

**Louis F. Oberdorfer Oral History Interview – RFK#1, 02/05/1970**  
**Administrative Information**

**Creator:** Louis F. Oberdorfer  
**Interviewer:** Roberta W. Greene  
**Date of Interview:** February 5, 1970  
**Place of Interview:** Washington, D.C.  
**Length:** 31 pages

**Biographical Note**

Louis F. Oberdorfer was Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division, Department of Justice, 1961 - 1965. This interview covers Robert F. Kennedy's 1968 presidential campaign, Citizens for Kennedy during 1968, and campaigning across the United States during 1968, among other topics.

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**Suggested Citation**

Louis F. Oberdorfer, recorded interview by Roberta W. Greene, February 5, 1970 (page number), Robert F. Kennedy Oral History Program of the John F. Kennedy Library.

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Louis F. Oberdorfer – RFK #1

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Oral History Interview

with

LOUIS OBERDORFER

February 5, 1970  
Washington, D.C.

By Roberta W. Greene

For the Robert F. Kennedy Oral History Program  
of the Kennedy Library

OBERDORFER: . . . worth mentioning in this whole affair. In anticipation of the result of the California primary, a meeting had been organized for the Wednesday after the election day. Our focus in the few days before that as a citizens organization was not so much the California primary as trying to define a role for a national citizens organization in the interim period between the California primary and the [Democratic National] Convention. And this memorandum of June 3, 1968, I discover here and invite to the attention of a historian as an item of interest. This sort of summarizes what we had been doing, our concept for what was feasible.

GREENE: Did you expect any opposition to that kind of an effort? I know there was some debate about whether such an effort would be valuable in that period.

OBERDORFER: Well, I expected to go to a meeting or a series of meetings at which this and other proposals would be considered and, as far as I was concerned, perhaps a change in the leadership of it. We recognized--Walter Sohler and I just rank as amateurs and we felt this was a thing that could be done, not knowing much about politics or about national politics. We certainly were going to defer to the pros. This was just a plan which spoke for itself and might or might not justify the use of the manpower and the money that it contemplated.

GREENE: Was there anyone that you expected would object to it. Anyone who had been a problem during the primaries?

OBORDORFER: I don't remember any. I didn't think of it as an adversary situation at all. I'd heard that people like [Kenneth P.] Ken O'Donnell and others thought that citizens activity was, you know, just an extra that you did when you could afford it. I had also heard from Byron White, who'd run this thing in the 1960 campaign, that it had a flexibility and a reach that was not available to the political people. It's all so hypothetical now, but I guess I thought that it would have been particularly important for Bob [Robert F. Kennedy] to have a nonpolitical--and we tried to think of it as nonpolitical--organization that could at least establish some kind of communication with the business community, professional people, who were generally sort of allergic to him. And, of course, under this umbrella they could have done all kinds of things in places where the political organization was controlled by the administration.

GREENE: Was there anything unusual about starting a citizens effort at this early stage rather than after the nomination and the rest? As far as I could tell, that's what they did in '60. There was not much of a citizens effort before.

OBERDORFER: I don't think they did that in 1960, and I don't know why they did it this time, really, except I guess the thing in 1960 had been very successful. I think Bob had had. . . . It had been run by Byron White, Jane Snydam, and [Joseph F.] Joe Dolan. I think Bob felt that it had a lot of potential and could be done really with relatively little cost and involve volunteers who weren't much good to the pols. And it was amateur and unstructured in the sense of relating to political organizations. Maybe if we'd gotten into the next phase there might have developed tensions and conflicts, but I had the feeling that we were just sort of left to do what we could do. We weren't competing with anybody. It was just trying to reach out and, at this point, find people who would, for the future, help.

I don't see in this file -- and if part of your role is to put together a file -- I don't see here the New York Times advertisement. It was prompted by [John] Seigenthaler.

GREENE: Well, I'll tell you, I have the complete list. In fact, you're welcome to have this copy of what we have in the Citizens [for Kennedy] files. It's ten boxes. What I did was I went through and I pulled things that I thought might be the basis of some discussion that would be helpful to you in terms of names and dates. I know you have a periodical file.

OBERDORFER: Well, let me again, if I'm not breaking up your game plan, invite your attention to an advertisement that was run in the New York Times in April or May, put together pretty much by our little group, a composite of names of people who had agreed to let their names be used in an ad. What it was was just a string of two hundred fifty, three hundred names and at the bottom "Are for Kennedy." That's all it said. I remember Ethel [Skakel Kennedy] was so pleased at that ad because it identified to her for the first time a lot of people whom she had not realized were . . . .

GREENE: This was national and included people from all the different groups?

OBERDORFER: Yes.

GREENE: I didn't see that in the files, but I must admit that I didn't go that carefully through the clipping files. I know I read about that ad.

OBERDORFER: It was a full page ad in the New York Times. A similar ad, I think, was run in the Los Angeles Times with little different names. I suggest that you interview Walter Sohler, who really was immediately in control of collecting those names.

GREENE: We're getting a little out of order, which is fine. I was going to ask you how you and Sohler got to do this in the first place, how you were selected. You say you were rank amateurs. Was there something particular that recommended you for these jobs?

OBERDORFER: Well, I don't know why I was asked to do it. I guess if you're interested in the sort of circumstances-- was down in New Orleans trying a case. As a matter of fact, I left here on Saturday morning, just as Bob was announcing, to fly to New Orleans to begin a trial that Monday. And when I got in New Orleans, I had a call either from [Theodore C.] Sorensen or [Stephen E.] Steve Smith-- and various times during the week, [Thomas M. C.] Tom Johnston--saying that Bob had asked if I would participate in running the citizens committee. I told him I was in this lawsuit and I couldn't do anything until at least the hearing was completed. Why they asked me to do it I don't know. In the Department of Justice days I had done that Cuban prisoner exchange work which is sort of like this. I had had a role in connection with the civil rights crises of 1963 in organizing groups of lawyers, a group of ministers, a group of businessmen. I don't know whether you know about this or not . . . .

GREENE: Yes, I do.

OBERDORFER: . . . to participate as volunteers. I guess they thought I had some experience in dealing with nonpolitical volunteers and some organizational experience, administrative ability, and got along well with them. So I guess that's why they asked me to do it.

GREENE: And do you think Sohier was more or less the same type of personality?

OBERDORFER: Well, Sohier was sort of a bluestocking fellow, friend of President Kennedy. He had also been in the government, AID [Agency for International Development] I believe in the Kennedy administration. He was probably. . . . My relationships, as far as the Kennedy family was concerned, were entirely with Bob and Ethel. I hardly -- I've never worked with Ted [Edward M. Kennedy]. I only knew them because I'd worked for Bob in the Department of Justice. I didn't know him, I hadn't even met him before I went to work for him. I was friend and contemporary of White. He brought me to the department. Sohier, on the other hand--I don't mean that I hadn't become acquainted with these people, but I hadn't worked with Steve or any of his sisters --Sohier had the confidence and relationships with the other parts of the family that I didn't.

GREENE: Kind of a well-balanced combination?

OBERDORFER: I thought he worked together very well, really. I enjoyed working with him, and in the end there was no rank about it. We were partners; we sat at a double desk. I don't know whether you've seen the pictures or not.

GREENE: No.

OBERDORFER: We set up a double desk--it was like two old Swiss bankers--in a little room not as big as this one; and shared the travel, shared the work, communicated about decisions. For a political operation which is normally hectic, it really was rather serene. We were, I think, sort of a calm eye in the tornado that was raging around there.

GREENE: Well, I think maybe it would be best to go back and talk about the decision-making and what part you might have had in advising or consulting.

OBERDORFER: Really very little. I, during that period, had talked to him mostly about these domestic issues involving tax incentives and housing and things like



that. I don't think that Bob ever considered me as a political person, and I am not. I never made a recommendation to him about whether to run or not. I remember one evening, in probably January of 1968, Adam Walinsky and his wife who lived not too far from me in McLean came over to my house. Adam pleaded with me to go to the senator and urge him to run, as if he were not inclined to do so, and that it would be a national tragedy if he didn't, and he feared for the survival of the Republic on this if Bob didn't run. And it's hard to sort out between what I said and what I thought.

We later had lunch, the Walinskys and I, at Le Petit Paris up here on Connecticut Avenue. Again his pressing that and my feeling very troubled by what he said and very disturbed that I wasn't taking a positive position with Bob, wasn't seeking him out. And again, I'm not sure what I said or even what I thought precisely at the time, but my recollection is a feeling of doubt about what I would do if I were in his position, not so cocksure, a) that he could win; b) that the institutions of this country were dependent on one man; c) that he should expose himself to the wear and tear and terrible, terrible strain that it would involve.

I didn't think anything about what happened, what did happen; I certainly wasn't thinking about that. I just had a feeling of, well, humility--who the hell am I to go to a man and tell him he's got to do this, and also finally feeling that if Bob wanted my opinion he would ask for it, and an understanding of why he had better people to consult with than me about whether he should do this. So I would say that outside of my conversations with Walinsky, in which, as I relate, I didn't, except by my silence, participate-- I didn't go to him and tell him not to do it either. . . .

GREENE                   What about the tax incentive bills? I know you worked with him on the preparation of those. How did he respond to the treatment they received by the administration?

OBERDORFER:           He got very angry about that.

GREENE:                Did it seem to affect his attitude towards the [Lyn--don B.] Johnson administration, or was that pretty far gone already?

OBERDORFER:           Well, you know, I don't remember anything--I mean I'm trying to be a lawyer: and what did he say and what did I say. I can't identify any particular statement about that. I do remember sitting in his office one day, talking about some of these things, when the president called him about housing legislation that the president was offering. What happened was that--and I guess I was involved in this. It was

really an awkward situation for me. Nothing wrong with it, it just required diplomacy. About the time I started advising him about the tax incentives idea--and I must say that I did advocate that rather vigorously because I felt and still feel that there are serious limitations on what government can do. I have a lot of--respect isn't the work--but I'm impressed with the capability of business organizations to produce and do things.

I had had that experience in the government of, several times, trying to build sort of partnerships between government and business for useful purposes. I don't know whether I ever wrote him anything about this, but I certainly talked to him about it. I remember particularly when we were on that African trip talking to him about the translation of this experience of mine and his into programs which would be useful for the country and useful for him politically, to enable him to show to the business community that his leadership was consistent with their best interests; that if you could make a reasonable business proposition out of doing socially useful things, business would be an effective mechanism for getting socially useful things done. I say what I'm saying now because it sort of summarizes things that I'd said to him, sort of puts it straight.

GREENE: Did you actually get involved in the preparation of the bills, or were you . . . .

OBERDORFER: Yes. Mike Curzan was working on his staff and Mike spent a good deal of time with me, talking out the ideas in the first place and then talking out and reviewing with me the specific legislation. I didn't participate in the hearings directly, but I helped corral some of the witnesses and was sort of a counselor to Curzan--and I guess [Lewis] Lew Kaden came in during that period--working through them without becoming directly involved in the drafting or in the controversy.

I started to tell you one of the reasons why I had to be more passive than I might have otherwise been. Our firm is counsel to Edgar Kaiser. Edgar Kaiser was chairman of a **commission [Committee on Urban Housing]** appointed by Johnson on housing and the Kaiser Commission was recommending proposals similar to Bob's. They weren't identical, but they were similar. In the fall of '67, I guess it was, Bob's hearings were going on. In the winter of '68, in a typical Johnsonian knee-jerk reaction to an initiative by Bob, Johnson picked up the Kaiser commission idea and came forward with his own proposal which became the Housing Act of 1968, which included some, but not all, of Bob's proposals. And I got caught a little

bit in the middle between my responsibility to my client. . . .  
Incidentally, the National Housing Partnership, which has  
grown out of that and which incorporates a lot of the ideas that  
were developed in the hearings that Bob had, is a child of that work.  
It's got tax incentives as the basis for it.

In February of 1968 we were having problems because while we  
were trying to get the legislation going for the National Housing  
Partnership Mike Curzan was sniping at it, I suppose, worried about  
it because it was possibly stealing the thunder from the Kennedy  
proposals. I remember at one point having a telephone conversation  
with Bob. He called me from somewhere up in Waterville Valley and  
he asked me to go to [Joseph A., Jr.] Joe Califano and explain to  
him ~~something~~ about Bob's position on the administration proposal.  
I had to explain to him--I thought he understood it before--that  
I had an attorney-client relationship which prevented me from  
representing him in this particular matter, and I think he under-  
stood it.

At that time he hadn't announced. I really thought he wasn't  
going to announce. I assumed that he was not going to . . . .

GREENE: Did you learn that he was going to run before he  
announced publicly?

OBERDORFER: Very, very short time before. I was not really a  
party to the decision. Sometime in early February 1968,  
Burke Marshall and his wife and my wife and I were  
in Antigua together. And we were taking as given that Bob was not  
going to run.

GREENE: You say this was when in February?

OBERDORFER: Early February, maybe the last week of January or  
early February.

GREENE: And Marshall was fairly convinced at that point, too?

OBERDORFER: Unless he was dissembling to me. But we certainly  
talked as if it wasn't going to happen.

GREENE: Do you have any idea what finally pushed him over?

OBERDORFER: Bob?

GREENE: Yes. Was it ever discussed?

OBERDORFER: Nothing but what I've really read in the paper.

GREENE: Was he very angered by the administration's somewhat parallel proposal? Did he feel it was simply politicking?

OBERDORFER: It was a typical. . . . It is anger and amusement. In other words, every time he'd come up with a good idea, they'd try to outflank him. My own view, particularly when I was assuming he wasn't going to run, was that--and I think he understood this--so far as I was concerned, I was committed to trying to get a program for the construction of housing for low- and moderate-income families. In the contest between the administration and the Kennedy proposals we were getting real momentum.

Is this strange to you? Is this a new area?

GREENE: Well, we haven't talked in very great detail about the incentive bills yet. And actually, I don't want to get into too detailed a discussion on the legislation itself at this point. We may at some later date. But, yes, I've read that this was in fact one of the many factors that contributed to his decision to run.

OBERDORFER: Thought they weren't going to do anything.

GREENE: Yes, perhaps he felt impotent.

OBERDORFER: Well, the Kerner Commission [Special Presidential Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders] report, I've always assumed, really--I didn't have any communication with him about that, but it certainly seemed to send him through the roof.

GREENE: Yes, that's another factor, and the Tet offensive, I guess, was probably the single biggest one.

OBERDORFER: Probably.

GREENE: Well, as far as the Citizens effort goes, it seems from those memoranda that you really didn't get too much going until about April first. Is that right?

OBERDORFER: I don't think I was here until about April first. I don't know when I got back from New Orleans, but it was into March. What day did he announce?

GREENE: March 16.

OBERDORFER: Let's see, I was on trial for the week of March 18. And I probably didn't get back here until the twenty-fifth.

- GREENE: And nothing had really been done?
- OBERDORFER: Well, no. Some women were down there handling mail. When I got there, they were just setting up the space for the headquarters.
- GREENE: Did you have any organizational meetings with Steve Smith or Senator Ted or people like that to discuss what you'd be doing?
- OBERDORFER: Oh, yes, principally with Steve. Tom Johnston had a lot of ideas about how this thing should be run. He had a very important role in that headquarters. He was very effective down there, had access to the senator and an overview that was very good. You see, he was not involved in the Department of Justice; he wasn't involved in the '60 campaigns. Where he was concerned, he had been coned to come aboard in the '68 campaign. And I found him really the best hitching place for this foundation. Well, we talked a good deal to Sorensen when he was there. [Lawrence F.] O'Brien, when he finally came, was interested some. But most of the direction we got came from Ted Kennedy, Tom Johnston, and Sorensen.
- GREENE: I notice also several memos to and from with references to Dun Gifford. Was he simply acting on Senator Kennedy's behalf?
- OBERDORFER: Yes. Yes, Dun was the nexus between us and Senator Ted Kennedy. He did also give us a good deal of direction and focus, steer us to where he thought we were needed.
- GREENE: Was there any problem getting Senator Robert Kennedy and Senator Ted Kennedy and maybe Smith to follow through on the contacts that you had when you felt personal diplomacy was important?
- OBERDORFER: Well, no. We never bothered Bob with this kind of thing during that period. I don't think he. . . . Ted did a good deal of it. Do you know Jane Suydam?
- GREENE: Well, I see her name of course, throughout these memorandums. And I'm glad you said it because everytime I looked at it, I pronounced it differently in my mind. I'd never heard anyone say it.
- OBERDORFER: She was Jane Wheeler in the '60 campaign. Between, she was divorced and remarried and her second husband died. In any event, she has a very vivid tale to tell of the Indiana primary. She went out to Indianapolis with lists

and whatever we'd been able to dredge up. She tells of sitting in a room with Ted with a long list and a secretary there with a list placing the calls, handing him the phone. He'd talk to whoever it was, put the phone down, do something else, and just over a period of hours, calling scores of people. The list carefully-- I don't know how carefully really, but it was careful. But at least some judgment was made about who he should call. And, of course, one of the worst things about an operation as loose as that is that some particular name will be floated up into four or five different people. There's one man in Indiana by the name of Irwin Miller. Have you ever heard of him?

GREENE: Just the name is somewhat familiar.

OBERDORFER: Irwin Miller was on the cover of Esquire during the campaign as a possible Republican candidate for president. You didn't see that?

GREENE: I don't recall it.

OBERDORFER: He's one of the great Americans. At the time of that Martin Luther King fracas in Birmingham in 1962 and for a few months thereafter, he was the lay president or chairman of the National Council of Churches. He probably had as much to do with getting the Protestant clergy behind the civil rights movement as anybody. And if I had to make a list of the ten most influential people so far as getting the country turned around on civil rights in the early sixties, I would list him high in the ten. He has a family business out there, Cummins Engines Co. He's on the board of the Yale Corporation, he's on the board of the telephone company, he's on the board of the Ford Foundation, he's on the board of one of the big New York banks, and he is just a magnificent fellow. He had been, as I say, very helpful to us in the civil rights situation. I mentioned to somebody that when they got to Indiana, if they could get him, they'd really get someone. And I'm afraid that forty people probably called him up at sometime or another. I know I called him; I imagine Ted called him; I imagine Bob called him, and I don't know who else just, you know, in the frenzy of trying to do something. It just turned that guy off. He ended up as [Nelson A.] Rockefeller's campaign manager.

GREENE: Other people are crying for attention and he had too much. Was that an unusual kind of a mixup or was that typical?

OBERDORFER: Probably. Well, I don't know what's typical and not typical. That certainly was something that shouldn't

have happened but did.

GREENE: How did you usually parcel out this kind of responsibility? Did you have some kind of control for who would be contacting certain groups or individuals so that you didn't have a lot of overlapping?

OBERDORFER: Well, you see, the thing was so fragmentary. When I think back on it, it was not a substantial effort; the thing hadn't flowered. We jumped into those primaries and we had..... You saw these categories of architects and artists and this kind of thing. Then what we'd do when the primary sort of moved from state to state, we'd send somebody from the office out with lists. It happened in Indiana; it happened in Nebraska.

GREENE: California, I guess, was somewhat more complicated, wasn't it?

OBERDORFER: I went out to California for a while and--who was it? Somebody from that office. . . . We sent a cadre. We recruited people like [Thomas J.] Tom MacBride and they went into each of these. You know, somebody went to San Francisco and somebody went to L.A. and worked right in the headquarters there with citizen idea operations. There was somebody down in San Diego; I've forgotten who that was.

GREENE: Wasn't there a certain amount of resistance in the beginning from California, from [Anthony B.] Akers and [Charles] Spalding?

OBERDORFER: Yes.

GREENE: Why was that?

OBERDORFER: I don't know. There was . . . .

GREENE: They wanted you to send out the lists as I remember rather than . . . .

OBERDORFER: Didn't want us to come. I don't really know why. You know, what we did was just bide our time and finally Steve called up. After they saw what was coming in Oregon, Steve called up and told us to get some people out there. And we bundled them up and got them out there. It's such a loose thing, I really.....

GREENE: It looks so much more organized, I think, on paper than it probably was in reality, you know.

OBERDORFER: Well, it may be that I've forgotten how organized it was, too. But, I don't know does this paper look businesslike?

GREENE: With my eyes I can hardly see it's a paper, if you want to know the truth.

OBERDORFER: I mean, did you read it?

GREENE: Oh yes. I thought all of those you know, they were very helpful to me. I noticed in a couple of places there seemed to be a certain amount of discrepancy, some which might stem just from the difference in dates. But, at one point, I think it's [Henry M.] Hank Dater writes a memo saying that your major problem is lack of real supervision and organization direction. Yet on paper it looks like the responsibility is very clear-cut and well-defined. So, I'm not really sure. As I understood it, MacBride had charge of the minority and poorer groups, the grassroots level, and then this fellow [John R.] Wagley has the white collar.

OBERDORFER: Wagley was not very effective.

GREENE: How did you hire these people, Dater and MacBride and Wagley and Jane Suydam?

OBERDORFER: Suydam.

GREENE: Suydam, right.

OBERDORFER: Well, this is amazing; I've forgotten all about this. One of the great guys in this thing was [Nicholas H.] Nick Zumas. He was just. . . . Have you interviewed him?

GREENE: No, no.

OBERDORFER: He was a tiger. He just could do anything, and tireless and unflappable, good writer . . . .

GREENE: He went out into the states?

OBERDORFER: He went to California, I think. Another find was Peter Rousselot, who is here, a lawyer now. Peter was indefatigable and imaginative and hard.



GREENE: What exactly was his responsibility? I didn't really get a clear idea from this.

OBERDORFER: Peter?

GREENE: Yes.

OBERDORFER: Well, he sort of told Walter Sohler and me what to do after a while. I remember he went up to one of the New England states, Connecticut or someplace like that. There was great disarray, and in a matter of hours he had the thing calmed down and organized and mail going out and money being collected and phone calls being made. Here's a mention of his meeting.

GREENE: In Connecticut?

OBERDORFER: Connecticut.

GREENE: Yes, I remember that now.

OBERDORFER: One of the great activities--I'm refreshed now--was the work that Karen Mayers did with athletes. Karen Mayers is the very pretty wife of one of my law partners. She, unbeknownst to me until that time, is a great sports fan. She was just thrilled at the idea of getting together with [Vincent] Vince Lombardi and, oh, Willie Mays and whoever else they had, Sam Huff, [Christian] Sonny Jurgenson. That became a very effective thing, and this ad had a good many athletes in it.

GREENE: Were the athletes useful in an active sense or simply to lend their names and their prestige?

OBERDORFER: Well, they went around here in the District of Columbia, the D.C. primary. What is the name of the fellow who . . . .  
. . . Bobby Mitchell and [Roosevelt] Rosey Grier and some of those fellows came in here one Sunday and went all over town with Bob, and they were very effective. Lombardi surprised me. He turned out with a strong endorsement very early in the game.

GREENE: From the memorandum I gather that the lawyers were in almost all cases among the most active and effective groups.

OBERDORFER: That was our backbone. [Robert L.] Bob Wald, organizing the lawyers, was superb.

You know, as I look at these memos, I realize my memory is underselling this thing. It was a better operation than I said.

GREENE: Maybe if I ask you some questions, it'll bring things back to you also. Well, I wanted to know a little bit about the hiring. I think that at least some of them were on salary and the rest were volunteers. Hank Dater and Tom MacBride, Wagley and Jane Suydam--how did you select them?

OBERDORFER: Wagley, somebody brought him in. I don't know where they got him from. Somebody knew him. Fitzhugh Green worked for us bootleg. He was working at the U.S.I.A. [United States Information Agency]. Somebody else who was an unsung hero was a fellow named [John A.] Schnittker, who was the under secretary of agriculture.

GREENE: That must be. . . . There are several references there to a high official that's been very helpful, but the name is never mentioned in this list.

OBERDORFER: And he just blew the roof off when [Orville L.] Freeman came out for Johnson; Schnittker went out to Indiana and came out for Kennedy. "[Hubert H.] Humphrey, is no more entitled to the support of the administration than Kennedy is. If my boss is for Humphrey, I have to say, I'm a presidential appointee--I'm for Kennedy."

GREENE: That was before Johnson issued his edict that none of his cabinet members could become. . . .

OBERDORFER: And forthwith issued it!

GREENE: That was the result.

OBERDORFER: I ran into John Schnittker the other day. He had a. . . .  
One of the cute, fetching memories is Mary Yates. Do you know who Mary Yates is?

GREENE: No.

OBERDORFER: You don't remember who Ted Yates was?

GREENE: Yes.

OBERDORFER: The NBC reporter who was killed in Israel, shot in the head.

GREENE: Yes, right.

OBERDORFER: Well, his widow is a magnificent girl.

GREENE: Yes, I've seen pictures of her in Life, I think.

OBERDORFER: Yes. She's a country girl from somewhere in Wisconsin--Middle America if you ever saw it, but terribly sophisticated. She was a close friend of my sister-in-law who is a newspaper girl. And, I don't know, Mary wandered into the headquarters and what could Mary do? She happened to mention that she was born on a farm, so we put her in charge of farmers. Have you heard this?

GREENE: No, but I remember now that her name was on that list as a coordinator.

OBERDORFER: Agricultural economics and the politics of agriculture were not originally her dish. She would sit at my desk with these big saucer eyes and listen to these suggestions of how to organize the farmers and what the issues were. And Kennedy had no agricultural position at all. I think he probably knew less about farm issues than she did. Somehow we got hold of Schnittker, I don't know how, and she arranged a secret meeting at her home on a Sunday attended by Schnittker and by Peter Edelman and somebody else. They sat around there and she served them coffee. She's got some of the most obstreperous kids that ever lived. They're real heavy and one of them has--I can't remember now whether it was a cobra or a boa constrictor. A real madhouse. And in that house on that Sunday afternoon with her providing light and air and booze, Schnittker and Edelman and whoever else was there worked out Kennedy's farm policy and speech.

GREENE: This was later on after he was actually not supposed to be doing this--Schnittker?

OBERDORFER: Well, I don't know when it was, before or after, but either way he wasn't publicizing the fact that . . .

GREENE: He was writing Kennedy's farm policy.

OBERDORFER: . . . that he was doing this. She went out into the field a couple of times. She had some in-laws out in Wisconsin. I can't reconstruct the . . . What I would say is that Mary Yates' role in this particular organization was the ultimate testimony of its amateurishness and its sweet reasonableness. You have this impression of the well-oiled, hard-eyed Kennedy machine and you see Mary Yates in charge of Farmers for Kennedy, and it really was completely disarming. The same thing with Karen Mayers and the athletes. She was a very pretty, fetching girl--not in any but the most refined sense--very, very nice, lovely person. Very cultivated, gentle, and she had this harem of forty of the best names in the athletic world. They were at her fingertips, and she marched them around the country like nothing you ever saw. It was really. . .

One of the cute incidents for Karen-- just to show you how amateurish we were. I think after the New York Times ad, Arthur Daley or some sports writer called. He'd heard about Karen Mayers, and I understood that he wanted to come in and interview her. So I called her up the night before and said, "Karen, have you ever had a press conference?" "Oh no, I haven't had a press conference." And I said, "Well, you're going to have one tomorrow. You really have never had a press conference?" She said, "No." I said, "Well, you'd better come down here and we'll have a little dry run about a press conference before the appointment."

So I sat her down at the desk and I went through my concept of what she should say. And we wrote out a little statement in case she had to make a statement. It was sort of like preparing a witness to me. This is the well-oiled Kennedy machine. Here's our manager of athletes.

And the other funny thing, I told her, "Now, you get dressed up fit to kill and knock this guy's eyes out." She came down there in a short skirt, just looking like a million dollars. I'm sitting there preparing her for this press conference and Arthur Daley called up on the phone and he says, "I can't get down there but can I talk to Mrs. Mayers over the telephone?"

GREENE: Aw, the disappointment.

OBERDORFER: So I handed her the phone and I got on the other extension. I was that nervous about what she would do. Not that she would do anything wrong, but that just an amateur, if this guy was hostile, there would be no way to protect her. I listened and I wished we had a recording of that. It really was one of the most charming conversations I ever. . . . "How did you get to be interested in athletes?" "Well, when I was a little girl, my father used to read the sports page to me." And it went on like that. And there's an Arthur Daley column. Just great.

GREENE: Speaking about this farm group that Mrs. Yates had, how did you do with farmers? I know in Oregon in at least one of those memos, it says you had some problems, but not generally?

OBERDORFER: Not that we had anything to do with it, but it was amazing how Bob did in Nebraska--I don't know about Oregon; we don't talk about Oregon.

GREENE: You don't mention that.

OBERDORFER: But he was surprised at the reception. You know, he's an outdoorsy guy, was an outdoorsy sort of fellow. To my mind, it was a function of the same phenomenon that got him some of the [George C.] Wallace vote in Gary, Indiana, that manliness, that appeal to outdoor people, people who work with their hands. I don't know whether Mary Yates really contributed anything up to that point but, by God, if we'd put that show on the road, she would have been an absolute smash hit. No question about it. You ought to talk to her if you can. Have you got time to get that deep?

GREENE: Well, so far no. So far we really have just the very top.

OBERDORFER: You want to talk to her on the phone?

GREENE: But we're hoping later to expand. We always make a note of these things people mention that would be helpful. What about Hank Dater, Tom MacBride, and Jane Suydam? Were they people that were earlier. . . .

OBERDORFER: Hank Dater was recommended to us--what's the name of the fellow who did this picture called . . .

GREENE: [William] Bill Walton.

OBERDORFER: Bill Walton! Bill Walton knew Hank Dater from somewhere and brought him in about the first day. Hank Dater had just lost his job. He had worked for IBM [International Business Machines Corporation]. I thought of him as a great--you know, we're going to put the citizens' movement on computers or something like that. We used him as sort of the administrative man. He was on a salary.

GREENE: Did he work out pretty well?

OBERDORFER: Pretty well, pretty well. Hank Dater loves life, and he found a lot of life to love in that headquarters. This report is what we hammered out of him. Here's something on that ad. He worked very hard on that.

GREENE: Yes, now, this is the businessman's ad. That's not the one that you were talking about in the beginning, is it? Wasn't that a general . . .

OBERDORFER: Well, I think that the one that we called . . .

GREENE: Because I was going to ask you about that in that it indicates that they wrote up the original ad in the headquarters and then they took it to Papert, Koenig and Lois, and they didn't like it and they worked it out with Burke Marshall to redo it. Did that eventually become the New York Times ad?

OBERDORFER: Possibly.

GREENE: Maybe they were just incorporated in with a lot of other people.

OBERDORFER: Possibly. It seems to me the New York Times ad was earlier than this. We kept trying always to get a businessmen's group but never could.

GREENE: Was [Thomas J., Jr.] Tom Watson any help? I know he had some . . . .

OBERDORFER: I don't know whether he signed that ad or not.

GREENE: I think he did. Were businessmen a problem everywhere?

OBERDORFER: Oh, yes. They were scared.

GREENE: Were all the ads written in the headquarters and then cleared through the advertising agency, or did you have other procedures?

OBERDORFER: Well, we wrote this ad and then the Papert people finally did it. We wrote some things. None of us were very good at that, really. We weren't any good at anything. Everything I did in this effort was something that I've never done before and I'm sure that's true with everybody else.

GREENE: Was there someone who had the final say on these things, or did you and Sohler . . . .

OBERDORFER: I guess Walter and I did.

GREENE: Yes, They never went to. . . .

OBERDORFER: Not on something like this. My relationship with Bob Kennedy from beginning to end was a source of constant amazement as far as I was concerned. His leadership technique, his management technique. . . . He really did not second-guess people to whom he gave responsibility.

GREENE: He just gave it.

OBERDORFER: You did it and you could get advice, you could get a feel of how it ought to go, but none of this tight management that was characteristic of other organizations.

GREENE: Were there any major bloopers in the campaign? I know there was one with, I think it was Leontyne Price, where her name went in when it shouldn't have.

OBERDORFER: Oh, yeah, that was terrible. Then we got smeared for that. We got into some argument with André Meyer about whether we should use his name.

GREENE: How did those happen?

OBERDORFER: The name that comes to mind is Hank Dater. I don't know how it happened. Somebody didn't check something, took something on faith without checking. My constant question to somebody like Dater, who would represent to me that somebody agreed to do something or something hadn't been done, was, "How do you know?" Just make him prove that it had been done or make him worry about whether they really had to put it in the spot.

GREENE: In cases like the one with Leontyne Price where you do get into hot water--it could be just lack of coordination or just a human error--are there ever any repercussions from the top, from the senator or Steve Smith or Senator Ted? How much tolerance did they have for that?

OBERDORFER: Tremendous. There are other areas where errors can be terribly damaging, but I never had any. . . . And I'm sure we made mistakes; that certainly was one of them. I think the Miller business was a bad mistake.

GREENE: Which business?

OBERDORFER: The Miller, the Irwin Miller, the overpursuit of Irwin Miller. I think we made a mistake not cultivating more assiduously people like André Meyer and Benno Schmidt, who was Bob's other friend.

GREENE: Was he approached?

OBERDORFER: Well, we should have counselled him or we should have used him or should have kept him better informed. We should have involved him, which we could have and we didn't. I'll tell you the worst thing about this operation. We

never got a black going in it.

GREENE: I know, that's in there, too. Why was that?

OBERDORFER: It was a terrible. . . . Well, I interviewed a few people. The ones we interviewed had to be paid and we didn't have any money. My own view was that during this period it was low profile business, and it was all going to be re-organized in May or June or disbanded. I just didn't have any contacts that produced a black and I knew that the political people were going to put one in there. I asked them for one or more. Sor-ensen--I kept complaining to him about it--he couldn't care less. This is something that will come later.

GREENE: What about [Earl] Graves? He was coordinator for the blacks. Did he especially do much?

OBERDORFER: Well, he really wasn't in our orbit. Graves was all over the lot. Graves had his own operation in New York. He was working up there with Bill Walton in New York. Bill had a pretty good operation going for him, in thinking it over-- I forgot about that--but he never really worked into the thing. I think he was part of the T.O.[Table of Organization] that we had.

GREENE: Well, on the list, on this, he's listed as the coordinator, I think, or the. . . . No, in fact, this is something I wanted to ask you about. He's listed as the temporary chairman of Negroes. In the temporary chairmen, you have sort of prestige names like, well, you've got in some departments, Abba Schwartz and Watson.

OBERDORFER: Watson?

GREENE: Tom Watson.

OBERDORFER: Was he something?

GREENE: Yes, coordinator of businessmen. And Jerome Wiesner, Stan Musial. And on the other hand, you have an Earl Graves who is merely a senatorial staff member. Was it because that's all you could get at the time, or was it because you were trying not to line up with any particular faction or what?

OBERDORFER: The coordinators over here on the right are the working people, the people who were in the office every day doing something. I don't know what the date of this was, but it was pretty early.



GREENE: I don't know either, and that was one of the things that was kind of confusing.

OBERDORFER: The names on the left, some of them don't mean much. Funny thing. Herman Badillo did some things; Ivan Nestigen did some things; Jerry Wiesner did some things; Tom MacBride worked like hell.

GREENE: And Tom MacBride is a staff man so that's why it's kind of confusing to me; there doesn't seem to be any pattern.

OBERDORFER: Well, he had come out of OEO [Office of Economic Opportunity] like that. Abba Schwartz, you know, he's sort of prestige guy, but he worked, too. [Robert] Bob Wald really did work. Bob had the best organization within the organization. I remember, for instance, we had to get some students in Indiana. Do you know about that episode?

GREENE: Well, it's mentioned.

OBERDORFER: And he did that. He did it. He got lawyer friends he knew around the country and pulled them together and he raised the money and he did it.

GREENE: Did anyone have to approve a project like that when you had a request to bring students in for canvassing, or did someone simply take hold and do it?

OBERDORFER: If it was money involved, Tom Johnston had to approve of the money and he did. I didn't notice till today that John Knowles was in this thing. Do you know who Doctor . . .

GREENE: That was funny because it was such a coincidence to see that name.

OBERDORFER: I never heard of him before.

GREENE: I wonder if there was any connection.

OBERDORFER: I don't know. You think that's why he got dumped because he was on this list?

GREENE: Well, if somebody revealed the fact that he was in charge of Doctors for Kennedy, it couldn't have made him very popular with [Richard] Nixon.

OBERDORFER: We had a terrible time getting doctors.

GREENE: Yes, I know that was a tough thing. What was the hostility in that?

OBERDORFER: Huh?

GREENE: Why was there so much hostility among the doctors? It doesn't seem as obvious as among businessmen.

OBERDORFER: Oh, really. Doctors are entrepreneurs and they're mechanical-minded really. There're a pretty conservative lot.

GREENE: I know you had a group of ten or twelve lawyers that was requested by Edward Kennedy to be used on quick notice somewhere. What kind of things did they end up doing? Were they the same people that went out to Indiana?

BEGIN SIDE II TAPE I

GREENE: I was asking you about Edward Kennedy's group of ten or twelve lawyers.

OBERDORFER: Well, that's what they were for. This may not be the same group, but we did have a group of lawyers working on the possibility of litigation, of challenging the delegate selection process in certain states in anticipation of the convention.

GREENE: Would that have been the people working with Ted Sorensen? I know he had a special lawyers' task force that was never explained.

OBERDORFER: I had organized a group to start on that out of the Bob Wald lawyers group. I don't know where it would've ended up. We had done some preliminary work on it.

GREENE: Did you actually get involved in any litigation or were you just beginning?

OBERDORFER: We just began to study it when the thing blew up.

GREENE: Well, what about the problems you ran into because of [Eugene J.] McCarthy's efforts? Did that make things more difficult?

OBERDORFER: You talk about mistakes. There was one paper that was put out through some group for which I had some responsibility that made a charge against McCarthy that he resented very much and was referred to over and over again as his justification for being rude and embittered in his relationship with Bob. Some distortion of his voting record was charged. I don't remember what it was now. I don't remember what my role in it was, but I remember thinking that I wished we had looked at that more carefully. I think it was something that was put out by Allard Lowenstein or some of those people, and then picked up by our group and re-circulated.

It didn't justify McCarthy's reaction. I remember sending all kinds of apologies over. For instance, one of my associates here, [Timothy B.] Tim Dyk was in the McCarthy organization. I remember calling him up and explaining to him the paper didn't emanate from us; that I was sure the senator had never seen it; that if I were starting over, I would not write exactly what that said, if I'd written it, which I didn't; and that they should not take umbrage at it. It was a mistake and I offered to take the responsibility for the mistake, but the McCarthy people just kept griping about it anyway.

GREENE: Gave them an opportunity. I know there were a lot of people switching here and there from McCarthy to Kennedy. Did you do anything to utilize these people, to perhaps loosen some more on the McCarthy side?

OBERDORFER: If we did, I don't remember.

GREENE: In one state there was a group--it wasn't called "turncoats," but it was something that amounted to that--that was made up of people who had been for McCarthy and then switched.

OBERDORFER: I don't know.

GREENE: You don't remember that? Oh, then there's a memo in there from--actually, I don't know if it's something that [R. Sargent, Jr.] Shriver discussed with someone and someone else wrote the memo or if it came directly from Shriver. Do you remember anything about that?

OBERDORFER: I saw that, too. I remember receiving it and looking at it, and looking at it as a very important piece of guidance.

GREENE: Why did he write it? Did someone ask for it or that was his. . . ?

OBERDORFER: I don't know. It came to me. I don't think this was the only copy of it. Oh, I know. He had been the original organizer of the citizens organization in 1960.

GREENE: And this was based on his experience?

OBERDORFER: That's right.

GREENE: Yes. And one of the things he says in there is that Robert Kennedy automatically has the lower- and middle-class blacks and that they should go hard for those on the right.

OBERDORFER: That's right. That's what the citizens group did in 1960.

GREENE: Yes. Did you follow that pattern pretty much?

OBERDORFER: Well, I think so, you know. We really didn't do much with the blacks. Here's a progress report from Tom MacBride about it, but actually I don't think. . . .

GREENE: And he says just what you did, that you really need a black in the front.

OBERDORFER: Yes, right, right.

GREENE: It seems like he was definitely weakest with just those groups.

OBERDORFER: What?

GREENE: Well, the more conservative, more affluent blacks. There was also some question I think, of whether blacks should be included as a separate group at all, or whether they should just be put into their proper category, sports figures or. . . .

OBERDORFER: We never knew.

GREENE: You never resolved it. Did you talk to anybody about this, besides Sorensen, that might have had some influence in bringing a black person in?

OBERDORFER: Burke.

GREENE: What was his. . . .

OBERDORFER: Well, he'd like to try to get it done.

GREENE: Yes. What about the funds? Did you raise all of your own funds or were you receiving money from the headquarters?

OBERDORFER: I never paid much attention to it. That little payroll was handled in the headquarters. We had stamps, and then somebody would pay the telephone and credit cards for airplanes and we had space and . . .

GREENE: What about materials?

OBERDORFER: . . . locally they raised their own money or the headquarters paid for it. I didn't do much about it. I was really rather irresponsible so far as the financing was concerned, except I didn't spend much money. We were very careful.

GREENE: But if you had dinners or other activities of that kind?

OBERDORFER: The only dinner we had that I know about. . . . Walter and I gave a dinner for that group at the Federal City Club during the middle of May. I couldn't be there at the last minute. He had the dinner or the cocktail party or whatever it was and I paid for it. I don't know that we did much of that really. As I say, there was some travel and there were telephones and that sort of thing.

GREENE: But you weren't actually fund raising and sending the funds into other parts of the campaign?

OBERDORFER: No, no, not yet.

GREENE: And the speakers bureau, did you have anything to do with that?

OBERDORFER: Well, I saw it there. Actually my son was in there for a while and Reuben Robertson, and I think they did a pretty good job. There's a list around of who they had, and they moved them. I think that that was going to be a very good operation. All I did was sort of know that it was there and get reports from around the country, requests for people, and funnel them in there. It began to run itself.

In an operation like this you try to get as many things started as you can. Sort of like the girl in the burlesque show that twists a tassel on one bosom and then another one and after a while, they're all going. It's that sort of starting-up process.

GREENE: Did you go out to Oregon at all?

OBERDORFER: No. Went to California, Indiana.

GREENE: Did you have any special problems in Oregon with Mrs. [Edith S.] Green?

OBERDORFER: I'm sure they did. I didn't. We were sort of walled out of Oregon. We sent somebody there; I don't remember who it was.

GREENE: B. J. Stiles?

OBERDORFER: B. J. was there, was he? By the way, he's a superlative fellow.

GREENE: He worked all over, too.

OBERDORFER: John Seigenthaler found him I think.

GREENE: The first several times I saw that name, I was sure it was a girl.

OBERDORFER: B. J.?

GREENE: It usually seems to stand for Barbara Jean.

OBERDORFER: Oh, really, I don't know what B. J. . . .

GREENE: And then someplace it said "he" and I realized it was a man.

OBERDORFER: What does B. J. stand for? I have no idea.

GREENE: I have no idea either. In Oregon another question that occurred to me had . . . First two groups that were formed were students for Robert Kennedy and academics for Robert Kennedy. Then a couple of weeks later they formed educators for Robert Kennedy. I wondered if these are just arbitrary categories?

OBERDORFER: I don't have any recollection of that.

GREENE: Did you actually get out to California at all?

OBERDORFER: I went there a couple of times.

GREENE: You did. What was the situation?

OBERDORFER: San Francisco--John Seigenthaler had things under control, and I think MacBride was in San Francisco.

GREENE: Yes, he was.

OBERDORFER: And he did a very good job. I don't know what, but Seigenthaler was very satisfied with him.

GREENE: And Zumas was in Southern California.

OBERDORFER: And Zumas was in Southern California along with two or three other fellows, and they were proliferating things very effectively. We were late getting to California but when we got there, I think we helped.

GREENE: April 27<sup>th</sup> was, I know, when Sohler was supposed to go out there for the first time with Steve Smith.

OBERDORFER: I think he did. And then I went in the middle of May.

GREENE: Was there any problem working with [Jesse M.] Unruh's people or did you just work separately?

OBERDORFER: I went out there sort of as a straw boss to what Zumas was doing, and talk to Steve and look around. Went up to San Francisco and did the same thing and came home.

GREENE: I just found that group. It's "operation changeover."

OBERDORFER: What's that?

GREENE: The people who had switched from McCarthy. It's not "turncoats."

OBERDORFER: Oh, really? I'd never heard of them.

GREENE: Yeah, it was headed by Professor Andrew Robinson who was an ex-McCarthy staffer. Were there any difficulties that you know of in coordinating what you were doing with what the political people were doing? Was there a lot of stepping on toes?

OBERDORFER: I really don't think so. It's probably because we weren't doing that much. What we were doing was so innocuous.

GREENE: How far had you actually gotten in the organization of the nonprimary states?

OBERDORFER: Well, not very far. This memorandum describes that. It says, "We've made tentative contacts with potential citizen leaders in Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, and Oklahoma," and I guess that's right. I don't have any present recollection of it.

GREENE: Then there is another one . . .

OBERDORFER: This was a very carefully written memorandum. If you notice, it doesn't overstate. I think I dictated it myself. It doesn't look like a hard sell or anything.

GREENE: Is that the May seventh?

OBERDORFER: The June third.

GREENE: Oh, no. Well, there's a previous one that you wrote, where you say that according to Dun Gifford the non-primary states should be considered. You give a priority : Kansas, Oklahoma, Michigan, Missouri, Kentucky, and Wisconsin. Then there's a later memo on May 23<sup>rd</sup> in which you list the priorities somewhat differently and some of the states, in fact, aren't even included. Was there any reason for this?

OBERDORFER: If there is, it's vanished from my memory.

GREENE: Okay. I just wondered if this had anything to do with the local delegate selection procedures or state conventions or something like that. Some of the larger delegate states weren't even included, like Ohio and Illinois, New Jersey; and then you had some small ones.

OBERDORFER: I don't . . .

GREENE: You don't remember?

OBERDORFER: I couldn't help you.

GREENE: Okay. Do you remember anything about that May 23<sup>rd</sup> memo dealing with the development of national state committees? People who . . .

OBERDORFER: <sup>A</sup>This Wagley memorandum?

GREENE: I don't remember anymore. Yes, that's probably it. Right, right. It says it's a sensitive area and everything has to be cleared with the boiler room.

OBERDORFER: Well, I think that there was some problem, yes. The boiler room was a very disciplined, tightly controlled operation. And they did get upset when they found that some of our people were calling into areas where they were maintaining contacts. I think that this was a device to dampen down the possibility of any conflict with the boiler room. We deferred to that operation. Our thing was extra. They could have done without us very nicely, but we were trying to really experiment as to whether



something like this would be useful or not. We weren't a proven political device and we just didn't try to insinuate where somebody else was doing something. That memorandum was to . . .

GREENE: Was it also to avoid things like the Irwin Millers where you're over-contacting people.

OBERDORFER: Some of that.

GREENE: What about in New York? Did you have much going in New York?

OBERDORFER: Bill Walton went up there at some point and did very well. He had a little--not a little--a big headquarters down on 42nd near Grand Central, storefront, big store, a lot of people working there, a lot of literature going out, developed a lot of contacts. There was either a convention or primary in New York scheduled for June . . .

GREENE: It was a primary, June 18th.

OBERDORFER: . . . and he was gunning for that on a much more political basis than perhaps other headquarters were. He had [John J.] Burns in there with him and [William J.] vanden Heuvel when he wasn't in Oregon. They were on their own. We didn't give them much supervision or help. I went up there a few times and talked to Walton to find out what he was doing, gave him some ideas. Again, he was much more experienced in this than I was. But that again. . . . In the next couple of weeks after California, that's where we were going to focus. I remember being up there toward the end of May and in beginning, just having conversations with Walton and Burns about how we could pour some of this talent we had into the state on a crash basis.

GREENE: Well, the only other question that I have on '68 is your personal recollections of time you spent with the senator. I don't know how much you actually got to see of him.

OBERDORFER: Very little.

GREENE: Is there anything that stands out?

OBERDORFER: I remember standing on the street corner with him in front of the hotel in Indianapolis, just before he went off on some trip, and just having a pleasant chat with him about whatever we were doing. I don't know what day that was--before the primary, I'm sure.

One thing that I think is worth getting the thread of is a conversation that I had about his personal security. At some point early in the campaign, Lew Kaden became the point of contact with the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], or whoever it was, for threatening letters and so forth. Kaden was young and green and naive, academic. He came to my house for dinner one night, and I remember saying to him, "Lew, while you have this responsibility, you better take it very seriously because there is continuing danger to a fellow like that. He's very careless about this kind of thing. You just make sure that, day and night, if you're the fellow who's the point of contact, your're in touch and know how to communicate and how to act, because you don't want to be the fellow that received the warning from the FBI and be the alibi for the FBI if something goes wrong."

Then I remember later we had some security problems at the headquarters there, and they brought in some former Secret Service people to . . .

GREENE: What kind of problems would you have?

OBERDORFER: I don't know, afraid that somebody was going to raid the place or steal files and whatnot. But I was, I'm frank to say, at that point--not originally, but by that point--conscious of the physical danger of the way that he was exposing himself, having that conversation with Kaden and with Dolan, too. And a conversation like that with Dolan worrying about who has the . . . . He was worried about the security . . .

GREENE: Did he also share this with . . .

OBERDORFER: And I think [Herbert J., Jr.] Jack Miller got into this, too, at some point.

GREENE: The attorney?

OBERDORFER: The former assistant attorney general in charge of the Criminal Division.

GREENE: Dolan was also concerned in this. Can you think of anything else on '68 that we ought to talk about?

OBERDORFER: I'm sure that what I've said is inadequate and . . .

GREENE: Well, not when it's put together with the memoranda, I don't think.

OBERDORFER: I think the memoranda are honest reflections of what we were doing and my memory. . . . I'm not senile, but this area is really very dim. I sort of feel futile about the whole thing.

GREENE: Well, I think the major questions that we had have been answered.