

Joseph L. Rauh Jr. Oral History Interview – JFK#1, 12/23/1965
Administrative Information

Creator: Joseph L. Rauh Jr.
Interviewer: Charles T. Morrissey
Date of Interview: December 23, 1965
Place of Interview: Washington D.C.
Length: 114 pages

Biographical Note

Joseph L. Rauh Jr. (1911-1992) was the Vice Chairman of the District of Columbia Democratic Committee from 1952 to 1964, general counsel for the United Auto Workers Union in District of Columbia from 1963 to 1966, and vice chairman of Americans for Democratic Action. This interview covers John F. Kennedy's role in the McClellan hearings, Hubert Humphrey's 1960 Democratic primary campaign, and the Kennedy administration's stance on civil rights, among other topics.

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Joseph L. Rauh Jr., recorded interview by Charles T. Morrissey, December 23, 1965 (page number), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.

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Joseph L. Rauh Jr.– JFK #1
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Oral History Interview

with

JOSEPH L. RAUH, JR.

December 23, 1965
Washington, D.C.

By Charles T. Morrissey

For the John F. Kennedy Library

MORRISSEY: Let's start by my asking you when you first met John Kennedy?

RAUH: I thought of this question ahead of time so I can place it. I first met John Kennedy in 1947 in Leon Henderson's house. We had just formed the Americans for Democratic Action within some months of that. We had a little meeting of young congressmen in Leon's house to discuss the legislative program. This very frail -- or at least appearing

to me very frail -- very young-looking man walked in and said he was John Kennedy. He didn't say very much that evening. A number of the other young congressmen talked a lot, but he seemed rather over-awed by the economic theories of Leon Henderson and some of the more liberal economists that were there that night. But he seemed very friendly. It was only some time later -- I think it was in '54 -- that he was quoted in the Saturday Evening Post to say he hadn't felt comfortable with "those ADA types." I will only say that I never felt any lack of comfort on John Kennedy's part. He never showed that side of himself to me. Maybe that just proves how good a politician he was.

MORRISSEY: Was his interest mostly in what [James MacGregor] Jim Burns has called

"market basket liberalism" rather than issues of civil rights or civil liberties?

RAUH: Well, if you're talking about that night, it's now too hard to remember much about that night, although I remember his walking in the door just like it was yesterday. But exactly what was said. . . ."

But as Kennedy developed I would say no. I think here was a remarkable development of a human being who may have started that way but who, as he got into the issues and learned about issues, became a very devoted supporter of them. For example, at the time of his death I suppose you could have put him in the civil rights movement even though maybe ten or fifteen years before he was very sympathetic to the Southern

position. I think that these things may be hard to date, but as he began to feel each problem and understand each problem, he then became a liberal on that problem. I think that what has been said would be my approach to it too -- that Kennedy became a liberal by intellectual persuasion, whereas maybe the man who I'm of course closest to in political life, [Hubert H.] Humphrey, was a liberal by guts, by insides, by just emotion, by immediate reaction. Kennedy became a liberal, it seems to me, on each item by persuasion. Of course, the persuasion was both political and intellectual. As he began to understand these things, I think that he went far beyond what you'd call "market basket liberalism." It's conceivable that there was a period during which that would have been

true even on civil liberties where we've had so much complaint about Kennedy not voting against [Joseph R.] Joe McCarthy. There, as he began to understand these problems better, he died, I'd say, a man with considerable interest and understanding of the civil liberties problems we've worked so hard for. This was a real change from the day in '54 when he couldn't vote against, or say a word against, Joe McCarthy.

MORRISSEY: Did you ever discuss McCarthyism with him?

RAUH: Yes, one time. There was a rather famous letter in the summer of 1960 which a number of liberals signed. The reason I say it's famous is because I never got as much opprobrium for anything, such as defending an alleged

subversive, as I did over the letter of the liberals for Kennedy. This was after Humphrey was out of the race, of course. [Henry Steele] Commager had written a draft of that letter for the Kennedy organization. It was sent to me. I thought it was nonsense. It spent a lot of time talking about the McCarthy thing and answering it and building up a lot of very minor points about Kennedy's civil liberties aspects. I thought that wasn't the reason I was for Kennedy.

I went to talk to him about the letter and showed him a redraft I had made of the letter in which I pointed out that he was determined now to put through the civil rights program, which was then the most significant thing. He looked at the draft and said he

agreed with it. It has a sentence in it that "President Kennedy has assured us that he will insist on the Convention making an all-out civil rights plank."

At that time he made a comment about the McCarthy period -- all of which I had taken out of the letter -- that there are a lot of things that you learn in this world that you don't maybe understand at first. He seemed to feel that I was on the right track.

Actually, the letter that came out is more along the lines that I suggested than the first letter that Commager had written. I think Kennedy, too, felt that minor apologies and minor little acts were not the way to answer it. The question was what he really felt now, and the letter did go out. But as I say, it sure brought

cries of outrage from the Stevensonians who felt that Kennedy should not get the nomination. I think Arthur Schlesinger and [John Kenneth] Ken Galbraith have said the same thing -- that they've never gotten as much criticism as they did for coming out for Kennedy in that letter.

MORRISSEY: At the time that letter was being drafted did it appear to you that John Kennedy wanted very much to pull some of the old Stevensonians into his camp?

RAUH: Well, that has a long history. I spent the year '59 and until the West Virginia primary in 1960 trying to get Stevensonians into the Humphrey camp where I thought they really belonged. See, I come at this as a Humphrey man, and we spent lots of our time trying to get the Stevensonians. I think at the time that Humphrey was in the race, Kennedy

must have realized that [Adlai E.] Stevenson's presence helped him rather than hurt him. It was only after Humphrey was removed that he would have been the heir to the Stevenson people. I think Kennedy left them absolutely alone before that. I think Stevenson was a great boon to Kennedy, Wisconsin being an example when we get to that. Stevenson's presence was a tremendous boon to Kennedy. I think he left that all alone until after the Humphrey thing was over.

That night in West Virginia he asked me if I was going to make good my pledge, which I'll tell you about later, of coming over to him. Then shortly after that they did say something about going after the Stevenson people. They used a lot of people

on that. [Byron] "Whizzer" White was one of those. But I don't believe that until Humphrey was out of the race, they ever thought of trying to go after the Stevensonians because they knew that we were the logical heir to them. But once Humphrey was out of the race, Kennedy was in fact the logical heir to the Stevenson people.

MORRISSEY: At the time the letter was being drafted of course the Stevensonian bubble was expanding in size. I was wondering if, in your talk with Kennedy at that time, this evidently bothered him a bit?

RAUH: It bothered him, but I wouldn't really say it was expanding terribly much at that time. My impression, looking back on it, without having looked at the exact date of that letter, was that

Stevenson was still being so indecisive on whether he would run that the Stevenson people were having a terrible time. It wasn't until a later period that [James] Jim Doyle and [A.S.] Mike Monroney and the others started to make a real drive. I think the letter came out at a period when Stevenson was rather down. Indeed, that's my pretty clear recollection. I don't have the letter in front of me, but it's my recollection that I wrote a sentence in that letter that said, "Now that Humphrey has withdrawn and Stevenson is standing aside . . ." -- based on his then statements. It seems to me that possibly this letter came out at a lower ebb in the Stevenson movement than you think and that it was at a later period, just before the Convention, that the new drive for Stevenson

and the picket lines and so forth were built up. I think this letter came out at a time when there was less thought of Stevenson beginning a major drive. Of course, Stevenson later did pick up all of the anti-Kennedy people. Just as John Kennedy accused Humphrey of leading a "stop Kennedy" movement, so the Stevenson thing became a "stop Kennedy" movement. It never had a chance of success; it was just the [Lyndon B.] Johnson method of stopping Kennedy.

MORRISSEY: Let me go back to the early 1950's and ask again this question about McCarthyism. Did you talk at that time with Senator Kennedy?

RAUH: I have no recollection of talking at that time with Senator Kennedy. I may very well have. I used to talk to Senator Kennedy in those periods. We

were working for civil rights legislation. I knew him slightly. As I said, I never got to know Senator Kennedy well until the McClellan Committee investigations. I knew him only slightly before that. But I cannot picture a direct conversation with him about the McCarthy period at that time.

MORRISSEY: How about that Civil Rights Bill of 1957 and the jury trial amendment?

RAUH: Yes, I talked to Senator Kennedy a number of times about that. I remember talking to him just before he went in to vote. Of course, we opposed the jury trial amendment. I remember the exact place. You can stand and talk to a senator as he's going in the door of the Senate Chamber. I stopped John Kennedy and said I hoped he would stick with us on the jury trial amendment.

He said he'd pretty much made up his mind to vote for the jury trial amendment. I just said, "Are you?" A little bit impatiently, I think, he said, "Well, I have a letter from Paul Freund." He read me a sentence, and it was a pretty good sentence for his point. But he wasn't quite fair about the letter. This letter must exist somewhere. It's a very interesting letter, and it's also interesting how Senator Kennedy used it at that time. The letter also contained an indication, "If you feel it is necessary to do this in order to get the bill, then . . ." such and such. But Paul Freund was really not saying that he would have voted for the jury trial amendment or advising Kennedy to vote for it. He was saying if this is the best you can get, then go ahead and vote for the jury trial amendment.

I think Senator Kennedy misused that letter a little bit. I think he wanted to be on both sides at that time. I think 1957 was a period in Senator Kennedy's life when the civil rights thing wasn't quite clear to him. I don't think he had had much experience. I think this was before he became the dedicated advocate of civil rights that he was in 1963 just before he died. But this was the period when he was playing both sides. He voted with us on the other major vote, which was the deletion of Part III, but he voted with Johnson twice, and with us only once. He voted with Johnson on sending the bill to Senator Eastland's committee; he voted with Johnson on the jury trial. He voted with us on Part III. I think that this was Senator Kennedy's then

way of indicating that he hadn't made a final decision on where he was going. Before he was elected, of course, he was running on an all-out civil rights plank. But the change occurred sometime between the '57 battle and the 1960 campaign.

MORRISSEY: Let me go back a little bit and see if you have any memory of two things. One, did you ever get involved with the question of an ADA endorsement of Kennedy when he was running against [Henry Cabot] Lodge in '52 in Massachusetts?

RAUH: I have a recollection, only vague, that either John Kennedy or his father asked Gardner Jackson for this endorsement and to work up there. I only have it from Gardner Jackson. I don't have it directly from the Kennedy side. The possibilities would be Mrs. [Phillip] Lecompte

in Boston might recollect that. Of course, Gardner Jackson has passed on, but Mrs. Lecompte might be able to give you that. My impression, and it's only an impression, from Gardner Jackson was that either the Senator or his father had called him and asked for the endorsement.

MORRISSEY: Do you recall anything about the fight in the Democratic party in Massachusetts in the spring of '56 in which John Kennedy tried to win control from John McCormack?

RAUH: Oh yes, and I think the ADA was completely with John Kennedy. Here you have to get it from [Samuel] Sam Beer who was working in it; Professor Sam Beer who later became the chairman of ADA was in that deeply. I remember this very well; this was sort of a young liberal against the machine. But I think the anti-machine

aspect was more stressed than the liberalism, as I recall. Sam Beer's participation in it was quite clear, and the ADA -- I'm quite clear in my memory -- participated in that fashion. Since I was in Washington not in Boston, Sam can give it to you much better.

Sam was always for Kennedy. He had a great admiration for Kennedy. This is a great tribute to Kennedy's integrity and promise that people like Beer who were all-out liberals, much more liberal on positions than Kennedy, had such respect for him.

MORRISSEY: Let's go up to those McClellan hearings that you mentioned. What was your relationship then with John Kennedy?

RAUH: The McClellan hearings, just to give a little background on them, were called

the Rackets Committee hearings because they were really aimed at [James] Hoffa and the Teamsters and similar corruption. Senators [Barry] Goldwater, [Karl E.] Mundt and [Carl T.] Curtis were members of the committee. They always wanted to get it away from Hoffa who, at least in the early days, had been a Republican, and wanted to get it at Walter Reuther and the heart of the Democratic Party. For a couple of years, I guess, they were fighting over whether to investigate the -- I guess it was only one year -- UAW [United Auto Workers]. Finally, the Democrats didn't want to look like they were covering up for Walter Reuther or labor so they agreed to have an investigation of the Kohler Strike. Well, I was the counsel for the UAW before the committee. [Robert F.] Bobby Kennedy

was the counsel for the committee.
Mr. Lyman Conger was the counsel for
Kohler.

You might note that this discussion
now comes at a time just a week after
all that has been settled. It was quite
a victory for the UAW in that we've just
gotten four and a half million dollars
of money from Kohler for their wrongdoings
then and later. So the ultimate UAW
vindication is clear. But at that time
a good deal of argument could be made
as sort of "a plague on both your
houses." There's no question about
Kohler's wrongdoings, but there were
also some things that UAW had done
wrong. My job was to minimize those
and maximize the Kohler things.

Well, the most interesting thing
about John Kennedy in those hearings

is that either he and Bobby had a walky-talky, or they had a telephonic system, or John Kennedy had extrasensory perception. It got to be a joke among our UAW group there: Whenever we were in terrible trouble and something was really going wrong, I would walk John Kennedy. He very seldom just sat there at these five-week hearings, every day, morning 'til night. He couldn't spend the full time there. He was running for president. Actually, that was 1958 and he was running for senator but then for president. But whenever there was trouble, I would look over at one of our guys, and I'd say, "Where is he?" and he'd walk down the aisle. It was a very well known joke among our crowd that John Kennedy would show up when we were in trouble.

It wasn't really a joke. It was much more than that to us. It was a very saving thing. For example, one day I was under attack; Goldwater opened a session with a twenty minute prepared speech against me. This is actually in the record. I remember in the middle of his speech, John Kennedy walking in. It had taken maybe five or ten minutes for someone to have gotten him there. When it was over, I got up and said I'd like to respond. Mundt and Curtis, backing up Goldwater, said, "Well, let's go ahead. Regular order of business. Go ahead," and not let me respond. John Kennedy of course got me the right to respond. The facts are all in the transcript, the record, for anybody to look at; it's been printed. But the relevant fact is he

wasn't in the room when it started. He got there. Somebody better ask Bobby Kennedy what kind of buttons they were playing that whenever the UAW needed John Kennedy, he was there.

My recollection of him in these hearings is the man who came in. I suppose you could say that he figured, "Well, Mundt and Curtis and Goldwater are taking care of the Kohler side. I'm really just offsetting it, so I'm not going to spend too much time finding out who's right. I'm taking the side of the UAW." Furthermore, politically, that would have been a wise choice to have made. So he came in and rather automatically took our side.

There's only one time when this wasn't true and the record will show

this, too. When Mr. Kohler testified, he was just wide open to destruction. John Kennedy had been given by me, oh, dozens of questions that could have destroyed Kohler and helped us a great deal. He asked almost nothing. Later, in the hotel where we had our headquarters -- in the Congressional Hotel -- when we were all sitting around, maybe twenty of the union people (because we used to have ten or twenty down here), the phone rang from Kohler, Wisconsin. It was the head of our local union there. Someone answered the phone and turned and quoted him, "We always knew that Kohler owned the city out here, but we didn't know that they owned John Kennedy too." That was at the moment when we were disappointed with John Kennedy. I was almost in tears with the emotion of

four weeks poured into it, being finally about to give them the coup de grace through John Kennedy, and he didn't perform.

However, on the other hand, as you look back now over the five-week period, there wasn't any question of how much value John Kennedy was to us. He made a political decision on that one big day. That was when Reuther appeared and Kohler appeared. He obviously had made a calculated decision on that big day not to become Walter Reuther's protagonist. Right or wrong, that was the decision he made. As you look back and you see how many things he had done for us there, one can't fault him too much for that.

MORRISSEY: Was that his explanation?

RAUH: Oh no, no, no. This is my explanation.

I never asked him this. He'd done so much for us in there. Actually, I recall now, as we're talking here, that before it started, I was invited over there to breakfast at the house on. . . . What street is that?

MORRISSEY: N Street?

RAUH: N Street. I had breakfast there the day before it all started to fill him in. He was very warm and sympathetic about our problem and very derogatory about Goldwater, Mundt and Curtis. He just felt they were beneath contempt, the three of them. He was very interested in being helpful, and he was very helpful. I tell this story about the Kohler thing only to complete the record. I've long since lost any animosity about that, although, as I say, I guess it was just too much for all of us when this

thing was said over the telephone and reported to us. It almost killed you. It almost hit you with a knife. But as you look back, John Kennedy made that hearing possible for the UAW. We did come out on top in the hearing and in the press due to John Kennedy. It did help us in the long run in our fight in the courts. I really feel that John Kennedy may almost have been the turning point of the whole fight that ended last week with our great success. Had we been too much clobbered there, it might have gone a different way at the Labor Board and so forth. So I can only for myself express great gratitude to him. But I just report that one incident.

Now Bobby Kennedy was also quite fair, and I think followed the same line.

But It's much harder for counsel to be your friend than for one of the committee members. He can't make declarative statements; he asks questions. The real declarative statements have got to come from a committee member. Here John Kennedy made them when we needed them, made them in the report, worked with us on the report.

This brings me to the time early in '60 when I was up there working on the report with John Kennedy. He pushed it aside and said, "Joe, how can you be in a stop Kennedy movement?" This was the thing I referred to earlier. It flowed from our relationship in the McClellan Committee. What he meant by that obviously was, "No two people have worked closer on a matter than you and I have worked together." (They were always very nice when I'd go in.

Mrs. [Evelyn] Lincoln would always slip me in even if there were people waiting because she knew we were collaborating on this thing.) He just turned to me and said, "How could you be working on a stop Kennedy movement?" Well, I was really quite taken aback by this. But then I realized what he meant. I didn't when he first said it because I was so devoted to Humphrey and so much in the belief that Humphrey should be president that I was startled. But what he meant was what was being said all over Washington -- that the Humphrey thing was just a front for Lyndon Johnson. We had a long discussion of this. He went through a whole list of the people who were there, and named them, who were for Johnson. He did very well, I must say. When he finished

it, he said, "Well, they're all for Johnson." And I said, "Well, you haven't named a few." He said, "Who?" And I said, "[James, Jr.] Jim Loeb, who's not against you. I think Jim's second choice is probably Stevenson." This I think is correct, that Jim's second choice was Stevenson. I said, "You haven't mentioned Marvin Rosenberg, our New York fund raiser", who was obviously for Humphrey and only for Humphrey. He said, "I don't know him." I said, "Well, you haven't mentioned me either." And he said, "Yes, I did. You're in it." And I said, "But I'm not for Johnson second. I'm for Hubert first and second." Then I said -- and I thought for a minute because one has to think before one makes this kind of statement -- "Well, I'm going to prove this to you right now -- that the Humphrey

camp is not solely full of stop Kennedy people. I give you my word that, if Hubert ever pulls out of the race, I'm for you and I'll do whatever I can."

What happened then, of course, to skip for a moment, that night in West Virginia when I saw John Kennedy at about 2 in the morning, we were all congratulating him, and he said, "Well, when are you going to make that announcement?" So I guess John Kennedy didn't forget political matters even from people as unimportant as me.

MORRISSEY: Was that discussion in his Senate office the first one you had had with him about his presidential chances or had you talked about it previously with him?

RAUH: Yes, I had talked about it previously. During the campaign of '58, he was

running for the Senate. They were using against him the jury trial vote of '57. He called me in and asked me how I felt about it. Who was his opponent in '58? It slips me now.

MORRISSEY: I think it was a fellow named [Vincent J.] Celeste.

RAUH: Well, I don't know who it was, but, anyway, he said they were using this. It obviously wasn't being fairly used. Furthermore, I had had some second thoughts about the jury trial amendment. It hadn't hurt as badly as we had thought it was going to hurt, and there were some civil liberties aspects to it. I'd had some second thoughts. At any rate, I wrote a draft of a letter from Roy Wilkins to, I think, the local chapter of NAACP [National Association for the Advancement of Colored People] or to Kennedy, I'm

not sure which -- I know that letter is in the record somewhere because Jack Kennedy thanked me very much for it -- explaining that John Kennedy had had a very good record. When he asked me for this letter, if I could work it out for him on his civil rights record, he said, "You know what I do here is going to affect '60." So he was in effect asking for it for '60.

Now, one has to make tough decisions in politics. I was not for him for '60. I was for Hubert Humphrey. On the other hand, I don't see how one had a right to go to him and ask him for all the things we did and then say, when he asked for this letter, that you could turn him down because you were for someone else. So I had actually done something for John Kennedy in the respect of the

presidency prior to that time. There never was any question that this letter was being obtained not in order to win the Senate race in '58 but in order to solve a political problem that might come later, and in order to get such a big majority in the Senate race as to make him a clear candidate for the '60 race. As I say, I hesitate to do that because I had my own candidate, but I didn't feel you could say that you won't do anything for another side. I think he appreciated that letter.

MORRISSEY: Between that time and the night the West Virginia primary returns came in, had you talked with Kennedy about his presidential chances?

RAUH: Well, there was this day in early '60 that I've just described where he told me he was going to win. I mean, that

was prior to his "Why are you in a stop Kennedy movement?" I remember those words clearly because they were so sharp and so shocking to my system. I don't remember the words with which he said I'm going to win, but there wasn't any question he was saying "How can anybody be in a stop Kennedy movement when he's my friend, especially when I'm going to win." I have noted there was the aura of confidence about this man.

Then I was in his office again on the same [McClellan Committee] subject. He was talking to the mayor of Wisconsin, mayor of . . .

MORRISSEY: Madison?

RAUH: Mayor of Madison who became his chairman, [Ivan] Nestingen. The minute I heard Mrs. Lincoln, because the door was open, and she said, "Mayor Nestingen is on the

phone," I started to run out of the room because I was, in effect, getting information for the enemy. I knew Nestingen was his man. He said, "Oh no, sit down. I've got no secrets from you." So then he talked to him about all the plans -- Nestingen announcing this and announcing that -- and hung up the phone and never said anything about it. The only real point, I guess, if I drew any deductions from what happened, is that he wanted to show me that he trusted me because I can't see any other reason for it. They were talking about where he was going to speak, what things were going to be said, what speeches he was going to make, what lines he should take. It was a long conversation with Nestingen. Here one of the -- well, I was at that time the the Humphrey speech coordinator and was

sitting in the room with him. [laughter]

Well, he had this tremendous candor. Kennedy, if he had one trait, it was candor. I think he played on candor. He enjoyed being candid. He enjoyed this frankness and candor. I think it was part of his no-nonsense nature. There was no nonsense or emotion. Candor was the kind of trait he thought people should have.

MORRISSEY: Did he comment specifically on how he thought he'd do in Wisconsin?

RAUH: Well, he did, but there I think he brainwashed himself. He kept saying, "It's uphill." This, I think, was part of the game. But I'm not saying he wasn't being candid here because I think they felt this way, they made themselves feel this way. They wanted it to look uphill so they weren't

knocked out if they lost. Then they went in, and of course, they beat us six to four statewide.

I think, as I look back this morning thinking about that primary, they beat us on three issues. They beat us on Hoffa, and Bobby didn't play fair on this. He would go around saying, "Hoffa's against us." Well, there was an implication in there that Hoffa was for Humphrey. This was just nonsense, and Bobby threw that implication all around. I don't think that was fair, but it did hurt us. Secondly, there was the so-called vote steal. This was the shift in votes to get more into the different congressional districts and less statewide. I think we made a terrible blunder there. I just think it was a terrible blunder because it

just showed we didn't think we could carry the state when we did this. And third, and the most important, was, "Humphrey's not a serious candidate; Humphrey's just a stalking horse for Johnson."

They used all three of these with great genius, with a lot of money, with a good organization against our very poor organization, and of course, they beat us badly in the only thing that mattered nationally, which was the statewide vote. They didn't beat us badly on districts, because we won the three districts next to Minnesota and we won Madison. At this point, I just comment that the only place we won outside of the border of Minnesota, where obviously Humphrey would be strong -- these are practically Minnesotans -- was the congressional district around Madison.

I'd like to pay tribute to Jim Loeb who was our campaign manager there.

It always makes me smile because the real battle inside [the Humphrey camp] was between the pros, who were essentially stop Kennedy people, and between the amateurs, Loeb and Rosenberg and me, who were really just a thousand per cent for Humphrey. The only place we ever won anything was in Madison, which Loeb ran, and the District of Columbia, which I ran, and Rosenberg raised all the dough.

MORRISSEY: How about the religious issue in Wisconsin?

RAUH: Oh, well, that was murderous. That was not an issue they used. The three I referred to were the speech issues. The fourth, the biggest. . . . The religious issue was murderous. Workers, union workers, UAW union workers for whom

Hubert had been the champion long before John Kennedy became a champion of these workers, went in overwhelming droves in these plants for John Kennedy. This despite the fact that we had some leaders there; Harvey Kitzman was with us and Sam Rizzo. We did have some leaders with us. One has to assume that the Catholic issue was a serious one there for these workers. Whether it was ever stimulated or not, I can't say. I don't suppose it had to be. All that John Kennedy had to do was to go to Mass in Milwaukee or Racine, and there it was. There was nothing we could say. We couldn't say he shouldn't go to Mass. Hubert couldn't go to Mass. There was no way out. But if you look at the labor wards, the labor precincts, you'll find that UAW voters voted for John Kennedy

on the religious issue. And it was a blow to us.

We had a meeting that night at the Schroeder Hotel in Milwaukee deciding whether to go on. I will say here I was for going on that night. I guess I had a selfish interest, in the sense that we had a primary here between Hubert, Stevenson and [Wayne] Morse, and I wanted to win for personal reasons. I guess my sense wasn't too good that night. Maybe we shouldn't have gone on. I did vote for going on that night, and I'm not sure that this was a very objective judgment.

MORRISSEY: Could you tell me who was there that night?

RAUH: I'll do my best. Hubert, Orville Freeman, James Rowe, Max Kampelman, Gerald Heaney, Jim Loeb, Marvin Rosenberg, myself. Those

come immediately to mind. I'm sure there were others. Of course we were ahead when the first returns. . . . Oh, Philleo Nash was there. When the first returns came in, Philleo announced them and said that they were very representative, but he was not correct in that announcement. We went to dinner thinking we were ahead and with Philleo's statement that we had returns from representative places. But it didn't last too long, and by morning it was quite a slaughter statewide.

Maybe we shouldn't have made our decision. But I remember it very well because we made the decision to go ahead, and I had to know because everybody in Washington was waiting to see whether we went on with our primary. So I took some plane about three hours

after we broke up at 3 o'clock to come back to build up a demonstration. Hubert got in to Washington about late afternoon. He had to have a demonstration at the airport, that we were going on, and that somebody was interpreting this as a great success.

I remember Mary McGrory as she got off the plane. She'd apparently been able to get Hubert to talk to her. Hubert said, "My trouble is I don't have any organization. All I've got is a lot of individuals fighting among themselves." I've always felt badly about that, because that was true. It was partly my fault; it was partly other people's fault. But it may have been that it was the impossibility of ever having unity among a group that was for Humphrey, and violently opposed to Johnson, and a group that was for

Humphrey because they wanted him to stop Kennedy for Johnson. Our differences may have been unbridgeable. At any rate they were never bridged. I do remember Humphrey's ride back to Washington because Mary McGrory printed the next day in the [Evening] Star this column that she'd gotten, wheedled out of Humphrey in his blueness there. We blamed the defeat on the organization and on the press. Hubert always felt that Jack Kennedy got a better press. I feel that's true, too -- that there was something about Kennedy that got him a better press in that period.

There was one memorandum that I noticed in this period that I just would like to mention because it's Humphrey's feeling on how he got a bad press. This was in October, '59. It was a New York Times magazine section piece. It said, "Two Candidates on the Road"

by Cabell Phillips in the October 25th. Humphrey sent me a memorandum in which he said that, on the whole, he admits the piece wasn't too bad, but he felt that it hadn't been quite fair. He said, "Well, you read it and see if I am too sensitive. Don't misunderstand me. I like the article. I'm glad that we were in the New York Times Sunday section, but I'm a little tired of having it appear as if we don't know what we are doing. I can outcampaign Kennedy and all of their crowd morning, noon and night, and from hell to breakfast. I'm getting a little tired of having these clever writers indicate to the contrary. I know I don't have the money, and I guess maybe I don't have the cultured upbringing and family background of some of these highbrows,

but I'm getting mighty fed up with having our activities interpreted as if we were bushman from the jungles of Africa out on the campaign trail with no plan, rhyme or reason." There was a little bit of a Humphrey inferiority complex in relation to Kennedy, and, I think, in relation to the fact that Kennedy always got a good press.

I haven't mentioned the money thing because I don't have too much resentment over these primaries. I know there was a lot of money used in Wisconsin and West Virginia against us.

I will say this, too, that Jim Loeb, Marvin and I always felt that we didn't want Hubert to attack Kennedy in a very divisive fashion. I was in charge of the speeches. No word against Kennedy ever was in a printed text of

Humphrey's speech. Anything that got in was some guy needling him just before he went on. I was the coordinator. Phillip^m_n Stern was the editor. We had such people writing speeches as Leon Keyserling, Clay Cochrane, Charles Stoddard on conservation, [Benton J.] Ben Stong on farms -- people of this caliber, writing the speeches. These were affirmative speeches on issues, and the parts that were anti-Kennedy were always ad libbed. This was, too, part of the same battle. It was our feeling that Hubert couldn't get anywhere attacking Kennedy, that it wouldn't work. I wouldn't have been opposed to it if I thought it would work because I was obviously in it for Humphrey. Arthur Schlesinger also wrote some speeches for us although he also wrote

them for others. There's a wonderful story that Arthur [Schlesinger] wrote all three speeches for Stevenson, Humphrey and Kennedy at the Mrs. [Franklin D.] Roosevelt Dinner in December, 1959, when they had all the candidates on the platform in New York. I know Arthur had written Humphrey's. That much I can swear by because I was the coordinator. But I understand that he had also written Stevenson's and Kennedy's. Quite a feat. [laughter]

MORRISSEY: Let me go back to that meeting in the Schroeder Hotel in Milwaukee. Did the decision to go on come quickly and easily?

RAUH: Yes, I would say it was quite overwhelming. It was a totally different one than the one we'll discuss later in Charleston. It was quite overwhelming. I'll tell you

this. You have to also realize that the blow was tempered. We were ahead. We got a little behind. The morning paper which I picked up I guess at the airport a few hours later was much worse than when we started the meeting. In other words, this was an accelerating defeat in which the more returns came in, the worse it got. Therefore, on this basis, I think we weren't fully attuned to how bad we had been beaten. At any rate, it was not acrimonious like the one in Charleston. I cannot think at this moment, if my life depended on it, of anybody who wanted to pull out. The only thing I wanted was a decision so I could go because I had the next primary, the one in the District of Columbia against Morse and Stevenson.

I just wanted a decision. I think at that moment I'd have taken any decision I was so tired, but I wanted a decision because I wanted to catch that plane. I wanted a big crowd at the airport, you know, something to offset the defeatism that would set into our ranks here and in West Virginia.

I do have a recollection of one thing -- where are we going to get the money? I remember Marvin saying, "Where are we going to get the money?" because a defeated army retreats. We didn't have much money to start with, but, oh, I don't know, everybody sort of felt they'd chip in their own pockets if they had to, to get some. We didn't need any for the District.

West Virginia, everybody had hopes that the religious issue would reverse. We

didn't know how good the Kennedys were at exploiting the religious issue, first with Catholics, then with Protestants. I guess we all had hopes for West Virginia, and I was sure we were going to win in D.C., so this never bothered me any.

Money was the only issue raised against going on. I guess people sort of felt, well, enough money will come in to live.

MORRISSEY: Let me ask one more question about Wisconsin, then I'd like to move on to the D.C. primary. From my very skimpy knowledge of what went on in Wisconsin, I would assume that the Kennedys were interested in getting an endorsement from labor, or at least preventing an endorsement by labor of Humphrey. Conversely, I assume that the Humphrey people were trying to get that endorsement.

Could you tell me about this?

RAUH:

Yes, we, of course, got Harvey Kitzman, who was probably the most significant labor leader in Wisconsin. When Harvey Kitzman announced, we must have overplayed it a little bit because the press announced, "UAW for Humphrey." Then Walter Reuther issued a denial, that the UAW was neutral. And so the national UAW was. But Harvey was for us.

There was a machinist leader in northern Wisconsin for us. Look, could we stop for a second? [tape recorder off] As I say, I remember Kitzman and I remember this machinist -- top machinist in the state -- but I don't remember too much else about it other than the UAW nationally was taking a neutral position. Probably we'd have been better off if Kitzman hadn't gone quite so far, and we hadn't forced this Reuther denial.

Another thing about this that occurs to me now is that we won completely in the Negro areas. This was due to our getting over Hubert's record. I think this may have added to the race problem. The foreign-born Catholics may have actually gone against us more than they would have if we could have done the Negro campaigning a little more quietly. Jackie Robinson went in and had quite a show. We did clean up in the Negro areas. It may not have actually been a total victory in the sense that some of the Catholic loss may have also been a race loss.

At any rate, we never did get that kind of unified labor operation; and on the lower levels I think the race issue did prevent us from even getting the leadership.

MORRISSEY: Was there ever any likelihood that the

national UAW would make an endorsement?

RAUH: I don't believe so. I believe from an early date that the national leadership of the UAW felt that Kennedy was going to be the next president. While they were helpful to Hubert on occasion, and they did give money . . . May I tell a story in that regard?

MORRISSEY: Sure.

RAUH: I think it was about ten days before the primary in Wisconsin. We went to Detroit for a big old, retired people's rally that Walter Reuther was running. Kennedy was there and Humphrey was there and [Stuart] Symington was there. They each spoke. I thought Hubert ran away with it, but that's just because he's obviously the orator of the three. He did run away with it.

But afterwards, we had a fund-raising

cocktail party in Detroit. I took the pitch for Humphrey. The pitch was that we had to have five thousand dollars for a network television the night before election, and we got the five thousand. Jack Conway pledged a hundred and fifty dollars which he pledged in a very eloquent statement about his children's trusts helping with this. He was Walter Reuther's closest assistant so it wouldn't be fair to indicate that we weren't getting help from the UAW. We were. But as a national organization I think they felt that ultimately Kennedy would win. I think they felt great obligations to Hubert, and I think, to a degree, they tried to do the best they could. I think Reuther and Conway and the rest of them did as well as could be done in a situation where you have friends on both sides. It does create very serious problems.

I remember this meeting in this house so well because Hubert was sitting there. You know, you always feel it's a little bit ugly when a candidate has to sit there while you have to drag five thousand dollars out of people. And these weren't such terribly wealthy people. These were middle class people. There wasn't anybody who was fabulously wealthy, but we left with the checks to get that last night's telecast.

That's why money would have been such a big thing in the Schroeder Hotel that night. If you had to live that way against a group that had its money budgeted and carefully handled, and you had to live through checks you pick up one night to pay the next night, you're in pretty bad shape, and so we were.

MORRISSEY: At the time of that meeting in the Schroeder,

is it fair to say you had no forewarning of what the ultimate outcome in West Virginia turned out to be?

RAUH:

We considered ourselves the favorite at that meeting. We considered ourselves the favorite in the next two primaries. The question that you couldn't debate that night was what good would it have done to win the next two. It would have killed Jack Kennedy, but it wouldn't have elected Hubert Humphrey. As you look back, if we couldn't carry Wisconsin, we couldn't nominate him. It was a kind of feeling that when you get one blow you go back for another. Therefore, it was unanimous there to go on except, in my recollection, for a discussion of finances -- and on finances the talk was not in the sense of "Let's give up", but in the sense of, "Oh God, what are we going to do?"

MORRISSEY: Was there ever any doubt in your mind about not winning the D.C. delegation for Senator Humphrey?

RAUH: No, there never was. We had the advantage there that Kennedy had over us in Wisconsin. We were the only serious candidate. Morse wasn't a serious candidate; Stevenson wasn't a serious candidate, and the people were running in Stevenson's name without him. Therefore, it would have been pretty hard for us to lose. Furthermore, we had the leadership of the city pretty well on our side. I never had any doubt that we were going to win.

It was hard work. My theory of the race was that we tried to be second to Morse in the Negro areas because he was going around making some pretty rash statements, and second to Stevenson in the white areas and win. Actually we

came about even in both so that it was quite a slaughter on our side. I think we had about as many Stevenson white votes as Stevenson. Morse had none. We had about as many Negro votes as Morse and Stevenson had none. So we came out considerably far ahead, and our whole group won.

The most important thing we did here was to do it without Hubert's time or Hubert's money. We hardly ever had him. We only made him spend a couple of days here, so he was always in West Virginia. We didn't use any money at all to speak of. We used very little money. We raised it all here, so that we wouldn't interfere with his other activities.

There were some who wanted to pull out of the District in the Humphrey camp,

but that was at an earlier stage. They wanted to make an arrangement with Morse that Morse would campaign for us in Wisconsin if we would give him the District. This was a proposal made by those who were really for Johnson. This was a way of hurting Kennedy in Wisconsin without giving him the District. If you were for stopping Kennedy for Johnson, then of course it would be a good idea. If you were really trying to win for Humphrey, you don't walk out of a race you can win, so that we fought and won that one. Actually this fight occurred in front of Hubert Humphrey on the day that our letter had to go in saying that he was a candidate. He had to sign the letter, being the candidate. The public never knew that that letter almost was not signed. The public doesn't know that to this day because obviously that wouldn't have been

a very helpful thing to be out -- that in a room, with the Senator sitting there as the judge, there was a bitter battle over whether he should or whether he should not sign it, and Morse would go out and campaign for him in Wisconsin. Morse was considered valuable in labor areas because he opposed Landrum-Griffin. Morse was sort of hot, because he was the one senator who opposed Landrum-Griffin. A lot of people thought that we could get some of the Catholic workers there, with Morse in there to steam them up, and against Kennedy -- because some people were calling it the Kennedy-Landrum-Griffin Bill. . . . Indeed, the machinists had a big headline calling it the Kennedy-Landrum-Griffin Bill. They thought that Morse could be useful to steam up that Kennedy-Landrum-Griffin

idea and thereby get us the votes that we wouldn't otherwise, and didn't, get. But that was an argument that we won, and Hubert went ahead. And, of course, he won here. The night he won D.C. he was in West Virginia, and they made as good use of the victory there as they could.

MORRISSEY: Do you recall any discussion about Senator Humphrey entering or not entering the Nebraska primary?

RAUH: Oh yes, I recall a discussion. I can tell you when I recall it. It was way back. It was October of '59. We were on the way to the UAW convention, where he was going to speak, in Atlantic City. We stopped in Philadelphia, and we were picked up in cars. Humphrey stopped to talk to us about Nebraska because they'd been calling. We just decided

right then and there that it would be impossible. I think the Democrats are 80 per cent Catholic in Nebraska. I mean, it would be just like taking a walk into disaster. I don't think it was ever seriously considered after that day. But that day, on the way up and in Philly, it was discussed. Then Humphrey took a call in the airport there to discuss that problem.

Then we went over to the UAW convention, where Harvey Kitzman had it arranged, so there was, I think, a thirty-minute ovation for Hubert. Walter Reuther was quite angry because he runs these conventions on a split second time schedule. It was too well organized. The delegates simply were not going to stop. Harvey had really done a job. There were pistols and balloons. It was

as good a run demonstration as I've ever seen. [laughter] That was October of '59.

MORRISSEY: Let's talk about West Virginia.

RAUH: I don't know too much about West Virginia because, you see, the West Virginia primary... It's my recollection it was May 10, is that right?

MORRISSEY: I think you're right.

RAUH: The District primary was May 3. Between the day we lost in Wisconsin and May 3, I never had a minute's free time. Now that we were in it, we had to win. I never had a minute. I only saw Humphrey when he was campaigning here in D.C., and so I didn't know too much about West Virginia. Although when we campaigned together here, we were in the car, and he would tell me about West Virginia. He said it was going very badly. From the night in

Wisconsin at the Schroeder Hotel when we assumed we would win in West Virginia, it just was a downhill thing. Every time Humphrey was back here for the few hours that they'd give us when we were riding around, he'd tell me that it was going badly.

MORRISSEY: For what reason?

RAUH: Money, I suppose, was the one that he thought was the worst. I've never known the answer to this, and I don't know it to this day. But at least I can say this: The Humphrey camp thought the Kennedy camp was giving the West Virginia political leaders in the different areas funds. Now I understand it's a practice in West Virginia to give funds to political leaders, which they in turn use for poll watchers and so forth, and that it is not, in fact, dishonest. Whether it is or it

isn't, it was our feeling that large sums were going to these leaders. There was one meeting I remember of the Humphrey group -- we had meetings of the Humphrey group, and this occurred here in D.C. while West Virginia was going on -- in which there was a discussion of doing the same thing. I remember Marvin Rosenberg's outrage at the immorality of it, but I don't have too good a memory of what was going on. I was too ⁿemgrossed in the primary here.

I remember that I was on the plane with Humphrey going to West Virginia on May 10, election day, and he told me about it. The defeat came as no surprise to Humphrey except maybe on the extent of it, but the defeat -- he told me he was going to lose. He told me that on the airplane that day. I think

the saddest sight I've ever seen was when he came from his hotel room into the headquarters there. There was a big blackboard up, and it had county by county returns. It was about 10 or so at night, I guess. Humphrey stood all alone in the middle of this big room while we were all against the walls and desks. All alone he stood there and looked at the blackboard, and almost was speechless. The banjo player we had started to cry, and Hubert had to comfort him. It was really one of the saddest moments of my life.

Then we went back to Hubert's suite. There was no longer the unanimity of Wisconsin. There was a real brawl in Humphrey's bedroom between those who wanted to go on and those who wanted him to withdraw. Jim Loeb and Marvin Rosenberg

and I just begged him to be generous, said that, you know, there'll be another day. Generosity is called for when you're beaten like this. We wanted him to get out and endorse Kennedy, but the latter was just ruled out at the beginning. The question then came of whether to get out a generous statement. The three of us were just desperate for that. We wanted to give the lie to those who had said we were just a stop Kennedy movement, while if he kept on going it would prove it. . . . Well, it was quite a brawl. We won. This is partly described in Arthur Schlesinger's A Thousand Days. We won, and I can't remember whether I said this to Jim Loeb or he said it to me, which was, "Well, this is the first argument of this tactical kind that we've won in this thing, and it happens to come as we lose."

Anyway, Hubert finally approved a very generous withdrawal statement, and I called Bobby Kennedy and read it to him. Then a strange incident occurred.

BEGIN TAPE I SIDE 2

A few minutes after I called Bobby Kennedy and read him Humphrey's generous withdrawal, the telephone rang in the outer room of Hubert's suite. We'd all left the bedroom where the argument had been; we were all together in the outer room of the suite. There were reporters there. I think the tension had reduced a little bit. We'd issued a statement that we were out of the race. It was over. At least we knew the answer, say as it was. Someone picked up the telephone from downstairs and said, "Mr. Kennedy is on the way up." Of course, we thought it was Senator Kennedy coming over to thank Hubert.

Then we looked at the television, and there Senator Kennedy was, live on television from some station there. I said to myself, "Oh my God, it's Bobby, and he is the devil as far as this camp is concerned." He was the one to whom the enmity went. He was the one whom all our people were so bitter about. I said, "Oh my goodness, what's going to happen here?" The door opened. Bobby walks in. It was like the Red Sea opening for Moses. Everybody walked backwards, and there was a path from the door to the other side of the room where Hubert and Muriel were standing. I'll never forget that walk if I live to be a hundred. Bobby walked slowly, deliberately, over to the Humphreys. He leaned in and kissed Muriel. I've always wondered whether she had on her mind at that moment that she

was going to poke him because she was really not very happy about the outcome. Anyway, he was very nice and very gracious, and it was the right thing for him to have done. But at the moment, it was sure something.

We all left West Virginia the next morning. I had hoped that Hubert was going to come out for Kennedy and be the vice president, but he didn't.

MORRISSEY: Who was arguing against you in that meeting?

RAUH: [James] Rowe and [Robert] Barrie and [Herb] Waters.

MORRISSEY: Was there much talk about Hubert Humphrey now as the vice presidential candidate?

RAUH: There was by me. I mean, I was for him. I mean, I didn't care -- if he was president, that's fine; if he couldn't be president, I was for his being vice president. There

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was a time when Hubert did tell me he would do it, and I could tell John Kennedy, and I did. Hubert said, "You can tell him I'll come out for him when he wants." That was a month or so after West Virginia, but he never really meant that.

Whether Jack meant it or not, I don't know. Jack Kennedy told me -- and I have the date on this. It was the day of the George McGovern Luncheon. I think it's June of 1960. It was a fund raising for George, who was running for the Senate. As he left, as Jack Kennedy left the luncheon, he motioned for me to come on. I rode back to the Senate with him. He said, "I want to talk to you about two things." Maybe he just said, "I want to talk to you about something." And I said, "What is it?" He said, "The New York Post is going to print

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that I have a disease with an adrenalin deficiency, and that I am on drugs and not fit to be president, not medically fit to be president. It isn't fair because I don't take drugs." He referred to something he had had and was over. It wasn't too full, but it was clear he was asking me to see if I could intervene with the Post on that story, which I did unsuccessfully. I can't remember now whether he brought up the vice presidency or whether this gave me the chance to. Of course, we went back to Hubert, and he said, "I can assure you it will be Humphrey or another midwestern liberal." That was his very clear statement in the taxicab there. Whether he would have nominated Hubert if Hubert had really gone ahead with the generosity in his statement of the night in West Virginia,

or whether Kennedy wouldn't have gone through with it, no one will ever know.

MORRISSEY: Did you have a feeling at the time between the West Virginia primary and the Convention that either a stop Kennedy movement might succeed or a nominate Stevenson movement might succeed?

RAUH: I never thought the latter might succeed. The former -- there were moments when I thought Kennedy was slowing down. Just before [G. Mennen] "Soapy" Williams came out for Kennedy, I thought he was slowing down. I was strongly for Soapy's coming out for Kennedy because I thought he was slowing down.

I've always thought that Kennedy didn't play quite fair with Soapy because I think that endorsement really broke the log jam there at a time when he badly needed the log jam broken.

I've always felt that Soapy's desire for HEW [Department of Health, Education, and Welfare] was certainly a political claim that ought to have been honored. While I think the job he ultimately got, he's worked at very hard and he's been very happy in it, but it did seem to me that he deserved his first choice, which was HEW, after he really broke the log jam. Just before Soapy came out for Kennedy, I thought there was a slowdown. In fact, I remember a meeting here with a group of liberals, who were for Kennedy, at which Sam Beer and some others were. We made that very point. Where could you get a new push for Kennedy? Everything had been done. The letter of the liberals had gone. They'd gotten all the pros they could, all the machine people they could, but they didn't really control

enough more. They needed a new start, a new initiative, a new push, and Soapy gave it to them. As I say, I thought that people discounted Soapy's role in that.

MORRISSEY: Were you involved at all in the writing of the Democratic platform?

RAUH: Oh, well, I guess I was. I was the member from the District of Columbia, the male member, on the Resolutions Committee. I was put on the Drafting Committee, which was a smaller group of a dozen or so. So I was, in fact, in on it. Of course, you don't write it. It's written ahead of time. But you can affect it. And we did strengthen the civil rights thing until we got everything we wanted. They stacked the Drafting Committee for us. There's no question the Drafting Committee was stacked so we could get what we wanted. It was the first time

that the Southerners were ever in a minority. By that I mean the first time they, plus their congressional cohorts, were ever in a minority. They always put a few congressmen on there who play ball with the Southerners in a kind of a hold the party together clubbiness. But this time we had them outnumbered, and we could get anything we wanted. Even old [William J.] Bill Green of Philadelphia, now passed away, cooperated with us -- or rather [Andrew] Andy Biemiller at my request got Green to promise to offer some very strong amendments. I would simply speak for him. The cooperation was rather strange. Bill Green hated the ADA with an absolute passion, but at this particular time this was forgotten. I'd give him the amendments. He'd propose them. I'd speak for them, and [Sam J., Jr.]

Ervin would speak against them. Almost without a voice vote, we'd win.

The only interesting thing that happened there wasn't on civil rights. But the one thing I remember that happened there was they started in, after the platform, on the Connally Reservation. The Connally Reservation is something the Democrats have long opposed. [Chester] Bowles, of course, who was the chairman of the Platform Committee and the Drafting Committee, had a provision in the draft platform putting the Democrats again on record to withdraw the Connally Reservation. Some of the Southerners, and then some of the Congressmen, started in on this. I had made up my mind never to say a word on foreign policy because I don't know anything about it, and besides I wanted to save what good will I would have for the civil rights thing, to get

a perfect platform. The staff looked over at me -- I remember [Abram] Abe Chayes was on the staff and Bill Welch. They all looked over at me, in anguish, as Bowles says, "Well, if you . . . Well . . ." I said, "Mr. Chairman." I spoke on a subject on which I have absolutely no qualifications whatever and raised the subject, "Well, do you really think we shouldn't stand by this?" Bowles, when he saw he had one supporter, stood up, and we didn't give it up.

With the exception of the civil rights thing, there wasn't so very much debate. I remember Clint [Clinton P. Anderson] made a little speech about civil defense, but essentially we accepted what was drafted. Oh, labor wanted a rewrite of something, and Arthur Goldberg gave me a plank he wanted stuck in.

All I had to say was, "This is what labor wants" and it went through. I don't think anybody listened while I read what labor wanted. This is what labor wants; this is what labor gets. It was a very liberal oriented drafting subcommittee.

MORRISSEY: How did that happen? Who's the key person in . . .

RAUH: Paul Butler. Paul Butler's never been given his due, and he never was given his due by John Kennedy. I never understood why they treated Paul Butler so shabbily. He died a rather unhappy man. I'm not saying Paul Butler was perfect. As a matter of fact, I was on the other side from Paul Butler. We felt, in the Humphrey camp, that Paul Butler was much too pro-Kennedy, which I think he was, but they really mistreated that fellow afterwards. So anyway, I think he's one

reason; I think that Bowles is another reason. You know the chairman is the boss. John McCormack used to run it with an iron hand. Bowles doesn't have John McCormack's iron hand, but he chose the Drafting Committee. Well, a Drafting Committee that they would let me on, on civil rights, was obviously one that was going to go pretty far. They wouldn't have let me on it if they were going to compromise it.

This goes back to the Jack Kennedy letter. Of course, Bowles was for Kennedy. Insofar as Jack Kennedy had anything to say about it, he had agreed to this sentence in that letter of the liberals that "Senator Kennedy has assured us that he will support the strongest possible civil rights plank" or whatever it was that we had in there. I remember seeing Kennedy just as we were

walking into the Resolutions Committee room for final action. He was going with his retinue to some caucus. He summoned me over there. He said, "Are we getting as strong a plank as we need?" He had a way of keeping everything in his head; he could balance an awful lot of balls.

Then at the Kennedy caucus which Bobby ran every morning with someone there from each of the delegations, the morning after the Drafting Committee came out with this terribly strong platform and it was going to the full committee, Bobby got on a chair and said, "Now we're selling this -- we favor the strong plank. Those of you who are working with Southern delegations, you tell them that we are not going to water down this plank, that our position is straightforward on civil rights,

but that we have the best understanding of their problems on the economic matters and other matters. And you fight to hold on to what you can down there. But on civil rights -- we're all out for this." It is a very clearcut and valuable statement.

MORRISSEY: Did you have any forewarning about the ultimate choice for the vice presidential nomination?

RAUH: I sure didn't. [Laughter] Indeed, I can say the contrary. The Washington Post was delivered every morning by some kind of a mechanism. They must have put it on a night flight of some sort, and then hand-carried, because as we got up every morning in our hotel in Los Angeles, each of the members of the Washington, D.C., delegation received a copy of the Washington Post. Now we were united

on many things, but the one thing I'd say we were most united on was our opposition to Johnson because we had a large Negro group, and we had a large liberal group. The split was over Kennedy versus Stevenson. I was for Kennedy and [Robert R.] Bob Nathan, one of my closest and dearest friends, was for Stevenson. He was great in his work. He'd take one of these nice girls who was really loyal to me, and he'd take her up to Mrs. Roosevelt. By the time she'd have about twenty minutes with Mrs. Roosevelt, she'd be for Stevenson again. Then I'd have to start all over again for Kennedy. The point of this story is Bob, very wisely, would be saying, "Kennedy's going to take Johnson." I'd have to knock this down. I would go to Bobby, and he would knock it down.

Then it appeared in the Post. The reason it appeared in the Post was what's come out later, that [Phillip L.] Phil Graham was working this side of the street. Phil kept Johnson alive in the Post. The minute this would come from the Post about three of the people I'd persuaded to go for Kennedy would come and would show this to me and would point at it very angrily. I'd say, "I'm sure it's not true. I'll go see Bobby Kennedy again." I went to see Bobby Kennedy, and I believe that Bobby Kennedy honestly told me that it would not be Johnson, that he meant it, that he believed it. So, far from having intimations this was going to happen, I had the best possible assurance it was not going to happen.

MORRISSEY: Did Bob Kennedy mention Hubert Humphrey?

RAUH: Not that late. By this time, Hubert's for Stevenson. Hubert is for stopping Kennedy for Johnson. It was "out". But it might have been. It was in the cards earlier or, at least, it was not "out" earlier. It was my impression it could have been done earlier, but by the time we're talking of now, the last few days, Hubert was clearly not for Kennedy. He came out for Stevenson finally as a stop Kennedy move.

MORRISSEY: Who was Bob Kennedy thinking of?

RAUH: I honestly don't know. He didn't tell me. All I was doing was getting the denial of this Johnson rumor. I don't know. I don't know too much about that. I know more about that from what I've read in books since. I worked on the platform steadily.

Then I worked to get our nomination for Kennedy and get our group for Kennedy. By then it was the end. So that I really know very little firsthand about that story which has been so much debated on what happened that day on the vice presidency. All I know is that I heard it and thought I was going to collapse after all the people I had promised it wouldn't happen. It was a kind of feeling you have that you've done something dirty when you go to people and persuade them to vote for someone on a premise that you believe to be true but turns out false. This had occurred to me. I remember some Utah delegates that Esther Peterson and I had persuaded to vote for Kennedy, and who we had promised it would not be Johnson. You just feel toward these people

as though you've done something ugly.
I think that may have been one reason
why I reacted so vigorously.

There's one nice thing about this.
If you attack the President in front of
forty million people on television, you
have no tendency to deny it later on.
I go around Washington today, and
everybody tells me that they've been
for Johnson for twenty years. I know
they're lying, but there's no real proof
against them. I can't get away with
anything like that so I might as well
be honest. [laughter]

MORRISSEY: I read somewhere that you were thinking
at that time of going ahead and nominating
Orville Freeman.

RAUH: That's in Arthur's book I think, but
it never reached that stage. Well,
actually, I did not get to the D.C. caucus.

I stood by our banner there, and that was the headquarters of the anti-Johnson feeling. That's all it was. It never was a serious political movement. The caucus of our D.C. group may have discussed that when I was not in it. Hubert Humphrey came up to me on the floor there, and we sat down. He said there was some talk about nominating someone else. So I said, "I don't think we would ever consider that. We know that Johnson's going to be nominated. We are expressing our feelings against this, but there is no question he's going to be nominated. We will try not to embarrass you". In a sense my actions and the actions of our group had the possible effect of embarrassing Humphrey himself. To my knowledge, Freeman was never very seriously suggested. There

were some pretty wild suggestions of people coming up, and I guess the reason. . . .

The things that made me so determined to at least make some show of opposition were first, the fact that I'd been made a liar of, and that hurts; and secondly, a group of Texans who had fought Johnson all their lives and who were absolutely distraught and beside themselves, urged me on. Ronnie Dugger of the Observer and Mrs. [R.K.] Randolph -- and another person who was standing there egging me on was Harry Golden. [laughter]

I remember Golden, Dugger, Randolph, and then there were some others of that same group who were just beside themselves, too. After all, on the national scene, some of us may have been unfair to President Johnson -- he may have gone

as far as a senator from Texas as he could -- but, on the local scene, he had been totally anti-liberal. The liberals of Texas were the people who had suffered the most under Johnson, and these were the people who were standing there egging me on. So, it was those two factors. I guess if I really had to guess what caused me to feel so bitterly, it was having been told over and over that it wouldn't be Johnson, having assured people, and having myself thereby been a part of something that was disreputable.

MORRISSEY: Who came from the Kennedy camp to calm you down?

RAUH: Oh, practically everybody. [laughter]
I understand there was a meeting in the Kennedy suite. Phil Graham told me this -- that they had a meeting after the

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decision. Who was going to talk to whom. Who would get to Scapy and who would do this and who'd do that. I was down on the list because I wasn't very important. Anyway, Kennedy looked over at Phil Graham and said, "I guess he's hopeless, but you take him." I'm told by Phil this happened. So Phil was the first. I have a picture on my wall that Phil had taken. He sent it to my wife and said, "Sometimes when Mr. Rauh is exceedingly difficult, look at my saintly suffering face." We have that on our wall. Of course, Phil's passed away now.

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He did. [P. Kenneth] Kenny O'Donnell came and said to me on the floor, "Joe, I'm as sick about this as you are, but in the morning we'll all feel better and we've got a job to do." Well, I couldn't

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disagree with that. I don't disagree with that. Ralph Dungan said roughly the same thing to me. I guess those were the three.

MORRISSEY: How about some of the . . .

RAUH: Well, Mike Monroney came and pulled off some of our anti-Johnson people. We were going to vote no as a unit. I had the votes, I think something like eleven to seven, to vote no as a unit. Of course, we never got to vote because the rules were suspended. But Mike Monroney came and picked up one of our group. They did some more work, and the anti-Johnson majority was eroding. Our opposition was eroding as the machinery went to work. Mike picked up one and someone, I can't remember who it was, picked up one of our Negro people, who came to me and said, "I'm going to

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vote for Johnson. I'm going to change my vote." So it got down pretty tough. I was very relieved when McCormack made his motion. I was very relieved when the vote was taken, and it sounded like there was so much opposition. I was very relieved when [LeRoy] Collins couldn't make up his mind how to call it. And there was [Sam] Rayburn, because we were very close to Rayburn, and you could just read his lips. "Yes, you damn fool. Yes, you damn fool." Well, anyway, Collins finally ruled that it had passed. Well, of course, he should have ruled that it had passed, but the moment of glory we had, at least for the few seconds there, was Collins' indecision. This is quite remarkable to have an indecisive vote on a matter involving the just nominated President.

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It showed the latent hostility in that room. Of course, we also had the galleries voting. I was aware of that. The Stevenson galleries voted no and a good bit of the delegates voted no. All of Michigan shouted, and we made a heck of a vote for no. The no didn't prevail.

MORRISSEY: Is there anything in the campaign in the autumn of 1960 that we ought to talk about?

RAUH: I don't really know that I have any special knowledge.

MORRISSEY: How about the question of ADA's endorsement?

RAUH: Oh, well, that was a remarkable thing. There's a letter that Arthur Schlesinger wrote John Kennedy that's a very valuable document for anybody that's going to study the reaction of liberals to Kennedy.

This ADA meeting was held very shortly after the Convention. There was tremendous opposition to an endorsement. It's all in this letter of Arthur's to John Kennedy -- it was written for the purpose of telling Kennedy that he had to do certain things to get liberals motivated. There wasn't any suggestion anybody was going to vote for [Richard M.] Nixon. That was never in it. Nobody was going to vote for Nixon in the whole ADA Board. It was a hot room in the Congressional [Hotel]; I remember it very well. Despite the fact that we had a letter from Herbert Lehman, our hero, from Mrs. Roosevelt, from [Joseph S.] Joe Clark, telling us we must endorse the ticket, there was tremendous opposition to an endorsement. In the final statement we endorsed the national ticket, but Johnson's name was

never mentioned.

Once you're in a fight, you've got to go all out. There isn't any question. I was totally on the side of full commitment to the Kennedy-Johnson ticket. So was Arthur. But Arthur's letter summarizing what happened at this meeting evidences the fact that Kennedy did not have a very strong position with liberals at that moment and that his nomination of Johnson had weakened even that position. But it all built up during the campaign. You could feel it as the campaign went along. The worse Nixon got, the more you got support for Kennedy. But if you take the day of that ADA meeting, it was a revelation. It was such an eye-opener to Arthur that he immediately put it down in a letter to Kennedy with some

recommendations on what to do. That letter I find a very valuable document in relation to the feeling of liberals at that particular time to both Kennedy and to Johnson. But on something like this, my recollection is not nearly as good as Arthur's letter written I think that night or the next day.

MORRISSEY: I noticed in the White House appointment books that you went in to see John Kennedy on February 10 for about forty-five minutes with Sam Beer, Bob Nathan, and is it Marvin Rosenberg?

RAUH: Marvin Rosenberg, that's correct.

MORRISSEY: What were the circumstances around this meeting?

RAUH: Well, there was an ADA board meeting in Washington. We had supported John Kennedy. We asked for an appointment to talk to him about things. I can tell you

quickly what happened. Sam Beer opened -- he was our national chairman at that time -- with a statement as to how glad we were that we'd supported him and how pleased we were with the way things were going and the Inaugural was great. Sam just sort of opened it with the amenities, quite enthusiastically. Then [Robert R.] Bob Nathan made a statement on what he ought to do on economics. It really was great. Bob was absolutely at his best, and Kennedy was very interested in it. He didn't even flinch when Bob said, "Of course, there will be a fifty billion deficit to get full employment" They were talking about how you get full employment. Bob explained that under his plan there would be about another fifty billion deficit. Kennedy leaned back in his chair and said, "Well, the difficulty with your proposal is that 93 per cent

of the people in this country are employed. That other 7 per cent isn't going to get enough political support to do it. The difference between me and Roosevelt is that he could get these things done. I don't believe that, right or wrong, there's any possibility of doing the kind of all-out economic operation that you want. But," and he turned to Bob and said, "I want you to keep this up. It's very helpful now for you to keep pushing me this way."

That was my cue. I said, "Well, Mr. President, I hope that the spirit with which you have treated Bob's pressure from the left, on the issue for which he speaks for the ADA, will go equally for the issue on which I speak for the ADA -- civil rights." I've never seen a man's expression turn

faster. He said, "Absolutely not. It's a totally different thing. Your criticism on civil rights is quite wrong." He started arguing with me that a lot had been done. Nothing had been done in my judgment, and they weren't planning any real action. This is two years before the big drive, when [Martin Luther] King was at Birmingham. Kennedy turned on me with great force.

As I look back, I think the difference is that he felt criticism of not doing enough on civil rights was a kind of moral criticism. Criticism of not doing enough on economics is a matter of judgment. Therefore, Bob was welcomed, and I was the skunk at the garden party as usual. I didn't mean it that way, but I'm glad it came out because it evidenced a feeling that went all through him. He was beginning to get a moral

sense on the civil rights. He was beginning to feel deeply. He hated criticism on it. He didn't want to take on a lot of civil rights battles at this stage. He was a minority president.

It was interesting the way he disagreed on the comments that Bob made and I made in these two areas. But as I've talked to Arthur about it since, it seems pretty clearly that it was a kind of guilty conscience because he felt that he wasn't doing enough in there, that this was a moral issue, that he didn't know just how to confront it. It wasn't until June of 1963 at the meeting in the White House where he called all the civil rights leaders together to support his bill that he made it so clear on the moral issue. He went around the table, you know, saying hello to everyone. I hadn't seen him in a long time. He said, "Joe, this is going

to be a long, tough fight, but we have to do it." It was a totally different attitude than he'd had in February of 1961. It was one of: "Well, I guess now left-wing pressure is going to be helpful to this fight we're doing." But it was very, very interesting -- his change in expression from Bob's criticism on the left in economics and my criticism on civil rights.

MORRISSEY: Did you ever talk specifically with him about, say, an order to end discrimination in housing?

RAUH: Oh, I had a laundry list that day in February, 1961. I gave him the whole works. Sure, the "stroke of the pen" that he'd promised in the campaign. . . . Oh yes, I was well prepared. Of course, Bob was well prepared on economics. This was our opportunity to give the President

our views. We'd supported him in the campaign. It was our opportunity to give him our program. It was agreed ahead of time that the two things we were going to talk about were economic recovery and civil rights. Bob made the one, and then I made the other. The difference in reaction was as night and day.

MORRISSEY: It's hard to put yourself into the context of, let's say, the two years up to the summer of 1963, but do you think Kennedy is justified in the way he handled civil rights problems to that time?

RAUH: No, I do not. I feel that he was going too slow. Again, one has to say that his reason was -- his particular reason -- he was a minority president. Civil rights is a very divisive issue. They

had to do other things. I don't personally accept that. But I think the thing was overwhelming.

Well, let me go back. In my judgment, the great mistake of the Kennedy civil rights program was the so-called [Harris] Wofford memorandum of December, '60, I guess. That memorandum, which I saw contemporaneously, took a rather "appoint and appoint and elect and elect" theory. It was "appoint Negroes. That is the political way. Do a lot of administrative things, but stay away from Congress." It reminded me of the Hopkins "spend and spend and elect and elect", but this was rather an "appoint. . . ." I said this contemporaneously that the Wofford Theory, which was apparently articulating Kennedy theory, was "appoint and appoint and elect and elect." Well, I don't

agree with that. I think appointments are fine, but a few Negro jobs are not the end. I think they're important. But they're not the end of the problem.

I think that not enough was done. For example, I think waiting two years to do an executive order on housing which he had called a "stroke of the pen", and then doing a very halfhearted and weak and, now we find, a meaningless document -- President Johnson hasn't extended it, however. I felt that Kennedy went much too slow.

Then in February in 1963 he sent up such an inane package of legislation as to make the civil rights movement feel that it wasn't worth going for. That's as late as the end of February, 1963. It was so bad -- people don't remember this -- that in March of '63

there was a lot of talk about "Well, the Republicans are doing a lot of good work in civil rights." The Senate Republicans put in some bills. Clarence Mitchell came to the Leadership Conference meeting on civil rights with a whole package of Republican bills to cheer us up. I tell you, if you need to be cheered up with bills like that that can't go anywhere -- nobody intended them to go anywhere -- you're in pretty bad shape. So I'd say in March and April, 1963, Kennedy would not have done well in Negro communities or civil rights communities.

Then came May. Then came King. Then came the police dog picture in the New York Times. Then came all the change. Then Kennedy came down with an axe. He was going to do something.

At this meeting I referred to in June, he read the famous poll that nobody's ever been able to find where he said that his popularity had gone down to 42 per cent, and that this was on civil rights, but he was prepared if necessary to sacrifice everything for the fight. It was a moral issue. It was a great speech he made to us. I felt from that moment he was terribly committed. I felt he had had advice even then because they didn't send up enough. We strengthened the bill afterwards. Again, he succumbed to bad advice. But there was no question of his total commitment in June of '63.

Back now to the February thing where he sent up this very poor, inane package. I remember people in the civil rights movement at this same

meeting, where Clarence Mitchell walked in with the Republican bills, saying of Kennedy, "Well, he's grown so that maybe in the second Kennedy Administration we'll get the legislation we've been fighting for." It was a kind of feeling of warmth towards him even when he was doing so little, as we felt he was. There was a kind of a serious, genuine feeling -- "Well, maybe in the second Administration." And it came in the first Administration because of the King move, but one would have to say that King's performance there in Birmingham did galvanize Kennedy as no single act ever did.

MORRISSEY: Arthur Schlesinger mentioned a meeting here in your office in January of '63 with some civil rights leaders.

RAUH: Yes.

MORRISSEY: I assume the leaders at that time were

a little distressed at the lack of progress?

RAUH:

Yes, I'll tell you why that occurred. The question was before the Senate of the filibuster rule. We were trying to change Rule 22 so that a majority could cut off debate. That was in the interest of civil rights legislation. A group went to see Johnson who had to make the fateful ruling on whether you could do this at the opening of a new congress. The group that went included Roy Wilkins, head of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights of the NAACP, Arnold Aronson, secretary of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, a couple of representatives of labor and a few others. Since I'd always done the legal work on this fight on the filibuster, they came here for a briefing. But I

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didn't go along. The reason for that was that nobody considered my credentials with Vice President Johnson especially high. So they went, and then they came back. They hadn't gotten anywhere. It was perfectly clear that neither the Vice President nor the President were going to do anything. They weren't going to do anything about legislation. Everybody was sitting there despondently. I can't remember who said this, maybe I did. I said, "Well, why don't we cut it out. Let's have a real attack on them." Wilkins -- one of the greatest men I ever met, Roy Wilkins -- said, "Well, Joe, I don't know about that. Let me tell you. I was down in North Carolina last week. I went after Kennedy hook, line and sinker. I said he hadn't done anything, and I blasted away. And they all sat on their hands. Then I

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mentioned some little thing he did and the place went up in smoke with everybody cheering." He said, "I don't know that we'd have many troops behind us in an attack." And here it was at the time when he was doing the least. So I told that to Arthur to indicate that somehow Kennedy had held on to the Negro rank and file, even at the period he sure didn't have the Negro leadership.

MORRISSEY: Do you recall any other discussions with the President other than the ones I mentioned?

RAUH: I don't offhand recall any. He made some very nice, personal, friendly remarks the night my wife and I were invited to the dinner for the Nobel Prize winner. But I don't remember any substantive discussions other than the two that I have referred to while he was President.

MORRISSEY: I think we've just about covered it.

RAUH: All right.

MORRISSEY: Any final comments?

RAUH: No.

MORRISSEY: Well, thank you very much.