

**John E. Powers Oral History Interview – JFK#1, 3/09/1967**  
**Administrative Information**

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**Biographical Note**

John E. Powers (1910-1998) was the President of the Massachusetts Senate from 1946 to 1964 and a clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court of Suffolk County, Massachusetts from 1964 to 1988. This interview focuses on John F. Kennedy's [JFK] 1952 campaign for Senate, JFK's relationships with Massachusetts political figures, and Powers' friendship with the Kennedy family, among other topics.

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Oral History Interview

Of

John E. Powers

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Oral History Interview

with

JOHN E. POWERS

March 9, 1967  
Boston, Massachusetts

By John Stewart

For the John F. Kennedy Library

POWERS: I first came in contact with him through the father. And I think it establishes a pattern. Back in 1941 the father [Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr.] had ideas about son Jack [John F. Kennedy]. And the father asked me, a very aggressive and articulate fellow in the legislature, to get out of the legislature to come to work for him. And then this whole association started, though which I didn't do, because I liked politics. But this again, I'm trying to bring you into this thing here to show how I became affiliated with him, and how all of Jack's father's friends thought I was a fool for not getting out of the legislature. Since then I've had a very wonderful relationship with the father, strictly on a basis that was political that grew into a warmth of personal friendship with him, with the family.

STEWART: Well, why don't we formally start by my asking you to first describe your situation during the 1940s in terms of your position in Massachusetts politics, and how you first met either Ambassador Kennedy [Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr.] and/or John Fitzgerald [Kennedy]. I don't know, did you know the grandfather?

POWERS: Oh, sure.

STEWART: Alright. Well, could you describe how you first met them?

POWERS: Well, sure. You tell me when.

STEWART: Go ahead, that's alright. It's on.

POWERS: Well, first of all, I come from a district in the Boston area, in South Boston, that was extremely political. It's the home district of the Speaker of the House, John McCormack [John W. McCormack]. And you're interested in politics in Boston particularly during that era, even in your early teens. As a young fellow during the depression days I became more interested in politics, and aspired for the House, and was elected to the House of Representatives in 1938, taking office in 1939.

At that time Chris Herter [Christian A. Herter], former governor, former Secretary of State, was the Speaker of the House. I was one of the youngest members of the House. It was sort of a breakthrough. In order to be elected, I had to break through an organization, which I think you find in many, many cities. But, however, he took a liking to me, and as a result of that, I received in my second term in the House an assignment to the Committee on Ways and Means, which was most unusual, and also became the assistant floor leader.

And during the course of the service, knowing, of course, the name reverently of Joe Kennedy, of Mrs. [Joseph P.] Kennedy--I affectionately will refer to her in this interview as Rose, because I want to establish this kind of relationship that was established on the basis of a Rose, and Joe, and a Johnny, as I was referred to. And I certainly knew, as we all did, Honey Fitz [John F. Fitzgerald], who was the grandfather of the late President. So born out of this, and also the fact that I was representing a waterfront district--Mr. Fitzgerald at that time was a member of the old Boston Port Authority. There had been legislation giving so much money to them, and this type of thing. Mr. Kennedy appeared, and he was appointed on a commission to study the port of Boston, and had made several appearances prior to his appointment before the legislature because he had an affinitive interest to Boston.

There was a gentleman by the name of Roy Smith who was born in East Boston, was born in the same district with Joe Kennedy and knew Joe Kennedy well. He was chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means in about '43 or '44. He introduced me formally to Mr. Kennedy and said that Mr. Kennedy had asked him if he'd intercede, and would I leave the legislature and go to work for him. During the course of his appearance before the legislature on the matter of giving money for wharfs and the port of Boston, I had propounded several questions to Mr. Kennedy--I wasn't awed by his presence--by simply saying, "I'm interested in the port of Boston, as are you, but I'd like to know what were going to do with the State's money. Have you any plans?" He said, no, but he knew that they'd do the right thing. And I said, "Well, if I went to your bank, Mr. Kennedy, and looked for a construction loan, would you want to see the plans?" He said, "Yes." And I said, "This is all that I ask." Well, apparently this type of thing impressed him. And he interceded with Roy Smith and I said, no, I wasn't interested, I'd like to stay in politics. Fellows like Joe Timilty [Joseph P. Timilty], Eddie Gallagher [Edward Gallagher], who were great friends of Joe Kennedy, came to me later on and said to me, "You've made a sorry mistake not getting out of politics. This man can do so many things for you, Johnny." And I said, "Well, I just wasn't interested."

As a result of this, however, a very, very close friendship developed between myself and Joe Kennedy, close in the respect that if you can get close to him. It was a quasi-political personal friendship type of thing. So that he could always feel free that he could call me Johnny, and I could call him Joe. This type of a thing.

And then along came, of course, the advent of Jack when he was running for Congress, in which I did not take too active a part because he was not representing a district that I was representing. You always learned in Boston that you never crossed over lines. You never just came into a bailiwick that just wasn't yours. You didn't come in. If you did, you portrayed yourself as a carpetbagger. But that....

STEWART: Let me ask you a question here. Did you have any role in the 1942....

POWERS: Congressional fight?

STEWART: No. Didn't Fitzgerald run in the primary against a fellow named Casey [Joseph E. Casey], from the Senate?

POWERS: He ran for--Joe Casey. At that particular time we were more or less involved with our own campaigns and.... Well, I knew Joe Casey and I knew, as I say, the father. To have an active part.... The answer is no, not too active a part in that. Plus the fact that when Jack did run, he ran against fellows that you were serving with in the legislature like the late Mike Neville [Michael J. Neville], and you just sort of mind your own business.

Although on the 17<sup>th</sup> of March, which is the Evacuation--it's a dual celebration; 17<sup>th</sup> of March and St. Patrick's Day are celebrated in the district that I represented, which is the scene of the evacuation of the British from Boston. And there's a parade over there, and everybody vies for position in that parade because it is a good political barometer as to your acceptance because people come from all over the city. And to set up the parade, and to set it up right--you either do it right or you do it wrong. Having lived, and saw so many of them, and had something, at all, to do with it.... So that at least Jack--and I refer to the President most affectionately as Jack--I helped in setting up that parade for him so that he was with people that were well thought of within the city. But other than that, nothing.

STEWART: Was there considerable resentment around the statehouse when he ran?

POWERS: Fellows like--yes. Fellows, young fellows in politics who felt here was a fellow that, just because he happened to be the son of Joe Kennedy, he was a millionaire, he just was going to step in at the top. There was a tremendous amount of resentment because of the fact that he had not been identified actually with Boston. He never had been around Boston, and very, very few people knew Jack Kennedy. And other than it was the contacts that the father had--and everybody respected the father for what he was--and plus the fact that the old man moved out into circles where the average man getting into politics couldn't move out, this was a calculated risk. I don't think that Jack Kennedy had ever spent too much time in the North End or the South End or the West End or Cambridge, those areas, other than going probably to Harvard, but not with the people. So in answer to the question, I would honestly say there was resentment to the people that thought that this fellow should run for local office rather than start in for a shot at Congress. But however, he did run and he won. And from then on he broke the ice, and he no longer was

regarded as an upstart, political upstart. He had been there. And so this kind of friendship developed over the years, but that was the very beginning of it.

Now along came 1948. You're jumping a few years, but I think at that particular time I managed the campaign of a fellow who was a governor of the Commonwealth, named Paul Dever [Paul A. Dever]. And Paul Dever was running against Bob Bradford [Robert F. Bradford]. Paul Dever defeated Bradford because we had organized the city quite well. It was the first time the city actually had been organized, and it has never been organized the way that it was then. And in that respect Jack Kennedy came in and helped Paul Dever too. Being the manager of the campaign, I got thrown into closer contact with Jack Kennedy. And he knew that we had, certainly had an organization.

Now in that position, 1948, we take the legislature of the Democratic Party for the first time in its entire history. We come to 20-20 in the Senate. We're a gerrymandered state. Even now people could never understand that this was only a recent turnover because they look to Massachusetts as the Democratic Kennedy state. It may have been in the minds of people, but it was so set up because gerrymandering was just born within this state because Governor Gerry [Elbridge Gerry] was the one who set it up. That's where the beginning of the word gerrymandering came from. And it was just impossible, but we did make a breakthrough because we worked hard. Everybody worked hard and contributed towards it. Now we come in after the two terms of Dever. They're aggressive terms. They're terms in which many things that had to be done and were done, but expenses were up, and however, now we find a United States senator, Henry Cabot Lodge, coming into the fight in '52. Dever's going to run for a third term. He's going to have as his opponent Chris Herter. Chris Herter, of course, was a former speaker of the House, is a representative here locally. He was a congressman here, which took in probably half of the city in his congressional district. He presented a different kind of a candidate than did either Bob Bradford, who came from Cambridge, or an Arthur Coolidge [Arthur W. Coolidge], who came from outside of Boston. So the same time Jack Kennedy's going to run for the United States Senate.

I had more or less of a slight political falling-out with Paul Dever, because I looked for a position as the clerk of the Boston Municipal Court, and at that particular time Paul Dever took a fellow who was a treasurer by the name of John Hurley [John E. Hurley], took him out of that position and gave him the job in order to entice from Washington a congressman by the name of Foster Furcolo [John Foster Furcolo], who he brought down here and put him in the position as the treasurer, the vacancy having occurred when the legislature was out of session. Under our constitution the governor makes the appointment.

And this is setting the pattern towards Foster Furcolo, towards Paul Dever, and towards Jack Kennedy, because somewhere along the line there was created some kind of a feeling between the young Congressman from Boston, Jack Kennedy, and Foster Furcolo, from the western part of the state, kind of political disagreement that never quite seemed to erase itself. And the reason that I bring it up is because later on in the lives of these two individuals they come together. The question involves around Larry O'Brien [Lawrence F. O'Brien], and you can ask Larry about this. He can better fill in this part about it. We all made projections on it. There was some story about the fact that Larry O'Brien was a partner of Foster Furcolo, along with Eddie Boland [Edward P. Boland] in the photographers business back in the western part of the state. Subsequently when Foster went to Congress, Larry became the secretary to Jack Kennedy. Whether or not this caused the breach is

something that I do not know. And if Larry wants this part of it taken out, I would suggest that it be taken out. But I would like to preserve what my own knowledge is very reverently towards Jack Kennedy because this comes into a very important part of my entrance and affiliation with the President.

So now we have a Foster Furcolo as the treasurer; we have a Paul Dever as the governor. We have Jack Kennedy running. The father sends for me. Because of this disagreement I had with Dever, the father sends for me and he says, "Johnny, I want you to manage Jack's campaign in Suffolk County. This is where the votes are." This is where you were dealing with several hundred thousand votes, in Suffolk County, which took in all of Boston, the city of Revere, the city of Chelsea, and the town of Winthrop. And I agreed to do it. He said that he would talk with Paul Dever, and I simply said that I'm a free agent to do anything that I so desire to do.

Paul Dever then sent for me. We weren't unfriendly, but I felt that the rules of the game--and I played this according to the rules of the game--that the campaign director of the governor of this Commonwealth could always name anything he wants. I was not an attorney; so the attorneys weren't worried that I ever was going to be a judge. But that job would have allowed me, as I saw it, to go in and to go to law school. I didn't get it. I felt that I had a right to ask for it. Any other governor of this Commonwealth from years back, the director in Suffolk County named what he wanted. Okay. Paul Dever objected. He said, "I don't want--don't do it." He said, "I want you to manage my campaign, and I'm sorry what happened." That type of thing.

So it was agreed anyways that I would manage both campaigns. This has never been done since or never had been done before. The agreement was made that the expense of the campaign would be shared equally by Dever and by the Kennedy forces, that Bobby [Robert F. Kennedy] would be the emissary for Jack, and that I would be acting for both of them, and that Paul Dever would invariably send a George McMahon or somebody else or a John Fox who would act for him. No, there wasn't any terrific cleavage between the Kennedys and the Devers; they were two entirely different schools of politics. Paul Dever represented the old entrenched, philosophic Democrats, who were looking at bread and butter issues, who came up through the channels, who were attached with the organization as it were. The organization is a personal organization here in Massachusetts. We're not now, we never were a controlled state. Many people think so, but it isn't so. And then, on the other hand, Jack had the attraction of being of the young people who were moving into this impossible type of a society called politics. And there was this kind of a clash between them. And to sit in judgment, to bring the pair of them together, so that we all worked for the common purpose was a rather difficult thing to do--but it worked out alright--because Bobby was extremely pugnacious, he was the fighter of the family. It was set up that way that if they had a fight the father said Bobby was the fellow to send for. Joe [Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr.] as you know was to be the politician, and Jack was supposed to be the studious fellow. This was the plan apparently in the father's mind as the father had told me time and time again.

Bobby was the fighter. And many times during the course of these campaigns we found Bobby clashing with people who were the entrenched politicians. I recall quite vividly the meeting in which Bobby and his group attended with our group in which he came to issue with a fellow who is now presiding judge, Judge Thomas Lanahan of the South Boston Court, because Bobby had made some reference to his brother Jack, "He isn't a politician."

And sincerely he meant it. And Tommy, who had been a former city council and member of the House, took umbrage to it, and they were both young. They were both aggressive, and.... Well, there was just no physical clash, only it came very close to it. I told you the story because I think that it's going to depict for you, John, this whole process of Boston, the entrance, how this whole thing came about.

Now we come in into the throws of this campaign and we're finding that this Herter is making some real ground gains because we're running against a fellow who was affiliated in Boston. And we're not going to carry this city by the three or four hundred thousand votes that we carried it before, and this is going to endanger Jack. The question is: Is Jack going to go on a solo, is Dever going to go on a solo? You had many, many things here that you had to confront with. It appeared that the strength of Kennedy in Boston was the strength of the Dever organization because Kennedy had no organization other than the loyal friends, but a political organization, no.

We then conceived upon an idea which I had developed, and this was mass assault in areas--taking all of the opinion formers, if they were judges, if they were officeholders, or clean-cut people, who you got together and trained then as a political Fullerbrush man who went door to door and this type of thing, making good presentations selling Dever. "It worked for us in '48, and it worked again in '50. Let's do the same kind of a thing in 1952." The question came, the Kennedy forces wanted to deliver a brochure alone for Jack to the exclusion of Dever. This type of thing you were running into. You blame not them because they were more interested in Jack than they were in Paul Dever. However, we did make this mass assault, but in going around you got a sense of this personal confrontation. And we all did it, including myself. This wasn't a question of all chiefs and no Indians. Everybody worked in this type of a thing.

And as you got around--by then they're running strong, but now Henry Cabot Lodge who has been more interested in Dwight Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower], now apparently finds out things aren't good, and he came back. Now Lodge was an extremely good looking candidate, very popular fellow here in the city of Boston. As a matter of fact, he previously carried Boston against United States Senator David I. Walsh, which is almost an impossibility to carry the city up until that time. Now apparently he gets the impression--it's true--that Kennedy was getting just a little bit too strong. So he now leaves the entourage of Eisenhower and now he starts to come back to personally campaign.

And as he did, within a period of two weeks this whole fight seemed to shift, and Jack was running much weaker than he was, which occasioned me, as I saw it sitting on the top of it, to call the father and say, "I'd like to talk with you." And he said, "Come down." And I said to him at that particular time when I met him down--he had an apartment down at Beacon Street, right next to the Engineers Club. I said, "Joe, I don't like the thing the way that I'm going, and as I see it going, because I'm around every night ringing door bells, I'm meeting people and Jack's fight is slipping. I think Dever's fight is alright, but I think Jack is slipping. And we've got to do something in order to offset Henry Cabot Lodge's surge." And he said, "What do you suggest?" And I said, "I would like very much to have you give to me Mrs. Kennedy." He said, "For what purpose?" Well, I said, "We have lined up nine and ten speaking engagements every single night. And I'm inclined to think that she can now lift this campaign up tremendously because...." And he said, "But she's a grandmother, Johnny." I said, "I know, but my wife, or I'll have some girl come along. We'll take good care of her.

She'll be in my hands, and worry not about her. But I think this is what you need, because I think that she's going to give to this kind of a campaign the type of impetus that it needs." He said, "In what respect?" I said, "Well, after all you've got to take into consideration that here is a very fine looking woman, a Bostoner, with twelve children, who's the wife of an ambassador, who's the daughter of a former congressman, who's the daughter of a mayor, who's the mother of a congressman and a candidate for the United States Senate, who's got everything and all the charm, who understands politics who also," I said, "is a gold star mother. Now," I said, "not only once, but your daughter, your son, her son in-law, you know, they've all as a result of this effort--people are concerned with the Korean War and all that type of thing, and I think that she could do this, this job." He said, "Johnny, she isn't young." He said, "Your kind of an aggressive campaign will wear this woman down." He said, "And I, it would be unfair for me," he said, "for me to even suggest it." He said, "Unless you insist, and then let me have a talk with her and you talk with her."

And it was arranged. He talked with her. He talked with Jack himself. I assume that they talked with the members of the family. This is purely an assumption other than I do know that Jack talked to me about it. And then I sat down with Mrs. Kennedy and with her husband, with Joe Kennedy, and outlined for him and for her what I intended to do. She would ride with me in my car. I would pick her up every night. I would have the arrangements all made. She would be adequately protected so that nobody was going to push her around. I would make the entrance speech which was strictly Boston, political type of campaign speech, and then I would present her. Then she would come on and say that this was something of a different kind of a role for her to play, but that she did want them to know that she had as much concern for the future as did they; that certainly she had been the victim of these mysterious visitations that are brought on by war, having lost a son and daughter and son-in-law; and that she felt certain that the Jack Kennedy that she had born would do everything that he possibly could to bring the boys back, their sons or their daughters. This type of thing.

Now as we started the first meeting would probably be into her, oh, her father's bailiwick down here in the North End. It might be an abandoned store that you set up as a headquarters. And I would go in, and she would go in. And her attire would be a very simple type of attire. She would change the outer appearances in the back of my car. When I say outer appearances, I mean she would wear a dress upon which she could throw an outside skirt. She would throw on just a very, very simple kind of a neck piece, or a coat. She would put on a very, very simple hat. There was no glare of, what you might say, of wealth or splendor. Very, very simple. And she adjusted herself physically to whatever we were going to make.

STEWART: Did anyone write her speeches for her?

POWERS: Nobody wrote anything. She just went in with a plain presentation, nothing prepared. Very, very short and simple after I would bring about, I hoped--try to arouse this tremendous interest which you can do in this kind of a campaign. The next place we would go to would be a style show and off would come this

wraparound skirt, if it might be. A mink stole would go on; a stylish hat would go on. This transformation took place for several weeks to nine, ten as many as twelve appearances a night. This clicked this campaign.

Now along with that, along with that, we're out ringing door bells, to which she came and the daughters came. And you'd knock the door and say, "Meet the mother of the candidate for the United States Senate. This is Rose Kennedy." "Oh, how do you do, Mrs. Kennedy?" By then, of course, there had been much publicity, great publicity, attached to what she was doing, so that people were just opening their hearts and their home to her.

And this really sparked this whole campaign, and this turned the campaign around so that what she was doing--and she was not speaking just for Jack alone. She spoke for the Democratic Party. This brought the whole fight up. So by the time now Jack came back here into Boston when they started to make these coffees with Kennedy, she was a seasoned performer because she had all these dry runs. She could adjust, and there was nothing.... She spoke enough Italian, she spoke enough French that she really--this woman was absolutely marvelous. She never tired. She was just as fresh at the end of this campaign, and Jack used to kid me about me squiring his mother around the town. But everybody knew that this was the thing--well this is a little bit braggadocio; I don't mean that. But I'd say of any one thing, if any one thing turned this campaign, as I see it--and I can be as wrong as rain, but I have never known anybody to refute what I'm saying now--if anything changed this whole campaign and this whole emergence of a Jack Kennedy, this was it. This was a family endeavor and they worked, the girls, Bobby, everyone. Ted [Edward M. Kennedy], of course, no. I think Ted was in Europe at that time. Ted was not around. But this, I think, was the one thing that really brought about this campaign.

Now if you look at the figures in Suffolk County, you will see an amazing phenomena of politics--this kind of a campaign, this duality of campaigns in which both candidates only ran about 197 votes off of each other in the casting of probably close to 750,000 votes. Now, on the other hand, Jack won; Dever lost. They run this close together in Suffolk County, but they come down into Bristol County and into New Bedford and Jack carries the city by 22,000, Dever carries it by ten, and Dever loses the fight by twelve. This shows you what it meant to run, because again, I think that there was--Dever was one of the greatest governors that this Commonwealth ever did have, or ever will have, and yet I think that the whole atmosphere of politics in Massachusetts was changing somewhat, that there was some type of resentment against the old, entrenched politician who looked like the politician as against somebody fresh and new who had this kind, who could make this kind of a television appearance that Jack was making.

STEWART: How strong was the resentment among Curley's [James M. Curley] people toward Kennedy because of his refusal to sign the clemency petition?

POWERS: Well, I think that you find people invariably build this thing up. The old pols might have resented it, but it wasn't resented too much. I think that, again, that this is something that is probably overstated. I think that my good friend John McCormack may have been a little bit dismayed about it because of the fact that here he had been in Congress so long. Curley was a legend here in Massachusetts. And let me say for the record here, for whatever it amounts to, that Curley opened the door for many of us. He

had to make the fight when you had to make a fight, and if he had some shortcomings, I think, that you have to weigh that against the overall picture of the atmosphere of the times, of the inheritances, of the clash between races, of the clash between classes, of the emergence of the new generation, this type of thing.

And so there was a feeling for Curley, a very, very warm feeling, a feeling because he was somebody--say what you want about him--he just had a personal compassion for people and he understood people. I don't think that that ever hurt Jack Kennedy as much as some people would think. Among the old pols, as I say, at the very beginning they regarded him more or less as an upstart. But in all of these fights, here I was just a youngster in the game who found myself in managerial position. I could command the appearance of Curley, and Curley would show up. Curley was a team player and I know because I was the last one in politics to defeat Curley for mayor of Boston, and the day after I defeated him, he was right in there pitching because he could rock and roll. I mean, Curley was one fellow who--and from him, I guess, we got the philosophy that if you don't know how to lose, you have no right to win. Curley would never let you resent. Personally, he might have felt bad about this type of thing, but it never really bothered him. I have never, in all of my friendship with Curley, have never once--and I say it honestly--heard Curley ever said anything derogatory about Jack Kennedy.

STEWART: Were you at all involved in the successful attempt to get the endorsement of the *Boston Post* in 1952?

POWERS: No. I had absolutely nothing at all to do with that. That was when John Fox was the....

STEWART: Yes.

POWERS: No. I mean, I knew many of the things that happened in the legislature. Fox had come in and there were many things he was trying to do for the mercantile interest here. That was my only exposure. I thought that they were good things to do anyways for the economy. The *Boston Post*, reverently do the people of Boston look upon it, not as any kind of a speculative type of publication, but it was a way of life with the people in Boston and everybody had this kind of an affection for it. Even today the *Boston Post* is missed. Other than I know what happened from the lips of the people who were involved. I in no way was involved.

STEWART: Was there any kind of a conscious attempt to avoid publicizing Ambassador Kennedy's role in the campaign?

POWERS: I think that there was no organized--you just couldn't hide it in Boston because what he did.... I think that Jack naturally went out and did it for himself because Jack worked in a campaign, that one thing that you'd have to say. But the father did not want to overshadow because I think this could have had a deleterious effect. But what he did he did most effectively, thanks to Graham Bell [Alexander Graham Bell], on the telephone. He could contact people who were in the high echelon of

opinion formers. He could command the type of thing and do it much more effectively over the telephone than he might be able to do it openly. He never showed. I never knew of a single appearance of the father in the whole campaign. But he was active, let there be no mistake. If you had a son, I think that you would do that exactly. There's no resentment; there never was any resentment.

It was a try to be developed about his role as the ambassador and whether or not he looked towards war as he should have looked about it, as events proved otherwise, or whether or not there were letters sent in which he felt that we should not enter the war, whether or not he had done things that he probably shouldn't have done, people who liked Roosevelt [Franklin D. Roosevelt], and this type of thing. But that didn't become an issue. Joe Kennedy was lost in this kind of a campaign, and Jack had made this kind of an impact.

But where did it come from? Where did all of this favorable comment? Was the father behind it? Did the father pull strings? Did the father know people? I think that probably that had something honestly to do with it. I think he played an extremely important part. I think that way, way back he had a plan for every member of his family. I think that he had a well organized plan, and I think that he was anything but a frustrated father who did everything he possibly could. This sort of master plan that he might have called in order to bring it about.

STEWART: You mentioned before, at the start of this thing, you as head of both the Dever and Kennedy campaigns in Boston, that there would be a split in expenditures. Did this present any real problems? Did it work out that way at all?

POWERS: Well, it worked out so--this is the first time I tell this story--I was sued as the campaign director by one who had rendered services, who was a sign painter, for Jack Kennedy and for Paul Dever. There was a bill of twenty-five hundred dollars which--I thought this fellow was doing it, honestly as a campaign worker, and he brought suit against me. I ultimately settled that bill for a thousand dollars. Didn't say anything about it. You just settle it. But Paul Dever told me later on--and I don't like to bring statements in of people who have passed away--but they had some difficulties with relation to.... But I think that all the commitments eventually were met. Paul Dever didn't get along too readily with Bobby. But he got along handsomely with the father. They were two.... Joe Kennedy was in many, many ways, a Paul Dever. He was a pro, as we would say. And if he made a commitment, he lived up to the commitment. Now there may have been variations in order to arrive at to what extent that commitment went, but I believe, because all the deficits were wiped out, that he held up his end of it.

I might say, in this respect, because you came back to it a little bit, that one of the interesting stories that has never been told--Maurice Tobin [Maurice J. Tobin] appointed Joe Kennedy as the chairman of the committee to bring about the creation of a Department of Commerce in Massachusetts. And, again, I was thrown in as a member of that committee, assigned from the Committee on Ways and Means to make sure that the state's money wasn't being erroneously squandered into that commission. And in the course of it, we talked once in which he said, "You know, Johnny, I never knew Maurice Tobin. I never knew Maurice Tobin who was our governor, who was our mayor, then our governor, and became Secretary of Labor," he said, "until he appointed me the chairman of this committee." He said, "In all

of the years since I've known him, I've asked him just for one thing, and that was not to," and I grant until I get it clear, "not to appoint my father-in-law as a member of the Boston Port Authority, but," he said, "he did it." And I think he probably felt that this was too much activity for the father, who then was along in years. And I knew him quite well, as we all did, but I think that it wasn't because he didn't have affection for him, but he just felt that, if he had that kind of a job and he threw in the enthusiasm that he had for anything that he did, that it would be too much for him. I think this is what he was trying to tell Maurice Tobin. But it's rather ironic that the only thing he asked him to do was not to do something which ultimately he did. But from that day on then developed, from that time on, this close, real close friendship for myself and Jack Kennedy.

STEWART: Before you move on, can I ask you just....

POWERS: No. I want to say that in that campaign we had John Hynes [John B. Hynes, Jr.], who was the Mayor of Boston. In order to be the mayor of Boston, particularly then--John was a little bit different than Curley. He was a consolidating type of an individual. Curley was a Democrat first, last, and always. John Hynes had a different theory and that was the theory to bring about this Republican vote in Boston and the independent vote. He wasn't the strong outspoken Democrat, and I think that we all would agree. I ran out against him too, and there's nothing personal in what I say because he's a good friend of mine. But in this particular instance there were people in his office who weren't doing for the Democratic candidate what they should be doing. The day after Jack Kennedy was elected to the United States Senate, he visited me in my office to thank me. I could look from my office in the statehouse, where I was the Democratic floor leader directly across to 22 Boudin Street. And when Jack was from Congress, or home, he would call me, or, knowing he was there, I would call him, and we would talk to each other on the telephone while we were looking across at each other, because you could look directly down. He visited me to thank me, as I have said, but also to say that he was deeply hurt to think that the efforts of the Mayor of Boston weren't as extended as they should have been.

Again to become the Devil's advocate relative to John Hynes, probably he felt that he did not want to alienate others who were independent or Republicans who may have been tied in with Cabot Lodge. But there was a lot of activity out of his office for Lodge which was resented a little bit. And this comes into another story later on in Jack Kennedy's life with relation to John Hynes.

STEWART: Just to back up a little bit. Was there ever any question that Dever would run for a third term? Did he seriously consider running, himself, for the Senate, to your knowledge?

POWERS: To my knowledge, the answer there was no. Dever was a realist. And while there may have been talk, Dever would have liked to go to the United States Senate, but Dever in his wildest imagination never felt that he could defeat Henry Cabot Lodge. While he would have liked to think about it, I don't think that politically, as I say, that there never was a more profound political realist than there was a Paul Dever.

STEWART: Was the reason....

POWERS: There were people around him that felt that probably this is the area in which he should move because he was erudite, he was intelligent, he had.... Paul Dever, as I say that, was a good governor, but other than the fact that, any more than I can probably portray myself to be six feet tall when I'm not, he just couldn't portray himself anything but the politician that he was from the House of Representatives; the controversial Dever; the attorney general; into being defeated for the Lieutenant Governor, running as he did with Maurice Tobin; and then to find himself--there was prior to that, of course, he and Tobin were going to run against each other for the Democratic nomination for governor, and Truman [Harry S. Truman] stepped in and gave to Maurice, made him the Secretary, which took him out of that fight. But at no time.... Dever had great contacts in Washington, and everybody had a great affection for him because during the war he had developed a lot of friends because he had set up this absentee voting system while he was in the service. He may have to people who were more friendly with him than I, but never did he once express to me a desire to run against Lodge for the Senate, although there were people who were moving to have him do it. And we could not afford to run anybody else for governor, because nobody else could have won.

And so I think Dever--and then again Dever, he would've just as soon get out of politics, because he felt that this illness that had plagued his whole family--he knew his own physical condition....[BEGIN SIDE TWO, TAPE ONE]....strong fellow. He had this heart condition which very few of us--I certainly knew nothing about this heart condition that he had, but every member of his family has been wiped out as a result of it. And I think that he suspected that. This other area, however, what his intentions might have been, I think fellows like John Fox, who was a secretary, or Judge Parquette [Wilfred Parquette], people like that who were close enough to him, who were the contemporaries within his age limit, might be able to discuss that much better. But your answer directly is no.

STEWART: No one else seriously considered running for the Senate, did they? What I'm asking: Kennedy had no real opposition for the nomination?

POWERS: There may have been others around, but Dever was the kind of fellow to clean a fight. He would call you in and say, "Look, the party means something." Now in this fight, again, you had the situation of--again, bring back into the picture the Foster Furcolo. Dever knew that there was a great impetus and a great voting strength of the Italian-American. And again, when he brought Foster Furcolo in here, we had to sort of clean this fight. Everybody felt at that particular time they were run on--there were no conventions; there were run-off primaries. And if one Irishman, or somebody with an Irish name, got a fellow by the name of Foster Furcolo, there'd be just no contest. They wouldn't count them. They wouldn't weigh them. I mean Furcolo never could survive even though there was this great concentration of Italian vote. So Dever set up a field in which there were some candidates put in there for the purpose of confusing, and ultimately he won. And there again, there was this feeling between Jack--it didn't break out into the open until a few years

later on at a TV station, which you probably know about. But it breaks out a couple of times during the course of my talk with you. I'll tell you about it.

STEWART: Okay. Why don't we move on then to your contacts with Senator Kennedy in the early 1950s. Were people around the statehouse generally satisfied with his performance as a senator? What contacts did you have with him?

POWERS: Jack Kennedy, as a United States senator, did all of the things that he was supposed to do as far as his personal appeal was concerned. He was a most popular fellow. There wasn't a fellow in that House or that Senate who didn't want Jack Kennedy in his district speaking for him. And in trying to capture this Democratic Senate and setting up....[Interruption, phone rings].... He said openly that anything he could do for the Democratic Party, he would do. And as an example, we set up something new that never had been tried; we set up eighteen rallies from the western part of the state right to the Cape [Cod] in one single day. I set them up during which time he went into every--all of these districts we set up through the state police, the local police. We were convoyed from one town to the other so that from 7 o'clock in the morning until 10 o'clock at night I don't think we were ten minutes off in the last rally. And this was a long--in which he went into every single one of their districts and spoke as a Democrat. Crowds were waiting there. And I think this is probably one of the reasons why ultimately we got a Democratic Senate.

So whatever resentment there was to the fact that this fellow started more or less at the top, this certainly was dissipated as the years went along. And I have pictures to show you; members of the House and the Senate were all, we were all invited down to his place at the Cape with Mrs. Kennedy [Jacqueline B. Kennedy] when he first got married to her. If you wrote to him you always got an answer, or you got a personal telephone call from him. He did all of the things he should've done, that is, as with the relationship of a local pol to the United States Senate. Those areas of decision that he made at the top were areas that were matters of conscience with him. Whether the St. Lawrence Riverway Development was going to hurt the city of Boston, hurt the Longshoremen, as again this was publicized that this hurt him in certain areas, he felt that this was something for the general good of and defense of the United States in its entirety, in its entirety, and this is how he voted. He did this many, many times. He did that which he thought may not be politically popular but which was morally and which was sound. And this type of a decision is his, whoever the individual might be. People knew better, people knew better than to try to tell a Jack Kennedy how they thought he should vote. This was his. You never interfered. This is an area in which he grapples with his own future and with his own conscience. But as far as the relationship was concerned, there never was a better relationship between anybody as there was between Jack, and Democrats and Republicans alike, see. He just grew on you. He just grew on you, John.

STEWART: Do you recall many contacts with either him or his office on substantive things, such as the St. Lawrence Seaway, during the early '50s?

POWERS: Any more than as the president of the Senate that a Jack Kennedy would call me and ask me to vote one way or another on a matter of state legislation, I

would not be that presumptuous. And I tried awfully hard and quite successfully in never sending down to Washington these resolutions that are conceived out of a legislature because somebody wants to get some local kind of promotion and they wind up, as you know, in the Congressional Record. I felt with a leader down there, with a John McCormack in the position of leadership and with a Jack Kennedy moving as he was, you know, and without congressmen, they would do--they had a regard for Massachusetts. And with a Joe Martin [Joseph W. Martin, Jr.]. Who are we to send things down? And the answer to that, never once did I interfere, would I be that presumptuous to even send him a letter. When people would say, "Would you send him a letter?" Never would I do it. And never would he do it to me.

He might call up and say that so-and-so is interested, as he did. Dave Powers [David F. Powers], when he was a young congressman or just went into the Senate, you know, do something for Dave, which was under Dever. I was very happy and did it because they were that close. But this type of thing, "Will you do something for so-and-so? If you can, will you do it?" Invariably this was a must. But that kind of official contact, that kind of bolstering him up in decisions, that kind of telling him what--no, I mean, my answer to that was no. The only thing that I would discuss with him were those things that were political, that I felt that as a friend I could discuss with him, and he could ask me about those things political. And this is the kind of relationship that would develop, that was strictly personal-political friendship of the highest degree. But as far as establishing any opinion or any policy, the answer to that was no.

STEWART: Could you describe your goal in the 1956 Democratic Committee chairman fight?

POWERS: That was a most important role, and I think that this was the real emergence of Jack in trying to bring together the party. Bill Burke [William H. Burke, Jr.] was a nice enough fellow, was a friend of John W. McCormack, and was controlled wholly by John McCormack. And Bill Burke, as chairman of the Democratic State Committee, operated that just as a subsidiary to John McCormack's Office. And it didn't mean too much. As a matter of fact, it meant very, very little. Again, I said that in the beginning we were not an organized state, that we were fragmented, and everybody was running on a solo. In all of the years that I was up in the legislature never once did a Democratic state committeeman ever have the presumption or the gaul to ever want to come into a caucus or ever ask to come in. We didn't have any state conventions at that time. The only time that they would function, that would be during the time of setting up slates for national committeemen.

It appeared in talking with the then junior Senator that, if we were ever to become a cohesive group, if we were ever to go to a convention meaningfully, without going off on a million different angles, we better get somebody who was going to take a good look at it. And I personally was most dissatisfied with Bill Burke, not as an individual--I have the highest regard for him--but I think that he just wasn't allowing any independent expression, he was not developing any new ideas as far as the party was concerned, and that it would be better to make a change. And so Jack agreed with me. He probably had ideas--I don't know--but I said I'm going to openly criticize Bill Burke for his actions, and I'm going to call for a

change. Coming from a Democratic Senate leader, this will appear in the press on a Friday. If you feel the same as I, I think that you should follow it up on a Monday. And this happened. I said some things that were not personal, but I think that in trying to develop towards the consideration of the members of the party and the Democratic Committee that we should make a change. And then the following Monday in the paper Jack Kennedy agreed with me. And that became this intramural fight within the party itself.

It got quite heated and it appeared to be that there might have been a conflict between Jack Kennedy and John McCormack. John McCormack, as you know, is intensely loyal to these things he believed and particularly to his friends, and lived in my own district, and you had to come make the decision between Jack, the party, as you saw it, with this new emergence, this new look, against the entrenchment of a Burke. And then the campaign began on a personal campaign, and it got quite heated. But as a result of it a Bill Burke was deposed, and in came the beginning of a Pat Lynch [John M. Lynch], who was a former mayor of the city of Somerville, and then along came the Gerry Doherty [Gerard F. Doherty]. But I was in the middle of that fight from the very beginning.

STEWART: Did most people recognize this factor that you mentioned of wanting to build up a strong cohesive unit to go to national conventions with some strength?

POWERS: Well, we felt this way about it: Your whole delegates-at-large, the whole setup being made without any kind of an expression and in order to function just every four years was of no value. Again, this party should be built up with some kind of expression from grass roots other than from elected officials. We had to bring in some new blood, new interest. This was the reason for it. One hand was going to wash the other in whatever the ultimate gains were to be made, but the Massachusetts wasn't going to mean anything unless you did that. Now there was a feeling, again, with--Dever had no feeling, I know, as a question of Bill Burke, that was for sure. So Jack had the feeling generally of the people that say "We're not satisfied with the majority of what's going on now. Let's make some change. Any change would be for the better. We're going to build up this party." And this was the beginning of getting more people. And Jack had to do this, as I saw it then, as I see it now. And I told him, if he ever was ever going to emerge as any kind of a leader, that he had to get his feet wet in the first political fight within the party. And if he did it, then he had to give it his all out effort, and that once he did it there was no backing away from it. Once Jack Kennedy did something, or gave you his word, then this was it. This was the plan, and he did everything that he was supposed to do.

And I think that by doing it he recognized that it wasn't a selfish motivation as much as it was the motivation of a group of people that needed some articulate expressor and needed some strength at the top to offset the strength that you had with a John McCormack--who was extremely potent, let there be no mistake. And again, in no derogation, because this guy is, this man is great. I say this honestly and I will prove to you, and I hope to be able to debunk many of the things that people said happened in the Convention between John McCormack and Jack Kennedy--haven't been there--and then have the latest meeting, that I know of, between John McCormack and Jack Kennedy. It was the 22<sup>nd</sup> of October in '63 here, in which I was a part of it. For the first time I will tell it.

STEWART: Why don't we move on then to the '56 Convention. You were there?

POWERS: I was there in the '56 Convention. We went there with Dever, who had a great affinity for Adlai Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson]. Dever was more or less of an intellect, and he thought there was just nobody like an Adlai Stevenson. And I had met him early and to which he had no--he just left me a little bit cold on my first meeting with him, but after you got to know him you felt the same, as intense, about him as did a Paul Dever. But we went there for the purpose of trying to bring all of New England as a voting block. This again was the idea of a Jack Kennedy and particularly a Paul Dever, with fellows like Denny Roberts [Dennis J. Roberts] moving in, who felt that we could then offset ourselves with the Ohios, the Pennsylvanias, the Californias, the Illinios, if we vote as a block. And this is exactly what happened. And the question was then to go along with Stevenson, but prior to that we had moved along with him in '52 as a holding type of an operation. And I seconded the nomination for Paul Dever as President of the United States only for the purpose of getting in a favorite son candidate so that when the time came we could then move to Stevenson, which proved to be successful. In '56 we were holding again for Stevenson, more or less pledged to go out there and vote for him.

And now along came--the most interesting part of the whole thing is the fight. There were very few people that thought that Jack was quieting down the fight for vice president, but at that particular time, during the time we got the nomination of Stevenson, we had a meeting with Jack in which the Speaker of the House here in Massachusetts, a fellow by the name of Mike Skerry [Michael F. Skerry] and many of us--and I urged the meeting--to find out then whether or not this was going to be just a lesson in futility, or an effort in futility, to go around promoting him as the vice president if he wasn't going to be a candidate. We had a meeting, behind the stockyards, and Bobby was there. At the particular time I said, I was the spokesman and said, "Jack, look we're out here for a purpose, but if you're in this thing let's know about it. I mean, this is unfair to be coy about this thing, and if you're moving without us knowing about it--we're out here working. If you're just going to pull the rug out from underneath us.... Don't do it. Let us know. If you are, we want to know it. If you're not, tell us. And if you are, then look, let's make a decent effort. Let's get something together and start to move on this thing." He finally said, well, he didn't know what Stevenson felt about it. And I simply said, "Well, as far as I'm concerned, if Stevenson agrees, if he's the nominee, that he will let this truly be a Democratic Convention, we will not interfere. I don't mind voting for Stevenson, be glad to do it. But if he's going to interfere with him, I can vote for somebody else. And I think we all feel this way about it. I don't want to be.... While it may be true that the president has a right, let's just have an open Democratic Convention. I think it's good for the people of the country and certainly I think in this respect, if he isn't going to name somebody, your chances are going to be better. And let's have that understanding.

That understanding was made. I was present when Stevenson said that if he was the nominee, then he would not interfere one iota with the naming of a vice president. From that time on--we had gone out there, we had many, many things to bring out there, all paid for by a lad in the Senate who was the mayor of the city of Quincy by the name of Andrew Quigley, who I think was the original promoter of the idea at least. There was so much resentment because we had a Democratic dinner in Boston a month or so before the Convention to which

he had put "Massachusetts Presents Kennedy for Vice President," put it on everybody's table, and Jack resented it very, very much. But this was an honest opinion of this young fellow, who was politically schooled and as erudite as anybody that you would want. But he paid for them, he had brought out to Chicago with him probably a hundred thousand buttons: "New England Proudly Presents Kennedy."

And when we started this campaign, once we got the agreement that Stevenson wouldn't interfere, when the Stevenson people were coming down the aisle we were putting on the Kennedy.... So it appeared Kennedy-Stevenson. And we were creating this type of thing all from Massachusetts to create this whole impression that this is the man that Stevenson wanted, because it was a forgone conclusion that Stevenson was going to win. And even, you had fellows like a Curley doing the same thing. Once that it got moving.... And I said at that particular time, "If you're going to run, you appoint Mike Skerry--who's the Speaker of the House here--and authorize him to go out and make some commitments and get some signs and look...."

And this is how this thing opened. Now, they may have been moving in behind us--I know, I know nothing about that. But this is, as far as I'm concerned, how this thing happened. There were all these people now. The majority of them are living now, who were at the meeting and who know what happened in the presence of Bobby and in the presence of Jack in which he authorized our activity to move forward on this. You may not have got this story, but this is the story as I'm telling it to you and the people who were involved.

STEWART: Could you describe any examples of successes that you may have had in, for example, visiting other delegations when the thing really got rolling?

POWERS: There is no question about it, Jack had a most prominent position within that Convention, as you know. And he made an excellent presentation. He had an attraction, there was no question about that. They had to have somebody from the East. He was running, of course, against the Kefauver [C. Estes Kefauver] type of thing. An interesting story in that respect. After I moved around--I had been in the National Legislative Conference to which you meet legislators from every state in the country, and had been active in that for all of the years since I was a young legislator. And at least you had an entry into all of these, not that you were going to convince them one way or another, but at least you had an opportunity to sound out. There was tremendous acceptability towards Jack Kennedy. There was a resentment against Kefauver, who they felt had become a liberal and turned his back on traditional attitudes of the individual states. And Jack, I think, probably got the backlash to the benefit of that in many, many instances.

Paul Dever, as an example, said, "Johnny,"--this again is a personal conversation, but it just depicts what some people thought, even right here. You know, a prophet is without honor in his own hometown. Paul Dever said, "Please don't be"--your fingers are bleeding because these are large buttons with a pin attached to them and always do you not put them in the right position so you're getting these little nips in your hand. You know, you're enthusiastic because this is somebody that you have a great deal of affection for. He said, "Johnny," quote Paul Dever, "Johnny, this fellow has no more chance. I've been around the hall. This thing is set up. They're not going to go for him." I said, "Paul, I've been around too. I think you're wrong. This fellow is going to win this thing." He said, "Just wishful

thinking.” Conversation ends not that Dever didn’t want to see him.... but he just never felt that Kennedy was going to get off the ground.

Now at the end--I’ve said it ten minutes after it happened and I say it again years later--had they left that totalizer up in that hall for the delegates themselves to see what was actually happening, this is in my honest opinion, while I know that hindsight is always better than foresight, looking back I’m convinced that this had to happen. There’s no question about it. I mean, a dark horse coming out as he came out would have absolutely won. There wasn’t anybody in the Massachusetts delegation who had the same computation or figures as to what was the spread between Jack Kennedy and Kefauver. They had taken the totalizer board down. If they had left it there and you actually could see it--now the people on TV could see it--but we could not. And the different networks had these tremendously advanced computer systems so that people could actually see this thing closing up and closing up. We did not. We knew it was near. We were probably ten, fifteen votes out of the way because you’re going half votes and this type of thing. It’s rather difficult to try to become rapid calculators ever. But as it started to move around, there seemed to be an affection for him. And he was moving. So that Dever said to me as the thing started to move, he said, “Gee, Johnny, you’re right. He’s going to win. And I can become the United States senator.” That’s the first time that Paul Dever ever said that he even had an interest. He said, “If he wins, I can become the United States senator,” which was alright. But the point that I’m making here is as astute a fellow as Paul Dever who had been there, the keynoter, and who knew national politics, knew it as well as anybody who ever was a student in this game, he just never thought that this could come about. But this thing happened.

Whatever happened between the last switching of votes and McCormack--in my opinion absolutely nothing that was anything deliberate upon John McCormack’s part because I think John McCormack was just as intense to have a Jack Kennedy. There was some feeling about Rayburn [Samuel T. Rayburn], and it’s been in many, many areas, that he is supposed to have said that if there is going to be a Catholic vice president of the United States, or a nominee, it’s going to be a John McCormack, to whom he had this close affinity. But this never, of a personal knowledge other than to hearsay, I couldn’t attest to that.

Other than this was the impact that a Jack Kennedy made himself and the impression that he made. He was young; he was fresh; he was brand new. And all of this thing. And people liked his mannerisms. He just wasn’t an old time pol. He had created this whole image by moving very quietly around. He came into that Convention certainly as no stranger. This is the part that we were disappointed in. We were all disappointed, but somebody has to win and somebody has to lose. But that’s exactly, as I see it, the part that I played.

STEWART: At this point is there anything more that you want to say about the dispute between Kennedy and Furcolo?

POWERS: During these many fights, there was a feeling between Furcolo and Kennedy that necessitated me going to Joe Kennedy and saying that, “I know, Joe, that there’s a feeling between Foster Furcolo and Jack. This isn’t good for our campaign, and I would appreciate it very much if you would call Jack and call Foster together and have an understanding with them. How they feel after the 6<sup>th</sup> of November, after

election day, this I'm not concerned with. But I'm concerned with what's happening from here, because these cleavages, they should be solved."

STEWART: This was in '56?

POWERS: No, this was before...

STEWART: Oh, before. Yes, yes.

POWERS: ...when you had your Dever and your Kennedy combination. He called the two of them together and they subsequently had a meeting. And this riff was straightened at least temporarily so that it didn't come about.

There was then no feeling towards them until such time as I became the first Democratic president of the Senate in the history of Massachusetts with a majority. Furcolo was the governor of the Commonwealth. Furcolo immediately embarked upon a program particularly of a sales tax, which we who are in this business of politics always felt was going to be something that was going to hurt the people, that was against the poor people, and as we used to say, it picked the pockets of the poor. This kind of alliteration, but we meant that philosophically this was a policy of the Democratic party, and every one of our conventions and the platform--and I chaired conventions and I was the chairman of the platform committee that wrote this plank in the party platform: "I'll admit no sales tax." Furcolo--bang, immediately embarks upon this. Not exactly truthful. He's a good friend of mine, but not exactly truthful. Not any of us knew that he was going to do this.

And so he did it. I came again, and this was my departing away from Furcolo. We were not personally friendly, but politically we were at odds end. And ultimately this, in the position of the president of the Senate and you could--I went all through the state debating Foster Furcolo. This is unusual for a Democratic president of the Senate to debate the governor of his own party. But, however, this took me into every town. And every area in the state. We defeated the sales tax time and time again. So at the time when I was friendly with Jack Kennedy--and Jack Kennedy had absolutely nothing to do with my feelings toward this particular thing.

Now along comes the nomination for United States Senate in which I feel that, while I'm unfriendly, if we're going to have a strong ticket, somebody running against Saltonstall [Leverett Saltonstall], you've got to have somebody with a name. Furcolo, other than that, had in many, many areas been a great governor. He concentrated on education. In that respect he was probably further ahead than anybody in this Commonwealth at that time. Morris Tobin went into the channels, as governor, of public health, of administration, balancing budget. Dever was preeminent with, in the field, particularly, of mental health. And along came Furcolo and in the field of education he was absolutely the epitome and despite the sales tax, which the majority of us didn't like.

However, he sent for me, and he said, "I'm going to be a candidate." By now we've got a Democratic convention system put on us by the Republican Herter. And we had that prior to it, and there was so much talk about buying votes and this type of thing that it was outlawed during the time of Charley Hurley [Charles F. Hurley] when he was the governor of the Commonwealth, a Democratic governor. He was the victim of it, and came back and

recommended that it be thrown out. So now the Republicans under Herter, when he defeated Dever, he put it in. And this was the type of a convention: it's a pre-primary convention in which people believe that you can ethnically, religiously, geographically balance a ticket. It may look that way on paper but it doesn't work out. I was always for the open primary system. Let everybody run; whoever got the majority votes was the nominee.

And so when Furcolo sent for me, I had a responsibility to the party to look and see who was the best candidate. This was prior to the convention, the National Convention. And because of the open hostility that I had towards Foster Furcolo, at least in the minds of the paper, the minute that he released the story that I was going to nominate him for the United States Senate, it was a matter of headlines. And the day of the convention in going down to the arena--I was then along with the Democratic Speaker of the House to be the co-chairman of the convention, a position of which I say now I never should, looking back, should take. I don't think anybody in that position should play the part of a nominating role. But, nevertheless, this was something that I said I would do.

I was sent for by Jack, who was in his apartment at 22 Bowdoin Street. Frank Morrissey came over to get me, and Jack was in the bathtub. He was soaking, and he was most, was a little bit profane--I won't say most, but a little bit profane. In thinking that.... He said, "Johnny, I thought you were my friend." And I said, "Well, I don't think that you should say that to me because I am." He said, "If you're my friend, why are you nominating Furcolo?" Up until that point he had never expressed any opinion to me as to whether he wanted Furcolo to be the nominee to the United States Senate. And I said, "Jack, before you make your opinion let me tell you something as I see it. I'm doing this because I am your friend. Let me see if I can prove a point to you." I said, "I have been most active and been now in the leadership position that I think I say with all honesty that I probably know as many state legislators as any man in this country, because I now have behind me almost twenty years in which I've seen these people almost day in and day out. And being in the national legislative leaders, on their executive board in the National Legislative Conference and all of these groups, I know them and they know me. And Jack, I have yet to meet an Italo-American legislator who says to me that you are anti-Italian and that I am fighting Furcolo because of orders from you because you have a disagreement with Furcolo. And they're waiting for you when you get out into Los Angeles. You're not going to get a single Italo vote because that has gone through the forces of the Italo vote in this country and they're waiting for you." And I said, "This is the only way that I think that I can do you a favor--and I have no personal feeling against Foster Furcolo--but at least to show people that I am not doing anything that you have been directing me against Furcolo, because you never have."

He said, "That's right." He said, "Well, this presents a little bit of a--you know I'm not too friendly with him. I don't think too much of him, and he probably doesn't think that much of me either, but," he said, "this sort of answers a little story. I could never understand why I was getting chilled by certain people." And he named the people, which I will not name, "who have been sort of chilling me in my candidacy for president." He said, "It's bad enough for me to find what I'm finding now, what Adlai Stevenson is doing to me after all that we have done for Adlai Stevenson--to find this kind of situation. I didn't see it that way until you explained it to me. Now you go ahead," he said, "and nominate Foster Furcolo."

I said, "Look I'm going down there and I'm going to get booed for doing it. And I'm going to get booed by your friends. And me getting booed at a Democratic convention," I said, "this is a role I've never been in before, but I'm going to do it, and I think it's being done for your advantage." And I went, and I did it, and I got booed. And we got the nomination for Furcolo. And this again--Furcolo keeps coming back into this picture now. Foster Furcolo is a good public official, is a good Democrat. This tells the story that has not been told before as to Jack Kennedy's confrontation with me and his feeling towards me nominating Foster Furcolo.

STEWART: Very good. Did he express any preference as far as the other Democratic nominees in 1960? For governor there was a big squabble between Ward [Joseph D. Ward], Murphy [Robert F. Murphy], and Peabody [Endicott Peabody].

POWERS: No. Never once did he step into that. Whoever the nominee was, he was going to be with the nominee. And he never had--as far as Joe Ward was concerned, I don't think that there was too strong a feeling there, as there might have been with other people. But once that was over then he would step in. I will come to the Peabody fight, but he never....

As far as I was concerned, I had then run for mayor of Boston in 1954 in which my opponents, the opponents were John Hynes, the present mayor, was James Michael Curley, the former mayor and congressman, and the fellow who sat here as the clerk and the former president of the Senate, Chet Dolan [Chester A. Dolan, Jr.]. And I was successful. It's a runoff primary. I was successful; I was nominated. Jack Kennedy did nothing against that fight for me. I knew how he felt towards me, but he did not contribute anything towards my campaign, nor did anybody in any way connected with him play an active part in that particular campaign. And I had not a single press here in Boston. And it was just a good fight, because you're the underdog coming forward. And out of--I received more votes in losing than any candidate got in winning. And there was a spread of twelve thousand votes between John Hynes and I, out of better than a quarter of a million votes cast.

Then we came into the '59 fight, which is a very, very interesting type of a fight, because of the fact that Jack did--and I asked him not to because I had run....[BEGIN TAPE II, SIDE I].... In '59, in running for mayor of Boston by almost twenty-eight thousand votes in the runoff and he just barely qualified. It would appear that I would have been all right, but I sort of had a feeling like Dick Nixon [Richard M. Nixon], being the front-runner after making such a fight against Hynes. Trying to maintain that front-run position for four years is very difficult. But the point is there are many other things attached to it, that I again found myself victimized by being a friend of a candidate running for president. Jack was running hard then, as you know, at that time. He endorsed me openly on Wednesday night before elections, which I told him I didn't think he had to do it, but I was his friend and he did it. And as a result then they start to shoot at me, shoot at him. There was a question--and I don't want to use this forum other than to just very, very briefly recite, there were raids of bookie shops in Boston by the Internal Revenue; there was no question about them being set up, not so much to embarrass me probably, to embarrass the President, too. And they, for the first time in history, called TV men at a rendezvous. And oh it was.... They were more interested

in taking my signs over.... Everyplace that I had a sign, I guess, that they raided. Well you have thousands of signs, as you know. One of the fellows--and he was the most prominent one because he had been the world's lightweight champion: that's Sal Bartolo--his brothers run a place in East Boston and they raided a place up over the place that they had. They have a sort of tavern. And there was "Powers for Mayor" and all you saw in the paper was the pictures. But that night, almost simultaneously, John Collins [John F. Collins], who is the Mayor now and was my opponent, came out and he was criticizing me being an exponent of power politics. He said, "This is what I meant with power politics" and he showed a picture of myself and Sal Bartolo, but they cropped the picture. Here's the picture that they showed, and here's the picture here. The other side is Jack Kennedy. Jack and I were at a banquet and Sal, who is a very popular fellow, came, as you can see by this picture here, and stood between Kennedy and myself. They cropped that picture. So this is probably one of the reasons, but however....

STEWART: Do you think that really hurt you....

POWERS: Oh, there's no question about it....

STEWART: I mean Kennedy's endorsement?

POWERS: I didn't, no, no. I don't think that--no, it never did hurt me, and if it did hurt me, then I'm glad that I got it. No, it didn't hurt, but I didn't think that I needed it and I didn't want him to get involved. There was no necessity for Jack Kennedy to get involved in a fight for the simple reason that I didn't think that I was ever going to.... I felt rather confident, and I think that I had reason for feeling confident. The Mayor had never won any kind of a primary fight, and I had showed that he had no attraction citywide. But, I mean, he had then become a victim, a polio victim, and in a wheel chair and this type of thing. No, Jack Kennedy's endorsement didn't hurt at all, other than the fact that it might have excited some Republicans who felt that I was going to be subservient to Jack as mayor of the city of Boston, going out to a convention, where he would be the candidate. Or if he was the candidate, and being the mayor of the city of Boston, you could do an awful lot to make sure--I mean, you're in a position to raise funds and many, many other things. So, if it hurt--I don't think so, but I was honored to have had it.

STEWART: Could we go back one year? What was your role in the 1958 campaign? It's been said that Kennedy sincerely desired a stronger opponent than Vincent Celeste [Vincent J. Celeste]. Do you know anything about that? And what was your role in the '58 campaign?

POWERS: There wasn't any campaign, other than again he traveled all over the state working for other candidates. I don't think he desired--nobody, as much as it might be said that they desire stronger candidates--I think this is a misnomer. I don't think anybody wants a.... What do you want to fight for when you can walk away for one? And Vinny Celeste was decent, clean-cut young lawyer, was a good looking kid, had some attraction, but he never made any kind of a fight. It was just token opposition that the

Republicans were throwing in. They felt--and can you say that they were wrong? Let's assume that they gave Jack Kennedy a tough candidate. Then it could have had its reverse reaction by Kennedy coming here and organizing as only Kennedy could organize, and then that would accrue to the advantage of the Democratic party. So, I don't think the Republicans made any mistake, if they were going to give Jack a candidate, that they gave him a candidate which he didn't have to worry about. He wasn't too tough a candidate. And then I think that this was a.... Were I to be in their position, I'd have made the same decision because I really don't think it was a wrong decision. It could have been much more fatal, you know, because once the Kennedys got a fight, they just don't kid about it, they go out and work.

STEWART: Just for the record, you were chairman of the Sussex County....

POWERS: Yes, but you couldn't generate any enthusiasm because it just wasn't necessary. One of the things, in that particular campaign you were probably in name only because you didn't have to do anything to be honest. But I recall going down to the headquarters down on Tremont Street at five minutes past nine in the morning and Mr. Kennedy was there, Joe Kennedy was there. And I said to him, "Where's the time clock?" He was looking at you as if, you know.... But he wasn't taking anything for granted. They worked hard. But this was the first time I'd ever seen Joe Kennedy in a campaign headquarters of Jack's.

STEWART: Is that right?

POWERS: First and only time. He laughed about it: "Not checking up on anybody, just thought I'd come down."

STEWART: They had quite a problem finding enough for all the volunteers to do, I think, didn't they?

POWERS: Yeah, they did. By that time everybody.... Well, I think they tell the story of Jack--every mother wanted to mother him, and every mother wanted a daughter to marry him, you know. He was a very eligible guy and he was a very, very attractive guy in all ways. He was a nice fellow, too.

STEWART: Could you describe your role in the 1960 campaign--you were, I assume, at the Convention at Los Angeles.

POWERS: Yes, I was at the Convention. I was a delegate at large to the Convention. My role was a most unimportant role, if you could call it any roll at all, because it was just as an emissary to do everything that you possibly could. This, they had every right to expect. They didn't bother, naturally, about New England. They had that in good shape. There were others who had gone out in the campaign in Wisconsin or West Virginia, the different areas. We had campaigned back home. We had the campaigns to set up a Democratic Senate and this type of thing, which is always a very, you know, a very,

very particular thing. But the role there was just going out and doing everything you possibly could.

However there is one particular role. It appeared at a particular time, and it was on the occasion of some kind of an all star baseball game that was taking place on the day. And it flashed in, and I was in a room where John McCormack was and Eddie Gilgun [Edward P. Gilgun], who was the treasurer of the Massachusetts Democratic state convention. And I said to him, "Here's Sam Rayburn down on the floor of that Convention--we were up in the room rather than the Convention--and here's John McCormack out in the other room, only because of the fact that nobody has asked John McCormack to do anything in this campaign, and I think this is a mistake." And so I called Bobby, said, "Bobby, John McCormack is in the next room here and it seems that you're making a horrible mistake in not asking him to get down on that floor, because he's willing enough to do it, even though he has to run in conflict with Sam Rayburn to ask votes for Jack. Now, you can't expect him to do it if you don't ask him, and I think that you should ask him." He said, "Johnny, I will."

And then we went out in the other room. The telephone rang, I said, "Mr. Speaker, or Mr. Leader, there's a call for you." He spoke and he said, "You bet I will. Yes, yes, yeah." He said, "Come on, let's go." He said, "Bobby just wants me to get out and do--asked me to do some work on that floor for Jack." He said, "Sam is down there doing it," he said, "and they want me to do it, and I'm going to do it." And from then on John McCormack did most effective work. I then went down, and he would send me--he was sitting in the delegation--he would send me to different delegations to bring certain people to him. This is the role that I played, sort of one that you sort of manufacture for me. But that's how it originated, because John McCormack had expressed that he doesn't want to go down and interfere with whatever their format has, he would be willing enough to do it if they asked him, and he almost gave an invitation. And so in calling Bobby and bringing this thing about, this is exactly what happened.

That's the only role as far as I was concerned, casting a vote or moving around with people that you had met. They had it set up. They knew where they were going. They were well organized you only did for them those things that they had assigned you. They had a good organization going. I wish I could have played even a greater part, but I didn't.

STEWART: Who made the announcement--this is sort of a sidelight--before the Massachusetts delegation? You didn't, did you?

POWERS: No, I was not....

STEWART: Who was the chairman of the....

POWERS: Patty Lynch, Pat Lynch was the chairman.

STEWART: Of the delegation?

POWERS: That's right. He made all of the announcements. He, of course, was Jack's man that Jack put in as the chairman.

STEWART: Right, right. As far as the....

POWERS: Ah, wait. Did he make.... Did he let John McCormack make the announcement? This I don't know. I kind of think that probably John McCormack--John McCormack made the announcement.

STEWART: I don't know. It's somewhere in the back of my mind. I thought you did, but I guess you didn't.

POWERS: No, no. I did not. When we had gone.... We had a little bit of difficulty at the Convention because of the fact that there were some people who just never, a few old timers who never sort of got over the fact that Jack didn't do what he should have done for Curley and felt.... But they were just inundated actually. There were people in the '56 campaign who were playing Kefauver off the board because of the fact that he was investigating crime within the cities and this type of thing and as long as they stayed away from the bailiwick in which they happened to be mayors, they were playing "footsy" with him. You could see that, but they didn't amount to too much.

STEWART: As far as the 1960 campaign here in Massachusetts, again was there anything significant about, for example, people associating themselves and not associating themselves as much as they could with the President?

POWERS: No, everybody, as much as you can say of a political campaign, everybody was with him--Democrats and Republicans.

STEWART: I've heard it said, for example, that Ward made a serious mistake by not associating himself as much as he could?

POWERS: No, I don't think so. Joe Ward is a Democrat and Joe Ward is a very idealistic fellow, very, very intelligent, extremely intelligent, a good Democrat, a good legislator, and again I think that this isn't so. He did everything I ever asked him to do. As far as Jack Kennedy is concerned, there may have been other things I know nothing about. But Joe Ward suffered, of course. This, again.... You know, you run against one who has a background of John Volpe [John A. Volpe], you run into trouble. He's an Italian and the Italians have as much pride in their race as do any other ethnic group. The result is that the Democratic Italian shifts over and he looks not for a reason but he tries to have an excuse for doing it, because he doesn't politically live with himself, because he considers--and I criticize not basically putting his nationality or his background before his political affiliate, his political loyalty. This is why they then, in order to justify it, then have to say something about the other fellow. And I think this is what happens. Joe Ward is.... I never knew of any rift. As a matter of fact I have pictures here; they're friendly.... Joe is down at the Cape with us, with Mrs. Kennedy, with Jack. There wasn't any reason, that I knew, of any rift. Then again, when somebody loses, you always look for, sometimes scapegoats. Why did I lose? And, you know, you can conjure up some awfully strange reasons why you lose and sometimes you pick scapegoats.

STEWART: Were you still in the Massachusetts legislature in December, 1960? I'm thinking of the time when the President-elect came.

POWERS: Oh, yeah. I was there.

STEWART: Did you meet with him at that time?

POWERS: Well, if he'd ever come to Boston, I mean, if I ever needed him, I could always get direct contact through Kenny [Kenneth P. O'Donnell]. I never had any trouble getting in contact. Or he might send some word to me through Kenny, he might send word he'd want to see me, and I would go down there. If you see that picture on the wall you see that I presided at this tumultuous convention between Eddie McCormack [Edward J. McCormack, Jr.], again, and Ted Kennedy, where you have to choose up. You have to, you know. You just make your choice, and I made the choice a long time ago as far as Jack was concerned and the Speaker. Although I remained extremely friendly with him, with the Speaker, in the Bill Burke affair. Then later on I was called to Washington by Jack, who asked me to preside. I had presided at a Democratic Convention which turned into one of the most riotous types of things that we've ever had in conventions in any state in the Union. People sort of began to associate our conventions with real donnybrooks in which physical contact was something that you expected. But I just had luck with them that I was able--knew most of them and been around the State, and I never had any trouble.

And so in this particular one Jack sent for me and I went down to Washington and I was interviewed--well not interviewed--but we conferred while he was in having his breakfast in his bedroom about this whole area of Ted. He said, in substance, he did not want Ted to be a candidate for the United States Senate, but he felt that Ted wanted to make his own mark, and that he'd been reading about him and naturally reading about Bobby and felt that probably this was the area that had an attraction for him. He felt that once he got in it that he was his brother and he didn't want--Ted never would do anything to embarrass him or humiliate him, but he wanted to make sure that, if it was to be a convention, that it was going to be run as honestly as a convention could be run. While he knew that I had taken a stand with Ted against Eddie McCormack, he felt that I should be, and he asked me, "Will you be the convention chairman? If you do, why then I know, at least if it's humanly possible, it'll be run on the level and it'll be impartial." And he said, "If you take that position, then I ask you, don't do anything for Ted openly. I mean, just be as nonpartisan." And he said, "I think that's a much better position for you, and I would feel better about it." And so I agreed that if that was his desire, I would do it.

We came here and now, if you can recall, this was probably a most extraordinary type of a convention because of the personalities involved. You had the brother of a president, the nephew of a speaker. This had never happened before in the history of our country, at least that I knew of, at least in modern history, and so it was covered by all of the political writers from all over the country and all over the world, who came on to West Springfield because they had heard about the tradition here of Massachusetts, this kind of a donnybrooker convention. The writer of the *London Times* said to me, "When is the fight going to break

out, Mr. Chairman?" "Well, there'll be no fight." This type of thing. But they came here with that idea that this was going to be an extremely riotous type of a convention.

Instead of that, you're able to keep this good tone. And in many of the things in the over thirty years that I've been privileged to be in government, you get many, many letters-- letters that might be commendary in many, many areas and criticism, rightfully so in many others, but never did I get so many letters of commendation for the way in which that convention was run. Both Democrats and Republicans said, "From out of the state I viewed with a great deal of interest and was very happy to see that this is the kind of a government that we're being exposed to, that it's run as nice, as decent, as honest" and this type of thing and it was good--and even the President himself, who contacted me and sent word that he was extremely pleased, naturally, with the results. But Ted wasn't hurt, Ted wasn't hurt at all as a result of it. It was conducted on a high level. Eddie McCormack was not hurt. There, you see that picture over there, on the left of that picture is the Chairman, Pat Lynch, and the former Chairman, John Carr, and that's Joan Kennedy [Joan B. Kennedy] and Ted.

Then I again had the unhappy faculty of being, again this is with an interim election of the two years. Then being the chairman, I got word that Ted Kennedy was just killed in an airplane crash in the middle of waiting for him to address or to come before the convention for his nomination and it just.... This convention would have broken, actually broke up if it wasn't handled properly, that you understand that there was an accident, you don't know whether he's on the plane or not, but "I will keep you informed. It's nothing to be alarmed about." Then, "There has been an accident. He was on the plane, but he now is on the way to the hospital. While he is injured, it isn't...." This type of thing. So, I've been crossing paths with the Kennedy family for a long, long time, John.

STEWART: Did you ever consider going to Washington as part of the Administration?

POWERS: No, for the simple reason that Jack designated me as a National Democratic Committeeman from Massachusetts, the position I hold now. I was appointed on the President's Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. I served there three years until I came here and I got off. Now I'm a consultant for that group. But I was never interested because I was a president of a Senate. I wouldn't.... This was a very prestigious position. The court asked me to come down here. Then they appointed me and then subsequently, this is an elective office, I ran for a six year term. No, I never thought of it and I just wasn't interested. Washington at one time when I was younger Congress did have an attraction for me, but it doesn't any more.

I will honestly say this, that politics just doesn't seem the same to me as when Jack Kennedy was around. I don't know, you.... Anything else is anti-climatic, you know. Through many, many things you arrive at a point where you're being privileged to have been so closely associated in a political way and I think in a friendship way with him so that you felt quite free to say things to him that other people might not say to him, based upon what you actually thought, with the benefit of your own experience.

We had a banquet here at the Armory on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of October just a month before Jack died and during the day I had met the President at the airport and came back with John McCormack. And I suggested to the Speaker that he come up with me to see the President and he felt that he wasn't invited. And I said that I didn't think that was quite necessary

because this was his hometown and I don't think you'd need an invitation. I think the President will understand. And so we did, we went up and we were brought in and then the President came in and he said, "I'm extremely happy that you came here." He said that he was going out to the Harvard game at that time but he said, "Johnny, I'm glad you brought the Speaker because I want you to know that our record in Congress may not appear to look very good upon a score card, but what we have done and what we have set up eventually will prove to be one of the greatest records that has ever been amassed by a Congress or by an Administration and by the efforts of all people of all parties for the good of this country. And I want you to know," and he stressed that he wanted me to know because he felt that I had to take these political positions sometimes contrary to the Speaker, although I had known the Speaker much longer than I had known Jack Kennedy, "that I could not have done it were it not for the loyalty and for the friendship," he said, "of a John McCormack." He said, "And just want you to know that." And I said, "I appreciate it." And the Speaker was very, very happy to learn.

"Now," he said, "will you tell me what's happening in Massachusetts." And I said, "Mr. President," I said, "I don't like what I'm hearing about people are going to make an effort to defeat Governor Peabody. Governor Peabody has done a good job and I think that Governor Peabody is more.... You need Governor Peabody's help right now, I think, more than probably Governor Peabody needs your help." And he sort of temporarily became a little bit distressed with me at that statement at which he said, "Well, this is something new. Will you please tell me why?" And I said, "Well, as I look at this from a political standpoint there are only two Catholic states that are in the Union. This is Massachusetts and Rhode Island. What are you going to tell people in the other forty-eight states if your friends defeat Peabody here, who is not a Catholic?" I said, "I think that you may be placed in some embarrassing position. They'll say, 'Well, what did you do to our boy back in Massachusetts' if your friends do that. I think in that respect it's important to you that you make sure that Peabody wins. Don't get mad with me for saying this, but this is a political observation." He looked at me. Usually when he'd start to get a little bit disturbed he's put his right hand in his pocket and he did during that particular time. He took it out and slapped me on the back and he said, "You do everything you possible can." I said, "I am."

On the way after we had left, John McCormack said, "Gee, I...." He said, "Johnny, I.... Do you know to whom you were talking?" I said, "Yes." I said, "I was talking to Jack Kennedy." And he said, "But he's the President." I said, "But I didn't regard him and I don't regard him as that. I regard him as a very, very close friend and I can say these things to him." He said, "I wanted to say the same thing to him as you just said, but," he said, "I would hesitate." He said, "But I'm glad that you told him." And he went and he told Governor Peabody, who then said to me, "Gee, thanks very much." I said, "Don't thank me. I was just making an honest observation that I would hope that you know, he would make to me, that I know he would make to me."

So, that's the last time that I had actually seen the President and I was in Israel when he was assassinated and had just got off the plane and then stayed and delivered the eulogy the following day to the Junior Chamber of Commerce in the Convention grounds at Tel Aviv. The eulogy is something that's out here on my wall. And I stayed in Israel for a period of three weeks explaining to the people, because they had set it up for me, how our system of government operated; how the Vice President would follow the political platform;

sacred documents and commitments made would be fulfilled; that I was sort of a member of the official family coming from Massachusetts, being a president of the Senate. The question was either come back to the funeral or stay there. Where would I do the most good? I thought I could do the most good back where I was, so I stayed there. That sort of closed the book to a very happy stage of....

STEWART: That's interesting. I didn't know you were in Israel at the time. It must have been.... The reaction....

POWERS: To make an observation, you could see the sorrow that was etched in the people's faces who felt that this type of thing was so mysterious. It was like losing a member of their family and they were sincerely sad about it. I planted the first trees in the Kennedy Forest in Israel. But these people from Abba Eban-- Abba Eban was a great friend of Jack Kennedy. But he was a great personality, there's no question about it. There are many, many things you could speak about as.... We used to tell the story that in this campaign I used to take him around these industrial tours, the waterfront and the factories in my areas of South Boston. We'd shake hands with the people and this he liked. He liked this personal contact. In going by where I was born, I don't live too far away from the house. It was an old tenement house which my mother owned and she had the front of it all fixed up by a couple of neighbors. It took about a year and a half to take all the bricks down. There was a streetcar line that used to go through it, and the shaking and vibrations cause it to belly out. So a couple of the neighbors during the off years, rather during the off time during the year, took the front out and, they were brick layers, they bricked it back up. In doing it, they put in picture windows and they made it much more presumptuous than it originally was in its original state. So going by I said.... And my sister, mother had passed away, my sister had put aluminum awnings on it. Going by I said, "Jack, I was born in that house." And he said, "You know Johnny, I've been hearing for years your talks about you coming up the hard way," he said. "You were born there?" he said. "You should see where I was born on Beals Street in Brookline." He said, "I'm the guy that came up the hard way." And I said, "That's right Jack. One morning they forgot to give you your breakfast in bed." And he used to tell that story around and that's how Joe McCarthy's [Joseph P. McCarthy] book, *The Remarkable Kennedys*, opens up with that story which actually happened.

Now I have many, many wonderful memories with Jack and these are the only things that I think that people actually should talk about. In this game of politics, he was no amateur. He knew this as thoroughly.... He planned it intimately. He planned it just as perfect as anybody could. He knew where he was going; he knew how to get there. He knew what to do and he did it. And he was no tyro in the game of politics because he had been brought up in it. But it is, it's a great thing to come.... I mean, I think that this is what you get out of our kind of society, when you can look back and say that you were on intimate terms with greatness. And this was greatness. He was great.

STEWART: Very good. There nothing else I have. Okay?

POWERS: No, I don't know of anything that.... [END OF INTERVIEW]

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