetts. It was pretty much a titular head operation because, (1) Ted didn't have much background, experience nor network of friendships in the state and (2) the operation was really being handled by O'Brien and O'Donnell and...

HOLBORN: And Steve [Stephen E. Smith] for the first time.

WINSHIP: And Steve for the first time. So Ted was really just

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window-dressing, and as you look back on it, he was put there to start exposing him.

HOLBORN: As I recall, he even had to go back to law school didn't he that fall?

WINSHIP: That's right. He had to go back and do some studying in Virginia. And then in 1960, of course, Jack gave him a third of the country; he gave him from the Rockies west.

HOLBORN: Well, speaking of Teddy, the *Globe* played a rather important part at one point in Teddy's subsequent campaign for the Senate in 1962 because it was through the *Globe* that what was thought to be by the opposition the sort of ticking time-bomb of the campaign....

WINSHIP: Their secret weapon.

HOLBORN: Was brought out their secret weapon, the so-called cheating incident at Harvard. How did it come about that the *Globe* published that at the time it did?

WINSHIP: Well, I'd like to really get this straight in most people's minds. As you recall, and as every student of the Kennedy family recalls, there was a rumor roaring

up and down the East coast in the spring of 1962, the year Ted was running for the first time in Massachusetts, that he had been thrown out of Harvard for cheating. I heard the rumor so frequently that I began investigating it. I think my first official port of call on this thing was Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. When I went and called on him at the White House in April of '62, I asked him for the details on Ted's problem at Harvard, and he told me. He said, "Yes, it is true. He

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was asked to leave when it was discovered that Ted had asked a friend of his to take a Spanish exam for him. Harvard told him that if he put in a productive year or two working and thinking over his indiscretion that he could apply for re-admission. And I told Arthur that I felt that this was a story that must be printed. Here's a candidate for high office after all. I told Arthur that we were a responsible paper; not sensationalists and that we were going to print this story. He said there is nothing more on the President's mind and Bobby's than this problem and they too had a feeling that it ought to come out, but the family could not quite figure out the most helpful way from their point of view that it should come out. Well, that was the beginning of the thing. I took the initiative to get this story out. I sent Bob Healy [Robert Healy], our political editor, to talk to Ted about it, and Bob came back and said that Ted was very unhappy about this thing and he was greatly troubled by it. I forgot exactly what the conversation was between Bob and Ted. I subsequently sent Healy to Washington to talk to Bob Kennedy about it. It turned out that Bob and the President had somewhat different ideas on how it should be handled. Bob Kennedy, as I recall, suggested maybe a question and answer interview in which this would be brought up. The President's first suggestion was an interview in depth, a profile of Teddy in the course of which reference would be made to his exam-taking at Harvard.

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Bob Healy brought these two thoughts back to us, and we said that if we were going to print this story, and if we were going to try to cooperate with the Kennedys on this, that we would have a few ground rules. They were that this was a major story and that we would write it as such. It would be a straight news story, disclosing that Teddy Kennedy had been expelled from Harvard. And we assured them, of course, that we would give Teddy every kind of an opportunity high up in the story to give his side and that we would consult Harvard and get the Harvard side, and so forth. We needed the Kennedy's help to enable us to deal with Harvard records. Well, it turned into quite a negotiating day when this whole thing was worked out. First, Bob Healy went to see Bob Kennedy. Bob Kennedy gave his views and Bob Kennedy said "Why don't you go over and see the President?" So Bob Healy was sent over to the White House, and he went in and saw the President in the morning, and the President was rather adamant about how he thought the story should be handled. Bob Healy reported back to us in Boston on the telephone, and we said that we were standing firm on our feeling that from everybody's point of view it should be handled as a straight important news story, which it was. So Healy sent word



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back to the President that we were insisting upon handling the story our way, and he was asked to come back to the White House again that the same day late in the afternoon.

In with the President when Healy went back the second time was Mac Bundy [McGeorge Bundy.] Bundy, being a former Harvard dean, had done more than a little work and gave more than a little thought to this problem plaguing the family. Bob Healy and the President and Bundy kicked this thing around very briefly, and he convinced the President that we would handle this in a responsible way and that we would write it in an unsensational but very straight-away manner. As Bob Healy shook hands with the President to say good-bye, the President's parting shot was, "Gee, we haven't spent as much time on anything since Cuba," and Bundy butted in "Yes, and with just about the same results."

Well, actually it was a good Bundy crack, but it proved wrong because no unhappy chapter in a President's life turned out with such happy results. We carried the story, I believe as a three-column headline, one the front page. We wrote it in a very sober way. Every single newspaper in the world, I think, picked up the story. It ran fully for one day, and that was the end of the incident. It hasn't been spoken of since. We considered it a very important story; we don't consider it was a feed by the Kennedys to the *Globe*, because it was the paper, not the Kennedys who initiated the investigation and wrote it the way it should have been. We think it was a well-handled story all around. It was quite a couple of days getting that thing printed.

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HOLBORN: Well, now to turn to a completely different kind of problem and sort of an issue that at least tangentially involved Kennedy and more than tangentially involved the *Globe* which has lingered on over a large number of years both while he was Senator and as President, this is the problem of Channel Five and the assignment of a Boston television channel in which the *Globe* was one of the parties. What dealings did the *Globe* have over this period of time with Kennedy or with his immediate staff?

WINSHIP: Yes. Let me say two things. First, can I at this point before I forget it, suggest that at the end of the discussion of the Ted Kennedy/Harvard story that we insert the story itself?

HOLBORN: Yes, by all means.

WINSHIP: Now on Channel Five. One thing I'd better correct right off is that the *Globe* was not a party in this proceeding initially. I don't think it. . . . It finally became a party only in that it was objecting to the station going to its chief opposition, the *Boston Herald Traveler*. It was not an applicant for the station itself.

HOLBORN: That's right. You're not going into the business yourself.

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WINSHIP: We became a party very briefly in that they allowed us to testify against the *Herald Traveler* but not on behalf of ourselves for the station. This obviously is the most delicate situation, I suppose, that the *Globe* has faced in its recent history.

The only association that I know of that the *Globe* had with the Kennedy office in regard to Channel Five was first back in about 1954 or '55 in a very casual Saturday afternoon conversation in Senator Kennedy's office with Ted Sorensen. He told me (I must say again in a very off-hand way) "Tom, if I were the *Globe* I would be terribly concerned about this Channel Five situation. If the *Herald* gets this, which it looks like they are going to, I think you're going to have some very real trouble staying in business." And this was the first time that I had ever been made acutely aware of the potential of this TV station going to our opposition in this most competitive city in the country. I know other people on the paper had been concerned about it earlier, but I had just joined the paper and it was the first time I had been jolted into being concerned. On the strength of that conversation, I reported this to our publisher. I told him he should be more concerned than we had been in the past. We did become more concerned and began making representations to the FCC [Federal Communications Commission.] So in this rather indirect way, Ted Sorensen alerted us to being more worried, which we have been ever since.

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The only other thing that I know that Senator Kennedy did in the Channel Five case on behalf of the *Globe* was he obtained for the two Taylors, Davis and John Taylor, the publisher and president respectively, and appointment for them to speak to then FCC Commissioner Richard Mack. I believe the President got this appointment through Senator Smather's [George A. Smather] office. We were making no secret of these appointments. In fact, the two Taylors went openly and visited all of the FCC Commissioners in their offices. We had no compunction about doing this because we weren't looking for a multi-million dollar franchise for a TV station for ourselves at all. We just wanted to point out what a station in the hands of our chief newspaper opponent meant to us, and we just frankly said we were scared because of the spoken threats from the publisher of the *Herald* to the *Globe* management about how he was going to use this TV station once he got it. How he was going to drive us out of business with his newspaper-TV-radio combination and so forth. It was a very nasty thing which is ancient history but... And I don't pretend to know, on the other hand, what the President did, if anything, to help the *Herald*. But I can say that these -- the Ted Sorensen conversation and alerting us to this great struggle and Kennedy's assistance in getting the appointment with Mack -- are the only brushes that we had with the Kennedy office on that thing. I must say the case still hasn't been settled, but we are still a very vigorous paper, if all the figures have any bearing.

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HOLBORN: Well, this whole episode is in part a reflection of a few large cities that are still very competitive in newspapers.

WINSHIP: That's right.

HOLBORN: When you were first in Washington you had the *Boston Post* as well.

WINSHIP: That's right, we did. And I think even today -- I know that per capita Boston is the most over-newspapered city in the country, so the struggle is not over with by a long shot. That's all I have to say on the Channel Five case. I have a couple of parting shots, if you want....

HOLBORN: Yes, well I have a couple more questions, but why don't you have your own parting shots, and then I'll end up with the last time in which you saw Kennedy. We'll do that last, but why don't you....

WINSHIP: I withdraw that. I have only one parting shot. It's an unrelated footnote. In January 1957, the President told me in his Senate office that there were three men for whom he had respect enough -- no, let me rephrase that. I just came across a note that I made at the time on it. He said there were three men for whom he could see himself being vice president.

HOLBORN: Comfortably serve.

WINSHIP: Comfortably serve under them and not necessarily for the same reasons in each case. They are FDR (Franklin D. Roosevelt), Eisenhower, and Lyndon Johnson. He obviously had different reasons for thinking that he would enjoy serving under each one of the three people. FDR he was always a great admirer of his. Eisenhower,

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he repeatedly talked to me about Eisenhower's personal magnetism. He was terribly impressed with his great political attractiveness. He thought he was one of the great politicians of all time. He never said so, but I suppose the reason why he could see himself being vice president under him is that there were so many things Eisenhower didn't do and there was a lot of room to pick up lots of pieces. And, Johnson -- well, that's ancient history, how highly he regarded him as powerful person and as a strong leader, irrespective of personal feelings towards him.

HOLBORN: Do you think that John Kennedy had any contemporary political heroes?

WINSHIP: Of his own age or....

HOLBORN: Yes, of his own time.

WINSHIP: He used to say that he was the luckiest person in the world because there were so few competitors around that he thought were as good as he was. He said he was awful lucky to come after Eisenhower. He said he never could have taken Eisenhower. He was always very cold-blooded and very analytical measuring himself against the Humphreys and the Symingtons. It was not in a boastful way at all; it was just in a very analytical way, setting up their weaknesses and strengths against his weaknesses and strengths. He thought it added up to the fact that he didn't have any real contemporaries who could touch him; and I guess he was right.

HOLBORN: At a different level, in the Senate days, did he ever say anything to you about Senator Saltonstall [Leverett Saltonstall],

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with whom he had apparently close association?

WINSHIP: No, he didn't, but it was an interesting and very nice relationship. They were both on completely different wave lengths: in their thinking, in their age, and in their daily behavior. One of them was a young man in a hurry, the other one was an older man who was equally conscientious, but operated at a different pace. And a great, great respect for each other. It was really a father-son relationship. I always enjoyed hearing Leverett Saltonstall address Kennedy as "Johnny" the only one I know who ever called the President "Johnny". And they both are smart enough politicians to realize how they helped each other. These two fellows had a great act sponsoring projects jointly. They had a fine rapport worked out in Massachusetts. Projects that were embarrassing for Leverett to sponsor, if it didn't conflict with Kennedy's principles, Kennedy would handle and vice versa. They flipped the ball back and forth between each other all the time. The teamwork, I think, worked at its best in the early days when Sorensen was worrying about Massachusetts and New England and Elliot Richardson was in Saltonstall's office. It got to the point where they were writing each other's campaign ads for a while during one campaign. I believe that was in '56 when Saltonstall was running against Furcolo [Foster Furcolo.] That was a Sorensen and Richardson [Elliot Richardson]....

HOLBORN: That'd be '54.

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WINSHIP: 1954. yes, when Saltonstall was running against Furcolo. I know Elliot and Ted wrote some ads together on behalf of Leverett.

HOLBORN: And Kennedy did derive real strength from this. .

WINSHIP: Of course he did.

HOLBORN: And then they played that into the New England block in the Senate which was very evident in '56 in the vice-presidential balloting.

WINSHIP: I was going to say, the V.P. balloting started out with that solid hundred votes which all grew out of this Kennedy-Saltonstall cooperation and grew out of this great little device that I guess Sorensen masterminded, the conference on New England Senators. I don't know whether Ted thought it up or Elliot. I really don't know which one, do you?

HOLBORN: No, I don't know which it was. As it happened Elliot, of course, left the Hill shortly afterwards.

WINSHIP: Anyways, that put together the New England bloc of votes for Mr. Kennedy.

HOLBORN: Well, maybe just before we come to the end, I think you might, from your vantage then on the editorial side when you were back in Boston while he was President, was Kennedy, being President a help in selling newspapers?

WINSHIP: Oh, I think Kennedy being President was an immense help to New England, an immense help to Massachusetts. It's funny how a few years help, sometimes you can be peeved one year and you finally get over being peeved because there's a payoff or the record is righted from your own parochial point of view. What I'm thinking of is how

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upset Massachusetts and New England generally was when the moonshot lab went to Houston, Texas. We all shouted "foul" and we all shouted "politics" and we all shouted in our most parochial way, "What good is it to have a Massachusetts man in the White House if he ignores his own state when it comes to a great economic bonanza?" So we fretted and stewed over that for a couple of years, and again the teamwork of Ted, being the Senator and the President in the White House, McCormack being Speaker, Saltonstall being a senior man in the Senate, paid off in us getting the space center, research center, in the greater Boston area. This may have come anyways, but I somehow doubt it. Getting that space center, I think, is an example of how having Kennedy in the White House has brightened the picture up there. I suppose the Kennedy influence helped us be one of the two cities in the country that got in on this Federal subsidy to improve railroad transportation. It didn't work terribly well, but it kept the railroads going long enough for the state to put through a transportation program, which it just did. Having President Kennedy in the White House, of course, greatly excited our daily life. It paid off in social and economic and political ways every day. It was

great fun having one of your own in the White House, just as I'm sure the Texans are going crazy over having Lyndon Johnson in the White House.

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Oh we miss him terribly, and I must say Ted Kennedy has done a magnificent job of keeping up the family name in Massachusetts and keeping up the interest. I've never seen a person bridge so many interest groups and satisfy so many people as he has done. And his immense popularity has been, I think, one of the real reasons why the fractionalism in the Democratic Party has been minimized to such an extent.

HOLBORN: In editing a newspaper does this make a difference, the knowledge that probably the President is going to be reading any particular issue?

WINSHIP: Yes, it selfishly used to help me a lot in my continuing efforts to make our paper more serious and make it more attractive. The President came into Massachusetts so often during his vacation trips and weekend trips it was always an incentive for me to make sure that we put out the best possible paper whenever he was around. And I remember whenever the President was in the state for any length of time I would always go to the management and say, "We need a few extra pages because we want to put out an extra good paper, because we want both the Presidential group and the White House reporters to see us at our best."

I am sure you get his recurring in every one of your interviews, but the one thing that I learned from President Kennedy was the importance of trying to be better, the importance of excellence, and how it's fashionable to be as good as you can be at whatever you're trying to do. I must say I think about this all the time, and I credit, from a personal point of view, my association

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with President Kennedy and watching him work and watching the people around him with helping me to be more serious in my newspaper. He used to tease me a great deal about how terrible the Boston papers were, and he was quite right. He gave me a great impetus to try harder to develop a better paper in Boston, which is what I am working on now.

HOLBORN: Did you ever take seriously the thought that he himself might become a newspaper publisher?

WINSHIP: Oh, I did nothing but lie awake thinking that he might do that. I was haunted by the idea that he might become associated with our opposition. It terrified me on two fronts: his immense financial resources and his immense ability to get good people to work for him. So I must say I gave it a lot of thought.

HOLBORN: But nothing ever concretely happened beyond the rumor stage?

WINSHIP: No. No, and I was never convinced that he would cut his teeth in the publishing world on any Boston paper. Were you?

HOLBORN: I don't think so. No. I think a weekly magazine would have probably been more....

WINSHIP: More to his liking, yes.

HOLBORN: Well, we've reached the end of this. You said at the very beginning that there was really only one occasion in which you saw him at close hand while President, and perhaps you might just tell about that, as a wind up.

WINSHIP: Yes, and it's worth telling because it's just another one of these little touches that explains what an immensely thoughtful

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and knowledgeable person he is. It was in 1963. and I was in Washington for the editors meeting....

HOLBORN: In April, then.

WINSHIP: Yes, April '63 and the President innovated the idea of inviting the editors and their wives to the White House. We went down with a thousand other editors and eager wives. It greatly amused me. I have always felt that about 75 percent of the nation's editors and their wives are arch conservatives, and you never saw such an eager bunch in your life as these editors and their wives not only to go to the White House but to shake hands with the President. They were bobby-soxers and the President sometimes wasn't the greatest expert at handling himself in a big crowd. He was so interested in talking to somebody he would become trapped in the middle of a room, and get into terrible crushes. Well, this happened.

This particular afternoon in April I had my eleven year old daughter Joanna and my wife with me. Both of them wanted to shake hands with him so I fought through the mob for about twenty minutes until I finally got within three or four feet of him, and I remember reaching my hand over the heads of about three people to shake hands with him. I caught his eye and I thrust my daughter's and my wife's mitts into his mitts for about twenty seconds each, and then we got pulled away from him. He said over his shoulder, "Hey Tom, are you going to Boston tomorrow?" I said, "Yes, I am," and this was the first time I had seen him, I guess, in about three years. And that was the end

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of the conversation: "Hey, Tom are you going to Boston tomorrow?" The reason I said I was going to Boston was that the editors meeting ended the next day and I was planning to fly up that night after the banquet. But the following morning I was woken out of bed about 7:15 by a telephone call, and it was General Clifton [Chester V. Clifton] on the phone saying that the President wanted to know whether you and your wife and daughter would like to fly with him in Air Force One to Boston when he goes up to give his Boston College speech. And I said, "Sure thing," and he told us where to be and when.

We got the usual treatment -- taking off from the White House lawn in a helicopter and transferring to Air Force One. We actually didn't see him until we were airborne and then I just had a very fleeting conversation with him. I was sitting with Barbara Ward. He came up and spoke to both of us. Barbara launched into a serious lecture urging the President not to spend much time fretting over his differences with Adenauer [Konrad Adenauer] and de Gaulle [Charles de Gaulle] that they would be passing along soon. The only point I'm trying to make is that it was, I thought, a nice gesture on his part and pretty good memory when he's shaking hands with a couple thousand people to remember to ask one of them to take a ride in his plane. It was a great last meeting with a person that I had spent so much time with, and I must say my family got a great boot out of it.

HOLBORN: And it was that trip too that he went on the first inspection of the various possible sites for the library.

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WINSHIP: Oh, that's right. Yes he took a ride out - I think it was right after he had given his Boston College speech, wasn't it?

HOLBORN: Yes.

WINSHIP: He went with Ed Hanify [Edward B. Hanify] and Pusey [Nathan M. Pusey.]

HOLBORN: Another example of looking ahead - a good distance.

WINSHIP: A long way ahead, that's right. And I am awfully glad for his sake that he didn't see that married housing completed. I don't think it looks much better completed than it did when he saw it at first. What was it, about half way done when he....

HOLBORN: Yes, perhaps even a little less at that time.

WINSHIP: Just let me say, the flight to Boston was a nice touch and it was a very considerate one which I shall always remember.

HOLBORN: And in a very real sense, it takes us back to where we started, in that Boston for him really was always a sort of homecoming. Despite the fact that in some



ways his roots were not.... so deep in Boston still he was convinced that that's where he ought to return...

WINSHIP: I think so.

HOLBORN: After he was President.

WINSHIP: I think he really felt very much at home with lots of people in Boston and/or Cambridge. I think he felt very comfortable. He had a split personality, and he split personality fitted very well with the split personality of Boston.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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JOHN F. KENNEDY • July 1, 1956

MR. NOVINS: Just six weeks from now the first gavel will echo from the podium of the National Democratic Convention in Chicago, and among those present—more specifically, among those being pushed toward the vice presidential nomination, will be Senator John F. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts. Senator Kennedy has spent ten of his thirty-nine years as a member of the United States Congress; three terms as a Representative, and this, his fourth year, as a member of the United States Senate, and he is here today to Face the Nation.

Senator, during the next six weeks, Congress will be acting on some very important legislation before adjournment and then we go into the pre-convention campaign with the very serious problems of the selection of the candidates and the platform will be handled. We have a great many questions we would like to ask you about that, so let's introduce today's panel of newsmen: John Madigan, Washington Correspondent for Newsweek; Thomas Winship, Washington Correspondent for the Boston Globe, and Arthur Sylvester, Washington Bureau Chief of the Newark News. And now for the first question, Mr. Madigan.

MR. MADIGAN: Senator, let's get right to the point. Do you want to be Vice President?

SENATOR KENNEDY: Well, I am not a candidate for Vice-President and I doubt if I will be nominated for Vice-President.

MR. WINSHIP: Senator, could it possibly be your health that is the reason why you wouldn't be a candidate? You certainly don't look unhealthy, but I know you had a very, very serious back operation--

SENATOR KENNEDY: No, I think—

MR. WINSHIP: —a couple of years ago. I was wondering how—what is the state of your health now?

SENATOR KENNEDY: It is very good, I think; but to answer your question, I think that I was elected to the Senate; I am satisfied to be in the Senate. I think you would be foolish to be a candidate for a job, the identity of which will be decided at the convention after careful consideration of what will be best for the Democratic ticket. So that is why I say I am not a candidate and also why I say I will probably not be nominated.

MR. SYLVESTER: Senator Kennedy, would you consider it an honor if your Party chose you?

SENATOR KENNEDY: Oh, of course, I would.

MR. SYLVESTER: And in that case you would accept it, of course?

SENATOR KENNEDY: I don't think you could probably refuse and of course, I would consider it an honor.

MR. SYLVESTER: What are the qualifications that you think a Democratic

Vice President should have?

SENATOR KENNEDY: Well, I think as a practical matter he should be of assistance to the Party in winning the election. I suppose that's the first. Secondly, he should have those qualities of character and ability which would permit him to carry out his functions as Vice President, and then if the death of the President should occur, which would make him a responsible President.

MR. SYLVESTER: You have been the Chairman of the Committee holding hearings on what should be done to strengthen the Vice Presidency or make the succession more clear, have you not?

SENATOR KENNEDY: Yes, that's right.

MR. SYLVESTER: What ideas have you come out of that with?

SENATOR KENNEDY: We were really more interested in President Hoover's proposal to lighten the burdens of the President.

MR. SYLVESTER: Right.

SENATOR KENNEDY: We felt, after some examination, that while they were heavy and manifold, that nevertheless, the proposal which President Hoover put forward to have an Assistant Vice President would not be of assistance to the President.

MR. SYLVESTER: You mean, then, that really the Presidency is sort of an office in which you can never escape the terrific burden, whoever he may be.

SENATOR KENNEDY: That is right. You can't escape the basic burdens, and we felt that the President, under Court decisions and Acts of Congress, had sufficient power to permit others to do those jobs which were—which was not necessary for him to carry out.

MR. SYLVESTER: You feel that under President Eisenhower they would attempt to institutionalize the office too much, or not?

SENATOR KENNEDY: Well, by "institutionalize" you mean to remove him from direct control of events?

MR. SYLVESTER: Yes, and responsibility.

SENATOR KENNEDY: Well, I think his illness last Fall has removed him—and his present illness has removed him to a substantial degree. The responsibility, however, still remains with him and will be as long as he is President.

MR. MADIGAN: Senator, recalling what happened to Al Smith in 1928 and taking into consideration that you are a member of the Roman Catholic faith, do you think if you were slated for Vice President on the Democratic ticket, that it would lose votes for your Party in certain areas of this nation?

SENATOR KENNEDY: Well, it's difficult, of course, for a Catholic to answer that question. I hope that no one would vote for a Catholic for Vice President because he was a Catholic or vote against him because he was a Catholic. I think it might, unfortunately, might lose him some votes because he was a Catholic and might gain him, even though ideally we would not wish that circumstance to be so. Al Smith ran, of course, in 1928 at the end of a—after great Republican victories in '20 and '24; he lost four Southern states; three of those States were lost in 1952. He did carry Massachusetts and Rhode Island which hadn't been carried before, so that Governor Smith ran badly in some areas; ran very strongly in other areas, but more basically, I think, there has been some change in the country. You have now a condition where Governor Muskie, who is a Catholic, who is Governor of Maine, where there aren't very many Catholics and I guess not too many Democrats, at least there hasn't been, and Governor Ribicoff in Connecticut. So there have been some changes since Smith, but that question would have to be very carefully considered by those who are going to make the selection and would be one of the reasons perhaps why I might not be considered, as I said.

MR. MADIGAN: That is exactly what I wanted to come to, Senator. You said you probably would not be nominated. Did you mean by that, that you thought being a

Catholic would work and militate against your nomination?

**SENATOR KENNEDY:** No, that would be a factor, as everyone who becomes a candidate, considered for Vice President—everything is carefully gone over, and all their votes and all these questions where they come from, whether they are Northerners or Southerners—all this would come into it and I would think there are many able people who could be chosen and I would think that the chances are that one of them will be chosen.

**MR. MADIGAN:** Senator, most political scientists agree that the Catholic vote, which was more heavily Democratic in former years, slipped in 1952 and went Republican, and without going into the merits of it, that is one of the reasons that your name has been pushed forward. You agree that because you are a Catholic, right?

**SENATOR KENNEDY:** Well, I think that might be one of the reasons and it might be one of the reasons why it might not be, so I wouldn't know.

**MR. MADIGAN:** You think it is unfortunate that you, and Mayor Wagner of New York, should be mentioned prominently in these days as a Vice Presidential nominee in order to capture the Catholic vote for the Democratic Party?

**SENATOR KENNEDY:** As I said, Mr. Madigan, I think it would be a mistake to vote for anyone because he was a Catholic.

**MR. MADIGAN:** I am talking about not voting, Senator. I am talking about your Party nominating you.

**SENATOR KENNEDY:** Well, I have given you the argument, Mr. Madigan, that I probably will not be nominated.

**MR. MADIGAN:** No, you think it is wrong for your Party's leaders in various States to propose you or Mayor Wagner for the nomination on the basis that "we will then get the Catholic vote?"

**SENATOR KENNEDY:** Governor Ribicoff was generous enough to mention me when that question was raised; dismissed the Catholic argument and said that he didn't feel that that was a handicap, nor do I believe it should be an assistance. I cannot help what some people—some of the reasons why people may be for me or against me. I am just giving you what my view is.

**MR. NOVINS:** Senator, you suggested that you would consider it an honor if the Party offered you the Vice-Presidential nomination, and that was without reference to who your running mate might be. Now, I know you have expressed yourself in favor of Governor Stevenson. Would you accept the Vice Presidency if it were offered to you if Governor Stevenson were not the top name on the ballot?

**SENATOR KENNEDY:** Once again I think it is very difficult to accept or reject anything that hasn't been offered to you, and which your honest opinion is, for a number of reasons which we will probably get into, that it will not be offered to me, so that I would prefer to let it stand, that anybody would be honored to be chosen. It would be difficult to refuse it, and of course let it stand at that. But, of course, I am wholeheartedly in support of Governor Stevenson and I hope he is nominated, which I think is the most vital question.

**MR. WINSHIP:** Senator, just one more question on this religious question. Do you feel that at any time your religion has influenced your—any legislative acts at all?

**SENATOR KENNEDY:** No, I really don't—I think your religion influences all your personal and public acts. I think it's a—it has some effect on on what you do, generally, but as far as being a Roman Catholic, whether that legislation comes up which affects the Roman Catholic faith and the Roman Catholic Church, since I have been here, I don't think that that has been a major issue in almost any case that I can think of.

**MR. WINSHIP:** Was it in the School Bill?

**SENATOR KENNEDY:** Except in the School Aid Bill in 1949, or 1950 when it was in the House of Representatives. It was a great question then of whether a section

should be placed in the Bill which would permit federal assistance not to non-public schools, because under the Constitution and under the Supreme Court Decision in the Efferson Bus Case, of course, a parochial school is not permitted to receive assistance. The question was whether an Amendment should be accepted which would permit some degree of federal assistance to non-public school children for bus rides, and that was the issue and as far as I can see since I have been here, that was the only time that this matter really came to a head. I felt, of course, that school children, regardless of where they went to school, should be treated equally.

That matter has not come up since in the School Construction Bill now in effect. It provides just for aid for construction, and of course, a non-public school would not be, under our Constitutional separation, would not be eligible for that assistance.

MR. WINSHIP: And you are supporting that?

SENATOR KENNEDY: That is correct. I was the co-sponsor of it.

MR. SYLVESTER: Senator Kennedy, politicians like to talk about the Catholic vote or some other vote. In your experience do you think there is such a thing? I mean do you think that people vote as Catholics on all subjects? Do they not vote their pocketbook as other people do? What is your feeling? Is there a deliberate vote? Do Catholics vote as a group?

SENATOR KENNEDY: No, I don't think—what I think is the situation, is that many of the Catholics—most of the Catholics were immigrants, immigrant groups who came in the last sixty or seventy years, the Irish, Italians and Poles. They were started at the bottom of the economic ladder and therefore, they supported the Democratic Party. As their economic conditions have changed, some of them have switched to become independents or Republicans. That is the first point. Secondly, the Catholics were strongly affected by the question of the struggle against Communism, and I suppose they perhaps were—as many of them were immigrant groups, for example, the Poles—were more conscious of it perhaps than any other group. So that there is some identity on certain issues, not because they are Catholics but because they belong in common with an economic group.

MR. NOVINS: Senator, you mentioned schools a minute ago and I would like to talk about schools in another context, if I may. Are you in favor of federal funds being used for segregated schools?

SENATOR KENNEDY: Well, what I am in favor of is the Federal Aid Bill that is before the Congress now. I am not in favor because I don't think—I think it would mean there would not be any federal assistance and I think we need it vitally. I am not in favor of the Powell Amendment because I feel that if the Powell Amendment were accepted, which provides in the case which you suggested, if it were accepted, the Federal Aid to Education Bill would not pass the Congress which I think would be a mistake, when you consider the two out of every five children are now going to school in schools which are not satisfactory from the point of view of safety on fires. I think it is vital that we get a Bill by and I don't think it would pass with that Amendment. Therefore, I think it would be a mistake to put the Amendment on.

Secondly, I think the question is being dealt with very satisfactorily by the Supreme Court, and the Federal Courts are in control of this question of segregation and, therefore, will deal with it and I think the Amendment would be a mistake.

MR. MADIGAN: Do you believe, Senator, that your Party should generally follow that thinking in its Platform Writing at the convention this year, gradualism theory in—

SENATOR KENNEDY: It is not a gradualism theory. It is permitting the Supreme Court to exercise its, and the lower Federal Courts, to exercise its judgment as to how fast their decision should be carried out. Fortunately, or unfortunately, I think fortunately, we in the House and in the Senate have nothing to do with that decision. Whether we are in favor of it or against it, it is going to be carried out. It is the law of

the land; there is no appeal from it, but I would hate us to intervene and prevent a satisfactory legislation from passing in the Congress.

MR. MADIGAN: If the Powell Amendment should be tacked on in the House and should come to the Senate, you feel sure that the Bill would die there with the Amendment on it?

SENATOR KENNEDY: If it were passed in the Senate, I think it would be filibustered to death.

MR. MADIGAN: In the House you mean—

SENATOR KENNEDY: If it were passed in the House and the Bill that was reported by the Senate Committee had it, that would be a question. Then it might be settled in conference. So I think it wouldn't pass and therefore, I am against it.

MR. NOVINS: Senator, forgetting Parties for just a moment, I would like to ask you a question as an American citizen who I am sure is aware that this whole problem of segregation is a very real problem for everyone concerned. Do you feel that the Supreme Court has been moving too rapidly?

SENATOR KENNEDY: Well, now, are you talking just of segregation?

MR. NOVINS: Just of segregation, in particular.

SENATOR KENNEDY: No, I don't think—they came to a decision in 1954, it was unanimous and it is the law. I don't think—I am a lawyer—and I don't think any critique—if you are for this decision, you might say it is high time they did it, and if you are against it, you say they are intervening in political matters.

MR. NOVINS: Well, do you feel that the Attorney General's office should move rapidly now to enforce these new decisions?

SENATOR KENNEDY: As I understand it, the Supreme Court used the words "deliberate speed," which may sound like a paradox, but isn't, I don't think, and left it to the judgment of the lower Federal Courts as to when it should be carried out; and I think that is a satisfactory arrangement.

MR. SYLVESTER: Governor—Senator Kennedy—

SENATOR KENNEDY: You have been to the Governor's Conference, I see.

MR. SYLVESTER: At that conference, Governor Williams of Michigan called the phrase "deliberate speed" 'weasel words' and insisted that the Democratic Platform must have much more forthright declaration than that. What is your own feeling on that?

SENATOR KENNEDY: Well, I think that it is a tremendous change in the South, that that decision is going to bring about and I think the Supreme Court, which is bringing it about, is certainly responsible. I think they are anxious to see their decision carried out. I don't think that they need assistance from any of us and, therefore, I think it is satisfactory.

MR. MADIGAN: You think that the Platform should even have to spell out that your Party is willing to follow a Supreme Court decision? That is the law of the land.

SENATOR KENNEDY: Well, I think it would be, Mr. Madigan, unnecessary. I think it is obvious, even the Southerners who signed the Southern Manifesto said they were going to use all legal steps to oppose it. I think it is recognized that it is done; under our system, that is the end of the matter. Now it may be politically desirable, some people may feel, to reemphasize it. In my opinion it is unnecessary because I accept it.

MR. SYLVESTER: Governor Herter felt that your Party, more than his Party, had to say in their Platform, had to name the Supreme Court Act and uphold it.

SENATOR KENNEDY: Yes, it may well be that that is so. It may be that—it may appear desirable to do so. The point I am making is that whether we do or do not, does not have any effect on what happens with the Court's decision. Now, as I say, it may be desirable to reemphasize the fact which I think is true, that the Democratic Party is a progressive party and it is interested in civil rights, in civil liberties and that

we may have to emphasize it in our Platform, but as far as that having an effect on the Court, I don't think it will nor should have.

**MR. MADIGAN:** The Republicans claim the Democrats are going to lose the Negro vote this year. Now, if you and Adlai Stevenson were the candidates and the Platform did nothing more than mention as it did in 1952 in general terms, do you believe you would lose much of the liberal vote in the Northern cities to the Republican Party?

**SENATOR KENNEDY:** I think the Negroes are more sophisticated on this issue and know more about it than any of us, and they recognize who is carrying—who made the decision and where it is going to be carried out. Now, it may be possible by emphasizing it one way or another to affect some votes, but my opinion is that based on the '52 record, the Negro groups supported Governor Stevenson perhaps as strong as any group who were traditional supporters of the Democratic Party. I think they recognize what the Democratic Party has stood for through the years and all it has meant to them in many fields in addition to civil rights; in housing, in minimum wage, and all the things that we have done to assist people in the lower income groups which many Negroes are in, so that I think the Negroes are going to support, as well as they ever did, and they have in a great percentage, support Governor Stevenson if he is nominated.

**MR. WINSHIP:** Senator, broadening this a little further. What is your candid opinion of the Democratic chances in November, and what is your over-all prescription for taking on the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket?

**SENATOR KENNEDY:** Well, I think the prospects are good. I think, what has happened since 1952 in local elections all over the country, in State elections, City elections, indicate the Democratic Party is the majority Party. I think every Republican analyst would probably agree with that. Now, the question is whether President Eisenhower's strength is so much greater than the Republican Party's strength, that he is strong enough to win. I think the polls indicate that he would be—has been the favorite. My judgment, however, is that with all that has happened in the last year, and with this basic strength the Democratic Party has, with a good record, responsible record, written in the last four years by the Democratic Party as the opposition Party, that we have an excellent chance to win.

**MR. WINSHIP:** Would you advise the Republicans to replace Mr. Nixon in view of the President's health problem this year?

**SENATOR KENNEDY:** Well, I think it is one of those difficult decisions. They obviously would begin a terribly harsh internecine political battle; those who wanted to keep him and those who did not and it might split the Republican Party open and it might lose them more than they would gain.

**MR. MADIGAN:** To get back to the Democratic Party, Senator, the Platform in 1952 said, and I quote: "A mandatory price support program for farm at not less than 90 percent of parity." How did you vote, Senator, when it came up in the Senate on rigid price supports of 90 percent of parity?

**SENATOR KENNEDY:** Well, I voted for the Humphrey Amendment which would have provided rigid price supports for the low income family. But on the whole, I supported flexible.

**MR. MADIGAN:** You voted against your Party Platform of 1952, is that correct?

**SENATOR KENNEDY:** That is correct. I supported the Senator Anderson, former Secretary of Agriculture under President Truman, and others who felt that a flexible program as long as it was flexible between reasonably high figures, which would be 90 percent, or perhaps 86 or 87 percent, the set-aside Amendment was preferable to the 90 percent.

**MR. MADIGAN:** Do you agree with the thinking of most of Democratic strategists that there is a farm revolt on and that the farm vote this year will go to the Dem-

ocrats and if so, wouldn't your position on the ticket in view of your vote on rigid price supports work against your party?

**SENATOR KENNEDY:** I don't think there is any doubt—you mean if I were the nominee—as I have said that would be one of the reasons I think that I probably wouldn't be nominated. But I felt it was the best.

**MR. MADIGAN:** Did you discuss this with Adlai Stevenson?

**SENATOR KENNEDY:** No, no, no, no, I never have, nor with anybody within the Stevenson inner circle.

**MR. MADIGAN:** Do you believe your vote is now right in voting for flexible price supports?

**SENATOR KENNEDY:** Oh, yes, I do. I believe the flexible supports were the program upon which President Truman campaigned in 1948. I think Senator Anderson, who comes from New Mexico, the West, know perhaps as much about the farm problem as anybody in the Democratic Party, I thought that his stand was the correct one. I think it was in the best interest of the farmer, and in the best interest of the country. Now, I don't think there is an awful lot of difference, at least to a farmer. Let me say it this way—I think it is possible to argue that the position which we took which provided in the final analysis in the vote on the Humphrey set-aside which provided for a platform of not less than 87 to 88 percent in cotton, corn and wheat as opposed to 90 percent—I don't think that that difference was bad for the farmer. Now, I think it was the right thing to do, I am for it. If that prevents me from being one of those considered, I will accept that in good graces. I still think it was the right vote.

**MR. MADIGAN:** Senator, one other thing that would come up if you were a candidate for Vice-President, I think you are the only Senator out of 96 in the Senate who is not on the record as having voted to censure Senator McCarthy because you were in the hospital. If you were on the floor, would you have voted to censure Senator McCarthy in December, 1954?

**SENATOR KENNEDY:** Well, I tell you, Mr. Madigan, that that is an issue long past and I was out in the hospital about nine or ten months and I had a bad year. Now, if you can give me back that year—the only good thing about it was perhaps I didn't have to be on the floor when they voted—if you can give me back that year, I will be glad to tell you. But to be more direct about it, I really don't see trying to, at this point, trying to revive that issue and trying to decide what I would do in that case.

**MR. NOVINS:** Senator, you spent a couple of years studying the problem of lobbies and I wonder as a result of your studies if you have arrived at any conclusions now and will you introduce any legislation?

**SENATOR KENNEDY:** Yes, we have a Bill in already and it is going to be other Bills. The lobbying laws are unsatisfactory now for a number of reasons. We are only reporting now about half as much money as being reported as having been spent last year as was reported eight or nine years ago. There is no agency which has jurisdiction over investigating lobby continually, and the reports are filed and they more or less die there. In addition, the Supreme Court decision in the Harris case prevents very clear lines being drawn as to when someone should lobby, what is direct lobbying, and what is indirect lobbying, where you do not need to report.

**MR. NOVINS:** Does your Bill provide for some central agency that will enforce that?

**SENATOR KENNEDY:** That is right. Now, whether it should be a joint Committee of the Congress or a part of the Justice Department, I think is still in the air.

**MR. NOVINS:** Hasn't the recent experience with select committees on lobbying indicated that you can't expect very much results when Congress investigates itself?

**SENATOR KENNEDY:** Oh, no, no, I think there has been a lot of investigations by Congress of itself in history, and there is no reason to think that they cannot be successful.



MR. NOVINS: Well, specifically in terms of lobbies. Nothing has come out of these Committee hearings.

SENATOR KENNEDY: Oh, yes, we are going ahead and investigating the groups on both sides. We are beginning to find out how much has been spent on the gas and oil lobby. We have asked everyone, the public, newspapermen, members of the Congress, to tell us if they know anything about improper or illegal pressures brought to bear, and this thing is just getting started. Before it is finished, I think we are going to cover that thoroughly. I think anybody who has any information, in the press or the radio, rather than saying it is not being done satisfactorily, should, if they do have any information, I think they should bring it to our attention.

MR. NOVINS: I hope you understand that I didn't say that.

SENATOR KENNEDY: No, but I think this thing is just beginning and we've got another nine months to go and it is a most complex job. I think it is going to turn up a good deal.

MR. NOVINS: Do you agree with the gas lobby's description of their own activities as "educational?"

SENATOR KENNEDY: That was one of its effects, but it was obviously more direct. But, most of the people who voted for the gas lobby, and there were some exceptions, voted for the Harris-Fulbright Bill, came from areas which were producing areas and they represented the interests of their constituents.

MR. SYLVESTER: Senator Kennedy, I don't want to dig up, as you say, something that has passed, but I was interested in what seemed to me your evasion on the McCarthy thing.

SENATOR KENNEDY: It is not an evasion, but I think it is just like a jury. If somebody was, as it turned out, on the jury—and it's perhaps regrettable that I wasn't there—but if you ask somebody who has been on a jury two years later what they would have done in a case if they had been—

MR. SYLVESTER: Well, let's leave that out and ask what you thought of what the jury did?

SENATOR KENNEDY: I thought that its action was probably reasonable.

MR. SYLVESTER: Well, that is a fair-enough answer. To go to one other question I would like to ask you: You have named two things, as I understand it, why you feel you might not be asked to be the Vice President. Would age be another one?

SENATOR KENNEDY: Yes, I think that is a factor. What my judgment is going to be, for what it is worth, when you get to the convention if the Southerners feel that a Southerner should be nominated, he will be nominated. If the Southerners feel that that is not essential, and the Westerners feel that it is essential for them, then a Westerner will be nominated. If they don't feel that way and if they feel an Easterner would help the ticket the most, then the Easterner would be nominated. My guess is that it will probably be somebody from the South. Governor Dever, coming back from Europe yesterday, said that he thought a Southerner, somebody like Senator Sparkman who ran in 1952 or Senator Gore or someone like Senator Symington or perhaps somebody from the West Coast. My judgment is that is what is going to happen.

MR. MADIGAN: You mean by that, Senator, that you don't think that the Presidential nominee should have the right to pick his running mate?

SENATOR KENNEDY: I think that he will pick the running mate, as I stated at the beginning, who will meet the standards which I set. One of those standards is to help the Party win the election.

MR. MADIGAN: In other words, the South is going to control the convention in so far as the second choice is concerned?

SENATOR KENNEDY: No, but I think that they will have a strong voice.

MR. WINSHIP: If you had a guess, who do you think will be the nominee—the Vice-Presidential?

SENATOR KENNEDY: I couldn't name them because I think there are four or five candidates.

MR. WINSHIP: You have mentioned Gore before.

SENATOR KENNEDY: I have, and I could mention Governor Hodges, Governor Collins of Florida or George Smathers or Estes—or Lyndon Johnson, who I don't think would want it. Obviously, if he wanted it, he would be it. But I think he feels his present responsibility is enough. And as I said, Stuart Symington. As I said, there is any number of people, and they are all from different areas and all meet a different need for the Party, so that is why I say it is awfully difficult.

MR. WINSHIP: You started to say Estes—I suppose you were going to say Estes Kefauver.

SENATOR KENNEDY: He is the only one I know. I think he would be a strong contender.

MR. MADIGAN: Senator, in your home State of Massachusetts, there are reports of bad blood between you and Majority Leader McCormack. Is there?

SENATOR KENNEDY: No, there isn't. We had a very amicable conversation last week.

MR. MADIGAN: Is it not a fact that your man defeated his to control the Party in the State?

SENATOR KENNEDY: We supported different candidates for the Chairman of the State Committee and the candidate which I supported, and others, Governor Dever, and others supported, was successful.

MR. MADIGAN: How about you and Mr. Furcolo. There is bad blood between you and Mr. Furcolo who is the candidate for Governor?

SENATOR KENNEDY: No, there isn't. We have had many friendly conversations. Your information is just not up to date.

MR. MADIGAN: Oh, there was bad blood previously?

SENATOR KENNEDY: No, we were very satisfactory. Everybody in politics has disagreements over what course of action should be followed and I disagreed and others have disagreed with me. The Party is united in Massachusetts and I think it has a good chance to be successful.

MR. WINSHIP: You will actively campaign for Mr. Furcolo this year?

SENATOR KENNEDY: If he is nominated in September, I will.

MR. SYLVESTER: Had you campaigned for him last time, you think that would have made the difference between election and defeat for him?

SENATOR KENNEDY: Unfortunately, Mr. Sylvester, I was in the hospital again. I wasn't there.

MR. SYLVESTER: Your people didn't even give him a word of help, did they?

SENATOR KENNEDY: I endorsed the ticket, but I did not specifically pick out Mr. Furcolo.

MR. WINSHIP: One more Massachusetts question. Where do you think the forty Massachusetts votes will go after the first ballot?

SENATOR KENNEDY: I think that Congressman McCormack on the first ballot is a favorite son. After that, for Governor Stevenson.

MR. NOVINS: Thank you very much, indeed, Senator, for coming here today to Face the Nation.

KENNEDY TEXT: RE - McCARTHY

Insert intended for page 22

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"MR. PRESIDENT:

"The issue before the Senate is of such importance that it is difficult for any member not to set forth clearly his position on this matter.

There are difficulties, too, in explaining in a limited number of words the deep-rooted feelings which motivate one on such an issue where so many emotions run high. I am not insensitive to the fact that my constituents perhaps contain a greater proportion of devotees on each side of this matter than the constituency of any other Senator. The zeal with which these citizens view this issue emphasizes their sincere concern for exposing the Communist threat and for combating Communism without adopting its methods. I respect that sincerity. I share that concern.

But the issue today, in my opinion, cannot be decided by our feelings toward Communism or even our own personal or political security. If our vote is to be meaningful, those collateral matters obscuring the issue must be dispelled:

1. First, this issue involved neither the motives nor the sincerity of the Junior Senator from Wisconsin. Many times I have voted with Senator McCarthy, for the full appropriation of funds for his Committee, for this amendment to reduce our assistance to nations trading with the Communists, and on other matters. I have not sought to end his investigations of Communist subversion, nor is the pending measure related to either the desirability or continuation of those investigations. Nor does this motion affect Senator McCarthy's committee chairmanships or seat in the Senate. Those issues, and the issue of the Senator's personal popularity, are not before the Senate at this time.

"In short, we are not asked to vote for or against Senator McCarthy, but for or against a motion censuring certain practices in which he acquiesced. As stressed by the late Senator Norris with respect to the censure of Senator Bingham in 1929:

"This is not a question of the vindication of the Senator from Connecticut or of his condemnation. It is a question of the honor of this body. It is a question as to whether the Senate is going to approve certain actions taken by.... one of its Members, and because it happens to be the Senator from Connecticut does not make it a personal matter by any means.....While I regret that it may hurt the feelings or injure the standard of some member of this body, it seems to me we owe it to the country to take that action or ourselves stand condemned in the eyes of respectable people."

2. Secondly, this issue must be separated for each Senator from the character, motives and reasoning of the sponsors of this vaguely-worded resolution. I, for one, cannot accept the various grounds for censure presented on various occasions by the Senator from Vermont. Although he has cited incidents stretching back as far as 1949 in support of his resolution, he has since that date voted to seat the Senator from Wisconsin as Chairman of the Government Operations Committee, voted funds for his investigations, and failed -- until recently -- to protest publicly these past acts which now loom so large in his mind. Indeed, as recently as last March, after Senator McCarthy had described in a speech the conduct of the Democratic party as "twenty years of treason" or at best "criminal stupidity", the Senator from Vermont the next day was reported by the Burlington Free Press to have

called this speech "magnificent for the Republican Party," and an indication that Senator McCarthy had "hit the sawdust trail"; and, far from censuring those actions of the Senator which he now condemns, the Senator from Vermont stated that "All would be forgiven if he (McCarthy) will only take the position and perform the way he did" the previous night!

I do not feel free, therefore, to base my vote upon the long-past misconduct of Senator McCarthy to which I registered no public objection at that time. Nor do I agree with those who would override our basic concepts of due process by censuring an individual without reference to any single act deserving of censure.

Nor do I agree with those who would vote to censure Senator McCarthy in order to conciliate foreign opinion in regard to the United States. The hostility shown to Senator McCarthy by those outside the United States is not, in my opinion, altogether the result of this own actions, however serious they may be, but rather because he offers an easy mark to those who wish to attack the prestige and power of the United States. Even if Senator McCarthy were removed from public life, these same forces would speedily fill the void left by his passing. They would say that we were not worthy to have the leadership of the Free World because of our failure to clear Dr. Oppenheimer, because of our failure to give comfort and support to the Communist government in Guatemala, because we took protective action against the Communists in the South China Sea, or for still more and as yet unborn spectres. In short, it is because we are the leaders of the Free World that we receive this ceaseless hostility, rather than because of any single man or any single action.

Viewing the instant case in the light of this background, the responsibility of the Senate is clear. Many conclusions of the recent Army-McCarthy Hearings must in fairness await the Report of the Committee. But no Committee Report is required to tell us or the nation that the dignity of the Senate was impaired by the conduct of Mr. Roy Cohn, until recently Chief Counsel of the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations. The evidence is unusually clear that;

First, Mr. Cohn used his official position, his relationship with Senator McCarthy, and his reputation and authority as Chief Counsel to the Sub-committee for the purpose of promoting the personal welfare of his friend David Schine;

Secondly, Mr. Cohn requested favors and preferential treatment from the Department of the Army at the very time he was investigating that arm of the Executive Branch;

Third, he sought such preference in a manner which made it clear that reprisals would result from the denial of his request; and

Fourth, he used threatening and abusive language, and sought to employ the authority of the United States Senate as a tool to achieve personal goals.

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of Bob Healy's  
from which copied



Third , that Senator McCarthy not only permitted and tolerated Mr. Cohn's improper means to obtain preferential treatment from the Army for Schine over a continuing period but also refused to curb Cohn with respect to such conduct and gave both Cohn and the Army every reason to believe that he acquiesced in it, and accepted and defended the results (in terms of Schine's extraordinary pass privileges of Mr. Cohn's activities, even though he had stated that Mr. Schine was not "indispensable" to Subcommittee work; and Fourth, that at no time did the Senator object to such efforts in the presence of Mr. Cohn or otherwise restrain him, nor has he at any subsequent time publicly criticized or repudiated such conduct.

Indeed, when Mr. Cohn's resignation was forced by the attitude of four Senators on the Subcommittee, from the ranks of both parties, Senator McCarthy called it a matter of "great satisfaction to the Communists and the fellow-travelers." And only last Wednesday night, he again gave Mr. Cohn his unqualified endorsement and his pledge to use him in the future, stating that "he has not and cannot ever resign as long as I am Chairman of the Committee."

As in the case of Senator Bingham, it may well be that Senator McCarthy's acquiescence was "not the result of corrupt motives" on his part. As in the case of Senator Newberry, such activities on the part of this staff may even have been carried on "without his knowledge and consent" at least in the first instance. But this does not permit

purely a question of the dignity of the United States Senate.

I.

We are all cognizant of the special fiduciary relationship between a Senator and the professional staff of his office or Committees. Our assistants serve, Roland Young pointed out in his treatise on Congress, as our "ears and eyes." Their influence is gained, as pointed out by Lindsay Rogers in "The Staffing of Congress," in part

"from the inevitable tendency of all busy persons to get rid of routine tasks which they think staff assistants will be competent to perform. Sometimes it turns out that the tasks are not routine at all but are in fact policy determining."

Such assistants may sign our names, record our views, commit our votes, prepare our remarks and in a multitude of ways influence our conduct and our relations with each other and the public. A Committee Counsel, whose assignment to the Chairman is dependent under the Legislative Reorganization Act upon his "fitness to perform the duties of the office," is in an especially sensitive position, particularly on an investigating committee. His action on behalf of the Chairman may have far-reaching effects upon the lives, fortunes and reputations of fellow citizens and the Chairman's fellow Senators. His powers of investigation, subpoena, interrogation and declaration--which rest upon his actual or apparent authority from the Chairman, and in the final analysis from the Senate itself--are tremendous in scope and potential effect, carrying with them implications far greater than mere idle threats.

Finally, I must express disagreement with those who support this resolution because Senator McCarthy has split the country wide apart. I hope no one is going to vote for this resolution on the assumption that its passage will ease that split. Indeed I think that the action we are about to take, precipitated as it has been by the Senator from Vermont, will have serious repercussions upon the social fabric of this country and must be so recognized.

Thus I want to make it clear that my vote shall be based solely on the grounds set forth in these remarks, and no others. As precedent for this position, I refer to the remarks of Senator George in 1929 stating that his vote for censure of Bingham was based solely upon his own interpretation of that resolution--which he would have preferred to have been reworded.

3. Third, this issue involves no partisan considerations. My political affiliation, and that of the Senator from Wisconsin, are irrelevant, just as the affiliations of previously censured Senators - Bingham, Tillman and McLaurin - were considered irrelevant by the large proportion of Senators in both parties supporting those resolutions.

There are those who would censure Senator McCarthy because of his divisive effect upon the American people. There are those, on the other hand, who oppose censure on the grounds that his intimate identification with the anti-Communist cause would be looked upon as a blow in their favor. There are those who say the Communists seek the adoption of this motion and those who say the Communists oppose it. But, in my judgment, none of this is at issue today. I shall not vote on the basis of what the Communists want or don't want. My vote involves

serves as a warning to all Senators to guard the dignity of the Senate whenever they entrust senatorial prerogatives to members of their staffs. It also serves, I might add, as clear notice to the Army that the Senate of the United States is taking action to reaffirm its status and dignity, and that we look to the Army to take similar action in correcting those weaknesses and dishonor on its part which were demonstrated in the same affair.

It is for these reasons, Mr. President, and these reasons only, that I shall vote to censure the Junior Senator from Wisconsin. It is because, as Senator Norris stated in the final words delivered concerning the Bingham resolution:

"When the Senate takes this action it seems to me it will have accomplished great good for the welfare of the country, for the practice of drafting of laws, and for the honor and dignity of the United States Senate."

him to escape liability for the acts of his agent, or permit the Senate to avoid its responsibility in censuring the conduct in which he acquiesced.

Thus this censure motion, like those previously adopted by the Senate, is more concerned with the dignity and honor of this body than with the personal characteristics of any individual Senator. The censure resolution in the Tillman-McLaurin case in 1902 censured those Senators by a vote of 54 to 12 "for their breach of the privileges and dignity of this body" in order, according to the accompanying Committee Report that the "public good and the dignity of the Senate will be alike best promoted and protected," The action of the Senate in the Newberry case which included a partial censure, "severely condemned and disapproved" conduct which the Senate deemed to be "contrary to sound public policy harmful to the honor and dignity of the Senate and dangerous to the perpetuity of a free government." The Bingham censure motion condemned the conduct of the Senator from Connecticut as "contrary to good morals and senatorial ethics" and tending "to bring the Senate into dishonor and disrepute."

Thus the Senate is again faced with the necessity of reasserting its honor and dignity in the face of an abuse of those privileges affirmed by one of its members. Our action today, as in the previous motions of censure adopted by this body, does not involve the vindication or condemnation of an individual Senator. It does not involve his views and objectives in years gone by. It is instead an action which serves to express our severe disapproval of particular conduct permitted, if not encouraged, by a particular Senator. It is an action which

Thus the misconduct and abuse of power by a Committee Counsel is not merely the concern of his Chairman or his Committee. It is the concern of the entire Senate, who has paid his salary, entrusted him with certain powers and granted him the use of its name and constitutional prerogatives. If his behavior brings disrespect and dishonor, it falls not upon him or his Chairman alone but upon the entire Senate.

Nor can a Chairman or any Senator avoid his responsibility to the Senate for the misconduct of his aide. The laws of principal and agent are peculiarly applicable to their relationship. A Senator, much as any other principal may be liable even for the specifically unauthorized acts of his agent, whenever his own conduct, statements, silence or acquiescence to others or in the agent's presence indicate his consent to such acts. His failure to object to or repudiate the acts of his agent may reasonably be interpreted to be an affirmance and ratification of them.

Such is the common law relationship between principal and agent; and such is the practical relationship between a Senator and his staff which the Senate has recognized on previous occasions.

In 1929, by a vote of 54 to 22, the Senate censured Senator Bingham of Connecticut for permitting a member of his professional staff to attend executive committee sessions despite the fact--which he failed to disclose -- that this assistant was a paid lobbyist seeking to influence the very legislation under action, the Senate declared, "while not the result of corrupt motive on the part of the Senator from Connecticut, is contrary to good morals and senatorial ethics and tends to bring the Senate into dishonor and disrepute." It was not the affair of

one Senator alone; for as pointed out by Senator George at that time:

"The official act of each one of us has a public quality and that act is either in the interest of the public good or it is contrary to the interest of the public. It either promotes confidence in the processes of government or it tends to weaken public confidence in the processes of government...."

Senator Bingham's motives, it was pointed out, may not have been dishonorable, and his role may have been comparatively passive; but he could not on those grounds escape the censure of his colleagues for this breach of Senate dignity committed under his auspices.

Similarly, in 1922, the Senate--while voting to seat Senator Newberry of Michigan--stated in its resolution that the expenditures made not by himself but on his behalf had been excessive,

"and that the expenditure of such excessive sums in behalf of a candidate, either with or without his knowledge and consent, being contrary to sound public policy, harmful to the honor and dignity of the Senate and dangerous to the perpetuity of a free government.....(is) hereby severely condemned and disapproved."

I think it is clear that the Senate of the United States, when confronted with conduct on the part of a senatorial assistant or Committee Counsel which tends to injure the dignity of the Senate, has the right -- indeed the obligation -- to take action censuring the actions of the Senator who was responsible for, who acquiesced in, and who ratified and adopted the acts of his Counsel.

Braintrust piece by Thomas Winship

Intended for insert - page 24



# Kennedy Moves to Organize

## Senator Seeking Leader For Speech-Writing Team

By THOMAS WINSHIP

Sen. Jack Kennedy is on the verge of "owning" a remarkable segment of New England's university and industrial brain power—lock, stock and speechwriting pad.



WINSHIP

Presently Kennedy's group of Greater Boston presidential advisers is so loosely drawn that a few of them also do chores for Adlai Stevenson, Nelson Rockefeller and Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.), between giving Kennedy assists. At this point no one is kidding anyone else, and this wearing of two and three presidential hats doesn't bother Kennedy or the professors.

★ ★ ★

For Kennedy to have exclusive writing help from many in Greater Boston's academic community, two things must happen, say several professors for Kennedy.

First, Kennedy must corner

an intellectual heavyweight of national stature to head his speech-writing group in the campaign setup.

He must be someone, the professors say, who can pick up the phone and call experts

on campuses across the country for a speech, a position paper, or an idea on domestic and foreign issues.

Kennedy's friends at Harvard and M.I.T. hope this will happen when the Massachusetts senator makes his bid official the first of the year.

The other condition needed to make some New England eggheads less skittish about signing up with the Kennedy bandwagon right now, is a better picture of Humphrey's and Adlai's political future.

Many professors frankly say they like Humphrey more than Jack and admire Stevenson more. Many have an emotional and friendship allegiance to either Hubert or Adlai, but down deep think both probably have had it.

But for old times' sake, they hate to desert the Humphrey or Adlai cause until they have more conviction about where Kennedy is going, and about the future of the Adlai and Hubert candidacies.

★ ★ ★

Here's how the so-called Kennedy academic group in Greater Boston came into being and operates today:

The system that Kennedy has evolved is a new kind of working relationship between the elected politician and the campus braintruster. In 1952 and 1956, Adlai had a closer relationship with a



GAVIN



GALBRAITH



W.O.

much smaller campus kitchen cabinet than Kennedy now has.

More than a year ago, Kennedy's very bright speech writer, Ted Sorensen, and his friend, Prof. Earl Latham of Amherst organized the group. Latham did some polling for Kennedy during his 1956 vice presidential effort.

First formal overture was an informal meeting more than a year ago at the Commander Hotel in Cambridge. About 20 Harvard, M. I. T., and other Greater Boston professors and instructors showed up. Also a couple from the Arthur D. Little Co. came. Sorensen presided.

The second and last gathering of the clan was at the Harvard Club of Boston, last February. Kennedy chaired this meeting. He called on his distinguished group for their views on what would be the key issues in the 1960 campaign, and how they would develop them.

Since then Kennedy partisan their separate Latham remains in year as a vice government. emphasizes that not a high-profile for-President isn't.

Fred Holburnment instructor work for Sen. his Washington handles much with the team. In Cambridge assistant is on Smith College. Diedri Hende.

Miss Hend Kennedy official the senator's advisor of go searcher who various professional done Kennedy.

Before Miss a professor's Kennedy writes h

# Organize Campus Braintrust



GALBRAITH

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an was at the Har-  
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edy chaired this  
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group for their  
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Since then most of the Ken-  
nedy partisans have been going  
their separate ways, though  
Latham remains titular head.  
Latham is in Cambridge this  
year as a visiting professor on  
government at Harvard. He  
emphasizes that the group is  
not a high-pressure Kennedy-  
for-President operation—and it  
isn't.

Fred Holburn, Harvard gov-  
ernment instructor on leave to  
work for Senator Kennedy in  
his Washington office, also  
handles much of the contact  
with the teaching fraternity.

In Cambridge, Ltham's as-  
sistant is one of his recent  
Smith College proteges—pretty  
Diedri Henderson.

Miss Henderson is on the  
Kennedy office staff and is  
the senator's campus amb-  
sador of goodwill and re-  
searcher who calls on the  
various professors who have  
done Kennedy chores.

Before Miss Henderson visits  
a professor's office, Sen. Ken-  
bedy writes him a letter ask-

ing for help and advising that  
Miss Henderson will pay a call  
on him.

Some of the professors like  
the arrangement because Miss  
Henderson—a bright person—  
can take notes and pick up al-  
ready-prepared memoranda,  
articles, or recent speeches.  
This saves the professor the  
time-consuming job of pound-  
ing out a new finished paper.

It also leaves the professor  
in a less committed position,  
vis-a-vis other candidates.

### Some Feel Uncomfortable

Others, on the other hand,  
feel a little uncomfortable with  
this somewhat detached opera-  
tion, because it offers the op-  
portunity for possible vital  
slippage between a professor's  
thoughts and nuances on a  
complicated subject, and the  
Kennedy speech, which is  
finished off in Washington.

Who makes up this intellec-  
tual candle power that Ken-  
nedy is tapping from time to  
time?

At the moment most agree

that Prof. Archibald Cox of  
Harvard Law School probably  
is the non-political expert  
closest to the senator. He was  
at Kennedy's side as chief  
architect of the new Labor Re-  
form Bill for hundreds of  
hours the past year.

Profs. Kenneth Galbraith  
and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.  
of Harvard, are two others  
whom Kennedy consults fre-  
quently. Both have declined so  
far to head up any Kennedy  
speech advisory staff. Both  
were Adlai writers in 1952 and  
1956. Galbraith is publicly  
committed to Kennedy.

Others who have helped Ken-  
nedy include Prof. Walter W.  
Rostow, M.I.T. Russian expert;  
David Frisch, M.I.T. nuclear  
physicist; Harvard Prof. Henry  
Kissinger; Associate Professor  
Robert C. Wood, expert on ur-  
ban affairs and author of  
"Suburbia;" Harvard Prof.  
Sam Beers, chairman of Dept.  
of Government and national  
head of Americans for Demo-  
cratic Action; Harvard Law  
School Profs. Mark DeWolfe

How Jr.; W. Barton Leach, a  
Republican and an authority  
on military policy and Abram  
Chayes, corporation law  
teacher.

James M. Gavin, head of  
Arthur D. Little, former Army  
chief of staff, a gifted writer,  
idea man and speaker, also  
has sat in with the Kennedy  
brain trusters.

Others in the Kennedy group  
are Prof. Martin Myerson,  
director of the joint Harvard-  
M.I.T. Urban Studies Center;  
Lucien Pye, M.I.T. professor of  
political science and an author-  
ity on Southeastern Asia.

One typical Kennedy effort  
now going on in Cambridge is  
a legal research on the Affa-  
davit-of-Disbelief Controver-  
sy raging on many college  
campuses. Kennedy is going  
to make a fight for its modi-  
fication in Congress next year.

When politicians and uni-  
versity intelligentsia get to-  
gether in a presidential year—  
especially in a year when "egg-  
head" is not a naughty word—  
there are plenty of arguments  
and good speeches.

# Harvard Candidates Looming Big For Kennedy New Frontier Posts



BOWLES



FREUND



HENDERSON



COX



BUNDY



GALBRAITH

By THOMAS WINSHIP

WASHINGTON, Dec. 7.—Walk around this town, talk to Kennedy staff people, friends of Kennedy staff people, friends of friends of Kennedy, Capitol newspapermen and the doorman, and you gather this bundle of speculative reports on who will man President-elect Kennedy's New Frontier:

Kennedy definitely has decided he wants a seat warmer in his Senate post for the next two years, just in case his brother Bob or another special friend wants to run for the job in 1962.

The latest candidate to go into the hopper is Boston attorney and civic leader Edward F. Hanify. The Ropes, Gray, Coolidge and Best senior partner, has wide respect everywhere in the Boston community. He never has dabbled in elective politics and could qualify admirably as a New Frontiersman, they say.

\*\*\*

Mark down with confidence

for a top job, perhaps even Undersecretary of State for Administration, McGeorge Bundy. The young Harvard dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences fits Kennedy's book on several counts.

He has an immense talent for administration. He enjoys Washington and has a family tradition in public service. His father, Harvey Bundy, was clerk to Oliver Wendell Holmes, special assistant to the late Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and his brother Bill is a ranking official in Central Intelligence Agency.

He is a close friend of the President-elect. And most important of all, he is a Republican-for-Kennedy. Kennedy's list of possible and available appointees is woefully short of Republicans.

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Chester Bowles, if he doesn't make Secretary of State, is a good bet to head a reshaped Aid to Under-developed Countries Program which will be combined with Voice of America propaganda efforts within the State Department.

Bowles has urged Kennedy to appoint professors and other foreign experts to important embassy posts, instead of the fat cats who sometimes have difficulty pronouncing the names of the countries to which they are assigned.

First professor to make the embassy speculation list is J. Kenneth Galbraith of Harvard, as ambassador to India. Galbraith, one of Kennedy's economic advisors, is writing a book on India's economy.

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Prof. Archibald Cox of Harvard Law School some weeks ago was considered a shoo-in for Solicitor General; now is being edged for the post by Harvard Law Prof. Paul Freund, say the ready-answer

boys. Freund always was tabbed as Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter's personal choice to succeed him on the bench.

Cox was offered one job in the Kennedy administration but turned it down. He is certain to be offered something to his liking before all good jobs are filled. No one worked harder in the last three years for Kennedy than Cox.

First, he helped Kennedy write his Labor Reform Bill, and all Fall he headed a speech-drafting and research crew in Washington under the most trying circumstances. The Cox team efforts seldom got through to Kennedy. Ted Sorensen, Kennedy's top speech writer, and his airborne group handled all speeches without help from anyone.

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Network newsmen Ed Murrow and Blair Clark, founding editor of the defunct New Hampshire Sunday News, soon will see Kennedy to give him some ideas on making more effective use of television in his administration. Clark is being mentioned as a candidate for the next vacancy on the Federal Communications Commission.

Deidri Henderson of Essex is another Massachusetts name sure to appear on some office either in the White House or in the foreign affairs side of government. She was staff director of the Cambridge Professors-for-Kennedy group and is a Kennedy family friend.

Kennedy Want Ad being telephoned all over the country: More candidates with expertise—Republicans especially desired—to feed into the Kennedy I.B.M. machines.

The Boston Globe, March 30, 1962

TED KENNEDY TELLS  
ABOUT HARVARD  
EXAMINATION INCIDENT

By Robert Healy

Edward M. Kennedy, candidate for the U.S. Senate, in an interview yesterday explained the circumstances surrounding his withdrawal from Harvard in 1951 when he was a 19-year-old Freshman.

The story, sometimes distorted, has been making the rounds in the Massachusetts political rumor mill for some time.

Kennedy said he wanted to set the record straight.

"I entered Harvard in 1950 at the age of 18" he said. "During the second semester of my freshman year I made a mistake. I was having difficulty in one course, a foreign language.

"I became so apprehensive about it that I arranged for a fellow freshman friend of mine to take the examination for me in that course," said Kennedy.

He continued: "The dean learned of this and my friend and I were asked to withdraw with the understanding that we might reapply for admission after a period of absence, provided that during that time we could demonstrate a record of constructive and responsible citizenship."

Kennedy said he chose to enlist in the U.S. Army and served two years in Europe as an infantryman.

"Upon my return to the United States I made application to Harvard and was accepted for readmission. My friend who was also readmitted and I later represented Harvard in inter-collegiate athletics," said Kennedy.

"I worked hard, passed all my courses-some with honors-and was graduated in good standing in 1956," said Kennedy.

"The authorities at that institution were fully aware of all the facts surrounding the Harvard incident. They have an honor system at the law school of the University of Virginia I was accepted at that institution and graduated in good standing three years later," said Kennedy.

"What I did was wrong", he added. "I have regretted it ever since. The unhappiness I caused my family and friends, even though 11 years ago, has been a bitter experience for me, but it has also been a very valuable lesson.

"That is the story," said Kennedy.

Dean Frederick D. G. Ribble of the University of Virginia Law School said of Kennedy: "He came here from Harvard as a graduate in good standing. He had a satisfactory record at Harvard and had come to us recommended by his tutor there.

"We felt his character was excellent. Harvard had endorsed both his character and his performance," said the law school dean.

"We were thoroughly satisfied with him as a student here. His conduct was excellent.

"We were also thoroughly acquainted with the details of his withdrawal from Harvard and we took the position- and properly so-that if Harvard was satisfied with him and awarded him a degree that was enough for us," said Dean Ribble.

Harvard University's dean John U. Monroe said that so far as Harvard was concerned this was a "closed affair". He said, "Any information that anyone wants about Edward Kennedy's record at Harvard should come from him. This is our regular policy."