

Charles Guggenheim Oral History Interview – RFK#1, 02/15/1973
Administrative Information

Creator: Charles Guggenheim
Interviewer: Roberta Greene
Date of Interview: February 15, 1973
Place of Interview: Washington, D.C.
Length: 83 pages*

Biographical Note

(1924 - 2002). Film producer, political media consultant, Robert Kennedy Senate campaign, 1964 and presidential campaign, 1968; producer RFK Remembered, 1968, discusses media campaigns in presidential races, and working for RFK's 1964 and 1968 campaign, among other issues.

Access

Open.

Usage Restrictions

According to the deed of gift signed January 8, 1991, copyright of these materials has been assigned to the United States Government. Users of these materials are advised to determine the copyright status of any document from which they wish to publish.

Copyright

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be "used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research." If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excesses of "fair use," that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law. The copyright law extends its protection to unpublished works from the moment of creation in a tangible form. Direct your questions concerning copyright to the reference staff.

Transcript of Oral History Interview

These electronic documents were created from transcripts available in the research room of the John F. Kennedy Library. The transcripts were scanned using optical character recognition and the resulting text files were proofread against the original transcripts. Some formatting changes were made. Page numbers are noted where they would have occurred at the bottoms of the pages of the original transcripts. If researchers have any concerns about accuracy, they are encouraged to visit the Library and consult the transcripts and the interview recordings.

Suggested Citation

Charles Guggenheim, recorded interview by Roberta Greene, February 15, 1973, (page number), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.

*The transcript contains two page 4s.

LWS

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY

Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interviews of
Charles Guggenheim

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Charles Guggenheim, do hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title, and interest in the tape recording and transcript of personal interviews conducted on February 15, 1973 and February 27, 1973 at Washington, DC and prepared for deposit in the John F. Kennedy Library. This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

(1) The transcript shall be made available for use by researchers as soon as it has been deposited in the John F. Kennedy Library.

(2) The tape recording shall be made available to those researchers who have access to the transcript.

(3) I hereby assign to the United States Government all copyright I may have in the interview transcript and tape.

(4) Copies of the transcript and the tape recording may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.

(5) Copies of the transcript and tape recording may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the John F. Kennedy Library.



Donor



Date

Archivist of the United States



Date

Jan. 8, 1991

Charles Guggenheim – RFK #1

Table of Contents

<u>Page</u>	<u>Topic</u>
1	Meeting Robert F. Kennedy [RFK] during Adlai E. Stevenson’s 1956 presidential campaign
4	Coming into the 1964 Senate campaign to create a biography film of RFK
6	Issues to address with the biography film
8, 41	Collecting material for the film and issues with obtaining photographs
10	Challenges with advertising agency Papert, Koenig, Lois, Inc.
12	Screening material and putting the film together in New York City
14	Struggles with support from the Jewish community and interviewing Harry Golden
19	Filming RFK during the campaign and his personal input
23	Incorporating outside input into the film
26	Challenges working with Frederic S. Papert and George Stevens
27	RFK’s opinion of the final biography film
31	Personal interaction with Ethel Skakel Kennedy
33	General comments on advertising agencies in political campaigns
37	Distribution of biography film
38	General comments on 1964 campaign
40	Contact with RFK between 1964 and 1968
45	Contact with Stevens about working on the 1968 campaign
48, 55	Challenges with the heads of the media campaign
51	Working with Papert and Donald M. Wilson
58	Agreement to produce a half-hour spot for the campaign
62, 65	Writing a memo to RFK about the problems with the media campaign
64	Cost of the media campaign
67	The media campaign bringing in Richard N. Goodwin
68	Support from Frederick G. Dutton
69	RFK’s dissatisfaction with the media campaign
71	Working with deadlines
71	Using the wrong film footage in Oregon
72	Filming on the campaign trail for the new biography film
74, 83	Staged situations for filming
79	Targeting groups of people with filming situations
79	Working with schedulers on the campaign
81	Challenges with working on a Kennedy campaign

Oral History Interview

with

Charles Guggenheim

February 15, 1973
Washington, D.C.

By Roberta Greene

For the Robert F. Kennedy Oral History Program of the John F. Kennedy Library

GREENE: Do you want to describe how you first met the Senator [Robert F. Kennedy] and how you got involved and how things developed?

GUGGENHEIM: This is probably of no interest to anybody, but see that picture there?

GREENE: Yes.

GUGGENHEIM: That's a picture of him I took in 1956 and it says.... It was on the Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson] campaign train. We had stopped in Niles, Michigan. No one recognized him, he stood alone. I believe this and one other picture taken the same day are the only photographs of him covering the presidential campaign of 1956.

[-1-]

GREENE: Is that so? That's very interesting, the only picture.

GUGGENHEIM: He just came around to observe. I remember he had an M-3 Leica which at that time was.... Leica had just come out with a camera which was rather expensive. I know I always wanted one, and I

remembered the camera.

GREENE: Being envious.

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah. He joined the campaign two or three times. I don't know what was in the back of his mind, whether....

GREENE: Oh, I think he was just taking notes, very careful notes, what not to do.

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah, I guess that's probably right. Yeah.

GREENE: Did you get to talk to him at all in that campaign?

GUGGENHEIM: No, I didn't. I was sort of embarrassed. I saw him at the Midway Airport—we were leaving at the same time and I saw him—and I never went up to say hello to him. You know, I didn't know what to say to him. I knew he was the son of the ambassador [Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr.], that's all I knew. Or was he ambassador at that time?

[-2-]

GREENE: No, he wasn't.

GUGGENHEIM: He wasn't, that's right.

GREENE: Yeah.

GUGGENHEIM: But I knew.... His brother [John F. Kennedy] had just been elected senator from Massachusetts?

GREENE: Right, but his brother had just lost the race for vice president at the convention.

GUGGENHEIM: But he was a senator?

GREENE: Oh yes.

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah. He had been a senator for two years maybe?

GREENE: No, he had finished.... Well, it was towards the end of his second term.

GUGGENHEIM: First term.

GREENE: Of his first term. And he was about to be re-elected in '58.

GUGGENHEIM: Right. Well, I had gone to the convention. I was doing Stevenson's television. And of course I had seen the president [John F. Kennedy] for the first time at that convention that you mention. Then I saw him in the hotel—not Bobby, but I saw the president in a hotel—when we went to Boston to do the last television show in '56.

[-3-]

GREENE: But again no real contact.

GUGGENHEIM: Well, Bobby, I don't remember being there at all. He wasn't there. So it's not really.... It's just interesting but there it is.

GREENE: I'll have to get up and look at it later because I really can't see that far very well.

GUGGENHEIM: Not very well? There's another one. I gave the other picture to Ethel [Ethel Skakel Kennedy] and to Teddy [Edward M. Kennedy]. The other one is a better picture actually. It shows him reading a newspaper while Stevenson is making a speech.

GREENE: Oh, that would be a good one. Anyway, I believe you were brought in by George Stevens. Is that correct?

GUGGENHEIM: That's right.

GREENE: And what was your first contact with the senator?

GUGGENHEIM: Well, he was in his office over at the Department of Justice. And I think George had suggested that if he was going to run, that he ought to have a half-hour film made for the

[-4-]

campaign. So he told me to come to Washington—I was living in St. Louis at the time. We went over to see him I think it was, as I recall, about 3:30 or 4 o'clock in the afternoon. I had never really met him before. We were in his office alone, with George, and he just asked what I would do and why I would do it. I explained, I guess maybe it took me a minute and half to do it. And he just says, "Yeah, I think you're right. Do it." And that was.... And he called in Ed Guthman [Edwin O. Guthman] and said, you know, "Make sure you give him some help." That was the end of the meeting.

GREENE: He was no more explicit than that about what he wanted, what he wanted the film to accomplish?

GUGGENHEIM: No he wasn't, actually. I was happy because, you know, sometimes you express yourself well and sometimes you don't. I thought I had at that moment sort of said all I could about why he should have a film like this.

GREENE: Had Stevens briefed you before about the kinds of things that were problems at that point and what sort of effect you'd want the film to have?

[-4-]

GUGGENHEIM: No, because I think the reason George brought us in, brought me in, was because he had seen what we had done in other films. We had, I had tried this technique, technique is a little oversimplified, but this process of making a biography film for a political candidate. He had seen us do this. We had tried it in Arkansas and he had seen that film. I'm trying to think—this was what?

GREENE: '64.

GUGGENHEIM: '64. He had seen.... We had done it for George McGovern [George S. McGovern] in '62 and George [Stevens] had either seen one or the other of those two films. I think it was the one we did for Sid McMath [Sidney Sanders McMath] in Arkansas. He saw it because we had sent him some films because we were interested in doing work for the United States Information Agency. And he had seen our political films and suggested, I would guess—George can tell you better than I, but I assume that he felt that this kind of thing would be helpful for Kennedy.

GREENE: Do you remember the thrust of what you described?

[-5-]

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah I do. Because my opinion of.... I think my being out in the Midwest and so forth, I think probably my assessment of him, from the electorate's point of view, was probably fairly accurate. It certainly wouldn't have been with eight out of ten people in Washington he would have talked to—that he was considered remote and that he was considered, you know, the word....

GREENE: Ruthless.

GUGGENHEIM: ...ruthless was always used. You know he was sort of behind the scenes with those steely blue eyes carrying on the hatchet work for the president. That's a little over exaggeration, but I felt that what he needed to be, what he needed to have done was to personalize him, and that the film was not going to be a film so much on.... Not only would it be a film about what he had done, but his personal approach, so people were able to identify with him as a human being as opposed to a politician. I used that very phrase: to identify with him as a human being as opposed to a politician, or as a public servant, someone in government.

[-6-]

You know how he'd slouch back. I don't think he'd put his feet up on his desk but I think he had his knees sort of up on the desk, you know how he did. I have even seen a lot of pictures that way, so it was all coming true. And he says, "Yeah, yeah, that's right, that's what has to be done." And I think his answer was so simple and direct that I was very impressed with it.

GREENE: Gives you confidence.

GUGGENHEIM: Yes. I mean I felt pretty confident about it.

GREENE: There was no discussion about the carpet-bagging problem in New York?

GUGGENHEIM: You mean really what his issues, what he really would....

GREENE: Well, in just, you know, certifying himself as a New Yorker?

GUGGENHEIM: I remember, and when I discuss the film later I'll tell you that that was one of the main problems that we attacked in the film, but whether or not in that meeting we discussed what I thought were, or what I later decided were the three main issues of the film, I can't remember. We may or we may not have.

[-7-]

GREENE: Okay.

GUGGENHEIM: I would opt for saying we didn't discuss that. Yeah.

GREENE: All right, where did you go from there?

GUGGENHEIM: Maybe we did though. You mean just physically?

GREENE: Well, yeah. How did you proceed from that point?

GUGGENHEIM: Well, first of all I asked to get a hold of all of the film and still pictures which would help us in making the film. And to make a long story short, it was a catastrophe. I don't know how....

GREENE: Was there a lack of cooperation?

GUGGENHEIM: I don't know if names should be mentioned in this?

GREENE: Yes. You can close this up for as long as you want.

GUGGENHEIM: I see. Well, it's not an issue of national importance, it isn't. There was a girl or a young lady who had been hired to collect all the pictures of him. George Stevens knows who she is. Her name escapes me. She was the person who was supposed to have been with Marilyn Monroe just before she died.

GREENE: I know who you mean but I can't remember the name either.

[-8-]

GUGGENHEIM: You know who I mean? George, I think, hired her for USIA and then she went with Bobby. And she had all of these great pictures of him. And for some reason she just didn't want to release them. And they were just.... It was you know.... You just couldn't get a hold of her and she took them to New York and I don't know whatever happened to them.

GREENE: And she was part of his staff?

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah, part of his staff. I don't know what the reason was but there is a.... She felt that maybe they shouldn't be used in that way. She had made up her mind the best way to keep them from being used was just to avoid us. We made all kinds of attempts to get a hold of those pictures and we couldn't get them. So I decided there was.... We learned very quickly that there was no enthusiasm for this project.

GREENE: Now, where do you mean? Where was the lack of enthusiasm?

GUGGENHEIM: The lack of enthusiasm, first of all, on the part of the advertising agency.

[-9-]

GREENE: Papert, Koenig, Lois, Inc?

GUGGENHEIM: Papert. Papert [Frederic S. Papert] felt it was not the right thing, he felt it was a waste of time and no one could watch a half-hour film. He made that very clear. We knew that. We were assigned. . . . LeMoyne Billings [Kirk LeMoyne Billings], we were sort of, I think, in an administrative capacity, responsible to him. I don't know what his title was in the campaign but it had something to do with advertising director. Papert was operating sort of off on the side. But there was LeMoyne and me, we were to deal with him. And LeMoyne's questions, though he was cooperative, gave me the reason that he wasn't quite sure that this project should be done. But I think Papert was telling him this too. And LeMoyne at that time was in the advertising business and I think somewhat insecure in it, and he felt he'd get his advice from the rest of the people on this thing. My vibes sort of told me that we were going to have to do this, do it on our own.

GREENE: The fact that the senator was in favor of it apparently didn't matter?

[-10-]

GUGGENHEIM: Well that often happens in political campaigns. The candidate often goes off and says he wants something, and then if his advisers don't want him to do it, they have ways of making the project kind of go off the dock, you know. That happens. I just experienced it in the McGovern campaign on a number of instances. But I don't mean that people were disruptive, they just were not helpful. And when we went to visit people to talk to them and ask for their cooperation, those who were very close to the campaign would give us the word that, you know, "Why are you doing this?" You know, you could tell some of the phrases they used that they had been told by someone. I don't think it was an active campaign. I think people just felt, well you know, they're off doing something crazy and why are they doing it. They weren't using much of their energy and time to go out and to sink it, they just weren't enthusiastic about helping on it.

We holed up in a hotel in New York, and I brought all, a lot of my staff from St. Louis to that hotel. We just, we slept there and we

[-11-]

edited, we went into all the archives and started to get our own film of him and just decided to cut ourselves free and not depend because we didn't have much time. We felt we could do it better if we just went off on our own. Well, I'm probably getting ahead.

GREENE: No, you're exactly where you should be. Go on.

GUGGENHEIM: Okay. I was supposed to meet with LeMoyne, I think, once a week or something, to tell him where we were. Or he'd call me and we'd go out and have lunch and I'd sort of tell him. It was kind of strange, you know, because here were all these guys from St. Louis working in this New York campaign.

GREENE: Somebody else told me that—a film company from St. Louis in New York.

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah. There they were in that crazy hotel. I don't know, a strange hotel.

GREENE: Was it the Chatham?

GUGGENHEIM: The Chatham, I think, yeah. We were there screening pictures on the wall; and getting things out of film library; lining up people to talk to like people who knew Bobby—nurses and guardians, not guardians but...

[-12-]

GREENE: Governesses.

GUGGENHEIM: ...governesses—and, you know, people who used to know him. We had Charles Evers, we had him come up from the South and we filmed him in New York. I think the most memorable piece or part of that film was Harry Golden because that was one of the three issues that we had keyed in on. One was the carpet-bagging which you mentioned. The other one was the fact that our polls were showing him in trouble in the Jewish community. The other one was the ruthlessness. The ruthless one I felt we could handle because we were getting very good film of him and especially in his humor and his self-effacement, which was very disarming. I thought if people saw that in the proper light they would immediately attach themselves to him, not as a ruthless person, which he certainly wasn't. And then the carpet-bagging thing we concentrated on...

GREENE: Boyhood friends in New York?

GUGGENHEIM: ...boyhood friends. The fact that he grew up in New York, you know, and that he went to public school in New York—we located the public school

[-13-]

and recreated his walk to school—and the fact that after he got out of college at the University of Virginia he went to work in Brooklyn as an attorney in the U.S. attorney's office. All these things, we could handle that.

But the problem, what do you do about the disenchantment of the Jewish community, that was a tough one. I was struggling with that, and I didn't know how in the hell to handle it. And I was having one of these luncheons with LeMoyne Billings. And LeMoyne, you know how he is, he says, "Oh my God." He says, "Everybody's coming into town. They're

calling up wanting to help." He says, "So and so's coming into town, I've got to take care of him. Oh God, Harry Golden's coming into town, and what are we going to do with Harry Golden." I mean the light went on in my head, you know: Harry Golden, that's who I need.

So we got Harry Golden and we put him in front of the New York Public Library and we

[-14-]

filmed him for about an hour, a very funny scene in which I don't think anybody would be interested except as an anecdote—it had nothing to do with Bobby Kennedy. We didn't have permission from the police to do it, and they wanted to kick us out of there. We kept lying saying that we were getting permission to shoot there and the man was coming from city hall with a permit. Harry Golden started talking about Bobby Kennedy. And the policeman, who was about to kick us out and was getting madder and madder at me, got interested in what Golden was saying. And he kept saying—I heard him behind my shoulder as I was sitting by the camera—"Yeah, that's right. Yeah, that's exactly right." He got involved in the campaign and he let us stay there.

GREENE: I forget, because the only time I saw the film was on the Academy Awards. Did they show the whole thing?

GUGGENHEIM: That was a different film.

GREENE: But you had pieces from the New York film.

GUGGENHEIM: There were parts in that film, yes.

[-15-]

GREENE: Maybe I've never even seen the Golden section.

GUGGENHEIM: No, you never have.

GREENE: What was the thrust of what he said?

GUGGENHEIM: He said, "Robert Kennedy, when he was attorney general, did a remarkable thing." He said, "He took the act, the civil rights act that was passed under.... He took an act"—he didn't say civil rights—he said, "He took an act that was passed under the Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] administration, not under the present administration, not under the Kennedy administration, but under the Eisenhower administration. He took that act and cracked the caste system of the South. Destroyed the caste system of the South." He said, "That was a remarkable thing for him to do." And he said, "You know, that sort of represents sort of the matrix of what human

rights is all about." And he looked in the camera and he says, "We understand this better than anybody." He says, "We understand this better than anybody."

GREENE: In a situation like that, how much preparation

[-16-]

would there be for a man like Golden, or maybe you didn't know what he was going to talk about and you just kept the camera going?

GUGGENHEIM: Well, we had discussions. He was on the "Today" show that morning—I'm trying to think whether in Kennedy's behalf or not, but he was on the "Today" show. He knew that I wanted to film him, and on the way over in the car he said, "What should we do?" and we discussed it. And I said I wanted him to talk. I think—and this maybe, you know, sometimes when you look back that far you make things work out better for yourself in your own memory—I felt that what the Jewish community would respond to, sort of the kind of group that our polls were showing us we were in trouble with would respond to those things that Robert Kennedy did in the civil rights movement. That's what they would understand.

GREENE: Because it was the liberal Jewish people that he was having the trouble with.

GUGGENHEIM: That is exactly right. It was the ones who say, you know, "Who says you can just come in here and ask for our vote?" You know we're thinking,

[-17-]

concerned people. We don't run over to this emotionally like the Catholics, like the Irish or the Italians. We're thinking, rational people. And we take everything, you know...." And I think that's where we were in trouble. So that was a response that they had always given a lot of. They'd always respond to that civil rights thing. And I knew that we wanted to put Bobby Kennedy in the middle of that and how much Golden as a Jew in the South would respect what he had done. Now that is as far as we went before he started talking. The fact that he would come up with the great words, you know, "We understand this better than anyone. We understand this better."

I showed the film to Harry Ashmore [Harry S. Ashmore], who, as you know was the editor of the Arkansas Gazette, won the Pulitzer Prize for the Arkansas thing, and he wrote me back and he said, "That was a great piece of political film-making"—Harry Golden standing on the steps of the New York Public Library talking about civil rights in the South. He said, "But you missed one opportunity."

[-18-]

He said, "He should have been sitting on Cardinal Spellman's [Francis J. Spellman] lap."
[Laughter]

GREENE: Yeah. Okay, are there anecdotes about making that film?

GUGGENHEIM: Well, I never saw Kennedy at all during that campaign.

GREENE: There was no filming of...

GUGGENHEIM: Of the campaign?

GREENE: I wish I had been able to see the film before we talked, but there was no filming of him during the campaign?

GUGGENHEIM: Yes there was.

GREENE: There was. You had a crew?

GUGGENHEIM: But you know, he would appear at a rally or something, and we would be there. Then we would film him and he'd leave. He would look over, I thought he would look over and say, "Well, yeah, I know who you are and what you're doing," but maybe that was in my imagination. But I had not, I didn't have.... No, that isn't true, that isn't true. I beg your pardon. No, that isn't true. At the very end of the filming I wanted to get some footage of him and his family. We worked out a time when he was

[-19-]

coming back to Hickory Hill. In fact, it was a very memorable occasion now that I think of it. Yeah. Because, in fact, I have some—not here—the cameramen actually took some pictures of me talking with him. I didn't know they were doing that. But he turned to me and said, "How are things going?" And we took a walk for maybe two or three minutes. "How are things going?" And I told him about the interviews that we had had and who we got. And he said, "Well, did you get McNamara [Robert S. McNamara]?" He would always suggest people that I felt were very bad for us. And he'd also suggest some people that were.... But he didn't know exactly in what pastels I was painting. He didn't know exactly how I was going to make this thing work out. He never was insistent, but he would say, "Well, how are you doing on it?" And I'd tell something about some great thing that happened that I thought was a great piece. I told him about the Golden thing, you know. And I think he liked that very much. He says, "Well have you got McNamara?" He always was suggesting sort of the—which was a Kennedy trait to always suggest

[-20-]

the top names in the field of things. They liked that you know. It's like when they have a problem they bring in the advisers, they always bring in the top people, you know. Mike Nichols would always be brought in to look at my films at the end, you know, something like that, which is great but I...

GREENE: How would you treat a suggestion like that? Would you just ignore it, or would you give him reasons for not wanting to?

GUGGENHEIM: I would, I would up to a point till I thought that... You know, you could always tell with him when he felt that the thing had gone and let's go on to something else. And you always—I'm sure you're sensitive too about the fact, you know, how interested are they in my problems? Obviously when he gave me the assignment he gave the assignment as I've described it to you with a tremendous amount of... I think in the back of his mind was, you know, either he's going to do it or he isn't going to do it and I haven't got time to keep on top of him and I don't know anyone else who really has. Maybe George Stevens helped me a great deal in that

[-21-]

respect, I assume he did.

GREENE: I was going to say, how much did Stevens do?

GUGGENHEIM: I don't know. I don't know.

GREENE: I mean, did he stay in close contact?

GUGGENHEIM: Oh, you mean on the film? No. You know, he was interested. I think at that time he still was with the USIA so he had a problem in that regard. He had a Hatch [Act] problem. George did not see the film... I may be inaccurate. He may have seen the interlock when we are finished with it—before we put it together, somebody approves it. Milt Gwartzman [Milton S. Gwartzman] was sent to St. Louis to look at it. We did have some problems which turn out in retrospect to be sort of unnecessary ones, but they didn't deter us at all.

GREENE: What kind of problems?

GUGGENHEIM: Someone was beginning to... There were pictures of Jackie [Jacqueline B. Kennedy Onassis] in the film of the president's funeral. We had some shots of her. The campaign was heating up a bit and people were accusing, as someone said, "Well the next thing he's going to do is, to bring her in." Was she overseas at that time I can't remember?

[-22-]

GREENE: She was in New York most of the time, I think.

GUGGENHEIM: That's right because she did come to headquarters one day when I was there. "The next thing you know, they're going to bring in the president's widow and have her campaign for him," or something like that. And they were trying to.... Had that offer.... I don't know. But Steve Smith [Stephen E. Smith] was sensitive to that and when it appeared in the film—obviously everyone was told about it—and when Milt saw the film he said, "Well, you know, we don't want to bring Jackie into it." And there was discussion with Steve on the telephone. And Steve was very strong. Steve said you know.... I made the argument that I thought that the way she was presented in the film certainly in no way encouraged any opposition on that issue. He was very good. He said, "You use your own judgment." But we took one shot out to sort of modify it.

GREENE: Was that the only problem that Gwartzman had? '

GUGGENHEIM: I think there was a technical thing in terms of what came first in the Bay of Pigs and there was some question about whether they had met the [National] Security Council. It was a chronology

[-23-]

problem as I remember. There may have been a couple of others. I don't recall.

GREENE: Did you think it was strange that they would send someone like Milt Gwartzman out to look at your film? Did that sort of thing irk you. You know, rather than sending someone who might be at least somewhat knowledgeable in film?

GUGGENHEIM: I wasn't familiar enough with the family—by that I mean those I considered family members. I think Joe Dolan [Joseph F. Dolan] as a member of the family; Kenny O'Donnell [Kenneth P. O'Donnell] is a member of the family. You know, I'm talking about...

GREENE: Those people.

GUGGENHEIM: ...those people. I wasn't familiar enough to know who the ballplayers were, to know whether Milt, to judge him if they sent him out. I would feel perhaps differently now, either pro or con because I know where he would fit in the spectrum.

GREENE: Yeah. I didn't mean necessarily because he wasn't close in enough or anything, but just that he's not a filmmaker and, you know...

GUGGENHEIM: Oh, I see.

[-24-]

GREENE: ...from a professional standpoint, does that irk you at all?

GUGGENHEIM: Well, you have two ways of doing it, two ways of feeling about it. One, that he doesn't understand—not Milt, but anyone—that...

GREENE: Right.

GUGGENHEIM: ...he doesn't understand, you know, exactly what these films, how these films, because Milt is very pragmatic, like many research-writer-lawyer types, of which he is an excellent one. But, you know, you say, "Well, you don't understand, you're looking at this thing not as a person would look at it, therefore you're not going to be able to criticize it properly." On the other hand, you send out a filmmaker, he's all ready to tell you how to change things. So some times you're glad they send...

GREENE: You prefer a layman?

GUGGENHEIM: ...the other person out.

GREENE: Did you have problems with Papert in this campaign once he made it clear that he thought the thing was a waste of time? Did he stay out of your way or was that an on-going problem?

[-25-]

GUGGENHEIM: I think you'd have to answer that in the negative. I mean I knew he was against it. And George Stevens did too. I think George felt that in a sense his judgment was being challenged too, which it was. In a sense George had committed himself in a way more than I had, certainly far more than I had because he was a friend of theirs. I think he felt, you know, he wanted Bobby's trust and he had recommended a project that if it had gone sour would have reflected on him—it would have reflected on me, but it would have reflected on him in a more personal way. So I think he felt some sensitivity towards Papert in a way that I previously described. But we were convinced and maybe we were paranoid but we were convinced of the little respect that Papert had for this, for this project when the time came to project it. That was an interesting story. They decided, well yes, maybe they could project it after a lot of delays.

GREENE: "They" is Papert?

GUGGENHEIM: I think so, and I want to make sure that I'm right about that. But the delay was, you know,

[-26-]

"Well, he's going to be here, how can he see it there?" It was that kind of conversation. Also Papert didn't feel, I remember he didn't feel we had enough time to get it on the air, and no one's going to watch the half-hour thing was repeated. People began to verbalize as we got closer to completion again the thing that they verbalized at the beginning.

So finally, he was going to come back in the city at a certain time and we were going to project it at the agency that evening. I think 10 o'clock might be a proper time. And everybody plied into the agency office. I brought the film in, you know—I had just gotten out of the laboratory—and I said, "Well, where can,"—there was no one at the agency to tell us where to go—"So where are we going to go?" Papert wasn't there, and no one in the agency knew anything about it. "Film? We didn't know we were going to project a film tonight." It was that kind of thing. And finally I said, "Well the projection room?" And he said, "No, the projection room is too small." Or "We can't get into there tonight, it's locked up," or something. You know, it was one of those things.

And finally, there was this room that they set up this projector in, and we projected it on the wall and people sat on the floor. It was

[-27-]

projected on the wall like this. And I was upset. I think Ethel and Bobby and maybe Kathleen [Kathleen Kennedy Townsend]—they had two or three of the children who came along—were the only ones who were sitting in chairs. Everyone else was leaning against the wall or sitting on the floor. It was projected on the wall. You know, of course, I'm just sitting there wondering what the reaction would be, and Bobby would be making comments, two or three comments, and people would laugh. Well, this happens quite a lot in films. It was usually in a thing which was very flattering or projected him well and his self-effacement humor would move in, you see. And some would say.... I remember Roger Hilsman was in the film. It was about the Cuban missile crisis and Roger Hilsman would say, "Robert Kennedy, more than anybody else around the president, was responsible for the fact that we did not have a nuclear holocaust. I really believe that." Well, you know, pow! And so Bobby would say, "Ah, couldn't he have stated that a little stronger." [Laughter]

[-28-]

It would be kind of things like that. Well, I didn't want people in the audience to.... I wanted them to go along with me, you know, not along with him, thought I can appreciate it in retrospect. You know, here's a guy who's embarrassed by this and has this great sense of

humor; the great thing about him. But there would be two or three cases where he would say funny things, you know.

But the minute the film was over there was this kind of silence and you don't know which way it's going to go. Leland Hayward was there and he didn't wait for anybody, he just said, "You go out and buy every half hour you can find." And from all I know, Papert did a good job, he went to work and....

GREENE: Wasn't it his guy Murphy [William Murphy] that was the real key to the whole thing then and in '68?

GUGGENHEIM: As a time-buyer?

GREENE: Yeah.

GUGGENHEIM: A time-buyer, right?

GREENE: Yeah. That he was the real value in the whole agency.

[-29-]

GUGGENHEIM: People commended him a great deal for being very good and working hard on the time-buying. A fellow named Gardner [Allan Gardner], Al Gardner, I think also was working at that time and I think people liked him very much. I better not say because I don't know.

GREENE: That's a familiar name and I think you're right. I think that I've heard other people say that that he had somebody working with Murphy that was very good.

GUGGENHEIM: Murphy, Al Gardner, I think.

GREENE: But Murphy gets an awful lot of credit it seems for....

GUGGENHEIM: For the '64?

GREENE: Yeah. And '68 too, as being among the only really good things about the Papert agency.

GUGGENHEIM: I think Gardner was. . . . I better not say. I personally don't think that thing was handled that well.

GREENE: Oh no?

GUGGENHEIM: But I'm a very prejudicial source as Mr. Papert will tell you.

GREENE: Well, I've heard a number of people say that

[-30-]

they—I mean a number of very close-in people say that they thought that this was the turning point; that the film is what really won the election. Did he ever express that to you?

GUGGENHEIM: Well, I've never tried to put that rumor down.

GREENE: Did the senator ever express that to you?

GUGGENHEIM: No, but he never was the kind of person to do that. You could tell how he felt. After it was over and he was still making those kind of jokes, I said, "My God, maybe he doesn't like it." He came over and finally he could see by my face that I was sort of in pain. And he said, "You know, it was a good job. It was a really good job." You know, he'd look down at the floor and he said, "It's a really good job, really good job". And you knew that...

GREENE: What about Mrs. Kennedy? She's always more open about things.

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah, that's right. You know, it's very hard about her.... I love Ethel. I feel so.... I didn't really get to know her until after Bobby's death, and then I got to know her better than any of the Kennedys. I love her, I just adore her. But

[-31-]

I can't remember what she said at that point. I do remember one comment which she probably wouldn't appreciate but which I'd be willing to tell you.

When we were over at the house, at Hickory Hill, looking for photographs—because I finally decided to get them off the wall, to hell with this woman whoever she was—and I was down in the basement looking at them, and we were photographing them and taking movies of the stills, she was in her room making telephone calls and everything. I didn't know her. I just apologized for disturbing her. She didn't pay too much attention to us. Then when I was about to leave, I thanked her. I don't know how it came up but it was the time when the polls were showing they were in trouble with the Jewish group, you know, and I remember she made a comment that didn't endear me to her at that time. She said, "You know, it's your people who are giving us all the trouble; it's your people who are giving us all the trouble."

I didn't know her and everyone said what a great person Ethel Kennedy was. That's, really

[-32-]

the only...

GREENE: Did that sour you?

GUGGENHEIM: It kind of soured me a bit. I didn't really get to see her until '68 and then I began to see a lot of her. I think I told her that story once and she said, "Oh God, did I say that?" But it was something she would say because it was on her mind. Sorry to jump around.

GREENE: No, that doesn't matter at all. No, don't worry about that. I was wondering what general comments you might have about ad agencies in political campaigns. I'm sure you have lots about it....

GUGGENHEIM: I have, yeah.

GREENE: It's sort of an interesting subject I think.

GUGGENHEIM: Well, let me just say I think in the '68 campaign there were two things that were fairly distinguished on television. One, I think the half hour was a distinguished, was a contribution. I think the thing that Papert did at Columbia University was also a very important thing.

[-33-]

GREENE: I was going to ask you . . .

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah, I think that that was very, very helpful.

GREENE: You said '68 but you meant '64, right? Yeah.

GUGGENHEIM: I meant '64, I meant '64.

GREENE: I was going to ask you if you had anything to do with that then?

GUGGENHEIM: I had nothing at all to do with it, but I think it was a very, very important thing.

GREENE: You would say that was a very important thing? Yeah.

GUGGENHEIM: I think the other stuff that was done, was it helpful? Perhaps. Perhaps.

GREENE: But do you think they lack—I'm just emerging from....

GUGGENHEIM: Not distinguished.

GREENE: ...a campaign myself—do you think they lack, I don't want to say a sensitivity, but an intuitiveness about political campaigns?

GUGGENHEIM: You mean in general?

GREENE: Yeah.

GUGGENHEIM: I think you could safely say that, yeah. The thing is the money they spend, the money they

[-34-]

spend is just mind-boggling. You see that's one thing that probably hurt me maybe out of proportion to reality. And that is the dollars that Papert was spending on production and the type of work that they were putting out. I'm not sure, I think any advertising in New York—I don't think it would be just Papert; I don't think Papert was out to bilk anybody—I just think that, you know, that they were just.... The thousands of dollars they were putting into production, the amount of tape they were making; they were almost equating volume with effectiveness. They didn't really understand it, you know.

GREENE: Is this characteristic of agencies in general in key political campaigns, or do you think...

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah, New York agencies.

GREENE: ...it was because it was the Kennedys and they didn't think money was a problem?

GUGGENHEIM: No, I think, well.... No. I mean Eugene Nickerson [Eugene H. Nickerson] would have the same problem, unless you set the ground rules. In one sense it was true because I don't think Steve set—or maybe there wasn't any precedent for it, because in a

[-35-]

sense they had set all the precedents in contemporary politics, they were the media pioneers in a sense. They felt, you know, the president was really the first media candidate, and therefore, you know, what you do is you get yourself a good advertising agency and you put a lot of emphasis on television and you have the resources so you go ahead. In retrospect it's a very rich way to live.

GREENE: What about your costs in '64? Were you given a budget or did you just proceed?

GUGGENHEIM: I told him I would do it at cost. I said I'd do it at cost...

GREENE: And nobody asked any questions?

GUGGENHEIM: ...which was unnecessary. Yeah, I think it would have been unnecessary. I mean it was a gift. I think it cost sixty-eight thousand dollars. Yeah, it was a gift. I mean, I'm not sorry, I'm just.... You know, it was a great opportunity for me, I thought it was. It was naive of me, if you take that sixty-eight thousand and put it next to what else was spent.

[-36-]

GREENE: It's nothing.

GUGGENHEIM: Nothing.

GREENE: Anyway, was there any problem as far as how the film should be used or was it just agreed that you'd get it done as soon as possible and they'd use it as much as possible.?

GUGGENHEIM: I think it was like so many of those things; it was done, you know.... I think Kennedy's, Bob Kennedy's idea was, and I think it was sort of solidified in his mind after the victory in '60 that if we had done something differently, if we hadn't done everything we did, we would have lost. I think he felt with this half-hour film that here was somebody he respected—George Stevens he respected—and that here was something that possibly could make a difference. Perhaps it wouldn't, but go ahead and do it. I think that was the feeling. I think if you had asked Bob Kennedy a week before the film was finished, Are you really counting on this thing to bring you over? I don't think he would have said, I don't know what you're talking about. That would be my guess.

[-37-]

GREENE: Right. Do you have any observations about the campaign in general that...

GUGGENHEIM: In '64?

GREENE: ...yeah, that you want to put down.?

GUGGENHEIM: I couldn't very well say that I was in a position to observe it. I was working on my one thing and I felt that if we made any contribution.... Well, hell, I didn't have the opportunity to make any other contribution. I think, as I say, Papert took the film and I think he honestly went to work to devise many half hours and to promote it as he could. The other things I've told you about LeMoynes and about what the people in the campaign really thought about it....

GREENE: You've talked about the lack of cooperation and encouragement, but was there anybody who was particularly helpful?

GUGGENHEIM: I thought John Sharon, as I remember, was very helpful.

GREENE: John Sharon?

GUGGENHEIM: I don't mean John.... Oh God, strike that.

GREENE: I was going to say, I've never heard of him.

[-38-]

GUGGENHEIM: Strike that, not John Sharon. John.... Oh gosh.

GREENE: Nolan [John E. Nolan]?

GUGGENHEIM: Nolan. Was it John Nolan? John Nolan.

GREENE: Right.

GUGGENHEIM: John Nolan.

GREENE: He was doing scheduling.

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah, who was doing scheduling. The lawyer.

GREENE: Right.

GUGGENHEIM: Nice guy, terrific guy.

GREENE: Very nice. I interviewed him about nine or ten sessions, I think.

GUGGENHEIM: Did you?

GREENE: Very nice person.

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah, well he would know so much. He's such a.... He was a lovely.... We were out of nowhere and he just was very, very helpful. And there were other people that just wondered what the hell we were always doing. I'd have to remember who they were.

GREENE: Well, if there's nothing else on '64, is there anything between '64 and '68 that you were called on? Projects or the Library or anything of that sort? Or social?

[-39-]

GUGGENHEIM: Between '64 and '68.

GREENE: While he was senator?

GUGGENHEIM: I was in St. Louis, you see, when he was in the Senate. I came to Washington about six years ago, so that would be what? Sixty...

GREENE: Around '66.

GUGGENHEIM: '66. And Art Buchwald [Arthur Buchwald] had an Easter egg party, and I think that's the first time I'd seen him since the campaign.

GREENE: The campaign.

GUGGENHEIM: That would be two years later, wouldn't it? He came up to me.... By that time we had been in a couple of other political things. One in which some of the things we were learning, I would guess, we were becoming somewhat effective in them. He had obviously heard about them because he mentioned them. We just had one, two sentences passed. He said, "How are you?" I said, "Fine." He said, "I understand you're doing very well?" I said, "I understand you are too!" He laughed and that was the end of it.

That was what, '66. I would say I had absolutely nothing to do with him. I don't think I saw him or anyone else.

There's one thing that

[-40-]

maybe I should say about the film, if I can go back, the film in '64. The word came down that Teddy Kennedy was very interested in what we were doing and was against the half-hour film. I've talked to Teddy about this since, and he said, "Oh God! Did I? Oh, that's terrible." You know, like that. But he was, at that time, flat on his back in the Boston hospital. I went down to Hyannisport to get pictures of Bobby when he was a child. And what absolutely,

absolutely amazed me, amazed me, was the fact that there were photographs there of those children, the president as a child, that I had never seen before, that were kept in places—Mrs. Kennedy [Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy] went and tried to find them, and she looked under something and pulled them out, you know—and here were these pictures that I had never seen, and obviously other people hadn't either.

GREENE: I wonder if anything has been done with them.

GUGGENHEIM: I don't know. You know, it was just....

GREENE: You just viewed them and put them back.

GUGGENHEIM: I had to remind him of the fact that she even gave them to me, to take with me. What I almost

[-41-]

said to her, you know, "For goodness sake, don't give me these pictures."

GREENE: I think I'll write that down because....

GUGGENHEIM: But these were family albums. Now maybe they've all gone since then. Maybe all these books have been written and they've all been gone into.

GREENE: Probably not, because I think you generally see the same pictures over and over, don't you find?

GUGGENHEIM: Well, I don't know when all these books came out. Let's see when would I.... I was working on this film in what? In '64?

GREENE: Sixty-four.

GUGGENHEIM: And, you know all the films came out, I mean all the books on the president came out. Maybe someone has gone into them since then. But there they were, and you know, they were loose. And she'd look through them as if that was the first time she had seen it in twenty years. She would say, "Oh well, yes, that's Bobby when we were at so and so and that's the president." His father was still living then and we had to move from one room to the other while he walked by in order to get out of his way. I just walked around the

[-42-]

compound and I remember going into the garage and seeing this golf cart. And there was a sign on the golf cart, "For the president's use only." It was just sitting there.

And then the word came down that I was asked to go up and talk to Teddy because I was told that he was not for it and he thought it would be bad to have a film with certain things in it. That kind of came to me secondhand. You know, while I was up at Hyannis, would I kind of call the hospital and make arrangements to talk with him. I'm trying to think who told me. Maybe it was LeMoyne who told me to do that. Mrs. Kennedy knew about it. She was going off to the hairdresser or something. And so I was going to drive back. I got in my rented car to drive back to Boston, and at that time I was just insecure enough to say that I'm not going to go see him. I'd never met him, I'd never talked with him. And I just avoided going to see him in the hospital. I just couldn't; I just didn't have enough ego strength to do it.

GREENE: Because you were afraid he would kill the project or because you were ill-at-ease about meeting him?

[-43-]

GUGGENHEIM: I think probably it was a combination of both. I knew nothing about it. Since then we've become very close—I hope so anyway—and, you know, I know him, worked on his campaign and everything. And I realize that any fear that I had, that his personality just did not deserve that kind of fear. I finally said to myself maybe it was because of the kind of feeling outside that there wasn't that much sympathy for the project, that I just better just go ahead and do what I think I should do without getting sidetracked any more. Because I was convinced a half hour, if it was a good film, would be effective; because we had seen it work in other campaigns. Well, I'm sorry to go back but that came into my memory.

GREENE: No, that's good to know.

GUGGENHEIM: I never saw Teddy Kennedy until, oh, three years ago, I guess.

GREENE: In '68? You didn't see him in the '68 campaign?

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah, I saw him in '68. Yeah, I did see him in '68. Some interesting stories of that.

GREENE: Okay, we'll get to that.

[-44-]

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah.

GREENE: Anyway, want to start in the beginning of the campaign in '68 and, I guess it was George Stevens again who called for you.

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah, I think that's accurate. There's a series of events there that are probably more interesting to me than they would be to general people because again the factors of who was involved again. There was Papert involved. I think the truth of... Well, I'll let you figure out the truth.

GREENE: I'll let the historians figure out the truth.

GUGGENHEIM: ...figure out the truth. And again, I'm not sure how important this is to posterity. But these are the events as I recall them.

George called me and said that we should go up and see Steve Smith. And whether George had said to Steve, "This is what you ought to do," or whether Steve, having experience with us in '64 said we could do it, I don't know. But I probably would feel that it was a combination of the two. But I think probably George probably said, "This is what you ought to do." So we went. George and I met in New York and went out to see Steve. It was my feeling, having been through a

[-45-]

number of political campaigns at that point, or enough of them, to now realize how all this money had been spent needlessly for what could have been done. And feeling that political campaigns could be run much more economically and more effectively, having gone through some at this point, I made a proposal that you did not need an advertising agency in the sense that they had used it before. We could get a time-buyer, we could get people to do the graphics and the written stuff. We didn't have to pay these huge fees to advertising agencies. You could, in a sense, almost set up your own agency—something we did in a sense in the McGovern group. And Steve seemed convinced at that point.

Now, Don Wilson [Donald M. Wilson] was not involved in that meeting. Then I was asked to come up...

GREENE: Do you know when exactly this might have been?

GUGGENHEIM: At what date?

GREENE: Yes. Well, not so much the date, but had he already announced, and like how long after he announced, do you think?

GUGGENHEIM: I think it was before he made the formal announcement.

[-46-]

GREENE: Oh, well that's pretty close.

GUGGENHEIM: I could be wrong. Have you talked to George Stevens?

GREENE: Yeah, it seems to me that....

GUGGENHEIM: What did he say, do you recall?

GREENE: It seemed to me that it was right after the campaign began, but I could be wrong on that; it's not really that clear. Everything happened so fast. It didn't seem to me that they had...

GUGGENHEIM: How did he.... He went over to the Senate Office Building and announced it, didn't he?

GREENE: Right, on a Saturday, March 16.

GUGGENHEIM: And New Hampshire was over?

GREENE: New Hampshire was the twelfth.

GUGGENHEIM: And how far, how was the next....

GREENE: Well, the decision was essentially made before New Hampshire, but it wasn't talked about in specific terms until the fourteenth and fifteenth.

GUGGENHEIM: How soon after New Hampshire was Indiana?

GREENE: Well, you mean the actual primary?

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah.

GREENE: May 7.

[-47-]

GUGGENHEIM: And this would have been what?

GREENE: March 16 was the announcement.

GUGGENHEIM: I see. It probably was after....

GREENE: You went on the initial swing around the country with him, didn't you, or at least part of it out to California?

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah, our crew did.

GREENE: Early right.

GUGGENHEIM: Right.

GREENE: Well that... It probably was right after the announcement. It's possible it could be before. Don Wilson started almost immediately.

GUGGENHEIM: That's correct.

GREENE: Is that helpful?

GUGGENHEIM: And they brought in Don. And I don't think Steve, at that point, at that meeting—although it probably isn't important—discussed Don's participation. I think we learned that later. I think we learned it in a meeting that was held in Steve's office about three or four days later where there were five or six people there.

GREENE: . Well, there were a number. I know there was one meeting the day of the announcement in Steve's office. There may have been another one dealing with the media.

[-48-]

GUGGENHEIM: Was that the day that the...

GREENE: It was a Saturday.

GUGGENHEIM: This dealt with the media, I think, almost exclusively.

GREENE: That was probably a different day.

GUGGENHEIM: And Don was to be put in charge, because I went out to lunch with Don right afterwards. And, I made the same proposal to Don. I made that same proposal there, and Don didn't object to it. But I think he was extremely insecure, and I think he had a reason to be. He wanted the security of that advertising agency; Again he was in an area which he really did not know very much about. In all due respect to him, it was a bad choice to put him there.

So he got in bed with Papert because he needed Papert. Papert's very articulate: "We'll have this; We have everything here; We'll do everything." Don, in a sense seeing himself as sort of the administrator of it as opposed to the doer of it, felt that was a good arrangement. So he called me and told me on the phone that he had decided to bring

[-49-]

Papert in and that Papert would be doing the production. But Papert thought, ironically, that a half hour was certainly a very good thing to do, and he didn't want me to be upset by that.

Actually, but maybe before he made that decision he came down—I think he did in all fairness—to look at.... He said, "Well, I'm not sure you can do political spots." And he came down to our office and looked at them one evening. And I don't know who he brought in with him; I don't think it was anybody from the Papert group but he looked at them. Then he made the decision and called me on the phone and said that he didn't think we should really be doing the production in the campaign "but that we'd sure like you to do the half hour, Papert has agreed that you can do the half hour."

GREENE: What was your reaction to that?

GUGGENHEIM: Well I was upset.

GREENE: But you didn't put up any more of an argument?

GUGGENHEIM: Well, I can't say that because I said, "Well,

[-50-]

I don't know." He said "Well, look, let's meet and work out the details so you can work with Papert." And we met at the Sans Souci.

GREENE: Were you objecting to the idea of an agency still, or was it Papert himself, you know, the agency itself that you objected to?

GUGGENHEIM: I think on both counts really. Again I felt that there were a number of procedures we could have gone through and this was not the right one. I did not have faith. I did not have faith in Fred Papert to handle the television campaign with Robert Kennedy properly.

GREENE: Did Wilson tell you that he had shopped around for another agency? Do you remember that?

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah. There was some indication....

GREENE: He had gone to Burnbach?

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah, I think Burnbach. I think that's right, he did. I do recall that.

GREENE: Would that have been any better? Did you tell him that you'd prefer that?

GUGGENHEIM: I think it was.... Let me see if I can.... I'm trying to be honest in my evaluation of this, because I'm sure, a lot of my personal

[-51-]

ego was involved in this whole business. You know, whether or not they could do a better job than we could looking at it rationally. Because, very frankly, I think Fred Papert is a salesman. There's a difference. There are brokers in this business: people who talk about how things should be done and then go out and hire somebody. I knew what Papert was going to do if he got this account. He was going to go out and find someone to do it. He was going to pick up a Bill Wilson [William P. Wilson]. He was going out to shop for producers. So Robert Kennedy didn't know what he was going to get. Though Papert would give the illusion having control, if you look at the stuff in '64 you'd see that he wasn't there when it was shot, he wasn't there when it was produced. He was there sometimes a bit when it was edited. But he'd come at the last minute. He was a broker. So how could you promise the client some type of insight and sensitivity and philosophy...

[-52-]

GREENE: When you don't even know...

GUGGENHEIM: ...when you don't know what you're going to get? It was this absentee ownership thing or absentee directorship thing that I always opposed a great deal. If Papert had said, "Look what we're going to do is get this guy," and I had seen his work or I knew who he was, I don't think I would have objected. If Burnbach, for instance, could have brought into the account the same guy who had done X account two years ago or the Rockefeller account or something like that and said, "This is the guy we are going to get," though I would have been very, I think, put down because I would loved to have participated, I don't think I could have objected except that my nose was out of joint. I think that is the only thing I could have objected to. But Papert was going to go through this bullshit again, and then go hiring people whose work I compete against every day and whose work I think is inferior work or mediocre work. And that's who he was going to hire. It's who he hired in '64. It's who he was going to hire

[-53-]

again. And his agency was disappearing, it was disintegrating, and he was just going along for another ride.

GREENE: But do you think that Wilson's inability to agree with this was because of his own insecurity or because he just didn't think you were right?

GUGGENHEIM: Well, that's hard to.... I would guess.... Wilson was very insecure, I think basically insecure. He couldn't very well make the judgment. It wasn't his field, he had never been in it. It was a bad choice on Steve's part or on Bobby's part to have selected him to this job. Now oftentimes, you know, who else are you going to get? You're going to want to get someone you can trust and they trusted Don because he was a good friend of theirs. So it would have made a much better.... George, of course, was in government and couldn't get out. Stevens would have been a far.... I don't say that because I think George respects our work, but I think George is sensitive to the communication process and he sees it. He ran the USIA, the film end of it extremely well.

[-54-]

GREENE: Well, they did want him but he was unavailable.

GUGGENHEIM: He was unavailable. So I guess.... Don was a bad choice. I can see why Don went that way. I can see why he went that way.

GREENE: Did you lay down any ground rules when you finally agreed to do it?

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah, I did, and they didn't live up to them.

GREENE: What were they?

GUGGENHEIM: Papert never did.

GREENE: In terms of control and....

GUGGENHEIM: Would I work for Fred Papert? That was the point. That's what they asked me to do. Now, maybe if I....

GREENE: "They" is still Wilson?

GUGGENHEIM: Wilson. We met at the Sans Souci. George Stevens was there. I don't think I acted as well as I should have. I was upset. I was tired too, as I remember. But George was there and I think Murphy and Papert and myself. They said, "Well, Papert is going to do the campaign, you will produce for Papert." And at that point maybe I should have said, "Of course." But I guess, for all the reasons that I have explained and the history of the thing, I couldn't see

[-55-]

myself doing that. I think I said, "One person has to have creative control." And I said, "I would rather him have control and work with the people he wanted to work with. I wouldn't want someone to say you have control but Papert is going to work with you." But Papert kind

of threw that out by saying, "But you would be the one I'd want to work with me." It was that kind of thing. But I guess I just could not.... Maybe if it had been a different person. In a sense I'm probably spoiled, but I have not had to people-second-guess except to sponsor what creative decisions I've made. It was hard for me to take at that point in my career, I don't know. But I told him I would certainly produce the half hour. And I asked that I would like to be treated the same way he was; I'd like the commission that was given to that material. Anytime that was on the air the commission would go to us; just like all the commissions for the other stuff went to him. And he never paid the commission, denied that he ever agreed upon it. And I got letters from Don Wilson and from George Stevens that he had

[-56-]

agreed. Then he says because Robert Kennedy had been assassinated, that he had lost money in the campaign because bills had not been paid and therefore his bills hadn't been paid, why should he pay mine.

GREENE: There was nothing in writing, I guess.

GUGGENHEIM: No. He never did pay us for it.

GREENE: I didn't know that at all. Anyway, were they asking you to do anything more than the half-hour film at that point?

GUGGENHEIM: No.

GREENE: You did end up doing some spots later on.

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah. Then I went through a very strange thing that I would like to have pieced together for me some day, but George can tell you some of it. I got a call from George one night that.... I'll tell you very briefly and then you could probably know more about it than I do. It went from the Wilson-Papert stage to the sort of unhappiness on the part of the candidate, I assume, with what Wilson was doing and insecurity there. Papert was sort of.... The candidate went over to see George Stevens, went over to his home one night to talk to him, and George told him again how he thought the thing should be

[-57-]

handled. And George called me.

GREENE: And that was that you should be let in?

GUGGENHEIM: That I went back in to make material. So I had a feeling that instead of cutting off Papert, though it wasn't really quite clear to me that they were going to let him go ahead and do something and then go ahead and let me do something. And then the third thing that came in was Goodwin [Richard N. Goodwin] who was given the job—as I understood later, I don't know if this was true or not but this is what I was led to believe, that he said he would come in and write speeches if he would also be able to do television. And that was the condition on which he came. So I think at one point either Papert was cut off and not producing and we were producing and Goodwin was producing; or Papert was producing as well as Goodwin, because Goodwin and Papert were together on some things, I think, and how Goodwin used Papert. I have heard that there was some use there, there was some collaboration there. But we were in Washington, we were sort of doing our own thing. And that group was either doing it together or separately.

[-58-]

GREENE: Well...

GUGGENHEIM: And Don Wilson was sort of off to the side, I think. Is that right or not?

GREENE: Well, I sort of understand that Papert was kind of discarded...

GUGGENHEIM: I see.

GREENE: ...pretty quickly. That they had no confidence in him, the candidate or almost anybody else, and that finally they worked very well with Murphy and perhaps this other young man. Gardner, that you mentioned. Gardner. John Gardner. Yeah. Or Al Gardner. Al Gardner, yeah. But that the rest of the Papert organization concentrated strictly on the...

GUGGENHEIM: On the print.

GREENE: ...yeah, pamphlets. And that Frankenheimer [John M. Frankenheimer] and Goodwin sort of went and did their thing...

GUGGENHEIM: By themselves.

GREENE: ...and you went off and did your thing. And Wilson tried to, I guess, conduct. But I don't know how accurate a picture that is.

[-59-]

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah, I think that's.... Well, that's what I've heard.

GREENE: I can't picture collaboration between Goodwin and Papert only because from everything we know, there was a great hostility.

GUGGENHEIM: Oh, was there?

GREENE: Yeah, Goodwin really disliked Papert.

GUGGENHEIM: I see. I wrote a memo to Bob Kennedy, a two-page memo, which was delivered by Fred Dutton [Frederick G. Dutton] at his request. Fred said that he was getting unhappy. Fred told me that he was upset by what was happening and he asked me.... This was when Fred came in to see the material we were producing. He had been sent by the candidate, or someone—not Wilson, that's why I think Wilson was sort of completely out of it. Fred Dutton was to come in and look at our material.

GREENE: Do you know when this might be? Can you place it at all?

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah. Yeah, I can. You mean what date?

GREENE: Well, maybe you can place it in terms of the primaries?

GUGGENHEIM: It was shown over in Logos [Teleproduction Center].

[-60-]

How soon after Oregon was California?

GREENE: The next week.

GUGGENHEIM: The following week. It was either just before Oregon or immediately after Oregon.

GREENE: That's pretty late.

GUGGENHEIM: Did they come back to Washington? When was the last time they came back to Washington before they went out to Oregon?

GREENE: Gee, I'm really not sure.

GUGGENHEIM: He was at Hickory Hill. Fred wanted me to come with him. He said that I should talk with Bobby Kennedy. And I was supposed to go right from there to the airport, I was supposed to get on the plane and go. And I think that was the last time he was in Washington.

GREENE: I could check it. I could easily check it by checking the schedules, but I can't remember offhand.

GUGGENHEIM: That was the night. . . . I had my bag packed and I was ready to go, Fred changed his mind or hadn't worked it out or forgot to work it out or something. And he thought it better if I didn't get on the plane. But I gave him the memo. And the next day or two he called me back, he

[-61-]

says, "Kennedy has read the memo, thinks it's absolutely right, and he wants to talk to you."

GREENE: What was the gist of your memo?

GUGGENHEIM: And then he was killed. What?

GREENE: What was the gist of your memo?

GUGGENHEIM: I still have it here.

GREENE: Would you be willing to let us have it or have a copy?

GUGGENHEIM: Sure, sure, I'll get it for you.

GREENE: Good. [Interruption]

GUGGENHEIM: He read it on the plane, Fred said. Fred could tell you more than I. I don't know how accurate he was, but he said he wanted to talk to me and that was it. But in that memo I said that I was directly critical of. . . . I had seen the things that Goodwin was producing. I said with one exception I thought it was an absolute waste of money and I was upset that he was. . . . I said in the memo that it was in-job training.

GREENE: Very inexperienced? And it showed?

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah. How a man could have that much. . . . I mean, he was using that as the first and last time to. . . . He wanted to get into. . . . He knew mass media was the. . .

[-62-]

GREENE: . . .the place to be.

GUGGENHEIM: ...the place to be. And he just spent hundreds of thousands of dollars of their money doing television shows. I thought it was an uncalled-for act. But it's very consistent with a man with that much talent and strength. I think you have to say that.

GREENE: You think he was talented but it was unrefined? Not professional enough for....

GUGGENHEIM: You can't.... You don't.... No one comes into a business this complicated and learns it in a few months.

GREENE: Right.

GUGGENHEIM: He didn't know how it worked. He didn't know how to write for it. He didn't know how to see for it. This is also true with Frankenheimer. This was also true with Frankenheimer. I mean, I don't pretend to do what Frankenheimer does, but you can't walk into documentaries, especially in the political area like this and make things that work properly. And if you look at that material its....

GREENE: You say there's one exception. Is that the one that was done in California? For California?

[-63-]

GUGGENHEIM: No, I think, as I recall, the one in Indiana. Was it the Wabash Cannonball? They did that one too.

GREENE: Yeah.

GUGGENHEIM: I think that was it. As I recall, they took a piece.... Maybe it's because I saw a piece from it that they did that I thought was quite effective. But the one they showed in Oregon, I understand, was just an absolute disaster. And, you know, you ought to look up the bills on that.

GREENE: I know that they said that the cost of the whole media operation was out of sight.

GUGGENHEIM: Out of sight.

GREENE: But there seemed to be a sense of "We've got to win and hang the cost, and we'll worry about that later."

GUGGENHEIM: They did that. That was a philosophy. But if the stuff they were spending was overpriced and effective, I think it would have been hard to make an argument.

GREENE: Right.

GUGGENHEIM: But the fact that it was overpriced and not effective I think was where you could move in.

[-64-]

GREENE: But from what Dutton said about Kennedy's reaction to the memo, they agreed that Goodwin was...

GUGGENHEIM: No, I'm not saying he...

GREENE: ...in over his head.

GUGGENHEIM: I think you would have to ask Fred about that because I don't know what... I think he was increasingly unhappy with what he was seeing. He was now the candidate as well as his campaign manager. So, as far as... [Interruption] I don't know how much of it he was seeing, but he was obviously hearing a lot. [Interruption]

GREENE: We've established that the date of the memo was May 12...

GUGGENHEIM: May 12.

GREENE: ...and the four major points were....

GUGGENHEIM: "Following up on our conversation the other evening, I am deeply concerned over certain aspects of our television campaign. These concerns quite simply are: 1) the indiscriminate production of vast amounts of broadcast material with little thought of how it fits into the

[-65-]

total campaign strategy; 2) the lack of good judgment in the selection of material to be aired; 3) the lack of judgment as to when selected broadcast material be released; 4) the lack of administrative leadership and coordination between producers, distributors, and policy people."

GREENE: And each of those points is expanded in the memo.

GUGGENHEIM: Then I expand them just very briefly.

GREENE: Okay, fine. I can either take that and copy it, or if you have copying facilities...

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah, we can do that.

GREENE: ...we won't even have to take it out of the building. Oh and you did say, I should put that on tape too, that this was a follow up to the May 8 weekend here, which was I think, Easter weekend.

GUGGENHEIM: That's right. At that time Fred Dutton expressed to me that the candidate was becoming increasingly unhappy with what he had heard about his paid television.

GREENE: Did he indicate that they were dissatisfied with Wilson or with the whole picture?

[-66-]

GUGGENHEIM: I think at that time, if I recall it, that the viability of Don Wilson was sort of academic. Because I think Goodwin came in so strongly that you realize that whatever Wilson was doing had really no effect on what Goodwin was doing and true with Papert too. The way I heard. it was that Don Wilson was sort of in the hotel but no one was sort of talking to him, at least about real things. That may be unfair; that's secondhand.

GREENE: We'll have to go back but while we are on the subject of Goodwin and that whole arrangement, how did that get started? Were you brought in at all? Or was it an ultimatum on Goodwin's part that led to his going into the TV end of it?

GUGGENHEIM: Well, Goodwin never talked to me, you see.

GREENE: And nobody else consulted you on how you felt about this arrangement?

GUGGENHEIM: No, no. And as a matter of fact, it would be interesting to know what George Stevens says about this, because, in a sense, if someone was to bring pie in they would have, I think by necessity, had to bring George in.

GREENE: Did you see him kind of almost as your spokesman or your.... You know in these....

[-67-]

GUGGENHEIM: George Stevens?

GREENE: Because Goodwin was closer in to Kennedy and had a great deal of contact with him.

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah.

GREENE: Did you see Stevens as someone who would make your case for you?

GUGGENHEIM: I think that's probably right. I mean, after all, he had in a sense, introduced me. I think he felt that.... He had recommended me. I would not have felt right if the candidate had asked me directly. I knew people in the campaign like Fred Dutton, who might have also said, you know, we ought to do this and that and come directly to me. I think its fair to say that most of the contacts that had been made in my behalf were made by George Stevens.

GREENE: That's interesting that they would bring someone in like that in such a close relationship and that you wouldn't, you know, be.... I guess that's just the way they worked.

GUGGENHEIM: What's that? How do you mean?

GREENE: You know, that they would bring Goodwin in an area so closely related to what you were doing and that you wouldn't be consulted, and there doesn't

[-68-]

seem to have been any discussion as far as demarcation of responsibility.

GUGGENHEIM: Well, I think there was a series of events here. I think it was Wilson in charge with Papert in a sense being the expeditor. And then disenchantment with that arrangement by the candidate, from what I understand, and going to George Stevens and saying, "George, look, this isn't working out, what do we do?" And George making another recommendation. Just as that was happening and getting underway, Goodwin being hired with certain conditions to be involved in television. And then there's Wilson against Goodwin, and Papert somewhere in the middle bouncing around. That was a good enough reason to forget whoever we were doing what we were doing for.

You also have to understand that these men followed the campaign train around, which to me was an indication that nothing really viable was being done. They felt somehow,

you can make television out of the campaign that's going to be of interest to people. I've never felt that to be true. And all these men were in a sense around the throne. You could find them. Calling up the hotel

[-69-]

where the campaign was there would be Wilson, there would be Goodwin, there would be Papert. And they just moved from city to city. That was a pretty good indication nothing really good was being done.

GREENE: Well, from what I understand, when you came on in '68, because of the way the campaign got started so late, there was no time to make a completely new film as you had done in '64. Is that right?

GUGGENHEIM: I revised the biography. Yes. I revised the biography.

GREENE: Was there any discussion of that or was it just obvious that there was no time for anything else?

GUGGENHEIM: Well, the only discussion was.... I went out to Bobby Kennedy's house for supper one evening. George Stevens was there too. Someone from the New York Times was there. But after supper they asked us to stay around to see a film and we sort of all wanted to get home for some reason or other and I said I couldn't stay. And everyone began to leave and Bobby said, "Is the new film going to be as good as the old one?" What I would have liked to have said was, "You can't. There's no time to make a new film." So I said, "Well, you know,

[-70-]

that would be pretty hard to do, but it's going to be as good as...." I don't think he knew how much of the old film would be in it and how much would be out of it. I don't think he knew that. I don't think he did.

GREENE: Was there any problem with deadlines as far as when the film.... Were they driving you crazy on that?

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah, because.... God, these dates are all screwy. I think when we came back the second time then there was a meeting out in Indianapolis where Papert came out and showed stuff he had done. We brought the material out that we had done.

GREENE: Was that when they...

GUGGENHEIM: In a television studio.

GREENE: ...showed, when Edith Green [Edith S. Green] was there?

GUGGENHEIM: Well she....

GREENE: Oh no, that was Oregon.

GUGGENHEIM: That's Oregon.

GREENE: ...when they showed the film, it was supposed to be a film made for Oregon and it was a piece from New York, "When I walked to school with Bobby Kennedy." Were you at that? There was some screening session where Papert brought the wrong

[-71-]

film. It was supposed to be an Oregon film and Edith Green was sitting there watching the little boy say, "When I walked to school with Bobby Kennedy in New York."

GUGGENHEIM: Oh really! I see.

GREENE: I guess that's two different sessions.

GUGGENHEIM: Well, this was a meeting where Papert carried on again. You could tell Bobby was getting increasingly disenchanted with him more or less.

GREENE: Let's see if we can back up a little bit and get some of this in chronological order, it may help. To begin with, you traveled or did you send a crew around with him on that first leg you took around .

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah, the minute he went off.

GREENE: But you yourself didn't go?

GUGGENHEIM: No. You know, that's the whole thing: Go out and get footage of the campaign. We're going out, let's go bring the camera along, that's all you need. So we, you know, instead of saying, "No, we want to think this over and see what has to be done," we put a crew on and went out and shot film.

GREENE: Who was pressuring you to do that now, Wilson?

GUGGENHEIM: I think Wilson, yeah. It's the old thing—a campaign, you've got to film it, getting on and

[-72-]

off airplanes. The crowds were terrific.

GREENE: What were the results?

GUGGENHEIM: We did use it in the film that was played at the convention. I didn't use it in the biography film, but after he died I used it.

GREENE: I remember that when it was shown on television.

GUGGENHEIM: These were massive crowds, just massive crowds.

GREENE: That's right. I was thinking I saw that film at the Academy Awards, but they showed it on television twice, didn't they? As a feature? Like a Wednesday night at the movies or something like that? That's when I saw it.

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah, well that was....

GREENE: The film for the convention.

GUGGENHEIM: No that was David Wolper [David L. Wolper], but he had taken a lot of our footage. The Democratic National Convention, the Democratic Convention, it played on all three networks simultaneously that evening. Yeah.

GREENE: What were the results of that California trip? Did you get anything that was useful for the biography?

GUGGENHEIM: Just crowds and crowds and crowds and crowds and crowds.

[-73-]

GREENE: Then you finally moved to situations, setting him up in rooms?

GUGGENHEIM: We set him up. We set him up here in Washington. We filmed out at St. Alban School. That was one thing we did. Columbus, Indiana was the only other time we shot him. I remember we shot him at Columbus, Indiana. We went and filmed him in a farm outside of Columbus. Then he went back to that old airplane; in fact, he didn't get off the ground. And I got into a Lear jet and went to California. He walked into this old rattletrap and I got into a Lear jet. I went to the Academy Awards that night because we had a film nominated, and I came back the next day and met him at the plant in, somewhere in Indiana, the factory. What factory was it? Anyway

he came in and he said, "How was it?" And I said to him, "It's not good when you don't win." And his face dropped and he gave me a look. "How was it out there?" I said, "It's no good if you don't win."

GREENE: What do you remember about the difference between the situations that worked for your spots.... Now I'm getting off too. You didn't explain how you got involved in doing the spots in the first place.

[-74-]

GUGGENHEIM: Well, that's when—George probably told you—Bobby came over to his house.

GREENE: Oh, it was at that point?

GUGGENHEIM: I don't know what date that was, but he called me and said, "The candidate just left." This was at 11 o'clock at night. "The candidate just left the house," he said.

GREENE: Could that be April 6?

GUGGENHEIM: He said, "Come on over now, immediately."

GREENE: April 6? Just before they went out to Indiana for the first long trip? Just before Martin Luther King [Martin Luther King, Jr.] was shot. Does that sound right? The next day they went out to do a spot with Jack Paar [Jack Harold Paar], an interview. Does that ring a bell? Were you involved in that?

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah, I was involved in.... The Paar interview Now let me see if I can put things in perspective. We could go back in our files and find some of this out. You know the "Tea with Kennedy" thing came up in Indianapolis where I got a call from.... Dick Goodwin was on board, so that may give you some indication because Dick Goodwin called me.

GREENE: No, this would have to be later.

[-75-]

GUGGENHEIM: I'm not addressing myself to the thing you're talking about but I think they had done the Paar thing before that. That's the one with Rose Kennedy and Ethel and John Glenn and Bobby. They wanted to do a tea with the Kennedys. They had done this ever since they had been in politics. The tribal ritual was rearing its head again.

GREENE: Right.

GUGGENHEIM: And I think Teddy felt that they ought to.... Teddy was sort of put in charge of it. They were going to have Rose, and they were going to sit down and have coffee. And I think only because Goodwin couldn't find a television station.... Goodwin was obviously in charge at that point because he called me. Don Wilson never called me. I never spoke to Don Wilson after that. I mean after what? After Goodwin came in I never talked to him. Never saw or.... I don't think I talked to him after that Sans Souci meeting. I never saw him.

Goodwin just took complete charge. He called me so he was obviously making arrangements for all the television shows. And he said, "You know

[-76-]

Charlie, we can't get.... I think this thing should be done on film." He never really kind of directly told the truth about these things. But what he was really saying was, "We can't get a television studio, and you can film and we don't know how to do it any other way and perhaps you could help us out." And I said, "Sure." So we got footage out of the vault in California. It was flown into Indianapolis because we needed film of Bobby when he was young. We used three motion picture cameras in the hotel in Indiana and we shot the "Tea with Kennedy." We made this half-hour film of his conversation with Rose Kennedy. Isn't that funny?

GREENE: And that was used?

GUGGENHEIM: That was used, in Indiana. Just for Indiana. We were talking about the Wabash Cannonball and Bobby brought up the old history of Indiana,—Captain Clark [George Rogers Clark] had taken Terre Haute or Vincennes or something like that—and how he went to visit Lincoln's [Abraham Lincoln] I don't know what, whatever it was. Rose Kennedy carrying on as she does eloquently. After her long speech Bobby would say, "That's why she wants to be president of the United States." [Laughter] We had that,

[-77-]

we never used it.

GREENE: That's good.

GUGGENHEIM: And we stayed up all night doing it. Teddy was sort of the... He was in charge and Goodwin kind of stayed out until the last minute. The minute we started filming it, he came in and started giving copy to everybody.

GREENE: Anyway, were there some staged situations that worked better than others? Was there much distinction among the ones that you did; things that you remember about them. The tea, and then you mentioned the farmers....

GUGGENHEIM: We did the tea. We did sort of a cinema verité thing with farmers just because we were there. He was also going to speak very briefly on the courthouse steps of Columbus, Indiana. It wasn't on the schedule for us—he was going to give the afternoon to us out at the farm—but since he was going to make this speech anyway, I put one camera up there and I filmed him making a speech. It was a great piece of film. It was used. Then the thing with the farmers was used for five-minute and sixty-second spots.

[-78-]

GREENE: How did you view something like this? I gather there was some debate about it. Do you see that type of situation simply as a vehicle for showing the candidate and his personal qualities and ability to handle questions? Or do you see it more as a spot made directly to appeal to farmers or doctors or whoever happens to be involved?

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah, well I think you... Well, our feeling on the farm thing was, yeah, 30 percent of Indiana is either agriculture or agricultural dependent—farm machinery, food processing farmers. So we were going after people who were sympathetic in that area. I wanted to put him with people like that. I wanted to record him in a one-to-one thing which I was impressed with. His remoteness was always a problem I thought.

GREENE: Did you find him cooperative? Was he willing to go along with the kinds of situations you decided on?

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah, he was. He was.

GREENE: What about schedulers, did you have any problem getting them to set the time aside?

[-79-]

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah, yeah. Difficult. It's always difficult. In those kind of things, there are always so many layers of people around. Each one of them wants to feel that they're responsible; or if something goes wrong, that they're not responsible. It's always true. And the importance of doing some of these—why are we doing it there? You know, there's always a lot of questioning about that. We wouldn't have that problems now, or we didn't have it with Teddy Kennedy when he ran in Massachusetts,

or we don't have it with other candidates now because people feel they know who we are and what we do. At that point we weren't that far along.

GREENE: Was it also a debate about where the candidate's time would be best used? Whether he should be out....

GUGGENHEIM: Always. Yeah.

GREENE: And that's probably been resolved somewhat.

GUGGENHEIM: You always get this view of the press—those guys, you can't cut the press out of here, they're going to get upset. And someone says, "Who cares what they write in the newspapers, television is more important." And you get that kind of dialogue going.

[-80-]

GREENE: I imagine some of that has been resolved just because people acknowledge now so much more.

GUGGENHEIM: I think they are more receptive now. But there is swing on the other side now too, you know. We had a lot of that, even in the McGovern campaign. The press will be upset, you know, if you do this. The local newspaper will get upset with us. We're getting off the subject somewhat—but I think it's a logical and an important question to ask. But I always felt that things were always much more cumbersome when you had a Kennedy on your hands.

GREENE: I was going to ask you that.

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah.

GREENE: They're more difficult than other people?

GUGGENHEIM: More difficult because there were just so many layers of people. But he was cooperative. He was extremely cooperative and once he got in he'd work very hard at it. And once I saw that he was getting tired or he didn't want to, I'd break off; I'd get by with something.

GREENE: Did he ever question your judgment or put in ideas of his own?

[-81-]

GUGGENHEIM: Well, he didn't have enough chance really, because we would take the film, go home, and work on it. In the Indianapolis thing, very early, just before Indiana when Papert made stuff and we made stuff and we all came together and showed it, I felt—maybe it was wishful thinking—he was much more receptive to our material. Papert was very much against using one thing that we did and Kennedy struck out and said, "No, I think you're wrong."

GREENE: What was that?

GUGGENHEIM: It was a spot which Papert has always criticized us for, it was a production spot of a little child walking up the capitol steps. We had produced it for another candidate, for Jack Gilligan [John Joyce Gilligan]. But the issues were exactly the same with Kennedy, and we weren't going to use it. We were going to use Kennedy's before we'd use it for Gilligan. We felt it was important. And Papert has often used it to say, you know, that we were the people who took one spot and used it for another candidate. And I told him before we put it on that this is what, you know, had been produced. And Papert said that you shouldn't use this that had been

[-82-]

produced, that we should have nothing on the air unless the candidate was in it. And he had a philosophy about it. And he carried on, and Bobby said, "I think it softens me."

GREENE: And I imagine that put an end to the discussion, is that right?

GUGGENHEIM: Yeah, that's right. Oh yeah, it was quite clear.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

[-83-]

Charles Guggenheim Oral History Transcript – RFK #1
Name List

A

Ashmore, Harry S., 18

B

Billings, Kirk LeMoyne, 10, 11, 14, 38, 43
Buchwald, Arthur, 40

C

Clark, George Rogers, 77

D

Dolan, Joseph F., 24
Dutton, Frederick G., 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 68

E

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 16
Evers, Charles, 13

F

Frankenheimer, John M., 59, 63

G

Gardner, Allan, 30, 59
Gilligan, John Joyce, 82
Glenn, John, 76
Golden, Harry, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20
Goodwin, Richard N., 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, 67-70, 75-78
Green, Edith S., 71, 72
Guthman, Edwin O., 4
Gwartzman, Milton S., 22-25

H

Hayward, Leland, 29
Hilsman, Roger, 28

K

Kennedy, Edward M., 4, 41, 43, 44, 76, 78, 80
Kennedy, Ethel Skakel, 4, 28, 31, 32, 33, 76

Kennedy, John F., 3, 16, 42, 43
Kennedy, Joseph P., Sr., 2, 42
Kennedy, Robert F., 1, 3-7, 9, 10, 12-21, 26, 28, 29, 31, 35, 37, 40, 41, 42, 46, 47, 48, 51, 52, 54, 57, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 68, 70-79, 81, 82, 83
Kennedy, Rose Fitzgerald, 41, 42, 43, 76, 77
King, Martin Luther, Jr., 75

L

Lincoln, Abraham, 77

M

McGovern, George S., 5, 11, 46, 81
McMath, Sidney Sanders, 5
McNamara, Robert S., 20
Monroe, Marilyn, 8
Murphy, William, 29, 30, 55, 59

N

Nichols, Mike, 21
Nickerson, Eugene H., 35
Nolan, John E., 39

O

O'Donnell, Kenneth P., 24
Onassis, Jacqueline B. Kennedy, 22, 23

P

Paar, Jack Harold, 75, 76
Papert, Frederic S., 10, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 33, 35, 38, 45, 49-53, 55-60, 67, 69-72, 82, 83

S

Sharon, John, 38, 39
Smith, Stephen E., 23, 35, 36, 45, 46, 48, 54
Spellman, Francis J., 19
Stevens, George, 4, 5, 8, 9, 21, 22, 26, 37, 45, 47, 55-58, 67-70, 75
Stevenson, Adlai E., 1, 3, 4

T

Townsend, Kathleen Kennedy, 28

W

Wilson, Donald M., 46, 48-51, 54-57, 59, 60, 66,
67, 69, 70, 72, 76

Wilson, William P., 52

Wolper, David L., 73