

**John E. Nolan Oral History Interview – RFK#1, 07/17/1970**  
Administrative Information

**Creator:** John E. Nolan  
**Interviewer:** Roberta W. Greene  
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**Biographical Note**

Nolan was the administrative assistant to the Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy [RFK], from 1963 to 1964. In this interview he discusses discussions of the possibility of RFK running for President in 1968; helping plan RFK's trip to Eastern Europe in 1967 and opposition to the trip; Nolan's trip to Vietnam; RFK's decision not to visit Vietnam; working with Senator RFK; the Tet Offensive, 1968, and changing views of the Vietnam War; discussing Eugene McCarthy's 1968 presidential campaign with RFK; traveling to California for RFK; and working with Jesse M. Unruh in California, among other issues.

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
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John Nolan

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

April 7, 1971



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Oral History Interview

with

JOHN NOLAN

July 17, 1970

Washington, D.C.

By Roberta<sup>W</sup> Greene

For the Robert F. Kennedy Oral History Program  
↑  
of the Kennedy Library

GREENE: Let me start by asking you about Robert Kennedy's interest in going to Eastern Europe in '67. I know you were called in to help plan and advance that trip. What happened with it and why?

NOLAN: He was interested in going to Eastern Europe, in part, I think, because he had never been there, and I think possibly also because he was frustrated by the relative inactivity of what he was doing then.

This was the fall of 1967, after ~~[Eugene J.]~~  
McCarthy's <sup>[Eugene J. McCarthy]</sup> candidacy started, and it was a  
very difficult, very trying time for him,  
for Bob ~~[Robert F. Kennedy]~~ I don't remem-  
ber exactly how it started, but, at some  
point, he called me. He said that he was  
thinking about going to Eastern Europe and  
did I have any ideas or did I have any  
suggestions on what where he should go, or  
what he should do, or something like that.  
So then we worked on it for a period of  
several weeks, a month, maybe.

GREENE: What do you mean by "worked on it"?

NOLAN: Well, we worked out a tentative schedule  
and itinerary. We contacted the State  
[United States Information Agency]  
Department and USIA, and others in government  
who might have some interest or responsibil-  
ity in the area. I know I met several times  
with <sup>de B.</sup> [Nicholas] Nick Katzenbach at State,  
with <sup>[Arthur S. Olsen]</sup> [Arthur S.] Art Olsen at either State  
or USIA. I contacted all of the embassies  
of the countries that were either on the

agenda or could be. I met with either the ambassador or somebody else at several of those embassies, I don't know: the Rumanian Embassy, the Czechoslovakian Embassy, the Czechoslovakian Ambassador. We got stacks of hand-out stuff with regard to the countries and what was what and where.

GREENE: What kind of a response did you get both over at State and USIA and from the embassies?

NOLAN: Well, <sup>that was</sup> it's always kind of a game, you know. I remember talking in considerable detail <sup>with</sup> to Art Olsen about it. Art had been with us in Eastern Europe when we were there before, in 1964, ~~and~~ he was <sup>a</sup> ~~An~~ Eastern, I think, ~~Eastern Europe~~. . . . He was a correspondent for the New York Times and I think was stationed in Eastern Europe or was stationed in. . . . [ Interruption ] And he was interested in the trip.

GREENE: What about Katzenbach?

NOLAN: Well, Nick was always helpful.



GREENE: Nobody accused you of playing politics?

NOLAN: Well, not in those terms. I think that

[Robert F.] Bob Kennedy's trips abroad  
were, after the President's assassination, were  
always viewed with mixed feelings by the  
[Lyndon B. Johnson] Administration. That

was certainly true in Latin America in

...<sup>GREENE: Africa. NOLAN: ...</sup>  
1965, and after. So ~~some~~ <sup>no</sup>body ~~was~~

really. I mean, we never got sabotaged or anything,

But some people were friendlier than  
others, in terms of people <sup>that you would</sup> ~~they do~~ work  
with, State Department people.

GREENE: In his discussions with you, did he link <sup>it,</sup>  
the trip at all <sup>to</sup> with a possible candidacy  
in '68?

NOLAN: No, definitely no. No, the trip would sub-  
stantially foreclose any candidacy. Trips  
are big deals. ~~They~~ <sup>you</sup> really require weeks  
of preparation in advance, two or three,  
~~weeks~~ plus in execution, and they would  
leave everybody <sup>that</sup> ~~who~~ had anything to do  
with <sup>them</sup> ~~him~~ drained, including him. When he

would finish a trip--when he came back from South Africa or when he came back from South America--he was just incapable of doing anything almost for a week or so.

GREENE:

<sup>Just</sup>  
~~This~~ physical exhaustion?

NOLAN:

I think after the African trip they went to Athens or someplace and just holed up for a couple of days and slept. I know I spent some time with him right after they got back from South America, and he didn't even know what countries he had been in. I mean, <sup>it's</sup> a very exhausting thing. <sup>So</sup> In terms of the candidacy, not only are you putting all of this effort into something that doesn't have any direct relevance to ~~the~~ <sup>a</sup> candidacy, but then you're out of communication, substantially, all the way for a <sup>prolonged</sup> ~~long~~ period of time. Then you come back and you're totally <sup>You know,</sup> ~~it~~ just takes that much longer to focus into it. So, I think that any ~~consideration~~ <sup>serious consideration,</sup> of ~~the~~ trip was mutually exclusive <sup>with</sup> ~~of~~ consideration of the

candidacy. The candidacy really came quite a while after <sup>that</sup> two months or so after.

GREENE: But there had been earlier discussions, <sup>I think</sup> at least general discussions, <sup>^</sup> This trip was supposed to be scheduled for December, is that right?

NOLAN: Yes.

GREENE: You don't remember any specific conversations with him about a possible candidacy before the trip came up?

NOLAN: I don't in connection with the trip. The trip was pre-empted <sup>ive, so</sup> to the extent that you were working on <sup>the</sup> trip, It meant that ~~the candidacy~~ <sup>you</sup> couldn't have a candidacy.

GREENE: Were there any substantial discussions before that, <sup>unrelated to the trip</sup> about a candidacy, that you can remember?

NOLAN: Well, I don't think ~~there's ever~~ <sup>the</sup> subject of running for the Presidency was ever really very far away from his mind. I think that ~~was~~ <sup>he</sup> worked on a

lot of other things, he thought about a lot of other things, but that was <sup>an</sup> inescapable reality, <sup>a</sup> constant reality.

GREENE: Well, anyway, what happened with that trip? Why did it fall through <sup>and</sup> how did things develop after that?

NOLAN: Well, the beginning of the decision <sup>to--</sup> not to go to Eastern Europe <sup>from</sup> perhaps the beginning of it altogether, but certainly <sup>in</sup> the beginning of it from my point of view <sup>that</sup> was a lunch I had with Adam Walinsky at his instance. Have you talked to Adam <sup>Walinsky</sup> about this?

GREENE: We've started <sup>with Adam,</sup> but we've never gotten this far; so whatever you tell us will be helpful <sup>as a matter of fact</sup>

NOLAN: <sup>OK</sup> O.K. Adam called me one day and asked if we could have lunch to talk about the trip, and we did, <sup>and</sup> Adam <sup>Walinsky</sup> thought that he should not go to Eastern Europe. He was against the trip. We spent a lunch just talking about it, with Adam raising the arguments why he shouldn't go to Eastern Europe <sup>and so on</sup>



And..

GREENE:

And <sup>is</sup> this ~~was~~ just the two of you? or was the Senator..

NOLAN:

Just the two of us. The Senator was not there. He was ~~was~~ I don't think he was in town. I think he was <sup>at</sup> in Sun Valley, <sup>Idaho</sup>

GREENE:

Around Christmas?

NOLAN:

Well, no. This would have been, maybe, early November, around Thanksgiving or

GREENE: That's very possible. NOLAN:

something like that. I have all these dates.

GREENE: Oh, that's good to know. NOLAN:...

NOLAN:

You know, I keep a diary, so I can tell when I had lunch with Adam ~~Walinsky~~ and so on, <sup>but</sup> I really don't recall it. I recall that on on the week-end of Thanksgiving we were at the lake and Thanksgiving is what, early November?

GREENE:

Usually late November. The last Thursday in November.

NOLAN:

Well, on that week-end, I had lunch with Adam ~~Walinsky~~ before that, I think sometime during that week and then, all during that week-end, the subject of the trip being cancelled was in the air, and he, the

Senator [Robert F. Kennedy] called me at the  
Lake two or three times over the weekend  
to talk about it, and I think that Ted  
[Theodore C.] Sorensen <sup>[Theodore C. Sorensen]</sup> ~~was~~ had been  
in Eastern Europe and thought he should  
go there. He thought particularly he  
should go to Rumania. By this time, I  
think most of the rest of us thought he  
should not go to Eastern Europe, and then,  
he asked me to come by on Monday, the Mon-  
day after Thanksgiving, which I did. It was  
still in the air for -- at that time and  
during the following week. But, back to  
the lunch with Adam [Walinsky]. Adam argued  
that if he went to Eastern Europe, he was  
placing himself in an impossible position  
as far as the Vietnam issue was concerned.  
He couldn't go to Eastern Europe and say  
the things about the Vietnam ~~was~~ that <sup>you</sup> ~~he~~ could say in  
the United States because it would be--  
rebound. On the other hand, he couldn't  
go to Eastern Europe and advocate the

American position in Vietnam, which would undercut everything <sup>that</sup> he was saying and had been saying <sup>and so on.</sup> He was obviously going to get a lot of questions about Vietnam, <sup>and</sup> There was really no answer to those questions. That, ultimately, came <sup>in</sup> in my mind <sup>a</sup> to represent <sup>a</sup> fairly important consideration. I don't know why it hadn't before. It's not that obscure a thought. But, I never really focused on it <sup>until</sup> til Adam Walinsky raised it. He had other points about timing <sup>i</sup> and being awkward, and so on.

GREENE:

<sup>And</sup> Weather. Wasn't that a factor?

NOLAN:

Yes. <sup>The</sup> Weather was bad, but a lot of people told us that <sup>you</sup> you know, people at the embassy <sup>They</sup> said that the roads <sup>are</sup> were icy and you can't <sup>get over</sup> go over them, and all that. <sup>we thought we could work that out</sup> But <sup>[Interruption]</sup> as I recall, in the course of this lunch <sup>when</sup> when the lunch began, I was really very set on the trip. I really had not looked at any questions about whether or not. I was just entirely

occupied with <sup>the</sup> questions of how to do it, <sup>and</sup> when --  
and that sort of thing. As I recall, in  
talking with Adam, I argued against each of  
these things <sup>that</sup> he was raising, <sup>but</sup> by the end  
of the lunch, I had to say the least, that he'd  
created in my mind a very, very substantial  
doubt about whether the trip was really  
/ a good thing  
a good thing or not, and the more I thought about it  
afterwards, the more convinced I became  
that he was really right, <sup>I</sup> that the trip  
was not a good thing. Part of my doubt  
about that really went to Bob (Robert F)  
Kennedy's motivation for the trip. We  
had picked it up someplace along the way.  
where we didn't really get into why he  
wanted to go <sup>and</sup> I don't remember whether  
Adam (Walinsky) suggested <sup>this</sup> or whether I  
thought of it, or <sup>whether</sup> somebody else suggested  
it but I began thinking about the consid-  
eration that he was really bored or frus-  
trated or something and that he... the  
foreign trips before had been all-consuming,



and <sup>they</sup> had gone rather well, and he was able to throw himself completely into them and come back with something that represented satisfaction. So to the extent that a significant part of the reason for going to Eastern Europe at that time was that, <sup>then</sup> it was a bad reason. There was really no need for him to feel happy or satisfied or something. That's not the game. So then I don't remember what I did. I remember I talked with <sup>[Thomas M.C. Johnston]</sup> ~~[Thomas M.C.]~~ Tom Johnston, about it, because I <sup>had</sup> talked with Tom ~~[Thomas M.C. Johnston]~~ about the trip generally, and Tom and I had worked together both in South Africa <sup>and</sup> ~~and~~ in South America. We had talked for quite a while in New York one day earlier about the trip. I think I called Tom ~~[Thomas M.C. Johnston]~~ and talked to him and went over some of the same considerations <sup>that</sup> Adam ~~[Walinsky]~~ and I had talked about. I think I talked with Ed <sup>[Edwin O. Guthman]</sup> ~~[Edwin O.]~~ Guthman and Burke Marshall.

GREENE: What kind of opinions did you get from them?

NOLAN: Well, in the beginning Adam was the only one that was firmly opposed to the trip. At the end <sup>A</sup> and I think through ~~these~~ discussions that it was really more, in a sense, <sup>of</sup> turning it over and <sup>a</sup> analyzing it and really trying to shake it to see what the different considerations involved were. But I think that after a period of time, which may have been several days, I ~~think~~ that we all really thought that it was not a good thing. Now, I think that some of them, either Burke or Tom or Ed or all of them together, or some of them at different times or something, talked to Bob about it in New York, and I talked to him here as soon as he got back from, I think it was Sun Valley, but it was someplace. It was a time in late November which I guess was before Thanksgiving. <sup>maybe</sup> It was just before the Thanksgiving weekend when he came back from wherever he was, ~~and~~ I went out to Hickory Hill and met him there as soon

as he came in, <sup>and</sup> ~~we~~ talked for a couple of hours or so about it. During that conversation, he really didn't. . . . He just heard everything and he asked some questions about it, ~~and~~ <sup>we</sup> talked about different things that were related to it, but he really didn't express any opinion. He didn't say, "All right, I won't go," or "No, I want to go." He was noncommittal.

GREENE: Would Adam have gone to him before he came to you to talk him out of it, or did he come directly to you?

NOLAN: I don't know. You could ask Adam that. I just don't know.

GREENE: I wondered if he was marshaling support, you know, for his own arguments?

NOLAN: My guess would be that he probably had. Adam <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~ pretty direct. My guess would be that he probably had, and <sup>he</sup> ~~was~~ either unsuccessful or <sup>he</sup> thought he was unsuccessful, and ~~so~~ <sup>so</sup>, he had some time and so he thought he'd try it another way or something.

Well, at any rate, I would say that the time between when all the arguments against the trip were in, in the sense that the ~~Senator~~ heard them all <sup>from</sup> ~~me~~ I'm really not sure who else talked to him. I know about my conversations with him at the house, and then <sup>on</sup> ~~over~~ the telephone <sup>then</sup> ~~over~~ the weekend, and <sup>[United States]</sup> in the Senate early in the week. I don't remember when this was when he was <sup>when he was</sup> in New York, with Tom and Burke and Ed, but I think it was probably the following week. <sup>I think maybe</sup> ~~because~~ he was here on Monday, and there on Tuesday and Wednesday or something like that. But there was a period of, I'd say, a week or so where it was all up in the air and the trip was under consideration. At times, I thought it was definitely off, but, then I would talk to him and see that he was still actively considering it, ~~and~~ <sup>he</sup> would say that he had talked to Ted Sorensen and Sorensen thought <sup>it would</sup> ~~it~~ be a really good



thing, he really had to go to Rumania or something like that. So, I didn't really know. As I think back on it, I'm not ~~really~~ sure that he ever decided or that he ever said to me that he wasn't going to go to Eastern Europe. What happened was that-- and part of this I got from ~~[David W.] Dave~~ <sup>[David W. Burke]</sup> Burke, ~~He and Bob and~~ <sup>[Kennedy]</sup> ~~Edward M.] Ted~~ <sup>[Edward M. Kennedy]</sup> and Dave Burke were talking about the trip to Eastern Europe, I think, at Ted's house, <sup>and</sup> I think probably sometime <sup>during</sup> ~~in~~ this week after Thanksgiving. Ted Kennedy, at that time, was planning a trip to Vietnam and had called me about working on a Vietnam trip <sup>with him.</sup>

GREENE: This <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~ while the Eastern European trip was still under consideration?

NOLAN: Right. So I said, "Thanks, but I'm already doing something." That's all. I think that at that meeting Bob either said that he wasn't going to go to Eastern Europe or he probably wasn't, and Dave Burke

said, "Well, then, what about John Nolan? ~~if~~  
~~he's not going~~, if you're not going to <sup>go to</sup> East-  
ern Europe? We can use him." Then he said,  
"Well, that would be terrific if he wants to  
do it," or something like that. At any rate,  
Bob never went to Eastern Europe. Ted did go  
to Vietnam and I went to Vietnam. So it  
worked out that way.

GREENE: So the next thing is what you found out and  
brought back to him on Vietnam and the con-  
versations about that?

NOLAN: Well, we went to Vietnam in early December,  
maybe like December 10<sup>th</sup> or something like  
that.

GREENE: I think that's right.

NOLAN: I came back early in January, right after the  
first of the year. I don't think Bob was  
here. Again, I think he was in Sun Valley.  
[Interruption] My recollection is that  
when I got back to Washington, Bob was  
not here. At any rate, I did ~~not~~ see him  
when I first got back. I came here to the

office, and worked for a couple of days on a report <sup>f</sup> on the trip. I flew to Salt Lake City and met Ted Kennedy at the airport. [Interruption] But <sup>at</sup> sometime shortly after that when Ted Kennedy was in Vietnam and Bob was back here, and I was getting ready to leave for Austria, I went out to Hickory Hill. We were supposed to go out there on Saturday night and we couldn't go, and I went out on a Sunday morning. <sup>-</sup> This would have been around the middle of January sometime <sup>-</sup> and talked with Bob for quite a while about Vietnam, about things generally. That's the conversation <sup>which has</sup> ~~that's~~ been referred to in some <sup>of the</sup> accounts of the period.

GREENE:

What stands out in your mind about it? <sup>?</sup> How did he react to what you had to tell <sup>him</sup> and ~~How~~ did it fit into his own thinking at that point?

NOLAN:

Well, I don't know. It's kind of hard to tell. We talked a lot about the trip. We talked a lot about Vietnam, particularly from the refugee and civilian casualty

standpoints, which were <sup>the</sup> things <sup>that</sup> we spent our time looking at. Most of what we talked about <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~ embraced in Ted Kennedy's later speeches and statements after he came back from Vietnam. Generally speaking, it was that none of the figures used to measure the problem of refugees was accurate, and the whole refugee program really was a farce, and that the civilian casualty problem was ~~a serious~~ <sup>a</sup> very, very serious problem, much more serious than anybody here had any inkling of. We were hurting a lot of people in Vietnam, and <sup>that</sup> the Vietnam War was very bad. I think that he took this really as a confirmation of his own views on, you know what he thought it was.

GREENE:

You say <sup>the</sup> middle of January. I've heard from some people at least that they ~~thought~~ <sup>felt</sup> ~~it was around~~ around January 19<sup>th</sup> or 20<sup>th</sup>, around <sup>in</sup> that period, that he had actually decided to run, and that it was subsequent events, including the <sup>[USS.]</sup> Pueblo, that reversed this thinking. Did you get any indication



of this at that time, that he was seriously going over it in his mind again? <sup>at</sup> time

NOLAN: That he was seriously going over it, yes, ~~But~~ not that he had decided to run. No, I think he was considering it and was weigh- ing it very carefully in January, ~~But~~ I don't think he had decided to run. I would be rel- atively quite sure that he had not decided to run at that time.

GREENE: Did he seem to be moving in that direction?

NOLAN: No, not really. I think ~~he always~~ as I say, he always considered <sup>it</sup> ~~to~~. It was really never very far from his mind. It was like living with a thing; it was always there. It was very much there when we talked in January. But ~~along~~ with it ~~were~~ all of the very, very formidable difficulties involved in his candidacy which he was <sup>very</sup> aware of. They really hadn't changed. <sup>Now</sup> I think <sup>the</sup> big thing that changed was Tet. Tet <sup>+</sup> stripped the mil- itary facade off the war. I think that the others were gone by that time. But certainly



as far as I knew, and as much as I know, as  
far as anyone else knew, there was no rea-  
son to expect Tet. If <sup>we had suggested to</sup> any of the people  
who we talked with while we were in Vietnam  
~~had suggested - if we had suggested to any~~  
~~of them~~ that Tet was a possibility, you  
know, just in the military intelligence  
sense that it was within the capability of  
the enemy to do Tet, it would have been  
laughable, laughed at. Everybody on the  
military side told us over and over and over  
again not only that anything like ~~that~~ <sup>Tet</sup> was  
not possible but that all of the <sup>[North Vietnamese Army]</sup> NVA main  
forces units were broken up, the only thing  
that was left was the VC [VietCong]. They were  
all dispirited, straggling, you know, dying on  
the vine. The thing was coming around. All  
we had to do was hang on a little longer and  
so on. So I assumed, when I came back from  
Vietnam, that in a military sense, ~~that~~ we  
had a clear upper hand, that there were no  
military problems of significant size

remaining in Vietnam other than a holding action, security type thing. I'm sure that that view was widely shared by everybody out there.

GREENE: It still is.

NOLAN: It still is. It's the same thing now.

GREENE: Anyway, did you recommend to him~~at~~ at that time during this meeting at Hickory Hill that he go himself?

NOLAN: To Vietnam?

GREENE: Yes.

NOLAN: Yes, I thought he should have gone to Vietnam. I recommended that to him earlier, back at Thanksgiving.

GREENE: What ~~did~~ he say?

NOLAN: He said he'd think about it. At one point he said that he didn't want to be away from the kids at Christmastime. ~~He said that,~~ because by then, you see, the time had moved time that along so we couldn't have done Vietnam on the same/schedule/we could have done Eastern Europe on. We couldn't have done Vietnam

before maybe the middle of December or something. I honestly forget why. If we were going to do it, I would go out right away, and, by the time we got it sorted out, it would take that long so it would stretch into Christmastime. If it didn't stretch into Christmastime, then he'd go out and duck out on the <sup>twenty-third</sup> ~~23rd~~ of December and come back and have Christmas dinner with his family or something. ~~So~~ <sup>that</sup> that wouldn't work out very well. So, by the time we got around to talking about it, which was around Thanksgiving, Vietnam was a Christmas trip, which was the way <sup>that</sup> Ted Kennedy had always planned it anyway. ~~If~~ I thought that he should go to Vietnam because it was a major issue. It was bound, under any circumstances, to be a major issue in the following year--not that he should do it in order to run, but that he should do it in order to lend authority to his statements about <sup>Vietnam</sup> ~~Vietnam~~. <sup>That</sup> Rightly or wrongly, whether it's superficial

or real, there is in you... You sort of authenticate your views by having gone out there; <sup>that</sup> He owed it to himself and his constituency; and also, particularly, as long as there was any alternative of running for the Presidency, <sup>that</sup> he really ought to do it then because any other time would be too late; and <sup>that</sup> that if it was too late then in December, that it was always too late, that he really should have done it two years before, but he hadn't.

GREENE:

Do you know why he hadn't? Was there ever any discussion and decision against it <sup>earlier?</sup> <sup>before</sup>

NOLAN:

No. It never came up with me directly. I think it did come up before in connection with a speech or a statement about Vietnam. He thought about going out there. I think he stayed away from it because ~~he~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~just thought for~~ some of the same reasons he stayed away from the candidacy, that he just thought it would be kind of showy. <sup>you</sup> know, he thought it would be kind of a cheap

trick, run out there for a few days and come back and so on. He didn't travel very quietly. Ted Kennedy's approach to those things is very different, and his trips to Vietnam were very different from the way Bob, almost inevitably, would have ended up doing <sup>(ti)</sup>. I think it was really because of the Johnson thing. He just thought it was ~~it~~ it wouldn't be right in context with that relationship.

GREENE: It's also been written that you supposedly urged him at this time or around this time that he prepare himself <sup>just</sup> in case later circumstances pulled him in. Was this strictly ,do you remember, in reference to Vietnam/or did you make other recommendations as far as what he might do to plan for that possibility?

NOLAN: Do you mean pull him into the Presidential race?

GREENE: Yes.

NOLAN: Well, mainly Vietnam. That was <sup>really the only thing</sup> ~~mainly what~~ we talked about. It wasn't necessary for me



to tell Bob Kennedy that he ought to prepare himself. But, I did in the context of going to Vietnam.

GREENE: Are there other occasions while he was a Senator that he called on you for things on his behalf, <sup>Are there</sup> ~~other~~ trips or other matters?

NOLAN: Well, I worked on all the trips.

GREENE: You worked on the Latin American and the African trip?

NOLAN: Yes.

GREENE: And the trip in '64 also? ~~Around the~~ world?

NOLAN: No, not the round-the-world trip. There were two trips in '64.

GREENE: One for Johnson?

NOLAN: One for Johnson which was the Malaysia-<sup>X</sup> Indonesia thing. I did not work on that because I was in Latin America when it started and I could have. . . . I talked to Bob a couple of times on the phone <sup>when</sup> ~~and~~ he was in Wash<sup>ington</sup> ~~ingston~~. When the trip came <sup>up</sup> ~~out~~ I think I was in Lima <sup>[Peru]</sup> or something.

I could, by flying to California, I could have picked up the plane and gone on. I had been away from home for quite a while at that time, and he didn't ask me to do it, so I didn't. ←

— The other one was Germany and Poland. A... NOLAN! And I did make that one. A GREENE!

GREENE: Right. That was later in '64. You did that?

NOLAN: That was June of '64.

GREENE: You advanced it?

NOLAN: I advanced it and also went on it with ~~him~~ them.

GREENE: Also with the Latin American and African ~~s~~ and... you advanced them?

NOLAN: No. In Latin America and Africa I advanced, but came back before the trip started and did not go on any part of either. I was back in the United States before they left the United States on both of those instances. In both of those instances, Tom Johnston. . . . In Latin America, both Tom and I left together and he stayed down there. In Africa, he was supposed to come over and meet me in South Africa but the ~~senator~~ held him here, so the

way it actually worked out was he didn't leave the United States till after I got back, which was maybe a week or so before the party left. He left then and went on out there and picked them up.

GREENE: Well, we'll have to do those next time, I think. Is there anything besides those trips that you got involved in for him while he was in the Senate?

NOLAN: Well, I don't think there's anything major. I used to see him quite a bit; I talked ~~././-~~ some of the Cuban things, I suppose.

GREENE: Even after the assassination?

NOLAN: Yes.

GREENE: Is there anything specific that we could discuss on that?

NOLAN: Well, there isn't anything about it that's of very great significance. Bob Kennedy was always interested in the Cuban problem, and he was always interested in the Cubans from the <sup>[Brigade 2506]</sup> Brigade. They showed up from time to time <sup>or</sup> and had problems from time to time.

We had a lot of conversations about [José  
Pérez San Román] Pepe San Román\* and  
[Enrique Ruiz-Williams] Harry Williams.  
This was mostly in the context of helping  
them get a job, get into school, handle  
some personal problem.

GREENE: They would come to you and you would take  
it up with him, or vice versa?

NOLAN: It worked both ways. They would go to him  
and he would come to me, or they would  
come to me and I would go to him. Some

of this stuff gets fairly ~~involved~~ <sup>very</sup> ~~so~~ <sup>It</sup>  
some of it might be <sup>very</sup> interesting <sup>and</sup> involved  
[Central Intelligence Agency]  
Some contacts with the agency, and with  
Johnson through [Joseph A.] Joe Califano. <sup>Joseph A. Califano</sup>

GREENE: How would they get into it?

NOLAN: The agency ran some things which might be  
called Cuban programs. They'd rearrange  
them from time to time, <sup>and they would</sup> take people on and  
lay people off or something. <sup>like that.</sup> Sometimes  
when they'd lay people off, they, or someone  
else, could be, . . . They could revise their

judgment; They'd put them back on again.  
It's a very difficult life for these people.  
~~They have a job which-~~ they have a difficult  
life to begin with, but these jobs are  
difficult, too.

~~While I talked...~~ I used to talk to  
him about that, and I used to talk to him about  
other things, ~~too~~, <sup>and</sup> I'd see him socially.

GREENE: Did you urge him to get into certain things?  
Did you give him any suggestions like the  
Vietnam thing? How did he respond to advice  
from friends generally?

NOLAN: ~~I may have talked to him,~~ I think I did talk  
to him about speeches or statements he was  
making <sup>on</sup> ~~about~~ Vietnam, about parts of them or  
something like that. I never urged him to  
get involved in Vietnam except in the context  
of ~~this~~, going over at this time, the trip?  
CH I did some work on Bedford-Stuyvesant when  
<sup>it</sup>  
A first started. I talked to him about that.  
I talked to Adam about that. I had some  
meetings in New York with Tom Johnston and



some of the people who were working on Bedford-Stuyvesant. I had some meetings with Adam in Washington. I had some meetings with the ~~Senator~~ about it.

GREENE: How would you get into something like that?

NOLAN: Various ways. ~~It was~~ just that he'd be doing it, and I think he used to like to keep people involved at a pace which was not an imposition on them, but which sort of matched their interest and time. That's always kind of a balance, you know, so you're ~~him over~~ I suppose that I saw a whole range of subjects during that period, not just <sup>on</sup> subjects, serious things, but I saw him and talked to him about things that were not of any consequence.

But I don't think I added any major influence on any of them, <sup>with the possible exception of</sup> ~~except possibly~~ the trips, and I pretty much ran the trips. But those were <sup>the</sup> periods of closest association I had with ~~them~~ <sup>him</sup> after he came in.

GREENE:

~~OK.~~ <sup>Okay</sup> Then, according to Jules Witcover, <sup>[Jules Witcover]</sup> you had a discussion with him in February at which time you warned him or cautioned

him that he could only stay out of the race at his own peril. Do you remember that conversation, how it developed, and what his reaction to it was?

NOLAN:

Well, I had several. I don't remember when we got back from Europe, but sometime in February, early in February, I'd say maybe the end of the first week in February or something like that, after Tet, we were skiing in <sup>to</sup> San Anton, a little town in Austria, <sup>remote</sup> ~~we~~ ~~eloped~~. You go through a mountain pass to get in there. We flew to Zurich and went in on a bus. While we were there, the area, the <sup>[Tunnel]</sup> Arlberg area, had the heaviest snowfall it has ever had in its history. The pass was blocked, the tunnel was blocked, all the roads were off; we were snowbound. So, we were there for ten or eleven days. We were only supposed to be there a week. It's quite removed from everything on the outside, and the only way you get a newspaper is by getting down to the railroad station

around five o'clock when the Paris Herald  
Tribune <sup>[International Herald Tribune]</sup> comes in, when the train runs.

We'd skip and sometimes we wouldn't pick them up, sometimes we'd get there late and so on. Then there was all this snow. One <sup>while we're there</sup> day we pick up a newspaper, after having missed for several days, and on the front page of the Paris edition of the Tribune it says, "American marines have scheduled a landing tonight on the roof of the United States embassy in Saigon in an effort to recapture those parts of the embassy which are still held by the V.C." I had been in Vietnam about three weeks before that, and reading this in the newspaper under these circumstances was like a put-on, you know; it was like one of the funny newspapers you have printed up. I couldn't believe it. It was absolutely incredulous. That was the first that we heard of the Tet offensive. Then, of course, we gobbled up what papers we could and read about it, but there really

wasn't very much. The news was kind of behind, and it was sketchy. But I was just aghast at Tet. So that was... So that really for me dropped out the last remaining piece of reality in the whole Vietnam War thing.

So then, I think by the time we got back to Washington ~~while~~ Tet was still going on, or the aftermath of Tet was going on, and there were stories in the newspapers about ~~how~~ what a good thing Tet ~~really~~ was because they had really showed their hand and now we were chopping off their heads and all that. It was a very, very unreal atmosphere, and it changed my thinking about the Vietnam War from what it was when we had come back.

The whole... and it seems <sup>ed,</sup> coming back into the United States then, that the whole that there were a lot of things that had changed. Tet was ~~going to~~ <sup>really kind of</sup> watershed, sort of like Cambodia, <sup>It</sup> and really change the thinking of a lot of people, their stance,



their attitude toward the war. I don't know what it did to McCarthy's candidacy. <sup>it</sup> certainly helped it; maybe even took something which ~~it~~ wasn't and made it something which it was, but it added an awful lot to that. It seemed to me, also, that it was awfully difficult for anybody really to be for the war after Tet. Also awfully difficult for anybody who was really against the war to stay on the side. <sup>really</sup> I haven't ~~really~~ thought about how or why <sup>really</sup> you know, the factors that changed my judgement. <sup>But,</sup> at any rate, my judgement was very different in February from what it had been in January. In January <sup>I</sup> thought that the war was a bad deal but there wasn't really a hell of a lot that could be done about it, and it was probably going to come out the way it was going to come out anyway. I really thought that we were going to get out of Vietnam. I thought it was a bad deal and everybody could see it was a bad deal, but they <sup>just</sup> needed



time and they just needed some kind of a means to do it.

Well, in February or ~~sometime~~ thereabouts, for something like these considerations, it seemed to me that really for the first time ~~in~~ his candidacy for the presidency, ~~he~~ made some sense. ~~Not~~ on the basis that he had to do it or that he had to win, but really more on the basis that he probably had to take a stand by a candidacy <sup>at that time, and that</sup> ~~if~~ he didn't that he really couldn't survive as a major political figure.

GREENE: How did he react to your arguments?

NOLAN: Well, I think he always basically, in terms of feeling, ~~he always~~ wanted to run, but he was a reasonable person, and he didn't want to run because he felt like ~~he~~ running. He didn't want to run unless it <sup>really</sup> made some sense. So I think that he liked or welcomed any kind of an explanation of why it did make sense. I think that was a. . . . He was receptive to <sup>those</sup> ~~that~~ kinds of explanation.

He was not particularly receptive to arguments about why he shouldn't go to Eastern Europe; ~~he~~ was particularly receptive to arguments about why he should run for the presidency.

GREENE: Did he discuss at this point what other people were telling him, particularly political people, and the impact that that had on his thinking?

NOLAN: Yes, to some extent

GREENE: Anything specific?

NOLAN: God, it seems like so long ago. He did discuss what other people were telling him. There was a period of maybe a week or so where I spent quite a bit of time in his office, ~~and~~ I talked to him intermittently on the telephone, I'd sit in his office while other people would come in and tell him things.

NOLAN: Is there anything else, let's say through the first week in March, that comes to mind, before you do go out to California for the

first time? Some of the things I thought

he might have commented on would be the

[Robert S. McNamara]

[Robert S.] McNamara resignation and the

[Clark Clifford]

[Clark] Clifford appointment, the [Otto]

[National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, headed by Otto Kerner]

Kerner Commission Report, McCarthy's whole

campaign. Any of these things?

The McNamara resignation...

NOLAN: No, practically none. ~~The McNamara resig...~~

GREENE: That was earlier.

NOLAN: That was earlier.

GREENE: But then Clifford was appointed somewhere in here, right?

NOLAN: <sup>No</sup> I never talked to Bob Kennedy about Bob McNamara's resignation and I sort of learned of it and soon (I think) later on what he thought about it but indirectly. I never talked to him about it. The Clifford appointment was while we were skiing in Europe. I never talked to him about that.

GREENE: And the Kerner Commission Report? Some have stated that that was a major factor in his final decision, or at least a factor.

NOLAN: May have been. I don't know.

GREENE: <sup>Okay</sup>  
~~O.K.~~ Any discussion about McCarthy's cam- <sup>affect him?</sup>  
paign at this point, in New Hampshire? <sup>How that would</sup>

NOLAN: Well, yes. It was apparent, and it was well  
known to Bob Kennedy, and I guess to every-  
body who watched those things closely, that  
McCarthy was going to win very big in New  
Hampshire. Bob Kennedy knew that for a  
fact two weeks before the election in New  
Hampshire, so the idea that he ran for the  
presidency because of the results of the  
New Hampshire election is one of those  
oversimplifications that sometimes come  
up. The reasons for McCarthy doing well  
in New Hampshire, <sup>though,</sup> are to some extent, more  
complicated. In part, he did well because  
Johnson's campaign was so badly mismanaged.  
Johnson had, at that time, [Lawrence F. O'Brien]  
Larry O'Brien, and other people around who <sup>might have</sup>  
Well, there were any number of people who  
could have taken over that campaign and  
done very well with it. Almost anybody  
would have done better than <sup>it</sup> ~~he~~ actually went.



they made major strategic, political errors. All of that was viewed with understanding and some amusement by Bob.

The Tet ~~offensive~~ and the war generally added a lot to McCarthy. He was very interested in that, but <sup>interested</sup> not in the sense of, "How is it going to come out? How is he going to do? ~~Is this~~ <sup>will</sup> going to indicate whether people will be for my candidacy or not?" He knew long before, ~~as I say~~ I think most people did, how it was going to come out. It was no big secret <sup>about</sup> how New Hampshire was going to go.

GREENE: Did he talk at all about his own feelings about McCarthy and the possibility of supporting him at some point, or was this ruled out from the beginning?

NOLAN: In his mind? <sup>start</sup> ~~It was~~ ruled out <sup>from the beginning.</sup>

GREENE: Yes.

NOLAN: ~~It was ruled out~~ He wouldn't support Gene McCarthy for.../ He wouldn't vote for him for the Student Council in a high school.



GREENE: What's your understanding of the foundation of that? I mean, I think that's a generally accepted fact.

NOLAN: He had no respect for him at all, <sup>Absolutely</sup> none. <sup>or anything,</sup> Not because he was a bad man, <sup>but, be-</sup> <sup>just</sup> cause he was almost not a man in his unreliability. I don't think Bob Kennedy would ever say it, or ever did say it, but I think he would, if put to that terrible choice, probably prefer James R. Jimmy Hoffa <sup>[James R. Hoffa]</sup> over Gene McCarthy in almost any frame, you know, either/or situation that you put the two of them. <sup>in</sup> I know he would prefer people like Johnson, [Richard M.] Nixon, <sup>[Richard M. Nixon]</sup> anybody else, [Nelson A.] Rockefeller <sup>[Nelson A. Rockefeller]</sup> and so on, over McCarthy.

No, McCarthy was never really taken seriously, not just by Kennedy, but by everybody else I know who knows him also.

greene:

Well, there were some people around him, weren't there, <sup>that</sup> ~~who~~ were kind of urging him to support McCarthy in hopes of taking it

[Democratic National Convention]  
away at the convention?

NOLAN: Yes.

GREENE: Do you know who that was?

NOLAN: [William J. vanden Heuvel] I think so.  
Bill vanden Heuvel and the whole thing That was  
one of the points of view that maybe Arthur  
[Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.]  
Schlesinger. . .

GREENE: Yes, I think that was one that. . .

NOLAN: That was one of the points of view that came  
out at a meeting at [Stephen E.] Steve Smith's [Stephen E. Smith]  
apartment.

GREENE: The <sup>thirteenth?</sup> [13th] The day after the primary?

NOLAN: Well, it was the day of ./. it may have  
been the day after the primary. It was the  
[Walter Cronkite]  
day of the Cronkite. . .

GREENE: That's the ~~13th~~ thirteenth.

NOLAN: Yes.

GREENE: How would Robert Kennedy react to that kind  
of suggestion?

NOLAN: He wasn't there when it was being discussed.  
I don't know. I just don't think he could  
have done that. Bob Kennedy was very <sup>-</sup> I  
mean, you might say he's very political and

he's very shrewd and he's a very complex man and everything, but there were very, very real limitations on what he could do and what he couldn't do. He was very, very much confined within his own limitations, in a personal sense. In the New York campaign in 1964 he was strung up very tight for a large part of the campaign, I'd say from the beginning till about two-thirds of the way through, and the tightness got tighter and tighter. [Interruption] There were very real limitations on what he could do as far as he himself was concerned.

90 During the New York campaign, people in New York who did not know him well would come to people like me who had come to New York with him and they would say, "Can we have a drink?" I'm very worried about the campaign. I want to tell you about it." It would come out in all different kinds of ways and at great length and everything, but what it would all boil

down to was, "Tell him to smile. He's got to smile. He's got to be nice to people." Well, you can't tell anybody to smile, but he was more, he was harder than most people to tell to smile. He couldn't smile if he didn't feel like smiling. He couldn't.

9) There were very real limitations on how he could act with a person like Lyndon Johnson, a person like Gene McCarthy, <sup>and so on,</sup> What I'm really saying is that, although the political, conventional judgment might indicate that he should support McCarthy for ~~the~~ the presidency at that ~~this~~ time for reasons which, you know, might be given in advance, ~~He~~ might have been physically incapable of doing ~~this~~ it, and ~~He~~ might decide a question like that just on that incapability. But, as far as I know, he really never seriously considered that.

Now the arguments for <sup>it</sup> ~~that~~ were that, to many people who were very sincere and who were very much for McCarthy, his entry



into the race would be viewed as confirmation of his ruthlessness and his opportunism. They would be very offended, whereas <sup>if</sup> he eased <sup>on</sup> or performed some ameliorating act, that would soften it or something.

GREENE: Well, the next thing that I have is that by ~~May 8th you were already in--Excuse me,~~ March 8<sup>th</sup> you were already in California working on a delegate slate, I believe. Is that correct, and how did it come about?

NOLAN: Yes, I was in California before this meeting in New York that we talked about.

GREENE: Right. That was the <sup>thirteenth.</sup> ~~13th~~ The earliest date I've seen is the <sup>^</sup> ~~13th~~ <sup>eighth.</sup> ~~8th~~ It could even have been earlier.

NOLAN: Right. Now, the <sup>eighth</sup> ~~8th~~ sounds about right. I went out to California at either Bob's request or Steve Smith's, and I don't recall which, <sup>but</sup> I kind of think it was Steve-- <sup>[Jesse M. Unruh]</sup> to talk to ~~(Jesse M.)~~ Jesse Unruh, and to find out what should be done ~~in the event.~~



In the event he was going to go, he had to go in California; ~~An~~ the event he was going to go in California, what did he have to do to qualify? ~~how was it.~~ what did you do if you wanted to run in a California primary? really was the question. So I went out on a Sunday morning, I think, and met Jess and his guy, Frank ./. .

GREENE: ... Burns?

NOLAN: Yes. ~~and~~ and another guy, <sup>that</sup> ~~the~~ guy in the State Legislature [Jack <sup>C</sup> Crose] ~~o~~

GREENE: I'm not certain, offhand ~~who~~ who you mean. I'm sure we have his name. It might even be on this California list.

NOLAN: Yes, sure you do. It probably is.

At any rate, the three of us spent the day in a hotel room at the International Hotel. I talked about all ~~this~~ <sup>this</sup>...

GREENE: What?

NOLAN: Oh, it's just some of these names. I've ~~ve~~ forgotten.

GREENE: Let me turn this over before you continue.

BEGIN SIDE II, TAPE I:

GREENE: <sup>Okay</sup>~~O.K.~~ So when you went out to California <sup>the first time,</sup>  
<sup>around the</sup>~~8th~~<sup>eight,</sup> what were you ~~///~~.

NOLAN: When I went out to California the first time around March 8<sup>th</sup>, I spent two days there, Sunday and Monday. I think that Steve asked me to go out for a week or <sup>four</sup>~~A~~ or <sup>five</sup>~~A~~ days, <sup>like that,</sup> or something and I said I'd go out over the weekend. Now this was the same day Bob <sup>[California]</sup> was in Delano.

GREENE: The <sup>tenth</sup>~~10th~~ that he was in Delano. ~~?~~

NOLAN: Well then, that was the day I was in Los Angeles.

GREENE: That was a Sunday, right?

NOLAN: It was a Sunday. Now, while we were sitting at the International Hotel, he came through the Los Angeles International Airport. But, <sup>didn't</sup> we didn't see him or have any contact with

~~I think~~ him. As I say, I think this was arranged with...  
~~It was~~ Steve rather than Bob who talked to me a-

bout going out there. I spent the entire day on Sunday. . . I got out there <sup>and I was picked u</sup> At the

5  
airport. I was picked up by Frank Burns. We went to the hotel room, and the other fellow, whose name I don't recall, was there, and Jesse came over. The four of us spent the entire day there talking generally about ~~a primary~~ a presidential primary campaign in California. First of all, what the legal qualifications were, <sup>do</sup> how you, you know, what papers were filed. I think that this had already been done, although there was a mix-up about . . .

GREENE:

Right. ~~They were~~

NOLAN:

. . . how it was done. The petition which finally became legally effective was, I think, filed by a group that Jesse referred to as "The Little Old Ladies". They were <sup>they just happened . . .</sup> amateurs. They didn't do it because anybody asked them to, They just did it on their own. ~~They were~~ just incredible. They just went and filed the petition, and that ultimately became the legal base for the Kennedy candidacy in the California primary.

~~and~~ without it, there would have been  
substantial doubt about <sup>his</sup> legal qualifica-  
tion to run. The other one, the supposed-  
ly././.

GREENE: Professional?

NOLAN: ././ professional one, which was done with  
some of the best, highest-priced legal  
advice in California was, for one reason  
or another, ineffective. We talked about  
that, how you qualify, how many delegates  
there were, how you assembled a slate  
of delegates, how much money it would take,  
what you'd have to spend money on generally,  
what kind of a campaign you'd run, where  
you'd go, where you wouldn't go, what you'd  
stay away from, what Pierre <sup>Pierre</sup> [E.G. Salinger]  
did that screwed everything up, ~~what..~~

Jess<sup>o</sup> and his associates have a view  
of California politics which turns ~~out~~ on  
what they do, and what everybody else does; and  
what they do is invariably right and true  
and wise, and what everybody else does is

Always wrong and false and unwise and foolish, ~~and~~ they always win, and everybody else always loses <sup>or</sup>, if they don't win, it's because somebody else got in and screwed something up; ~~or~~ if somebody else wins, it's an accident. <sup>So,</sup> some of that.

But so we talked, and the ~~next day--~~  
I think I stayed over that night, ~~and the~~  
next day I had lunch with Ed Guthman there at the International Hotel; and sometime that afternoon I got on a plane and flew back to either Washington or New York. ~~Washington,~~  
I think.

GREENE: Did you have instructions or guidelines at all when you went out there as far as .).|.|.|. Nothing?

NOLAN: Just, "Would you be able to take a look at California and see what we ought to do there?"

GREENE: They weren't concerned at that point that these early discussions might cause some trouble later with the Unruh people, or



were they general enough so that you weren't getting yourself into...|

NOLAN: How do you mean, "cause trouble"?

GREENE: Well, that, you know, you might make some kind of arrangements with them that would later have to be unmade.

NOLAN: No.

GREENE: And you found him pretty cooperative? Were there any real areas of disagreement as far as the kind of slate you were looking for?

NOLAN: Well, there were when we got into the slate. But, there weren't...|

GREENE: But in the general sense?

NOLAN: ...| in general terms, no.

GREENE: And you didn't discuss specific people for positions in the campaign?

NOLAN: We did to some extent. We didn't make any decisions on specific people.

GREENE: ~~WERE YOU~~ speaking to him at this point, and was it his understanding, that Robert Kennedy <sup>was going to</sup> would definitely run?

NOLAN: No.

GREENE: It was still very up in the air?

NOLAN: Yes. I think it was his judgement that he probably would run. Jesse had always been very ~~./././~~ ~~don't...~~ I think, at various times, you could say that there was no responsible political figure in the United States, with the exception of Jesse, who strongly urged him to run. <sup>9</sup> Now, Jesse is a very astute guy. He's got very good political judgement. He's also very loyal. He was a good friend of the President's. He <sup>always</sup> was a good friend of Bob's, and he ~~was~~ a very capable man, so I don't want to reflect adversely on Jesse. <sup>e</sup> ~~no~~ <sup>11</sup>

But you could never really tell whether Jesse's strength, the strength of his recommendation, didn't come out of his own situation, which was very precarious. <sup>9</sup> He was hanging on to the State Assembly ~~by one~~ <sup>6</sup> as speaker, by one vote or something like that coming out of an election district in a blue-collar area of South Los Angeles

where he had sort of squeaked through. He had done about as much with the Assembly in California as George Washington did with the initial thirteen colonies, but he could be a nonentity at the stroke of an election official's pen and not even in his own race. So he was a major figure in danger of becoming a minor one by events that he had no control over. So it was. In other words, Jesse could go for something like that, and if he lost, he wasn't losing very much really, and, if he won, he. If Bob Kennedy lost in gambling on the Presidency, he was really losing a lot, certainly all the way through until you get into the February thing where you make a judgment that he's not really losing so much after all, because inactivity is the equivalent of losing under certain circumstances. So, I don't know.

GREENE:

Was it Robert Kennedy's view, that, do you think, that Unruh was really in it for himself and he had to be regarded that way?

NOLAN: No.

GREENE: Not that he really wasn't interested, but that his primary concern was his own situation?

NOLAN: No, that oversimplifies it. I think Robert Kennedy had great respect for Jesse Unruh, in addition to that always had, and, / I . . . he liked him and thought a lot of him personally. No, I think he would start out by taking everything Jesse said at about face value, and he had great respect for him as a political pro. But he would discount it because of this uncertainty about the kind of motivation that Jesse may really not have. . . . you know, it doesn't have to be conscious as far as Jesse ~~was~~<sup>is</sup> concerned, really. But it's a factor in evaluating Jesse's recommendation. When<sup>re</sup> you get to the point where everybody else is saying one thing and Jesse is saying something else, then you really take a good, <sup>Is it</sup> hard look at it to see why ~~if~~<sup>if</sup> all these people are wrong and he's the only one

that's right, <sup>?</sup> or is it a special situation because of that kind of thing.

GREENE:

Okay  
O.K. Then you went back and the next thing, I guess, would be the meeting at the Smith's on the <sup>thirteenth.</sup> ~~13th~~. Was that called in advance of the New Hampshire results? In expectation of the New Hampshire results? Do you remember when you first heard about that meeting?

NOLAN:

Well, I don't remember. The New Hampshire results were nothing pivotal. I mean, they ~~were~~ ... In the context of those days, telephone conversations and meetings and so on, nobody really paid any attention to them because they were ... they would have been big news if they were the other way but they came out exactly as everyone thought they would come out. They were just the public reception was an event, I guess, but the results themselves were nothing. . . .

GREENE:

Okay  
O.K. Can we continue or do you want to stop? It's up to you.

NOLAN:

Well, maybe this would be a good place to



break. I just told somebody you wanted to  
cut it short.