

**Alan Raywid Oral History Interview – RFK#1, 08/15/1974**  
**Administrative Information**

**Creator:** Alan Raywid  
**Interviewer:** Roberta W. Greene  
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**Biographical Note**

Alan Raywid was Special assistant to the Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice, 1963 - 1966. This interview covers preparations for the March on Washington in 1963, the transition from the Eisenhower to Kennedy administration, and incidents in the Justice Department under Robert F. Kennedy, among other topics.

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Alan Raywid – RFK #1

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Oral History Interview

with

ALAN RAYWID

August 15, 1974  
Washington, D. C.

By Roberta W. Greene

For the Robert F. Kennedy Oral History Program  
of the John F. Kennedy Library

GREENE: Why don't you just recall how you first got involved in the whole thing.

RAYWID: Well, I was a special assistant to John Douglas. In the structure of the Department of Justice, John Douglas was the assistant attorney general in charge of the Civil Division. I was his special assistant which was something akin to an admiral's aide. He was assigned by Robert Kennedy to see that all of the government details, administration details, in connection with the March [March on Washington, 1963] were properly handled and were adequately--the planning was adequate and full. I much later learned how he got the assignment, which comes to me second or third hand. I was told that--this apparently came out at the Democratic [National] Convention, I believe, in 1968. Would that have been Atlantic City?

GREENE: '68? no, Chicago.

RAYWID: '64, it would have been in Atlantic City.

GREENE: That's right. Yeah, that's right.

RAYWID: At that convention--I did not attend--but I understand there was a sort of in the nature of an old-fashioned Irish wake in a bar--well, in a room adjoining one of the convention rooms. A lot of the old Kennedy people were there

reminiscing about it. Incidentally, this story appeared in the Paris edition of the Herald-Tribune. It was reported that President [John F.] Kennedy in a Cabinet meeting asked about the March which had been announced in the newspapers. Philip Randolph was apparently the spiritual leader of it. Bayard Rustin was the principal organizer. They had made several announcements. It was beginning to get a larger press. The president asked at a Cabinet meeting, or subcabinet meeting, who was running that march. No one seemed to know. The president is reported to have said, "They're liable to come down here and shit all over the monument. I've got a civil right bill to get through. We'll run it." There I'm filling in. Of course, I know of none of that firsthand, but he apparently made the assignment to his brother, Robert Kennedy, to see that the matter was at least handled properly. Robert Kennedy delegated that function to John Douglas.

GREENE: Do you know anything about the point at which they went in to try to change the plan from a March on the Capitol to what it finally evolved to, the March on the Mass?

RAYWID: Well, yes, but if you want more in the way of structure-- or . . . maybe you already have that from your other interviews.

GREENE: Well, at what point did you come in? Did you come in after it had already been. . . .

RAYWID: At the beginning.

GREENE: When they were still planning to go on. . . .

RAYWID: John Douglas set up a group within the department. It was composed of a team of five people. It was chaired by himself, I was on it . . .

GREENE: Reilly [John R. Reilly] and McShane [James J. P.]

RAYWID: Reilly and McShane were on it.

GREENE: I don't know who the fifth was. Who was the fifth?

RAYWID: Well, that may be. . . . I might be in error.

GREENE: Not Burke Marshall because he. . . .

RAYWID: No. Burke Marshall was consulted at an early stage, but that was the group that organized it, then Douglas made assignment within that group. The first thing that Douglas did was, he asked me to make a list of everything that could possibly go wrong. I was somewhat surprised and I said, there were a lot of experts in this field such as traffic and sanitation and water. Douglas who was an outstanding administrator, in my view, said that he had little trust for experts, and that he wanted to, after we had figured out what could

possibly go wrong, talk to the experts. He said on other occasions, either in connection with this or on other occasions, "Good administration presumes what can go wrong will go wrong." So we operated from that premise. Then we started calling in people who had dealt or people who were planning, particularly people in the [Washington] D.C. government and the [National] Park Service. They were the two largest branches, but then there were many other agencies that had to be contacted. We started talking with them and questioning them. It was always surprising to me, having something of a military or bureaucratic background at that time, that no one ever questioned our authority. The police were summoned to the Department of Justice to explain their plans and were sent back to rework them. The police and the Park Service seemed to be somewhat negative in their planning and they were more or less told to detail these plans and to facilitate the plans.

GREENE: When you say negative, do you mean pessimistic, assuming the worst?

RAYWID: Well, I remember, I believe the deputy director of police had the assignment within the police of coordinating this. He said he had never worked with a group like this. They weren't asking permission for anything, they were making demands. I inferred that he was not accustomed to receiving demands. Since it was more than a simple permit that was required, a lot of coordination was necessary, for instance, blocking off streets for the parking of buses, rerouting traffic. With the influx that they predicted, it was, of course, necessary to really have a lot of plans. My judgment was that the police were not about to open the city gates without some rather high level administration advice indicating that that was an acceptable administration policy. To my knowledge, there was never any document in writing saying that authority for coordinating governmental activities and planning was vested in John Douglas or the Department of Justice. To my knowledge, I say. I do know that at one time, at that time, we had three commissioners in the District and that the commissioner who sort of chaired the commissioners was named [Walter] Tobriner. Tobriner was told at one stage of the activity that we were undertaking, and he must have passed the word that they were to cooperate with this. Other than that, there was never any question as to lines of authority, which really from an organizational and administrative point fascinated me.

GREENE: You don't think John Douglas let it be known that he was speaking for the attorney general and therefore for the president, you mean.

RAYWID: I never heard him say that. I recall the first meeting that we had was to try to call in everyone that we thought would have responsibility . . .

GREENE: Was this the one at the police department that was talked about? One that you had over at the police department?

RAYWID: Well, he had many meetings. His meeting at the police department was a meeting between police officials and organizers of the March or sponsors of the march. But we had a preliminary meeting after we had our list of problem areas and then who had responsibility with respect to them, and then we'd call these people in. I guess the large bulk of them were police people, but it included traffic, riot control, it included the park police, the Capitol police . . .

GREENE: The National Guard?

RAYWID: It included not the National Guard at that stage. We had [Joseph A. Califano, Jr.] Joe Califano from the Department of the Army, together with a general. . . .

GREENE: General Powell?

RAYWID: General Powell. We had . . .

GREENE: Also [Major] General [P.C.] Wehle? Is that correct? I'm not sure I'm saying it right.

RAYWID: I don't recall him.

GREENE: He was in charge of the military district for Washington.

RAYWID: He certainly did not come in at an early stage, and I don't think that I ever saw him, except on the day of the march.

GREENE: What about a [Major] General [William H.] Abendroth? I'm not sure that's correct; it was very hard to read-- commander of the D. C. National Guard. Someone you remember.

RAYWID: Another thing in the way of background--I haven't forgotten your question. This was the first of rather a large project that I personally had worked on, but the Department of Justice and the Department of the Army had been through together and sweated a lot of crises in the civil rights area and there had been a lot of coordination. I know that Califano had been in on the others. I suspect that perhaps Powell had, but there seemed to be a very fluid and a very easy working relationship between the Department of Justice and the Department of the Army. Again, without any rigid lines of communication, there was no question or doubt as to who was in charge and how the plans were to be directed. I was not in on any of the military planning. I don't know to what extent Douglas was in on it. The military planning was for the most part contingent except for the use of military guardsmen in the area of traffic control, but there was a large troop movement into the area should the matter get out of hand. For that, on the actual day of the March, we had a military command post in the same buildings as the police command

post and with Douglas more or less operating as a coordinator between both groups. My own position on that day was with the police command central. I've just remembered who the fifth guy was. He wasn't in the original planning, but he came in at one stage or another, and that was an advance man for Jack Kennedy.

GREENE: [Gerald J.] Jerry Bruno?

RAYWID: Jerry Bruno.

GREENE: He worked with Reilly on the arrangements for the traffic and the platform and that kind of thing, if I remember Douglas' explanation correctly.

RAYWID: I really have paper work and I really have a lot of documentation that tells what everyone did. My recollection is that I worked on the communications system in the planning of it. We were very much worried about that, and also. . . .

GREENE: The sound system.

RAYWID: The sound system and the platform. I worked with the park Service in the communications network. On the actual day of the event Reilly and Bruno were at the monument grounds. I also remember another thing that Bruno and Reilly did. I went down in the preplanning stage. There was a staging, I don't recall how much staging there was at the Lincoln Memorial, but there was elaborate staging at the Washington Monument grounds with the networks building staging right in front of the platforms. I remember my own reaction was that that might be an irritant to the crowd. But someone else went down there with more muscle--it might have been Bruno or Reilly--and told them that those stands were coming down. But I'm skipping around a bit.

GREENE: Did you work with Jack Conway by the way? I guess he was representing the UAW [United Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America] on the sound systems. From what Douglas said, that was one of their major contributions, on the sound system. Do you remember that?

RAYWID: The United Auto Workers that Conway represented, I believe, had offered to make a financial contribution which I believe was ten thousand dollars. Conway, I don't know whether it was known to the leaders of the March, but their contribution was not without strings, as I understand it. They were willing to put some kind of, exercise some kind of control through the use of their money, and they consulted with us, and Conway consulted with us on a number of occasions. I think after we had worked out some of our plans and arrangements, he made those conditions to those funds.

GREENE: Do you remember what the conditions were?

RAYWID: Well, we were most concerned, for crowd control, that they had a very good sound system. I believe we obtained from the Park Service names of people who had done work in the parks before and were reputable people, I believe that I talked to them, and that I was also the one that fed the names to the sponsors. Then we put them together.

We also told them, sketched out some ideas as to how we wanted this sound system to work and where the speakers would be, and how the speakers would be apart from the crowd. We were most fearful that the crowd might get out of control because there might be hostile elements within the crowd to the march and might try and destroy the sound system, so we wanted it to be secure. The people that did the sound work didn't follow our advice, as I recollect, with speakers spaced down along the reflecting pool, but had two sort of telegraph speakers at the memorial itself on either side of it.

But I cannot recall specific conditions placed on the UAW money, except that that was one of the uses that they thought was necessary. I think we checked with them to see how adequate the sound system was. I also remember that Reilly insisted on the day of the event, which was not preplanned, that he have a cutoff to the sound system.

GREENE: I was going to ask you about that.

RAYWID: . . . should anything inflammatory happen during the program, that he was so positioned that he could have cut the whole system, which was an arrangement made with the contractors and which presumably they were paying for and we were interlopers. Another basic idea that we had.

GREENE: Excuse me. Just let me ask you, would that particular thing have been discussed with the march organizers or something. . . .

RAYWID: It was not.

GREENE: It was not. It was just something that you did on your own.

RAYWID: No. I don't think they ever had knowledge of that. One of the basic concerns was that we wanted to. . . . I think our official position was, that there were so many different elements of government involved that it had to be coordinated, and that we wanted to see that it was coordinated and it was handled in a rapid fashion. Despite Jack Kennedy's profanity or what it might suggest--if that story is true--in his initial policy direction, that he wanted to see that from the government's standpoint everything moved properly or was facilitated.

But the Jack Kennedy statement also suggests that the government was going to plan it, and that was not the way it was wholly

administered by any means. We were interested to see that their planning was adequate and that they had thought through their plans, and that to the extent that we thought that their plans were not sound, we were not hesitant to tell them that we thought that they should be reworked.

We did have some disagreements and some negotiation as to movement of people and that what they planned was too much. Their original plan was to make stops at the White House, to go also to the Capitol, and have a demonstration and to have something at the [Washington] monument and to have something at the Lincoln Memorial. We tried to talk out all of that movement or to center it only at the monument. Then they countered and explained to us how important and significant the Lincoln Memorial was to blacks or Negroes and that that was absolutely essential that the memorial be included in their program. Then, apart from organization, we wanted to see that all irritants to the crowd, whether they had planned it or not, were removed. Just as a little example of that, the GSI [Government Services Incorporated]. . . . Has that been related to you?

GREENE: Well, the funny thing is I saw the initials in the Douglas transcript and I couldn't figure out what they stood for. Is it Government Services Institute or

. . .

RAYWID: Government Services Incorporated, I believe, and . . .

GREENE: Incorporated?

RAYWID: . . . that is a government corporation which runs the cafeterias in government buildings.

GREENE: Yes, I gathered it was related to that.

RAYWID: It's a catering service. On some national park facilities, GSI runs the concessions. On others, they're independently contracted out, I understand. But for the major concessions in the Park Service in the District of Columbia, GSI runs them. As you can imagine, they're a pretty large food outfit. They were very much concerned that all of their concessions be pulled out on that day. Again, that reflected, if I haven't already stated, no one knew what was going to happen. We didn't know whether this was going to be a full-blown riot or whether it was going to be a happy event, but it was part of the planning that removed the irritants. Douglas insisted that they would very well be open and that not only would they be open, they would be well stocked. I have the figures. They broke all records in hot dog sales and Coca-Cola sales and they opened a number of different stands all up and down the Mall.

GREENE: Do you remember the meetings with these people? Was it a task to get them to change their viewpoint, or was it accepted that these people had the authority to. . . .

RAYWID: Well, I spoke to you about. . . . No one questioned our authority. Quite frequently, the plans that were submitted were rejected, and they were told to rework them. At the other times, a presentation such as on traffic control or bus parking, they were questioned as to why they had come to such decisions, and when their reasons proved inadequate, or where we had input, they were told to rework them and sometimes with our suggestions. They always very dutifully went back and reworked them. Now, I only remember one particular problem where we were told that we were wrong and that they would not back down. That was the K-9 Corps. Has that been referred to before?

GREENE: I remember Douglas talks about that.

RAYWID: There was--I don't remember the numbers, but somehow twenty-seven sticks in my mind, that there were twenty-seven dogs and twenty-seven policemen with dogs. The police said that if it came to a threatening point where they had to use dogs, they would, because it was a general police policy that when a policeman's safety and life is in danger, that they must resort to all available means for their protection. We tried to persuade them that dogs had in the civil rights background a very adverse . . .

GREENE: Association.

RAYWID: . . . association or history, and that if things reached that stage, the army would be at hand, and that rather than protecting policemen's lives, this might very inflame a crowd and endanger them. They were not persuaded. They understandably, I suppose, respected the force and means at their control rather than having to fall back and rely on someone else's. That matter had to be passed to Robert Kennedy who, I believe, called Tobriner and said, "No dogs." That was the end of that matter. But that was the only time, it seemed to me, that it was necessary to bump a decision up higher and give a direct order that this is the manner in which it would be handled. I say there was no written paper work or orders. The legal standards for calling in the military are rather precise. Do you know anything about that?

GREENE: No.

RAYWID: Well, troops can't be called into an area. . . . Let's see. More prominently and more recently, there was a big conflict which was publicly aired, I believe, between Governor Romney [George Romney] of Michigan where he wanted troops, and where the government was insisting that he state that it was beyond his control . . .

GREENE: And he was embarrassed.

RAYWID: . . . which he was unwilling to do.

GREENE: Right.

RAYWID: Well, that was a misunderstanding as to what the legal standards are.

GREENE: Well, it was Baltimore, too, very recently. Remember, during the strike, the garbage strike? They wanted federal money--oh, maybe it's somewhat different--but they wanted federal money because they considered it a disaster or whatever it was. They wouldn't give it to them unless they called it a full-scale riot and the . . .

RAYWID: And they were reluctant for political reasons for doing so.

GREENE: . . . mayor refused to classify it beyond a civil suit.

RAYWID: Well, here, of course, we had all the luxury of time in the planning. The planning stage, incidentally was six weeks, and it was a full-time enterprise for the team. They did nothing else. Well, essentially nothing else during that period. With respect to that issue, the office of the legal advisor [Office of Legal Counsel] which is a department of the . . . . no, I'm mixing my attorneys here.

GREENE: You mean Reilly's . . .

RAYWID: No, not Reilly's. Anyway, a part of the Justice Department.

GREENE: Yes. I thought that's who Reilly represented.

RAYWID: No, Reilly's function was. . . . He was the coordinator of the United States attorneys.

GREENE: Right, right.

RAYWID: Formerly that post had been held by a man that also was in charge of U.S. marshals, but McShane was the first chief U.S. marshal. That office was created under the Kennedy administration. But anyway, the Office of Legal Counsel--I guess that's it--which is a division of the Department of Justice, that advises the president and also prepares presidential proclamations. A gentleman from that office. . . . yes, Office of Legal Counsel. . . . It's the post that Rehnquist [William H. Rehnquist] held most recently.

GREENE: But I can't think of who it was during the Kennedy administration.

RAYWID: I can't think of who it was then. But anyway, the legal standards and the legal requirements for calling in the troops had been well researched. There were papers which were prepared in advance and were all signed and positioned so that

there would be no time delay. That consisted mainly of three or four documents, the first of which was a letter from the chief of police to Commissioner Tobriner saying that the matter had gotten out of control and they could no longer handle it. Then there was a letter from Tobriner to the president telling him referring to the commissioner's--I mean the chief of police's-- communication and requesting federal aid and troops. Then there was a presidential proclamation relating the situation, and either in the same document or a separate document, ordering the troops to handle the situation. Well, since we had positioned the troops in advance and since this was supposed to have to take effect immediately, all of these papers were signed days before and all positioned in the proper points. I suppose they would be, if necessary, put into effect by Douglas' discretion.

GREENE: He was with the chief of police that day, wasn't he?

RAYWID: No. He was at the district. . . . I don't know whether they've changed now, but the police seem to operate in different territorial jurisdictions. You know, like street gangs, they held their territory. There was the chief of police and then there was, I believe, about five deputies, and then there are the precinct captains, I guess. All of the deputies were of equal rank, and one of them had to really be best with executive authority. We hardly ever saw the chief of police. He was not in on the planning. He was not present during the occasion. He was in a squad car. The, sort of, executive director or administrative deputy was the one at the police central where Douglas was and where this general in charge of the troops was, but the chief was out in the field and his squad car got surrounded by people. If my memory serves correctly, he was even cut off from communications. Incidentally, the chief of police was the one that took all the bows for this marvelous organization and planning.

GREENE: It's the way it usually is, isn't it.

RAYWID: Well, certainly they were most cooperative and certainly the planning was detailed, and usually the person at the top does take the bows as Robert Kennedy was entitled to and as Jack Kennedy was entitled to, but somebody else was doing the detailed work.

GREENE: Let me ask you something, going back a little bit. When you talk about having drawn up your list of problem areas or possible problem areas, having had no such experience yourself, how did you compile that kind of list?

RAYWID: Well, that was the assignment given to me by Douglas, but I think Douglas did most of the thinking on it and I think Douglas did most of the identification of problems. It was thinking and it was talking, and the list was expanded and added to, but it was from the frame of common sense and a lot of skepticism of experts and a lot of questioning of them. I think it was. . . .

We overplanned in some areas, but essentially we achieved the purpose that we set out to do, and that was that people have certain basic needs and people in large numbers may have them in extremis and they have to be met, and if you want to remove irritants, you see that those basic needs are met. We considered everything from water, sanitation. We recognized with this size crowd, the ordinary means of toilet facilities would be grossly inadequate, and we had to rent a great many of those facilities.

We had this thing with the food. I believe there was a representative of the World Council of Churches who had great experience in feeding people around the world. We were very much impressed with him because he came in, and he said he recognized what his problem was, and he stated what his group was willing to do, and he outlined it and then he departed. In retrospect, that was overplanning. He did not know his group as well as he thought because. . . . Here were some of his considerations: that people were coming long distances, they were going to have to be fed, it was going to be a hot summer day, and food would deteriorate. What he wanted to see was that basic feeding needs were met. He designed a lunch that his people would package and prepare and pay for. I think it was locally contracted, and his group was from New York. It included a piece of American cheese between two slices of bread and an apple. There may have been something else. But all of those items were considered stable, and wouldn't spoil, and were sufficiently nourishing. The problem was that they weren't very appetizing, and they were given free, and they didn't go. They had thousands of them left over. I forget how many thousands that they had for free distribution. The hot dogs, the Cokes, they went, and people paid for those. The ice cream.

GREENE: I know that Douglas mentions specifically consulting with a guy in Chicago--I think his name was Jack Reilly--who had worked for many years with the mayor on large-scale gatherings. Their problem then was how much time to allow for the march from the monument to the memorial. He gave them a grossly exaggerated figure, grossly exaggerated compared to what you had expected and also certainly compared to what it took. Do you remember talking to any other outside experts? I mean outside the Washington area.

RAYWID: Well, now, I'm a little bit confused. Jack member of the team . . .

GREENE: No, I know and. . . .

RAYWID: . . . and he is also from Chicago and also was close to Mayor [Richard J.] Daley. Now, there's another Jack Reilly, I believe, an elderly man--I don't know whether he's any relation or not--who was on the mayor's staff.

GREENE: That's who I think--I think it's just a coincidence that these two. . . .

RAYWID: Well, I do not recall him being consulted at all.

GREENE: Well, it could be that I'm confused on the name, but  
. . .

RAYWID: I know we were trying to estimate the time. We were trying to estimate the walking time. I remember a very funny McShane act, saying, "Time me," as he shuffled across Douglas' office. We all laughed at that. I don't know how much additional planning went into that. I wasn't in on it.

GREENE: But do you remember any other people outside the city area that were consulted on different problems? Or were most of your so-called experts right in this vicinity?

RAYWID: No, I think. . . Well, another area of expertise that was relied upon was intelligence, because we did not know how many people would try and subvert this march, or would benefit by seeing it be a riot. That was one element of intelligence that we were concerned about. Another element of intelligence that we were most concerning about gathering was what was going to be the size of the crowd because that we didn't know. We tried in various cities. We used the traditional source of intelligence of the Department of Justice, the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], and their estimates were grossly inaccurate. We wanted to find out how many people were coming, by major cities, how many buses were being contracted for. There was also at one point a scare that there going to be some Communists within the group that were going to try and foment a riot, but. . .

GREENE: What did you do about that?

RAYWID: We tried to identify it, we tried to identify the individuals and we tried to have them surveyed. But I don't think that the intelligence report was accurate because it didn't materialize. I mean there was no problem.

GREENE: What about the Black Muslims? That was another group that there was some of talk of threat from.

RAYWID: I don't recollect that.

GREENE: Okay. Why don't we back up and try to recall some of your meetings with civil rights leaders and what kind of atmosphere there was and who was involved, and who was helpful and who wasn't and that kind of thing.

RAYWID: The local coordinator was Walter Fauntroy. He was approachable and easy to work with from the outset. Another local coordinator who was not always as easy to work with and. . . His name escapes me. He's locally prominent. The man who's had the deteriorating physical condition.

GREENE: Oh, yes. Anyway, I know whom you're thinking of.

RAYWID: Always with a pipe.

GREENE: Right. It begins with a H, doesn't it?

RAYWID: Hobson.

GREENE: Hobson.

RAYWID: Julius Hobson.

GREENE: Julius Hobson.

RAYWID: He was at several meetings. There seemed to be a little bit of rivalry between him and Fauntroy. And it also was a matter of personality, too, but I don't recall any problems in that area. I also met with Bayard Rustin, and Rustin was rather. . . . I had several meetings, and I went as a representative. I think that they properly regarded me and properly assessed me as not a policy maker but one who was going to convey what their messages were.

BEGIN TAPE II

RAYWID: There was a rather large meeting, and an official meeting, down at police headquarters at which all the officials had come to meet with all the police officials. At that meeting, unannounced to the press, was Douglas. The press never knew of his participating. Then they were posing for the press picture before and after with the police. At that early meeting, I believe it was conveyed that we understood our function to be to see that they knew what official permits were required, everything was done, that the planning was going to be detailed, that we would have to know their planning in order that we would make our plans accordingly. From that very early stage the message was given to them very clearly that they didn't have to fight for this event, that we wanted to see that their plans were met with the appropriate official action.

GREENE: Did you ever sense any antagonism on their part because they felt there was too much of a government hand in it?

RAYWID: No, there were areas of definite conflict. For instance, we tried to make it plain that we were not sponsoring the event, that we were not underwriting it, that it was their expense, that they had the rights as did any citizens to use public property. But we were not constructing facilities for them, and they had to pay for them, that. . . .

They had, I suppose their own lists of problem areas, one of them was they wanted to sleep a lot of people. They presumed that people would come in the day before and they would be tired after the event and would want to stay over. They had a demand of a substantial amount of army equipment for sleeping--tents, sleeping bags, and so forth. We said that that was not available, and that

was a point of conflict.

We also were most insistent that everybody come in on the day of the event and leave on the day of the event. They were resistant to that, but finally agreed to that. The local Catholic official--not the cardinal, but a monsignor, I don't remember his name, said that all Catholic schools would be available for sleeping and that the army should provide cots. We were opposed to any sleeping facilities being provided and we had a fight with him as to the function, and that we not be placed in the position of doing any more than accommodating anybody's rights to use public facilities, and because they had a right, with such a large group; that more planning and more accommodation was necessary, but not anything that might be construed as sponsorship. Douglas had quite a discussion with him. I was not present or privy to it. At the last moment, we finally relented to his insistence, that is, this monsignor. He then said it was too late, the offer came too late. The planning had been revised. To my knowledge, those facilities were not used. Everybody arrived in the early hours of the morning or through the morning and every bus departed that night, which was incredible. Particularly people that had come such long distances turned around and went home.

GREENE: Do you think that as the thing went on the march leaders encouraged people to do that? Or do you think it probably would have turned out that way anyway? That once the whole thing with the Catholic schools and cots fell through, that they may have let the word go out that they should plan on returning the same day.

RAYWID: My understanding was that in their planning and coordination, they instructed people to leave, and that's the way everybody did it. Of course, there were a lot of people that came individually . . .

GREENE: And stayed.

RAYWID: . . . and stayed, but so far as the large groups, organized groups that came in buses, which was by and far the largest group of the marchers, all turned around and went.

GREENE: How much effort was made to keep the government's role quiet? It seems to me it was kept very quiet. Was that deliberate?

RAYWID: I never saw anything written up about it. Douglas' style was such that he shunned publicity. I think he's a very effective administrator. He was not interested in any of the credit or any of the bows. I don't know that we recognized at that time, but just going back to that, the Jack Kennedy statement is open to different interpretation, that the government tried to run the event. I imagine that we must have been aware that we might be subject to that criticism, that in our cooperative

efforts we had shaped the event. You might compare it to, once Lyndon Johnson said, "We shall overcome," the ring to that phrase, and all the steam of it went out. So I do think that there was a consciousness that our efforts should be minimized and kept quiet, and that to the extent it could appear that the normal municipal services were functioning and nothing else. That was desirable. So I do think that there was an effort to down play it. Then also so far as the actual military muscle that was available, and which I told you I have a little knowledge on that planning, with that shadow in the background. . . . It was reported in the press that the troop movements--some of them had come from North Carolina, I believe--that would defeat the air of a successful or happy voluntary or unobstructed event.

GREENE: Was there a sensitivity on the part of the march organizers to the government, at least to the public knowledge of the government's involvement?

RAYWID: Well, I think that--and I'm inferring quite a bit--they must have been concerned that they were not getting cooperation where they felt it was needed. In other words, traffic regulations had to be changed for buses to park, people had to be directed, streets had to be blocked off. They wanted people to do that, I think that they were quite happy that someone was doing that. Now I don't know whether their suspicions might have been aroused if they knew that Jack Conway who, for example, was conferring with us separately [INTERRUPTION]

GREENE: Jack Conway.

RAYWID: Or that his money was earmarked in the manner in which we thought it would be most helpful to the success of the thing.

GREENE: Well, they must have know. Didn't they know that the UAW was making a contribution?

RAYWID: Oh, the UAW made their contribution directly to the march organizers, and said how much it would be. I don't know that they knew that Jack Conway was meeting with us separately.

GREENE: Oh, oh, I see. Right. Let's talk about some of these other leaders. You may not have had any contact or a little contact with them. [Martin Luther] King. How much did you see of King?

RAYWID: None. To my knowledge, he did not participate in the planning.

GREENE: What about Roy Wilkins?

RAYWID: None.

GREENE: And Randolph?

RAYWID: Randolph. Well, Bayard Rustin was Randolph's stand-in. I did meet with Randolph once, and Randolph came to the Department of Justice once, but I think that that was mainly a ceremonial visit.

GREENE: Also a guy named Cleveland Robinson, I think, was representing Randolph in some of your meetings. Is that right?

RAYWID: I don't recall it.

GREENE: Also James Farmer?

RAYWID: I don't recall Farmer being in on the planning. . . . You know, in our meetings.

GREENE: What about Whitney Young?

RAYWID: I don't recall him either.

GREENE: [John] Lewis, John Lewis of SNCC [Student nonviolent Coordinating Committee]. Did you get involved at all with the problems over his speech, with the cardinal's objections?

RAYWID: No, I believe Reilly did. I believe Reilly was sort of the courier. As I understand it, the cardinal sat up in the Statler [Hilton] Hotel and said that he wouldn't appear. The speech was rushed over, I believe, to Burke Marshall who edited it. They rushed it back to the cardinal and the cardinal came at the last moment.

GREENE: But you didn't have a personal hand in that at all.

RAYWID: No, I recollect that one of the things that we had done very wisely was to make a rear stairway, constructed up the Lincoln Memorial steps, and that was the way the cardinal was able to arrive at the last minute. We hadn't constructed it for that purpose. We had constructed it for people that might have to leave or exit, officials that might have to exit apart from the crowd, and it served that function.

GREENE: Do you remember a fellow named Frank Montero [Frank L. Montero] who was supposed to be coordinating the march leaders back in New York?

RAYWID: Yes, if I recall correctly [INTERRUPTION] Yes, I recollect him meeting with us on more than one occasion.

GREENE: Was he effective, do you think?

RAYWID: As I also recollect, Frank Montero was very, very

sympathetic, much more so than other groups, to our position because he had very heavy Democratic party credentials. I don't think Rusin did, and I don't think Fauntroy did, but he did. Then, of course, not only were we proceeding under the mantle of the administration and Robert Kennedy, but we had some people that were very politically identifiable such as McShane and Reilly, and then Bruno.

GREENE: Did you have many problems with the friction among the different leaders? Did you find yourself acting as kind of a mediator from time to time, especially in the early stages?

RAYWID: In the early stages, I can recall a little bit of friction, it seems to me, by Hobson and Fauntroy, but I don't recall. . . . I think I specified some of the points of friction that we had generally, but I don't recall differences among them.

GREENE: It wasn't a major part of your responsibility, then to kind of keep the peace.

RAYWID: We tried to keep pretty close tabs on their thinking. I think Conway and maybe. . . . what was his name, Mateo?

GREENE: Montero.

RAYWID: . . . Montero may have kept us apprised of differences. In just a vague way, I recollect that we knew what was going on in their camp, but I don't recall any open participation, as you've characterized it.

GREENE: Did you feel they were very disorganized at first? That they really hadn't thought the thing through at all, and that it might have been a disaster if you hadn't come in and started to put the whole thing in. . . .

RAYWID: Let me put it this way. The event needed coordination. It required coordination. If there were substantial friction between municipal services and participants, then there would have been a substantial likelihood of friction, or of confrontation, and all that might follow that with such a large crowd. So that to that extent, it was necessary and desirable. [INTERRUPTION]

GREENE: When you first came in, if you had the feeling that the organization was really inadequate and that if your hand hadn't been put into it, it might have been a disaster.

RAYWID: There did not seem--I don't know whether this event was so unprecedented, or if not unprecedented, that it was not in the experience of the particular individuals. But if you know anything about Washington, you know it's a multijurisdiction area. We had the park police who were at that

time a very small force, I think about one hundred and fifty men. Then there were the D.C. police who were three thousand men. Now, as I understand their jurisdiction, they have concurrent jurisdictions throughout the whole metropolitan area with areas of particular interest and responsibility, and the park police being the park areas. I suppose in the past they've negotiated areas. For instance, park police direct traffic during rush hours in areas abutting the Mall, but still even with the working relationship that they had, it seemed to us that a lot of knocking down of jurisdictional lines was necessary. More than once, the D.C. police said, "That's not our problem. That's the park police." They had to be made to realize that we expected something more than that.

The same thing was true in clean up and sanitation. The Park Service cleans up the parks, but the D.C. sanitation service had a gigantic force, and we wanted their people to be turned loose on the parks. Without a supervening authority over all different jurisdictions that would not have occurred. I think it was important and necessary. I don't think that the municipal government had enough muscle to make that occur.

GREENE: Actually, I was thinking even more in terms of the organization among the march leaders themselves. How would you describe their status when you came in?

RAYWID: I think when we came in they were still in the formative stage. Of course, they were in the formative stage right up until the event, which is more a tribute to them than anything else because without any resources. . . . As I understand it, this thing occurred in the mind of Bayard Rustin, who sold it to Randolph and used Randolph's tremendous prestige, and then it grew from there. To build an organization and to build a successful event without a pre-existing organization and without resources is quite a masterful stroke. Now, whether we could have ruined it by trying to frustrate it and undermine it, maybe we could have and maybe it would have been a smaller and angrier group. I'm sure that if the administration had taken a negative stance many of the people that did cooperate and did participate would not have. So to that extent it contributed to its success if you judge success in size of the group and in the manner that it was conducted, that it was peaceful. Then, I think, in the rather great political foresight of the president, the civil rights bill was enhanced by this event. It certainly put this civil rights movement in its most glorious trimmings, or trappings, or whatever.

GREENE: You know, it's obvious that it was in the interests of the administration as well as the civil rights groups that the march be sizeable. You know, what did you do to generate as much interest as possible, and especially what did you do to encourage participation? Or wasn't that within your domain?

RAYWID: I do think that we were interested in this inroad, that we had to insure that the group was responsible in the sense that it could afford this sound system. But I don't think that to my knowledge we encouraged the participation of anybody else. We did try and mend fences and arbitrate. I say we. At that last minute event, Burke Marshall did, and Reilly assisting him, but we encouraged the participation only of persons who had--well, we did encourage the participation of the [American National] Red Cross, for instance, that traditionally does service large groups. We encouraged the participation of the National Council of Churches [Of Christ in the U.S.A.] in their donation of food, but Red Cross and National Council of Churches was sort of supplemental to municipal services. To my knowledge, we didn't encourage the participation of any marchers or, as you've suggested, white participants.

GREENE: What about working with the [United States] Civil Service Commission on government leave policy to allow employees in Washington . . .

RAYWID: All right. Well, that brings to mind some other planning. One big thing--and digressing a bit--was liquor sales within the District of Columbia. There was great debate as to whether the liquor stores should be closed by government edict. I do not recall how that turned out, but there was a lot of discussion about it, whether this would be an affront to blacks as being irresponsible on a Saturday night jaunt kind of thing, or whether the absence would make the event and the aftermath of the event more responsible or less distasteful to the public. The other thing was the leave policy. I believe there was a genuine fear in a lot of civil servants that they were going to be endangered. If they didn't have that fear, it certainly was a valid fear that logistics was a problem because of congestion. We were also concerned with government buildings. Guard forces were increased. We thought of making government buildings open for toilet facilities, for instance, and then, I believe, decided against that as a danger, so that access to government buildings along any of this route or facing this route were closed. I just happened to think of something else. We had some problems with the bus company.

GREENE: D.C. Transit.

RAYWID: D.C. Transit. There were a lot of people that were going to come in by train, and we wanted those people quickly transported to the area. We got some assurances that we need not worry about it that there would be adequate busing. Those kind of answers were not adequate for John Douglas. He wanted specifics. He wanted to know how many buses, and how they would be lined up, and when they were going to be there and under whose authority. Two people came down--well, the executive vice-president of that company came down with another operating man. Douglas in a very lawyerlike way found out that the executive vice-president was just giving him a lot of soft soap, and the other guy

was prepared to make the buses available if he were directed to do so and knew how to move them. He was a real operating man. With that discussion, Douglas let it be known that Robert Kennedy would get in touch with Mr. Chalk and tell. . . . They were very reluctant for that to be done, and they fell into line.

Then we had another intelligence network apart from the FBI. We had young attorneys at the Department of Justice positioned at different spots that could report to us periodically as to what was occurring and what were the trouble spots. We had a man at Union Station and we had a man on top of one of the government buildings, and we had two men up there at the Lincoln Memorial.

GREENE: This jumps ahead a little bit because you're talking about the day of the march, but how did that work out? Did it go fairly smoothly as far as you'd. . . .

RAYWID: Well, it went just absolutely perfectly. Douglas was fond of telling a joke on me that I reported to him that we had a major area of conflict, that at the Johnny-On-The-Spots, which were the portable toilets, were overflowing in several areas and that the people to service them couldn't get through the crowds. But to my knowledge, that was the only incident of concern. At some point in the day or at some early point, we knew that this thing was not going to be an ugly event but an historic and beautiful event. Early in the afternoon, I expect, the general took off on a sort of sightseeing jaunt with one of the police lieutenants who was responsible for the planning and toured the area from the air, which he could not have done if he were going to command the movement of the troops. So I think there was a recognition about somewhere in the day, just about midday, that we were going to have a pleasant event and not a confrontation.

GREENE: I have a few more questions regarding the preparation, just to back up. Did you have any contact with people on the Hill to get their input, or criticism, or whatever they had to contribute?

RAYWID: Yes, we had the. . . . As I recollect, there's five police forces in this city. There's the White House Police, the Metropolitan Police, the U.S. Park Police, the Capitol Police, and there are other agencies involved with police responsibilities such as the FBI, some related police responsibility. But all of those police groups were represented in the planning. The Hill was concerned that because of early plans in the march, they needed extra police. I believe we were of the opinion that the plans of the march had shifted. An early plan was that they would ring the Capitol, that got the Congress or leadership very much upset, and they insisted upon extra police. When the plans changed and we were satisfied that they had changed, we tried to assure them that those police--or to the extent that they wanted them--were not necessary. They nonetheless insisted, and so valuable policemen were drained off for that purpose. They

were, of course, kept apprised of the plans, but were somewhat out of it because of a shift in the plans.

GREENE: What about the congressional offices? Did you have any contact with them, in terms either of soliciting their ideas or of encouraging their support or anything of that kind? With congressmen and senators?

RAYWID: No, the only thing was an assurance of the leadership that there was municipal planning, and that it was thorough.

GREENE: Okay, do you remember any discussions about possible roles for members of the administration in the events? Particularly of the president or Robert Kennedy. Was there any discussion about. . . .

RAYWID: I don't recollect that there was any request for that, nor do I. . . . Well, I do recall that we repeatedly emphasized our role was not sponsorship or participation, but ordinary municipal services. I don't recall that they were requested to participate.

GREENE: Did you have anything to do with working out the plan for the president to meet with the leadership afterwards?

RAYWID: No. I personally didn't, and I didn't know anyone else who did.

GREENE: What about contact or problems with the press? Did you have much contact with the press? Or did you steer clear of it deliberately, or. . . .

RAYWID: We deliberately steered clear of it, and I don't know that. . . . The police fronted as the coordinators and no one ever went behind that front, no one ever suggested that. . . . I don't think John Douglas' name was ever in print.

GREENE: Okay. One thing you mentioned off the tape was the effectiveness of the director [National Capital Region] of the National Park Service, and we hadn't mentioned him, Mr. Sutton [T. Sutton Jett].

RAYWID: Well, I thought he was an extraordinary man who had experience with many different groups on different scales, and his suggestions were always good. He was most cooperative. These guys came when you asked them to come. They went down and surveyed the area. I just thought he was extraordinarily on top of it. He had the large territorial area to coordinate. It was his responsibility first for a permit. It was, secondly his responsibility for construction and staging, and the approval of the sound arrangements. It was his responsibility for the National Capitol Police came under him, and then the cleanup was his. It all fell within his territory. He had nothing to do

with traffic control which was, of course, a large element, and the traffic direction, he had nothing to do with that. But a large part of it fell on his territory. He had his small force really turned out or totally dedicated to this event.

GREENE: I don't know any details about this, but I know there was a group of New York City police that were organized and came down here to help, I think, particularly with the traffic control. Do you remember something about that?

RAYWID: No. I vaguely recollect that there were a lot of marshals within the group that had some police experience. I don't know whether they fell within that group or . . .

GREENE: I'm not sure either. It was just something that was mentioned. I thought that it might have come from McShane. Did McShane come out of New York?

RAYWID: Yes.

GREENE: Yes, I think it may have been a group that he brought in, but I really don't remember any. . . . I don't really think I've seen any details on it. Well, we've covered most of the specifics. Is there anything else about the march itself that we should discuss, or anything about the follow-up on it?

RAYWID: I said in the introduction that . . .

GREENE: That's right. I wanted to ask you about that.

RAYWID: . . . perhaps in the experience and reflection I wonder if we would have acted as we did. I think that at the time, the attitude was that planning, efficiency, staying on top of things, seeing that everything functioned was our prime goal. It never occurred to me that there were any other implications beyond that. I think that a reasonable interpretation was that if this was a protest movement and it started out that way, that the coordination, particularly to suggest to the leaders that they could not cover all the bases, or to negotiate with them that, for instance, they had to get out of town by the end of the day, people could draw the interpretation that the established order was too heavily intertwined with the protesters and that some of the steam of it was lost. On the other hand, it's equally valid to give the interpretation that having made it, its sheer size and its character, and then its outstanding speeches which were so quoted--the "I have a dream" speech, for instance--was the high point of the civil rights movement and contributed largely to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

GREENE: Are you saying, though, that it could possibly be construed that the heavy government participation implied that the government was trying to mold the march for its

own purposes? That if somebody wanted to give that interpretation to it, the evidence is there? Is that. . . .

RAYWID: I think it's a fair inference to say that despite our recognition and our statements repeatedly that our role was coordination of municipal services, our impact upon the event was such as to shape it and in shaping it, it was, if you will, robbed of its protest character.

GREENE: But, of course, in a sense. . . .

RAYWID: It was designed and its initial announcement was to pressure Congress in its pending civil rights consideration.

GREENE: But, of course, in a sense, you had a common goal, the administration and the protest leaders, because the president's major concern was that it not do anything to undermine his getting the civil rights act through, which was the purpose of putting the pressure on Congress in the first place.

RAYWID: Well, when one petitions Congress doesn't--and the right of petition, I guess, is in the Bill of Rights--does the congressman who is being petitioned have the right to draft the petition? Not that that's a totally apt analogy. The fact that there was a commonality of purpose and goal, I don't think it would still have been appropriate for the government to have gotten involved in the sponsorship of this event. We recognized that sponsorship had to be officially limited, and was limited. I mean we could have acquiesced to a lot of demands, many of which we didn't acquiesce to because we didn't think the demands would serve their purposes, like the tents, but. . . .

GREENE: In retrospect, do you see the government's role as at all inappropriate? The actual role that you did take.

RAYWID: Well, in the protest movements that followed, such as the protest movements against the war, which, of course, were at loggerheads with the action or goals of the administration, if the government, for instance, provided sanitation facilities and water, and I don't believe. . . . They may have provided water; I don't think they provided sanitation facilities. They certainly didn't turn out the GSI to sell hot dogs to them. If they had done so, I think it might well have been construed that the government was interfering with their protest and was stealing its thunder or . . .

GREENE: Almost mocking it.

RAYWID: . . . or disarming it in some way. Perhaps that's different. Of course, rather than resenting the participation, more was asked than was actually given. So I don't have a clear answer on that. I think that that's an issue upon which reasonable minds could differ. I guess what would

determine your answer would be what you construe to be a protest movement and the effective ways of influencing history and legislation.

GREENE: Of course, I think the difference between the protest against the Vietnam war and this particular protest is that in the case of the war, the protest was against active administration policy, and in this case, the march was consistent with what the administration wanted, which was a strong civil rights bill. Is that accurate.

RAYWID: The goals of this march were not altogether that clear. The goals shifted somewhat. I think that the way it ended up was a name, March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom.

GREENE: Yes. I think you're right. I had forgotten that. Jobs and Freedom.

RAYWID: I don't know whether the jobs were added or taken away . . . . [INTERRUPTION]

BEGIN TAPE III

GREENE: I was going to ask you about subsequent involvement with civil rights groups, or in the civil rights movement, that you may have gotten into as a result of your experience here.

RAYWID: Well, yes. You know, you do something and then you're considered an expert. There was another protest which followed this event, I think, a year or two later.

GREENE: Then, of course, during the Johnson administration.

RAYWID: Yes. I was supposed to work on that event.

GREENE: Do you remember what administration it was?

RAYWID: I'm embarrassed to say I don't. I don't remember its goals and purposes, but John Doar had the responsibility that John Douglas had. This was by no means as large, nor was the preparation as great, but this was a protest movement, and we broke all records for arrests which we considered a failure in a sense. The park police were lined up to try and still the, to break the. . . . They were marching up the mall. I remember the event, and I was out there. John Doar was on the sidelines. His was a prominent face--even more so now--and he didn't want to be identified with the police control, but it was primarily his responsibility.

GREENE: This would have also been civil rights then, right? If Doar was in charge?

RAYWID: No, that assignment was not made. . . . You know, [Louis F.] Lou Oberdorfer had one of the assignments down in Alabama. It wasn't necessarily civil rights.

[Interruption] Well, anyway, I can identify that event that . . . . I think three hundred and fifty some people were arrested. They were going to the Capitol. First they went through the rim of the park police. Then the Metropolitan Police had the Capitol grounds very well surrounded, and there was a long confrontation. Then they started arresting and sent them all to the. . . . That was the largest arrest in Metropolitan Police history up until the more recent one.

GREENE: The moratorium?

RAYWID: Well, one during the Nixon [Richard M. Nixon], the Mitchell [John N.]. . . .

GREENE: Where they stopped the traffic?

RAYWID: Yes. Then you asked . . . .

GREENE: . . . well, if there was any other involvement in the civil rights movement, really during the Kennedy administration, is what we're mainly interested in.

RAYWID: No, no. Not on my time.

GREENE: Were there other projects or activities you were involved in that we should talk about, that would be of special interest?

RAYWID: In the Kennedy administration?

GREENE: Yes.

RAYWID: Cut it. [Interruption] Well, one event that I participated in as a lawyer in the Admiralty and Shipping section [of the Civil Division] of the Department of Justice was the highjacking of a Cuban ship that was bound for Russia. The name of the ship was the ? It came into Norfolk harbor when the crew mutinied against the political administrators of this vessel. Prior to the ship's entry into Norfolk, the president, in order to discourage the highjacking of U.S. planes to Cuba, had stated that all Cuban vessels--at that time, fishing vessels and things were coming into Cuba--would be returned. Having made that statement, by the president himself, it certainly was a firm policy announced by the head of the government, that that's the course to be pursued when this vessel came into Norfolk. There was an immediate complication because so many of the crew had deserted and a replacement, relief crew had to come from Cuba to take the vessel back. But in the meantime, a number of different claimants that had had property seized by the Cuban government filed maritime liens against the vessel, and proceeded against the vessel to satisfy their outstanding claims or judgments, and it got

snarled up in court proceedings. It was a very involved and lengthy court proceeding. We were unable because of lengthy legal arguments and because the judge was struggling with rather difficult legal arguments to implement the president's policy immediately and effectively. There was a confrontation there between the court and the executive, which I thought was certainly an interesting legal argument. I don't know whether you want me to go on at length about that.

GREENE: I think that's kind of interesting. You were representing the executive department in this confrontation, I assume. Is that right?

RAYWID: Yes, I was one of a team of three lawyers from the Department of Justice that went to Norfolk to try and implement this executive policy, to get this vessel out of the country, since that was the president's announced policy and the prestige of the executive and the honor of the president's word was somewhat at stake.

GREENE: Who were the other two attorneys?

RAYWID: One was the assistant chief of the admiralty and shipping section. His name was Carl Davis. The other Washington attorney at the Department of Justice was James Westner, both of whom are still in Washington. Then there was the local U.S. attorney. This was shortly after Jack Kennedy came in, I believe. It was a complicated legal procedure. First of all, the Coast Guard took possession of the vessel. When the marshals, in implementing the court's policy of seizing the vessel, came to arrest the vessel and take it into the custody of the court, the Coast Guard announced that it was in the custody of the executive. So the court was, at an early stage, opposed to the Coast Guard. The judge was quite exercised that the marshal had been repelled by another government official, and he issued a show cause order why the Coast Guard official should not be held in contempt of court. The judge was Walter Hoffman [Walter E. Hoffman] who later was the judge I guess, his most recent action was--he took the plea of Spiro Agnew [Spiro T. Agnew] in Baltimore.

GREENE: The nolo contendere. Oh.

RAYWID: Yes. Walter Hoffman was the first judge appointed by Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] so he was a Republican appointee, a judge very much respected in that district, and a well-known admiralty judge. He made the statement that not since Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus had the processes of the courts been so interfered with. He was exercised to say the least.

We had two lines of defense principally or at least at the outset. One was there is a principle that vessels owned by the United States or carrying cargoes of the United States or in the custody of the United States are not subject to suit. So we had the

defense that the Coast Guard having claimed, or having taken possession for whatever purposes, the vessel could not be arrested. That didn't seem to be the most palatable line of defense because the judge had already announced that he was very upset that his marshal had been turned back.

Incidentally, and this is a procedural item, the marshal actually follows the orders and directions of the court, but he is really an officer of the executive, but largely at least--well, more than not--he takes his direction from the court, and his administration and personnel matters and pay come from the executive, and his hiring. So that I thought it necessary to distinguish when I said his marshal. We certainly didn't interfere with the marshal to that extent. We didn't give him any contrary directions to the court, but we did give directions to the Coast Guard that the marshal should be repelled.

A second line of defense, or an alternative line, was that the United States government can file with the court a suggestion of sovereign immunity, that is, that our government will recognize the sovereignty of another vessel if it's a government owned vessel. There are some exceptions to that, also. Certainly that applies to the warships of another nation, but it doesn't apply completely to vessels in commercial trade of another vessel, and there are a number of procedural difficulties in connection with the filing of a suggestion of sovereign immunity.

Usually the foreign state makes this request to the secretary of state who then requests the attorney general to submit it to the court. But in this instance we had no official communication with the Cuban government. We were communicating, as I recall, in Switzerland and we were using our ambassador in Switzerland. . . . No, no. We were using a neutral ambassador in Switzerland and the Cubans were using the Yugoslavs, as I recollect. That was the way business had to be conducted between the United States and Cuba, which made things a little bit complicated.

Then too we had some procedural errors. The form in which this suggestion of sovereign immunity was submitted was technically defective. One thing was, usually the suggestion is signed by the legal advisor, and in this instance, it was the acting legal advisor. There was an insistence that it be signed by the secretary. We had some problems there. The language was not technically correct. That caused delay.

GREENE: Who had the ultimate authority for working out this strategy? Whose responsibility was it?

RAYWID: Well, it was the assistant attorney general in charge of the civil division who at that time was William Orrick [William Orrick, Jr.].

GREENE: Bill Orrick, yes.

RAYWID: He was a very diligent worker and he was right on top of it. He was at the phone all the time. One of the important things was to impress the Cubans in our sincerity in trying to move the thing along.

GREENE: Was that handled through you or through the State Department?

RAYWID: I think probably through the State Department, but we had to give them status reports. We prepared a couple of status reports for the president for his press conferences, but it never came up.

GREENE: It must have been amusing to the Cuban government to see two parts of the American government struggling over a Cuban ship that way.

RAYWID: Well, that was difficult to understand. Another side track that the case got into was that Orrick called the judge to explain to him the interest of the administration and the statement of the president. The judge refused to talk to Orrick and made some public announcement to the effect that there had been an ex parte representation by the government, which he was very much upset about. He was upset about a lot of things through the course of that case and personally upset with me at one stage. That's on the side, I guess.

GREENE: How much of this do you think was his Republican dander, and how much was really legitimate?

RAYWID: Well, I have tried several cases in front of Judge Hoffman, and I've never met a fairer minded man.

GREENE: Oh, really.

RAYWID: He quite frequently was too ready to state his thinking on an issue. He was very definitely an opinionated man, and he always quite candidly stated his opinions. But he was a fair-minded man, and with enough humility to change his opinion when he thought that it was wrong. And frequently did, and with full recognition that he was reversing himself.

GREENE: So then it's not likely that it was partisan politics.

RAYWID: Right. If he had a bias against an individual, if anything they had an advantage in his courtroom. That was how fair he was.

GREENE: Did Robert Kennedy get involved in this at all when it stagnated?

RAYWID: I was always impressed with the way Robert Kennedy, as an administrator, he seemed to stay on top of everything without getting bogged down and involved in it. But he

was informed and he knew the steps that were taken, and the president was advised.

GREENE: But they didn't try to pressure the judge?

RAYWID: No, the front line was Davis with the two other lawyers, myself and Westner, and Orrick was the policy maker to whom we reported as the developments. . . . We thought it was going to be a simple case and over quickly, and it got more and more involved. We had the FBI checking the validity of the claims. They seemed somewhat spurious. The court was not going to go beyond those claims.

We came up with another purely legal argument which had an admiralty ring to it that the judge liked very much. As I recollect, he accepted the sovereign immunity. We abandoned the Coast Guard line of attack because that had boiled up so initially. He accepted the sovereign immunity, but he also accepted an argument, the principle of barratry. There's another barratry which has to do with illegal practice of the lawyer, but barratry in admiralty means a vessel in distress seeking a port of refuge, and mutiny is one of them. A vessel is supposed to be immune from process if it is seeking a port of refuge, which in this instance, it was.

GREENE: And that's how it was resolved finally? By his acceptance?

RAYWID: He accepted the sovereign immunity argument finally, and he accepted the barratry argument, and he released the vessel.

GREENE: How long did that take from start to finish?

RAYWID: I think it was about a week.

GREENE: Oh. I was thinking in terms of several weeks when you said it went on and on.

RAYWID: Well, it might have been as much as two weeks. But you've got to remember in the context that was a long time because we didn't want the Cuban government keeping our planes. We wanted those planes turned round. We wanted to be able to show the same sort of accommodation and that concerned us. We wanted to get this over with very speedily.

GREENE: That's a very interesting story. I'd never heard anything about it. I remember vaguely when it happened, but certainly I don't remember any of the detail. It's very interesting.

RAYWID: If I may make some general observations, I was there before--or some general observations--I was there in the Eisenhower administration when William Rogers was there.

It was a nice place to work. But when the Kennedy administration came in, I think we had a real feeling of pride that we were the government institution around which a great deal of action was occurring. We felt that we were an extremely important agency. So, too, did we seem to enjoy that kind of press. We got tons of letters from citizens. The volume of mail increased I don't know how many fold. . . .

GREENE: In general, do you mean? Or in specific areas?

RAYWID: No, I mean citizen mail, people writing in about a complaint and looking to the Justice Department for relief and for advice.

GREENE: But not necessarily in the areas that the Justice Department was then emphasizing like. . . .

RAYWID: No, as a matter of fact, most of those letters had to be turned around. We had to up the staff, but we had standard responses to explain that the function of the Justice Department was representation of the government as an institution and not its citizens as individuals, which. . . .

GREENE: . . . was probably not widely understood.

RAYWID: Well, no, it wasn't. I think that, with Robert Kennedy being the brother of the president, it was thought that the department would be much more responsive. That was in part, I believe, the reason for the great volume of mail.

I remember another incident within the Civil Division. The Civil Division was sort of a catchall division responsible for government claims. We had one claim brought, it was a tort claim. Usually, the attitude of the department lawyers was pretty much wanting to win a case and represent the government in the best possible way and to defeat a claim or if not to totally defeat it, at least to bargain a settlement which was, we thought, the best possible settlement. At an early stage in his administration. . . . The attorney general had to approve certain settlements of the dollar figure. The assistant attorney general had to approve them of a lower dollar figure. But if they went into the hundreds of thousands--I forget what the cutoff was--it had to go personally for the attorney general's approval. Well, in this tort claim the lawyers and the civil division hierarchy thought that they had negotiated a rather good settlement and were pleased with their effort. It got to Robert Kennedy, and Robert Kennedy said it was an outrage that we had so taken such advantage of the individual. Usually these memos were written up to show, to demonstrate with some pride, how they'd beaten a claim or beaten back an extraordinary claim. He said it was unconscionable, and boosted the claim substantially which was unprecedented. It sort of shocked the lawyers that their submissions for approval--usually the thought that they wouldn't be approved because they had been too generous--to have it kicked back in this way was quite a

surprise.

GREENE: Do you remember the specifics of that? Who was involved, or why he might have had the attitude towards it?

RAYWID: It was a particularly painful case, but it could be run down.

GREENE: You mean it's something that. . . .

RAYWID: I know who would remember it vividly would be Carl Eareley who was. . . .

GREENE: I just wondered if there was something in the specifics of the case that Robert Kennedy would have had that reaction to, rather than just the money involved.

RAYWID: I don't recall. It was a federal tort claim where the person had been badly injured. The settlement was substantial.

GREENE: Physical injury?

RAYWID: Yes. Physical injury.

GREENE: Oh, oh, I see. Well, that may. . . .

RAYWID: I don't know whether there were any other extenuating circumstances, whether it involved any minority group or anything of that sort, but it was. . . .

GREENE: I didn't catch when you said that the first time that it was a physical injury.

RAYWID: Yes.

GREENE: Is there anything else? These are interesting incidents. There must be so many in that period. Let's ask about, how much contact did you have with the attorney general? Was he kind of a remote figure?

RAYWID: I can't recall that I had any direct contact with him at all. I felt that I was very close to his office, but through Douglas. I remember I had a watch there one night because there was some crisis and that the place had to be manned twenty-four hours a day. So I had the run of his office and took full use of his icebox, so that was a. . . . I shared an office with a lawyer, a young lawyer, younger than I, I guess, by about five years. In the course of his department tenure, he got to know Robert Kennedy socially, which amazed all of us. . . .

GREENE: Who is that?

RAYWID: His name is Bardyl Tirana.

GREENE: Oh, yeah.

RAYWID: Do you know him?

GREENE: Yes. His wife Gail, too, was . . .

RAYWID: Gail.

GREENE: Yes.

RAYWID: She was a dinner partner of Jack's on barge one night. Bardyl was there.

GREENE: On barge, what. . . .

RAYWID: On the barge, the presidential barge.

GREENE: Oh, I didn't realize what you meant. You mean the presidential yacht?

RAYWID: Yeah, yeah, you know. That's a fascinating story, how he got to know Robert Kennedy. But you asked about contact. He had sessions in the evening of young attorneys, about forty of them, in which he would ask them questions about what they were working on.

GREENE: Did you go to. . . .

RAYWID: No, I don't think even in those days I qualified as a young attorney or I was so busy I was out of the office so much. I think I was scheduled one night, but I never made it.

GREENE: When you spoke before in terms of, "We felt the great pride," I assume that was a collective we, and you were speaking in general for the other attorneys in the department. Was that a general feeling of pride in the department and the attorney general?

RAYWID: Yes, and remains today. I think we felt that we were the most important agency. I think that also we that have left it and look back on it in the Mitchell, [Richard G.] Kleindienst . . .

GREENE: Mitchell, Kleindienst. Who else is there?

RAYWID: . . . [Elliot L.] Richardson, [William B.] Saxbe, but particularly Mitchell and Kleindienst, not only their subsequent problems, but their conduct of the office, that it became highly politicized, partisanly so, and that it fell on dark times. So different from the events that we've described about the handling of the marches. The reprisive [sic] manner in

which Mitchell oversaw. . . . Well, I've heard several people speak of that balcony view as he looked down on the protesters and was puffing on his pipe and just inflamed the crowd. I wasn't there, but I've heard that event described several times.

GREENE: Well, what did he say? It was like. . . . What the word he used implying that they were a bunch of . . .

RAYWID: Animals.

GREENE: . . . animals, or beasts. Is there anything else that you can think of?

RAYWID: Well, someone that I think might be interesting for you to talk to at length who's still at the Department of Justice, who is sort of a trouble shooting attorney and has continued to be a trouble-shooting attorney is Irwin Goldbloom . . .

GREENE: I don't recall his name.

RAYWID: . . . who's still in the Civil Division. He might be an interesting lead for you.

GREENE: He had special assignments? Is that. . . .

RAYWID: Yes.

GREENE: Okay. That's something that I'll look into.

[INTERRUPTION]

RAYWID: One interesting little vignette of how the department operated. When I was assistant to Douglas, there was a request to review a matter in which Joseph Kennedy was involved. Apparently while Joseph Kennedy had been an ambassador to England a man on his staff had been convicted in the British courts of being a Nazi spy. Years later the Miami papers picked this man's name up as a resident of the area and interviewed Joseph Kennedy and asked if he were, in fact, a spy. Joseph Kennedy said something to the effect that he remembered that the man had been on his staff and was indeed a convicted spy. It said something, in connection with the proof of his spying activities whether he had documents in his possession or something. I believe it was the Miami Herald and Joseph Kennedy were sued for libel. Joseph Kennedy inquired, presumably, of his son Robert who was attorney general, whether since his knowledge arose out of his service to the government as an ambassador, the department would not undertake to defend him. The matter was raised with John Douglas, the assistant attorney general in charge of the Civil Division, as to whether or not it was appropriate for the Department of Justice to defend in a libel action the former ambassador to England. Douglas made the judgment that the ambassador, although his knowledge arose out of the time when he was officially serving the government, the

alleged libelous statement occurred when he was retired and residing in Florida. Therefore he would have to engage private counsel to represent him.

GREENE: By the way, did he go ahead? Did he have to defend himself? Or was the case dropped or. . . .

RAYWID: I don't know the ultimate disposition of the case, but he did have private counsel. [INTERRUPTION]

There was no question that this man had been convicted and sentenced as a spy in English courts. I believe that as I recollect in reviewing this matter for the determination as to whether we could handle it, the question was that the grounds or the reason for his conviction had been properly conveyed by Joseph Kennedy in his statement. That was the issue upon which the accuracy of his statement was the alleged libelous remarks.

END OF TAPE III