

**Stewart L. Udall Oral History Interview – JFK #2, 2/16/1970**  
Administrative Information

**Creator:** Stewart L. Udall  
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**Biographical Note**

Udall was the Secretary of the Interior for the President Kennedy and President Johnson Administrations (1961-1969). This interview focuses on John F. Kennedy's campaign visit to Arizona, Udall's appointment and role as Secretary of the Interior, Indian Affairs, and Appointments of Department of Interior staff, among other issues.

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Stewart L. Udall  
JFK #2

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Second Oral History Interview

with

STEWART L. UDALL

February 16, 1970  
Washington, D.C.

By W. W. Moss

For the John F. Kennedy Library

MOSS: All right. Now, this is our second oral history interview. We got through the election last time, and you said just before I turned the tape on that you had one thing that you left out of the first tape on the pre-convention period, about a visit to Arizona by the candidate.

UDALL: Yes, I think I remember the exact date, I believe it was April 8, or 9, or 10, in that period. It was after Kennedy [John F. Kennedy] had won in, largely won, and defeated Humphrey [Hubert H. Humphrey] in Wisconsin and before the West Virginia primary, which, of course, was absolutely crucial.

We left in the Caroline one night, and he had an evening meeting at South Bend, University of Notre Dame. Of course, I went right along with him. After that meeting ended we went out and got in the plane and they flew all night, and we arrived in Flagstaff, Arizona, and had a morning breakfast meeting. These were with party people to meet Kennedy. Then we went to Tucson for a luncheon, and we went to Yuma, and then in Phoenix they had a big thing in the evening. Well, he was the only candidate in that pre-convention period to get into Arizona with that kind of a tour, and it was highly successful. I mean, he was, as always, very, very.... He met everyone very well and said the right things. We had a very good day together, campaigning together.

And I think this, probably in the long run may have helped me as much in getting the Interior [Department of Interior] job as anything, because he had a pretty good chance to size me up. I was introducing him everywhere.

We would bring people on board who would fly with him, key people. It was very effective, a very effective day, and it sort of helped in that period, which was just before the Arizona state convention where we selected the delegates. This was, as I recall it, about two weeks before that convention, which was in late April, as I recall. So this was another opportunity we had to campaign together. I probably – well, that was April – I spent more time with him that day, those two days, in kind of casual and intimate conversation than I did at any time from then until he was elected.

MOSS:           What sort of things did you talk about? Can you recall any of the conversations?

UDALL:           Well, he was, of course, asking a lot of questions, very curious about Arizona and Arizona politics. A lot of it was the political focus. Of course, we talked about West Virginia; we talked about his campaign, his strategy, and so on and so on.

MOSS:           Do you recall what he said about West Virginia?

UDALL:           Well, I remember what Pierre Salinger told me, that this was the ball game; that they could lose everything or win everything in West Virginia; and that the odds initially, were very heavy but they were throwing everything into it. Kennedy, as I recall it, was rather cautious. He didn't seem at that point to be at all cocksure, nor was he, no braggadocio at all, even though he'd just won in Wisconsin. He had a sort of calm and a sort of fatalistic approach. It seemed to me that he was just going to give it all he had, and if they could come through in West Virginia, that this would give him a big push towards the nomination. But he was very cool about it and so on. Even to me...

MOSS:           Yeah.

UDALL:           ...he summarized it for me in a very dispassionate way, as being an extremely tough job. They'd have to get all the breaks. They were blanketing the state with their people, and that was going to be the big effort.

MOSS:           Any sense of exasperation with Humphrey for going into West Virginia?

UDALL:           No, no. I don't recall that at all.

MOSS:           Okay.

UDALL:           He was always very generous in anything I heard him say about Humphrey.

MOSS: All right. Did he mention the religious issue at all in connection with West Virginia?

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UDALL: Yeah, they were very worried, they were worried about it. They regarded that as the major obstacle to getting the kind of votes that he knew he had to get.

MOSS: Do you recall any discussion of FDR Jr.'s [Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.] role in West Virginia?

UDALL: No, no. I think that probably occurred afterwards, as a matter of fact.

MOSS: Later. Okay. Okay, fine. Now on the visit to Arizona, you said that you had him meeting key people. Did he deal at all with substantive issues, or was this just sort of a meet-people kind of situation?

UDALL: No, it was more a meet-people thing. I mean, the people that I would get aboard the plane were, oh, a county chairman who was going to be a key figure at the state convention; some of these people that had gotten themselves in line where they would probably go to Los Angeles as delegates and also play a role at the state convention. It was largely a matter of giving them a chance to get acquainted with him. I'm sure some of them may have inquired or talked about various issues, but most of these people were already for him. They'd made up their minds, and it was a matter of establishing a little bond of intimacy on the plane, you see. We would put three or four or five of these people on to fly from this place to that, and this was quite effective.

MOSS: Were there any other of the conversations you had with the candidate on that trip that you can recall?

UDALL: No, my memory's not too detailed on it. I just have these general impressions that I've given you.

MOSS: Okay, fine. Well, perhaps we can turn then to the period just following the election and begin with your appointment as Secretary of Interior. This took place, as I get from the newspaper at any rate, on 8 December 1960. Prior to the announcement, what had been your initial expectations in the way of some kind of appointment?

UDALL: Of course, I had been reelected to the House, although I had suffered the biggest setback in four races. I lost three or four percentage points. Nixon [Richard M. Nixon] carried my district, as I recall. The fact that I had my neck so far out for Kennedy, some of the Democrats, I suppose, who were for Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] or for others took it out on me. Actually, I was very depressed after the election for

that reason. I had no expectations. I hadn't really entertained the idea; I'd been so busy with the campaign. You know,

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you knew it was going to be a close election. Quite frankly, I never had any discussions with Kennedy about it, or with any of his people. Ted Kennedy [Edward M. Kennedy] was the one who handled the West, he and Hy Raskin [Hyman B. Raskin]. The first thing that happened, Hy Raskin had been in California – you remember they had the long count over there...

MOSS: Right.

UDALL: ...where Kennedy appeared to have won it and then lost it on the absentees – he came over to Tucson three or four days later to rest up for a few days. He and I had had some contacts and, of course, he knew and admired the job that we had done in Arizona to help him get the nomination. He was the first one to bring the subject up. And Hy, of course, had worked for Kennedy for well over a year, as I recall it. The West had been his bailiwick. And if there was going to be a westerner – that was the first time my ears began to prick up and I began to realize that I had chance, when it was clear that he thought Kennedy ought to appoint me. Because he knew the West, he knew who had produced and who hadn't. And in a curious way, as we talked and began sorting it out, if Kennedy was going to appoint a westerner, there no one that he really was indebted to. Clair Engle had done some things for him in California, but Clair was a senator and it was thought he wouldn't be interested. Senator Jackson [Henry M. Jackson] from Washington, of course, was close to Kennedy, had been the national chairman during the campaign. Whether Kennedy talked with him or not, whether they had ever had any discussions, for some reason he was never in the picture. He would have been the other logical person if you were going to have a westerner.

Of course, California had behaved badly in the whole business. They didn't give him many votes at the convention, not as many as they should have. California didn't go for him. In fact, the West turned him down, you see. So there was no large western state. There was only, what, New Mexico and Hawaii, Nevada, I guess, were the three that went for Kennedy. So nobody had any claims on him. When it became clear to me that Hy Raskin thought that, looking over the whole western scene from the standpoint of who was owed what – I think Hy probably had some opinion of my ability as well – that he felt that I ought to have the job, the question then was, you know. What should I do to push my changes? Fortunately for me Hy was in touch with Palm Beach. The President was down there then. He was talking with Teddy and Bobby [Robert F. Kennedy]. He [Hy Raskin] made some calls and he reported back to me. I didn't do anything. I didn't pick up the phone. I hadn't talked to the President after the election. I suppose I sent him a wire or something, but I didn't call. He didn't call me, naturally, all the things he had on his mind.

But this was, oh, say, a week or ten days after by then, and Raskin reported back to me that he thought I was in the running and that he thought Teddy was for me. I still didn't wage a campaign – it was curious –



I think largely because I really didn't feel at that point that Kennedy owed me anything. I didn't have any feeling of that kind. So another week or ten days went by. Then speculation began to appear in the press and my name began to appear. And I knew that this was coming from the President's people, which bore out what Raskin had said, that it looked like I was in the running. Finally, I believe I talked to Ted Kennedy or maybe it was Bobby. This was about the time the President moved from Palm Beach up to Washington in late November. And they said, "Well, why don't you come on back?" Nothing was offered, nothing was said. I was staying in Arizona because my family was there, and they said, "Why don't you come on back?" So I got on a plane and went back. I checked in with Bobby at the operation he was then running where, of course, they were selecting, all the high officers in the administration, and he and I had a visit; I made an appointment and had a visit with him. He made it plain to me at that time that I was the choice at that point and that the President then was having the meetings with people over at his Georgetown home and would come to the door and people would go in and out, and it was that interesting game that was being played.

So after my visit with Bobby, my hopes were very high then and, of course, the speculation was more and more turning in my direction. So I went over to Georgetown to see the President and, actually, I believe he was ready to announce me that day. And this would have been, if I was announced on the eighth, this was six days earlier. I would have been the second person, I think – after Luther Hodges [Luther H. Hodges] – to have been announced. In other words, he decided on me rather easily and early apparently. Then an extraordinary thing happened, because Kennedy was ready to announce me that day – that would have been December 1 or 2 – and he picked up the phone, doing what he thought was a clever bit of base-touching, talked to Senator Clinton Anderson [Clinton P. Anderson] in New Mexico. He made the mistake of saying to him, "Well," he said, "of course, if you were interested in the job you would be my first choice." And Anderson practically knocked him off his feet by saying, "I'm interested."

So Kennedy was nonplussed when I came in. He said, "My God, I was ready to announce you today, and here's what Clinton....What's up?" Fortunately, I knew Anderson well enough; we'd worked a lot together on Southwest problems, Indian problems, we had a very.... I knew he was playing games, because at that point he was over sixty years of age, he'd been in the Truman [Harry S. Truman] cabinet; and I knew he wasn't interested. But he was also a great poker player; I knew he wanted something. It turned out – because my name then had been very much in speculation the last week – fortunately for me, my relations with Anderson were good enough that I was acceptable to him, and I thought I would be. But there had been rumors as to who I was going to choose for Indian commissioner. And there was one person who Anderson was violently against, who he thought I was for. Actually, this is what it turned out: He wanted some assurance on that. So,

what Kennedy and I decided is that I would call Anderson and I would find out what it was that was bothering him, and that then we would get back together again in a few days, when we got this out of the way.

MOSS: Do you want to mention names on this, on the commissioner?

UDALL: Well, the fellow who was mentioned was a Navajo Indian, Morris Macabe, who was putting on quite a campaign out in the Southwest. Anderson, who was a great bearer of grudges, for some reason had a grudge against this guy and thought it was a mistake, and he violently opposed it; and all he wanted from me was that assurance. So, I think I checked back in with Bobby – either he called or I called – and we straightened the whole thing out. Then I was told to be in New York on the eighth and I was announced on the eighth. That was the way it came out. So, it was a very agreeable thing from my point of view because I didn't campaign for it; I didn't ask for it. Kennedy obviously chose me because he wanted a westerner. I imagine it was a combination of thinking that with my age and whatever abilities he thought I had and the fact that I had worked for him, that here was a happy combination of circumstances.

Clyde Ellis [Clyde T. Ellis] of the REA [Rural Electrification Administration], he was trying to mount a campaign for himself during that period, and I knew all about that; I was kept posted on this. He was, I think, the main person that was running a campaign. Then immediately, when I became secretary, he mounted a campaign for the undersecretary's job.

MOSS: Right. Do you know if this was ever seriously considered?

UDALL: I don't think so. I don't think so because he had no claim on Kennedy; he hadn't stuck his neck out particularly. And I know the thing that Clyde was as much responsible for as anyone, I guess, is the meeting at Billings [Shrine Auditorium, Billings, Montana], and the fact that the REA's and the public power people got strongly behind Kennedy. That was his main interest. He, of course, having been a former congressman and all and a battler at times, I think he felt that he was a logical – fighting Harold-Ickes-stance secretary that would be good for Kennedy. That was what he was trying to sell him on, this...

MOSS: Yeah, he tells a good deal of this story in his book, *A Giant Step*, I believe.

UDALL: Yes, that's right. Heah, there's quite a bit in there, a lot of it *ex parte*. We were amused at some of the things that Clyde put in. But I think he was disappointed.

I think he did put on

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a bit of a campaign and was disappointed.

MOSS: There's another Ellis, a Frank Ellis [Frank B. Ellis] from Louisiana, whose name comes up in the papers as having pretensions at some sort of high job. I'm not entirely sure that he was shooting for the secretaryship. Do you recall any of that?

UDALL: Yeah, Frank, I think, had been one of the key people that helped swing Louisiana into the Kennedy camp, and therefore he had asserted, in a way that I didn't, some claims to some high appointment. I think he ended up with the Office of Emergency Planning job. And Frank Ellis, I believe, very briefly made a little pass at the undersecretary's job in my department. He may have.... You know, a lot of politicians like to be flattered. He may have gotten some mention in the press. You know, by namedropping and that sort of thing. But I would wager from all that I ever heard because Bobby didn't mention his name, that he was not considered for Secretary of Interior at all, no matter what may have appeared in the press. In fact, as I say, I think my appointment was probably one of the easiest ones in the sense that I don't think they struggled with anything. I don't think there were any great pressures other than what Ellis put on, and fortunately, being a member of Congress, enough of the congressmen knew me so that it was a popular appointment in that sense. I think Wayne Aspinall [Wayne N. Aspinall], who was the Chairman of the House Committee [on Interior and Insular Affairs] and one of my elders and so on, I think his nose was out of joint quite a bit, in the sense that he felt probably that he should have been considered and that he was far more capable than I was...

MOSS: Any particular incident that gave you to believe this?

UDALL: No, except that he was – in the first few months I had to warm him up a bit. He wasn't nearly as openly pleased with my appointment as most of my other House colleagues were, you know, kind of feeling that they were flattered by Kennedy in having one of their number put in the cabinet. I was the only member of Congress to go in the cabinet – of the committee members that I'd been on. Aspinall, I think, felt that he would have been a better choice. But he also is very diffident; would never have campaigned for him [Kennedy], would never have done anything. I just think that his impression at the time was that Kennedy made a mistake in not asking him instead of me, because he was older and so on. I think one of the reasons Kennedy didn't was youth was in my favor. So that was about it. See, he and Kennedy had also served in the House. In fact, Aspinall was very fond of Kennedy. I remember him telling me, right after Kennedy's assassination – because he'd also had a couple of bruising

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encounters with Johnson; he was very negative about Johnson – he said, “The men are as different as day and night.” He said, “Kennedy's an idealist, and Johnson is a tough, brutal politician.” He had apparently liked Kennedy when they were in the House together and had strong feelings about him.

But we patched that up, and as I said, he never did anything discourteous. But I could tell, and some other people bore this out, that he was disappointed.

MOSS: Now, when you talked both to Robert Kennedy and to the President-elect, did you discuss what kind of an Interior Department you wanted, how you viewed the job, how they viewed the job, this kind of thing?

UDALL: Well, this was the interesting thing about it, when I look back. Because they didn't have any ideas that were at all well thought out; nor did Ted Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen] even, who you know, being from Nebraska and all, you would have thought would have been the strategist. They obviously had a great deal of confidence in me. I was given – this was one of the pleasant things, and it helped give you a lot of self-confidence in the beginning – it was clear that, touching base with Bobby and so on, that I was to put together my own team, I mean. They had suggestions to make from time to time and in a few instances made outright appointments in the department, but most of my people I selected myself. This was a very good thing because most western congressmen and senators, Republicans or Democrats, when they take over, for some strange reason they look at the Interior Department as their possession, and they were all vying; they all had their candidates, you see. Interestingly enough, I'm sure they would go through Bobby's apparatus and so on, but he would always refer them on to me. The decision in most cases was up to me. I'd get some guidance, but I had a pretty free hand to select my top people.

But when it came down to the department, it was curious in the sense that in part, I believe, due to the fact that President Kennedy had not carried the West and in part, too, due to the fact that, despite the Billings speech and the Billings meeting, he didn't have the kind of intense interest that he might have had in western problems and western development, the theme of Kennedy's western campaign, the catchall theme that was used in all the states, was that he was going to end the “no-new-starts” policy. This was the main note that was struck at Billings. He was going to do things for public power, in other words, and he was going to be more aggressive in championing the kind of western development the Democrats had had under Roosevelt [Franklin D. Roosevelt] and Truman. This was the aura that it came in. But it wasn't very specific; it was general. And, of course, Clyde Ellis had it all spelled out in big print. He was the person who had had probably more grandiose ideas than anyone.

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Unfortunately from my standpoint, you see, I had had nothing to do with the Billings meeting, with the Billings speech, with any of this. In that sense, like most Cabinet officers I came cold to my job. But I found – and I was disappointed at the very outset, although I dismissed it at the time – President Kennedy having other things that were very urgent on his mind. In the first place, when I met him at the house, our conversation – I was there for a half hour or so – I mean, was pretty well dominated by this Anderson thing. We were just sort of stunned. Although I talked to him there about Robert Frost being on the inaugural program also and then in New York when he was at the Carlyle [Hotel] – that's where I was announced – we just visited briefly before we went down and then had a joint press conference where he announced me. Of course, he was very busy, moving fast.

So the opportunity where I thought I was going to have a chance to discuss things with him and get some guidance from him was on the plane – he was going back to

Washington that night – on the plane going back. There were several things that I wanted to talk about. He got on the plane. He was very restless. I tried to get conversations started a time or two. Dick Goodwin [Richard N. Goodwin] was on the plane, and apparently was doing a lot of work on the Alliance for Progress, and this obviously was the sort of thing he was devoting a great deal of thought and time to. He kept pumping him and asking him questions and so on. I even maneuvered around so I was sitting next to him, hoping this would calm, that he would get off the subject and that I could get in some questions and discuss some things, both about people that I was then thinking of and get some of his ideas as well as explore some of my own on policy. It was clear to me that, you know, number one, he hadn't given it a great deal of thought; number two, that the Billings speech was it, in a sense. And the Billings speech was a good general platform. But it was very obvious, too, that he hadn't given it any further thought in the election period, with all the things that had been on his mind. And it was also clear that I had a pretty free hand.

MOSS: Any indication that he had an appreciation for things other than power and reclamation that were in Interior – minerals, territories, Indians, parks?

UDALL: No, it's curious, looking back. You see, we're all the creatures of our past, and our lives, our interests – particularly members of Congress, you know, the committees they serve on, the causes they take up. The one thing that he had done as a senator just before becoming president that was a good experience for him and that was helpful to me later was the Cape Cod National Seashore legislation. He, of course, knew the Cape very well. The legislation was put together by his people. He had to know the details of it and any time he got to know details, why, he, of course, learned a lot. So, he had firmly in his mind the idea

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that we ought to save some of the, not just Cape Cod, we ought to be looking at the seashores of the country.

The other idea that he had on his mind – and this, in a way, was very sound in concept, it was then and it is now, but it also had a little bit of an anti-western twist, too. He said, “All the parks are out in the West, the national parks, and the people are in the East,” and that there was an imbalance here. And that's one of the reasons, with seashores and other things that the national government ought to do a lot more, in terms of having national seashore type parks or something like that in the East. He stressed this a lot and it became, borrowed partly, a theme that Johnson used to push, and even Nixon's now pushing it.

So that was helpful. But the President, I don't think he ever pressed any ideas of his on Indians, for example, on me. I often wondered, in his travels around, whether he ever really was filled in on it. Bobby came so deeply interested in it in his last year that, you know, the difference was quite a contrast. But I was given no guidance, basically. My guidance was the Billings speech. That was about it. The President had no further follow-up thoughts. And, the other thing that was clear to me... Not that there was any bitterness. I don't think he ever expressed any bitter comments, you know that, well, the West had turned him down. He never said that, in a way, but it came through with this ironic wit of his. I mean, he

would occasionally make a comment, like saying, “Well, don't do too much for them, because remember the election returns,” or something like that.

I remember in December of 1961 – while I'm talking about this – about the end of the first year, and I had gone out and there had been – it got in *Time* magazine and everything – a guy chased my party off. We were looking at a prairie national park in Kansas, and this fellow came and chased us off the property – we were helicoptering around. And this got in the papers. The President said to me, halfway jokingly, but a little bit half serious too, he said, “Why the hell do you want to do anything in Kansas? I mean what have they done for us?” The idea was that this wasn't good politics, that there's enough to do other places. Of course, he was right in a political sense. He was wrong in the sense that what I was trying to do at that point, and I increasingly had it in mind, was getting the nation thinking in terms of a big national program during the 1960s, to what I called round out the national park system and make additions – not just seashores and so on. The whole mid-continent section had very few national parks and we should have, all of us thought, a big hunk of prairie as a piece of virgin America that would be left. That hasn't been done yet today. It's one of the things we failed on. But he approached it.... It was curious. When we talked about it, he was kidding me a little about it. He said, “Why do you want to do anything in Kansas?”

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MOSS: Just to follow up the digression a little bit on the business of being run off the rancher's land in Kansas: As I understand it, the reason that happened was that the park service really hadn't done its homework on who were the hostiles and who were the friendlies to the program.

UDALL: Yeah, that's right. It was Connie Wirth [Conrad L. Wirth], the park director, had done a very poor job. They had people in there; there were all kinds of friends and all you had to do was to stay on friendly territory. So I was done in, in that instance, by bad staff work; except, looking back, in fact, I have no regrets about it because this helped focus attention, in a way. It was a dramatic thing to have a cabinet officer chased off with a shotgun; but that's all right, you were out there trying; that was the thing that I was interested in, that we were aggressive and we were trying to convince the people that something ought to be done.

MOSS: Early example of the politics of confrontation?

UDALL: Yeah, that's right, perhaps.

MOSS: Now, how about the task force operations? Did these help you any? There was Frank Smith's [Frank E. Smith] outfit that was working during the campaign and came up with sort of a task force report. Was this very helpful?

UDALL: Well, again, you see – this was the post-election task force...

MOSS: Right.

UDALL: ...that you're talking about. This tended to be the very same people who, of course, had put the Billings speech and the Billings ideas together. They were water project-oriented, dam-oriented, more public power-oriented. This was the main thrust. It's surprising, when you look back, you know, how little mention of pollution there was. National parks didn't get then, I think, the emphasis that I thought it deserved. But the people who dominated that task force, they didn't talk to me very much. I don't know whether they should have. I was very busy during that whole period. In the first place I had to go back to Arizona and move my family, so I was out of touch. Well, we stayed until Christmas, I didn't just go back and move. That's the way we always did. My paramount problem that I had to devote most of my attention to was selecting my top people. This consumed most of my time until about the fifteenth of the month of January. Well, I wasn't even in Washington, so that the Smith group couldn't have talked with me. It's interesting, I haven't looked at that. It would be interesting to go back and look at it.

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MOSS: Well, I read it over the other day and it doesn't seem to offer anything really new in the way of a report. It seems to be a nice summary of all the hopes of conservation people but not really a workable program.

UDALL: Yeah, well, you can see from that – I mean the Billings speech and the task force report – how limited, in a way, and rather simple the expectations were. I remember in December Dave Bell [David E. Bell] and Ted both talking with me. The thing on Ted Sorensen's mind was, “Now, the thing you've got to bear down on is remember the President's going to end the no-new-starts policy.” This was about all I got out of Sorensen at that point. Dave Bell's people quickly turned up the fact that they thought the Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] Administration had been playing a numbers game with Indian education and that we ought to put several million dollars of new money into Indian education facilities. You know, they had been saying that every Indian school child had a classroom, and a seat in a classroom, and it turned out there were six thousand that didn't. Bell was very good on that. I didn't even have to fight for that. He said, “This is something we ought to do.” His budget people apparently identified it and so we put a big slug of new money in the first budget for Indian education. So that was helpful.

MOSS: You set up a task force on Indian affairs yourself, didn't you? This was not from the President, but...

UDALL: Yes, that's right.

MOSS: ...Bill Keeler's [William W. Keeler] operation?

UDALL: Yeah, that's right. I did that later.

MOSS: Well, would you rather talk about that later, in sequence?

UDALL: No, we can talk about it now. The problem anyone has. It's such a complex, knotty problem. Although I, as a congressman, had had more Indian constituents and more Indian land in any congressional district than any other and had worked very closely and, I believe, was considered very sympathetic and very much interested in Indian welfare, still the problem is so diverse, you know. The problem in Arizona is not the problem with the New Mexico Pueblos or the Alaskan natives or the Plains tribes and so on. Actually, there isn't and never was an Indian problem. There were 75 or a 120 or whatever it is Indian communities living in various kinds of tribal governmental organizations on pieces of land having different resources. So the whole thing for that reason was very complex. It seemed to everyone that we needed a statement of policy; we needed a definition of

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objectives. I had difficulty, in the beginning, selecting a person. That was one of the jobs I didn't fill. I appointed John Crow [John A. Crow], who was an Indian himself, as acting Indian commissioner, to come over – President Kennedy participated in that in his office – acting with the idea that we would have this task force work for about six months and come out of that with a statement on Indian policy with programmatic content, and that out of that Philleo Nash, who I had some reservations about, and I felt with Jim Officer [James E. Officer] who I was very close to, and with Keeler, that they would test him, and that when they got through, we would know whether he was a man or not. Well, they felt he came through very well. They recommended him and he was appointed later.

I felt the Indian task force did a thorough job. They worked very hard. They came in with a statement that I think stands up quite well today. The main regret I have about that task force, however, and about our overall approach to it, is that I believe we could have been and should have been more aggressive in trying to point out to the country and the Congress the sorry plight of these people, the fact that they had the highest unemployment rate, the most miserable living conditions. Their plight always was worse than the blacks in the ghettos in a way, because at least the blacks in the ghettos got certain services and conveniences merely by living in a large city, even though you're in a slum.

I always had the feeling later that Nash became, in effect, the rather willing prisoner of the bureaucracy, and that the bureaucracy itself was always quite satisfied to feel that they'd just done a little better job than the year before. There was sort of a feeling, like you get with any large, sluggish bureaucracy, of willing to settle for gradualism, and never anything very dramatic, and “don't rock the boat.” I didn't get with either of the two Indian commissioners I had the kind of dynamic leadership that I wished I had got. I was disappointed in both of them in that sense. Nash seemed to want to settle in, and spent a great deal of time the way all Indian commissioners do, you know, traveling around, meeting with the Indians. He'd take his guitar with him and play music. They liked him as a person. He was very popular. This was almost a disease they all fell into. Bennett [Gordon R. Bennett] was the same way. As though if the Indian commissioner was popular, this made the Indian program a success.



To making dramatic or rapid progress with Indian affairs the obstacle has always been the Congress, because every senator and congressman from an Indian state considered himself an expert, and they all had different ideas. Many of them for various reasons, including some of the liberals like Frank Church from Idaho, ended up with a sour feeling about Indians, you know, the fact that it was hopeless and you couldn't do much for them. Then there were the ones, the conservative Republicans usually, who thought that the solution was to terminate them and put them on their own. So, I mean, the Hill always was a very big problem. Nash wore out his welcome up there. In fact, he never established his welcome. He concentrated on wooing the Indians so much that he neglected ever to establish very good relations on the Hill. And this increasingly became a handicap to him and increasingly meant that legislation that we proposed would move at a

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sluggish pace. The Indian committees, too – the two Indian subcommittees, particularly the one on the Senate – Jim Gamble [James H. Gamble] who Senator Anderson brought in, was about as unsympathetic and hostile to the Indians as anybody in the country. So he was there throwing his weight around almost as though he were a senator, trying to block anything. Maybe I've been too critical of Nash but I finally ended up being furious with him because despite all the problems that he had, where there were instances where you could get a bill through, or get an appropriation, or get something done.... If he had asked me to help, so that two or us were lifting instead of one – he never asked me. His idea was that he didn't want to disturb the secretary. And I wanted to be disturbed, and I was damn mad about it in the end.

MOSS:           You had a middle echelon here, too. Did John Carver [John A. Carver, Jr.] help?

UDALL:           John Carver and I saw things eye to eye on much of Indian policy. He was from an Indian state, he was a sophisticated person, and he also was from the Hill. He understood all the roadblocks up there. My feeling about John was, too – because he encouraged Nash, I believe, to say, “Well, let's not bother the secretary with this. We'll handle it ourselves.” And I think he also sort of fell into the feeling that all you could hope for was gradualism. John was one of my most effective and able assistant secretaries. He worked hard. The Indian area was one of the few that I really ended up feeling I had a little complaint against him, but it was largely a matter of, as I say again, always saying, “Well, you can't do it, you know,” or, “Well, Congress just won't go along.” I just was increasingly frustrated that I wasn't being thrown into the fray and that we didn't get more done in terms of some of the things that we were trying to do. We didn't shake the bureaucracy.

That's really the thing that I felt, I think, most critical of Carver and Nash in the long run, that as far as the top level bureaucracy in the Indian affairs, they just left it intact. There were very few replacements. We had, for example, a nice old lady who ran the school system. Here at Indian education – disadvantaged children and all their special problems, we should have immediately gotten, in my view, looking back – I did this five years too late myself, after I pushed Nash out – an outstanding educator, who was an expert with

disadvantaged children. Instead of this, we inherited this nice old lady who'd been teaching in Indian schools and knew all the thing. And again, her idea was well, if you did a little better this year than last year with Indian education, why, that was good enough.

MOSS: Okay. We seem to have gotten into a substantive area rather than talking about the early days and the appointments. Let me get back just for a moment to the Indian task force and Keeler's role. How does a man like Keeler square his Indian interests with his oil interests?

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UDALL: Well, Keeler, I hadn't met him – I suppose I knew him only slightly. He had been, I think, about that point in time, president of the National Congress of American Indians, which is the main Indian group. Of course, with his business acumen, his native shrewdness and all, he was a standout leader. Everyone you'd talk to would say that the outstanding person for Indian commissioner – oh, this takes me back now. I tried to get Keeler to be commissioner in December early on. I also tried to get Will Rogers, Jr. [William R. Rogers, Jr.] to be commissioner. I tried both of them. I'd forgotten about that. So Keeler, being held in very high regard by all the Indian leaders and having this business background as well – I think everyone we talked to, Carver and all of them, said, “Well, by all means, Keeler should head it up.” And, of course, his ties with Phillips [Phillips Petroleum Company] – he was, I guess, a vice president at that time. He wasn't as high as he later became. He now heads the organization. So, I don't think anyone felt that there were any inherent conflicts between his oil responsibilities and his doing a good job. He spent a lot of money, I think, he took the company plane and other things that made me a little bit nervous at times. But the fellows that worked with him – and I had Jim Officer, who was an Arizona person that I knew very well; he, in effect, was the secretary and kind of the driver on the whole thing – felt that Keeler worked very hard and did a good job.

MOSS: Okay. Let's talk a little bit about the appointments of your team, the selection of your team. And I suppose the logical place to start is Under Secretary Carr [James K. Carr]. How did this appointment come about?

UDALL: Well, when I look back at the appointments that were made, I'm not surprised. After all, I was a member of Congress. As I say, I was jolted a bit at the extent to which particularly senators were demanding, you know, particularly the leading senators from the West. Rather than looking for any of the other ten government departments, they had to have somebody from their state in a high position in Interior, as though it were someone to look out for their interests. Most of the westerners had that attitude. There were practically no exceptions. They were all very aggressive, particularly the senators. So as a congressional politician, naturally I knew where the power was. Senator Anderson from New Mexico obviously was in a critical position because he was the chairman. There were others who I knew would be crucial to my programs. If they would come up with good people, I felt I was almost in a position where I had to work with the

senators, make them come up with people that I could accept, and go through that kind of a gauntlet. You know, rather than conduct a kind of talent search of my own.

Now, I did do some talent-searching. I mean, the Keeler-Will Rogers thing is a good example in that area. And Ralph Dungan and the Bobby Kennedy operation, they were screening and they were shooting people over. They would let you know when they were going through the

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motions and when they were pressing hard for somebody. Like, John Carver's appointment was a very happy one, for example, because John had the kind of talent and ability that I like. He had worked for Kennedy in the pre-campaign period, so the Kennedy people were for him. He was off Senator Church's staff, so Senator Church was pleased, you see. So Carver was one that was a home run in every respect. But with most of the rest, it was this kind of a tug-of-war with members of Congress. The first three people that I selected, there was a big rhubarb because Anderson and Chavez [Dennis Chavez] called Kennedy in Palm Beach. Because I hadn't touched enough bases, I got burned on that, and I learned. The first three that I announced and selected were that Floyd Dominy [Floyd E. Dominy], the reclamation commissioner, would be reappointed. This was something that pleased Aspinall and Senator Hayden [Carl T. Hayden] in particular. I knew Dominy extremely well. He's a very tough, able guy – although I had regrets about it later.

MOSS:           You had a rough time over him in the nomination hearing, didn't you?

UDALL:           Yeah, they jumped me on that. But I had been on trips with him; I knew him. I mean, here was someone I knew personally. And I thought also that it was better to go with someone that would please some of them, than to try to get somebody new. You know, it would have been a tough job to pick a reclamation commissioner from outside. It always is. The Nixon Administration, they took six or seven months, I notice, to do that. But Dominy I selected. I felt that I had a right to have a solicitor who was personally close to me, and I selected Frank Barry [Frank J. Barry, Jr.] from Arizona, who was a former law partner of mine – this is one of the things that made Anderson mad – and Jim Carr from California.

Now, Carr, Clair Engle.... After all, California's the largest state in the Union. Bob Kennedy and the Kennedy people made it plain that they thought since California wasn't doing too well in major appointments – Ed Day [J. Edward Day], the Postmaster General right at the tail end supposedly was from California, but actually he'd just moved out there from Illinois, a few years before; his ties with Adlai Stevenson got him in the cabinet as much as his being from California – and that California being such a big, dominant state and being so important politically, that I ought to favor on getting someone. So, I knew Engle very well I'd served on a committee under him for four years. And I kept telling him, “Well, damn it, you've got to.... If you come up with somebody really good, why, I'll give him a crack at the under secretary's job.” Clyde Ellis was making a pass at the under secretary's job, there were others who were in the business.

Senator Engle came up with Carr. Carr had served eight or nine years earlier as a staff man to the House committee and Aspinall and

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other committee members knew him well. So I mean that was also in his favor, that it was somebody who was familiar and so on. I had reservations about Jim Carr's ability in the beginning because, after all, he had left town as a staff man on a committee, and to come back as an under secretary, it bothered me in the beginning and I was right. He acted as a staff man often times when he should have been acting as an under secretary in his relations with the Hill and with other things. He had other serious weaknesses. As an executive, he was the weakest under secretary I had. But it had that appearance that Pat Brown [Edmund G. Brown], who was then the governor of California, he was pushing. This pleased Brown; it pleased Engle; it pleased Aspinall; it was a gesture to California. Also part of the thing in the picture was the Arizona-California water feud, you see. This was a way of my saying to them, "Well, look, we're going to work together, and I'll take a California under secretary."

But when I cleared those with the Kennedy people and they were announced, Anderson and Dennis Chavez both called Kennedy direct – the President. They said that other than Hawaii, New Mexico was the only state that carried for Kennedy and here these people were being left out. Anderson hated Dominy's guts; he had a perfectly good candidate who was a former president of the American Bar Association for solicitor. Oh, they really.... In fact, Kennedy called me – I forget where I was, I guess I was in Arizona about that time. He said in his usual way – I mean, he just reported it sort of half-joking but then laughing about it – but then said, "Well, you better take care of them. Keep in better touch; do a better job with this." He didn't complain to me at all. I mean, I explained why I had done all three. I explained to him that I knew Anderson well enough to know why he was unhappy. So, as we moved on down the line.... For example, at one point – this is another interesting thing that came along – the assistant secretary for Minerals [Minerals Resources], I had practically selected Leif Erickson from Montana, who was strongly recommended by Mike Mansfield [Michael J. Mansfield]. And...

MOSS: UMW [United Mine Workers of America] was pushing him.

UDALL: Yes, and others. I had met Erickson somewhere along the line. Of course, he'd been an old, staunch Democrat. I think he ran against Burke Wheeler and took him on, didn't he in a primary back there? He came in and I interviewed him, and I was impressed with him. Yeah, he's a very capable fellow. I liked him, and I sort of gave Mike Mansfield and Lee Metcalf the idea that I was going to go with him. And Anderson at that point really crashed into me and said that New Mexico was getting left out, and that they were going to have to have one of the assistant secretary jobs, and the one he wanted was that; not only that, but he would come up with a name very shortly. He dressed me down on the phone, and he came up with John Kelly [John M. Kelly]. I had to tell Mike Mansfield who,

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after all, was then majority leader of the Senate, that Anderson was my chairman and he was so determined about it that although Erickson was my first choice I was going to have to take Kelly. Mike was decent enough to say, "Well, I understand." Mansfield was always very gentle about things like that. That was the way that one was filled. I had a much rougher ballgame than most of them had. Let's see, who were the other people?

MOSS: Let's see. We've got Briggs [Frank P. Briggs] in fish and wildlife.

UDALL: Yeah. Well, I took my time on that. Actually, I tried to get Tom Kimball [Thomas L. Kimball] of the National Wildlife Federation to take that job. I was very disappointed when I couldn't get him. I wanted somebody younger, in fact, Kimball himself. And I talked with Gabrielson [Ira N. Gabrielson] and these other people, and for some reason there was no outstanding, you know, young.... I wanted a younger person. Briggs I finally came to kind of in desperation because it was the last unfilled job and it went on for two or three months. He'd been a former US senator, he took Harry Truman's place. Clarence Cannon, the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, was very important to us on power appropriations. So this pleased him; it pleased the Missouri people; it also gave us a little better spread, as far as the geography was concerned.

Well, now the other one I should mention is Ken Holum [Kenneth Holum]...

MOSS: Right.

UDALL: ...because Ken stayed the full eight years with me. This one, again, was rather easy except Anderson barked at me on this one and others. But because Clyde Ellis, I knew, was going to be one of my severe critics and I felt that I had to have somebody out of the public power movement and that that was the logical thing; George McGovern and I were very close; McGovern had Holum come in, and I knew that Holum stood high with all of these people; if I didn't pick Ellis, if I had somebody like Holum, that although Ellis would backbite at me, that I would be in good shape. This also gave good geographical distribution. That's the other thing I was trying to do was balance it out. I didn't have anybody from the upper Midwest. They had all kinds of power problems. So that was one of the reasons for my choice of Holum.

MOSS: Yeah. Let me flip this tape here, since it's running off to the end of it.

[BEGIN SIDE II, TAPE II]

MOSS: We were talking about the appointments of the assistant secretaries, where you got them through Congress and squaring it with Anderson and all. A couple of things

on this before we go to the bureau-level appointments. First of all, what sort of understanding did you have with the individual assistant secretaries as to their latitude in running their areas, what did you expect of them?

UDALL: Well, I began with the idea that both assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs should select their own immediate staff, that I should not meddle in that; that for them to be strong they had to surround themselves by people that they worked well with, and that you have to give them considerable leeway. I also had it as a major operating principle – because that's the way the whole thing was structured, of course – that they would supervise the people in their area and that I and the under secretary – the under secretary, of course, simply being assigned whatever I gave him to do – that their main job was to identify problems and bring them to me. I instituted, early on, something was very useful to me, both as a way of knowing what they were doing and of spotting things that I would be interested in that they might not know I was interested in. I had each of them send me a weekly report. Usually their top deputy wrote this out. It would both flag things that were coming up; new problems that had arisen; report on things that were being done. This gave me, I could flip through these in a few minutes – usually Saturday when I was at work – and have a feeling of having my finger on the pulse. They'd usually break it down by the bureaus that they served.

I think I also made it plain, unlike many of my predecessors, that I intended to be active in the details of a lot of administration, particularly things that I was interested in, that I would run a kind of swinging door office; there would be a lot of meetings in my office; there would be large groups. I like to function by having a lot of people in on an issue and let everybody be heard – operating not in a judicial way exactly, but that it was a very good thing, both from the standpoint of morals and from the standpoint of decision-making practice, to let, for example, a bureau chief, if there was a problem that he was concerned with, to bring six or eight of his top people in with him, the ones who knew something about that; to have the assistant secretary there with his people; to have the solicitor in or whoever else I had, depending on what the problem was, and for us to have a very vigorous argument; and for me to hear everybody; and to get them in arguments; and to hammer out policy on that kind of anvil rather than on the basis of people submitting papers to you.

Yet, within that context, I gave my assistant secretaries quite wide latitude, you know, as far as their own personal schedules were concerned, as far as the way that they handled their relations with their bureaus. I believe, from the standpoint of administration, of giving people a lot of elbowroom, giving them responsibility; but of getting myself deeply involved in those policy issues and administrative decisions and other things where a secretarial decision or a secretarial direction was necessary.

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MOSS: Okay. Now, very specifically, did you have an understanding with John Kelly that he had a direct route to the White House on oil matters?

UDALL: Well, this was a part of the problem, in terms of discipline and everything else. You had to ride hard on it because if you had people who were

aggressive and didn't report to you, I mean, they could get themselves involved in relations with other departments, with the White House and so on, policy matters. Kelly was one who came in knowing the oil industry and knowing the oil business. He actually tried, in a very suave way, to intimidate me in the early stages in this way, by saying, "Look, this is the most explosive thing you've got in the department. I know the industry and I can protect you, you see. Therefore, the thing for you to do is to stay out of it as much as possible and let me handle it."

It took me a while to figure out what his strategy was because actually – in fact, John, he just had that kind of personality. He was one of my assistant secretaries who wanted to aggrandize his power and responsibility as much as possible and wanted to keep me out of things as much as possible. I usually had to yank him up by the shirt tails most of the time by finding out things that were going on and particularly when it came to oil policy, because he also wanted to be.... He had worked in the department back during the war period. He knew far more about oil, about the oil industry, about oil matters, than I did, all the complications of the oil import program and everything. He wanted to be Mr. Oil. I could see that after a little time went on, that he wanted to be in a position where the industry people would say, "Well, John Kelly's the one to see. Udall doesn't know anything about it, you see. He's delegated the responsibility to Kelly."

It was when I began to develop the insights and have staff that could tell me and show me some of the complications and help me understand it, and then I began to move in, that Kelly resented it. In fact, he finally, I think – he never did say to me, I never asked him – I think he left the department in part because I made a decision that he disagreed with on an oil policy matter.

MOSS: We were talking a few minutes earlier about the assistant secretaries and we forgot one, Otis Beasley [D. Otis Beasley] who was of course a carry-over. Was this an automatic thing or did you consider replacing him?

UDALL: See, he had taken that job under Oscar Chapman [Oscar L. Chapman]. Yes, that comes back to me now. Oscar and I were very friendly. Of course, I both liked Oscar personally, wanted to flatter him. I had him over for lunch before I took office. He was very strong for Otis. He felt that the system.... Indeed, the assistant secretary system, when it was established back in about 1950s, and this man was to be the carry over, this was the intention of the whole civil service arrangement. I accepted that, Beasley having gotten the job under Oscar Chapman and Oscar having assured me that he's a good career man and knew where all the bodies

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were buried and everything, and would be loyal and all that, and so on.

I had misgivings about this later. I think I made the right decision at the time, because I think that was the thing to do with an inexperienced secretary with a whole new team; that you badly needed an Otis Beasley. I wished later that I had pushed him out earlier, because he also had his little empire. He was not easy to work with. He had so many things in the department; people and policies he was interested in, and all kinds of large and small things,

you know, that.... A person like that tends to build his own empire and his own apparatus, and he, too, wants to keep you out as much as possible because the more you're kept out, why, the more power he has. I increasingly clashed with him and had unpleasant things, and so on. Ultimately, in a very late hour in my eight years, I finally got him to the door.

MOSS: Okay. Now, on the bureau-level appointments, I guess we better take them by general area. In John Carver's area, in the Bureau of Land Management, Karl Landstrom [Karl S. Landstrom] was the initial man there. How did his appointment come about?

UDALL: Well, that was quite a simple one, because Karl is one of the two or three staff people on the House Interior committee. I had worked with him. Actually, I misjudged him. He was a mistake. But he was very industrious. I always worked well with him. Again, this was a good thing, it was a tie with the committee. That appealed to me, plus the fact that I thought he had a competence that he lacked. He was a very poor politician. So that was the explanation of that one.

MOSS: Was anybody pushing him particularly?

UDALL: No, I think that was an instance where there were several candidates, several people being pushed.

MOSS: Okay. We've already mentioned Philleo Nash. In the territories area, Taitano [Richard F. Taitano] was the man for the trust territories.

UDALL: Well, there's an interesting story on this one, involves both Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson.

MOSS: Daniel [Marion Price Daniel]?

UDALL: In fact, two of the appointments that the White House dictated direct were Ralph Paiewonsky in the Virgin Islands – I mean, I just got word one morning that, “You have the governor of the Virgin Islands,” and so on and so forth, “The President's announcing it – ” and even though it was my appointment. In the case of Guam, John Carver and I worked very closely on this. The last governor of Guam – or was he commissioner of the High Territory – what's this fellow's name? Well, anyway, John was very industrious and very good at these personnel problems because he was very thorough about it and he'd done a lot of work. What we were shooting for as a major gesture, breakthrough in territorial

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affairs was to have the natives have native governors. Now, Paiewonsky fit that mold. And we were pushing for Manuel Guerrero [Manuel F. L. Guerrero], I believe, who later became governor, to be the first governor. I mean, what we wanted to know, and John was finding



that out from people who knew Guam, is who is the ablest person there. And, of course, they had almost a one-party system and they were allied with the Democrats.

So we were in the process of identifying this person when suddenly I got a call one day from Ralph Dungan, I guess. He said, "Hold up on Guam. I think the President may have an appointment on that." We talked about it. It turned out finally that Price Daniel, who was governor of Texas during the 1960 presidential campaign, had at some point – I suppose this was one of those things, although few people did this to Kennedy – apparently with him and Lyndon Johnson, the three of them off in a corner somewhere, Daniel had said, "If you're elected, there's one thing that I want" – I think this was done during the campaign and not after the election – "I've got a brother and he wants to be appointed governor of Guam," or Samoa or Virgin Islands, something like that. Apparently, the governorship was actually discussed. As I sort of put it together, I think the Kennedy people were not about to validate that promise unless it came from on high. So, Daniel, working through Lyndon Johnson, who was pressing them and saying this was a commitment and it had to be kept and so on. They finally got to the point where since he'd been promised that he was going to be governor that we just finally threw our hands in the air and said, "Well, if that's the way it has to be, we'll take him." The FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] report on him was one of the funniest documents I've ever seen because the fellow was very eccentric, and was almost a disaster out there in a way.

So, in any event, John Carver and I – I think I ought to give John the credit. I think he came up with this, and idea, because we knew this would look awful. We were trying to establish the idea of native governors. Here Kennedy comes in, he has confidence in the territorial peoples wanting native governors, and here's obviously, a brother of the governor of Texas, a political hag, going out to Guam. Kohn came bouncing in quickly when we got the word. There was no arguing. He said, "Well, let's take somebody from Guam and make him the director of the Office of Territories so that he will be supervising Daniel" – Dick Taitano, who had been singled out for us as a very able little fellow – actually, he was not too aggressive or forceful as it turned out, but very competent.

So, I remember calling Ralph Dungan, I guess, at the White House and saying, "Hey, we got an idea." Well, they liked it. I mean, they thought that was great. So the two were announced together. That's the way we filled the territories slot, with Dick. With John really being the supervisor, it worked out quite well.

MOSS: I was just looking for the name of the man who was the trust territories...

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UDALL: Well, the trust territories...

MOSS: ...person.

UDALL: ...fellow was Will Goding [M. Wilfred Goding].

MOSS: Right.

UDALL: Here again, we were trying to please senators and made a bad appointment. Goding was Senator Bob Bartlett's [Edward L. Bartlett] man. Of course, I had served with Bob in the House. He was then in the Senate, wonderful man and so on. He hadn't asked for anything. You know, here you are down at this level. Goding seemed to us – John Carver and I looked at him very closely and he appeared to be quite strong. That was his problem. He later considered, after he got out there, halfway around the world in the Pacific, that he was, in effect, the President's designee out there and that we were not supposed to supervise him. This is essentially the position he ended up taking and he became very difficult about it. We tried to remove him a couple of times. We tried to ease him out. He'd go to the Hill with Senator Bartlett and build backfires. John and I both had a lot of misery with him. He wasn't all that good, either. I mean, he was kind of plodding – disappointment really, on balance.

MOSS: And Rex Lee [Hyrum Rex Lee] in Samoa.... You were considering a woman for Samoa for a while, weren't you...

UDALL: Yeah.

MOSS: ...and this backfired because of some people in Southern California or something?

UDALL: Gee, I don't.... John's memory on that would be better than mine. Yeah, we did. We were looking for a woman's appointment. I even forget who the person was. I just have the memory that yes, some woman came into consideration. Then again, this was Carver's resourceful mind. Lee was the third man in the Indian bureau, was very good at handling native people, very diplomatic. But he also was one who had been kind of a battering-ram for the Eisenhower Administration. So it was a good thing to get him out of there. John is very clever at moving people around, and he said, "Let's send Rex Lee down." Well, I didn't know Rex. I had seen him in action before the committee a few times and knew that he was competent. He turned out to be one of our very best appointments, in my view. He was a bit authoritarian, but I think he did a very good job at Samoa and was really our star performer. Then later, President Johnson, of course, put him on the Federal Communications Commission. He was very, very aggressive, very resourceful. He got educational television started out there and so on. John Carver had the idea for Rex, and I bought it.

MOSS: Okay. On Paiewonsky, you said that it was a political appointment also. Who was pushing that one?

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UDALL: Well, the Virgin Islands people had been for Kennedy at the convention. You know, they had votes at the convention. I didn't know anything about this at all, of course, but Paiewonsky apparently was one of the leaders. I was told later that Bill Green [William J. Green, Jr.] of Philadelphia – he was the political boss up

there – that he was the one that put the arm on the President to appoint him. But I'm sure that Ralph Dungan, who kind of was our contact, had something to do with it too, because we also inherited Pepe – what was his name? – this Puerto Rican fellow that became the deputy high commissioner out in the Pacific. He had helped the Kennedy people in Puerto Rico. Can't think of his name, but it will come back to me though.

MOSS: Well, it's in the [U. S. Government] Organization Manual, so it can be checked out.

UDALL: Yeah, yeah.

MOSS: Now, let's see. Humphrey was pushing a fellow named Cyril King for government secretary of the Virgin Islands, too. Do you recall that?

UDALL: Yes, this came a little bit later. Cyril was a black, I guess had either lived in the Virgin Islands or had a Virgin Island background. He'd worked for Humphrey, and I think Humphrey was really trying to get rid of him on his own staff. He pressed very hard on it. I forget whether the White House people gave us a further push on it but we did put him in, purely as a political thing for Humphrey. And it turned out to be a disaster because he and Paiewonsky were at each other's throat for eight long years.

MOSS: Okay. On the Alaska Railroad, you changed the rules a little bit on the appointment, didn't you, when Manley [John E. Manley] came in? Instead of selecting somebody from the railroad industry, you promoted from the ranks of the Alaska Railroad?

UDALL: That's right. That's right. This, again, was John Carver's idea. I think John either made a trip up or talked around. John had a way of doing very thorough work. When he came to me on some of these, he had more influence on me than anyone else in terms of the appointments in his area.

MOSS: Okay. And one more in his area, of course, is the re-appointment of Connie Wirth as the National Park Service director. Was this automatic or did you have some discussion of this?

UDALL: No, this was entirely automatic. It was my feeling that the

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park director's job was one that traditionally had been a career person, and that whoever holds the job, as long as he's functioning well, ought to remain. In fact, Wirth, I believe, was another one that went back to Chapman. Chapman had some influence with me on that. But I never faltered at all in feeling that he should be continued on because of the career tradition.

MOSS: Okay. We've been running for, about an hour and a half. Do you want to break it off here, and...?

UDALL: Yeah, I think that's enough.

MOSS: ...next time? All right.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

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