

Philip M. Klutznick Oral History Interview – JFK#1, 04/07/1970
Administrative Information

Creator: Philip M. Klutznick
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Biographical Note

Philip M. Klutznick (1907-1999) was the United States representative to the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) from 1961 to 1963. This interview focuses on the 1960 presidential campaign, the feelings of the Jewish American community towards John F. Kennedy, and Klutznick's time serving the United Nations, among other topics.

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Philip M. Klutznick
PHILIP M. KLUTZNICK

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of Philip M. Klutznick

Interviewed by: Dennis J. O'Brien

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Philip M. Klutznick– JFK #1

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Oral History Interview

with

PHILIP M. KLUTZNICK

April 7, 1970
Chicago, Illinois

By Dennis J. O'Brien

For the John F. Kennedy Library

O'BRIEN: I think a logical place to begin is with the question, "When did you first meet President Kennedy?" Or I suspect it was then Senator Kennedy?

KLUTZNICK: I met him the first time when he was Congressman Kennedy just after he was elected. It was a casual meeting. I had served during the latter part of the war as the Commissioner of the Federal Public Housing Authority which was concerned with public war housing. You may recall that Congressman Kennedy's first big pitch was for housing after he'd returned from the war. I met him at a couple of meetings at that time, when he looked like he was about twenty and when his priority was to see what he could do for the veterans.

O'BRIEN: What do you recall of his attitudes towards housing at that point?

KLUTZNICK: Well, he didn't change much during all the time I knew him. He wanted to be sure that the people who didn't get housing for whatever reason got it. He put special emphasis on the veterans problem, which was quite real at that time. The sudden demobilization had aggravated the situation, and 1946 was a period of tremendous national concern.

Mr. Kennedy was very much concerned about it. His real drive at that time was to see what the Congress could do to be sure that people got housing, especially those who were the returning veterans. This view matured as years went on into a more comprehensive attitude toward the whole problem.

O'BRIEN: When he later moves on into the Senate, do you maintain contact with him at that point?

KLUTZNICK: Well, actually, I would run into him on occasion at some public function. I had no extended contacts with him again until about 1958. At that time I was invited, through Sargent Shriver and Hyman B. Hy Raskin who were working at testing the political water, to have a visit with the senator. This was after I had served in the UN United Nations in one of the Dwight D. Eisenhower delegations in '57. I was then international president of the B'nai B'rith, and I went to Washington and spent a few hours with the senator alone. It was a rather unique experience.

It was in the spring, as I recall it, of '58. And two things were rather interesting. The first time I'd seen Theodore C. Teddy Sorensen since he was a baby was when I walked into that office. One of the first jobs I had in Nebraska was working for his father. The second thing that happened was, I had been wanting to talk to the senator about his famous speech the fall before on Algeria, and when I was in the UN and when we were having a hard time over that problem. So I did. I got a chance to talk to him about that and a few other things. We were there a few hours, alone. He sat in his rocking chair and me a leg away from him trying to make up my mind whether this was the man I wanted to see president in 1960. I chided him about the Algerian speech because I thought that, while I had a great deal of sympathy for what he had to say, I couldn't understand its timing in view of the difficulty we were in in the UN. Interruption I tried to tell him how embarrassing it was to the whole delegation that was trying to steer a middle course. I remember his answer was, "Somebody had to bring this thing out in the open." He felt that I would find out later it may have served a constructive purpose. So I said to him, "It may well have served a purpose," and I was sympathetic to his objective, but I thought his timing was bad.

Then we got into a discussion of other things including his attitude toward problems in the Middle East and elsewhere. It was the first real visit I'd ever had with him. I found him very sharp and, on such things where he was walking a tightrope, very

fuzzy. On the Middle East at one point I said to him, "Look, you've got to make up your mind. I'm not here to sell you anything, but frankly I think you're trying to carry water on both shoulders, and it isn't going to work. It just won't work. You're going to have to make up your mind whether you're for or against some of these things. Being a statesman on this one isn't going to get you anything any more than being a statesman on Algeria would have gotten you anywhere." He listened. He was a great listener at that time. He was absorbing. He had a tremendous range.

Some months later he was given an award by an organization in New York, B'nai Zion, and he delivered a speech on the Middle East. He sent me a copy of it, with a note, "Do you like this better? signed, Jack." So, he didn't forget the discussion. You might want to know what I thought after I got through with that meeting.

O'BRIEN: Yes, I would.

KLUTZNICK: You know, Jack Kennedy, even in those days, before he became president, and before he became an active candidate, had a quality of showing respect for another's position and listening very carefully. Even when he disagreed with a person--I found this of him later--he showed a kind of respect for the view of that person that didn't leave that person feeling as if he'd been a fool. And I walked out of there very much impressed with his willingness to listen to my viewpoints. When I was asked by Hy Raskin what I thought, I said, "I think he's a wonderful fellow, but my own guess is he's probably four years early." And that's the position I took. I was friendly with Governor [Adlai E.] Stevenson, and I hoped that lightning might strike again. I guess I was rationalizing more than anything else and therefore, I didn't join the effort to get Senator Kennedy nominated or elected.

O'BRIEN: Did you feel that this was a concerted effort to pick you off as perhaps other Stevenson people?

KLUTZNICK: I don't think it had to do with trying to pick me off because I was a Stevenson man. I had a feeling it was an effort to pick me off for other reasons, which is good politics. I was the head of the largest and oldest Jewish organization in the world. I had access to certain people who could bring some measure of strength. I was not naive about it at all. And I didn't resent it. Quite the contrary, I felt that this was a good, sound approach. Why not? Why not try to get people to join up who brought a little strength here, a little strength there? And there was nothing offensive about it.

I want you to understand that. It was not blatant, and it wasn't political in the normal precinct type of approach.

O'BRIEN: Well, now, from 1958 on to the time of the election of 1960 do you see him again?

KLUTZNICK: Yes.

O'BRIEN: Do you have much contact with his Senate staff or his campaign staff?

KLUTZNICK: Well, I didn't have much contact with anyone other than two who were related to him, other than Sarge Shriver, and later Newton Minow when he joined and tried to convince the governor to throw his weight that way. Wallace Ollman was helping in every way he could. I made my position very clear to Sarge afterwards. I said, "As long as there's any chance of Adlai Stevenson being nominated, you can't count on me. But once he's out, I'm for him. In the meanwhile, I consider Hubert Humphrey as a stand-in for Adlai Stevenson, so I am going to support him," which I did. Even though I had not made any commitment, after Jack Kennedy won in Wisconsin, I went to a luncheon for him at the Merchandise Mart. And that was the first time that I spent any time with him since that meeting that I referred to. He was nice enough to say, "I hope the time comes soon when I can convince you that you ought to be on our team." Very, very decent and very nice about the whole thing. I didn't join them until after the convention.

O'BRIEN: Well, did you play a major role in Governor Stevenson's campaign then that year?

KLUTZNICK: No. I'm not really active in politics anyway.

O'BRIEN: Did you have much contact with Governor Stevenson?

KLUTZNICK: Oh, yes. Quite frequently.

O'BRIEN: How is he reacting to the Kennedy movement in politics in those years?

KLUTZNICK: Well, let me take one evening, which was a key evening, in advance of the convention. I was living out in the country, and I came in late afternoon, and he closed the door. Actually, both Newt Minow and William M., Jr. Bill Blair urged me to sit with the governor. Several times during the year before we'd gone over

some public issues that he was speaking on. He'd occasionally call me when he was going to give a speech on a housing matter or an urban development matter or the Middle East or something of that sort, and I'd sit and have lunch with him and we'd talk about it. But never in terms of his being a candidate because he was very careful not to be one.

But that evening he wanted to talk quite openly about the meetings he'd had with Jack Kennedy, and with Lyndon Johnson before that, in which he said--the first time he ever said to me-- "You know, I just can't come out for either one of them. I promise to be neutral." This man used to suffer with his thoughts very much. He says, "I've promised that I would stay neutral, but," he said, "it's beginning to look like I'm playing for something, and I'm not." He says, "I could be secretary of state if I'd come out for either one of them if they were president." And he said, "You know, there's no position I'd rather have, above the presidency or anything else than that." But he said, "Phil, I just don't dare do it." And I said to him, "Look Adlai, I don't think you ought to do it for another reason. These two men could knock themselves out, and then what will the party do? And it seems to me you have to maintain a position of neutrality between these two men." No one at that time knew for certain which way it was going. "You owe it to the country and to the party to stay above this fight. It just isn't becoming to you." Now that was contrary to the advice that I know he was getting from his partners and from others. He said to me, "Well, if you had to chose between them, who would you chose?" I said, "I have no problem in that regard. I would chose Kennedy as between them, because I think he's younger, and I think he's more attractive, and I think he'll keep the country tied together better. But, I said, "I don't think you can afford that luxury." In retrospect, I gave him very bad advice, but I felt it and believed it. At one point he turned to me and he said, "Don't tell me you think I might have to go through this thing all over again after having been to the well twice." And he described the experiences of running for presidency. You know, he never liked being a candidate. He really never did. But that was it and that was about the tenor of any discussions we'd had.

O'BRIEN: Did you go to the convention in 1960?

KLUTZNICKS: No. I don't go to conventions.

O'BRIEN: And you didn't get involved at all in a choice for vice-presidential candidate?

KLUTZNICK: No, sir. Let it be said to my everlasting credit, "I had nothing to do with it."

O'BRIEN: Perhaps the best way to put it is, "When did you first begin to realize or sense that you were going to be asked to serve in the United Nations?"

KLUTZNICK: Well, it didn't happen quite that way. First of all, once the primary was over I did get involved in the campaign. Bobby Robert F. Kennedy invited a few of us down right after the primary to his house to sit down and see if we could organize certain special aspects of the campaign. Let's see, Byron R. Buzzer sic White was there, and he was handling the citizens. Sarge was there. Newt and I went down, and there were a couple of other people there. They asked me if I wouldn't do something in connection with the businessmen, and I said, "I'd be glad to do anything I can now, now that the thing is over and decided." Luther Hodges took on the businessmen's operation which was a kind of a front operation, and since headquarters was in Chicago, I acted as chairman of the executive committee and helped raise the money for it. That was the end at which I operated. Sarge was overspending everything we raised, as he would. We helped and had, I think, a reasonably successful effort.

I saw the old gentlemen out here once during that period of time, and we did some work across the country. Myer Mike Feldman was charged with Jewish community aspects of the work, in a sense. Whenever he got into trouble, he'd call me and we set up a kind of an operation. I got him some people to work in that end of it.

I recall when the candidate went to the Zionist Organization of America, contrary to my advice, to deliver a principal speech, and some of us helped work on it, and it was the greatest success. My advice was never any good. It was one of the most successful things I've ever seen. This was in August of 1960. I nearly was squashed in the crowd that tried to get near him and touch him. That night I turned to a few of the fellows, and I said, "You can't beat him." He came close to being beat. But he had grown up to the point. There was a charisma about him. There was a desire to touch and to feel. I hadn't seen it since Franklin D. Roosevelt. And to me it just seemed like this man was going to be next to impossible to beat--just feeling. And the way he looked at his speech and threw it away and made a remarkable statement. Seated next to me was Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, who was against Democrats as a general rule, and he turned to me and he said to me, "Is this man for real?"

Because," he says, "Phil, this is the best speech I've heard on this subject." So I was involved in those things as we went along until the election was over. Now you want to know how did I know I was going into the UN.

O'BRIEN: Well, let's pause on that one for a moment because I was going to get into this a little later. But I think those two things, involved in the organization of the citizens' campaign, and also your relationship with the Jewish community and Democratic politics, I think are two real important areas that perhaps would be worth going into. First of all, with the organization of businessmen, in your organization here, where do you have success in finding money and support for Jack Kennedy in 1960 in the business community?

KLUTZNICK: Well, this was a mixed can of worms. I think that this was one place where a fine Italian hand was at work that helped us a lot more than people understand or appreciate, and that was father Joe [Joseph P. Kennedy]. In spite of many harsh things that people said about him, he had some remarkably close and affectionate relationships in the business community, and some in the Jewish community. In his own very circumspect way, I'd run into situations where I knew he was there before.

O'BRIEN: Is that right?

KLUTZNICK: Yeah. And I must say, I built up a profound respect for an activist of this kind being able to be as modest as he was during a rather difficult time for any father. And so I'd say that in some respects he was very helpful. In this area Sarge Shriver had developed a very, very nice status with people who respected him. He was chairman of the school board here, and he was helpful. Luther Hodges had once been the vice president of Marshall Field and Company, which didn't hurt. And there is always, in a national election, a certain number of people who are unhappy with the Republicans, who are businessmen. And we managed to pick them up wherever we could.

But I wouldn't say that we even approached the success that Johnson had in 1964 with the business community. Then he was operating from the presidency, which makes a difference, and he was operating against [Barry M.] Goldwater, which made a difference. And he had a lot of businessmen who were avowed Republicans who were in his camp. Now, we had some, but it was hard picking at times. We were fairly good in Michigan. We were just fair; the businessmen we picked up in New York were

the businessmen that would have been for any Democrat with a few exceptions, which is New York. We were pretty good in Ohio. We were, I thought considering everything, excellent in Illinois. We were fair on the West Coast. We organized California, and it didn't produce what it should have produced as a businessman's operation. It produced from another point of view. So I wouldn't treat our activity as being the best of all worlds. We managed. We'd get a quarter of a million dollars together and we spent it. A little more than that.

O'BRIEN: You did raise about a quarter of a million?

KLUTZNICK: Oh, a little more than that. I mean actually I guess by the time we were through we had closer to \$350,000, but Sarge Shriver would spend the extra for the Martin Luther King brochure, and we wouldn't even know that we had the money. Well, we had a businessmen's breakfast out here that was quite good. When the senator was coming through, we put on quite a show and got, oh, about sixty or seventy first-class businessmen who came out there to meet with him and take pictures with him. It had the aura of movement much more than it had depth.

O'BRIEN: Well, who were some of the major supporters that you can call back?

KLUTZNICK: We had Neil Staebler, who wasn't then chairman of the state committee in Michigan, who did a good job in Michigan. Luther Hodges was working down South, but he had a man from New York--I'm trying to think of his name; I've even forgotten it now--who came to me, after it was over with, he said, "Now, you know that Luther Hodges wants to be secretary of commerce. You're not contending for it, are you?" I said, "Hell, I couldn't think of a less important position than to be secretary of commerce in a Democratic administration, but if he wants it, I'm for him." I'm trying to think of his name because the president put him on some sort of committee. It slips me now. We had a man out on the West Coast, a young lawyer, [James] Loebel, who worked awfully hard. We had a fellow in Ohio who was good and I'm trying to think of his name, and it slips me now. It's ten years ago, and I don't remember too well. We had them scattered. We had a fellow by the name of [Alphonsus J.] Donahue, who has twelve or more children, from New York who worked very hard. You know who he is. I think he's running for something there now or wanted to.

O'BRIEN: I didn't realize that.

KLUTZNICK: He helped us. We had quite a few around here. We had Modie Spiegel Modie J. Spiegel, Jr.. We had Pete Volid of King Korn stamps Kingkorn Stamp Company. We had a fellow who's since passed away who was with Thor Power Tools Thor Power Tool Company who was quite active. He was our state chairman and worked very hard. We had Ross Siragusa who was chairman of the breakfast with the Senator and helped out considerably. We had a fairly representative Midwest group. I think much better than any one of the other groups and principally because they were friends of ours here. And it gave it the right facade.

O'BRIEN: Now you had mentioned '64. What happens between '60 and '64 to bring the business community into the Democratic camp. Is there any particular. . . .

KLUTZNICK: Well, I think if President Kennedy had been alive we'd have been more successful with the business community anyway because, first of all, his policies did prove effective from a point of view of the business community. There was prosperity, and the business community was not ungrateful. That's proposition number one. The Democrats had proved good for business, and a lot of the fellows wanted to get on the bandwagon. Secondly, of course, any time that you're operating from the presidency you have a lot more influence with those who would normally be against you than if you're operating from the position of being a senator and a candidate. And third, Johnson was running against Goldwater instead of Richard M. Nixon and without Eisenhower being president. You add these three things together, and it would have been absolutely a miracle if he didn't have an enormous backing.

I think John Loeb and the other fellows that he got, Joe Fowler Henry H. Fowler, helped organize that group. Joe Fowler was in our group too, incidentally. I should have remembered that. They took everything we had and could only add on to it. They lost nothing. And they multiplied by three or four and therefore they even had a fellow like Maxwell Rabb, who had been secretary to Eisenhower's cabinet, who was active in the campaign.

During his first year as president Lyndon Johnson reached over backwards to bring Republicans into view. I attended a few of the parties and I must say that Lyndon Johnson had a certain kind of respect for Eastern wealth and industrialists that I never have had and I don't think that President Kennedy ever looked at in that way. I mean Lyndon Johnson had a kind of an insecurity that Jack Kennedy never felt. The result was that he reached for people who he felt insecure with, to try to

capture them. And I think he did it quite effectively. He had nothing going against him, don't you see? I would think that if the president had lived and had been a candidate, that he would have had a very successful industrial and business backing. Presidents nearly always do.

O'BRIEN: When they look like winners.

KLUTZNICK: Yes. Candidates have a hard time when they're out. [Interruption]

O'BRIEN: Well, let's turn for a moment to the Jewish community and, well, Democratic politics in 1960 and particularly the primary campaign of Senator Kennedy. Is there a great deal of enthusiasm for him in the Jewish community?

KLUTZNICK: In the Jewish community. Well, I would say generally, no. I would also say that this was not his fault. There was a great carry-over as far as his father was concerned. There was a feeling that he was friendly to the Nazi cause, and the story was distributed all over the lot. There was also a feeling with respect to certain relationships that he'd had. Actually, after the primary, the only time I went on television in the campaign was in connection with a scurrilous piece of material about the president's father. [Louis E.] Lou Martin and Sarge Shriver and I sat up one night. Lou was telling me about it the other day at young Adlai's [Adlai E. Stevenson, III] meeting. He said, "You remember that night when we finally euchred you into going on television at midnight?" And we went on at midnight to answer charges at the end, against the father and some things that he's alleged to have done which were really false. We sat up and wrote the answer and I found myself delivering it.

But this was the way Sarge operated. He's a good operator when it comes to situations. Planner he was not, but he would move into a special situation with alacrity and he'd stay with it until it was over.

So it is true that there was a lot of doubt about the Kennedys as a whole. And I think it reflected upon the senator. On the other hand, I think he may have won. . . . It 's hard to put your finger on one situation, but that speech in August to three thousand people turned the tide, in my judgment. No one had to apologize for him in the Jewish community after that speech, and therefore his political judgment and that of his advisors

was a lot better than mine. I would have said, "Don't make that speech there." And Nixon's advisors were a lot worse than mine. They told him not to, and he sent a tape or something to that meeting. There was a dinner for Kennedy in advance of that meeting. The president of the American Zionist organization [Zionist Organization of America] was in Chicago at the time and a Republican, Max Bressler, and therefore I presided at the dinner. He acquitted himself well under those circumstances, but his speech was a bell-ringer. It just absolutely took all the fire out of everybody. He said much more than if I'd written the speech. But he was that way. If he finally worked himself up to a position, that was it, and he'd let it go. But it took him some time to work up to it, I guess.

O'BRIEN: Well, I understand there were some private meetings with the various leaders of the Jewish community in New York and in Chicago. Were you in on any of these at all?

KLUTZNICK: Yes. Yes, the first one that was held was held in New York. Mike Feldman and [Abraham A.] Abe Ribicoff and [Abraham] Abe Feinberg, who was an associate of mine in New York, brought together about twelve or fourteen people in Abe's apartment. And the senator came there and exposed himself to the damndest questioning. Took it all, all the way. We were there about an hour and a half or so. The interesting thing about that meeting is that that was precisely the pattern which was used by Mr. Nixon in nineteen hundred and sixty-eight. They tried to get me to go to that meeting. I didn't go.

Now, here in Chicago he didn't have that kind of meeting. He met with individuals instead and did quite well. But that meeting in New York was very important. It gave some people who were good Democrats, take a fellow like [Jacob M.] Jack Arvey. Colonel Arvey was in that meeting. He walked away from there on air. He'd had some doubts about certain things, and he walked away from there absolutely on air. I had made up my mind by that time. The meeting didn't make any difference to me. I didn't see anywhere else to go, and it looked like a good home to go to, don't you see? But it was wide open. He didn't pull any punches, and here, I think, speaking with responsible people he was in some respects better than when he spoke from the platform because there he didn't hesitate to hedge where he felt he had to hedge. And he'd say it: "I'm hedging." Whereas when you're speaking to three thousand people--I guess he was smarter in that than some of the rest of us--he gave it to them without the hedges.

O'BRIEN: Do you recall at that what were the two or three major questions that were in the minds of the American Jewish leaders in terms of Jack Kennedy and the presidency?

KLUTZNICK: Well, the question of his father came up at that meeting. I wish I could think of the words. He used to have a unique way of putting things when he was speaking off the cuff. I thought he was at his best off the cuff when he believed something. When the issue of his father came up he took it calmly and spent some time making clear how he felt about his father. And he also spent some time making it clear that the president of the United States may have a father, but the father can't make his policy for him. And, on the other hand, he says, "I won't mislead you. I have great confidence in my father's judgment on many things. I'm always grateful for the fact that he's around for me to counsel with. But my father, on the other hand, respects my position and my ability to make my own decisions which I shall keep." It was really a moving few minutes.

The other thing that came up, of course, which always comes up these days is his attitude toward the state of Israel, the Middle East. And there he handled himself clearly. There was none of the fuzz that I saw in '58. He had thought the problem through, made up his mind, and as subsequent events when he became president made clear, when he had to face the issue he faced it, and did so courageously. And he never forgot what his promise was in that connection. Actually, if there was any change in U.S. policy toward our relationship with Israel in the Middle East, it took place in Kennedy's administration. It started then. I know in subsequent times he remembered that speech he made in August and the discussion he had with these people.

Now the other thing that always comes up in any discussion of this sort is the question of human rights and there his record was good enough for anybody. His position on immigration--of course, he'd written a leading pamphlet on that subject before. He didn't miss the opportunity to say so.

The two things that stood out were his defense of his father and his relationship to his father, and the second was the problems of the Middle East. I did considerable of the questioning. I thought his answers on human rights and civil rights, the whole issue of first-class citizenship, was first-rate. Those are the only things that they ever get concerned about, anyway.

O'BRIEN: Do you recall some of the people that were there in the New York meeting and the Chicago meeting, some of the major people?

KLUTZNICK: Well, I say Abe Ribicoff was there because Abe was in a measure responsible for the meeting. Abe Feinberg was there. Jack Arvey was there. Max Bressler, the president of the Zionist organization, the Republican, was there. I was there. There was only a dozen. I'm trying to think of the others. I don't recall whether Robert S. Bob Benjamin was there. No, he wasn't there at that. Bob and Arthur Krim came to the first businessmen's meeting in Washington. They were not at that meeting. But I don't recall other names.

O'BRIEN: How about Chicago?

KLUTZNICK: That, I didn't spend any time on that one at all, and it isn't even clear in my mind.

O'BRIEN: Were there any other meetings anywhere around the country that you were aware of. . . .

KLUTZNICK: Yes. Yes. We arranged for him to meet people wherever he went, but we didn't arrange it in the same way it was done in New York. In New York it was clearly an open session, "Say what's on your mind, ask what you want." What we did wherever he went was to try to make sure that there were respectable and representative leaders of the Jewish community that were present, got a chance to shake hands with him as they did here, and not to engage in this kind of exchange because you don't put a candidate through that too often.

O'BRIEN: Who were some of the major people you suggested that he see throughout the country other than Chicago and New York?

KLUTZNICK: Well, I'd have to get out my records on that, but I could name some. I'd just as soon not name some without naming a lot, and I'd have to go back into my files. It must have been a hundred and fifty, two hundred names.

O'BRIEN: Oh, is that right?

KLUTZNICK: Oh, sure. We had a list of everybody that was anybody, and we'd try to get them into the business effort rather than. . . . That was the one place. When we couldn't get them that way we'd try to get them some other way. You know how the game goes.

O'BRIEN: Well, let's pass on to the United Nations, then, and the question of how did your appointment come about.

KLUTZNICK: Well, first of all, as you may recall, Sarge Shriver was a talent scout. Right after the election I was going--I don't know where--I think Morocco or some place, and he caught me on the telephone and called me about a couple of posts, and said, "Now, what do you want?" I said, "I don't want anything." He said, "Well, look, you've got to be in this administration. You helped. You did this. You did that." I said, "I just don't want anything, Sarge, and besides which I've been in and out of government enough, and I'd like to rest a little while now. I've got some other business things I want to do." "No, you've got to go in."

Well, that was the end of that conversation until I went abroad, came back and this business of who was going to be secretary of state came up and who was going to be the head of the then housing agency, the Housing and Home Finance Agency [HHFA] came up, and I got caught in the middle of both of those discussions. At one point [J. William] Fulbright was suggested, and I was asked what I thought about it and I said, "I can only say one thing to you. I happen to respect Bill Fulbright very much, but I can't get you a tinker's damn of Jews who would like it. If you want my honest judgment, it would go down very badly because of his record and attitude on the Middle East." And I said, "I would think twice before I'd do it for another reason. He's got a rather questionable position on school segregation, things of that sort." And so that was at that point.

I said, "Who are you considering? How about Adlai?" "Well, he's out. He's out." So I said, "Well, why in the devil don't we get him into the UN?" I just mentioned it casually. The day that he was offered this I got a call from Sarge again. "All right. He's been offered it. He hasn't accepted it. See what you can do about getting him to take it. He's your friend. He's in [William L.] Bill Benton's apartment in New York, so you talk to him." I was in New York at the time. Well, I said, "Look, I don't want to get in the man's business, but I happen to think that if he isn't going to be secretary of state, that's the one voice that we need in the UN, so I'm going to talk to him," which I did. Adlai said to me, "Look," he said, "I'm not going to be able to turn this down, but I'd be darned if I wanted to accept it before they appoint a secretary of state. I want to know who I'm going to work with." That was about the extent of our discussion that day.

Meanwhile, I came back to Chicago and I got a call from one of the businessmen who was active in Texas. I'm trying to think of what his name is now. He was a home builder. He was a friend of Lyndon Johnson's. And he called me up and he said, "Phil, we're in a hell of a box. We have it on direct authority that they're going to appoint a Negro the head of HHFA and we've talked to the vice president, and he said that if we could get a good candidate that we could defeat him. Now we want you to be the candidate." I said, "Look, let's get one thing straight. I've been in the housing agency in my lifetime, and I understand the fellow's going to be Robert Weaver. Bob has worked for me in years past, and I'm for him. And I wouldn't be a candidate to oppose him under any circumstances, besides which I'll do everything in the world I can to defeat you if you try to get anyone else to defeat him if he wants it. Now, if he doesn't want it, we'll talk about it again."

I called Sarge immediately and I said, "Look, there's a movement being built up. Now if Bob wants it, he ought to have it. He's a good man. But make that appointment in a hurry or you're going to get opposition. The home builders are afraid of him. Others are afraid of him." Well, he got the message, and about that time he says, "How about yourself?" I said, "Myself, I'm sitting where I am."

Well, the next day I got a call from Adlai Stevenson. "Come down and have lunch with me." "What is it?" He said, "Look, I've got two posts that I can fill. I want you to take one or the other of them." "What's that?" "You can be assistant secretary of state for international affairs or you can be a minister at the UN in charge of economic and social affairs and take care of all the financial matters. Now which do you want?" "I don't want either one of them." He says, "You're going to have to take one. You've got me into this thing. You'd have to be my man in Washington in the IO [Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State]." And I said, "Who are you considering for that?" "Harlan Cleveland," and he mentioned a few other names. "Who are you considering for the other posts?" He told me. I said, "Let me think it over. Let me study it over and I'll be back to you."

O'BRIEN: Who was in consideration for that post outside of you at that point?

KLUTZNICK: You mean up in New York?

O'BRIEN: In New York.

KLUTZNICK: I've even forgotten the names of the people.
I only remember Harlan Cleveland in Washington.
He mentioned several others on that one, too.

Well, I went back and got my material out on the Economic and Social Council. This was an area that I was deeply interested in. I came back and I said to him, "Look, Adlai. One, I don't think I want to go to Washington to be your man. I don't think that's possible. I don't think a man can be assistant secretary of state and be responsible to you in New York. It won't work, and besides which, you've got a first-rate man in Harlan Cleveland, and if he wants it, count me out. I wouldn't take that post. I wouldn't have two bosses for all the money in the world. Now the second one, I'm deeply interested in economic and social affairs, but I would not take it on a part-time basis under any circumstances. I believe the job is too important to flit in and out of, and secondly, I won't take it as a minister, and not because I give a damn what the title is. But I've gone over the records of the last ten years and nearly all of the important powers are represented in the Economic and Social Council by an ambassador or better and I will not sit below the salt if I'm going to deal with other nations. It's just that simple." He says, "How can I make you an ambassador?" I said, "You don't. The president does. I don't know that I'll consider it under any circumstances, but it's a full-time job to be done properly. That means I have to close up my office. I have to close up my house, and I have to move to New York, spend six weeks or eight weeks each year in Geneva. If I have to handle the financial affairs on top of that, then it's a double full-time job. And I don't intend to do it as an office boy. At my stage in life, I'll be glad to help you in any way you want me to help you. I'll come to New York ever so often at my own expense." "Well, Phil, I've got to have you. I haven't got anyone in the community that really knows these things. But how can I make you an ambassador?" I said, "I'm sorry. Those are my conditions, see."

Well, to make a long story short, he went and talked to the president, came back, and he says, "Would you come in now, and I'll promise you that after a few months the title will be changed?" I said, "I want you to think again as to whether you want me. Remember, a permanent post in the UN for an American Jew at this time is not the easiest thing in the World. Have you thought about that? Besides which I've written a book that's going to be published that is rather critical of

U.S. policy, and Farrar and Straus are putting it out next month." "Oh," he says, "forget that. You couldn't say anything that I wouldn't live with." I said, "Maybe you ought to read the script before you say that." "Well, no, no, Phil. I know what you say is all right, perfectly all right." He says, "I want you to do it." Well, I went back and had a talk with him. I never talked to the president about it, because I wasn't going to work for the president. I was going to work for Adlai. I'd been in the bureaucracy long enough to know that if you're going to work for a guy, you better make up your mind he's the guy you're working with. And I had a lot of soul searching. Finally said to him, "All right, if you accept my conditions, I accept yours." "Fine." Date is set for my taking. . . .

I went before the committee and sure enough Mr. Fulbright gave me a hard time on the question that I'd been chairman of the United Jewish Appeal and president of the B'nai B'rith, and this and that and the other thing. But he wouldn't have given me a hard time if Hubert Humphrey hadn't tried to support me so much, because he probably had to defend himself. But he voted for my confirmation. They all did.

Getting ready--I was going to be sworn in in front of Dean Rusk by Thomas C. Tom Clark, who's an old friend of mine. Then I get a telephone call--I was going down by train--he says, "Gee, the State Department has read those chapters from the book, and they're just terribly upset about the whole thing." I said, "I told you that before. I'll stay home. It's perfectly all right." "Oh, no, no. Don't worry about it." But he said, "Just want you to know that." I said, "Adlai, I am not going to stultify myself. Now you better call me back and tell me it's all right. I told you what was in that, and I told you to read it." Well, he came back and he said, "Go on down and get yourself sworn in."

So I went and got sworn in, went to New York. A week later, Roger Tubby and others started in on me. "Phil, you don't have to publish that part of the book. You can publish that after you leave, and you can add to it." They went to Farrar, Straus and got them to agree that they could publish half the book and leave the other half for later on which had to do with foreign affairs, and that's what they did. And that's how I got to New York. Some few months later I was made an ambassador, and I stood it as long as I could.

O'BRIEN: Well, you're immediately faced with a major political problem which, of course, is the Bay of Pigs. Do you remember anything about the briefing that took place when the CIA Central Intelligence Agency guy came up?

KLUTZNICK: On the Bay of Pigs?

O'BRIEN: Yeah.

KLUTZNICK: CIA guy came up. I was not involved on the briefing on Bay of Pigs because that was during the special session and I was involved on Congo. I was working day and night to get some money out of the UN to get the Congo financed, and I nearly lost that damn thing because of the Bay of Pigs. So I never got into the Bay of Pigs thing except as it nearly killed our whole operation. There were only two committees that were operating at that time. One was the political committee where the Cuban complaint was under consideration, where Adlai was involved. The other was a fifth committee on the financing of the Congo where I was involved. Because of the Bay of Pigs, I couldn't get any help. I was really handling the whole Congo business with two aids, and he had about eighteen over there on the Bay of Pigs thing. No, I was not in on that briefing. I was in on the Laotian briefing shortly thereafter. No, before that, as a matter of fact.

O'BRIEN: What do you recall from that one?

KLUTZNICK: Laotian briefing?

O'BRIEN: The Laotian briefing.

KLUTZNICK: Well, I recall the Laotian briefing was before the Bay of Pigs briefing. The CIA big brass came up. We were still at 2 Park Avenue at that time. I recall, first of all, when we came into the conference room all the shades were drawn and all the phones had been disconnected, and we were introduced into an atmosphere that was foreboding. As a boy from the country, I felt like leaving before I started. It was on a Saturday. We listened, we went through it, and it was indicated to us as clearly as it could be that there was a great possibility that there could be a war break out over Laos. And the geography and the necessity for defending the Laotian position was made very clear. We asked questions, we were there for a long while. I left there absolutely in a daze, I must tell you quite candidly.

I walked home. We were temporarily staying at the Navarro Hotel until our apartment was ready. I felt such a terrible depression. I never keep anything from my wife normally. Here was something I couldn't even talk to her about. And it was scary as hell, just scary as hell. I've often thought about that incident because I got to know Averell Harriman best when

he was traveling around the world and settling that problem temporarily. When he was sitting in Geneva--I had to be in Geneva during those summers too, both summers--somehow he averted the end day. We were only being briefed because we would have to defend the U.S. position in the UN if war broke out.

I never followed it because my area was entirely different. I only breathed a sigh of relief when it didn't happen. And later on, as I say, by chance I used to spend considerable time with Averell when he was attending those difficult, no action meetings in Geneva, and I was busy. But we'd take him to dinner now and then. He had little to do but sit there and outwait the opposition. And then I was there when Dean Rusk flew in to sign the agreement, and I attended the Polish party the night before. So my history with Laos goes all the way from, it was late January or early February of 1961 when we got the CIA briefing, to the point where Dean Rusk flew in in the summer of 1962 to sign the agreement.

O'BRIEN: Pursuing that line of thought for just a bit, did you ever get any insight into the Russians on that? I think [Georgi M.] Pushkin was there for part of that time, wasn't he?

KLUTZNICK: This was going on in the Palais [des Nations] at the same time that a thirty member delegation that I was heading was in constant session. The only time I got any insight at all was as the end was being reached. The Poles had a national day party and they invited us. Averell was going over so I went over with him. And he introduced me to the Russians and the Chinese with whom I was negotiating. That was near the end of the show. So I never got involved in it in any other way than listening to Averell talk about what a terrible thing it was to negotiate by not negotiating. And it was. This was the art of the whole darn exercise: patience, maturity, outwaiting them, not losing your cool. I think the governor was superb in that respect. He was just plain superb. Then when I was traveling around the world and trying to sell some UN bonds in the spring of '62, I ran into him in Thailand and Hong Kong. He was out selling his bill of goods in the field before the session started. He was a very patient and a very astute negotiator.

O'BRIEN: I understand that. Going back to the time of the Bay of Pigs, and of course, you were working on the Congo, but did you ever have the occasion to talk about the events of the Bay of Pigs and Governor Stevenson's reaction particularly after he discovers the . . .

KLUTZNICK: Of course we did. I mean this was, of course, a tragic incident. I think you must understand one thing about the governor's attitude toward the president. It was one of great affection, and yet at times when we'd have our delegation down there or I was there with him, I almost felt he was treating the president like he treated his oldest son, Adlai the third. He wanted to protect him. And I'm not sure the president appreciated it all the time either. But he had that attitude toward him, in spite of the fact that he made it difficult for him to get the nomination. Not intentionally. I'm sure that if he had to choose between the two and felt he could, I know who his choice would have been. But he had the kind of affection for Jack Kennedy that a father would have for his son. And it showed itself many times. And therefore he was terribly hurt. He was terribly hurt. There are about three times when I've seen him badly hurt during that experience. Really only once while I was with him, and twice afterwards on Vietnam. This time he just felt that anybody but Jack Kennedy would have done this to him.

There are many things said about the governor. There were times when you felt that you wish he would get a little tougher. There were times when you wished he was a little more orderly. But he was a person of extraordinary human sympathy and people just loved to talk to him, because he was listening all the time. When he got hurt, those blue eyes of his would water up. All the compassion he felt for everyone else, and he did. This man had an extraordinary relationship with the rest of the world. He could have been elected president of any place except the United States a lot of times. I saw this more in the UN than I ever saw it before. I don't think he was as close to quitting as a lot of people say he was. He did contemplate it before he went to London, although I don't think he was serious then.

O'BRIEN: Is it true that he oftentimes debated with himself through other people?

KLUTZNICK: Oh, yes. His greatest technique, the one you had to learn to know how to live with him, was that he would talk and talk and talk about the subject on several sides of it. He was really not talking to you, he was trying to get you to say something. The most outstanding example of it was before he went to London. Whenever I went to New York I'd have lunch with him or sit in. The type of thing that Eric Sevareid said about him, which I thought was a terrible thing to say after he died, namely, that he was going to quit and so forth and so on. He had spoken those

words almost precisely to me before he went to Geneva and then later to London. I listened for twenty-five minutes without saying a word. And he turned to me and he said, "But, Phil, you're not saying anything." I said, "Adlai, there's nothing to say." "What do you mean?" "You're not going to quit." He says, "Why do you say that?" I said, "Adlai, for you to quit, you can't do what I did. You've got to lead an opposition. You're Adlai Stevenson. You can't quit and just walk away from here. Now the question isn't whether you believe the president is wrong. You've believed presidents were wrong before and under circumstances where a man might have quit if he wasn't in your position. If you quit, you've got to lead an opposition, and you're not prepared to lead up the cudgels nationally. Until you are, you can't quit. You've got to do the best job you can inside. And I don't know that you'll ever quit." And he looked at me and didn't say a word. I'd lived through that with him during the days of Jack Kennedy. I heard him talk about quitting when the Bay of Pigs took place, but I didn't take it seriously. The president has a great deal of insurance when he hires a man or appoints a man who can't quit, and I think a former candidate for president finds it difficult to quit.

BEGIN SIDE II TAPE I

O'BRIEN: . . . in your own relationship with Governor Stevenson.

KLUTZNICK: I had known Governor Stevenson, of course, when he was governor. I served in the position that he wanted me to handle. Later I got to know him better and we became friendly. Actually I didn't know him but casually in Washington during the war. Matter of fact, I outranked him in Washington during the war. I was a presidential appointee and he wasn't. But I didn't know him that well. We'd had a number of occasions to sit down and discuss issues, and I'd drop in his office now and then, visit about various things. He'd call me when he was going to give a speech now and then, as I indicated before.

But in the UN we lived right across the street at the Parkland Hotel and he was, of course, living alone, and on a number of occasions we'd get together and we'd go out to dinner. In Geneva, when we were living there he'd come down for a week or ten days. He liked Geneva. He liked that part of the world. We'd spend a lot of time together, a weekend or two together.

I got to really appreciate the depth and sincerity of the man. He was a person who just had the kind of sympathy for other

people that you rarely find in men who have gone into politics and have advanced as far as he's advanced. The first year we were in the UN I went over to Geneva to head our Economic and Social [Council] delegation. I could have sold tickets to the other delegations who wanted to meet him privately, and I had to give a number of parties just for people who wanted to shake hands with him. This went for people behind the Iron Curtain. The Latin Americans, of course, in 1961 were especially eager to see him, because you may recall that the president had asked him to make a special trip to Latin America in the late spring of '61, and he made that trip and went directly from that trip to Geneva. So it was a costly experience for me because I used to have to party him in order to give these people a chance to meet him. But they all wanted to meet him. When the Indians would send some of their top people there, the first thing they would ask me is, "When is the governor going to be there?" And "We'd like to have them come about the time he's there. Can he meet with them?" and so forth. And, on the other hand, this man who was so much sought after by people in the world who had remembered him as a candidate and had seen him on his travels around the world, this man was a simple, lonely heart-broken man. He had tremendous domestic problems and raising those children of his. He was both father and mother to them, and took that very seriously, very seriously. A simple man.

When on day I said to him, "What are those shoes you're wearing?" "Well," he says, "you remember when I had that hole in my shoe?" (We were walking in Gstaad on a weekend while we were in Geneva.) "Well," he said, "you know when I had that picture of me with the hole in the shoe that I must have gotten a couple of hundred pair of shoes sent me from various people." He said, "I haven't worn them out yet." He was wearing them at that time. Or, one day I was in New York and we were having lunch and he says, "Look, do you mind if I drop you off? I've got to go over to Brooks Brothers and buy a tuxedo." I said, "Are you still buying tuxedos from Brooks Brothers?" "Sure," he says. "Do you know what happened?" He says, "I was at a dinner party in Washington, that one that [Hervé] Alphand got so mad about because they put me to the right of the hostess." And he said, "I looked down and there were my tux trousers, ripped wide open." He said, "Of course, I'd only worn it for ten years. I don't know why they couldn't have lasted longer."

He was an economical person. Sometimes I was ashamed to get on a plane with him. The bag he had was ready to fall apart.

But he was simple. Many people didn't know the real Adlai Stevenson.

I recall during the campaign of '52 when people were talking about, "he would spend this country into debt." They don't know how careful he was. Our trouble in the mission often was that he'd say to us, "Look, you've just got to get along with less money." And I'd say to him, "but I'm writing fourteen speeches for myself every darn day. I'm on four committees. Give me a guy that can at least do research." "But Phil we haven't the money," he'd say. He was that way.

At the same time, I've never known a man who could intuitively grasp an international situation as well as he could. Sure, like any man he'd miss a guess. But I oftentimes said, "I'd rather have five minutes with the governor on a problem than ten hours of position papers from the State Department," because he had an intuitive grasp of these matters. On the other hand, he had certain prejudices like all of us have, and I got caught in the middle of them. For example, he had a great concern about the Middle East. Now I had no responsibility for the Middle East in the UN, except as a ranking officer I would get all of the dispatches and I could see what was happening. Either he or Charles W. Charlie Yost were supposed to handle that. And Robert O. Bob Blake who ended up with Sarge Shriver, of all people, in Paris was handling this area.

But occasionally a political aspect of it would arise and I'd get a call from Mike Feldman, would I come down and see the president. I had an understanding with the president, and with the governor. The first time this arose I went to the governor and I said, "I've been asked to come down on this issue. Do you have any objection to my going?" And he says, "No, not at all, Phil. Of course, you go down there and help out in any way you can."

I remember the first time we had a discussion involving the Middle East was in the president's sitting room upstairs. It involved a decision the president had to make on AID Agency for International Development funds. It was a political decision, bluntly. Mike had brought Arthur Goldberg and Abe Ribicoff and me together to talk to the president about it. At the end of this discussion there was another aspect--I've forgotten now what came up--and the president said, "Now, look--he'd always call us all by titles." "Mr. Ambassador, when you get back to New York, please tell Governor Stevenson such and such and such." And I said, "Mr. President, I can't do that. I work for the governor. I can't deliver an order from the president to the governor. I don't think you want me to do that, sir." Looked

at me. He said, "You're quite right. Mike, will you see that I tell him?" But we had an understanding that whenever that happened I'd go back and I'd tell the governor everything that happened in that connection.

O'BRIEN: Was this the Hawk missiles?

KLUTZNICK: Well, no. At this point it turned around a question of a special AID allotment that involved some concern on the part of the Arab world. This was before the Hawk missiles and early in the administration. The Hawk missiles and the water rights in Israel came up much later, and I got involved in both of those with the governor's full knowledge and with his complete disagreement with my position on both matters. There, I think, Dean Rusk and the governor were closer together than I was with either of them. But, look, I am not either a diplomat nor a politician, so I wasn't there to try to get any votes. I called them as I saw them.

For example, on the water rights issue, there was a great difference of opinion as between both the State Department who agreed with Adlai, and the president. The president was probing for a way of getting a message to Israel that would offset the adverse effect of the Syrian complaint where Adlai Stevenson in the spring of 1962 had delivered a speech with an extra paragraph that caused him and me and everybody else a lot of trouble. At that time, the president, who was quite astute on this matter, said, "Look, we've got to indicate to these people that we're not just against them all the time." And he picked on the question of water rights, the development of water resources, as something that might indicate that we were prepared to do something. Now this was his own choice. I had nothing to do with it. The issue arose as to how to convey that information to Israel. And both the State Department. . . .

Adlai felt it ought to go by way of an aide-memoire from State to the Foreign Ministry in Israel, in Jerusalem with simultaneous transmission to our ambassadors in certain Arab capitals. An aide-memoire would have to go through fourteen layers. You might as well publish it in the newspaper. That's hardly an intimate way of getting an idea across. And when I was asked for my choice of methods, I said, "I would think that if the president addressed a letter to David Ben Gurion for eyes only that it would never see the light of day, and it would accomplish the objective. I think a normal procedure would first of all lose all of its sense of intimacy. It would have no political impact, and you might as well stay in bed."

Now this argument went on for several weeks. It was on the eve of my departure for Geneva when I got a call. It was just the day before I was to leave I got a call from the White House, "Come down immediately." I couldn't say I was going to Geneva the next day. I told the governor I got the call. I went down. I was shown the message, asked to check it, and I did. When I got back that night at the office, there was a note on my desk from the governor, "There is in the top secret file a communication which you'd better see." So I had to get the security officer to open it up. When I looked at it, it was exactly what I had seen. And the note also said, "Before you sail tomorrow, see me in the morning before you leave." I was sailing. I was dead tired, and we were going to take the United States to London and then fly over.

Well, I saw him in the morning, and he was very upset about the fact that the president had done this. But I said, "Look, he's the president." He says, "Phil, I think you're wrong on this, but I know how you feel about it." He said, "I hope it turns out right." Well, the communication never saw the light of day. The kind of fellow he was, one day after I'd left the UN, long after I'd gone away, we were working on Eleanor Roosevelt Foundation business, and he turned to me out of the clear sky, he said, "Phil, you know, I owe you an apology." I said, "What?" And he remembered that incident and said to me, he said, "You were right." He said, "It turned out to be the only thing to do." Well, that's the way he was.

Dean was a little jealous of him, and understandably. I recall one night I was in Washington again, and this was on the Hawks business. We were getting it ready when I got a call from Adlai. He said, "Look, you got any of your boys in town?" "No." He says, "Well, I've talked to Ethel [Klutznick]. The Rusks are coming for dinner tonight and we're going to the theatre. They're bringing one of their daughters. One of your boys around would be nice." I said, "I'm sorry, Adlai, they're all gone. But what show are we going to?" I said, "I'll get back in time for dinner and the show. But what show are we going to go to?" That was the Robert Morse show "How to Succeed in Business Without Really Trying." I said, "You know, that's hard to get tickets for." He says, "Well, I thought I'd call so and so and so." I said, "Look, if you're buying the dinner, let me get the tickets. You'll never get any tickets even for Dean Rusk at this hour." So I got a hold of Leonard Lyons and we got some tickets. We went to the theatre afterwards, sitting there and of course with our guards and whatnot. We didn't move in the intermission. I was seated next to Dean, and I turned to him. People didn't leave the place. They were looking down at that row as they do, gaping.

I said, "Look, they've certainly got their eyes on you, Mr. Secretary." He said, "Phil, not with him sitting there," pointing to Adlai. Well, this was there all the time.

Like that evening the setup on the Hawks had been agreed to that day in Washington and the president had said, "I've asked Dean Rusk to tell Adlai about this." He knew he was going to be there. He was aware of this thing. "Just in case he got tied up, be sure that Adlai knows what we're going to do over this thing." Now this wasn't asking me to tell him to do something. It was just reporting, which I considered to be my duty. Ethel and I went to dinner, came there a little early in the hope that the Rusks would not be there, and I pulled him aside and I said, "Adlai, has Dean Rusk had a chance to talk to you yet?" "Well," he says, "He's been in." I said, "Has he said anything about this?" He says, "No." "Well," I said, "the president wanted to be sure you knew this," so I told him what the president was going to do. But there was a kind of a coolness there. And Dean was a little bit uncomfortable in Adlai's presence. I can't say that Adlai made life any more comfortable for Dean either. It wasn't the kind of a camaraderie that in the first days seemed to exist between Arthur Goldberg and Dean Rusk. That also changed. These things do.

O'BRIEN: Do you recall any other friction points there between Governor Stevenson and Secretary Rusk?

KLUTZNICK: Well, there was one in which I got involved personally and I got sent to Siberia on, involving the UN bond issue, something that never sat very well with me, but I don't mind it any more. The UN bond issue, which was calculated to save the UN, and which I've often considered as one of my greatest personal contributions to the UN in the time I was there, raised an awful lot of flak in Washington. I'm not saying this was my idea. I want it clear. I am saying that I participated in putting it together, devised the strategy, and when the State Department kept saying to me, "You'll never get it through," I kept saying, "Don't worry about us in New York. We'll get it through. Better start worrying about what Washington does." And we got it through. We got it through because we were a bit modest about it. When they asked me what strategy would be, I said, "Look, if we're for this and the other western powers are for this, this has got to be U Thant's idea. It's his program. Even if we thought of it, it's got to be his. If it isn't his, we can't make it."

Well, I went to U Thant and Governor Stevenson was supposed to be there. He was caught in Washington. So I had to spend the

time selling the idea to U Thant and making it clear to him that this is the way it looked to us, but he could reject it . . . [Interruption] . . . or he could buy it, but if he bought it, it was his. And all we could do was defend it and help him. Well, he gave it some thought and with some modification and he bought it. We put it through. It was a hard job, but we got it through. I handled all the debates on it in the committee and in the [UN] General Assembly. Every word that went into that resolution was our western group we pondered over and went over very carefully. Then the issue was set up for hearing before the Senate. I was to come down to testify on the third day. The secretary was to testify on the third day. Stevenson was to testify the second day. And Harlan Cleveland and I together were to testify the third day. I came down the morning before the secretary was to testify, and [Albert F., Jr.] Al Bender, who was my assistant, turned to me and said, "No." He said, "You'd better look at it." I took a look at it, and it inaccurately quoted the resolution. I don't know who did it, but it was a complete misrepresentation of what the resolution said. It had to do with whether or not the secretary could take the proceeds of these bonds and use them for the purposes of the organization other than the Congo. The fact is he could, if he wanted to. There was no way in the world the resolution could have stood up any other way. And the language had been cleared. The theory was that the resources would save the UN from bankruptcy. He had already taken from other funds for the Congo, and the only hope to keep it from bankruptcy was to give him funds that he could use to replace some of those funds he'd taken, as well as to use them for purposes of the Congo. And that had been debated and carried through a dozen trials. If we hadn't done it, we wouldn't have carried the resolution to start with. U Thant wouldn't have been for it. We shouldn't have been for it. In spite of that, Rusk's written testimony was contrary.

Harlan Cleveland and I were getting ready to go with the secretary. And I said, "Harlan, you can't do this. You've got to go to the secretary. This is an inaccurate statement." So he went to the secretary with me. The secretary said, "What can we do? There are fifteen hundred copies of this out now." I said, "Mr. Secretary, I don't know what I do when I have to testify. I'm never going to be able to say honestly that this is so. And the governor's testifying tomorrow. If the papers pick this up, the fat's in the fire." Dean said, "Well, it's all out. We'd better play it this way." "As long as you know, sir, that this isn't accurate, that's entirely up to you." "Well," he said, "this is not too important anyway. The important thing is to get the approval."

Well, he testified, and [E. W.] Kenworthy of the New York Times picked it up immediately and checked it and said, "Is this so?"

It wasn't so in New York." And the next thing I know the governor and I are being called. We were working in the State Department. The governor was working on his testimony. And Frederick G. Fred Dutton was then, you remember, the assistant secretary. So I got hold of Fred, and I said, "Fred, we're in trouble." Fred had gotten a call too from Kenworthy. So I said to the governor, "We better sit down and have a talk with the secretary before your testimony tomorrow." So the governor said, "No, Phil, you handle it with him, you go ahead and take care of it. I understand it. Whatever you decide with him is perfectly all right. You and Fred can work this out." So Fred and I went up with Harlan to see the secretary. We tried to figure out what to do. So the secretary said, "Well, what do you fellows think?" I said, "You know, the governor has to testify tomorrow. We can say to Kenworthy to wait for the governor's testimony which will clarify this issue, if we want the governor to clarify it. We can arrange for someone to ask him a question, and he can fuzz it a little bit." So Fred and I worked on some language.

The secretary sat there for a while and said, "Well, I guess, like always, I've got to take it on the chin. Let him get the credit." And he lost his cool for the first time on that thing. I said, "Look, Dean, some of us are in the middle. Remember, I'd rather not testify on this. If I testify, I'm going to have to tell them what it is. I can't be ignorant of it. I've handled this all the way through. It's better for the governor to clear it up." "Well, I guess he can get the credit." We went back and talked to the governor, and the governor for some reason could never focus on financial problems of the UN. He'd listen to me and say, "Okay, go ahead." But he couldn't focus. And neither was Dean, too much, for that matter. They were saving the world but bankrupting the institutions while they were at it. So Fred and I explained this to the governor.

I sat next to the governor the next morning. He was asked the question. He didn't clarify it by his answer. It just left his mind completely. Harlan was on one side of him, and I, we nearly dropped dead. So now comes the next day. Here I am a subordinate sitting there, and Frank J. Lausche starts out after me. And Doris Fleeson never knew; she wrote me up afterwards I was arrogant in my answers and whatnot. I was ducking. I was trying to answer without answering. You know how you go through this thing. How in the devil do you say, "The secretary didn't tell the truth. The governor didn't tell the truth. I know the answer." But Lausche wouldn't let loose. And finally he put it to me, "Now, look, Ambassador, you handled this matter all the way through. I'm asking you," and he put the question in a way I couldn't duck, "Can any of the proceeds of this be

used by the secretary for anything other than the Congo?" And I said, "Well, senator, the resolution speaks for itself." "No," he says, "I'm not asking you what the resolution says. I want to know what you say." So I said, "Yes, he can, sir." Well, from that point on I was sent to Siberia, because on the rest of that bond issue I was never even permitted to testify. When I got to Tokyo on an economic mission, I got a cable from the State Department: "Senator [George D.] Aiken has just announced today that you're the real father of the bond issue. Don't answer him." You know, I nearly sent my resignation in that moment because it had placed me in a very embarrassing position. But I went on and sold some more bonds to the Japanese.

But that was the other time when I saw this problem between the governor and Dean. I couldn't get them in the same room to discuss the question. He didn't want to discuss it with Dean. And when Dean finally reached a conclusion which made sense, he was rather resentful, in spite of the fact that he could have corrected it that morning himself. And then the governor, I don't know to this day whether he purposely fumbled it or that he fumbled it because it slipped his mind.

O'BRIEN: That's a rather interesting insight into that relationship.

KLUTZNICK: But all in all, it was regrettable because I have great respect for both of them.

O'BRIEN: I know you have someone waiting.

KLUTZNICK: Yes. I have a man from London who wants to talk to me about something. [Interruption]
Let him wait another five minutes, shall we?

O'BRIEN: Okay.

KLUTZNICK: I'm too verbose, but you'll have to forgive me.

O'BRIEN: No. This is very, very good. You have excellent recollection on these things. Well, the UN is impacted with a lot of new states, Afro-Asian states which come in in 1961. I think one of the problems you have there almost immediately is with the African diplomats. Did you ever get involved in some of the problems of these people in, well, living in the United States?

KLUTZNICK: Yes. I inherited some I guess by default. Under the normal procedure it would have been Ambassador Francis T. P. Plimpton's area. But one of the regrettable things about most of our diplomatic work is that everybody wants to be in on the big political issues, so-called, and no one wants to be in on the meat and potato issues. So I found myself handling not only the financial problems, which were at that time very serious, but all of the problems that arose on the question of residency, because Bender and Carmel Marr, who were responsible for this, reported to me on financial matters, so that it was natural for them to come to me when they got into trouble on housing problems and things of that sort. Besides which, the only thing I was supposed to know anything about when I got there was housing. So they used to bring it to me, and yes, I got in on several of them. I got in on the question, when we had a breakdown, one of the distinguished citizens of New York who was not going to let an African move into an apartment that he controlled. I'd rather not mention his name. But I'd known him for years. I knew him to be a generous man in human rights causes, and yet when it came to this, he slipped. So I had enough information on him that I was able to call him up one day and say to him, "Look, Mr. so-and-so, you come over and have lunch with me at the UN." Oh, he was delighted to. When I told him what I wanted to talk to him about, he wasn't so delighted. I said, "You have your choice. You either let these people into that apartment or you get the publicity that's involved in it. They're prepared to blast you from hell to breakfast. And here you're a man who's been making all of these contributions to human rights and civil rights activities. You know, your family won't look you in the face." And he really turned white, because he didn't realize how serious it was. "I can't stop it. Now the only thing I can do is if you want to sign the lease with them, I'll arrange to have them over in your office, and we'll take a picture of you signing a lease with them. That's the only compensation." That's what we did. Those are the kind of things we used to have to do. We had other problems. Some of them would leave without paying rent. These were quite difficult problems. We had even more curious problems. You know, I remember one day I was in Washington and the governor called me and he said, "You know, Kwame Nkrumah is coming to breakfast tomorrow." Do you know that story?

O'BRIEN: No. Go ahead.

KLUTZNICK: "Nkrumah is coming to breakfast, and it's important. He's bringing his minister of economics. and he's bringing so-and-so, so I'd like to have. . . . If you can get back in time Francis T. P. Plimpton and Charlie

Yost, you and I will have breakfast with them, the eight or ten or us. And you've got to get back if you can. I can't handle these other questions alone." So I got back, and he says, "Show up at about eight o'clock." So I was there at eight o'clock. We waited. Mrs. Elizabeth Stevenson Ives was to be the hostess, his sister. And he said, "I'm going down to get the president." Well, he goes down and he comes back with thirteen people. The table was set for ten altogether and there were four or five of us. Mrs. Ives was superb. She fiddled around a little bit and broke it up into two tables. There we were. I doubt that our guests knew the panic they had created. But this was illustrative.

The next morning we were having a meeting of our delegation. It started at nine thirty, and Mrs. Roosevelt was then an advisor to the delegation. She wasn't feeling well. She didn't show up. And she was always there ten minutes ahead of everybody. She was so loyal, she just was meticulous about her responsibilities in the UN. So the governor started to worry. The rest of us started to worry. He sent someone to the telephone. Just as she was going to the telephone in comes Mrs. Roosevelt. And she enters the conference room with her piping voice, "I'm so sorry I'm late. I'm so sorry I'm late. Will you please forgive me? But President Nkrumah called me last night. He said he was coming for breakfast, and he came with seven people and I've just washed up the dishes." Well, this was the trouble with the Africans. Either you'd invite them and they wouldn't come at all, and forget to tell you they weren't coming. Or you'd invite one and they'd come with ten.

I remember the Arthur Krims used to keep open house for the Africans. We'd try to arrange with people who were willing to do it. They never knew on a Saturday night whether it was going to be five or fifty. It took them and us some time to get accustomed to the habits. The housing problem was difficult. Their problem of representation activity was very difficult. You never knew where they would be or who they would be. We had to be very patient with some of the new countries. I at least developed a personal standard where I hesitated long before I answered them even on grievous charges, because I realize that much of what they were saying was pent up emotion. They were for the first time disposing of it. But they grew up. They grew up too fast. They grew up to an understanding of political power to a point where they used it with great deal more ruthlessness than any of us were prepared to use it. They had the votes. It was awfully hard to deal with. When they had them, well, like our first veto the other day. I know what

Charlie Yost was up against. When they had the votes, even if you were appealing for some sort of consideration, they used them. And they used them with the same ferocity in which they may have fought each other. So it was a difficult period, very difficult.

But I had some introduction to it in '57, when I was in the delegation and Ghana was admitted as the first of them. And you may have recalled in '57 we had Little Rock, Ark., and the troops were sent to Little Rock. And by simple chance I was giving a luncheon for the Ghana delegation about the second day after it happened. And I've never forgotten to this day how hurt they were. They wouldn't talk about it to an American. They just wouldn't talk about it. Yet, when I came back to the UN a few years later, Ghana had Alex Quaison-Sackey as its representative who was as mature and as good a diplomat as there probably was around the place. So it took a few years.

Any other question, and then I've got to get this man.

O'BRIEN: Well, let me ask you one more on this particular point. Okay, you had the African diplomats coming into New York. And on several occasions the New York Times, at least, reported you speaking out on America's efforts to sort of rectify the problems of segregation. Now do the two ever come together? Do you see any impact of the African nations coming to New York and the rise of the civil rights movement or black nationalism among American Negroes in New York when you're there?

KLUTZNICK: Now this is an impression, and I can't say I researched it. You must understand one thing about the atmosphere in the UN in those days and today. Let me relate one of the high moments in my experience in the UN when the president first came there in his first year, in September of 1961, and made his first speech to the UN. He called for a UN development decade. I was assigned the responsibility of putting it through, and it was an enlightening experience. We finally came through with a unanimous resolution, but we had about a hundred and ten amendments to it. I made one of my longest speeches on that subject. You know, when the president says he wants something, you have to get it one way or another. We got it. But it was illustrative of a spirit that one must understand. The developing countries never expressed appreciation for that which the developed countries did. I cite it only as an example. They felt they had this coming, and all we were doing was giving them back something we'd taken from them. So, we never built up any good will by an act of generosity.

I used to argue this with our people. "Let's not do it if we expect to get a vote because of it." You don't blame African nations for this. This happens in human experience. Who hates you most? The relative that you do the most for, don't you see, because he expects it, and he's unlucky and you're lucky. You've got it and he hasn't. Well, it's the same with nations.

Now, when it came to the question of human rights, and the relationship between the Negro community here and the African countries there, I can't prove this but my impression is that the African countries' liberation was the beginning of the black power movement in this country. Many of our Negro citizens who used to come to receptions, leaders and others who weren't, who say these Africans strutting around in their native dress or as prime ministers or as foreign ministers or as delegates to the UN couldn't help but feel, "Look, they have a power base. Now we've got to get a power base." I think the freedom of Africa did more to create a black power movement here and force an idea of segregation onto the minds of a lot of people, instead of desegregation. I think it'll wear out. I think it's wearing out now, because what a nation can do a segment of a nation can't do.

As I say to my Jewish friends, "Sure, a back-bencher in the Knesset in Israel has more standing in Chicago making a speech than one of our most distinguished Jews, but do you want to be a back-bencher in Israel? Well, go to Israel. You'll be a back-bencher." This has to dawn on a people. In the meanwhile, I think it's done a lot of mischief. It's done a lot of mischief as well as a lot of good. This is a shakedown process.

O'BRIEN: Well, thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for a very incisive interview.

KLUTZNICK: Thank you for coming.